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rooseveltinstitute.org
Industrial
Policy 2025:
Bringing the
State Back
In (Again)
With essays by
Kyunghoon Kim,
Saule T. Omarova,
Jonas Algers, Andrea Furnaro,
César F. Rosado Marzán,
and Lenore Palladino
Foreword by Todd N. Tucker
About the Roosevelt Institute
The Roosevelt Institute is a think tank,
a student network, and the nonprot
partner to the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library and Museum that,
together, are learning from the past
and working to redene the future of
the American economy. Focusing on
corporate and public power, labor and
wages, and the economics of race and
gender inequality, the Roosevelt Institute
unies experts, invests in young leaders,
and advances progressive policies that
bring the legacy of Franklin and Eleanor
Roosevelt into the 21st century.
Industrial Policy 2025: Bringing the State Back In (Again)
rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Table of Contents
Foreword
By Todd N. Tucker
1
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned
Entities in the Global Economy
By Kyunghoon Kim
13
Finance as a Tool of Industrial Policy: A Taxonomy of
Institutional Options
By Saule T. Omarova
29
Leading With Industrial Policy: Lessons for
Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
By Jonas Algers
43
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based
Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green
Industrial Transformation?
By Andrea Furnaro
58
Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card
Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor
Unions in the United States
By César F. Rosado Marzán
73
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate Guardrails Can
Improve Industrial Policy Outcomes
By Lenore Palladino
85
1
Foreword
Foreword
By Todd N. Tucker
Todd N. Tucker is a political scientist and director of Industrial Policy and Trade at the Roosevelt
Institute, where he helps lead research on global governance, democracy, and the administrative state.
He is author of Judge Knot: Politics and Development in International Investment Law (Anthem Press,
2018), and received his PhD from the University of Cambridge. His popular writing has been featured in
Politico, Time Magazine, Democracy Journal, the Financial Times, and the Washington Post.
1. Introduction
interdisciplinary analysis by a diverse group of
scholars from around the world that aims to answer
the question: What institutions and strategies are
missing from US industrial policy that could help it
potential tools of economic statecraft that could
complement the tax credits and grants that have
term industrial agenda.
The ideas in this collection have two things in common. First, the cases described in each essay involve a more
embraced in recent decades. Second, they have been practiced somewhere in the world at some point in time
currently bedevil US industrial strategy.
these have generated from certain observers about what has been seen as excessive levels of state intervention.
2. The New Industrial Policy and Its Critics
manufacturing vaccines to the baby formula shortage to deploying heat pumps. The US has also deployed tax
credits, loans, and grants on a scale not seen in generations.
What institutions and
strategies are missing from
US industrial policy that could
help it be more successful?
2rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
income, and otherwise), and the climate crisis (). Upon becoming president, Biden himself
wealth. I want to change the paradigm.” He saw lifting up the middle class and unions as core to “restoring the
soul of the nation” (
planned to respond to these interwoven crises, the press, and in particular Biden’s critics, began using the term
Bidenomics ( and
one of the most successful midterm election performances by an incumbent party in US history, Biden himself
embraced the term.
Bidenomics is both a theory of economic growth and a theory of economic power, and it is meant to replace
(), the former “is rooted in the recognition that the best way to grow the economy is from the
middle out and the bottom up” (). This vision in turn centers on three pillars:
).
add up to trillions of dollars in new spending (; ). Former
growth dynamic that balances resilience and price stability, speed and resilience, and international and
domestic considerations ().
), use of the presidency’s
bully pulpit, changes in labor law interpretation by presidential appointees at independent agencies (Meyerson
).
consumers but also concentration per se (which is seen as ruinous to democracy and innovation). This agenda
; ).
The economic data suggests that state intervention has been productive and effective. The contribution
of manufacturing construction to GDP is at the highest levels on record (
).
).
1 This included th e rechristening by Senator Joe Manchin (D -WV ) of the House- passed Build Back Better Act into the Inflat ion Reduction Act.
2 Labor power can also help improve the q ualit y of public subsid ies to pri vate f irms, by h aving “whist leblowers” that can make sure that the
funds are used well (Tucker et al. 2023).
3 It is al so integrated into the public inves tment p lank through lim its on s tock buybacks a nd corpo rate extraction (Palladino and Estevez 2022).
3
Foreword
Deese made a major speech calling for a “one-time capital investment in this country” of hundreds of billions
and modest,
). In
Biden’s major speech inaugurating his approach to economics, he almost apologetically offered, “I’m a capitalist.
).
This defensiveness has been alongside a rising chorus of critiques of the new industrial strategy from the
right and left. These have come in a few varieties: critiques of what, where, who, and how. These perspectives
question the role of the state, the nation, the private sector, and the demos (respectively) in industrial policy.
The what critique questions whether states anywhere are even able to conduct industrial policy (and whether
they have been at any time in history), and posits that industrial policy is essentially impossible, given the state’s
).
The where critique allows that industrial policy may be useful, but that it should be agnostic as to the national
). The who critique
comes from the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, and questions whether the private sector should
have any role whatsoever in the green transition (). Finally, the how critique accepts the desirability
public sector to do too many things at once. Sometimes called the “everything bagel” critique (), it
priorities ().
There are elements within each that deserve respectful contemplation. The state will confront informational
can
can
corporations that may suffer from their own information asymmetries, as shown by Danish wind company
contracts (). And unquestioning adherence to current regulatory processes can lead to missing
out on the chance to innovate new and smarter ways of governing.5 Yet the practical upshot remains the same:
careful studies have concluded that, even with the highly imperfect system of US statecraft, government
entities with more capacity can help shepherd better outcomes (; Wang, Yuan,
).
3. Bringing the State Back In
second guessing of private actors, or not enough? Fortunately, there is a robust comparative politics scholarship
on the theory of the state that can shine light on these debates. In particular, social science can help evaluate
4 In the speech, Biden con flated “trickle -down economics” and “MAGA- nomic s” in ways that fla tten im port ant political economy differences.
Reagan an d Bush I, for inst ance, paved the way for multilateral neoliberal ins titutions like the World Trade Organization ( WTO), which Trump
sought to weaken through unilateral state-led actions.
5 See Bagley 2019 and Pahlka 2023 for discussion.
4rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
A particularly useful contribution to this inquiry is Bringing the State Back In
determined exogenously by their “objective” economic interests or the ideas that attracted them, and they
see their economic program prevail and carry the day. While state actors may appeal to notions of the national
or public interest, in this view, such rhetoric is merely providing empty cover for delivering for the group or
class that dominates the state as much as the rest of society.
The Bringing
able to not only independently shape economic outcomes but also shape the very preferences and strategies
remained decentralized, racialized, and used for patronage purposes, thereby creating a stronger and more
industrial policy and others do not? This chapter of Bringing
leaned into the policy mix that each state had already developed. In the UK, this meant opening up the spigot
union wages. The former was dependent on the revival of economic growth (to in turn increase tax collection),
Success begat success (both economically and politically), enabling Swedish Social Democrats to win a string
dominate the economy; develop a suite of administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive powers; and then
use those powers to reinforce the state’s own authority, legitimacy, and political longevity, they may be able to
effectuate economic outcomes that reductive analyses would fail to predict.
6 In contr ast, s tates that never had to inves t in their own capacities a nd relied on external mili tary and other protec tion of ten fai led to develop
such a balance that roughly corresponds to constitutional checks and balances.
7 The United States und er Frank lin D. Roosevelt traversed a t hird way, responding in the early New Deal with indust rial and infras truc ture
polic y meant to help labor. America ultimately fai led to ins titutionalize a robust version of that age nda due to s tate st ructures like a relative ly
powerful Supreme Court and Congress, leaving instead what the authors call “commercial Keynesianism”—a type of lower common
denominator countercyclical policy that some share of the Republican Party and business interests could abide.
5
Foreword
While not a central reference point of the Bringing
Bringing project seems more relevant than ever.
This scholarship would inspire numerous offshoots, such as American Political Development, historical
politics and industrial policy, the state is seen as the indispensable actor in accompanying economic transitions
(; ; ).
4. Toward a Synthesis: Learning from What Works
The authors in this Industrial Policy 2025 collection provide rich comparative politics studies that have
have greater state involvement in the economy than countries with more recent avowedly “developmentalist”
and more. Singapore’s state holding company is exemplary of a third model, an institution that can exercise
models in the years ahead.
and mining companies that are wholly or partly owned by governments, including public institutions in
6rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
can go hand in hand.
and “just transition policy,” which she considers as subsets of industrial strategies.
successfully developed a textile and apparel industry while adopting a sectoral bargaining strategy that gave
mainland unions a toehold on the island. He closes by proposing “Fair Transition Boards” for the US clean
Last but not least, Lenore Palladino’s essay brings us closer to the present through her case study of the bailout
meaningful labor or other conditionalities in this bailout. Palladino concludes with recommendations of how
5. Conclusion
happened many times), the existence of these institutions (explored by Furnaro) enabled a nimbler response.
economy (described by Marzán).
7
Foreword
) and the history of racial exclusion leading to uneven trust of
the state by distinct demographic groups (
come before. Indeed, part of the US turn toward industrial policy can be explained by observing the challenges
).
Bergsen et al.
; ; ).
Act and other new policies.
The author would like to thank Suzanne Kahn, Sonya Gurwitt, and Sunny Malhotra for comments and
assistance on this project, as well as all the contributing authors.
8rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
References
Bringing the State Back
In
.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/
.
Michigan Law Review 118
.
Bergsen, Pepijn, Leah Downey, Max Krahe, Hans Kundnani, Manuela Moschella, and Quinn Slobodian.
h t t p s : //
.
https://www.cleaninvestmentmonitor.org/reports/
.
House.
.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/
md/.
Huffington Post
.
Law.” The White House
.
Investment, and Industrial Policy.” Rocky Mountain Institutehttps://rmi.org/
.
9
Foreword
Economics of Investing in America
.
New
Yorker
.
The American Prospect
.
https://www.whitehouse.
.
Ne w York
Times
.
Bringing The State Back In.
New Yorker
.
International Politics and Institutions in Time
Press.
https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/
.
The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market
Era
h t t p s : //
.
Environmental Research Lettershttps://iopscience.iop.org/
.
Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change
University Press.
Annual
Review of Political Science.
10rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
A User Guide to the Inflation Reduction Act: How New Investments Will Deliver
Good Jobs, Climate Action, and Health Benefitshttps://www.
.
.
Business Insider,
.
Perspective.” In Bringing the State Back In
https://www.
.
New York Times
.
h t t p s : //
.
Washington Post
.
h t t p s : //
.
New
York Times
.
Journal of European Public Policy, July.
.
Comparative Political Studiesh t t p s : // d o i .
.
11
The American
Prospect
.
The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, first edition.
.
Recoding America: Why Government Is Failing in the Digital Age and How We Can
Do Better
.
Financial Times,
.
Innovation.” Washington Post
.
Foreign Policy
.
US Department of Commercehttps://www.commerce.gov/news/
.
challenging. It’s useful to consider a couple examples where the Biden Administration has actually
Public Citizens: The Attack on Big Government and the Remaking of American
Liberalism
Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism
Harvard University Press.
Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy
Progressive Studies.
pdf.
Bringing the State Back In,
Foreword
12rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Institute.
Industrial Policy Synergies: Reflections from Biden Administration Alumni. New
.
Applied Economics
.
to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States.” In Bringing the State Back
In
https://www.
.
Slow Boring
.
13
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
The Role of State Ownership:
Overview of State-Owned Entities
in the Global Economy
By Kyunghoon Kim
Kyunghoon Kim is an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic
Policy (KIEP) where he is analyzing the political economy and industrial policies of Asia’s developing
countries. He holds a PhD in development studies—political economy from King’s College London.
Prior to his PhD, he received a master’s degree from the London School of Economics and worked at
the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) covering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) for six years. His recent publications include journal articles in
, , , and
the .
1. Introduction
incentives, preferences, and regulations, as often discussed in the literature on state capitalism and
developmental state, government control over economic entities is particularly strong and direct through
international political economy.
salient trends.
14rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
2. Three Main Types of State-Owned Entities
The government can be an owner in various forms of entities. The most common types are state enterprises
or corporations whose shares are owned by the government. Some of these entities are fully owned by the
government, while others are only partially owned. These companies can be further divided into majority
enterprises are often concentrated in industries that produce essential products such as water, electricity, and
transportation infrastructure and services. These enterprises are also found in strategic industries such as
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are entities responsible for investing state money (). Many SWFs
have been created and expanded as the government has injected current account surpluses. These funds are
often found in countries with large trade surpluses (i.e., the gap between exports and imports), such as oil
targeted investment in diverse asset classes including shares, bonds, derivatives, infrastructure, and property.
SWFs also play a role in exchange rate stabilization and intergenerational savings and transfers. Some SWFs
development mandates.
De
). The major role of these entities is to provide funding for activities that could have
broad sections of the economy, while others cover narrow segments such as small and medium enterprises,
3. Spotting State Ownership
The Reach of State Enterprises in Selected Countries
This subsection compares the extent to which state enterprises are present in different economic sectors
whether each country’s government controls at least one company across different economic sectors. The
such as electricity and transportation and “other” sectors that include manufacturing and services. Nearly all
economic sectors excluding agriculture are covered.
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
Scope o f state- owned enter prises ind icator (ove rall), 0
~6
OECD?
Electricty generation
Electricity import
Elec trici ty export
Elec tricity r etail supp ly
Gas production
Gas import
Gas expor t
Gas storage
Gas reta il supply
E-C ommuni cations – xed -line net works
E-C ommuni cations – retail xed line serv ices (voic e, video & data)
E-Communications – mobile networks
E-C ommuni cations – retail mobi le serv ices (voice, vide o & data)
Railwa ys – passeng er transp ort
Railwa ys – freight t ranspor t
Air tr ansport – d omestic p assenger t ranspor t
Air tr ansport – i nternati onal passen ger trans port
Air tr ansport – o peration o f airpor ts
Water transport – passenger transport
Water tr ansport – f reight tra nsport
Water tr ansport – o peratio n of terminal f acilitie s
Road tr ansport – f reight tra nsport
Road tr ansport – l ong-di stance do mestic pas senger tr ansport b y coach
Indonesia
France
Russian Federation
Poland
Switzerland
Germany
Norway
South Africa
Argentina
Sweden
Romania
Tur key
Italy
Canada
Brazil
Austria
Japan
Ireland
Mexico
Korea, Re public of
Denmark
Australia
Colombia
Israel
Netherlands
Belgium
United Kingdom
Spain
United States
Chile
Table 1. “Scope of State-Owned Enterprises” Sub-Indicator:
Network Sectors, Circa the End of the 2010s (30 Largest Economies in the Sample)
Source: Author’s illustration using OECD indicators of
product market regulation database.
Note: (i) The sub -indicator identifies whether the government controls
at least one firm in each sector. (ii) The countries are ranked in the order
of overall “scope of state-owned enterprises” sub-indicator’s score, from
highest to lowest.
Key
Yes
No
Sector does not exist or data not available
5.9 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 4. 2 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.5 2. 4 2.3 2.3 2. 2 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1
15
16rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Scope o f state- owned enter prises ind icator (ove rall), 0
~6
OECD?
Manufacture of tobacco products
Manuf acture of re ned pet roleum produc ts
Manufacture of basic metals
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment
Building and repairing of ships and boats
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
Manuf acture of ai rcraft an d spacecraf t
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, med. chemical, and botanical products
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Manuf acture of co mputer, elec tronic, a nd optica l product s
Manufacture of motor vehicles and their parts and accessories
Construction
Wholesale trade, including of motor vehicles
Accomm odation, f ood, and bev erage ser vice acti vities
Other urban, suburban, and interurban passenger transport
Finan cial serv ice acti vities, except cent ral banki ng, insur ance, pension fundin g
Motion picture distribution and projection
Gambling and betting activities
Indonesia
France
Russian Federation
Poland
Switzerland
Germany
Norway
South Africa
Argentina
Sweden
Romania
Tur key
Italy
Canada
Brazil
Austria
Japan
Ireland
Mexico
Korea, Re public of
Denmark
Australia
Colombia
Israel
Netherlands
Belgium
United Kingdom
Spain
United States
Chile
Table 2. “Scope of State-Owned Enterprises” Indicator:
Other Sectors, Circa the End of the 2010s (30 Largest Economies in the Sample)
Source: Author’s illustration using OECD indicators of
product market regulation database.
Note: (i) The sub -indicator identifies whether the government controls
at least one firm in each sector. (ii) The countries are ranked in the order
of overall “scope of state-owned enterprises” sub-indicator’s score, from
highest to lowest.
Key
Yes
No
Sector does not exist or data not available
5.9 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 4. 2 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.5 2. 4 2.3 2.3 2. 2 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1
centralized state capitalist economies whose underlying data is not publicly available and therefore not
Indonesia, the country with the highest score, has state enterprises in virtually all sectors. At the other end
of the spectrum, the countries with the smallest numbers of sectors with state enterprises are the United
17
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
and water transport, a large number of countries have state enterprises operating airports and seaports. In
“other” sectors, more countries have state enterprises in services than in manufacturing. A particularly large
advanced manufacturing sectors. However, a number of countries have state enterprises in the aircraft and
spacecraft manufacturing industry, a sector that is considered strategic for national military capability.
Large State Enterprises’ Country and Sectoral Distribution
This subsection focuses on a sample of sizable state enterprises. Using the , this subsection
analyzes the national distribution and characteristics of large state enterprises. The sample includes active
assets could obscure the overall picture. For this subsection, state enterprises are companies with an ultimate
manufacturing; real estate businesses; electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; and transportation
and their entities. Similarly, the German government has large utility companies, such as Uniper and numerous
mining and quarrying, and construction. Norway’s state enterprises are concentrated in utilities. The list also
concentrated in manufacturing and utilities in developing countries and utilities, transportation and storage,
and real estate in advanced countries.
8 NACE: Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne.
18rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
In terms of assets, there are differences in the countries with large state enterprise segments and their
manufacturing, construction, transportation and storage, and electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning
Norway, Brazil, and Mexico. The share of state enterprises’ assets in mining and quarrying is particularly large
Korea, and Sweden. Within public utilities, aggregate assets of state enterprises in electricity, gas, steam, and
air conditioning supply are the largest, followed by those in transportation and storage and information and
technology.
9 The assets of some of these companies may be double counted as their majority shareholders may be other state enterprises.
Table 3. Sectoral Distribution of Large State Enterprises in Terms of Numbers, 2022 (Top 30 Countries)
Source: Author’s illustration using Orbis database.
All countries
All except Chi na
China
Sweden
India
Vietnam
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Finland
Germany
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Poland
United Arab Emirates
Norway
Russian Federation
Singapore
Switzerland
Korea, Re public of
Thailand
Malaysia
Denmark
Brazil
Austria
France
Italy
Colombia
Qatar
Belgium
Lithuania
Bolivia
Spain
Japan
1,791
611
1,180
45
38
27
26
24
23
22
21
21
20
20
20
20
19
19
17
15
14
12
11
11
11
9
9
8
7
6
6
6
1
1
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
9
4
2
21
7
12
4
0
14
24
10
5
10
5
0
0
5
41
0
0
8
9
0
0
11
0
0
0
33
0
0
21
15
25
0
42
26
73
0
0
41
29
14
25
5
30
5
0
0
6
27
7
0
0
0
18
0
33
0
0
17
17
0
13
25
7
18
13
22
0
58
26
5
5
14
5
40
55
5
37
37
12
7
21
42
45
27
18
44
11
25
57
50
17
0
3
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
0
0
5
6
7
14
33
0
0
0
22
0
0
0
0
17
0
7
3
8
2
11
11
0
0
9
0
19
5
0
0
0
0
0
5
6
7
7
0
9
0
0
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
2
6
2
0
4
0
4
0
5
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
0
12
7
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
15
8
4
5
11
0
17
26
5
10
19
15
15
5
20
21
5
18
7
7
8
9
36
45
0
0
38
14
0
50
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
7
2
0
5
11
8
0
4
14
10
0
25
10
0
15
5
0
0
0
7
8
0
0
9
11
44
13
0
0
0
0
10
7
11
33
0
0
0
4
0
9
0
10
5
5
0
10
11
11
0
0
29
0
27
27
9
0
11
13
29
0
0
0
6
5
7
4
0
7
0
4
0
5
0
5
0
10
0
20
26
0
0
13
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
15
7
19
33
0
0
0
8
35
5
5
10
5
5
0
15
0
32
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total number
of state
enterprises
Percentage of State Enterprises
A)
Agriculture,
forestry
& sh ing
B)
Mining &
quarrying
C)
Manufacturing
D)
Elecricity,
gas, stea m
& air
conditioning
supply
E)
Water s upply,
severage,
waste
management
& remediation
activities
F )
Construction
G)
Wholes ale &
retail tr ade,
repair of mo tor
vehicle s &
motorcycles
H)
Transportation
& storage
I )
Accommodation
& food service
activities
J )
Informa tion &
communication
L)
Real estate
activities
M)
Professional,
scienti c &
technical
activities
Others (N–S)
19
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
State Enterprises at the Top of the Corporate World
This subsection describes how state enterprises stand out among the world’s largest companies. The
largest company in the world. Additionally, an investment arm of Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund owns
Table 4. Sectoral Distribution of Large State Enterprises in Terms of Total Assets, 2022 (Top 30 Countries)
Source: Author’s illustration using Orbis database.
All countries
All except Chi na
China
Saud Arabia
France
Korea, Re public of
Russian Federation
India
Norway
United Arab Emirates
Brazil
Mexico
Sweden
Malaysia
Germany
Thailand
Singapore
Italy
Indonesia
Tai wa n
Switzerland
Colombia
Iran, Islamic Republic of
United Kingdrom
Vietnam
Poland
Japan
Denmark
Austria
Finland
Chile
Qatar
24,3 52
7,3 08
17, 04 4
1,030
764
515
419
396
329
259
242
236
228
226
215
209
167
165
163
133
124
116
110
109
87
84
84
77
71
64
63
55
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
24
8
68
0
3
1
41
54
2
77
49
4
0
0
65
0
0
5
24
0
55
8
0
2
4
0
0
1
1
71
0
15
10
17
13
0
0
2
27
1
13
0
0
0
78
0
1
3
9
59
0
0
0
51
0
36
3
0
1
0
0
12
39
17
30
11
12
57
58
8
28
30
19
13
51
41
2
77
19
4
22
4
57
23
28
0
0
33
39
0
13
57
69
0
14
1
2
1
0
0
4
0
0
0
19
7
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
0
0
0
10
1
14
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
7
0
0
11
0
0
2
0
0
5
1
0
3
3
0
0
0
4
2
5
0
12
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
1
1
0
3
15
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
4
7
0
0
0
3
0
0
13
16
11
0
22
1
89
1
2
22
3
0
1
6
6
4
26
18
7
0
51
0
0
98
5
9
100
3
8
14
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
5
3
4
0
0
0
1
8
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
2
13
0
21
1
37
0
7
0
0
1
0
0
0
43
6
4
7
2
9
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
23
0
0
0
7
50
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
32
0
16
30
2
0
5
4
2
5
1
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
6
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
8
1
0
59
0
1
0
0
13
4
17
0
0
35
0
0
1
0
0
0
29
1
16
0
10
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
9
0
0
Percentage of State Enterprises
Total number
of state
enterprises
A)
Agriculture,
forestry
& sh ing
B)
Mining &
quarrying
C)
Manufacturing
D)
Elecricity,
gas, stea m
& air
conditioning
supply
E)
Water s upply,
severage,
waste
management
& remediation
activities
F )
Construction
G)
Wholes ale &
retail tr ade,
repair of mo tor
vehicle s &
motorcycles
H)
Transportation
& storage
I )
Accommodation
& food service
activities
J )
Informa tion &
communication
L)
Real estate
activities
M)
Professional,
scienti c &
technical
activities
Others (N–S)
20rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Sovereign Wealth Funds
This subsection uses the database of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute to analyze the size of sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) around the world (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute n.d.). SWFs, which are investors of
that some countries had more than one SWF. While most countries have one or two SWFs, some countries,
notably those with federal political systems, have several subnational SWFs. For example, the United States has
countries with large current account surplus. As an individual fund, the largest one is Norway’s Government
10 Hong Kong is analyzed separa tely given its SWFs’ dis tinct histor y.
Figure 1. Number of State Enterprises among Top Global Companies, 2022
Source: Author’s illustration using Orbis database.
Top 10In terms of assets Top 50 Top 100 Top 500 Top 1,000
6
39
73
382 784
4
State
enterprises
Others
11 27 118 216
21
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
Development Financial Institutions
purpose (
entity that controls the institution’s management direction. The sample excludes multinational and subnational
institutions and focuses on national DFIs owned by central governments or their entities. For brevity, the term
“DFIs” refers to this group.
Figure 2. Assets of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Source: Author’s illustration using Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute database.
Unit: Trillions of USD
1900
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Figure 3. Number of National-Level Development Financial Institutions
Source: Author’s illustration using Public Development Banks and Development Financing Institutions databases.
1900
0
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
22rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
nine institutions, followed by India (eight), Malaysia (seven), France (six), Nigeria (six), and Saudi Arabia (six).
mandate is the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).
Table 5. Development Financial Institutions’ Total Assets and Distribution
by Mandates, 2021 (Top 20 Countries)
Unit: Billions of USD
United States
China
France
Japan
Germany
Italy
Korea, Re public of
India
Canada
Netherlands
Mexico
Brazil
Thailand
Norway
Morocco
Russian Federation
Poland
Spain
Sweden
Tur key
7,8 49
4,840
1,484
1,039
775
589
521
337
318
291
209
143
118
57
54
54
49
44
43
34
Total Assets
2021
General Local
Government
Infrastructure Agriculture Housing MSME International
Trade and
Investment
Overseas
Private Sector
Development
Low – Mand ate’s Level of Target ing – High
Source: Author’s illustration using Public Development Banks and
Development Financing Institutions databases.
23
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
4. State Ownership and Key Issues
transportation system, and this problem was often pointed out as a major obstacle to industrialization (Kim
institutional reforms with the aim of attracting private investment. But however large the opportunities were
government has continued to have a large number of state enterprises in diverse sectors, as shown in previous
sections, because there was strong nationalistic opposition to full privatization. However, state enterprises
have been the target of governance and ownership restructuring, with some of them undergoing partial
Wijaya Karya, and Pembangunan Perumahan by injecting capital, incentivizing asset revaluation, lowering
dividend payout ratios, and assigning a stream of major infrastructure projects (). Another step was to
that state construction companies have accrued over the years. By selling these assets to the fund, which has
conduct new projects. While performance has been impressive across various infrastructure segments, the
length of toll roads built during the prior four decades ().
Furthermore, state ownership is also strengthening in the resource sector as the demand for critical minerals
assigned the state enterprise Litio para Mexico to manage the resources (
).
24rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
as the fourth largest military spender in the world to attract investment to the defense industry. As part of
this strategy, the Indian government is using Hindustan Aeronautics to increase domestic value added and
White
).
The role of state ownership in advanced countries has also visibly strengthened in recent years. This trend
(
). The UK had
). Moreover, state capital is becoming even more
disruptive technologies ().
of achieving stability in energy supply and accelerating carbon reduction, the French government began a
). With full ownership, the French government plans to accelerate the
construction of new nuclear reactors and transition to cleaner energy. With an increase in energy insecurity
). Furthermore,
pivotal role in leading the coalition government’s plan for the “biggest industrial modernization of Germany in
). The development
).
The Norway Government Pension Fund Global, the world’s largest SWF, is nudging its investees to strengthen
).
25
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
5. Conclusion
recently, with the emergence of polycrisis, a resurgence of active state ownership is becoming more visible.
subsidies for strategic sectors across the world, such as in the United States.
Though discussing the possibility of strengthening government ownership in the United States may continue
to be taboo, even in the current political landscape in which we may be seeing “one of the largest expansions
) and the “new era of big government” (),
). Furthermore, if the
current speed of subsidy provision to businesses continues for the foreseeable future, there may be questions
with the society (). In situations in which designing, applying, and monitoring
conditionalities for the recipients of government subsidies may be challenging, state ownership may offer a
solution.
The author would like to thank Todd Tucker for his comments and Claire Greilich, Sonya Gurwitt, and
Sunny Malhotra for their editorial contributions.
26rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
References
Journal of Economics and Business
.
Financial Times
.
Reutersh t t p s : //
.
Tempo,
.
Financial Times
.
Financial Times,
.
Survey of National Development Banksh t t p s : //
.
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage
Jakarta Globe
.
h t t p s : //
.
Development Financiers.” Pacific Reviewhttps://www.tandfonline.com/
.
Journal of
Contemporary Asia
.
.
27
The Role of State Ownership: Overview of State-Owned Entities in the Global Economy
Competition and Change
.
EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund
.
Financial
Times.
Reuters
.
Purpose.
.
.
The Size and Sectoral
Distribution of SOEs in OECD and Partner Countries
.
.
and Development Trends.” China Economic Quarterly Internationalh t t p s : // d o i .
.
Financial Times,
.
Transition.” Reuters
.
.
Financial Times
.
28rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
.
.
.
Financial Times
.
29
Finance as a Tool of Industrial Polic y: A Taxonomy of Institutional Options
Finance as a Tool of
Industrial Policy: A Taxonomy
of Institutional Options
By Saule T. Omarova
Saule Omarova is the Beth and Marc Goldberg professor of law and director of the Jack Clarke Program
on the Law and Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets at Cornell Law School and a senior
fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. A political scientist and lawyer, she specializes in regulation of
nancial institutions and markets, banking law, and political economy of nance. Before joining Cornell
Law School in 2014, she was the George R. Ward Associate Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina School of Law.
1. Introduction: Why Financial Institutions Matter
Industrial policy is on the rise, but it has yet to evolve
today’s challenges. In industrial policy discussions,
of government subsidies, tax credits, and trade and
regulatory policies (). The tools
to government grants, loans, loan guarantees, and
private partnerships (PPPs) or similar structures.
lower the cost of capital for targeted private business
desired goods or services on the desired scale.
This approach paints an incomplete picture of the
It is a critical interface between the state and the economy that the state is trying to reinvigorate or redirect.
Finance is a direct transmission mechanism of the state’s industrial policy, which fundamentally shapes the
money spent or allocated to industrial policy goals, or the form in which the money is disbursed (grants, loans,
guarantees, etc.) is only part of the picture. Just as important is the institutional channel through which the
programs.
Finance—which encompasses
financial tools, practices, markets,
and institutions—is not simply one
of many commonly used industrial
policy levers. It is a critical
interface between the state and
the economy that the state is
trying to reinvigorate or redirect.
30rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
therefore, a central component of the overall design and execution of a successful industrial policy. It is a far
policy tools subject to traditional political and budgetary constraints. A dedicated institution can be designed
developmental and industrial policies. It focuses on three main institutional categories currently in operation
to examine these phenomena through mini case studies of individual institutions whose success and global
implement an ambitious industrial policy the US needs today.
2. The Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) Model:
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG)
wealth preservation, and socioeconomic development (;
(Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute n.d.). While their investment strategies differ greatly, SWFs generally aim to
foreign currency denominated securities. The fact that SWFs typically have no debt liabilities allows them to
projects ().
Sea, for the dual purposes of managing petroleum revenues and providing for future obligations of the state
(
).
The GPFG is subject to independent audits, complies with extensive public disclosure requirements, and
regularly reports to the legislature.
11 This essay focuses on national-level financial institutions, as opposed to multinational or subnational entities. It also excludes traditional
government agencies that may disburse appropriated government funds for industrial policy purposes as part of their broader sectoral
mandate. The focus here is on sp ecialized institutions of public inves tment .
12 For the full NIA design pro posal, see Omarova 2022.
13 The government can draw funds from t he GPFG , up to a specified limit ( Alsweilem et al. 2015).
14 The Sorting (Norway’s legislative body) establishes the Fund’s formal framework and assigns responsibility for its implementation to the MoF.
The Sor ting has to approve any signi ficant change to the Fun d’s investment strateg y (Norges Bank Investment Management 2019).
31
The GPFG is one of the few large SWFs owned by a democratic government, and is currently the single largest
as well as by limiting or prohibiting investment in individual companies on ethical grounds (Halvorssen and
management mandate for the Fund” (). The MoF expressly
Norges
). The MoF also prohibits the GPFG from investing in foreign companies
; ; ).
The GPFG has long invited criticism as “a template
for substantially transparent but politically
wealth” (). The primary reason for
these criticisms is the perception of the Fund as an
instrument of extraterritorial exercise of political
perspective of industrial policy capabilities, however,
Norway’s experience is valuable precisely because
it demonstrates the potential of a SWF structure to
serve as an institutional tool for changing economic
incentives and behavior of multiple private companies
in multiple sectors. Yet, SWFs operate on the cusp of
democratically established economic priorities. Their greatest strength lies in the scale and scope of their
investment portfolios: The bigger a shareholder an SWF is, the more power it can exert on the behavior of a
15 By 2021, the GFPG had divested its holding s of fossil fuel comp any assets (Arvin 2021).
16 This foreign-domestic divis ion is a direct fun ction of indiv idual SWFs’ mandates. Some SWFs, such as Ireland’s Strateg ic Inves tment Fund
(ISIF), have an explicit mandate to invest in domestic industries (National Treasury Management Agency n.d.). Financial returns, however, are
an essential element of th e SWF business mo del, which again l imits their f lexibi lity as a tool of investing in a broader range of domest ic public
goods.
Finance as a Tool of Industrial Polic y: A Taxonomy of Institutional Options
SWFs operate on the cusp of
market and politics in a very
particular way. Because they
do not borrow in private capital
markets, their capacity to make
mission-driven investments
is not constrained by private
bondholders’ demands.
32rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
3. The National Development Bank (NDB) Model:
Germany’s Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
currently operate in multiple countries around the world (). That list
or NDBs, differ from SWFs in their explicitly domestic focus, more diverse sources of funding, and greater
on their individual mandates, NDBs invest in the construction of traditional physical infrastructures,
agricultural development, social housing, strategic export industries, and other areas prioritized by their
governments ().
appropriated to Germany under the Marshall Plan. It is owned jointly by the German federal government
public policy objectives and political priorities (; ). KfW is directly supervised by the
Board of Supervisory Directors that exercises overall strategic oversight of KfW’s business affairs ().
any obligations of third parties expressly guaranteed by KfW (
lending and investment activities ().
policies. The KfW Group accordingly operates through multiple subsidiaries with separate portfolios.
projects, and an array of global funding instruments intended to support Germany’s global developmental
objectives. The vast majority of Kf W’s loans are extended through, and in partnership with, Germany’s
).
17 The KfW Law expressly mandates this participation approach (Kf W 2020).
33
supply in Germany ().
). A recent study, for example, details
). To support
adoption of the highest environmental standards. These efforts have generated three times as much total
investment in these improvements as Kf W’s commitments. It is projected to generate aggregate returns to the
).
economic and political results. It highlights the core strengths of the NDB model: the possibility of a broader
and more ambitious developmental (as opposed to reserve management) mandate, ability to access private
NDB’s mandate determine the scope and scale of its operations and, therefore, must be formulated in a way that
operations. Yet, government incumbents should not infringe upon the NDB’s operational autonomy nor restrain
commercial revenues necessary to cover the NDB’s debt service payments.
Generally, it is important to remember that the historical, political, and economic context in which an
individual NDB operates fundamentally shapes its business choices and its chances of success. The KfW’s
actor is not as effectively embedded in the existing institutional arrangements. Moreover, in the absence
). This example underscores
the need to contextualize individual institutional design features of successful NDBs.
Finance as a Tool of Industrial Polic y: A Taxonomy of Institutional Options
34rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
4. The State Holding Company (SHC) Model:
Singapore’s Temasek
and assertive way than either an NDB or a SWF model would typically allow.
funds on behalf of the Ministry for Finance (MFF), its sole shareholder.
).
expected net investment returns each year.
trusted steward” of Singapore’s public funds (). Its primary objective is to “build a resilient portfolio
that delivers sustainable returns over the long term” (
directly or through investment funds.
is on being an active portfolio manager, nimbly positioning itself for the maximum return over the long horizon.
; ;
; ).
18 Minister for Finance (Inco rporation) Ac t (Cap 183, 2014 Rev Ed), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/MFIA1959; see also TEMASEK, Temasek Review
2023, TEMASEK .COM (2023), https://ww w.temasekreview.com.sg/.
19 See Temasek Review 2023, A Trusted Steward, https://www.temasekreview.com.sg/stewardship/a-trusted-steward.html; Constitution of the
Republic of Singapore, Fifth Schedule (Sing), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963?ProvIds=Sc5-#Sc5-.
20 MAS is Singapore’s monetar y auth ority; GIC i s the principal SWF.
21 Toward the lat ter goal, Temasek claims to “deploy capital to catalyze sol utions that enable the transit ion to a low c arbon economy” (Temasek
n.d.d).
22 In recent years, Temasek has pivoted away from public markets and toward private markets (South China Morning Post 20 19).
35
and commercial paper instruments.
variety of social services and provide public goods to communities.
).
requirements (). As a Fifth Schedule company with the right to draw upon Singapore’s reserves,
Directors is accountable to the Singapore president and the parliament, and the president’s approval is required
for the appointment, reappointment, or removal of any board members.
Nevertheless,
investment company” operating under the guidance of its board, with neither the country’s president nor the
MFF being involved in its management or investment decisions (). There are also signs suggesting
; ).
primarily on lending but can build predominantly equity holdings, which gives them more effective ways of
capabilities. Furthermore, exercising corporate control over strategically important domestic companies
allows the government not only to continuously shape the structure of the economy or maintain its geopolitical
economy or the state managing it.
accountability structure that would preserve this entity’s decisional autonomy and ability to pursue public
23 As of March 31, 2023, Temasek had S $20.2 bi llion in outst anding b onds, and S$1. 3 billio n in Euro -denominated commercial paper (Temasek
n.d.c).
24 By 2023, the co mpany has commit ted in tot al close to S$1 billion to operate its nearly 1 ,500 so cial programs that inclu de mental and physical
health services, cultural exchange, music and arts educational facilities, care for the elderly, and so forth (Temasek Foundation n.d.).
25 Constitution of the Republic of Singap ore, §22C (1A) (Sing), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963?ProvIds=P15-#pr22C-.
26 Const itution of the Re public of Singap ore, §22D (1A) (Sing), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963?ProvIds=P15-#pr22D-.
27 Gi ven the direct s tate own ership of an SHC (es pecial ly if it is o rganized as a commercial corporatio n with a single shareholder), this model is
likely to f ace the sa me political an d ideological obstacles as the more general category of a “state -own ed enter prise” (S OE), routinely vilified
in the mainstream economic literature of the last several decades.
Finance as a Tool of Industrial Polic y: A Taxonomy of Institutional Options
36rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
5. The US “Emergency Public Finance” Experiment:
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Secretary of the Treasury
; ; ; ).
that provided a reasonable assurance of repayment, so that its investment income generally exceeded its losses
investments were made with little to no expectation of recovery. Notable examples included grants and loans to
other federal government and state agencies during the New Deal era and expenditures in support of the WWII
attaining broad economic goals” ().
(
investor in the country (
;
28 See Reconst ruct ion Fina nce Corp oration Act, 15 U.S.C . § 601 et seq (repealed 2010) [hereinafter RFC Act].
37
transferred to other federal agencies (). While unique in many respects, its experience shows
6. Conclusion: Institutional Design Lessons
for Financing US Industrial Policy
The choice of the institutional form optimally suited for delivering the desired macroeconomic and
sociopolitical results is an essential component of a viable industrial policy. This essay has offered a taxonomy
institutional instrument for the type of industrial policy the United States needs to address multiple challenges
it faces today.
enabled them to rise to their current prominence. Their success cannot, and need not, be replicated through
ensuring its democratic accountability.
design (
nationwide developmental and industrial policy initiatives. Its proposed structure allows for a coordinated
of investments (
set of tools applied at a deliberately large scale.
). It would
function as a publicly owned asset manager, setting up multiple investment funds and soliciting pension funds,
partners in its funds.
public input and oversight, individual funds’ portfolios of equity investments in advanced clean technology,
renewal.
29 The RFC’s surviving offspring include the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the housing finance giant originally
established as the RFC ’s mortgage subsidiar y, and the Sm all Business Administration ( SBA), w hich was set up in 195 3 to take over t he RFC’s
small business and disaster relief loans (Butkiewicz 2002).
30 To minimize undesirable arbitrage opportunities, Wall Street banks, private equity funds, and hedge funds would not be eligible participants.
Finance as a Tool of Industrial Polic y: A Taxonomy of Institutional Options
38rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
However, to maximize its operational autonomy from both incumbent politicians and private bondholders,
many public and private entities today. In an emergency, the NIA would also have the right to borrow directly
goals without being hampered by demands of “commercial viability” or electoral cycles ().
The author would like to thank Zachary Hunt for excellent research assistance, Todd Tucker for his
comments, Sunny Malhotra for research assistance, and Sonya Gurwitt and Claire Greilich for their
editorial contributions.
39
References
https://www.imf.
Sovereign Investor
Models: Institutions and Policies for Managing Sovereign Wealth
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.
Vox
In Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law,
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Northwestern Journal of
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Development and
Public Banks
The Future of National Development Banksh t t p s : // d o i .
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Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund.” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy
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http://www.dfidatabase.
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Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years with the RFC (1932-
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https://www.cambridge.
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https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/rcf/
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Finance as a Tool of Industrial Polic y: A Taxonomy of Institutional Options
42rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
https://www.scmp.com/
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Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). n.d. “What Is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?” SWFI. Accessed
.
.
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https://www.
.
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ttps://www.
.
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Wall Street Journal,
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https://www.
.
43
Leading with Industrial Policy: Lessons for Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
Leading with Industrial Policy:
Lessons for Decarbonization from
Swedish Green Steel
By Jonas Algers
Jonas Algers is a PhD candidate at the division for environmental and energy systems studies at Lund
University where he studies the political economy of steel industry decarbonization. He has been a
visiting researcher at the OECD, and worked at the Norwegian think tank Manifest on green industrial
policy for the oil producing country. He received a master’s degree in economics from The New School.
1. Introduction
). However, two “green steel” projects located in Northern
policy in enabling these two projects.
main input. This route reduces iron ore to iron, and later this iron is smelted together with other materials,
per tonne of steel directly
and indirectly (
per tonne of steel, most of which arise from
).
The process detailed in this essay is the hydrogen direct reduction route, which produces direct reduced iron
). Using green hydrogen
().
). However, the largest contribution to global
LKAB n.d.b).
44rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
based steel abroad. These projects have propelled Sweden to the top of the globe among green iron and steel
and LKAB, which in turn is the largest shareholder
while LKAB has produced iron ore for more than
restructured the steel industry in response to the
the differences between these two projects show how
the same innovation system.
Why has Sweden reached a globally leading position on iron and steel decarbonization? And what has been the
supporting deep industrial decarbonization in the US steel industry.
The differences between these
two projects show how distinct
types of actors—with different
types of state involvement—can
play complementary roles across
the same innovation system.
Figure 1. Green Iron and Steel Announcement by Capacity
Austria
Chile
Australia
Netherlands
Germany
China
Sweden
France
Spain
Russia
Romania
Canada
Belgium
United
States
Finland
Brazil
South
Korea
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
MTPA
Note: Figure 1 shows green iron and steel announcements by capacity. The methodology
for accounting green steel projects does not yet include H2 Green Steel’s full plans but is
used here for comparability with other countries.
Source: LeadIT Green Steel Tracker.
Key
Green Iron
Green Steel
45
2. The Climate Policy Framework
). The target
not merely for reducing emissions, but for deep decarbonization
direction (
called Fossil Free Sweden () to coordinate business initiatives by sectors and institutionalize a
relationship between government and business in which business could communicate policy needs to achieve
state with business ().
to low capture rates (;
realistic prospects to reach parliament’s target of zero emissions.
3. Renewable Energy Cost Declines Enable
Hydrogen-Based Steelmaking
scale, as it requires vast amounts of electricity to replace energy derived from coal, increasing costs and
;
; ). Because
). Getting
innovation system as a whole.
Leading with Industrial Policy: Lessons for Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
46rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
emission reductions that included the sale of coal assets, and an intention to focus on “enabling customers to
reach their climate targets” (
HYBRIT
the entire iron and steel value chain. Meanwhile, the government set up the The Industrial Leap (
n.d.
While the initial funds were relatively small, they were important in funding early research. Universities and
effects ().
n.d.a
emissions (LKAB n.d.b).
facilities ().
state of Missouri.
H2 Green Steel
Northvolt and it had become clear that steel would be the next step in the decarbonization of the vehicles
adopters, and costs would only increase by a few hundred dollars that could be passed on to consumers.
technology in the highly inert steel industry. Their strategy has been based on getting upstream and
). In June
) and cable and grid
47
).
4. Financing the Transition
The state has had a direct engagement in fostering the development of green steel in Sweden. As mentioned
and discussed below.
The Industrial Leap and EU Exemptions for State Aid
investments in clean technologies and research on an application basis. As mentioned earlier, this program was
The Industrial Leap has now been expanded and can give larger subsidies for major investments. It was the
program (
).
Leading with Industrial Policy: Lessons for Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
Table 1. Identifi ed Key Interventions Supporting the HYBRIT and H2 Green Steel Projects
Intervention Type of Intervention Backing Organization Funds
Industrial Leap and EU
exemptions for state aid
Subsidies The Swedish Energy Authority SEK 3.1 billion for H YBRI T and
SEK 3.8 billion for H2 Gree n Steel
Green Credit Guarantees Credit guarantees The Swedish National Debt Offi ce Guaranteeing 8 0 percent of a
€1.2 billion loan to H2 Green Steel
Export bank support Loan and import guarantee The Swedi sh Export Cre dit
Agency and Euler Hermes
Aktiengesellschaft
Undisclosed
New fi nancial targets in LKA B Lower div idends from LK AB The Swedish Government and
LKAB
Lowering the return on equity from
over 12 percent to 9 percent and
increasing the net debt/equity
ratio to l ess than 0.6 times f rom
0 to 0.3
The European Investment Bank Loan The European Investment Bank €750 million in senior debt
fundin g to H2 Green Steel
The EU Innovation Fund Subsidies The EU Innovation Fund €143 million in support to HYBR IT
and an undisclosed amount to H2
Green Steel
48rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Green Credit Guarantees
contributes to lower emissions (
).
Export Banks
), and the agency has established
(
).
New Financial Targets in LKAB
were agreed upon (
the upcoming transformation” (), the government would increase the allowed net debt/equity ratio
full ownership, the state has been able to allow for higher debt and lowering the target return on equity, thus
supporting LKAB to achieve its transition by lowering revenue to the state budget rather than by increasing
expenditure via subsidies.
The European Investment Bank
).
The EU Innovation Fund
; ).
49
5. Discussion: Directionality, Risk-Taking, Ownership,
and Competition
Sweden is currently a leader in steel decarbonization. But why has steel decarbonization reached so far in
Sweden, and not in other countries with similar endowments of renewable energy and iron ore? What lessons
can be learned from Sweden for industrial decarbonization elsewhere?
Directionality
directionality
transformations (; ; ). Innovation is inherently uncertain
). This process allows the different parts of
the innovation system to coalesce around a path to decarbonization and collaborate across the value chain in
its development.
creation of Fossil Free Sweden established an institution through which learning and cooperation across
Risk-Taking
Finance Daniela Gabor, who has been a prominent participant in the debate, argues that a clear limit with this
approach is that it “outsources the pace of decarbonisation to private capital, and in so doing, can amplify its
). Indeed, in the Swedish case, the
from Germany (
Leading with Industrial Policy: Lessons for Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
50rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
even though the project struggles (see, for example, the battery manufacturer Freyr in bordering Norway,
and other industries could be combined with curbs on personal remuneration until the plant is operating
commercially.
State Ownership
ownership policy.
not commercial) goal of decarbonization in their strategies, without having to please shareholders whose
). While it is commonly argued that
direction giving change agents” (
and cooperate in negotiations with government, which is unusual.
subsidies and overcapacity (). At the same time, state ownership can play a particular role in
). This is in line with other empirical studies
(see, for example,
act.
;
.
51
Competition
Finally, having two different types of projects that can both complement and compete with one another has
researching the technolog y and then piloting would not have been possible for a company without revenue.
.
call the “opportunity creation” of the Swedish
entrepreneurial state, and reciprocates by speeding up the entire process.
6. Conclusion
The Swedish iron and steel transition is at the forefront of the global steel decarbonization process, and the
carbon pricing nor passive subsidies for industry initiatives. Instead, use of industrial policy has been active and
seen. At this point, however, we can conclude that the relevant companies have committed to clear timelines
).
So, what can we learn from the Swedish case for decarbonization of US industry?
). In addition, the US
Leading with Industrial Policy: Lessons for Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
52rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
) to
cooperation and to transform declining renewable energy costs into attractive paths to decarbonization.
industrial processes (), the federal government could leverage its federally owned
offshore wind project in the UK citing higher costs
without being able to raise revenue from power
federally owned electric utilities and/or the Army
operate clean energ y generation in collaboration
pause in US Treasury payments. They can also be
industrial decarbonization projects. By doing so, they
capacity within clean energy and hydrogen management.
Nippon Steel has made an offer to buy US Steel () though its bid will be reviewed
several decades and indicating that it does not believe it will need to decarbonize soon (
the pace of US primary steel decarbonization, and the White House should carefully consider how any potential
buyer of US Steel may affect how competition aligns with decarbonization in the sector.
The United States has started its journey toward a clean energy future. But to increase the pace of the
This essay is based on interviews with Mårten Görnerup, former CEO of HYBRIT; Ola Hansén, director
of Public Affairs at H2 Green Steel; and Per Bolund, former Minister for Financial Markets and Minister
for Climate, who I thank for their invaluable input. I also want to thank Joachim Peter Tilsted, Max
Åhman, Max Jerneck, Chris DellaCamera, and Elisabeth Lindberg for commenting on an earlier draft
of this essay, as well as Roosevelt Institute staff Suzanne Kahn and Todd N. Tucker for comments and
Sonya Gurwitt and Claire Greilich for their editorial contributions.
State-owned entities can play a
key role in strategically pursuing
decarbonization objectives
independently of short-term
shareholder value maximization.
53
References
Dagens Nyheter
.
.
Financial Times
.
Making Net-Zero Steel Possibleh t t p s : //
.
h t t p s : //
.
https://www.energimyndigheten.
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h t t p s : //
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https://ec.europa.
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EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap 2021-2025. https://www.eib.org/en/
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.
Stato e mercato, Rivista quadrimestrale. h t t p s : //
.
Sweden.” Research Policy.
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.
https://www.
.
https://www.hybritdevelopment.se/
.
Climate Change 2022: Mitigation
of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changeh t t p s : // d o i .
.
Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Changeh t t p s : // d o i .
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Iron and Steel Technology Roadmaphttps://iea.blob.
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Achieving Net Zero Heavy Industry Sectors in G7 Members
.
system/industry/steel.
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https://www.
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Law and Financial Markets
Review.
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Industrial and Corporate Change
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Energiföretagen. February
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Hydrogen Insighthttps://www.hydrogeninsight.
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Industrial Transformation 2050 - Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions from EU
Heavy Industry
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The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. London:
Anthem Press.
Industry
and Innovation.
and Why It Matters.” Technological Forecasting and Social Changeh t t p s : // d o i .
.
Science.
Drama.” New York Times
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Climate Policyhttps://doi.org
.
.
.
Times of Northwest Indiana, May
.
.
Energy Policy
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https://www.regeringen.se/
.
h t t p s : //
invest ment s/.
.
.
sustainability/.
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57
Bergsmannen, May
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Annals of Public and Cooperative Economicsht t ps://onli nelibrary.wiley.
.
h t t p s : //
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Joulehttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
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What Is Green Steel? Towards a Strategic Decision Tool for
Decarbonising EU. Lund, Sweden: Lund University.
.
Journal of Cleaner Production
.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
.
Leading with Industrial Policy: Lessons for Decarbonization from Swedish Green Steel
58rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
Just Energy Transition in the Time
of Place-Based Industrial Policy:
Patch or Pathway to the Green
Industrial Transformation?
By Andrea Furnaro
Andrea Furnaro is an associated researcher at the FossilExit Research Group, Department of Energy and
Environmental Management, Europa-Universität Flensburg, where she studies the political economy
of low-carbon energy transitions. She is also a policy analyst at the Natural Resource Governance
Institute. She holds a PhD in geography from the University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Introduction
a proactive approach to economic policy in which
growth (). It recognizes the need to target
strategic investments and interventions in regions
that may be lagging behind economically. Just
Transition Policies (JTP), on the other hand, especially
those that emphasize subnational regions, are
crafted to mitigate some of the adverse economic
based to more sustainable industries.
This essay examines the German experience with
PBIP and JTP. Germany is notable for its extensive
history of experimenting with JTP (even before this
term was coined) ().
During different periods and to varying extents,
policy approaches into its economic strategies.
31 Just tr ansition policies can encompas s a much broader ran ge of
interventions, including support for workers in fossil fuel industries
affected by the energy transition, communities adversely impacted
by the expansion of p rojec ts to ex trac t minera ls needed for the
energy transition, communities affected by new renewable energy
investments, or developing countries rich in fossil fuels, among
others.
Place-Based Industrial Policy
(PBIP) represents a proactive
approach to economic policy in
which governments intervene not
only in specific industries but also
in specific locations to stimulate
economic growth.
Just Transition Policies (JTP), on
the other hand, especially those
that emphasize subnational
regions, are crafted to mitigate
some of the adverse economic
impacts associated with the shift
from fossil fuel-based to more
sustainable industries.
59
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
This has resulted in a complex landscape of tools and outcomes, with varying degrees of success over time
(). These policies have evolved to address the challenges of transitioning from coal and other
poli cy.
experience: (i) educational and research investments, (ii) the debate around balancing support for incumbent
and emerging sectors, (iii) anticipatory and proactive planning, (iv) spatial governance, and (v) a robust baseline.
2. The Rebirth of Place-Based Industrial Policy
geographic locations, with the primary objective of transitioning the economic landscape of these areas toward
; ). What characterizes a PBIP as such
are targeted (
Kline
).
For at least four decades, industrial policy was in decline and the conventional approach for economic policy
geographic locations (
less effective as they might divert resources from industries and areas with growth potential that are better
redistributed (). According to Bailey et al. (
by the belief that “spatial adjustments occur relatively smoothly between levels of equilibrium in response to
policies might be captured by a local elite, while other critiques argued that these policies are rarely able
subsidies (; ). A common object of concern in these critiques is
as one area experiences growth through PBIP, it could potentially affect economic activity in other regions,
prompting questions about the overall contribution to economic growth ().
Lang
; ; ;
32 Biden’s recent policies allocate d $80 billion for place- based spending, which is eight times more t han the amount all ocated for TVA or AR C.
60rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
). Studies have
also demonstrated that perfect mobility by individuals is often an unrealistic assumption ().
Factors such as housing costs and social ties limit individuals’ ability to relocate. This consideration is crucial,
().
Another important driving force explaining the resurgence of PBIP is the increasing recognition of the political
). The shift from traditional
centers, has worsened this spatial inequality (
Tomer
).
Simultaneously, it highlights the strategic use of interactions between local and external actors and institutions
local elites, who, as per Barca (
alternatives (
).
Table 1. Place-Neutral vs. Place-Based Industrial Policies: Examples of Policy Tools
Shared too ls (diff erentiated
by the presence or absence
of spatial targeting)
Place-Neutral Industrial Policies Place-Based Industrial Policies
Specifi c tools
(specifi c to each type ba sed
on their spatial scope)
• Direct and indirect subsidies (lump-sum transfers, grants, loans, underwriting
and guaranteeing investments, tax incentives, public procurement, etc.)
• Infrastructure investments
• Research and development
• Workforce training programs
• Provi sion of low -carbon goods and ser vices (common in green indu strial polic y)
• Chang es in trade polic y to support
domestic industries
• National employment policies
• National development banks
• Local cluster policies
• Special economic zones (e.g., enterprise zones,
industrial parks, etc.)
• Funds to support economically declining regions
61
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
3. Place-Based Industrial Policy Vis-à-Vis
Just Transition Policy
The new wave of PBIP coincides with a surge in JTP. JTP refers to a set of strategies and interventions aimed
at minimizing the social, economic, and environmental disruptions caused by transitions to more sustainable
economic systems. These policies operate at various scales, from the global and national levels to regional
are supported, while also advancing broader environmental and social goals. While the term “just transition”
to encompass various domains (). In the context of subnational policies, which are the
Nonetheless, these two approaches frequently differ in scope. JTPs typically encompass a broader array of
elements that extend beyond economic development, often placing a strong emphasis on social policies. PBIPs
may emphasize other types of economic initiatives, particularly when their primary objective is to bolster
promising regions rather than those experiencing economic decline. A prime example can be observed in
endowments or other competitive advantages in cleaner industries, such as regions with high solar radiation or
geological conditions for carbon storage (e.g., ; ).
PBIP and JTP can also be seen as complementary tools for addressing the complex challenges of a green
inequality). The utilization of JTP can help address other issues associated with PBIP, such as the concentration
). The
effectiveness of PBIP is still an area in which more impact analyses are needed.
whether policies should focus on productive investments within sectors that are already dominant, leveraging
existing (static) competitive advantages, as opposed to promoting new (dynamic) sectors (Armitage et al.
regions to leverage their available local competencies (). However, other analysts advise caution
radical innovation (; based on and ). Instead, PBIP
in economically declining regions should support emerging sectors that hold potential for agglomeration
air capture have the capacity to generate synergies among innovation, environmental, and equity objectives.
According to Armitage et al. (
that by introducing these nascent industries in disadvantaged regions or those expected to face challenges in
).
62rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
4. Relating Place and the Just Transition in Place-Based
Industrial Policymaking: The German Case
(
(). However, mirroring the global trend, recent years have witnessed a resurgence in both
industrial policy and PBIP in Germany, accompanied by the emergence of explicit JTPs.
The country has established various initiatives aimed at supporting coal regions impacted by the energy
(Strukturstärkungsgesetz
This policy has been formulated not only as a response to the adverse effects associated with the green
industrial transformation, particularly Germany’s green energy transition policy process (the Energiewende),
but also as a proactive implementation of PBIP. According to the government, the Structural Strengthening Act
().
The subsequent sections illustrate important aspects of Germany’s approach to connecting both JTPs and
PBIPs.
Table 2. Key Approaches in Place-Based Industrial Policies and the Role of Just Transition Policy
Traditional industrial policy
Focus on promising regions Focus on economically challenged regions
Green industrial policy Commonly observed in regions with substantial
potential for low-carbon investments. Some JTP
initiatives complement this approach by providing
support to regions economically reliant on fossil fuel
acti vitie s that are impacted by new investments.
Traditional regional development policies often
employ a winner-p icking a pproac h, with a f ocus
on opportunity-rich regions or the preservation of
existing agglomerations.
Approach frequ ently s een in JTP s that aims to assis t
regions economically reliant on fossil fuels through
abundant economic support (in these cases, JTP
represents a subtype of PBIP).
Traditional regional redevelopment and revitalization
policies, characterized by a reparative approach.
Their primary objectives include fostering
agglomeration or preventing deglomeration in
regions facing economic risks.
63
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
Educational and Research Investments
transition objectives, and which has been relatively stable over time, is the focus on educational and research
The focus on funding existing and supporting new educational and research institutions persists in
contemporary PBIP to support coal regions, for example with funds to set up new applied science and research
institutions that can contribute to innovation efforts (
n.d.b.;
nonuniversity research institutions and applied sciences, something that has scarcely changed in the past three
decades (;
win approach, aligning regional and national economic growth with social equity objectives. Investments in
increasing wages and tax revenue, and creating future economic value that would otherwise remain unrealized
without these investments.
Balancing Support for Incumbent and Emerging Sectors
Soete and Stierna (
by regional smart specialization strategies, tend to prioritize “incremental” improvements, shying away from
more disruptive changes (). The extent to which investments supporting coal regions in
Germany should follow a similar approach remains a subject of open debate in the country ().
main investment criteria: (i) create and maintain jobs and training positions in the regions and (ii) diversify
the economic structure of the region and improve its attractiveness as a business location (). This
Act, however, incorporates comprehensive plans for the three lignite regions, explicitly stating the goal of
preserving their role as “energy” regions or areas (). In practice, investment plans have prominently
targeted hydrogen, renewables, and electricity storage projects, capitalizing on existing energy sector
centers for applied research in these technologies (
Figure 1. Brown Coal Mining Regions
Source: Adapted from braunkohle.de
Open-Pit Mines
Rhenish mining areas
1 Garzweiler
2 Inde n
3 Hambach
Central Germany mining areas
4 Amsdor f
5 Profen
6 Vereinigtes Schleenhain
Lusatia
7 Welzow-Süd
8 Jänschwalde
9 Nochten
10 Reichwalde
Kiel
Schwerin
Dresden
Berlin
Magdeburg
Wiesbaden
Düsseldorf
München
Stuttgart
Saarbrücken
Hamburg
Bremen
Hannover
Erfurt
Mainz
Potsdam
Rhenish
mining
areas
Helmstedt
Central German
mining area
Lusatia
1
2
4 7
8
910
5 6
3
64rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
n.d.b.;
by political factors, as the shift from “coal regions” to “energy regions” garners more local support, boosting
both economic and representational path dependency in the transition process. However, it is not always clear
).
Anticipatory and Proactive Planning
German Federal Government
n.d.). This anticipatory approach is characterized by a proactive preparation for an anticipated decline in
regional economic activities rather than a reactive response.
planning strategy. The notion of ensuring “planning security” (Planungssicherheit) was often raised in public
and disparity (). While the planning capacity of the German coal exit process has faced criticism
from various actors, from an international standpoint, it stands as a noteworthy example of forward planning
for the decline of a dominant industry.
Spatial Governance
place in a vacuum but in a context in which in many countries’ local governments have been underfunded
)
capabilities of local governments. Both historical and contemporary JTPs have directly provided economic
assistance to local governments ().
Within the Structural Strengthening Act, program implementation is supervised by a committee comprising
the national government and the federal states (or Länder) in which the lignite regions are situated
33 This includes, for example, representatives of environmental organizations arguing that it doesn’t provide enough planning capacity to ensure
a rapid incorporation of renewable energies (Mieritz 2019) and representatives from the steel i ndust ry and t he right-wing p opulist party
Alternative für Deutschland who have argued that these laws don’t protect planning security to avoid future energy supply disruptions (Home
of Welding 2020; Deutscher Bundestag 2020).
34 For instance, in the United States, despite former Los Ange les Mayor Eric Garcetti’s use of Green New Deal rhetori c to characterize t he
city ’s sustainability plan, regulatory and financial limitations constrain the city’s ability to raise and allocate sufficient funds for a robust PBIP
(Furnaro a nd Kay 2022).
65
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
involving the federal government and at least half of the LänderLänder holds one vote, and a
recommendation cannot be made against the vote of the national federal department or Länder involved. The
the mission statements and regional development concepts of the Länder, regions, and municipalities (BMWK
).
processes to formulate project proposals (; ). The utilization of competitive mechanisms
for allocating grants among local participants is a central feature of this policy, promoting local cooperation
).
Länder ().
related to the successful submission and management of projects. These centers aim to address issues such
),
and existing national and Länder
decentralization. This approach also promotes vertical coordination among various levels of government by
).
However, the multilevel governance of the policies to support lignite regions has faced criticism for not
adequately involving local representatives, with predominant roles still played by representatives from both the
Länder
infrastructure (including transportation, digitalization, urban development, health and cultural facilities, and
tourist infrastructure), and research and education (
).
Table 3. Distribution of Funds from the Structural Strengthening Act
Pillar 1 allocates $14 billion to the
Länder and their municipalities, with
the Länder having decision-making
authority over the projects.
Pillar 2 allocates $26 billion from the
federal government, and project decisions
are made by the national-Länder
coordination committee.
Coal region Länder
Rhenish mining area (37%)
Central German mining area (20%)
Lusatia (43%)
North Rhine-Westphalia (100%)
Saxony-Anhalt (60%)
Saxony (60%)
Brandenburg (60%)
Saxony (40%
Source: BMJ 2020.
66rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
The Baselines
The recent resurgence of PBIP in the United States has prompted questions about whether Germany and
the totality of PBIPs that have long been in place (). This is particularly important in Germany, where
the aim of achieving equitable living standards across regions is explicitly included in the constitution. In the
be seen as the baseline for additional PBIPs and JTPs (). Following Kattel et al. (), some
domestic and international policy discussions.”
Gesamtdeutschen Fördersystems). This
the Structural Strengthening Act (
5. Conclusion
The recent increase in both PBIP and JTP reactivates
important policy questions about the capacity of
to stimulate both regional and national economic
growth. From a policy perspective, it is crucial to
analyze the challenges and opportunities in balancing
the relationship between PBIP and JTP. Potential
promoting regions with growth potential or regions
regionally. In this context, the relevant question isn’t
rather how to integrate PBIP and JTP to enhance the
effectiveness of both.
Denmark
Canada
Switzerland
Belgium
Germany
Sweden
Spain
Korea
Australia
Mexico
Finland
United States
Japan
Colombia
Austria
Norway
Poland
Netherlands
Iceland
Czech Republic
Italy
Latvia
Estonia
Lithuania
United Kingdom
France
Slovenia
Slovak Republic
Chile
Portugal
Israel
Hungary
Luxembourg
New Zealand
Ireland
Türkiy e
Greece
Costa Rica
Figure 2. Subnational Government Expenditures in OECD Countries
Source: OECD 2023.
0 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Key Per capita (US Dollar) As a percentage of general government, same transaction
The relevant question isn’t
solely about how to make
PBIP more equitable, but
rather how to integrate PBIP
and JTP to enhance the
effectiveness of both.
67
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
While JTP is commonly viewed as a patch to address some of the negative impacts of green industrial
transformations, often from an equity perspective, the German case demonstrates an attempt to integrate BPIP
and JTP approaches more closely. Different elements of the approach used in the Structural Strengthening Act,
which explicitly attempts to incorporate both approaches, were highlighted in this essay. Most of the results,
however, are still to be seen.
The German model of prioritizing educational and research investments in PBIP and JTP, with a special focus
on nonuniversity research institutions and applied sciences, offers valuable insights, although its direct
application in the US would require adaptations to the local context. This includes considering, for example, the
The issue of the degree to which path dependencies and disruptions should be promoted is critical in this
regard and is not a settled conclusion in Germany, although we see today a tendency to promote the transition
might reinforce existing economic structures at the expense of hindered adaptability and the introduction of
agendas can help manage the transition and create economic gains, an anticipatory approach that underscores
a fundamental aspect of how Germany is trying to harmonize JTP with PBIP. The applicability of a similar
approach in the US depends on complex issues such as political will, regulatory challenges for the central
Germany provides numerous examples of the complexities involved in navigating multilevel governance within
PBIP. This particularly pertains to how to effectively support regions in implementing investment projects by
local governments with the necessary resources and expertise. While local governments in Germany have the
The US can learn from this model to ensure that local initiatives contribute to national industrial strategies
that respect the autonomy of states and local governments while pursuing shared national economic goals.
targeted just transition interventions, is crucial, especially as numerous processes of green industrial
disruption are anticipated in the near future. They can enhance resilience, foster greater regional cohesion,
The author would like to thank Todd Tucker for his comments and Claire Greilich and Sonya Gurwitt
for their editorial contributions. Special thanks to Nora Stognief and Marius Koepchen for their
valuable suggestions on earlier versions of this essay.
68rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
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Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
Report on Research, Innovation
and Technological Performance in Germany 2019https://www.econstor.eu/
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Capital Have Failed—and What to Do about It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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71
Just Energy Transition in the Time of Place-Based Industrial Policy: Patch or Pathway to the Green Industrial Transformation?
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Handbook on
Cohesion Policy in the EU
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for All Regions and Cities.
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System Governancehttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
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73
Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor Unions in the United States
Fair Transition Funds, Employer
Neutrality, and Card Checks: How
Industrial Policy Could Relaunch
Labor Unions in the United States
By César F. Rosado Marzán
Professor Rosado Marzán is an internationally recognized socio-legal scholar and award-winning
author who holds a PhD in sociology from Princeton University and a JD from the University of
Pennsylvania. He is currently the Edward L. Carmody Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, where
he also has an afliation with the Department of Sociology and Criminology. His scholarship has
focused on laws and institutions that protect workers.
1. Introduction
membership has declined steadily to record lows
(
that limit labor’s capacity to adapt to new realities
(
decrease in union membership. Union density, or
were members of unions and were covered by
are members of unions or covered by collective
bargaining agreements (Hirsch, Macpherson, and
Kerrissey
to robust labor unions (See also ).
Union decline threatens the
US middle class as we have
known it. Without a robust
middle class, US democracy is
also at risk, as unions directly
shape democratic governance.
74rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Given the importance of unions for democracy and for a strong middle class, this essay describes how US
industrial policy can reinvigorate US unions. It focuses on industrial policy rather than on labor law because
episodic and rare experiences of industrial and labor policies being woven together, this essay begins with
lessons we can draw from places where industrial policy has been used effectively to promote both industry
practice by which employers voluntarily recognize a union when it proves majority employee support through
administered union election.
2. The Gold Standard: Rehn-Meidner
comprehensive economic and wage policy program in Sweden (
Quintas and Ianoni
unions a leading role in shaping and implementing the plan.
Until about the Korean War, Sweden’s main ruling party, Socialdemokraterna (the Social Democratic Party,
combination of low interest rates and high government expenditures. However, the Korean War spurred
the SDP and the leading labor union in Sweden, Landsorganisationen i Sverige
wage growth at the top of the income pyramid (). But unions were willing to exert wage restraint at
Hibbs
). The policy expressly favored capital concentration in large corporate entities that were
“highly competitive internationally” (
35 “CHIPS” stands for “Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors.” Pub. Law No. 117–167, §102 (2022).
75
Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor Unions in the United States
As described by Felipe Quintas and Marcus Ianoni (
those that favor accumulation, social welfare and competitiveness in international trade would survive.”
().
Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation
Sveriges akademikers centralorganisation
(
institutionalized practice in Sweden.
Unions played a critical part in managing unemployment, retraining, and job matching schemes; they
).
Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen
36 Coordinated market economies are those in which firms are sai d to make decisions and take ac tions based on “insider in format ion” gain ed
through relationships between firms and their stakeholders (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8). Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden are said to be coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001, 20). Liberal market economies are those in which firms
principally make decisions and take actions based on market information, such as prices, interest rates, and unemployment levels, and relate
to other actors t hrough formal contrac ting (Hall and Soskice 20 01, 10). Polit ical sci entis ts Hall and Soskice (2001, 20, 30) have classified the
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada as liberal market economies.
37 According to some scholars, the Bret ton Woods interna tional monetary rules provided the background and globa l norms that helped to
finance Rehn-Meidner. The end of Bretton Woods in 1971 contributed to the demise of Rehn -Meidner (Quintas and Ianon i 2021; Erixon 2010,
684). Bretton Woods attempted to create an international monetary system that was “rules-based and not manipulable by powerful states
for mercantili st advantage” (Gowan 1999, 16). I t pegge d the US dollar, the st rongest currency, to the price of gol d. All ot her currencies ha d
to set their value to the dollar, and governments could not unilaterally change their currencies’ prices. The goal was to provide price stability
to currencies and promote fa ir trade. Additionally, Bretton Woods placed strict controls on i nternational c apital flows. It permitte d fina ncing
for trad e and for foreign pro duct ion inves tment, but “repressed” most ot her ty pes of international capital movement s. These control s gave
national state governments institu tional heft to subsume their financial sectors to their national development g oals, as Sweden cou ld do
during t he period of Rehn-Meidner (Gowan 1999, 1 7). In deed, Re hn-Meidner was made possible by strict capi tal controls pl aced on f inance.
As Quin tas and I anoni (2021) recount, “Swedish capital [was] basically dependent on production, not speculation.” Its central bank was
subordinate to the government, and not to capital markets. When capital markets were liberalized globally, a result of the collapse of Bretton
Woods, Sweden, like other countries, also had to liberalize its capital markets. That liberalization introduced financial problems to the Rehn-
Meidner scheme (Quintas and Ianoni 2021).
76rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
).
). Despite growing inequality in Sweden during the past
two decades, the country remains one of the least unequal countries on earth. Its citizens are part of a robust
middle class and enjoy some of the planet’s highest standards of living (see ). Despite contemporary
), it is a rich and equitable country overall.
bargaining relations between large, organized actors such as national unions and employer organizations.
employer groups do not bargain substantially at the national level. Industrial relations are decentralized, and
). In the private sector, US union density has all
).
garment industry.
3. Puerto Rico: A Case of Promoting Industry and
Unions in the US
over industrial policy, which in turn helped unions retain an institutional role and build organizational capacity.
Union participation in the National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB) and its successor, the National War Labor
Board (NWLB), are perhaps the clearest examples of US union relevance in national industrial promotion.
Historian Nelson Lichtenstein described the importance of these tripartite government agencies for the
maintenance of labor peace during wartime in industries involved in the production of arms, equipment, and
the income scale, during World War II US unions agreed to limit wage demands and militancy when they
security,” or union shops. Union shops are arrangements in which all employees employed by an employer
must be automatically enrolled to the union after their hiring. In response to this demand, the NWLB enacted
38 As discussed by Professor Kenneth Dau Schmidt (1990), the Taf t-Hartley Act banned the closed shop, which requires pre-employment union
member ship. In 1 963, t he US Supreme Cour t also effectively o utlawe d the union shop. As Dau Schmidt described it, “In the Taft-H artley Act ,
Congress outlawed the cl osed sho p . . . The Supreme Cour t has also interpreted the second proviso of se ction 8(a)(3 ) to prohibit enforcement
or observance of the membership requirement of a union shop agreement” (NLRB v. General Motor s Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (196 3)).
77
Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor Unions in the United States
Some may argue that wartimes are exceptional periods with limited generalizability. But tripartite boards in the
US have not been exclusive to wartime. Perhaps one of the most successful US peacetime sectoral experiments
().
inapplicable.”
However, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was one such law that
President). However,
39 As the US Federa l Relati ons Act w ith Pue rto Rico states, “[t]he s tatutory laws of the United Sta tes not locally in applicable . . . shall have the
same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the U nited St ates” (48 U. S.C. § 7 34 [2012]). The meaning of “locally inapp licable” has been t he
subject of intense litigation and remains an open question (Harvard L aw Review 2017).
40 See NLRB v. Gonzalez Padín Co., 1 61 F.2d 353, 355 (1947) ( the NLRA appl ies to Puerto Rico) .
41 Residents of Puerto Rico can partic ipate in party primar ies, however. They can t hus inf luence the choice of party candidates for the US
presidency.
78rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
excluding economic terms bargained through the Board and marginally at the plant level. Finally, the ILGWU
was successful in negotiating for slightly better wages at the plant level than those mandated by the Board
).
the Board level, and the ILGWU had preexisting relationships with the same employers in the United States.
States today via industrial policy?
4. Promoting Unions with Industrial Policy in the
United States Today
industry (
of federal programs include Tesla, the wind turbine
Gallucci
; ;
As described above, an important reason union
membership has declined in the US is that historically
unionized industries have been declining in relative
importance, giving way to industries that are
nonunion. A shift to green industry will thus further
erode union membership in the US unless unions can
Industrial policy could bolster
industries and unions in the
service economy, in which many
women and people of color—
historically policy afterthoughts
and at the margins of labor
protective legislation and union
representation—work.
79
Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor Unions in the United States
union apprenticeship programs and mandating prevailing wages (). Some parts
some companies that receive direct federal subsidies are required to remain neutral during a union election
and/or voluntarily recognize a union (
thwarting unionization (). Thus, a more robust policy would include mandating employer neutrality
and
).
The federal government could also help promote what this essay calls “Fair Transition Funds,” which can
Industries would
be federally supported if they can better guarantee quality union jobs for those who will lose in the transition,
green economy devoid of a middle class and threatened by oligarchy and autocratic government is not the
bright future we hope for.
to green industry. And once government incentives are no longer attractive, using those incentives to promote
unions would no longer be viable. Unions would have to sustain themselves in a different industrial context, in
which they might be even less relevant than today.
42 Supplementar y unemployment benefits should help sustain workers and their families during workers’ retraining and job matching periods.
These funds would go beyond typical unemployment benefits to better guarantee that workers and their families are able to maintain
dignif ied lives during the transitio n to a green economy.
43 Inf lation has been one of the hallmarks of “Bidenomic s.” Hence, s ectoral wage boards such as those prevailing in Puerto Rico could also be
used as an ti-i nfla tionar y tools, like in Sweden, if inflation experts determine that hig h wages are a leading cause of inflation in th e US.
80rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
5. Addressing Some Skeptics
this question, but given the current structure of US labor law, union organizing rules, and collective bargaining,
a spending bill.
their speech? This is a complex constitutional question with an answer beyond the space limits of this short
piece. But the brief answer is that there should be no constitutional bar to a federal spending bill that includes
objectives even if these objectives result in favoring some points of views over others. The government may
Third, which unions and employers would be part of the Fair Transition Funds? How will the federal
government compel these parties to participate in them? How will the funds be underwritten? How would
Hasn’t the US federal government and many state and local governments already toyed with retraining
to create new training programs?
These are certainly essential questions that we must answer to craft a viable policy for Fair Transition Funds.
But before we discuss those details, we should agree, in principle, that unions and employers should collaborate
threshold agreement, we can discuss the details.
44 Rust v. Sullivan, 5 00 U.S. 173, 193 (1991 ).
45 Regan v. Taxation Wi th Representation of Washington, 461 U.S . 540, 549–55 0 (1983).
81
Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor Unions in the United States
6. Conclusion
they have seen their economic conditions deteriorate, while individuals at the top income levels have seen
their fortunes expand exponentially. Union decline has been a major reason for the worsening conditions
contributed to union decline. The shift to a green economy shepherded by US industrial policy could give
labor an opportunity to gain some lost ground, but only if US industrial policy includes express provisions
ingredients in Sweden were centralized collective bargaining and robust institutional roles for unions to help
The author thanks Robin Clark-Bennett, Deepa Das Acevedo, Matthew Dimick, Catherine Fisk, Andrew
Jordan, Amy Koopman, Sunny Malhotra, Madison Rush, Todd Tucker, the participants of the 2022
Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law, and participants of the 2022 Roosevelt
Institute Industrial Policy Convening. The author would also like to thank Claire Greilich and Sonya
Gurwitt for their contributions to this project.
82rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
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Fair Transition Funds, Employer Neutrality, and Card Checks: How Industrial Policy Could Relaunch Labor Unions in the United States
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85
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate Guardrails Can Improve Industrial Policy Outcomes
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate
Guardrails Can Improve Industrial
Policy Outcomes
By Lenore Palladino
Lenore Palladino is assistant professor of economics and public policy at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. She is a senior fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and a research associate at the
Political Economy Research Institute. She holds a PhD from the New School University in economics and
a JD from Fordham Law School.
1. Introduction
Transforming the auto industry is a top goal for decarbonization: Transportation is the leading cause of
to redirect the US auto industry toward electric vehicle production (). Public efforts require
private auto manufacturers to change their production processes, but do not necessarily challenge their focus
interest for decades. This essay considers how past public policy toward the auto industry has supported the
should include corporate guardrails to maximize its success in the future.
products,” while also always relying on a system of suppliers and dealers (). While the “Big
newly inaugurated President Biden signed a series of executive orders on climate change, General Motors
46 This essay builds on the analysis that Isab el Estevez and I offered in a 2022 Roosevelt Insti tute issue brief, “The Need for Corporate
Guardrails in Industrial Policy.”
86rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
processes and build battery production facilities (
electric vehicle future, including critical minerals sourcing and processing and battery manufacturing” (White
).
for domestic battery manufacturing (as well as funds to build out rapid charging infrastructure) (Department
; ).
manufacturers.
While public investment is necessary for such a
complex and urgent transformation of a major sector
of the economy, the government’s engagement with
the auto sector runs into a profound challenge: the
shareholder primacy orientation in US corporate
economic theory for the corporation and how the
and the public interest (; Palladino
). Shareholder primacy, based on the neoclassical
shareholder wealth, rather than producing goods
(; ; ;
). This points to the challenges faced by an
administration funding GM and other auto companies for the electric vehicle transition: There are currently
no limits in place to ensure that companies do not simply use the public funding to increase their payments to
shareholders.
47 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has also proposed s weepin g regulation to ensure that n ew cars produced and sold in the United
States will be ele ctric (Meyer and Pontecorvo 2023).
48 The triumvirate of indus trial p olicy p rojec ts incl ude many effor ts related to electric vehicles that are not discussed in th is essay. Fo r example,
the Bipartisan Infr astructure L aw invested $5 billion over f ive years in supporting states to devel op the EV chargin g netwo rk throu gh the
National Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Program (Joint O ff ice of Ener gy and Transp ortation 2023 ). Other initiatives focus on
reshoring the critical minerals—mainly lithium—required for electric vehicle production.
49 While t his essay focuses on corpo rate guardrails in indus trial p olicy, I have writ ten elsewhere abo ut the ne ed to tran sform corporate and
financial law across the entire economy, including in: “Towards ‘Accountable Capitalism”; “The Potential Benefits of a Public Asset Manager”;
“Responsible Asset Managers”; and “Regulating Stock Bu yback s.” The premise here is that while these broader changes are necessary, the
political will is lacking, and industrial policy will be stronger if it includes changes that should eventually be applied economy-wide.
50 This is after a 2015 f ight wi th act ivis t shareholder Ha rry Wilson in which GM committed to $5 bill ion in sto ck buyb acks to kee p Wilson off the
GM board (Hopkins and Lazonick 2023).
While public investment is
necessary for such a complex
and urgent transformation of a
major sector of the economy,
the government’s engagement
with the auto sector runs into
a profound challenge: the
shareholder primacy orientation
in US corporate governance.
87
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate Guardrails Can Improve Industrial Policy Outcomes
support for companies with “conditionalities” or
(
describe how the auto industry bailouts that occurred
the company’s later behavior away from shareholder
primacy but instead extracted concessions from
guardrails that complement the focus on maintaining
administration have prioritized, including limits
on corporate extraction, and mechanisms to bring
also has a brief history in the US; I describe how encouraging such participation could again be a focus of US
moving forward.
While this essay focuses more narrowly on policy that affects auto manufacturers, it supports the premise
that industrial policy should reduce individual vehicle dependence by supporting a strengthened public
) have noted,
“Americans collectively drive more than three trillion vehicle miles per year, most of those as a single driver in
the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law put substantial funds toward highway expansion even as it also sought to
household dependence on individual vehicles and build a robust public transportation infrastructure.
2. Auto Bailouts during the Financial Crisis
). The GM
once the loan was repaid) (
51 The Climate & Community Project’s “Toward a Green New Deal in Transportation” has an important set of recommendations to equitably
decarbonize our transportation infrastructure (Freemark et al. 2022).
52 For a complete description of public equity stakes taken during the financial crisis, see GAO 2010.
53 For details on the actual number of shares held, see Black 2010.
Industrial policy has the ability
to pair financial support for
companies with “conditionalities”
or “guardrails” to make sure that
the public-interest purpose of
public financial investment is met.
88rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
GM offers just one example of how the federal government could have approached the last decade differently
shareholder promoting the public interest. The federal government became the majority shareholder in GM
despite robust
the decade even while its efforts to transition to electric vehicles proceeded slowly (as described below) (Gilpin
; ).
55) says, “there is
).
government feels it is necessary to respond to a company’s request for substantial assistance, the government
growth,” (
to the crisis meant that different institutions were dealt with differently and there was no consistent approach
shareholder ().
were a private shareholder, Davidoff (
on the table, enabling them to accrue privately rather than to the public interest. In other words, this meant
economic recovery and the public interest.
54 The announcement o f plant cl osures made its s tock price soar, in a clear example of the lack of a focus o n produc tion in the logic of
shareholder primacy.
55 Davidoff and Zaring (2009) describe the government’s role in the JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger as “a deal-making middleman, a traditional
role for investment bankers.”
56 The Treasury M anagin g Guiding Principles state, “we want to see t he capi tal base of our financial s ystem return to private hands as quickly as
possible, while preserving financial stability and promoting economic recovery.” Guiding principles include:
- Protect taxpayer investments and maximize overall investment returns within competing constraints;
- Promote stability for, and prevent disruption of, financial markets and economy;
- Bolster market confidence to increase private market investment; and
- Dispose of investments as soon as practicable in a timely and orderly manner that minimizes financial market and economic impact (Black
2010).
57 Thi s was not the fir st time t he US government took public equit y stakes: In 1984, “the FDIC too k an 80 percent stake in a troubled bank ,
Continental I llinois, and hel d the sto ck for seven years before it di vested . The FDIC was an ac tive sharehold er, though i t was careful to
distinguish i ts role as an active shareholder f rom nationaliza tion: it recruited and selected t he new CEO a nd Chair of the Boar d. The stock had
no voting rights though they did have veto powe r over directors. The bailout cost the FDI C $1.1 billion” (Black 2010).
89
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate Guardrails Can Improve Industrial Policy Outcomes
international competitiveness. The UAW agreed to concessions as part of the restructuring, including layoffs,
labor costs (
replacing cash commitments with equity. An additional provision mandated by the government was that
().
3. Policy Recommendations for Corporate Guardrails in the
Electric Vehicle Transition
as applicants that currently pay top quartile wages in their industry,” which earned approval from the UAW
(). The administration’s public statements about funding availability include
consistent reference to “quality auto sector jobs” that remain in the communities in which they are currently
located, in an explicit focus on the unionized facilities in the Midwest (). There is,
in other words, an explicit focus on ensuring that factory conversions do not result in lower job quality.
58 From the DO E Loan Program Of fice’s description of it s criteria: “In t he event t hat an app licant seeks LP O fina ncing for a projec t that co nvert s
or direc tly rep laces an existing factory that has hig h-qualit y jobs, LP O will also asses s the projected economi c impac ts of the facili ty
convers ion relative to th e existing faci lity, including factors such as contribution to the local economy, employm ent history, ant icipated
employ ment, a nd durat ion of it s existence For these project s, LPO wi ll asses s the degree to whic h the prop osed project is likely to p reser ve
high- quali ty jobs, prior itizing applic ants that currently pay top quar tile wages in their industry as repor ted by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, as well as commensurate non -wage compensation b enef its, as applic able. LP O will also consider the deg ree to which the proposed
projec t, or group of proj ects, are in communities with a 20+ year history of producing vehicles or sup plying part s for vehicles” (Depar tment of
Energy 2023b).
90rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
Works Councils and Worker Voice on Corporate Boards
of considering health and safety issues.
).
;
resonated among union employees because:
They reached the conclusion that they don’t have a voice in their own destiny and their own future unless
they have representation at the point the decisions are made or before the decisions are made. Because
once the decisions are made and once they are irreversible, you really can’t do anything about it. You can
complain about it. But you can’t challenge it effectively. You have to be there, and you have to be a party to
.
directors, to which he was elected with a statement to shareholders saying that he viewed his position as
. . never thought about before” ().
Limits on Corporate Extraction
; ). The
59 For a comp lete analysis of how worker representation on corporate boar ds and wor ks councils could funct ion in the United States, see
Palladino 2021.
60 Fraser goes o n to say: “ I think representation on the Board, repre sentation on all levels of t he decision-making p rocess will come ab out, will
grow, because it’s the true spirit of d emocra cy. In the f inal analysis , the companies are g oing to realize, as some of them have now, it’s go od
for all of us” (Fraser 1982).
91
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate Guardrails Can Improve Industrial Policy Outcomes
The loans are intended for the purpose of:
mode or condition, low or zero exhaust emissions of greenhouse gasses.
price manipulation,
Public Equity Stakes
Acting as a shareholder, the federal government can vote on corporate decisions alongside other shareholders,
engage when companies and projects have been deemed in the public interest such that they are worth public
investment.
decisions resulting from an excessive focus on shareholder primacy, though the substantive implementation
business corporation, the government should participate in corporate governance by voting on major corporate
including the ability to veto certain company actions, and accompany both economic and governance rights.
61 Inf lation Reduction Ac t of 2022, Pub. L . No. 117-1 69, § 50142, 136 Stat. 181 8, 204 4 (2022); Ene rgy and Independence and S ecurity Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No-110-140 § 1 36(d) ( 2007) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 17013).
62 See Hop kins and Lazonick (2023) for a full over view of executive compens ation at GM and how C EO Mar y Barra’s pay is actu ally influen ced
by the company’s moves to affect GM s tock price.
92rooseveltinstitute.orgRoosevelt Institute
vote on major corporate decisions such as dissolutions or mergers (). The federal government
4. Conclusion
As the foreword to this series of essays discusses, a more active economic “statecraft” is necessary for future
industrial policy to be successful. The auto industry is central to the US decarbonization agenda and to
institutions and strategies are missing from US industrial policy that could help it be more successful? It does
auto industry in its industrial policy efforts. In order to ensure that public investment results in public gain,
decisions, and participating directly in corporate governance.
The author thanks Roosevelt Institute staff; project participants; and Matt Hopkins and Bill Lazonick
for their excellent feedback. The author would like to thank Todd Tucker for his comments and Sonya
Gurwitt, Claire Greilich, and Sunny Malhotra for their editorial contributions.
93
Electric Vehicles: How Corporate Guardrails Can Improve Industrial Policy Outcomes
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Industrial Policy 2025: Bringing the State Back In (Again)
For More of Roosevelt’s
Industrial Policy Research and
Progressive Ideas, Read:
Sea Change: How a New Economics Went Mainstream
by Felicia Wong, Suzanne Kahn, Mike Konczal, and Matt Hughes
Multi-Solving, Trade-Offs, and Conditionalities in
Industrial Policy
by Isabel Estevez
Lessons from Abroad: What US Policymakers Can Learn
from International Examples of Democratic Governance
by Shahrzad Shams, Johanna Bozuwa, Isabel Estevez, Carla Santos Skandier,
and Patrick Bigger
Industrial Policy Synergies: Reflections from
Biden Administration Alumni
by Todd N. Tucker, Sameera Fazili, Jane Flegal, Jennifer Harris, Janelle Jones,
K. Sabeel Rahman, and Tim Wu
Progressive Preemption: How the Defense Production Act
Can Override Corporate Extraction, Boost Worker Power,
and Expedite the Clean Energy Transition
by Joel Dodge, Joel Michaels, Lenore Palladino, and Todd N. Tucker
Industrial Policy and Planning: What It Is and How to
Do It Better
by Todd N. Tucker
rooseveltinstitute.org
