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The Historical and Populist Construction of “The People” and “The Anti-People” in Pakistan
Abstract
The chapter explains the multifaceted historical processes through which different identities have been formed in Pakistan which are likely to influence the public discourse. Given that we are using the psychoanalytical concept of identification, with emphasis on the populist dichotomous structuring of “the people” versus “the anti-people” the chapter has been divided into two sections. The first section introduces the variety of ways politicians and state actors have articulated “the people” followed by a section describing the way Pakistanis define their identities. The next section focuses on the historical description of anti-people both within and outside Pakistan followed by the description of how our respondents talked about these “anti-people.”
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The #Taliban 2.0 in #Afghanistan took the world by surprise. This article investigates how this event was seen differently in varied contexts, such as neighboring #Pakistan. Our research shows epistemological pluralism in Pakistan, i.e. how different groups use different ways of knowing (epistemology), being (ontology), and valuing (axiology) to explain and analyze Taliban 2.0. Conceptually, the paper draws on insights from the relationality theory to demonstrate the reasons behind such epistemological pluralism. The theory of relationality provides the grounds for epistemological pluralism, i.e. the mixed sentiments and feelings among respondents about the Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan. Our research reports the perspectives of nine selected civil society activists about Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan. The respondents were interviewed during the second quarter of the Taliban administering Afghanistan. Some called it the victory of #Islam, the #freedom of Afghans from foreign occupation, and the protection of the Pakistani border from Indian proxies. Others were worried about the risks of increased #extremism and #terrorism in Pakistan, including the rise of banned organizations like #Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. This study intends to document the interviewee civil society activists' suggestions to the State of Pakistan for dealing with #Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
The resurgence of religion worldwide proved that secularization is not a de facto reality of modernity and the initial chaos that came along with the birth of postmodernity evolved into uniquely developing combinations that recognized cosmopolitan, multicultural, and hybrid (i.e., fluid and hyphenated) identities. Universal values became more instrumental than ever to connect members of hyper diverse societies while ethnocentric, nativist and exclusivist patriotism expired (and only recently starting to attract far right and white supremacist groups alone). Most Islamic revivalist movements emerging from this context have had minimal interactions with non-Muslims and influence on mainstream societies. Being in search of a solution to respond to the overwhelming effects of the West on Muslim societies, these revivalist movements could not change (and maybe contributed to) the binary positioning of Islam and the West. On the contrary, the Hizmet movement, inspired by Muhammed Fethullah Gülen and his predecessor Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, appeared in the global arena as an Islamic revivalist movement whose discourse resonated with the commonly shared universal values of every culture, ethnicity, and religion. The Hizmet movement did not position itself as an antithesis to Westernization, secularism, and modernity; the movement adopted a universalist and all-inclusive attitude, which re-introduced to the world that Islam is universal religion with the capacity to accommodate people of diversity and meet the needs of every age. This paper explores the Hizmet movement’s historical, theological, and social roots as a transnational Islamic revivalist movement. It analyzes the movement’s outreach across multicultural societies and its capability to adapt to a changing world through its educational and interfaith and intercultural activities across the globe. While unpacking thirty years of the Hizmet movement’s activities and the contribution to the literature, the paper also addresses some of the criticisms that have emerged regarding the movement and its activities, particularly in the wake of the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. It should be noted that much criticism toward the movement emerged in recent years, and the movement did not face much backlash in its early years of development. With this in mind, this paper explores the development of the Hizmet movement and how much of its initiatives rapidly left a positive mark on diverse societies around the world. The paper is thus structured chronologically, tracing the birth, growth, stagnation, and transition (or according to some collapse) of the movement. The paper, by extension, too, positions the Hizmet movement within the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism as this movement is born out of similar conditions as are other Islamic revivalist movements but taking a slightly different direction, which is that it challenges the prevailing binary ‘us and them’ discourses produced mostly in ethno-centric political discourses.
This article investigates the construction of gender identities of Pakistani men and women Facebook users given that Facebook has emerged as the prime social media platform through which Pakistani users interact. By employing thematic analysis and taking insights from theory of performativity and intersectionality, the findings of the interview data suggest that the formation, negotiation, and expression of gender identities on Facebook occurs through complex interplay between the discourses of religion, class, culture, and tradition. In some cases, Facebook highlighted the reproduction of the prevalent cultural models of masculinity and femininity while in other cases; there was resistance to the existing socio-religious cultural norms of the society.
Women are more than half of the Pakistan’s population, still they are discriminated in every field of life due to prevailing misinterpreted religious teachings, patriarchy, and feudalistic values, which are deep rooted in society. Alongside, since independence military role remain dominant in political that have strong impact in shaping women status in Pakistan. For this reason, in this article comparison of two military regimes General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf is made to explore how their policies shaped the women status in Pakistani society. General Zia was determined to Islamized the legal system of Pakistan, which limited the women within four walls of home; no practical political will was there to empower women. The introduction of Hadood Ordinance 1979, blocked women social, economic, and political liberation. Contrary to this, General Pervez Musharraf’s era seems a cure, as political efforts made, for instance, Women Protection Bill 2006 introduced, and vague legislation introduced in General Zia era redrafted. First time in history of Pakistan women quota that much increased in National Assemblies of Pakistan, their political struggle to get rights encouraged, which resulted in women-oriented legislation. All this effort, remained very helpful to enhance the women social, economic, and political position at national level, and portrayed soft image of Pakistan internationally.
The researchers investigate Pakistani Premier Imran Khan’s (IK) speech in which he called Bilawal Bhutto Zardari – Sahiba. Similarly, the leaders strongly need to convince their supporters when they deliver speeches on public platforms. However, utilizing the persuasive political power, the Premier (IK) propagated identity to promote the specific ideology to gain political benefits. The present research employs Political Discourse Analysis (PDA), to understand the social and political persuasive style employed by the premiere. The researchers have analyzed the data employing a qualitative approach. There are reliable findings to suggest that IK has successfully used stable vocabulary (taboo) to persuade the specific supporters, convincing them to deform the identity of Bilawal Bhutto. Later, the Premier faced considerable criticism from the opposition. However, for the time being, he successfully dominated through sociological and persuasive power sourcing the meaning-making structures of power. Hence, the politicians often convince their supporters/followers to utilize political-strategic tools and to remain in their political procession against their opponents.
This study examines the persuasive strategies of Imran Khan's political discourse. It also highlights the covert ideological practices as they are embedded in his political speeches. The analysis is based on the theoretical perspective of Fairclough and Van Dijk. This study analyses the linguistic elements and contextual facets to find hidden ideologies. The findings suggest Khan use of multiple strategies to get the political power, and promote his ideology by urging the urban youth and less-privileged part of society to play a role. Moreover linguistic analysis prove Khan's claim to be (un)conventional as he frequently addresses and acknowledges women support for political activism.
The tribal structures of the society in Balochistan has strongly influenced Baloch nationalism in Pakistan. The Baloch nationalism has been shaped in the process of widespread politico-tribal rivalry, in the context of a week state in Pakistan interacted with the post-cold war conditions marked by the absence of the Soviet Union hegemonic power, and the processes of globalization. In this framework, the attitudes, scope, and directions of the Baloch nationalism, in this area, have shifted. The radical nationalism predominantly has become more aggressive, more exclusionary, more puritan, and more ethnically oriented. It has become more relaxed in using unethical and deceitful means such as indiscriminate killing, kidnapping, ransom; arm trafficking, and sometimes some of the nationalists, if not directly, gaining benefit from the drug trafficking, and banditry to achieve their objectives. Considering the geopolitical conditions in the whole region, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and the strength of tribal- sardari values associated with inter and intra rivalries, it is not surprising to find a peculiar situation in Balochistan. This research is mainly based on literature review, but also some limited conversations with a few anonymous informants and contacts with some of the Baloch political and community organizations and activists.
The large number of female participants in political rallies is often cited as a political party's success in making women more active in the political sphere. However, there is not much research, in Pakistan, examining whether these women have gender consciousness and motivation to extend their political activity beyond participation in a rally. The study involves interviews of women attending political rallies in Pakistan during the election campaign of 2018 to inquire about their purpose of attending the rally and their motivation to run for office for the same party. The research found that high political activity of females in Pakistan provides no guarantee for women's political empowerment. Women lack gender identity but are extending their familial and other social roles in the political arena. While they are willing to become political leaders, they lack enthusiasm and their goals of joining politics are subject to either mobilization by the political party or performance of that party in the future. This study concludes that while increasing the number of women voters and political activists is important, equating it with women's empowerment leads to misinterpretation in the form of comprehension and factual flaws.
The tribal Pashtuns of Pakistan, based in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border region, have historically been portrayed as “violent” and “warrior-like,” both in the colonial and contemporary literature. However, a brief review of archival literature suggests that oriental representation of tribal Pashtuns is based on various generalizations that were formed and propagated during the British military expeditions against the tribal Pashtuns. Moreover, these generalizations and stereotypes against the tribal Pashtuns have persisted since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. Recent developments in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal belt, with various tribes convening Jirga meetings, condemning and countering militant activities and protesting against the state’s injustices explain the importance and desire for peace among the tribal Pashtuns. Finally, a brief analysis of the recently started Pashtun Tahafuz (protection) movement (PTM), an indigenous peace and human rights movement involving both men and women, and its nonviolent nature also reinforces the importance of peace for the tribal Pashtuns.
The Punjabi language movement is the aspiration of certain Punjabi intellectuals to increase the use of the Punjabi language in the domains of power in place of Urdu and English. It is an urban phenomenon which started soon after the emergence of Pakistan but has never become either populist or powerful. The activists of the movement have, however, created some modern terminology in Punjabi and they publish some journals and books. The movement is a reaction of intellectuals who feel that the Punjabi elite dominates the country by using the integrative symbols of Islam and Urdu, which is the national language of the country despite being the mother tongue of about 8 percent people, whereas Punjabi is the mother tongue of more than 48 percent people. They feel that the neglect of their mother tongue is too great a price to pay for suppressing language-based ethnic movements in the other provinces of Pakistan and hence retaining hegemony over the whole country.
In the early 20th century, colonised people across empires rejected their status quo with visions and articulations of different emancipatory futures. The more radical and creative of these projects fused socialist thought with national, cultural or religious traditions. Grounded in ideas of equality, redistribution and common ownership, these visions offered futures of freedom beyond nationalism. Islamic Socialism was one of these revolutionary currents alongside Arab socialism, African socialism and Black Liberation Theology. The article reviews the historical scholarship on the relationship between Muslims and Left politics in 20th century South Asia and proposes Islamic Socialism as a new field of study. Some of the earliest articulations and enduring commitment to the politics of Islamic Socialism emerged from South Asia, yet the topic is not easily located in the existing scholarship on the region or elsewhere. Employing a diverse set of texts, I show how we can approach through three categories ‐ time, space, and ideas– and map out subaltern Islam as a future area of research. Existing studies have treated Islamic Socialism variously as crude readings of Islam and Marxism, an immemorial Islamic tradition, the intellectual product of theoretical congruence, or as a novel and creative experiment. Reflecting on its minor status in historiography, the article argues for the importance of Islamic Socialism in thinking beyond Islamic literalism and furthering our understanding of decolonisation experiments, everyday subaltern politics, and the possibilities for Marxism and Islam in the Global South.
Identity formation is a complex process and has been
discussed by post-structuralist discourse theorist Ernesto
Laclau. This paper focuses on Laclau's proposed ideas on
the means of identity production and populism and studies
the popular independence movement for Bangladesh
under that rubric. It locates charismatic leadership as a
necessary condition for populism and identifies Bangabandhu
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the charismat suturing
the various chains of equivalence that rose to become
the populist movement that resulted in the nation's
struggle for independence in 1971. This paper also looks
at the transformational leadership of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and acknowledges it as a necessary condition
for the patterns of identity creation in East Bengal in the
late 1960s.
Women’s political participation is a fundamental prerequisite for the assurance of Gender Equality and Genuine goodwill of Democracy. No nation can rise to the height of glory without the participation of their women into legal, political, socio-economic and decision making process of household to public life. Gender-sensitive Governance has been achieved all over the Globe to some extent but struggle is still on its way and it needs much encroachment. Previously, women who partook in electoral campaigns or political uplifting of other women were docketed as deteriorated women by misogynist portions. This article is based on the struggle of two most Empowered Ladies of Pakistan, Miss Fatima Jinnah and Benazir Bhutto for the refurbishment of democracy, women emancipation and equitable and inclusive governance of women. Though, they both faced a lot of backlash, but still they marked a difference among those people for the sake of their women.
“Narendra Modi’s Hindu Economicus and Imran Khan’s Homo Islamicus masculinities take their cues from a populist playbook that they have authored and in which the leader is the deeply religious, patriotic and traditional father to the middle class, tech-savvy, enterprising, globalized yet pious, male subject."
Sindhi nationalism is one of the oldest yet least studied cases of identity politics in Pakistan. Ethnic discontent appeared in Sindh in opposition to the rule of the Bombay presidency; to the onslaught of Punjabi settlers in the wake of canal irrigation; and, most decisively, to the arrival of millions of Muhajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants) after Partition. Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari, the Pakistan Peoples Party has upheld the Sindhi nationalist cause, even while playing the game of federalist politics. On the other side for half a century have been hardcore Sindhi nationalist groups, led by Marxists, provincial autonomists, landlord pirs and liberal intelligentsia in pursuit of ethnic outbidding.
This book narrates the story of the Bhutto dynasty, the Muhajir factor, nationalist ideologues, factional feuds amongst landed elites, and the role of violence as a maker and shaper of Sindhi nationalism. Moreover, it examines the role of the PPP as an ethnic entrepreneur through an analysis of its politics within the electoral arena and beyond. Bringing together extensive fieldwork and comparative studies of ethno-nationalism, both within and outside Pakistan, Asma Faiz uncovers the fascinating world of Sindhi nationalism.
The relations between Pakistan and the United States, throughout the course of history, have witnessed many ups and downs. At times, when their interests were aligned, strong socio-economic and military cooperation was seen between the two states. Yet, on other occasions they were at odds with and distant from each other. However, post 9/11, Pakistan–US relations were at its zenith, when Pakistan became the frontline ally of the US in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and the US granted Pakistan the prestigious status of non-NATO ally. Soon after, though, the partnership between the two states was in troubled waters: when the US repeatedly violated Pakistan’s sovereignty through drone strikes and covert ops, it diplomatically painted Pakistan as the bad guy by claiming it to be part of the problem (terrorism), not the solution, and by promoting India within the region. Furthermore, when Pakistan became part of China’s New Silk Road initiative, commonly known as the Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan–US relations saw its lowest point in history. This article critically analyzes post-9/11 Pakistan–US relations by application of two mainstream theories of international relations in tandem: Realism and (Neo)structural Realism. Realism explains the US foreign policy rationale, while Structural Realism explains Pakistan’s foreign policy choices in relation to the US.
Few social science categories have been more heatedly contested in recent years than ‘populism’. One focus of debate concerns the relation between populism and nationalism. Criticising the tendency to conflate populism and nationalism, De Cleen and Stavrakakis argue for a sharp conceptual distinction between the two. They situate populist discourse on a vertical, and nationalist discourse on a horizontal axis. I argue that this strict conceptual separation cannot capture the productive ambiguity of populist appeals to ‘the people’, evoking at once plebs, sovereign demos and bounded community. The frame of reference for populist discourse is most fruitfully understood as a two‐dimensional space, at once a space of inequality and a space of difference. Vertical opposition to those on top (and often those on the bottom) and horizontal opposition to those outside are tightly interwoven, generally in such a way that economic, political and cultural elites are represented as being ‘outside’ as well as ‘on top’. The ambiguity and two‐dimensionality of appeals to ‘the people’ do not result from the conflation of populism and nationalism; they are a constitutive feature of populism itself, a practical resource that can be exploited in constructing political identities and defining lines of political opposition and conflict.
This article aims to highlight the reasons behind the historical animosity between India and Pakistan, and its continuation for last seven decades by examining the role of ideologues who shaped the national identity discourse of two communities—Hindus and Muslims—before and after the Partition. To understand the present protracted conflict, probing the pre-Partition clash of narratives is indispensable. The Islamic imagery and Hindu symbolism used by the two communities were exclusionary and based on ‘othering’ which not only thwarted the vision of inclusive nationalism but also generated more animosity and distrust, and severely antagonized the relationship in the post-Partition period. However, this article argues that despite the deep-rooted animosity and distrust there is still scope for re-imagination and reconciliation. For that, both the countries need to transcend the sediments of the past memories and adopt a more pragmatic approach to resolve the long-standing issues that have been weighing them down for decades.
The Punjab held the key to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. It formed the heartland of a future Pakistan state — Jinnah indeed called it the ‘corner-stone’ of Pakistan. Thus, it is especially important to examine the political legacies which Pakistan inherited from the region.
More than four decades after the state of Pakistan was created it is still a country in search of an identity. This is not because the issue of our nationhood has not preoccupied our minds. To the contrary, it is one that we have been obsessed with and much blood has been spilt in the process. Political debate and conflict have revolved around the question: what is the legitimate place of subnational aspirations and demands within a larger concept of Pakistan nationhood? There is a tension and a dialectical opposition between these two levels of political identity which has never been resolved, for those in power have tended to look on subnational movements as a threat to ‘the nation’ and subversive of national unity.
Under what conditions are some developing countries able to create stable democracies while others have slid into instability and authoritarianism? To address this classic question at the center of policy and academic debates, The Promise of Power investigates a striking puzzle: why, upon the 1947 Partition of British India, was India able to establish a stable democracy while Pakistan created an unstable autocracy? Drawing on interviews, colonial correspondence, and early government records to document the genesis of two of the twentieth century's most celebrated independence movements, Maya Tudor refutes the prevailing notion that a country's democratization prospects can be directly attributed to its levels of economic development or inequality. Instead, she demonstrates that the differential strengths of India's and Pakistan's independence movements directly account for their divergent democratization trajectories. She also establishes that these movements were initially constructed to pursue historically conditioned class interests. By illuminating the source of this enduring contrast, The Promise of Power offers a broad theory of democracy's origins that will interest scholars and students of comparative politics, democratization, state-building, and South Asian political history.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s ambitious Islamization program vis-à-vis gender status in an Islamic Republic remains embedded in the legal system to the detriment of Pakistan’s females. Passage of the Hudood Ordinances of 1979 was a harbinger of things to come as the military junta moved to implement laws perceived to be congruent with Shariah (Islamic) law. This article examines specific discriminatory legal measures, which ensured the reversal of the slow but significant gains made by females since Pakistan’s creation in 1947; and explores how certain draconian measures enacted by Zia’s regime served to mobilize some Pakistani women to political activism.
'Politically' the materialist conception is close to the people, to "common sense." It is closely linked to many beliefs and prejudices (witchcraft, spirits etc.). This can be seen in popular Catholicism. "This statement by Antonio Gramsci suggests that Marxism could be viewed as a new type of Catholicism. It was a philosophy of praxis and as such adaptable and mutable. This article tells the story of the first organised response to the colonial state by the radical left in Punjab which by and large conforms to Gramsci's notion of common sense. It is an account of how communism was refashioned to appeal to a Punjabi audience, to solve their particular woes.
Le mouvement des femmes musulmanes au Pakistan est divise en quatre phases : (1) la quete vers l'amelioration de l'education et du statut des femmes dans le cadre d'une reforme sociale et d'un anti-colonialisme, (2) une alliance entre les organisations feminines et le gouvernement moderniste d'Ayub Khan (1958-1968), (3) la tentative d'islamisation par le gouvernement de Zia Ul Haq (1977-1988) et la creation du forum d'action des femmes, et (4) la reponse des femmes progressionnelles a ces changements d'orientation gouvernementale
Although a few studies1 are available on the N-WFP politics, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and the Khudai Khidmatgars, they are primarily centred on Abdul Ghaffar Khan (also popularly known as Bacha Khan), and his relations with the Indian National Congress (INC). In this paper, an attempt has been made to study and analyse the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, and Bacha Khan's role in the freedom movement, especially in the revival of Pashtoon nationalism, and the adoption of non-violence in the Pashtoon society. The present study is different from others mainly because primary source material has been utilised to support the analysis. The North-West Frontier Province (N-WFP) has played a significant role in the shaping and re-shaping of the Indian history. Its crucial strategic location made it not only the frontier of India but also an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole British empire. The British came late to the N-WFP because it was far away from their points of early contacts with the subcontinent, i.e. Bengal, Madras and Bombay. As the region is situated on the 'highway of conquest', the majority of the earlier invaders had made their way into the Indian subcontinent through this area. Throughout the medieval period, until the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the area remained part of the Muslim empires of north India and Afghanistan. The internal feuds between the Pashtoons provided Ranjeet Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, with
Ethnicity and nationalism are the dominant issues of war and peace in contemporary world politics. Though ethnic tensions stem from multiple causes, conflicts over competing visions of political identity are frequently at the root of many current disputes. This article analyzes how national identity is constructed and articulated in Pakistan. It argues that ill‐conceived attempts to define and shape a homogeneous ‘Pakistani identity’ reinforced rather than weakened multiple linquistic and cultural identities, encouraged political mobilization on the basis of ethnicity, and contributed to severe conflict.
This paper will introduce intellectual debates from Pakistan's early years to show how the country's future culture was being discussed, deliberated and reshaped in these circles at the moment of its own inception as an independent state. By focussing on the communist perspective on Pakistan's independence, it will seek to illuminate some of those historical moments in Pakistan's history that have not received much attention either from historians or from the public. Within this context, the paper will present contesting voices that are critical of one another—particularly regarding the place of Islam in the new state—in order to rethink Pakistan's early history as a period that could have led to a range of possible future historical trajectories.
Nationalism is a way of dealing with a world where 'everything melts into thin air'. It is a form of self-love in which individuals elebrate their collective identity. And like all forms of self-love it gets its strength more from the hatred of others than its love for the self Here lies the secret behind some of the most intractable conflicts in the world.Nationalism is, probably, the only form of self-love that gets its life-blood from an institution, the modem state. Had the state not been behind the self-love of the Germans, they would not have been able to torture and murder so many Jews in such a short period of time. Likewise, had the west not helped the Jews to establish their own state in Palestine, the Jews would never have been able to displace and kill so many Palestinians.Nationalism is not the 'pathology' of the odem world, but is, as a sentiment and as a doctrine, only a pathetic way to deal with a pathetic world. But nationalism as a game of power, as a politics, is lethal and destructive. As a sentiment and as a doctrine nationalism may be the child of an unstable and fast changing world but as a politics it is the child of the nation state. This thesis explores the relationship between the nation-state and the nationalisms of four ethnic groups, namely, Pukhtun, Sindhi, Baloch and Mohajir, who have, at various points in time, contested the legitimacy of the administrative structure of the Pakistani state. It starts with identifying the issue of ethnic conflicts, goes on to review the available literature and then outlines a framework for studying ethnic nationalism. As the emphasis here is on the role of the modem state in provoking ethnic discontent and resistance the second chapter discusses the interventionist role of the state and tries to highlight its relationship with nationalism. The second section of the chapter looks at various approaches to nationalism and explains as to which approach is more suitable and why for dealing with ethnic nationalism. The third chapter endeavours to explicate the difference between pre-colonial and colonial state in India as well as the way the colonial state despite being modem was different from the modem state system in the west. The fourth chapter discusses the state system in Pakistan and argues that the postcolonial state is a replica of the colonial state. The next four chapters examine the emergence of four ethnic movements and their varying strategies for dealing with the centralising and homogenising policies of the state. Throughout, the focus remains on the ethnic groups' distance from and proximity to the state system as the major factor in determining their relationships.
Imran Khan’s ball-tampering in politics and Pakistan’s feminist movement
- A Bakhtiar
Pakistan’s foreign policy and the Palestine question in the light of Quaid’s vision. The News
- K Al-Saba
A leaf from history: The Ahmadi issue
- S Aziz
Populist discourse in Pakistani politics: Testing a new two-dimensional model of inclusionary and exclusionary populist discourse
- F Batool
Punjabi identity in Pakistan: Between state and culture (PhD dissertation)
- S Khokar
Punjab Kisan protests
- M Mukherjee
Surkh salam: Communist Politics and Class Activism in Pakistan 1947-1972
- K A Ali
Surviving as an Ahmadi in Pakistan
- A Chudhary
Why the India-Pakistan rivalry endures
- S Ganguly
Pakistan and India: Creating an enemy. Australian Institute of International Affairs
- D N Motwani
The sickle that rusted
- S Sangi