No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Autism and metamorphic temporalities
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
The temporal encoding of nonverbal signals within individuals, referred to as intrapersonal synchrony (IaPS), is an implicit process and essential feature of human communication. Based on existing evidence, IaPS is thought to be a marker of nonverbal behavior characteristics in autism spectrum disorders (ASD), but there is a lack of empirical evidence. The aim of this study was to quantify IaPS in adults during an experimentally controlled real-life interaction task. A sample of adults with a confirmed ASD diagnosis and a matched sample of typically-developed adults were tested (N = 48). Participants were required to indicate the appearance of a target invisible to their interaction partner nonverbally through gaze and pointing gestures. Special eye-tracking software allowed automated extraction of temporal delays between nonverbal signals and their intrapersonal variability with millisecond temporal resolution as indices for IaPS. Likelihood ratio tests of multilevel models showed enlarged delays between nonverbal signals in ASD. Larger delays were associated with greater intrapersonal variability in delays. The results provide a quantitative constraint on nonverbal temporality in typically-developed adults and suggest weaker temporal coherence between nonverbal signals in adults with ASD. The results provide a potential diagnostic marker and inspire predictive coding theories about the role of IaPS in interpersonal synchronization processes.
To facilitate multisensory processing, the brain binds multisensory information when presented within a certain maximum time lag (temporal binding window). In addition, and in audiovisual perception specifically, the brain adapts rapidly to asynchronies within a single trial and shifts the point of subjective simultaneity. Both processes, temporal binding and rapid recalibration, have been found to be altered in individuals with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis. Here, we used a large adult sample (autism spectrum disorder: n = 75, no autism spectrum disorder: n = 85) to replicate these earlier findings. In this study, audiovisual stimuli were presented in a random order across a range of stimulus onset asynchronies, and participants indicated whether they were perceived simultaneously. Based on the synchrony distribution, their individual temporal binding window and point of subjective simultaneity were calculated. Contrary to previous findings, we found that the temporal binding window was not significantly different between both groups. Rapid recalibration was observed for both groups but did not differ significantly between groups. Evidence of an age effect was found which might explain discrepancies to previous studies. In addition, neither temporal binding window nor rapid recalibration was correlated with self-reported autistic symptoms or sensory sensitivity.
Lay abstract
It has been known for a long time that individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder perceive the world differently. In this study, we investigated how people with or without autism perceive visual and auditory information. We know that an auditory and a visual stimulus do not have to be perfectly synchronous for us to perceive them as synchronous: first, when the two are within a certain time window (temporal binding window), the brain will tell us that they are synchronous. Second, the brain can also adapt quickly to audiovisual asynchronies (rapid recalibration). Although previous studies have shown that people with autism spectrum disorder have different temporal binding windows, and less rapid recalibration, we did not find these differences in our study. However, we did find that both processes develop over age, and since previous studies tested only young people (children, adolescents, and young adults), and we tested adults from 18 to 55 years, this might explain the different findings. In the end, there might be quite a complex story, where people with and without autism spectrum disorder perceive the world differently, even dependent on how old they are.
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are associated with cognitive dysfunctions, including mental time travel (MTT). However, findings on diminished MTT ability may be confounded by a number of factors, including the individuals’ language ability, factors related to the MTT task and the demographic factors of participants. The present study provided a meta-analysis of MTT ability in people with ASD. The results showed significant overall reductions in MTT ability in people with ASD. Moderator analyses revealed that the variables examined did not explain the reduction in MTT ability. These findings suggest that MTT ability is diminished in people with ASD and that the degree of this diminishment may not depend on the characteristics of measures or demographic variables of people with ASD.
An emerging body of research suggests that temporal processing may be disrupted in autistic children, although little is known about behaviours relating to time in daily life. In the present study, 113 parents of autistic and 201 parents of neurotypical children (aged 7–12 years) completed the It’s About Time questionnaire and open-ended questions about their child’s behaviour relating to time. The questionnaire scores were lower in the autistic compared with the neurotypical group, suggesting that behaviours are affected. Three key themes were identified using thematic analysis: autistic children had problems with temporal knowledge, learning about concepts relating to time, such as how to use the clock and language around time. There were differences in prospection with autistic children having more difficulties with how they thought about the future and prepared themselves for upcoming events. The final theme, monotropism, described how autistic children viewed their time as precious so they could maximise engagement in their interests. The present study indicates that behaviours relating to time can have a considerable impact on the daily lives of autistic children and their families. Further work exploring the development of temporal cognition in autism would be valuable for targeting effective educational and clinical support.
Lay abstract
Many everyday activities require us to organise our behaviours with respect to time. There is some evidence that autistic children have problems with how they perceive and understand time. However, little is currently known about this, or the ways in which behaviours related to time are impacted in daily life. In this study, 113 parents of autistic children and 201 parents of neurotypical children completed a questionnaire and open-ended questions about their child’s behaviour relating to time. Questionnaire scores were lower in the autistic group compared with neurotypicals, which suggests that behaviours relating to time are affected in autistic children. The open-ended responses further confirmed that the autistic children struggled with time and that this impacted on them and their family. Three key themes were identified. Theme 1: autistic children have problems with learning about concepts relating to time such as telling the time from a clock and using words to describe time (hours, minutes, etc.) appropriately. Theme 2: autistic children think about the future differently. Planning and working under time pressure were described as a problem. Theme 3: autistic children have strong interests which take up a lot of their attention and worrying about having sufficient time to pursue these interests causes anxiety. This research indicates that behaviours related to time can have a considerable impact on the lives of autistic children and that targeted support may be required.
In this article, I argue that rhythm is a key concept in understanding autism. The article builds on fieldwork conducted amongst autistic children at two specialized institutions in Denmark, as well as interviews with parents of autistic children, some of whom were also autistic themselves. The paper draws on Lefebvre’s theory of ‘rhythmanalysis’ and treats rhythm as a ‘way of being’. Viewing autism as a rhythm by using locutions expressed by my interlocutors, such as staccato, schematic, robotic, desynchronized, not tuning in and dissonant, illustrates the many ways to perceive social interaction as rhythmic. I add to this the concept of syncopation, to describe some of the most common features associated with autism, pointing to a non-pathological way of being irregular or offbeat. This ‘non-pathologizing language’ communicates both the challenges and contributions of social interactions between autistic people and their friends and family members.
Although the experience of time is of central relevance for psychopathology, qualitative approaches to study the inner experience of time have been largely neglected in autism research. We present results from qualitative data acquired from 26 adults with high functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Employing inductive content analysis we identified a distinct pattern of interrupted time experience in ASD. Individuals with ASD seemed to implement structured and routine behavior by future planning to guarantee that the present passed uninterrupted. We reason that the success of corresponding compensatory mechanisms determines the development of distress and noticeable symptoms. Considering recent theories on Bayesian perceptual inference we relate the syndrome of interrupted time experience to the putative neuronal mechanisms underlying time experience.
We present a conceptual framework on the experience of time and provide a coherent basis on which to base further inquiries into qualitative approaches concerning time experience. We propose two Time-Layers (Macro-Layer and Micro-Layer) and two Time-Formats (Flow and Structure) forming four Time-Domains. Micro-Flow and Micro-Structure represent the implicit phenomenal basis, from which the explicit experiences of Macro-Flow and Macro-Structure emerge. Complementary to this theoretical proposal, we present empirical results from qualitative content analysis obtained from 25 healthy participants. The data essentially corroborate the theoretical proposal. With respect to Flow, the phenomenally accessible time experience appeared as a continuous passage reaching from the past through the present into the future. With respect to Structure, the individual present was embedded in the individual biography, emerging from past experiences and comprising individual plans and goals. New or changing plans and goals were being integrated into the existing present, thus forming a new present. The future appeared as changeable within the present, by means from the past, and therefore as a space of potential opportunities. Exemplarily, we discuss these results in relation to previous empirical findings on deviant experiences of time in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) that is presumably characterized by a breakdown of Flow and concomitant compensatory repetition resulting in an overly structured time. Finally, we speculate about possible implications of these findings both for psychopathological and neuroscientific research.
The temporality of intentions and actions in situations of social interaction can sometimes be paradoxical. I argue that in these situations it may sometimes be possible to conceive of individual acts that can, in a strong sense, be intended retroactively. This could happen when the relational patterns in social interaction literally alter the virtual structure of a participant's past corporeal intentions resulting in an odd experience of having intended something all along without knowing it. I propose that this possibility should be interpreted as more than just a narrowly epistemic phenomenon. Examining this claim involves clarifying the enactive perspective on intentionality, which I do here. The enactive approach rejects the model of a causal relation between intention and action for one of an intrinsic qualitative relation between the two as facets of sense-making. I develop this idea and compare it with Merleau-Ponty's Fundierung model of the mutual relation between corporeal and reflexive intentionality to show that co-regulated moves/affections during social interaction may modulate both arcs of this relation, creating the possibility of a re-signification that alters not the actuality but the virtual tendencies that preceded the social act.
Most mental disorders include more or less profound disturbances of intersubjectivity, that means, a restricted capacity to respond to the social environment in a flexible way and to reach a shared understanding through adequate interaction with others. Current concepts of intersubjectivity are mainly based on a mentalistic approach, assuming that the hidden mental states of others may only be inferred from their external bodily behaviour through 'mentalizing' or 'mindreading'. On this basis, disorders of intersubjectivity for example in autism or schizophrenia are attributed to a dysfunction of Theory of Mind modules. From a phenomenological point of view, however, intersubjectivity is primarily based on a pre-reflective embodied relationship of self and other in an emergent bipersonal field. Instead of a theory deficit, autistic and schizophrenic patients rather suffer from a basic disturbance of being-with-others which they try to compensate by explicit inferences and hypothetical assumptions about others. The paper consequently distinguishes three levels of intersubjectivity: (a) primary intersubjectivity or intercorporeality, (b) secondary intersubjectivity or perspective-taking, and (c) tertiary intersubjectivity, implying a self-other metaperspective. On this basis, disturbances on these different levels in autism and schizophrenia are described.
Research on autism has increased significantly over the past several decades. This upsurge parallels the steep rise in autism diagnoses. Together, these conditions have increased the number of people occupying the social role of research participants, including investigators, analysts and subjects. Simultaneously, addressing scientific questions about autism now involves new research efforts including prospective enriched-risk cohort studies exploring the environmental and genetic causes of autism during pregnancy and early child development. Rather than one-time donations, these studies require extended commitments on the part of all those involved in the research. This article draws on ethnographic observations of research practices and interviews with investigators, study staff and participants to examine the emergent relationships between research and care in this area of autism science. I introduce the notion of ‘taking care’ to describe the forms of anticipatory labor and mutual extraction involved in longitudinal research. Through tracing three modes of taking care across practices of study design, data collection and participation, I argue that research and care become intimately intertwined and mutually constructed during the research process. These findings reflect how processes of taking and giving are constitutive of research participation for all those engaged in the research enterprise. This article considers the relationships between these practices and new forms of community and sociality related to biomedical science.
Asperger's syndrome is a pervasive developmental condition characterized by features of autism. As observed in clinical practice, individuals with Asperger's syndrome present an impairment related to inflexibility in their everyday routine, an immediate manner of experiencing and relating, and difficulties in estimating periods of time. Following a phenomenological perspective, this study is an attempt to examine these aforementioned aspects in terms of temporality. Thirteen participants with Asperger's syndrome, from 13 to 20 years old, were interviewed about their experience of periods of time, personal history, their past, present and future; and their concept of time and finitude. After the interviews, it was possible to identify three general themes which emerged in the invariant aspects of their experience of time: factual experience of present and future dimensions, chronological time and the past experience. Moreover, participants' descriptions evidenced aspects of experience based on the specificity of lived facts and a sense of time specifically related to what was lived in the past.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
This essay provides a nonessentializing account of how gender affects the social construction of time in communicative interactions. Niklas Luhmann's systems theory serves as the theoretical framework for explaining how time is constructed through communication codes. Using Luhmann's model, the essay argues that gender is a communication code that operates to align social participants' perspectives towards a socially constructed “present.” However, the essay notes that participants' experience of that present will be contingent upon the specific cultural and historical criteria that constitute their use of the gender code. The criteria specific to Anglo-American culture are used to illustrate how this instanciation of the gender code might affect temporal experience.
The many levels of intersubjectivity
- Rucinska
The intertwinement of temporality and intersubjectivity. Two dimensions of the embodied human mind and its pathologies
- Pritzkau