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Gender-based resilience
Fostering
women’s leadership
Published in 2024 by the United Nations Educational, Scienti c and Cultural Organization,
7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France
© UNESCO 2024
ISBN 978-92-3-XXXXXX-X
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Cover illustration: Aurélia Mazoyer
Graphic design: Aurélia Mazoyer
Printed by UNESCO
Printed in France
SHORT SUMMARY
“Since wars begin in the minds o f men and
women it is in theminds of men and wome n
thatthe defences ofpeace mustbe constru cted”
No (leadership) share no gain (for societies and
economies)!
Leveraging UNESCO’s unique Gender-Based Resilience Framework,
this report explores the role of women in leadership positions
in both decision-making and high-tech, including in articial
intelligence-related innovations. It further highlights
progress towards the G20 Brisbane Target, aimed
to accelerate progress on gender equality by
reducing the gender gap in labour market
participation rates by 25% by 2025.
Women remain underrepresented in decision-
making, holding only about 26% of seats in
national parliaments worldwide on average. In
the world of work, female labour participation
continues to lag behind men’s, at 47% for women
against 72% for men2 on average. Despite progress
by G20 members towards the Brisbane Target, a 2% average gap
in absolute terms remained to be lled in 2022. In the high-tech
world, women make up only 30% of AI professionals, and even less
of leaders.3 Female inventors in AI account for about 37% of patents
led in 2022-23.
The lack of diversity and inclusiveness that these gaps represent
continues to hinder progress, creativity, innovation, and wellbeing,
undermining resilience and societies’ ability to respond to crises. The
evidence proposed calls on policymakers to develop and implement
eective gender-transformative policies to eliminate these gaps.
Only 8 women
appear among the CEOs of
the top 100 high-tech
companies.
Gender-based resilience
Fostering
women’s leadership
4
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Foreword
Would a person be able to move away from a place
if the strings of one of her shoes were trapped in a
closed door? The answer we may all give is no, and we
would perhaps add that, to be able to walk away, that
person would need to open the door and tighten her
laces rst, before moving. Well, this is exactly what is
happening to humanity, whose strings made of old
and new constraints, social norms and prejudices,
prevent women and girls – i.e. over half of humanity –
from being fully empowered to advance. This, in turn,
hinders societies’ ability to progress, and to move away
and recover from shocks.
Resilience, and the ability of societies to withstand
and overcome challenges, entails more than merely
surviving crises. It requires having the individual and
collective ability to adapt, change, redress and thrive.
Yet, still today, women are not given equal chances
when it comes to contributing to, or benetting from,
a wide range of opportunities, including in decision-
making. Built leveraging the whole spectrum of social
and human sciences, UNESCO’s Gender-Based
Resilience Framework underscores the centrality of
women’s empowerment as a necessary condition of
resilience, and tracks progress – or lack thereof – based
on robust empirical evidence.
This year the report focuses on decision-making, both
in policy or technology, and on women having the
possibility to be at the helm; on innovativeness and
on women’s opportunities to contribute to building
the future we collectively want; and on women’s
labour market participation, as resilience is intertwined
with independence, understood also as nancial
independence. The ndings are clear.
Despite progress observed in recent years, women
continue to be underrepresented in top decision-
making roles worldwide. In 1995, women held about
10% of parliamentary seats in the world; now, they
account for about 26% of parliamentarians. Gender
quota systems greatly contributed to this result, and
while this more than double gure mirrors progress,
women remain below the 30% target set by the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995. Women
now hold 28% of ministerial positions, an increase of
8 percentage points since 2014, but still not enough.
Let me give you another example: this year, out of
the 27 presidents elected, only 4 were women, and I
am proud to say among them there is the President
of my country, Mexico. While improvements emerge,
it is paramount to continue fostering more inclusive
policymaking, as evidence shows that when women
lead, they bring unique perspectives and contribute to
improve and enrich policymaking.
In the labour market, in 2014, G20 countries rearmed
their commitment to gender equality by agreeing
on the Brisbane Target, aiming to reduce by 25% the
© Christelle Alix
5
Foreword
gender gap in the labour market by 2025. This was a
hallmark outcome for the G20, which was looking for
new sources of inclusive growth. I am proud to say
that, together with the other Sherpas, we managed to
provide the evidence that let to leaders recognising
that increasing women’s participation in the labour
market was not only the right thing to do, but also the
smart thing to do. This agreement opened the door for
numerous gender-focused outcomes adopted since
then, both at the G20 and G7, further strengthening
the growing global consensus that women’s
participation in the labour market benets the welfare
and wellbeing of both economies and societies. While
gures show that, on average, G20 countries managed
to meet the Brisbane Target, progress remain uneven
and at times partial.
In G20 countries, women remain 1.5 times more likely
to hold low-paying jobs than men, 82% more likely
to work part-time, and earn on average 14% less.
When it comes to high-tech companies, in the top
100 worldwide we only nd 8 women at the helm. In
the top seven high-tech companies (Amazon, Apple,
Google, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla), women
represent only 33% of the workforce and only 25% of
technical roles. Also, data about women participation
in articial intelligence-related innovations, as proxied
by patents, show that women accounted for about
37% of them – quite far from gender equality, although
an improvement compared with the past. These
gender gaps hinder progress, creativity and innovation,
undermining individuals’ and societies’ resilience
and well-being. In the case of articial intelligence,
there is an urgent need to avoid the generation,
reproduction and amplication of gender stereotypes,
in and through the digital world. This is what that we
are pursuing through our UNESCO Women for Ethical
AI platform, leveraging the gender chapter of the
UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Articial
Intelligence - the only global normative standard that
exists and that is applicable to all 194 UNESCO Member
States.
This report calls for urgent action from governments,
businesses, and communities. It is now the time to
continue improving and to step up engagement and
delivery, as the evidence is clear: empowering women
translates into greater welfare and wellbeing for all,
and ultimately leads to more inclusive, peaceful and
resilient societies. Together and more equal we are
stronger.
7
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
This report was developed by Mariagrazia Squicciarini, Anna Rita Manca, and Garance Sarlat under the leadership
and overall supervision of Gabriela Ramos, Assistant Director-General for the Social and Human Sciences of
UNESCO.
We would have not been able to develop and nalise this publication without the invaluable support of Lara Savini,
José Valdez Genao, Salma Ibrahim, Louisa Ben Saïd and Juliette Solesse who helped gather the rst-hand data
collected for part of the analysis, retrieve relevant literature, perform some of the analysis, and proofread the work.
Thanks also go to Eleonora Lamm for contributing a section related to the 2024 UNESCO Women for Ethical AI’s
Outlook and to Roman Jurowetzki and Diletta Abbonato for sharing data about patents in articial intelligence.
Finally, we are grateful to Aparna Nayyar, Angad Singh Malik, Isha Kakkad, and Ramit Singh Chimni (Eight Goals
One Foundation), Erica Emdon (Higher Health), Nadia Caïd (Women’s Forum), Ligia Nobrega (European Institute
for Gender Equality), and our UNESCO colleagues Lora Gailly and Tabué Nguma for providing comments on earlier
drafts of the report.
All errors remain our own.
8
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Table of Contents
Foreword 4
Acknowledgements 7
Executive summary 13
1. Monitoring Framework conditions 13
2. Women in decision-making 14
3. Women in the labour market 14
4. Women in technology and innovation 15
Introduction 16
Chapter 1. The Gender-Based Resilience Framework: A brief overview 19
Tracking trends: Monitoring change 21
Violence against women 21
Expenditure in education and school dropout 22
Youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) 25
Unpaid work 27
Chapter 2. Women in policy- and decision-making 31
Framing the issue 32
Status quo, evolutions and challenges 35
Regional trends 36
Gender diversity in parliaments 42
Political representation by gender and age 43
Case studies: Elections in 2024 45
Worldwide parliamentary and presidential elections in 2024 45
European elections in 2024 48
Women’s representation and democracy 50
Data, model specication and results 51
9
Table of Contents
Chapter 3. Women in the labour market 55
The Brisbane target: objective and key indicators 56
Charting a more inclusive path: the political framework and current situation 57
Progress in achieving the Brisbane target: women’s participation in the labour market 58
Progress in relation to the quality of women’s employment 60
Job quality 61
Labour market security (S) 63
Working conditions (W) 67
Chapter 4. Women in innovation, the digital world and AI 77
Gender, technological change and innovation 78
Female graduates in STEM 80
Women in the digital world and AI 81
The role of women in AI-related innovations: Evidence from patents 84
Prioritizing gender equality in AI policy frameworks 87
Towards the gender-based resilient future we want: some conclusions and policy implications 87
References 89
Annex I.Details of the gender distribution of employees by company 97
10
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Measurement approach 19
Figure 2: Forms of violence against women (%) 20
Figure 3: Female school dropout and government expenditure on secondary education (%) 21
Figure 4: Male school dropout and Government expenditure on secondary education (%) 22
Figure 5: Association between female NEET rate, government investment on secondary education and
poverty headcount 23
Figure 6: Association between male NEET rate, government investment on secondary education and
poverty headcount 24
Figure 7: Paid versus unpaid work (%) 25
Figure 8: Employment rate and gender gap in unpaid work 26
Figure 9: Female entrepreneurship and unpaid work 27
Figure 10: Women in Parliament -1995-latest available data year 33
Figure 11: Europe and Northern America: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year 34
Figure 12: Latin America and the Caribbean: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest
available year 35
Figure 13: Oceania: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year 36
Figure 14: Eastern and South-Eastern Asia: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year 37
Figure 15: Central and Southern Asia: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year 38
Figure 16: Northern Africa and Western Asia: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest
available year 39
Figure 17: Sub-Saharan Africa: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year 40
Figure 18: Distribution of female MPs by age cohort 41
Figure 19: Distribution of male MPs by age cohort 42
Figure 20: Age and gender distribution of MPs by regions (All Chambers: 2015-2021 comparison) 42
Figure 21: Candidates to the national presidential election in 2024 44
Figure 22: Gender distribution of presidents elected 44
Figure 23: Comparison of government composition before and after elections 46
Figure 24: Gender distribution in the European Parliament 2024-2029 46
Figure 25: EPs’ women’s representation since 1979 47
Figure 26: European Parliament 2024-2029 by gender and age 47
Figure 27: Women and Men in the European Commission since 1977 48
11
Table of Figures
Figure 28: Association between women’s political participation and electoral democracy index,
rule of law and political corruption index in 2023. 50
Figure 29: Gap in participation rates between men and women (15-65 years old) 56
Figure 30: Gender gap in employment rate (15-65 years old) 57
Figure 31: Gender gap in part-time work 58
Figure 32: Gender wage gap at the bottom earnings (1st decile) 59
Figure 33: Gender wage gap at the median earnings 60
Figure 34: Gender wage gap at the top earnings (9th decile) 60
Figure 35: Gender gap in low-paid work 61
Figure 36: Gender gap in the unemployment rate 62
Figure 37: Gender gap in long-term unemployment rate 62
Figure 38: Gender gap in temporary employment rate 63
Figure 39: Gender gap in informal employment 63
Figure 40: Gender gap in long hours of work(40 hours and above per week) 65
Figure 41: Gender gap in 35-39 hours of work (35-39 hours per week) 66
Figure 42: Share of women in senior and middle management positions (%) 67
Figure 43: Share of women in ministerial-level positions (%) 68
Figure 44: Gender gap in self-employment 69
Figure 45: Employment gap in couples with children aged less than six years old 69
Figure 46: Gender gap in time-related underemployment (15-64 years old) 70
Figure 47: Gender gap in time spent on unpaid work (hours per day) 71
Figure 48: Gender gap in short hours of work (20-29 hours per week) 72
Figure 49: Gender gap in short hours of work (1-9 hours per week) 73
Figure 50: Girls and Boys achievement in mathematics programme (PISA - 2022) 78
Figure 51: Female share of graduates from Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 78
Figure 52: Decision-making bodies in top 100 high-tech companies 79
Figure 53: Gender distribution of employees in the top 100 high-tech companies 80
Figure 54: Decision making bodies by numeber of employees and total revenues 81
Figure 55: Women’s representation in the top 7 high-tech companies 82
Figure 56: Inventors in AI patents, by gender and technology class, fractional counts (2022-2023) 84
12
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
List of Tables
Table 1: Number of representatives elected at the national parliaments 47
Table 2: The independent variable and its sub-dimensions 51
Table 3: Fixed eect OLS regressions on Women’s Political Empowerment Index and respectively
Electoral Democracy Index, Rule of Laws and Political Corruption Index 53
Table 4: Italian G20 Presidency set of indicators integrating the Brisbane target 56
Table 5: Number of AI-related patents by IPC class, women and men’s contribution, 2022-2023 85
Table 6: Patents in AI by teams of only men or only women inventors, by technology class, fractional
counts (2022-2023) 86
13
Executive summary
Executive summary
Building on last year’s ndings, this second Gender-
Based Resilience report continues to shed light on
the way individuals of dierent gender respond to
shocks and structural changes, and how this, in turn,
contributes to foster - or otherwise hinder - societal
resilience (UNESCO, 2023a). The focus of this year is
on the participation and role of women and, more
generally, of people of dierent gender, in policy- and
decision-making, in the labour market, and in the high-
tech sector, including articial intelligence (AI).
The analysis leverages a wide array of data, indicators
and sources – including purposely collected rst-hand
data -, to maximise coverage across countries and over
time, shed light on possible trends, and thus assess
progress or lack thereof.
1. Monitoring Framework conditions
UNESCO’s Gender-Based Resilience Framework
is articulated over three main layers, namely (i)
fundamental rights, (ii) core domains and (iii)
contextual domains.
(i). Fundamental rights, encompass from the right to
live free of violence and discrimination to the right
to education.
(ii) Core domains refer to access to health, education,
work, and political and civic engagement, inter alia.
(iii) Contextual domains include representation, values,
perception and institutions, which interact with the
aforementioned core domains.
While progress has been made towards reducing
violence against women and girls, it remains
insucient, with underreporting contributing to
mask the true scale of abuse.
#Between 2020 and 2023, the proportion of women
experiencing psychological and physical violence
at least once in life (among women aged 15-49)
dropped from 36.7% to 23%. Many cases likely
go unreported due to taboos and experiences
of secondary victimization in reporting and trial
processes.
#Global data on sexual violence against women
and girls show rates between 6% in 2019 and 10%
in 2018, with 6.7% reported in 2023. This minimal
decline calls for strengthened policy eorts for zero-
tolerance against sexual violence, and adequate
budgets and training for their implementation.
Higher investment in education contribute to
reduce dropout rates and may help addresses
youth unemployment and Not in Education,
Employment or Training (NEET) rates.
#Over the past 20 years, 22% of young girls and 14%
of young boys have been NEET. Girls are 1.6 times
more likely to be NEET than boys.
#Since 2010, countries have invested an average of
1.5% of GDP in secondary education, with a slight
decline to 1.4% in 2018-2019.
#Women’s NEET rates have dropped to 16.75% and
men’s to 12% in 2023.
#Higher government spending on secondary
education can help reduce NEET rates: a 1%
increase in education spending relate to reduced
female NEET rates of 6.9%.
#NEET rates are linked to poverty, especially in the
case of young women (correlation coecient: 0.53,
versus 0.34 for young men).
#Some countries with signicant increases in
education spending over the last years still
experience high dropout rates, particularly
among boys. This points to the need for further
investigation.
14
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
The more the time spent on unpaid care work,
the lower the participation of women in the
labour market. This calls for policies aiming to
redistribute and recognise unpaid work.
#For every additional hour spent on unpaid care
work, women’s employment rate decreases by 5.9%,
a worsening trend from the previous estimate of
4.4%.
#In countries where women spend more than two
extra hours on unpaid care work compared to men,
female employment rates are halved, at around
50%. This decline becomes even more pronounced
when the gap increases to four hours, with female
employment dropping to just 30%.
#Each additional hour of unpaid care and domestic
work is associated with a 4% decrease in the share
of rms owned by women, and, consequently, in
women’s economic opportunities.
2. Women in decision-making
Important progress has been made during
the last 30 years in relation to the UN Beijing
Conference’s target of having 30% women
in decision-making, albeit dierence across
countries and regions remain.
#In 1995, women held about 10% of parliamentary
seats; by 2024, this share had more than doubled, to
an average of about 26% across UNESCO regions.
#35% of countries have reached the critical mass
target of 30% of women’s representation in national
parliaments, with 79% of these countries having
adopted gender quota systems.
Gaps remain between formal and actual
representation, across regions and age cohorts.
#As of 2023, more than half of countries (54%) had
more than 25% of women in their legislative bodies.
#Europe and North America lead with an average of
33.4%, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and
Sub-Saharan Africa have also shown strong growth,
with countries like Cuba, Rwanda, the UAE reaching
over 50% representation.
#While women’s representation among young
Members of Parliament (MPs) increased by 11
percentage points by 2021, signicant age-related
disparities persist: Young women under 30 have
consistently made up less than 1% of MPs over the
past 15 years.
The unprecedented number of elections held
across the world in 2024 oered an opportunity
to increase gender diversity in policy making, but
expectations were not met.
#In 2024, only 4 women were elected as presidents
out of 27 countries holding presidential elections.
In 16 of these countries, there were no women
candidates at all.
#In national parliamentary elections, only 11 out of
27 countries achieved the critical threshold of 30%
female representation.
Analysis shows that countries with higher levels
of women’s political empowerment also tend to
have stronger democratic systems and adherence
to the rule of law.
#An increase in women’s political empowerment is
associated with a 52% higher probability of having
an electoral democracy.
#An increase in women’s empowerment is linked to a
57% improvement in adherence to the rule of law.
#Women empowerment is related to a 46.8%
reduction in corruption levels.
3. Women in the labour market
While most G20 countries have met or are close
to meet the G20 Brisbane Target, challenges
remain in relation to informality, part-time, and
low(er) wages, among others, in addition to
unpaid care and domestic responsibilities, which
overburden women.
#The Brisbane target of a 25% reduction in the
gender pay gap has been reached on average
across G20 countries for which data are available.
#Australia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and the Northern Ireland have met and
even surpassed the Brisbane target.
#In G20 countries, women’s employment rates
remain 28% lower than those of men and women
are 82% more likely than men to be employed part-
time.
15
Executive summary
#Women are 1.5 times more likely than men to
perform low-paying jobs and the sectors in which
women are overrepresented often tend to be those
in which wages are lower.
#In 2023, women earned on average 14% less
than men, with greater dierence in the pay gap
emerging in relation to top earners, where women
earned 18.8% less than their male counterparts.
4. Women in technology and innovation
Women remain underrepresented in high-tech,
including AI, in relation to both innovation and
management, inequalities that, among others,
may lead to the perpetuation of gender biases.
#Contrary to the stereotype that boys are better at
mathematics, evidence shows that 15-year-old boys
and girls tend to perform similarly in mathematics.
This however does not translate into career choices.
Women continue to account for less than 35% of
graduates in Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics (STEM), fuelling a persistent gender
gap in STEM elds.
#In the top seven high-tech companies (Amazon,
Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla),
women represent 33% of the workforce and
account for only one fourth (25%) of technical roles,
based on info reported in their 2023 annual reports.
#In the top 100 tech companies, women account for
a mere 8% of CEOs’, 22% of executive boards’, and
30% of boards of directors’ positions. While women
make up 37% of the workforce, they account for just
9% in high-tech roles, despite evidence showing
that diverse leadership leads to better performance.
#Only 24 out of 138 countries have government
frameworks addressing gender inequalities in and
through AI.
#Innovation continues to be male dominated, with
women accounting for only about 37% of all the
patents led in 2022-23 in relation to AI.
16
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Introduction
As societies increasingly grapple with the
compounding eects of technological disruptions,
climate change, and socio-economic inequalities, the
concept of resilience has gained renewed urgency.
Central to building resilience is the imperative to
ensure that all voices, particularly those of women,
are adequately represented in decision-making
processes across all spheres (Bawany, 2020; Verma,
2019). Research consistently demonstrates that when
women are empowered, the resulting societal benets
extend beyond individual well-being, signicantly
contributing to the stability and adaptability of
communities. Empowered women play essential
roles in decision-making processes, fostering inclusive
governance and ensuring that diverse perspectives
are represented in policy formulation. This inclusivity
not only leads to more equitable outcomes but also
strengthens a country’s ability to respond eectively
to economic, social, and environmental challenges.
Consequently, understanding the dynamics of women’s
empowerment is crucial for developing strategies that
enhance national and global resilience.
The present report leverages UNESCO’s unique Gender-
Based Resilience Framework, and builds on last year’s
ndings to look at women’s empowerment through
the lens of leadership, specically in policymaking
and the high-tech sector. This approach allows for
an in-depth analysis of women’s participation in
leadership roles, as this can inuence decision-making
processes and drive innovations in critical elds
shaping our future. Also, with the G20 Brisbane Target
approaching – a G20 target aiming to reduce the
gender gap in labour market participation rates by 25%
by 2025 -, it is imperative to assess the current levels
of women’s participation in the labour market and
their roles. Finally, the report investigates the role of
women in articial intelligence (AI)-related innovation,
emphasizing the importance of gender diversity in
shaping technologies that impact society. By exploring
these dimensions, the report seeks to provide a
comprehensive view of how women’s leadership can
transform decision- and policy-making, labour market
dynamics and technological advancements, ultimately
contributing to societal resilience.
Results shows that progress towards achieving the UN
Beijing Conference goal of 30% female representation
in decision-making roles has been notable over
the past 30 years. In 1995, women occupied about
10% of parliamentary seats, and this gure rose to
around 26% by 2024. Presently, 35% of nations have
attained the critical mass of 30% women in national
parliaments, with a majority implementing gender
quota systems. Despite advancements, signicant
gaps persist between formal and real representation
though. By 2023, 54% of countries featured over 25%
women in legislative roles, with Europe and North
America leading (33.4%) and Latin America and
Sub-Saharan Africa showing notable improvement.
However, the 2024 elections, involving over 4.1 billion
voters and oering a unique opportunity to reshape
the global political landscape (The Economist, 2024)
yielded disappointing results. Only four female
presidents among 27 countries were elected and only
11 countries achieved 30% female representation in
parliamentary elections. Increasing the presence of
women in high-level policy making would benet
societies and democracies. The analysis we perform
shows that greater female political empowerment
correlates with stronger democratic systems, enhanced
adherence to the rule of law, and decreased corruption
levels. Without intentional eorts to increase the
diversity of political leadership, the potential for
achieving truly inclusive governance remains limited.
When it comes to work, gures show that despite
advancements, challenges persist for women. The
Brisbane target of a 25% reduction in the labour market
participation’s gap of women has been met on average
across G20 countries for which data are available.
Notably, Australia, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom have surpassed this target. Despite progress,
however, women’s employment rates remain 28%
lower than men’s, with women being 82% more likely
to work part-time. Additionally, women are 1.5 times
17
Introduction
more likely than men to hold low-paying jobs, and they
earn, on average, 14% less than men having similar
qualications or jobs, with top earners experiencing
an 18.8% disparity. The overall picture that emerges
is one whereby, notwithstanding the dierences that
emerge across countries and in relation to the specic
labour market-related indicators considered, setting
targets and leveraging multilateral approaches to such
complex endeavours appear eective in advancing the
gender agenda.
When it comes to the role of women in high-tech
elds, including AI, women remain underrepresented,
with less than 35% of STEM graduates being female,
fact that contributes to perpetuating gender biases.
The report further shows that, in the top seven tech
companies worldwide, women make up 33% of the
workforce, yet occupy only 25% of technical roles.
Among the top 100 tech rms by market capitalization,
female representation is dismally low, with 8% as CEOs
and 22% on executive boards. Also, innovation-wise,
the presence of women remains insucient, as they
accounted for just 37% of inventors in AI patents
published in 2022-23. Finally, when it comes to AI
governance frameworks, gender and gender-related
aspects are explicitly considered or addressed in only
24 out of 138 countries.
In what follows, the report rst proposes a brief
overview of UNESCO’s gender-based resilience
framework and tracks change related to violence
against women; expenditure in education and school
dropout; youth not in education, employment or
training (NEET); and unpaid work. Chapter 2 focuses on
women in policy and decision making. It rst frames
the issue to then look at the status quo, the challenges
and some regional trends over time. It then investigates
more in depth some of the key outcomes of the
elections held in 2024, and looks at parliamentary
and presidential elections from a gender perspective.
Finally, it proposes an analysis of the relationship
between women’s empowerment in policy making and
democratic outcomes. Chapter 3 focuses on women in
the labour market by shedding light on the objective
and key indicators related to the G20 Brisbane Target
and investigating the extent to which targets have
been met. In addition, it looks at job quality-related
indicators, including labour market security and
working conditions. Chapter 4 conversely focuses on
women in innovation and the digital world, including
AI. It highlights the presence and role that women
have in the high-tech world and their contribution
to innovation and to shaping the technologies of the
future.
The conclusions of the analysis follow, enriched by a
number of implications for policy.
As the world stands at a crossroads, the imperative
to adopt inclusive policies that prioritise gender
inclusion and equity is clear. The resilience of our
societies depends on ensuring that women are not
merely participants but leaders in shaping the future.
This report thus serves as a guide for action, calling on
decision-makers and stakeholders to embrace gender-
transformative policies that will lay the foundation for a
more inclusive and resilient world.
19
Chapter 1.
The Gender-Based
Resilience Framework:
A brief overview
20
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
In 2023, UNESCO introduced the Gender-Based
Resilience Framework. This framework aims to shed
light on the way individuals of dierent gender
respond to shocks and structural changes, and
how this, in turn, contributes to foster (or otherwise
hinder) societal resilience (UNESCO, 2023a). Gender
roles and societal expectations signicantly inuence
decisions related to education, employment, and
access to healthcare, among others. Expectations
and stereotypes based on gender continue to shape
economic opportunities, and participation in civic
and political life, often resulting in persistent forms of
discrimination.
For example, the career aspirations of young people
are often constrained by stereotypes, such as the
belief that men excel in quantitative disciplines and
should serve as primary breadwinners, whereas
women are deemed better suited to the humanities
or professions oriented towards caregiving. Such
stereotypes can reinforce inequalities and contribute to
the systematic disempowerment of women and girls
and the devaluation of the so called “care economy”,
which, despite contributing to societal well-being,
is characterised by low pay, if any, and poor working
conditions (e.g. Folbre, 2006; Grantham et al., 2021;
Heggeness, 2023).
Gender-related norms, beliefs and stereotypes tend to
translate into important imbalances in education and
labour markets alike, contributing to making societies
less inclusive, innovative and resilient. Women make
up less than 30% of researchers globally and 20% of
university professors (UNESCO, 2022). On average, they
perform unpaid care work 2.3 times more than men
and earn 14% less than their male counterparts having
the same roles and responsibilities (UNESCO, 2023a).
When it comes to transformative technologies like
articial intelligence (AI), only 22% of AI professionals
are women, and women contribute only about 14% of
peer-reviewed AI publications (World Economic Forum,
2024).
The vulnerabilities that women face throughout their
careers have long-term repercussions on their pension
entitlements, further exacerbating gender disparities
in retirement security. Currently, women aged 65 and
above receive 26% less than men from the pension
system (UNESCO, 2023a). The greater vulnerability to
which women are systematically exposed undermines
not only their individual resilience but also that of
whole communities. Evidence shows that women’s
empowerment relates positively to the ability of
societies to thrive and be resilient (see, e.g. Aziz et al.,
2022; Duo, 2012; UNESCO, 2023a). Especially in times
of crisis, the involvement of all individuals is essential
in responding to both personal and community-level
shocks. Yet, gender-based discrimination weakens this
collective response.
UNESCO’s Gender-Based Resilience Framework
advocates for policies and interventions that empower
women and gender-diverse individuals. Institutions
have the power to reduce gender-based vulnerabilities
by ensuring equal rights, opportunities, and access
to resources for all, regardless of gender identity,
sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, and socio-
economic status, among other factors. This includes
ensuring equal access to decision-making, sexual
and reproductive healthcare, combatting all forms
of violence and discrimination, and safeguarding
fundamental rights such as education, employment,
justice, and participation in democratic processes.
Figure 1 exemplies the approach pursued in the
present report to understanding the drivers and
conditions required for the empowerment of women
and gender-diverse individuals, and the relationships
that exist between empowerment and resilience, at
both individual and collective levels.
21
CHAPTER 1: THE GENDER-BASED RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1
Figure 1: Measurement approach
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
CORE SET FACTORS
At individual
level
Representation Health Civic
engagement
Education
Environmental
justice
WorkInstitutions
Values and perceptions
At household
level
At the
community/
local level
At regional/
country level
Inequalities and inclusion
Source: UNESCO, 2023.
1 https://www.unwomen.org/en/articles/faqs/faqs-types-of-violence-against-women-and-girls
The core set of factors includes the relationships
between women’s and girls’ access to, and
empowerment in, education, health, work, political and
civic engagement, and resilience. Contextual factors
interact with core factors to either mitigate, exacerbate
or improve individuals’ resilience.
In what follows, we propose an update of some of
the key indicators and statistics rst proposed in
the UNESCO 2023 gender-based resilience report,
complement this information and identify possible
trends and changes. As mentioned in the introduction,
the second part of this report conversely focus on
three key issues: women’s participation and leadership
in decision-making, in both policy and high-tech
business; their participation in the labour market;
and their contribution to innovation, especially AI. As
technologies like AI continue to transform economies
and societies, it is imperative to examine the extent to
which women take part in shaping them and, in turn,
how technologies may aect gender equality, and
whether they can serve as catalysts to close the gender
gap, or rather exacerbate existing inequalities.
Tracking trends: Monitoring change
Following the conceptual framework illustrated in
Figure 1, we rst provide evidence about fundamental
rights, by monitoring violence against women and how
gender stereotypes relate to violence.
Violence against women
Violence against women and girls, which is a form
of gender-based violence, may entail several forms
of physical, sexual, psychological, and/or economic
violence such as: intimate partner violence (IPV),
domestic violence, harassment, rape, human
tracking and exploitation, conict-related violence,
female genital mutilation (FGM), child marriage,
virginity testing, dowry violence, femicide, as well
as technology-facilitated violence online such as
cyberbullying, stalking, non-consensual sexting, doxing,
or deepfakes, among others1 (UNWOMEN, 2024).
On average, among the countries for which data are
available since 2015, evidence shows that instances
of violence against women have been varying
importantly over the past nine years, and that physical
and emotional violence are closely intertwined.
Following a peak in 2020, when 36.7% and 33.5% of
women, respectively, reported having experienced
these types of violence during their lifetime, gures
drop to approximately 23% in both categories in 2023
(Figure 2).
22
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
When it comes to sexual violence, global data
available from 2015 onwards show percentages
ranging between 6% in 2019 to 10% in 2018, with
6.7% reported in 2023. This data, derived from
the Demographic and Health Surveys conducted
internationally, point to a very likely underestimation
of violence against women, highlighting the gravity
of what remains a largely hidden issue, of which we
merely observe the tip of the iceberg. Violence against
women, which is a phenomenon that aects one
in three women globally, on average (UNWOMEN
and WHO, 2018), constitutes a violation of women’s
human rights, as recognized by the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) (CEDAW, 1979). It further represents
a major barrier to personal fullment, which has both
immediate and long-term physical and psychological
consequences for women, their children, and the very
resilience of societies.
Gender-based violence and violence against women
are rooted in the unequal power relations that exist
among women, men and gender-diverse individuals.
It gets perpetuated through entrenched gender
stereotypes, and exacerbated in times of crises (e.g.
in the COVID-19 waves). For example, as illustrated in
Figure 2, between 2015 to 2020, two out of ve women
believed that domestic violence could be justied
under certain circumstances. This stereotype, which
legitimates the use of physical violence if a person fails
to conform to patriarchal norms and behaviours2, is
seemingly being dismantled gradually. The most recent
gures we have, i.e. for the 2023, reveal that 14.6% of
women still continue to believe domestic violence can
be justied, although this gure is nearly three times
lower than the one observed in 2020.
While the above evidence points to possible greater
awareness about women’s rights, this nevertheless
contrasts with overall statistics about the dierent
types of violence perpetrated against women. Between
2015 and 2023, almost nothing changed. We do not
observe diminishing trends but rather see peaks
emerge at times of crises (i.e. 2018-2021) among
periods when the situation barely changes. This likely
mirrors how entrenched aggressive behaviours against
women are and calls for the need to engage men
in the ght against violence against women and to
foster positive masculinities. The latter is the purpose
of UNESCO’s Transforming MEN’talities Programme3,
2 This indicator measures the percentage of women who believe a husband is justied in beating his wife for any of the following ve reasons: 1. When she argues with
him, 2 when she burns the food, 3 when she goes out without telling him, 4 when she neglects the children, 5 when she refuses sex with him.
3 https://www.unesco.org/en/social-human-sciences/transforming-mentalities#:~:text=Transforming%20MEN’talities%20aims%20to...&text=Strengthen%20skills%20
by%20engaging%20key,build%20individuals’%20social%20emotional%20skills.
which aims to engage men and dismantle harmful
masculinities and gender-based prejudices.
Figure 2: Forms of violence against women (%)
10
20
30
40
50
2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
2024
Year
Sexual violence Physical violence Emotional violence
Domestic violence is justied
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023.
Expenditure in education and school
dropout
The eradication of violence against women is a
collective responsibility that requires the active
engagement of both individuals and communities.
At the policy level, it is imperative to adopt gender
transformative approaches that leverage education
as a tool to raise awareness and empower women
and gender-diverse individuals, and that encompass
stringent and eectively enforced laws that hold
perpetrators accountable.
Education remains a fundamental component of
individuals’ empowerment and a key asset to build and
reinforce societal resilience to shocks and structural
changes, and foster prosperity (UNESCO, 2023a).
Education and training can improve individuals’ lives
by providing the skills, competences and knowledge
needed in life and at work, enabling positive impacts
that also benet future generations. Through education
and free, impartial research (UNESCO, 2017) humanity
can be able to nd solutions to some of the world’s
most pressing challenges, including climate change,
widening inequalities or democratic backsliding.
Education and individual and societal empowerment
remain the most powerful and peaceful tools to
reimagine and shape a more just and sustainable
society grounded in reciprocal respect and peace
(UNESCO, 2022a).
23
CHAPTER 1: THE GENDER-BASED RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1
Figure 3: Female school dropout and government expenditure on secondary education (%)
0
25
50
75
100
Girls school dropout rate of upper
secondary school age (%)- 2024
01234
Government expenditure on secondary education as % of GDP (%) - 2019 Correlation= -0.4085
BEN
BFA
BWA
CIV
CMR
COM
ERI
ETH
LBR
LSO
MDG
MOZ
MWI
NAM
NER
RWA
SEN
SLE
SYC
TCD
TGO
TZA
ARM
BHR CYP
DZA
GEO ISR
JOR
LBN
MAR
OMN
QAT
SYR
BGD
BTN
IND
KAZ
NPL
PAK
BRN
IDN
JPN
KHM
KOR
LAO
MNG
MYS
PHL
SGP
THA
VNM
AUS
COK
FJI
NZL
PLW
TON
VUT
WSM
ARG
BLZ
BRA
BRB
CHL
COL
CRI
CUB
CUW
CYM
DMA
DOM
ECU
GTM
GUY
HND
JAM
LCA
MEX
NIC
PER
PRY
SLV
TCA
TTO
URY
VEN VGB
ALB
AND
AUT
BEL
BGR
BIH
BLR
CAN
CHE
CZE
DEU
DNK
ESP EST FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
HUN
IRL
ISL
ITA
LTU
LUX
LVA
MLT
NLD NOR
ROU
SMR
SRB SVK
SVN SWE
USA
UNESCO electoral groups: SSA NA&WA C&SA E&SEA Oceania LAC E&NA
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and World Bank data, 2024.
Note: School dropout rate is the number of females (males) of ocial upper secondary school age individuals who are not enrolled in upper secondary school,
expressed as a percentage of the female (male) population of ocial upper secondary school age individuals. This indicator corresponds to SDG 4.1.4.
Government expenditure on secondary education, expressed as a percentage of GDP, includes expenditure funded by transfers from national and international
sources to the government. It is computed by dividing the total government expenditure for the secondary level of education by the GDP and multiplied by 100.
Education (including quality education) represents
a fundamental right and should be a must have for
all genders. However, data indicate that in 2023, 250
million children and youth aged 6 to 18 were out of
school globally, of which 48% are girls (UNESCO, 2023a).
Governments play a pivotal role in making education
accessible to all and in fostering gender-transformative
resilience, also through providing the nancial means
for this to happen. On average, in countries for which
data are available, an average 1.5% of GDP has been
invested in secondary education since 2010, a share
that declined to 1.4% between 2018 and 2019. More
recent data, despite not being comparable with the
ones for the 2018-2019 as they refer to a dierent
group of countries, show investment of 1.65% in 2020
and 1.58% of GDP in 2021 in secondary education,
pointing to a (slight) negative trend that, if conrmed,
would be worrisome.
Figure 3 shows a signicant and negative correlation
between investment in secondary education in 2019
and girls’ school dropout rates in 2024. Estimates
suggest that an additional 1% of GDP allocated to
education may relate to lower dropout rates by 13.6%
for girls and 13.4% for boys, setting the basis for more
resilient and brighter futures for millions of children.
While these ndings indicate that government
investment in education has a similarly positive eect
on both genders, dierences emerge over time.
Between 2019-2020 and 2023-2024, the percentage of
girls dropping out of school decreased by 3 percentage
points, reaching 24% in the latter period. In contrast,
boys’ dropout rates declined less, by 0.6%, reaching
24.15%. These overall trends, however, hide important
cross-country dierences and varying regional patterns.
24
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 4: Male school dropout and Government expenditure on secondary education (%)
Male school dropout rate of upper
secondary school age (%)- 2024
Correlation= -0.4139
0
25
50
75
100
01234
Government expenditure on secondary education as % of GDP (%) - 2019
BEN
BFA
BWA
CIV
CMR
COM
ERI
ETH
LBR
LSO
MDG
MOZ
MWI
NAM
NER
RWA
SEN
SLE
SYC
TCD
TGO
TZA
ARM
BHR CYP
DZA
GEO
ISR
JOR
LBN
MAR
OMN
QAT
SYR
BGD
BTN
IND
KAZ
NPL
PAK
BRN
IDN
JPN
KHM
KOR
LAO
MNG
MYS
PHL
SGP
THA
AUS
COK
FJI
NZL
PLW
TON
VUT
WSM
ARG
BLZ
BRA
BRB
CHL
COL
CRI
CUB
CUW
DMA
DOM
ECU
GTM
GUY
HND
JAM
LCA
MEX
NIC
PER
PRY
SLV
TCA
TTO
URY
VEN VGB
ALB
AND
AUT
BEL
BGR
BIH
BLR
CAN
CHE
CZE
DEU DNK
ESP EST FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
HUN
ISL
ITA LTU
LUX
LVA
MLT
NLD NOR
ROU
SMR
SRB
SVK
SVN SWE
UKR
USA
UNESCO electoral groups: SSA NA&WA C&SA E&SEA Oceania LAC E&NA
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and World Bank data, 2024.
Note: School dropout rate is the number of females (males) of ocial upper secondary school age individuals who are not enrolled in upper secondary school,
expressed as a percentage of the female (male) population of ocial upper secondary school age individuals. This indicator corresponds to SDG 4.1.4.
Government expenditure on secondary education, expressed as a percentage of GDP, includes expenditure funded by transfers from national and international
sources to the government. It is computed by dividing the total government expenditure for the secondary level of education by the GDP and multiplied by 100.
4 In line with the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, www.unesco.org/en/articles/recommendation-ethics-articial-intelligence
In Europe and North America, for instance, countries
typically allocate between 2% and 2.5% of their GDP to
secondary education, and experience a school dropout
rate below 10%, for both girls and boys. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, dropout rates for both genders vary importantly
against investment in education that generally range
between 0.5% and 1.5% of GDP.
While the observed correlation between greater
investment in education and lower school dropouts
is signicant and important, a number of exceptions
emerge, which would deserve further investigation.
For example, Botswana and Lesotho stand out in terms
of investment in education, corresponding to 3.8%
and 2.3% of GDP, respectively. Yet school dropout rates
remain high, at about 30% in Botswana and 55% in
Lesotho, with boys exhibiting higher dropout rates
than girls. In other cases, we observe very high or very
low dropout rates against investment in education
that are relatively average. This may point to the fact
that time and persistency are needed for education to
shape dynamics for good and that other factors may
need to be in place for structural change to occur.
Additional research related to these patterns may help
understand the causes leading to such high dropouts,
vis-a-vis investment in education, to inform and guide
policy.
Another pattern that emerges is that in the countries
exhibiting the lowest dropout rates for girls, boys’
dropouts are often very high. While this may reect real
dierences in educational patterns, it may nevertheless
simply represent a statistical feature, whereby big
coecients can be obtained when comparing
numbers, one of which is very small. As an example, if
we were to compare dropout rates of 0.2% and 2% it
would be correct to say that the second is tenfold the
rst. However, both numbers remain very small and
may hide non-signicant dierences.
Investing in youth is essential to enable a gender
equal, inclusive, resilient future. Young people are those
that will have to deal with the digital transformation
throughout their lives and continue steering articially
intelligence for good as it evolves4. They will also have
to continue coping - and perhaps increasingly so - with
climate change, while striving for a just green transition
(often called “the twin (green & digital) transition”
(Diodato et al., 2023).
25
CHAPTER 1: THE GENDER-BASED RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1
Youth not in education, employment or
training (NEET)
Being able to deal with change and remaining resilient
in the face of shocks requires being endowed with
the skills needed to live and thrive in the digital era
and being included in society. This is seldom the
case for people that are not in education, training or
employment.
As Figure 5 and Figure 6 show, a negative correlation
exists between government expenditures in secondary
education as percentage of GDP and the proportion
of youth that are not in education, employment or
training (the so-called “NEET”). How can one expect
young generations to be adequately prepared to face
future challenges when, on average over the past 20
years, 22% of young girls and 14% of young boys aged
15 to 29 have not been in education, employment, or
training?
Figure 5: Association between female NEET rate, government investment on secondary education and poverty headcount
0
20
40
60
80
Female NEET rate (%)
01234
Correlation = -0.3785
BLRBLRBLRBLRBLRBLRBLR
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Government expenditure on secondary education as % of GDP
Poverty headcount ratio - quartile Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high)
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2024. (Pooled data 2015-2024).
Note: The NEET indicator is the share of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) which is the proportion of young people who are not in
education, employment, or training to the population of the corresponding age group (15-29). This indicator corresponds to SDG 8.6.1.
Government expenditure on secondary education, expressed as a percentage of GDP, includes expenditure funded by transfers from national and
international sources to the government. It is computed by dividing the total government expenditure for the secondary level of education by the GDP
and multiplied by 100.
26
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 6: Association between male NEET rate, government investment on secondary education and poverty headcount
Male NEET rate (%)
01234
Government expenditure on secondary education as % of GDP Correlation = -0.0885
0
20
40
60
80
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Poverty headcount ratio - quartile Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high)
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2024. (Pooled data 2015-2024).
Note: The NEET indicator is the share of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) which is the proportion of young people who are not in
education, employment, or training to the population of the corresponding age group (15-29). This indicator corresponds to SDG 8.6.1.
Government expenditure on secondary education, expressed as a percentage of GDP, includes expenditure funded by transfers from national and
international sources to the government. It is computed by dividing the total government expenditure for the secondary level of education by the GDP
and multiplied by 100.
Moreover, as can be seen comparing the two graphs,
there is no signicant association between male NEET
rate and government expenditure on secondary
education, while young women are seemingly aected
by it. Since 2000, young girls have been 1.6 times more
likely than young men to be NEET.
In most countries worldwide, a number of policies
have been put in place to address the NEET condition,
leading to lower rates of 3.3 percentage points for
women on average, reaching 16.75% in 2023, and 2
percentage points for men (reaching 12%). Despite
this general trend, in countries such as Guatemala,
young women are 5 times more likely than young
men to be NEET. In India young women are 3.7
times more likely than young men to be NEET, and
in Mexico 2.8 times. These disparities could be
partially related to issues such as youth pregnancy,
which remains a signicant factor leading to school
dropouts among young women (Klepinger et al.,
1995; Josephson, et al., 2018; Sobngwi-Tambekou, et
al., 2022). As of 2019, adolescents aged 15–19 years
in low- and middle-income countries accounted
for an estimated 21 million pregnancies each year,
of which approximately 50% were unintended and
which resulted in an estimated 12 million births
(Sully et al., 2020). The disruption in education that
pregnancies can cause may contribute to exacerbate
vulnerabilities and to constrain future employment and
economic independence (UNESCO, 2023a; University of
Pennsylvania and Masterson, 2021).
Among the policies that can play a pivotal role in
addressing the NEET issue there is investment in
education, including in vocational education and
training (VET) as well as technical and vocational
education and training (TVET ). Evidence indicates that
quality VET and TVET programmes can help equip
individuals with the practical skills demanded on the
labour markets and can be particularly eective in
reducing NEET rates (Bolli et al., 2021)policymakers
around the world support vocational education and
training (VET. Data from Figures 5 and 6 suggest that
a 1% increase in GDP investment in education could
correspond to a signicantly lower female NEET rate
by 6.9%, while the impact for boys is not statistically
signicant.
The analysis also highlights the relationship between
NEET rates and poverty. In Figure 5 and 6, countries are
denoted by their poverty headcount rates, with light
blue indicating low poverty (rst quartile), and dark
blue representing high poverty (fourth quartile). Results
show a strong correlation between higher NEET rates
and poverty, which in addition is more pronounced for
young women (correlation coecient: 0.53) compared
to young men (0.34).
27
CHAPTER 1: THE GENDER-BASED RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1
Additionally, government investment in education
shows a signicant and negative correlation with
female NEET rates (-0.37), which is weaker and not
statistically signicant for male NEET rates (-0.13).
These ndings emphasise the importance of
investment in education, particularly where poverty
is more widespread and disproportionately impacts
young women. Expanding access to quality VET and
TVET programmes and ensuring alignment with labour
market needs is essential to reduce NEET rates and
address socioeconomic inequalities.
Unpaid work
Figure 7: Paid versus unpaid work (%)
Correlation= -0.4818
0
20
40
60
80
Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%)
3 4 5 6 7
Daily hours spent by women in unpaid domestic and care work
UGA
EGY
GEO
TUR
BTN
KAZ
KGZ
CHN
JPN
KOR LAO
MNG
THA AUS
FJI
BRA CHL
COL
CRI
CUB
DOM
GTM
MEX
PRY
SLV
BLR
CAN CHE
FIN
GBR
MKD
PRT
RUS
SRB
USA
UNESCO electoral groups: SSA NA&WA C&SA E&SEA Oceania LAC E&NA
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023. (Pooled data 2015-2022).
Note: Employment to population ratio is the proportion of women employed of age 15 and above over the female country’s population. Employment is
dened as persons of working age who, during a short reference period, were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or prot.
Daily hours spent by women in unpaid domestic and care work measures the average time women spend on household provision of services for their own
consumption. This indicator corresponds to SDG 5.4.1.
Data are expressed as a proportion of time in a day. Domestic and care work includes food preparation, dishwashing, cleaning and upkeep of a dwelling,
laundry, ironing, gardening, caring for pets, shopping, installation, servicing and repair of personal and household goods, childcare, and care of the sick, elderly
or disabled household members, among others. The gender gap in unpaid domestic and care work is the dierence between unpaid domestic and care work
of women and men over the number of hours spent by men in these activities.
Being in a NEET and poverty condition generally
stems from the obstacles that individuals encounter
in relation to enrolling in education or participating
in the labour market. Moreover, deeply ingrained
and persistent gender stereotypes that continue to
disproportionately assign caregiving roles to women
and breadwinning roles to men (Oxfam, 2020)
aggravate such patterns. These roles tend to exclude
women – particularly those from marginalized or lower
socioeconomic backgrounds – from paid employment,
pushing them into unpaid caregiving roles and
informal work sectors. This in turn limits their ability to
contribute to household income, achieve economic
independence, and access opportunities to develop
their potential beyond family responsibilities. Research
by ILO (2018) and UNWOMEN (2020) highlights how
systemic barriers restrict women’s economic and
professional contributions, exacerbating existing
inequalities. They show that while unpaid care work
sustains families and economies, contributing an
estimated $11 trillion annually to the global economy,
it remains undervalued and disproportionately
performed by women (UNWOMEN, 2020).
As shown in Figure 7, there is a clear link between time
spent on unpaid work and reduced labour market
participation for women. It would thus be important
for policy interventions to prioritize the redistribution
and recognition of unpaid care work, to foster resilience
and equity in both the public and private spheres.
28
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 8: Employment rate and gender gap in unpaid work
0
20
40
60
80
Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%)
0 2 4 6 8
Gender gap on unpaid domestic and care work Correlation= -0.6573
UGA
EGY
GEO
TUR
BTN
KAZ
KGZ
CHN
JPN
KOR
LAO
MNG
THA
AUS
FJI
BRA CHL
COL
CRI
CUB
DOM
GTM
MEX
PRY
SLV
BLR
CAN
CHE
FIN
GBR
MKD
PRT
RUS
SRB
USA
UNESCO electoral groups: SSA NA&WA C&SA E&SEA Oceania LAC E&NA
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023. (Pooled data 2015-2022).
Note: Employment to population ratio is the proportion of women employed of age 15 and above over the female country’s population. Employment is
dened as persons of working age who, during a short reference period, were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or prot.
Daily hours spent by women in unpaid domestic and care work measures the average time women spend on household provision of services for their own
consumption. This indicator corresponds to SDG 5.4.1.
While sharing family responsibilities should be a matter
of fairness and of both parents being actively involved
in raising their children, the reality paints a dierent
picture. For every additional hour spent on unpaid care
work, women’s employment rate decreases by 5.9%
(Figure 7). This marks a worsening trend compared to
the gure proposed last year, when the decline was
4.4%. Countries such as Mexico and Egypt report the
highest proportions of time that women spend on
unpaid care work, while Brazil and Thailand report
the lowest among the countries for which data are
available. However, these gures should be interpreted
with caution and further analysis is necessary to
understand what drives such disparities.
The gender gap in unpaid care and domestic work
has shown little improvement over time. In countries
where women perform more than two additional
hours in unpaid care and domestic work compared
to men, female employment rates appear halved, at
about 50%. When this gap increases to four hours,
female employment rates fall further, at just 30%
(Figure 8). Furthermore, the unequal distribution of
unpaid work hinders women’s ability to start and run
their own businesses. As shown in Figure 9, there is a
signicant and negative association between female
entrepreneurship and unpaid care and domestic work.
Specically, each additional hour of unpaid care and
domestic work appears to be associated with a 4%
decrease in the share of rms owned by women.
29
CHAPTER 1: THE GENDER-BASED RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1
Figure 9: Female entrepreneurship and unpaid work
0
20
40
60
Firms with female participation in ownership (%)
3 4 5 6 7
Daily hours spent by women in unpaid domestic and care work Correlation= -0.5299
EGY
GEO
TUR
BTN
KAZ
KGZ
LAO
MNG
THA
BRA CHL
COL
CRI
CUB
DOM
GTM
MEX
PRY
SLV
BLR
FIN
MKD
PRT
RUS
SRB
UNESCO electoral groups: SSA NA&WA C&SA E&SEA Oceania LAC E&NA
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023. (Pooled data 2015-2022).
Note: Daily hours spent by women in unpaid domestic and care work measures the average time women spend on household provision of services
for their own consumption. This indicator corresponds to SDG 5.4.1. Firms with women’s participation in ownership are the percentage of rms with a
woman among the principal owners.
Overall, the statistics proposed thus far point to
only modest improvements in the areas examined.
Additional evidence about women in the labour
market will be nevertheless proposed and discussed
when assessing whether countries’ have managed to
meet the Brisbane Target (in Chapter 3), i.e. to reduce
gender gaps in the labour force by 25% by 2025.
It is also important to note that not all statistics
presented in the 2023 Gender-Based Resilience report
could be updated to assess progress or lack thereof, as
new information is not available for all countries. This
hinders the ability to monitor possible improvements
and highlights the need for up-to-date data, for
accurate assessments to be possible.
31
Chapter 2.
Women in policy- and
decision-making
32
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Framing t he issue
Ensuring women’s presence in policy- and decision-
making is critical for numerous reasons. Importantly,
the right to public participation, including political
participation, is a human right enshrined in Article 21 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5. Women’s
involvement in decision-making – both in policy-and
decision-making– ensures that they can contribute to
shaping decisions that aect their lives and the lives
of others, both in the short and long term. Holding
a political oce further grants legitimacy to make
decisions that impact society as a whole (Paxton et al.,
2021).
Decisions on resource allocation and investments, at
any level of government (whether local, regional or
national), including in public education, health and
the world of work, are critical to fostering empowered
and resilient societies. Especially when resources are
scarce, decision makers may make choices that favour
certain groups, such as prioritizing social benets
for specic low-income households while excluding
others, or granting tax incentives to particular types of
businesses.
The power to shape societal dynamics and institutions,
including health and education systems, extends
beyond merely choosing which initiatives to support.
It is fundamentally inuenced by how problems
are dened and who is identied as the target of
interventions. For instance, programmes designed
to support families will vary signicantly depending
on how «family» is dened, along with the rights
and responsibilities associated with that denition.
These decisions have far-reaching implications for the
inclusion and equity of public policies.
Policy making should serve the interests of the entire
society, and laws are to be applied to all individuals,
without discrimination based on gender, ethnicity,
religion or any other grounds. However, when decision-
makers are predominantly male, or represent only
one or few groups, there is a high likelihood that laws
favouring the interests of women or of marginalized
groups will not be prioritized (Carver, 2024).
Research on gender and decision-making has long
underlined that men and women often bring dierent
perspectives and priorities to policymaking (Shapiro
and Mahajan, 1986). Evidence suggests that the gender
of legislators signicantly inuences policy preferences
5 https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
(Paxton et al., 2021) and shows that male MPs are less
likely to champion women’s interests as the proportion
of women in parliament increases (Höhmann, 2020).
This makes it even more important to strive for
gender equality in policymaking, to ensure that the
interests, needs, and aspirations of women and other
underrepresented groups are eectively represented
(Mechkova and Carlitz, 2021).
Female policymakers tend to advocate for policies
that address social inequities, such as those
aecting women, families, and marginalized groups
(Chattopadhyay and Duo, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer and
Squire, 2014). Evidence further indicates that increasing
women’s representation in decision-making bodies
enhances the focus on policies that improve quality
of life and promote equity across diverse populations
(Hessami and Da Fonseca, 2020; Markham, 2013).
Women’s leadership in decision-making can also
foster healthier and more equitable societal structures.
Women’s socialisation skills is found to shape their
leadership style, making it more likely to be nurturing,
collaborative, and rooted in empathy (Bell Hooks,
2015). Such leadership can be transformational in
decision-making, especially when addressing issues
of inequalities, social justice and gender-based
discrimination. Women often bring critical perspectives
shaped by their unique experiences of discrimination,
contributing to more inclusive and equitable
policy-making (Davis, 1981), thereby enhancing the
eectiveness and inclusiveness of policies (Lowndes,
2020).
Women’s political representation has progressed
signicantly since the last century. In 1946, the UN
General Assembly recommended that all Member
States should “grant to women the same political rights
as men” (Resolution 56). At that time, only around
50% of UN Member States recognized women’s right
to vote. This landmark resolution marked a crucial
step towards the global recognition of women’s
political equality, setting a standard that would shape
future progress for women’s rights worldwide and
establishing women’s political rights as fundamental
human rights (Childs, 2024).
Despite these advances, important discrepancies
remain between formal and actual, impactful
representation, leaving women still ghting for full
political rights and meaningful participation. While
women now enjoy political rights in 99% of countries
worldwide, only fourteen grant full equal rights to
women (World Bank, 2023). Moreover, according to
33
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
IPU data,6 amongst the countries analysed, only 54%
exhibit more than 25% of women in their legislative
bodies.
Formal representation alone does not suce to ensure
a substantive presence of women in decision-making
(Paxton et al., 2021). For instance, while a growing
number of female Ministers are being appointed
around the world, they are often assigned to Ministries
that are less likely to oversee key economic or strategic
decisions, such as those related to Finance, Interior,
Foreign Aairs, Defence, Justice or the Economy.7
Moreover, as long as individuals continue to experience
gender-based social and economic inequalities, they
will face barriers to their ability to fully leverage their
political opportunities. The structural disadvantages
that women experience often translate into disparities
in political outcomes, which in turn, can undermine
their eective participation in policy and decision-
making (Phillips, 1995).
In this respect, the concept of formal “political equality”
is being progressively substituted by the “descriptive
representation” concept, which underlines the need
to ensure that political representation more accurately
reects the demographic composition of populations
(Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation rests on the
principle that in democracy, racial, ethnic and gender
groups are uniquely positioned to represent their own
perspectives.
Research has mainly focused on the functioning
of electoral systems, party lists, and proportional
representation and quota systems (Norris, 1996),
highlighting the importance of providing historically
marginalized or silenced groups with a voice in political
institutions. By sharing common experiences and
interests, these groups are often best equipped to
represent their own needs and advocate eectively
within legislative and decision-making processes
(Paxton et al., 2021; Phillips, 1995).
Another concept that is relevant to women’s
representation is the one of “substantive
representation”, which relates to women politicians’
ability and willingness to advocate and take action
on issues that directly aect women, i.e. to speak
for and act to support women’s issues (Childs, 2024;
Pitkin, 1967). Research argues that women in policy-
6 https://data.ipu.org/compare/?eld=surage.right_to_vote®ion=0&chart=map&year_to=#
7 For example, in France such Ministries are called “Regalian” Ministries, or referred to as the regalian funcons of the State. See, e.g. https://www.fo-dgp-sd.fr/007/IMG/
pdf/dafpe_admin_regal_etat_050310.pdf
8 BIPOC stands for for Black, Indigenous, People of Color. People are using the term to acknowledge that not all people of color face equal levels of injustice. They say
BIPOC is signicant in recognizing that Black and Indigenous people are severely impacted by systemic racial injustices. ( https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
BIPOC).
9 LGBTQIA+ is an abbreviation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, asexual, and more. These terms are used to describe a person’s sexual
orientation or gender identity.
making across the political spectrum and with dierent
agendas still share more common ground with each
other than with their male counterparts. This, however,
does not mean that women are a homogenous group
with homogenous interests (Coole, 2016). In some
countries for instance, assuming that heterosexual
white women’s experiences were the norm, led at
times to marginalizing the voices and experiences of
women of colour (Strolovitch et al., 2017).
Today, many feminist scholars argue that, while
increasing descriptive representation of women in
policy making is necessary, this is not sucient (Dolan
et al., 2022). Increasing the participation of BIPOC8,
migrant and LGBTQIA+9 individuals for instance
can allow them to more eectively champion the
issues that aect them and their communities. This
diversity in representation ensures that the interests of
underrepresented groups are better defended, while
also bringing to the fore concerns that may have been
neglected by the majority. (Mansbridge, 1999). The
more diverse the voices, perspectives, and ideas from
various groups, the more adaptable and change-ready
systems may become, and thus more resilient.
In addition, the symbolic impact of diverse
representation in political institutions is signicant,
particularly to foster trust and legitimacy. This is
especially the case in contexts marked by a history
of discrimination and distrust between minority and
majority groups. In such settings, the inclusion of
women, ethnic minorities, and marginalized groups in
policy can inspire others from similar backgrounds to
pursue public oce (Dolan et al., 2022).
When assessing the dierence that women can make
in decision-making, research about Latin America shows
that female legislators are more likely than their male
counterparts to prioritize women’s issues and family
concerns, but their attitudes toward other policy areas
such as the economy and employment are largely similar
to those of their male colleagues (Schwindt-Bayer, 2006).
Evidence also shows that increases in the number of
female politicians are associated with greater spending
on social programs, including education (Halim et al.,
2016). Studies further reveal that greater participation
of women in decision-making is signicantly associated
with lower mortality rates among women and children
(Macmillan et al., 2018, Bagade et al., 2022).
34
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
In addition to improving health outcomes, the
presence of women in elected local councils is also
found to often be correlated to a reduction in large-
scale corruption (Bauhr et al., 2018), the creation of
more inclusive cities where structural inequalities are
more eectively addressed (Baboun, 2018), greater GDP
per capita growth (Dahlum et al., 2022) and greater
police responsiveness, particularly in relation to tackling
crimes against women and minorities (Dahlum et al.,
2022).
In summary, the improved health outcomes, economic
growth, security, safety, and equality that result from
women’s equal participation in decision-making
enhance the wellbeing, welfare and resilience of
societies.
The new CEDAW Recommendation 40 denes equal
and inclusive representation as achieving parity
between women and men, in all their diversity,
with respect to both access to and power within
decision-making (CEDAW, 2023). The distribution of
decision-making capacity can be achieved through an
empowerment and leadership model that leverages
policies such as gender quotas, aimed at advancing
gender equality and redening women’s leadership, to
yield new outcomes. The critical mass theory supports
this approach, suggesting that signicant change
occurs when a tipping point is reached, such as the
30% target for women’s representation outlined in the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action10.
In social dynamics, “critical mass” refers to the point
at which enough individuals within a system adopt a
new idea, technology, or innovation, thereby triggering
widespread change. Originally a concept from
physics, critical mass in social science describes a set
of conditions where a particular behaviour becomes
reciprocal and self-sustaining (de Silva de Alwis,
2023). Achieving critical mass is crucial not only in a
quantitative sense but also for its qualitative impact,
encompassing elements such as reputation, shared
goals, commitment, consensus, and decision-making
capacity. From this perspective, reciprocal behaviour
among individuals can drive transformative change
through sustained collective action.
The critical mass theory was developed by Dahlerup
and Kanter, who posited that women in political oce
struggle to eectively represent women’s interest until
they reach a signicant minority among legislators.
They also argued that, to achieve the necessary
10 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is a resolution adopted by the United Nations as result of the Fourth World Conference on the Status of Women held in
1995. It promulgates 13 principles and measures corresponding to critical areas for advancing gender equality and women’s rights.
critical mass, female politicians had to overcome at
least two primary barriers (Kanter, 2008). First, they
must prove that they are equally capable as their
male counterparts, a task rendered especially dicult
by male politicians’ longer tenures and historical
dominance in the political arena (Dahlerup, 1988).
Second, women must show that their increased
representation leads to meaningful changes.
In Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political
Representation (Childs and Krook, 2008), Childs and
Krook build on Dahlerup’s concept and emphasize the
twofold impact of reaching critical mass: advancing
decisions related to women’s interests and, serving as
role models to inspire more women to enter policy
making. They further argue for a reimagining of critical
mass theory, advocating for greater focus on the
relationship between descriptive representation (the
presence of women) and substantive representation
(advocating for women’s issues) (Childs and Krook,
2008).
In addition to structural barriers, women’s ambitions
to hold political oce are often thwarted by harmful
stereotypes and misogynistic tactics that seek to
undermine their competencies and capabilities.
These attacks frequently draw on traditional gender
roles, casting women as more suited to caregiving
responsibilities, preferably within the home, rather
than to positions of authority and leadership. Political
misogyny manifests through disparaging rhetoric
intended to amplify existing biases, associating
women’s political identities with negative attributes, to
trigger and reinforce prejudiced beliefs and attitudes.
Women in policy- and decision-making are often
subjected to contradictory criticisms—smiling too
much makes them seem frivolous, while not smiling
enough makes them appear assertive and unfriendly.
They are scrutinized for being “too prepared” (perceived
as overcompensating) or “underprepared” (seen as
incompetent). Physical appearance is also weaponized:
women may be deemed “too attractive” or “not
attractive enough” to be taken seriously. Queer women,
too, endure specic scrutiny. They are criticized for
appearing too feminine or too masculine, reecting
the compounded biases they face in public life
(Williamson, 2015). This misogynistic rhetoric often
escalates into hate speech directed at women as a
group. Ultimately, misogynistic language in policy- and
decision-making spaces upholds dominant patriarchal
norms, casting women as unworthy of political agency
35
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
and undermining their legitimacy. This contributes to
diminishing individual women’s standing and erodes
the inclusivity and diversity that are essential for
healthy democratic societies (Dovi, 2024).
In addition, women in leadership positions worldwide
often face additional layers of scrutiny and criticism
compared to their male counterparts. Research
consistently shows that female leaders are more likely
to have their competence questioned, face gendered
stereotypes, and endure personal attacks that focus
on their appearance, family roles, or behaviours,
rather than their policies or decisions (Van Der Pas
and Aaldering, 2020). These biases are deeply rooted
in societal perceptions of leadership as traditionally
masculine and perpetuate barriers for women aspiring
to decision-making roles. Women who despite all this
navigate these challenges contribute to redening
leadership and inspire a more inclusive vision of
governance, oering a hopeful trajectory for future
generations.
Status quo, evolutions and challenges
Nearly thirty years have passed since the United
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing
set the goal to achieve a critical mass of 30% women
in decision-making. Since then, signicant strides have
been made in increasing women’s representation in
national parliaments worldwide.
According to data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(IPU), in 1995, women held only 10.1% of parliamentary
seats and regional variations were substantial. Europe
and North America had the highest representation at
14.2%. Recent data covering the period from 2020 to
2024, indicate that this gure has more than doubled,
reaching an average of 25.9% across all UNESCO
regions. Among the seven sub-regions, Europe and
North America have reached critical mass, with a 33.4%
rate. Latin America and the Caribbean are close to the
target with 29.9%, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa at
26.3%, and Eastern and South-Eastern Asia at 20.7%. In
the remaining regions, women hold between 13% and
18% of all seats available in parliament (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Women in Parliament -1995-latest available data year
0 % 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage
Oceania
C&SA
NA&WA
E&SEA
UNESCO
regions
SSA
LAC
E&NA
1995 Latest data available
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union
data-IPU, 2024.
Note: Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
In countries like Rwanda, women’s representation in
the national parliament has increased by 57 percentage
points since 1995. The United Arab Emirates also
improved importantly, progressing from having no
women in parliament to achieving 50% representation
in the most recent year for which data are available,
in this case 2019. Additionally, Andorra and Monaco
saw remarkable increases of 46.4 and 40.2 percentage
points, respectively, between 1995 and 2023. As
shown in Figure 10, Latin America and the Caribbean,
along with Sub-Saharan Africa, have surpassed the
50% threshold, moving above countries in the Europe
and Northern America group, which used to be at
the forefront of women’s representation in national
parliaments with 14.2% of women MPs in 1995.
Over the past thirty years, the ranking of the top ve
countries with the highest representation of women
in lower and single Houses of Parliament has shifted
importantly. In 1995, in European countries, Sweden
topped the list, at 40.4%, followed by Norway at 39.4%,
Denmark and Finland at 33.5% both, and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands at 32.7%. Today, countries from Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean
feature among the top ve, all having reached or
exceeded 50% representation of women in parliament.
Rwanda stands at the top with 61.3%, followed by
36
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Cuba at 55.7%, Nicaragua at 53.8%, and the United
Arab Emirates and Namibia, all at 50%, Costa Rica and
Mexico at respectively 49% and 48.2%.
Parliaments worldwide are making signicant strides
toward gender parity. In 1995, only 2.9% of countries
had 30% or more women members of parliament
while in 60% of countries, women held fewer than
10% of the seats. Today, women have reached a critical
mass threshold of 36% in national parliaments, on
average, and the proportion of countries with less
than 10% female representation has dropped to 11%.
Additionally, nearly one in six countries (15%) now have
40% or more of parliamentary seats held by women.
Regional trends
Deep diving into regional dynamics, the data reveal
that countries in Europe and North America, which
started from relative high percentages, experienced
relatively low increases in women’s representation
in Parliament since 1995. The 43 countries in the
UNESCO’s Europe and North America group reached
the 33.4% threshold of seats held by women, on
average (Figure 11). Future analysis may want to
investigate the drivers and mechanisms leading to
similar levels of women’s representation in Parliament
and the role of gender quota policies, particularly in EU
countries where such policies are widely implemented,
compared to other regions where they are less
commonly adopted, to identify good practices.
The elements available point to results likely reecting
a combination of factors, including cultural shifts
towards gender-equal value systems and long-standing
advocacy by women’s movements, some of which have
been active for over a century (Teigen and Wängnerud,
2009). Additionally, most European countries have
adopted either proportional or mixed electoral system
that combine majoritarian and proportional elements.
Evidence indicates that, globally, proportional systems
are those most successful in creating an enabling
environment for women’s advancement in policy- and
decision-making (Brechenmacher, 2018). This can also
be partly explained by the “district magnitude” eect,
which suggests that larger electoral districts tend to
favour women’s inclusion on party ballots, as they do
not require parties to displace male candidates to make
room for female candidates. In contrast, single-member
districts often require parties to choose between male
and female candidates, limiting opportunities for
women’s representation (Paxton et al., 2021).
Figure 11: Europe and Northern America: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
0
10
20
30
40
50
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
BEL
HUN
ROU
SVK
GRC IRL
CZE BGR
MLT LTU POL
EST
LVA
ITA
PRT
HRV LUX
DEU
FRA SVN NLD
AUT
ESP DNK
FIN SWE
SMR
RUS
BIH
UKR
LIE USA CAN
BLR
MKD GBR
ALB
CHE
MDA
NOR
MCO
ISL
AND
E&NA Global
Europe and Northern America Average
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data-IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
37
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Many scholars advocate for gender quotas as eective
tools to overcome barriers preventing women from
participating in the political arena. Many countries,
among which Mexico and Rwanda, have indeed
followed such advice and implemented either
legislated quotas or voluntary party quotas (Clayton,
2021; Paxton and Hughes, 2015; Rosen, 2017).
In the United States of America, women’s
representation in parliament has increased from 18%
in 1995 to 29.2% today. Canada is now approaching
critical mass, with women’s representation reaching
30.4% in 2024.
Figure 12: Latin America and the Caribbean: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
0
20
40
60
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
HTI
PAN
MEX
ATG
LCA
BLZ
BRA BHS
GTM
VEN
PRY URY BRB
HND JAM
TTO
COL
KNA GRD
SUR SLV
CHL DOM
DMA
PER GUY
ARG
ECU
CRI
NIC
CUB
LAC Global
Latin America and the Caribbean Average
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data-IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
Adding a 45-degree line in Figure 11 helps illustrate
the percentage of female MPs and track changes over
time. In Europe and North America most countries
experienced an increase in the proportion of seats
held by women. Andorra saw the most signicant
improvement, with an increase of nearly 13% between
the two periods (over a total of 28 parliamentary
seats available), followed by Iceland, where women’s
representation rose from 25.4% in 1995 to 47.6% today
(over a total of 63 parliamentary seats).
Latin America and the Caribbean emerge as the
region with the second-highest average percentage
of women in parliamentary seats. Two of the top ve
countries with the highest share of female MPs are
from the region: Cuba, which has increased women’s
representation in parliament by 32.9 percentage points
since 1995; and Mexico, which has more than tripled
this share, with women holding 48.2% of seats in 2020.
The case of Mexico is a successful story of gender
quota implementation. After introducing quotas in
the 1990s, the country strengthened its enforcement,
achieving signicant progress (IPU, 2020) and has
recently elected the rst female President of its history.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, nearly all countries
improved their shares of female MPs. In 1995, Argentina
exhibited the highest share of women in parliament
(25.3%), followed by Cuba (22.8%), while most other
countries exhibited shares of less than 10%. Today, 48%
of countries in the region have reached or surpassed
the critical mass threshold of 30% of seats held by
women. This progress is largely due to the adoption of
equality measures and quotas in sixteen Latin American
countries over the past thirty years (IPU, 2020). Ecuador
exhibits one of the greatest improvements, with
women’s representation rising from 4.5% in 1995 to
43.1% in 2023. Brazil, which implemented a gender
38
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
quota system, increased women’s parliamentary
seats from 7% in 1995 to 15.6% in 2023. Experts credit
measures like court rulings on public funding for
campaigns, introduced in 2014, with supporting this
progress by promoting transparency and reducing
traditional campaign nancing biases which tended to
favour men (Vallejo, 2024).
In Oceania, a UNESCO regional group composed of ten
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) along with New
Zealand and Australia, the average share of women in
parliament stands at 13.2% for the most recent year
for which data are available. This share represents an
8-percentage point absolute increase since 1995, with
gures that are mainly driven by New Zealand and
Australia, both of which surpassed the critical mass
threshold in 2023. In particular, New Zealand increased
its women’s representation going from 21.2% in 1995
to 45.55 % in 2023, and Australia rose from 8.8% in
1995 to 38% (Figure 13). Papua New Guinea and Palau,
which had no female representation in 1995, now
exhibit rates of 2.7% and 12.5% respectively. A notable
example in this region is represented by Fiji, where
women’s representation in policy- and decision-making
has improved signicantly from 4.3% in 1995 to 19.6%
in 2020. This major stride towards gender equality
in policy- and decision-making is said to have been
largely driven by the appointment of Fiji’s rst female
Speaker Dr. Jiko Luvenii, who may have inspired many
women to enter politics. She introduced a mandate for
gender mainstreaming in parliament and established
a women’s caucus, successfully engaging female
parliamentarians (IPU, 2020).
In Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand),
women face several barriers to their active participation
in political life. The geographical dispersion of islands,
often located far apart, makes it challenging for women
to campaign. The costs associated with travelling,
coupled with the diculty of balancing campaigning
with family responsibilities – especially in the absence
of external support – can deter women from stepping
into politics. Moreover, men traditionally hold positions
as local chiefs, a practice that often extends to the
national political arena, and that can contribute to
leave women aside (IPU, 2020).
Figure 13: Oceania: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
Oceania Global
0
10
20
30
40
50
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
TUV
VUT
PNG
SLB
PLW TON
FJI NRU
MHL
WSM
AUS
NZL
Oceania Average
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data–IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
39
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
In Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, the average
proportion of women in national parliaments has
signicantly improved over time. In 1995, women held
8.5% of seats, a gure that has since increased by 12.4
percentage points in absolute terms, bringing the
current share to nearly 21%. Although countries in this
region dier widely in terms of characteristics including
electoral systems, structural settings and cultures, the
gap in women’s representation has narrowed over the
past thirty years almost everywhere. Today, two out
of the thirteen countries — Vietnam with 30.6% and
Singapore with 29.3% in 2023 — are approaching or
have reached critical mass. One of the most remarkable
progresses could be observed in the Republic of
Korea, experiencing a tenfold increase in women’s
representation since 1995, and reaching 20% in 2024
(Figure 14).
Figure 14: Eastern and South-Eastern Asia: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
0
10
20
30
40
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
IDN
JPN
MYS
KHM
MNG
THA
KOR
LAO
CHN
PHL
SGP
VNM
E&SEA Global
Eastern and South-Eastern Asia Average
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data-IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
In Central and Southern Asia (Figure 15), women
currently hold an average of 16.3% of parliamentary
seats across the region. In 1995, three-quarters of
countries in the region had less than 10% women
representation in parliament. By 2020, only a few
countries remained below the 10% threshold. As of
2023, Uzbekistan is the only country in the region that
has surpassed 30% women’s representation, achieving
34.7% - corresponding to an absolute increase of 28.6
percentage points since 1995. Also in 2020, one-third
of the countries in the region had surpassed the 20%
threshold for women’s parliamentary seats, including
Pakistan (20.2%), Bangladesh (20.9%), Turkmenistan
(25%), and Kazakhstan (27.1%).
An interesting case is the one of Bhutan. In 1995, when
the Beijing Platform for Action was signed, Bhutan
had no women in parliament due to barriers such
as the university degree requirement and a ban on
civil servants running for oce, which excluded most
educated women (IPU, 2020). However, by 2020, female
representation in parliament rose to 14.9%, thanks to
three decades of eorts by civil society and women’s
networks.
Within the Central and Southern Asia group,
Afghanistan represents a case. During two decades
of governance reform (between 2001 to 2021), the
country witnessed signicant progress in living
conditions and the development of laws and policies
40
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
aimed at enhancing gender equality. Between 2005
and 2018, women’s representation had increased to
27.8% of seats in the lower house and 27.4% in the
upper house. However, since August 2021, when
the Taliban took over the country, these gains have
been swiftly reversed. The Taliban authorities have
systematically eroded the fundamental human
rights of women and girls, severely restricting their
rights to expression, mobility, access to education
and professional opportunities. The latest restrictive
and abusive measures, the “Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice” law, issued by the authorities in
August a 2024, imposes a discriminatory dress code
for women, restricts women’s movement, forbids
that women speak in public or to each other, and
bans news media from publishing images of all living
things. This law represents yet another violation
of international human rights and an act of severe
dehumanisation of women and girls in Afghanistan.
This stark reversal underscores how progress for
women’s rights, even when signicant, can never
be taken for granted. It highlights the fragility of
advancements in the face of systemic oppression and
the urgent need for sustained eorts to safeguard
these achievements globally.
Figure 15: Central and Southern Asia: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
IND
MDV
BTN IRN LKA
PAK
KAZ
BGD
KGZ
TKM
TJK
UZB
C&SA Global
0
10
20
30
40
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
Central and Southern Asia Average
Source : Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data-IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
Among all considered regions, North Africa and
Western Asia exhibited the lowest level of women’s
representation in 1995, at 5.6%, percentage that rose
to 13.25% by 2020 (Figure 16). One of the factors
contributing to this rise was the introduction of quota
systems in some cases, like the presidential decree
in the United Arab Emirates. In 1995, there were no
women in the Emirati Parliament; but three decades
later, the country is the rst in the region to achieve
gender parity in parliament.
Although challenges persist in achieving full political
participation for women in North Africa and Western
Asia, there have been some notable advances. In 2016,
Algeria, and in 2017, Tunisia, enacted laws criminalizing
violence against women, including political violence.
These legislative measures contributed to signicantly
increase women’s representation in parliament, with
women holding 24.9% of seats in Tunisia and 25.8% in
Algeria in 2020.
41
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Figure 16: Northern Africa and Western Asia: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
NA&WA Global
YEM
KWT
LBN
DZA
SYR
JOR CYP TUN
AZE
GEO
TUR
MAR ISR
IRQ
ARM
ARE
0
10
20
30
40
50
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
North Africa and Western Asia Average
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data-IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
Elsewhere in the region, Armenia surpassed the critical
mass of women’s representation, steadily improving
since 1995, to reach 36% in 2024. Iraq has also made
progress, with women holding 28.9% of seats in recent
years.
Sub-Saharan African countries rank second only to
Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of women’s
representation in national parliaments, as shown in
Figure 17. Since 2020, Rwanda has led in this regard,
with women holding 61% of parliamentary seats.
Rwanda’s success can be partly attributed to the
introduction of gender quotas, reserving at least 30% of
seats for women. This policy led to remarkable progress
increasing female representation from just 4.3% in
1995, signicantly improving the socioeconomic
conditions and legal status of women in the country
(IPU, 2020).
42
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 17: Sub-Saharan Africa: women in parliament between 1995 and the latest available year
0
20
40
60
Women in Parliament (%) - latest available year
0 10 20 30 40
Women in Parliament (%) - 1995
MDG
ZAF
GMB GNB
LBR BWA
COD CIV
STPGHA
COG ZMB
COM BFA
TGO MUS SYC
MWI
SWZ
KENMRT LSO GAB TCD
DJI BEN ZWE
MLI GIN
NER GNQ
CMR
TZA BDI
AGO CPV
ETH
MOZ
SEN
NAM
RWA
SSA Global
North Africa and Western Asia Average
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union data-IPU, 2024.
Note: the dotted line represents the 45 line which helps to better see improvements. Latest available years refer to the latest year for which data are
available, mostly 2022, 2023 and 2024 and in few cases 2020.
In the most recent year for which data are available,
women held more than 25% of parliamentary seats in
twenty-two out of forty-one countries in the region.
This represents substantial progress in advancing
women’s political rights, especially considering
that in 1995, twenty-eight out of these forty-one
countries had less than 10% women’s representation
in parliament. Notably, Djibouti and Mauritania
had no women in parliament in 1995, and by 2024
women’s representation increased to 26.2% and 23.3%,
respectively. Additionally, between 2022 and 2024,
six countries surpassed 40% women’s representation
in parliament: Ethiopia (41.3%), Mozambique (43.2%),
Senegal (46.1%), South Africa (46.4%), Namibia (50%),
and Rwanda (61.3%).
Gender diversity in parliaments
A higher representation of LGBTQIA+ individuals in
national parliaments can positively inuence the
legislative process, potentially fostering greater equality
for LGBTQIA+ communities. Research suggests that
countries with more progressive LGBTQIA+ rights often
have had some degree of LGBTQIA+ representation
for an extended period (Reynolds, 2013)gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT. While no ocial statistics
currently track LGBTQIA+ representation in parliaments,
institutional mechanisms exist to advance their rights.
For instance, the Congressional LGBT Equality Caucus,
established in the U.S. House of Representatives in
2008, focuses on promoting human rights, repealing
discriminatory laws, combating hate violence, and
improving LGBTQIA+ health and well-being. In the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global LGBT+
Rights plays a similar role. Additionally, the European
Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBTI Rights, the largest
intergroup within the parliament, currently comprises
150 members from various political backgrounds.
43
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Political representation by gender and age
The connection between descriptive and substantive
representation is also tied to the issues at the
intersection of gender and age. It would only be
fair that those who will experience the future for a
longer period shall have a voice in shaping it. Older
leaders can leverage their experience, which is often
invaluable, but can also overlook younger people’s
perspectives and concerns as their time horizons
are shorter (Bidadanure, 2021). This is especially true
for challenges such as climate change, education,
intergenerational social justice, or economic
inequalities. Additionally, young people make up
a signicant portion of the global population, with
notable demographic variations across countries and
regions.
69.7% of countries worldwide have set the minimum
age for holding oce higher than the voting age (IPU,
2023). This age threshold is often justied by the belief
that formal policy- and decision-making requires a
high(er) level of accountability, responsibility, and
competence – qualities associated with seniority. Yet,
research indicates that older leaders do not necessarily
perform better in oce than younger politicians
(Magni-Berton and Panel, 2021). The inclusion of young
people in parliament raises important questions about
representation systems in political bodies (Seery,
2011). The political disengagement of young people,
often reected in low voter turnout, could be reduced
with more youth representation in parliaments and
elected bodies. Young legislators would provide both
symbolic and substantive representation, ensuring
their issues are prioritized and encouraging greater
youth engagement in policy- and decision-making
(Stockemer and Sundström, 2022).
Figure 18: Distribution of female MPs by age cohort
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
2024
Year
0
2
4
6
8
10
Percentage
Up to 30 years old 31-40 41-45 46-50
51-60 61-70 over 70 years old
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union
data-IPU, 2024.
When examining the distribution of representatives
in all chambers by gender and age over time,
dierences emerge in the share of seats held by
women as compared to men. Both genders reach
their peak representation between 51 and 60 years
old, a consistent trend since 2008. However, over the
past fteen years, the highest share of seats held by
women peaked at just 10% in 2022, whereas men’s
representation ranged from a high of 36% in 2009
to 21% in 2023 for the same age cohort. Since 2018,
women aged 31-40 have become the second most
represented age group among female MPs, peaking
at 7% in 2021, followed by women aged 61-70. Young
women under 30 have conversely consistently made
up less than 1% of MPs over the past fteen years.
The age distribution for male MPs reveals a dierent
pattern. Aside from the 51-60 age group, men over 50
have consistently held the largest share of seats since
2008, with the 46-50 age group being the second
most represented. The youngest male MPs under 30
are the least represented, peaking at 1.2% of seats in
2023. Notably, the proportion of male MPs over 70 has
remained steady, at around 8%, since 2012, roughly
equivalent to the share of seats held by women in their
most represented age group.
44
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 19: Distribution of male MPs by age cohort
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024
Year
Percentage
Up to 30 years old 31-40 41-45 46-50
51-60 61-70 over 70 years old
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union
data-IPU, 2024.
Focusing on the gender distribution of youth MPs
across UNESCO regions, and considering all the
Chambers, it can be seen that the share of young
parliamentarians below the age of 30 has increased
since 2015, but remains less than 3%, namely 1.4% in
2015 and in 2021 is of 2.3%. As the parliamentarian
age increases to 40 years old, it also increases their
representation to respectively 14.6% in 2015 and 17.7%
in 2021.
Looking at MPs under 30 years old across dierent
regions, in 2015, one sees that women held 36% of
seats across all regions, on average, while men held
63%. By 2021, women’s representation among young
MPs had increased by 11 percentage points. However,
this growth was not consistent across all regions, and
important dierences emerged. In two out of the six
regions — namely, Central and Southern Asia, and
Eastern and South-Eastern Asia — young women were
absent in both periods (Oceania could not be assessed
due to lack of data).
In the other regions, the proportion of seats held by
young women generally increased. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, young women made up 71% of the young
MPs in 2021, reecting a 16-percentage-point
absolute increase since 2015. In Latin America and
the Caribbean, young women held 67% of seats in
2021, while in Northern Africa and Western Asia, the
gure reached 55%, marking a 20-percentage-point
improvement over six years.
Figure 20: Age and gender distribution of MPs by regions
(All Chambers: 2015-2021 comparison)
C&SA
NA&WA
E&SEA
SSA
LAC
E&NA
UNESCO
regions
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage
2015
C&SA
NA&WA
E&SEA
SSA
LAC
E&NA
2021
UNESCO
regions
Women Men
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Inter Parliamentarian Union
data-IPU, 2024.
Results call for a greater inclusion of young MPs in
national parliaments, and a balanced representation
of both women and men. It would be important
for countries to address the underrepresentation of
youth, which to some extent constitutes a sort of
democratic decit in governments, parliaments, and
political parties, possibly through the implementation
of institutional reforms. These could include lowering
the age of eligibility to stand for oce to align with
voting age, developing new recruitment strategies,
establishing youth quotas, and strengthening the role
of party youth wings.
45
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Moreover, the ndings highlight that women face
compounded discrimination based on both age and
gender, despite research showing that diversity across
various characteristics enhances perspectives and
overall organizational eciency (McKinsey, 2020).
The analysis above suggests that strengthening the
resilience of countries may also entail improving
the diversity of political representatives. Young
parliamentarians can oer fresh perspectives to
entrenched issues. Also, since youth are the ones
that will bear the long-term consequences of today’s
political decisions, it would only be fair and eective to
include their voices in the decision-making process.
In conclusion, over the past thirty years, decision-
making bodies have gradually become more open to
female participation. In 1995, women held only 10.1%
of parliamentary seats; by 2024, this share had more
than doubled to an average of 25.9% across UNESCO
regions. However, only 35% of countries have reached
the critical threshold of 30% female representation,
79% of which have adopted gender quota systems.
Conversely, women hold fewer than 11% of
parliamentary seat in 10% of countries, with just 3 out
of these 19 nations implementing gender quotas.
Gender parity in parliament is not just a desirable
goal; fostering political leadership among empowered
women is crucial to improve representation in
decision-making bodies. The underrepresentation
of women in political leadership reects broader
democratic shortcomings and undermines the
legitimacy of democratic ideals. According to the V
Dem classication of global regimes, from 2020 to
2024, women-held 33.6% of parliamentary seats in
liberal democracies.
Achieving gender parity and promoting women’s
participation in decision-making roles are essential
tools for strengthening democracy and ensuring
resilience. Gender parity extends beyond the
implementation of quotas; it requires ensuring that
women’s representation translates into substantive
inuence over policy and governance.
11 https://time.com/6991526/world-elections-results-2024/
12 Countries and corresponding election day in brackets holding presidential elections in 2024 were: Algeria (07/09/24), Azerbaijan (07/02/24), Chad (06/05/24), Comoros
(14/01/24), Dominican Republic (19/05/24), El Salvador (04/02/24), Finland (28/01/24), Ghana (07/12/24), Iceland (01/06/24), Indonesia (14/02/24), Iran 01/03/24),
Lithuania (12/05/24), Mauritania (29/06/24), Mexico (02/06/24), Moldova (20/10/24), Namibia (27/11/24), Palau (05/11/24), Panama (05/05/24), The Russian Federation
(17/03/24), Rwanda (15/07/24), Senegal (10/04/24), Slovakia (23/03/24), Sri Lanka (21/09/24), Tunisia (06/10/24), United States (05/11/24), Uruguay. (27/10/24), Venezuela
(28/07/24).
Case studies: Elections in 2024
Elections have the power to shift the paradigm from
“business as usual” to one that proactively addresses
pressing issues. The unprecedented number of
elections held around the world in 2024 has presented
humanity with the opportunity to renew its political
leadership and enhance diversity, with over half the
global population—approximately 4.1 billion people
— expected to elect their political representatives.
Around seventy-ve countries11 held either presidential
or parliamentary elections, including seven of the
world’s most populous nations: India, the United States
of America, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mexico,
and the Russian Federation.
Nearly thirty years after the Beijing Platform for Action
and related Declaration, which set the goal of increasing
women’s presence in power and decision-making, the
issue of gender representation in policy- and decision-
making remains critical. The 2024 elections provide an
opportunity to reect on the progress achieved and
identify strategies to further close the gender gap,
ensuring that political institutions are more inclusive
and representative of societies they serve.
Worldwide parliamentary and presidential
elections in 2024
The data presented in this section are the result of a
rst-hand data gathering exercise from the countries’
ocial sources related to both presidential and
parliamentary elections. The data collection started
in January 2024 with the elections of the National
Assembly of Bhutan and ended in November, after the
elections in the United States of America.
Figure 21 presents data on presidential candidates from
elections held in 27 countries during the year 202412.
An overrepresentation of male candidates in nearly all
countries considered emerges, with Iceland standing
out as the only country with gender parity among
candidates, despite the absence of gender quota laws.
46
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 21: Candidates to the national presidential election in
2024
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Number of candidates
AZE
COM
DZA
GHA
IDN
IRN
LKA
MOZ
MRT
PLW
RUS
RWA
SVK
TUN
URY
VEN
LTU
SEN
SLV
TCD
DOM
MEX
PAN
USA
FIN
MDA
ISL
Women Men
Last update: 2024 11 20
Source: UNESCO’s own data collection based on countries’ ocial data, 2024.
13 The success rate is calculated as the number of women elected over the number of countries where women candidates were present, i.e. 4/11.
At the time of nalizing this report, in November
2024, an analysis of the 2024 elections indicates that
only 4 women were elected as presidents, namely in
Finland, Iceland, Mexico and Moldova, out of a total
of 27 countries that held presidential elections. In 16
of these countries, there were no women candidates,
leading to a success rate of 36%13. While this gure may
appear to be a mathematical abstraction, the reality
remains that in 14 out of 25 countries, women did not
have the opportunity to actively participate in political
leadership.
Figure 22: Gender distribution of presidents elected
15%
85%
Women Men
Last update: 2024 11 20
Source data: UNESCO’s own data collection based on countries’ ocial data,
2024.
47
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Table 1: Number of representatives elected at the national parliaments
Country Code Gender quota Women % Wsomen Men % Men
Maldives MDV No 3 3,2 90 96,8
Tuvalu TUV No 1 3,3 29 96,7
Bhutan BTN No 8 5,6 134 94,4
Iran IRN No 16 5,6 268 94,4
India IND No 74 13,7 468 86,3
Pakistan PAK No 50 16,2 259 83,8
Togo TGO Yes 21 18,6 92 81,4
Cambodia KHM No 12 19,4 50 80,6
Bangladesh BGD No 70 20,0 280 80,0
South Korea KOR Yes 60 20,0 240 80,0
Indonesia IDN Yes 116 20,2 459 79,8
Mongolia MNG Yes 32 25,4 94 74,6
Uruguay URY Yes 37 28,7 92 71,3
Rwanda RWA Yes 24 30,0 56 70,0
San Marino SMR Yes 18 30,0 42 70,0
El Salvador SLV Yes 19 31,7 41 68,3
Portugal PRT Yes 75 32,6 155 67,4
Croatia HRV Yes 50 33,1 101 66,9
Belarus BLR No 37 33,6 73 66,4
France FRA Yes 208 36,0 369 64,0
Austria AUT Yes 66 36,1 117 63,9
North Macedonia MKD Ye s 47 39,2 73 60,8
United Kingdom GBR Yes 263 40,5 387 59,5
South Africa ZAF Yes 177 45,3 214 54,7
Source data: UNESCO’s own data collection based on countries’ ocial data, 2024.
Note: In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and South Africa gender quota applies to the Lower chamber but not
to the upper one. Last update: 2024 11 08
The situation diers slightly when examining national
parliamentary elections globally. In 11 out of 27
countries, women have reached the critical threshold
of 30% representation in parliament, while in four
countries, their presence remains below about 6
%. This numerical imbalance may hinder eorts to
promote women-related policies. Interestingly, two-
thirds of the countries analysed have adopted gender
quotas. Among those that reached or exceeded the
30% threshold, almost all implemented such quotas,
highlighting the eectiveness of this approach in
boosting women’s representation in parliament.
Figure 23 illustrates the number of female government
members before and after the recent elections across
countries for which data are available. The comparison
indicates that women’s representation improved in 8
out of 20 countries.
In Lithuania, women’s representation in ministerial
roles increased signicantly, from 7% before the
election to 35% once the government was formed,
after the elections. Following the 2024 elections, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
displayed gender parity in its government composition.
In Mexico and Panama, women now hold 58% and
35%, respectively, of ministerial seats, following the
elections. Finland, which had already achieved parity,
saw an increase, with women now representing 55% of
the government. In South Africa, women hold 14 out of
48
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
29 ministerial positions, while in France representation
increased from 35% to 44%. In other countries for
which data are available, women’s representation either
declined or remained low, with Austria and Portugal
that maintained a critical mass of 30% female ministers.
Figure 23: Comparison of government composition before and
after elections
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of ministries
Women Men
AUT
BTN
DOM
FIN
FRA
GBR
GEO
HRV
IDN
IRN
LTU
MDV
MEX
PAK
PAN
PRT
RUS
SLV
TUV
ZAF
AUT
BTN
DOM
FIN
FRA
GBR
GEO
HRV
IDN
IRN
LTU
MDV
MEX
PAK
PAN
PRT
RUS
SLV
TUV
ZAF
Before After
Last update: 2024 11 20
Source: UNESCO’s own data collection based on countries’ ocial data, 2024.
European elections in 2024
In June 2024, the European Union held elections for the
10th European Parliament (2024-2029). This represented
one of the largest democratic exercises worldwide,
involving approximately 358 million European citizens
who cast their votes to elect 720 members of the new
European Parliament.
The gender composition of the new European
Parliament elected in June 2024 is shown in Figure 24.
Women account for 278 members (38,66%) while men
hold 441 seats (61,34%). In three out of ve countries
women secured more than 33% of the seats, with
four countries achieving or surpassing gender parity
in their parliamentary representation, namely Spain,
France, Finland and Sweden, while 14% of countries
have less than 20% female representation. Female
leadership of the European Parliament presidency has
been rearmed with Roberta Metsola continuing as
president of the European Parliament and Ursula von
der Leyen securing a second mandate as President of
the European Commission.
Figure 24: Gender distribution in the European Parliament
2024-2029
0 25%
50%
75% 100%
CYP
MLT
LTU
ROU
LVA
BGR
POL
EST
GRC
ITA
DNK
LUX
SVN
DEU
CZE
PRT
AUT
BEL
HRV
IRL
SVK
HUN
NLD
ESP
FRA
FIN
SWE
Women Men
Source : Authors’ own data collection based on European Parliament ocial
data, 2024.
49
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Over the past forty-ve years, women’s representation
in the European Parliament has steadily increased with
each election, reaching 30% in 1999 and continuing
to grow, ultimately comprising 40% of the seats by
2019. By June 2024, this gure had slightly declined
to 38.7%. While the previous European Parliament’s
female leadership had raised hopes of achieving 50%
gender parity, results highlight the need to continue
pursuing equal representation within Europe’s highest
institutions.
Figure 25: EPs’ women’s representation since 1979
010% 20% 30% 40% 50%
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
2004
2009
2014
2019
2024
Women Men
Source: Authors’ own data collection based on European Parliament ocial
data, 2024.
An analysis of the age and gender composition of the
newly elected European Parliament reveals that the
average age of female MPs is 48 years old, compared
to 51 for male MPs. The youngest MP is a 23-year-old
woman from Austria, and the oldest is a 77-year-old
man from Italy.
Overall, young MPs under 30 make up less than 2%
of the total, with women in this age group nearly
doubling the number of men. The highest proportion
of women (about 13%) falls within the 50 to 59 age
range, followed by women aged 30 to 49, each
representing about 10% of their respective groups.
Women over 60 account for approximately 6% of MPs,
with a very small share over the age of 70. In contrast,
male MPs can predominantly be found in the 40 to 60
age range, representing 19% and 18%, respectively.
Men over 70 are nearly three times as many as women
in the same age group, and almost double the
proportion of women above 70.
Figure 26: European Parliament 2024-2029 by gender and age
0 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
men
women
< 30 30-39 40-49
50-59 60-69 70+
Source data: Authors’ own data collection based on European Parliament
ocial data, 2024.
It was at the fourth Commission’s cycle that the rst
female Commissioners were appointed in European
Union, with Christiane Scrivener and Vasso Papandreou,
appointed in the 1989-1993 European Commission
under the Delors’ presidency. In subsequent
Commissions, Christiane Scrivener continued to
serve alone with 17 men, with small improvements
made under the presidency of Jacques Santer from
1995 to 1999. During the Prodi presidency, female
Commissioners constituted about one-fourth of
their male colleagues. In the following three cycles
the number of women remained unaltered, at 10
members, but reached the critical mass of 30%.
The 2019 cycle marked a signicant shift. When Ursula
von der Leyen became the rst female President of
the European Commission, she requested Member
States to nominate both a female and a male
candidate for each position. This approach resulted
in the Commission nearly achieving gender parity for
the rst time since 1977. However, notwithstanding
von der Leyen’s renewed appeal to Member States,
the selection process for the 2024-2029 Commission
resulted in the appointment of 11 women (including
the President) and 16 men.
The 2024 renewal of the European Parliament and
Commission saw a decline in both the number of
women MPs and women Commissioners, despite
female leadership in both institutions. This highlights
the need to continue pursuing gender balance within
the European Parliament and Commission. Women’s
50
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
leadership alone is insucient to ensure equal
representation in European decision-making bodies.
Proactive measures are required to address the male
dominance in policymaking and to prioritize inclusion
and diversity, ensuring that all voices are heard.
Figure 27: Women and Men in the European Commission since
1977
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Number of Commissioners
1977-1981
1981-1985
1985-1989
1989-1993
1993-1995
1995-1999
1999-2004
2004-2009
2010-2014
2014-2019
2019-2024
2024-2029
1973-1977
women men
Including President, Vice Presidents and High Representative of the Union.
Latest update: 2024 11 29
Source data: Authors’ own data collection based on European Commission
ocial data, 2024.
Women’s representation and
democracy
So far, this report has argued that women’s
representation in policy making can be characterized
following either a descriptive or a substantive
representation. Descriptive representation, on the
one hand, refers to having a relevant number of
representatives that mirror ethnic, migrant, gender,
or other relevant groups that are present in the
reference population. Substantive representation,
on the other hand, is a concept that underlines that
elected representatives actively advance the interests
of their group in the policy agenda. While the two are
not mutually exclusive, descriptive representation is
necessary, yet not sucient on its own.
This chapter seeks to gather evidence on the
relationship between women’s political empowerment
and the strengthening of democracy, with a focus on
democratic principles, adherence to the rule of law
and the reduction of political corruption. It explores
how the combination of descriptive and substantive
women’s representation relates to democratic progress,
leveraging the abundant evidence highlighting the
existence of a strong and positive correlation between
democracy and gender equality.
Women’s political empowerment, in this context,
encompasses a broad range of factors, including
enhanced civil liberties, the ability to voice women’s
perspectives in society, and women’s participation in
decision-making processes. These factors align with
UNESCO’s gender-based resilience framework, which
argues that, when women are empowered, they may
act as catalysts for change, introduce new perspectives
and ideas, foster innovation in both the political
and economic spheres, and contribute to enhance
prosperity and resilience (UNESCO, 2023a).
51
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
Data, model specification and results
To assess the relationship between women’s
representation and democratic progress, we use the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge
et al., 2019). This expert-driven survey captures latent
demographic phenomena through measures based
on the judgments of over 4,000 experts. Each expert
contributes at least ve country-year observations,
which are combined using a Bayesian Item Response
measurement model. This model adjusts for experts’
alignment with others, and incorporates additional
controls, such as anchoring vignettes and cross-
country coding, to ensure comparability across time
and countries (Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al.,
2018). The V-Dem dataset covers an extensive time
series, from 1789, across up to 168 countries. For the
present analysis, we focus on data about the 2023.
The key independent variable of our simple descriptive
model is V-Dem’s Women’s Political Empowerment
Index, which comprises three equally weighted sub-
indices, considered one at a time. The rst sub-index
measures women’s civil liberties, including property
rights, freedom of movement within a country, and
protection from forced servitude. The second sub-
index gauges women’s freedom to voice their interests,
in both private and public spheres. The third sub-index
assesses women’s participation in political decision-
making bodies.
Table 2: The independent variable and its sub-dimensions
Women Political Empowerment Index
Sub - index Indicators
Women civil liberties index
Freedom of domestic movement women
Freedom from forced labour women
Property rights women
Access to justice women
Women civil society participation index
Freedom of discussion women
Women’s participation in civil society organisation
Estimated percentage of women’s journalist in the print and broadcast media
Women political participation index
Lower chamber female legislators
Power distributed by gender
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on V-Dem methodology.
The rst dependent variable we use in the analysis
is the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index. This index
encompasses the right to vote, the fairness of elections,
and the conditions necessary for civil society to
operate freely. It also includes freedoms exercised
between elections, such as freedom of expression
and the existence of independent media that can
criticize political power without facing prosecution or
persecution.
The second dependent variable is the Rule of Law
Index, which assesses the transparency, independence,
predictability, impartiality, and equality of laws, as well
as the extent to which government ocials adhere to
them. This index proxies whether citizens are granted
equal protection under the law and safeguards exist
against arbitrary exercise of government power, so that
political and civil rights are upheld.
The third and nal dependent variable is the Political
Corruption Index, which encompasses various forms of
corruption across the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government within the executive realm.
It accounts for instances of bribery, embezzlement, as
well as corruption aimed to inuence law-making or
policy implementation.
52
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 28: Association between women’s political participation and electoral democracy index, rule of law and political
corruption index in 2023.
0
.25
.5
.75
1
Electoral Democracy Index
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Women Political Empowerment Index Correlation= 0.8184
0
.25
.5
.75
1
Rule of Law Index
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Women Political Empowerment Index Correlation= 0.7298
0
.25
.5
.75
1
Political Corruption Index
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Women Political Empowerment Index Correlation= -0.6097
Source: Authors’ own analysis based on Von V-Dem data, 2023.
53
Chapter 2: Women in policy- and decision-making 2
The bivariate analysis presented in Figure 28 reveals
a positive and signicant correlation between the
Women’s Political Empowerment Index on the one
hand, and the Electoral Democracy Index and the
Rule of Law Index on the other hand. This suggests
that countries with higher levels of women’s political
empowerment tend to also exhibit relatively stronger
democratic systems and greater adherence to the rule
of law.
When examining the relationship between Women’s
Political Empowerment and the Rule of Law Index,
more dispersed patterns emerge. Several countries fall
below the regression line, indicating below-average
scores.
Finally, the third panel in Figure 28 displays a strong
and negative correlation between the Women’s Political
Empowerment Index and the Political Corruption
Index, lending support to the argument that greater
presence of women in policy making is linked to less
corruption.
In addition to conducting the descriptive bivariate
analysis above, we estimated a simple xed
eect Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, with
cluster standards errors by country across all three
specications. This was done to better assess the
relationships above, while accounting for country-
specic structural characteristics that are known to
shape such dynamics. By doing so, we aim to avoid
14 The model specication is the following: Υi,2023= β1 X1,i,2023+ β2 X2,i,2023+ β3 X3,i,2023+ β4 X4,i,2021+ αi + ui,2023 for i=1,…,159 and represent the country observations considered.
Where Υi,2023 refers to respectively each independent variable, (namely Electoral Democracy Index, Rule of Law, and Political Corruption Index), X1,i,2023 identies the rst
independent variable ( Women political empowerment index) for country i in 2023, X2,i,2023 represents the second independent variable (Gender quota), X3,i,2023 the third
independent variable is GDP growth and the fourth one, X4,i,2021 is the Human Development index measured in 2022. The betas are the estimated coecients for each
variable considered. αi represents the country coecient (the xed eect) and ui,2023 is the error term.
incorrectly attributing outcomes solely to women’s
empowerment, while they could conversely be the
result of other factors. We also included region-xed
eects, to account for region-specic characteristics
that may aect outcomes. Additionally, socioeconomic
control variables were incorporated, such as GDP
growth, to capture economic performance and the
UN Human Development Index (HDI), to account for
broader dimensions such as health, education, and
living standards14. Lastly, we controlled for the presence
of gender quota systems, to assess their relationship
with women’s political representation.
It is important to note that this analysis does not get
at causal relationships, but rather seeks to identify
robust, controlled correlations and to highlight
statistically signicant relations. Also, as several of our
regressors are indexes, caution needs to be applied
when interpreting the results, as some of the controls
used can become non-signicant because of (partial)
multicollinearity – that is, when some of the variables
are correlated among themselves.
Across the three models estimated, the Women’s
Political Empowerment Index appears to positively
and signicantly correlate with both the Electoral
Democracy Index and the Rule of Law, whereas it
exhibits a negative and signicant association with
the Political Corruption Index, as initially hypothesized
based on existing literature.
Table 3: Fixed eect OLS regressions on Women’s Political Empowerment Index and respectively Electoral Democracy Index,
Rule of Laws and Political Corruption Index
Electoral
Democracy
Index
Standard
Error
Rule of Law
Index
Standard
Error
Political
Corruption
Index
Standard
Error
Women political empowerment index 1.06*** (0.09) 1.14*** (0.13) -0.75*** (0.13)
Gender quota -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
GDP growth -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Human Development Index 2022 0.35*** (0.12) 0.87*** (0.18) -1.16*** (0.19)
Region dummies yes yes yes
Constant -0.47*** (0.07) -0.80*** (0.10) 1.73*** (0.10)
Observations 160 160 160
R-squared 0.793 0.700 0.649
Level of signicance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: Authors’ own analysis based on V-Dem and World Bank data, 2023.
Note: UNESCO ‘s own analysis
54
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
The simple analysis performed conrms that women’s
political empowerment may represent an important
enabler of democracy and the rule of law. Moreover,
the negative values of the intercepts in the rst
two models signal that when women’s political
empowerment is absent (i.e. when its value is zero),
the predicted values for the Electoral Democracy Index
and the Rule of Law Index are also negative, holding
all other covariates constant. This entails that when
women are not politically empowered, democratic
governance and the rule of law are weakened.
Taken together, results underscore the pivotal role
of women’s political empowerment in enhancing
democratic governance and upholding the rule of law.
To further elucidate these relationships, we built a
dichotomized version of the dependent variables,
assigning a value of zero for observations below the
sample average and a value of one for those above.
This approach allows to estimating average marginal
eects and “quantify” how democracy and the rule
of law increase, and corruption decreases the more
women are politically empowered.
The analysis reveals that an increase in women’s
political empowerment is associated with a 52%
higher probability of having an electoral democracy.
The relationship is even more pronounced for the
Rule of Law Index, where an increase in women’s
empowerment is linked to 57% improvement.
Furthermore, the negative correlation between political
corruption and women’s political empowerment
suggests that when women are empowered, there is a
46.8% reduction in corruption levels.
While, as previously mentioned, these results do not
establish causal relationships, they nevertheless provide
robust evidence that women’s political empowerment
enhances democracies and can signicantly contribute
to reduce political corruption. This supports the
assertion that women’s empowerment and political
participation are not solely matters of justice, equity,
or human rights for women themselves, but also have
pragmatic, widespread and whole-of-society relevance
in strengthening democracies. Enhancing institutional
quality, promoting adherence to legal norms, and
reducing corruption are all tangible outcomes resulting
from greater women’s involvement in policy- and
decision-making. While increasing the number of
women in decision-making roles is desirable – and
can be expedited through the implementation of
gender quotas – true gender-transformative resilience
hinges on the substantive empowerment of women.
This, in turn, would foster a systemic and sustainable
leadership model whereby women can act as catalysts
for democratic progress and anti-corruption initiatives.
55
Chapter 3.
Women in the labour
market
56
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
The Brisbane target: objective and key
indicators
At the 2014 Summit in Brisbane, under the Australian
presidency, G20 leaders committed to the so-called
Brisbane target, with the aim to reduce gender gaps
in labour force participation by 25% by 2025. It was
underlined that this would happen “taking into account
national circumstances” and that this would translate in
bringing “more than 100 million women into the labour
force”, to “signicantly increase global growth and reduce
poverty and inequality”15. In their G20 Communiqué
delivered in Brisbane in 2014, leaders committed
to boost economic growth and resilience, promote
sustainability, and strengthen global infrastructures
and institutions. Importantly, leaders acknowledge the
need to not only create jobs, but quality employment
opportunities.
Since 2014, under the G20 presidencies that followed,
Ministers of Labour agreed upon a number of key
principles furthering the 25x25 Brisbane target and
15 https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-communique.html
16 The respective gender equality plans refer to: G20 Policy Priorities for Boosting Female Participation, Quality of Employment and Gender Equity (Australia, 2014) , G20
Policy Recommendations to Reduce Gender Gaps in Labour Force Participation and Pay by Improving Women’s Job Quality (Germany, 2017).
expanded its scope, to include improvements in
the quality of women’s employment. In 2021, under
Italy’s G20 presidency, the G20 Roadmap Towards and
Beyond the Brisbane Target was launched, setting
out pathways for achieving equal opportunities and
outcomes for women and men, in both labour markets
and societies at large. The Roadmap, building upon the
gender equality plans introduced under the Australian
(2014) and German (2017) presidencies, encompasses a
comprehensive set of policy measures16. These include:
(i) increasing the quantity and quality of women’s
employment; (ii) ensuring equal opportunities and
achieving better outcomes in the labour market; (iii)
promoting a more balanced distribution of women
and men across sectors and occupations; (iv) tackling
the gender pay gap; (v) promoting a more balanced
distribution of paid and unpaid work between women
and men; and (vi) countering discrimination and
gender stereotypes in the labour market. Furthermore,
the Italian G20 presidency in 2021, proposed a set
of indicators aimed to provide a clearer picture of
progress towards achieving the 25x25 Brisbane target.
T able 4: Italian G20 Presidency set of indicators integrating the Brisbane target
Participation and Employment - Brisbane target (B)
Indicator Denition Policy domain
B1. Gap in participation rates between women and
men
Gender dierence in labour force participation rate
of persons aged 15-64
Increase quantity of employment of women
Auxiliary indicators (AB)
AB1. Employment rate of women Employment rate of women aged 15-64 Increase quantity of employment of women
AB2. Gender gap in part-time share of employment Gender dierence in share of employment in part-
time work
Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
Job quality
Earnings (E)
E1. Gender gap in earnings (unadjusted) Dierence in median hourly earnings between men
and women divided by the value for men
Tackle the gender pay gap
E2. Gender gap in low-paid work Gender dierence in share of workers earning less
than 2/3 of median hourly earnings for all persons
Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women and tackle the gender pay gap
Auxiliary indicators (AE)
AE1. Factor-weighted gender gap in earnings Gender gap in median hourly earnings adjusted for
gender dierences in individual characteristics
Tackle the gender pay gap
Labour market security (S)
S1a. Gender gap in unemployment rate Gender dierence in overall unemployment rate Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
57
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Participation and Employment - Brisbane target (B)
S1b. Gender gap in long term unemployment rate Gender dierence in long term unemployment rate Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
S2a. Gender gap in temporary work Gender dierence in incidence of temporary
employment
Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
S2b. Gender gap in informal employment Gender dierence in incidence of informal
employment
Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
Working conditions (W)
W1. Gender gap in long hours of work Gender dierence in the
incidence hours of work
greater than 50 per week
Promote a more balanced distribution of paid and
unpaid work between women and men
W2. Share of women in managerial and leadership
positions
Share of women employed in managerial and
leadership occupations (ISCO-08 Group 1)
Promote a more even distribution of women and
men across sectors and occupations
W3. Gender gap in self-employment Gender dierence in incidence of self-employment Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women and promote a more even distribution of
women and men across sectors and occupations
W4. Employment gap for women associated with
young children
Dierence in employment rate between women
aged 25-54 with and without young children
Promote a more even distribution of women and
men across sectors and occupations
W5. Gender gap in time-related underemployment G ender dierence in incidence of time-related
underemployment
Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
Auxiliary indicators (AW)
AW1. Gender gap in time spent on unpaid care
work
Gender dierence in the total time spent in unpaid
care work.
Promote a more balanced distribution of paid and
unpaid work between women and men
AW2. Gender gap in very short hours of work Gender dierence in the incidence hours of work
lower than 15 per week
Increase quality and quantity of employment of
women
Source: G20 Italy 2021: https://g20.utoronto.ca/2021/G20-2021-LEM-Annex1_RoadmapBrisbane.pdf, 2021.
Linking indicators to specic policies objectives helps
steering policy action, enables monitoring, may help
enhance eciency and eectiveness of the policies put
in place, and ultimately allows assessing progress or
lack thereof.
In what follows, the analysis tries to provide evidence
in relation to all the indicators included in the G20
Roadmap, calculates the 25% reduction required in
relation to the 2014 situation, i.e. the year in which
the target was agreed, and analyses the results.
To distinguish the results related to the Brisbane
Target itself from those related to the indicators later
introduced by the G20 Italian Presidency, we refer to
the latter as target-related indicators.
Charting a more inclusive path: the
political framework and current
situation
Considering that G20 countries account for 85% of
the global GDP, over 75% of global trade, and nearly
two third of the global population (Agarwal and
Topiwala, 2023), the G20 context represents a powerful
forum when it comes to advocating for women’s
empowerment. Yet, the Brisbane target, and its 25x25
goal, is not the rst global initiative aimed at increasing
women’s participation in the labour market.
The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, endorsed by
189 countries, remains the most comprehensive
and transformative agenda to date aimed to achieve
gender equality and empowering women and
girls. Similarly, the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, introduced in 2015, outlines
17 goals, one of which is specically dedicated to
gender equality.
58
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
In September 2024, Heads of State, government
leaders, and high-level representatives convened in the
context of the Pact for the Future Meeting - a summit
aimed at forging multilateral agreements addressing
emerging global challenges and leveraging existing
opportunities. These include sustainable development,
nancing for development, international peace
and security, as well as advancements in science,
technology, innovation, and digital cooperation.
Organized by the United Nations, this event brought
together stakeholders from civil society, the private
sector, academia, local and regional authorities, as
well as youth representatives, among others. The goal
was to collaboratively chart a path towards a safer,
more peaceful, just, equal, inclusive, sustainable, and
prosperous future. Youth were recognized as essential
to this transformation.
Once again, moving beyond «business as usual»
and achieving tangible transformations towards a
resilient and sustainable future requires ensuring
gender equality, fostering women’s empowerment
and recurrently assessing progress, also towards the
Brisbane target.
Progress in achieving the Brisbane target:
women’s participation in the labour market
The primary objective of the Brisbane 25x25 target is
to narrow the gender gap in labour force participation
among women and men of working age (15-64 years),
across G20 countries.
Figure 29 illustrates the gender gap in labour force
participation from 2014 to 2022 (the latest year
for which data are available), vis-a-vis the Brisbane
target. The data indicate that all G20 countries
have made progress in increasing women’s labour
force participation. As of 2022, women’s average
participation in the G20 labour market stood at 61.6%,
marking a rise of 3.7 percentage points on average
since 2014, attesting the current gender gap at
18-percentage points, which is reasonably close to the
Brisbane target gap of 16%.
In the following sections, the title of each graph
displays the full name of the considered indicator,
which is then represented on the y-axis. The label
on the y-axis shows the indicator’s code, as listed in
Table 4, rather than repeating the full name.
Figure 29: Gap in participation rates between men and women
(15-65 years old)
0
25% 50% 75%
B1 indicator
CAN
FRA
DEU
GBR
RUS
USA
EUU
AUS
CHN
ZAF
JPN
ITA
KOR
Average
BRA
ARG
IDN
MEX
TUR
IND
SAU
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Brisbane Target
Gender gap calculated as dierence between percentage of men and
women in labour force participation (LFP) rate. The Brisbane Target is
calculated as 25% reduction of the 2014 gender gap.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023.
Four countries — Australia, France, Japan and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
— met and surpassed the Brisbane target, while ve
others – Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, China,
Germany and Canada are nearing the Brisbane target,
with gender gaps in labour force participation ranging
between 6 percentage points and 9.7, among the
last three countries, and respectively 45.5 and 16.5
percentage points for the rst two. In nearly half of G20
countries, the gap between the 2022 gures and the
Brisbane target is between 1 to 5 percentage points,
except for India that exhibits a 10-percentage-point
dierence from the target.
59
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
As can be seen, the majority of countries made
signicant progress to meet the Brisbane target, even
if important dierences in labour force participation
rates emerge across G20 members. In countries such
as Brazil, Italy, Argentina, and Mexico, women’s labour
force participation remains between 54.9% and 60%,
which is on average 20 percentage point lower than
that of men. In Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and India, the
gender gap is between 37 and 49 percentage points.
Among them, Saudi Arabia has made substantial
strides, with women’s labour force participation that
has increased by 15 percentage points since 2014.
Results change slightly when analysing the
employment rate dierences between women and
men where the gap to be narrowed to reach the
Brisbane-related target is very close to that of the
labour force participation in Figure 30. The labour force
participation rate is the ratio between the total labour
force divided by the total working-age population,
whereas the employment rate is the extent to which
people available to work are being employed. The
concepts of labour force participation rate is similar
to the one of employment rate, but diers from it as
it includes people with a job as well as the number of
people actively looking for work.
Gender gaps in employment vary importantly across
countries: in 2022, Canada, France, Germany and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland recorded the smallest gap, below 7 percentage
points. These improvements brought these countries
to meet and surpass the Brisbane-related target. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, countries such as
India, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye show relatively greater
disparities, with India reporting a gap of 49 percentage
points.
On average, by 2023, women’s employment rate in
G20 countries was 61.6%, as compared to 79% of
men, i.e. 2 percentage points short of achieving the
Brisbane-related target. Overall, between 2014 and
2023 the gender employment gap narrowed in most
of the countries, although one third of countries made
little progress, as can be inferred from Figure 30. In
Italy and the Russian Federation, the gap remained
almost unchanged, at 18 and 10 percentage points,
respectively. Notably, progress was primarily observed
in countries already close to the target (i.e. within one
percentage point). Encouragingly, nearly half of the
countries showed signicant advancements toward
meeting the sought Brisbane-related target.
Figure 30: Gender gap in employment rate (15-65 years old)
0
25% 50% 75%
AB1 indicator
CAN
FRA
GBR
DEU
USA
AUS
EUU
CHN
ZAF
RUS
ITA
JPN
Average
KOR
BRA
ARG
IDN
MEX
TUR
IND
SAU
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender gap calculated as dierence between the percentage of men and
women employed. The target is calculated as 25% reduction of the 2014
gender gap.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2024.
Saudi Arabia also exhibited remarkable progress, almost
doubling the employment rate of women since 2014
– which brought the country close to achieving the
Brisbane related-target. Japan too exhibited signicant
improvements, with 53% of women employed in 2023,
an increase of ten percentage points over the last nine
years in absolute terms, corresponding to a reduction
of 13.6 relative percentage points.
60
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Progress in relation to the quality of women’s
employment
The data further reveal a disproportionate prevalence
of part-time employment for women compared to
men (Figure 31). On average, the gender gap in part-
time work in G20 countries is 18 percentage points,
in absolute terms. While part-time employment can
provide exibility, and can be valuable for work-life
balance, it is often associated with lower pay and
limited career progression opportunities. Over time,
this can also result in lower pension contributions,
which may negatively impact women’s nancial
security (Milner, 2024).
Figure 31: Gender gap in part-time work
AB2 indicator
0
10%
20% 30%
RUS
ZAF
KOR
USA
BRA
FRA
MEX
TUR
CAN
Average
EUU
ITA
ARG
GBR
DEU
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender gap calculated as dierence between men and women in part-time
jobs. The target is calculated as 25% reduction of the 2014 gender gap
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2024.
To promote gender equality in employment, narrowing
this disparity to a 14-percentage-point gap by 2025 is a
key goal. Important variations across countries emerge,
with the smallest gender gap in part-time employment
observed in the Russian Federation and South Africa,
where absolute dierences are 4 and 6.5 percentage
points, respectively. By contrast, some countries with
relatively positive overall employment conditions
for women, such as Germany, Argentina and Italy,
exhibit high levels of part-time work among women
(60%, 55.3% and 50%, respectively). This highlights
the importance of addressing part-time employment
disparities as well as broader employment conditions.
As illustrated in Figure 31, nearly all countries made
signicant progress in reducing the gender gap in
part-time work since 2024. Among the most notable
performers, Türkiye almost halved its gender gap,
bringing it down to 28 percentage points in relative
terms in 2023, while Argentina reduced its gap by 4
percentage points, in absolute terms, lowering its gap
to 10% in relative terms. However, some countries
have seemingly struggled to make substantial
improvements. For example, in the Republic of Korea,
the distance between women and men in part time
work worsened by 2.7 percentage points since 2014,
corresponding to an increase of 12 percentage points
in relative terms, arriving at a 5-percentage-point
distance from the Brisbane-related target.
The Russian Federation and Türkiye are the
only countries that met and went beyond the
Brisbane-related target, with respectively 3.8 and
11.7 percentage point absolute gaps, in relation to
part-time work. Brazil, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the United States of America are most likely to achieve
the Brisbane-related target in 2025, each being within
1 to 1.6 percentage points from the goal already in
2023. However, the countries furthest from the target
remain between 4 to 7 percentage points behind it, in
absolute terms. Yet, there is hope the Brisbane-related
target may be met by 2025.
In this rst part of the analysis, focusing on labour
market participation and employment, ndings
indicate that women continue to remain at the
margins of the labour market. On average, in countries
for which data are available, women’s labour force
participation is 22.6% lower than men’s, leaving a
gap of 4 percentage points from the Brisbane-related
target. These disparities are even more pronounced in
employment rates: women’s employment averages
28% less than men’s across G20 countries. Additionally,
part-time work remains disproportionately undertaken
by women, who, on average, are 82% more likely than
men to be employed in part-time roles.
These statistics underscore the persistence of
systemic inequalities that disproportionately aect
women, posing signicant challenges to achieving
the Brisbane-related target and progressing towards
gender parity in labour market participation.
61
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Job quality
Job quality can be assessed in relation to a number
of components. The analysis that follows focuses on
earning and, in particular, on the gender wage gap, on
labour market security and on working conditions, as
shown in Table 5.
Earning inequalities between women and men can
be assessed in terms of unadjusted wage dierences
relative to men’s earnings at the bottom, median and
top deciles of the income distribution. Findings reveal
(Figure 32) substantial variations across countries and
income levels.
Figure 32: Gender wage gap at the bottom earnings (1st decile)
E1 indicator
0
5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
ITA
MEX
AUS
FRA
USA
Average
GBR
CAN
DEU
JPN
KOR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender wage gap is the dierence between the 1st decile earnings of men
and of women. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the gender gap
in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD data, 2024.
Figure 32 shows that, among lower earners, women
earn between 3.7% less than men (in Australia and
Italy) and as much as 20% less (in Germany). On
average, the gender pay gap for lower earners across
G20 countries is 11%. Encouragingly, some countries
have displayed notable improvements at the lower end
of the earnings scale since 2014. For instance, in the
Republic of Korea, the gap narrowed signicantly from
20.3% in 2014 to 7.3% in 2023. Similarly, in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the gap
reduced by four percentage points to 8 over the same
period.
In some countries the situation nevertheless worsened.
In Mexico, the gap among lower earners widened
substantially, with women earning 4.4% less than men
in 2014 compared to 16.6% less in 2023. Germany also
experienced a slight increase in the gender pay gap,
rising from 18.6% in 2014 to 20.4% in 2023.
In terms of progress towards the Brisbane related-
target the Republic of Korea, Australia and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland met the
target and even went beyond it by, respectively, 8, 1.6
and 1.5 percentage points dierence compared to the
target. Canada met the target, with 11.5 percentage
dierence absolute gap, followed by Italy, Japan France,
and Australia which are very close to meet the goal.
By contrast, the majority of remaining countries still
fall behind by approximately 2 percentage points
compared to the target.
The gender pay gap in median earnings, shown in
Figure 33, presents a dierent picture compared to the
disparities observed at the lower end of the earnings
scale. Across all countries for which data are available,
progress has been made to reduce the gender pay gap
since 2014, though the pace of improvement varies.
On average, women in G20 countries earn 14% less
than men, marking a 3-percentage-point improvement
since 2014.
Among the countries exhibiting the largest reductions,
the Republic of Korea and Brazil have narrowed
their gender pay gaps by 7 and 6 percentage points,
respectively. Nonetheless, disparities persist. Women
in Brazil continue to earn 10% less than men, while the
Republic of Korea records the widest gap at 29.3%. Italy
exhibits the lowest gender pay gap at median earnings
levels, and has reduced gaps from 6.6% in 2014 to
3.3% in 2023. In 2023, other notable reductions were
observed for Australia (11.34%), the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (13.3%), Japan (22%),
and Mexico (15%).
In terms of progress towards the Brisbane-related
target, Australia, Brazil, and Italy, showed to have
reached and bypassed the goal, positioning themself at
respectively 0.5, 2.5 and 1.6 percentage points beyond
the target. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland followed by Mexico and the Republic
of Korea are the countries closest to achieving it. In
contrast, almost one-third of countries still lag behind
when it comes to the dierence between the 2023
gender pay gap and the Brisbane-related target, by 2 to
4 percentage points.
62
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 33: Gender wage gap at the median earnings
E1 indicator
0
5%
10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
ITA
BRA
AUS
FRA
GBR
Average
DEU
MEX
CAN
USA
JPN
KOR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender wage gap is the dierence between the median earnings of men
and of women. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the gender gap
in 2014
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD data, 2024.
The a nalysis of the gender pay gap among top earners
reveals greater disparities than those observed in the
case of median or low-income earners (Figure 34). As
in previous cases, important variations across countries
emerge. With the exception of three countries, all
countries reduced the gender pay gap at the top over
the past nine years. Despite this, on average, women
in the countries considered earn 18.8% less than
their male counterparts, leaving them 2 percentage
points short of achieving the Brisbane-related target.
Among the countries that have progressed the most in
narrowing the gap there are Australia (17.1% in 2023),
Germany (18.7%), the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (17.6%) and Italy (18.7%). One
third of countries succeed in achieving the Brisbane-
related target, namely Australia, Germany and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(and Italy is very close). These countries set a precedent
for others to follow.
Figure 34: Gender wage gap at the top earnings (9th decile)
E1 indicator
0
5% 10%
15% 20%
25% 30%
35% 40%
BRA
MEX
AUS
GBR
DEU
ITA
USA
Average
CAN
FRA
JPN
KOR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender wage gap is the dierence between the 9th decile earnings of men
and of women (top earning). The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD data, 2024.
The last indicator of the G20 Roadmap related to job
quality is the gender gap in low-paid work (Figure
35). The incidence of low-pay work is dened as the
proportion of workers earning less than two-thirds of
median earnings.
In 2023, data from all countries for which data are
available, indicate that the absolute dierence between
women and men attested at 7.5 percentage points,
which entails having met the Brisbane-related target.
Half of the countries met and even went beyond
the target, while remaining countries are up to 2.3
percentage points from the target. Brazil, Japan and
the Republic of Korea stand out, with Japan and
the Republic of Korea that reduced their gender
employment gaps by 5 and 8.8 percentage points,
respectively, between 2014 and 2023, surpassing the
Brisbane-related target.
63
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
In summary, the Brisbane-related target related to
earnings has been achieved almost in all countries for
which data are available. Women nevertheless remain
marginalized in the labour market, with employment
rates that are 28% lower than those of men. They are
disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs,
and remain 1.5 times more likely than men to hold
such positions in G20 countries. Additionally, women
are 82% more likely than men to be employed in part-
time roles, which exacerbates the gender pay gap.
In 2023, women earned on average 14% less than
men, with disparities widening among top earners,
where women earned 18.8% less than their male
counterparts.
Figure 35: Gender gap in low-paid work
E2 indicator
0
5%
10% 15% 20% 25%
BRA
FRA
AUS
MEX
USA
Average
CAN
DEU
JPN
KOR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierencelow-paid work is calculated as dierence between women
and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the gender gap in
2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ILO data, 2024.
Note: Data refer to full-time employment. This indicator is measured as a
percentage of full-time workers.
Labour market security (S)
This dimension refers to labour market security, with
the rst indicator analysed being the gender gap in
the unemployment rate. This indicator serves as a
proxy for the underutilization of female labour supply,
reecting an economy’s inability to generate sucient
employment opportunities for individuals willing and
available to work.
Results show important cross-country variations, and
two main groups emerge, as shown in Figure 36. The
rst group includes countries with negative gender
gaps, indicating that women are slightly less likely
to experience unemployment, with the gap within
1 percentage point in absolute terms. Within this
group, the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Korea reversed the gender gap in 2023 by registering
a slightly higher percentage of women unemployed
(with a 2023 gender gap respectively of 0.22 and 0.08
percentage points in absolute terms). Canada, France
and Germany met the Brisbane-related target while the
remaining countries - despite seeing a widening of the
gender gap in 2023 - are still close to meeting the goal
by a magnitude that does not exceed 0.8 percentage
points dierence from the 2023 gender gap.
The second group includes countries such as
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Italy,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye where
women are more likely than men to be unemployed.
Within this group, Saudi Arabia stands out: the
gender gap in the unemployment rate decreased
signicantly, from a 19-percentage-point dierence
in 2014 to 10.4 percentage points in 2023, surpassing
the Brisbane-related target of 14.3 percentage points.
Argentina also showed remarkable progress, reducing
the gender gap below the target, with a 2023 female
unemployment rate of 6.8% compared to 5.6% for men.
Meanwhile, other countries moved further away from
achieving the target.
64
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 36: Gender gap in the unemployment rate
S1a indicator
-2% 0 2% 4% 6% 12% 18%
CAN
RUS
DEU
GBR
FRA
JPN
KOR
USA
MEX
AUS
EUU
Average
ARG
ITA
BRA
TUR
ZAF
SAU
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in unemployment rate is calculated as absolute dierence
between women and men (National estimates). The Target is calculated as
25% reduction of the gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ILO data, 2024.
The long-term unemployment rate measures the
duration of unemployment, focusing on unemployed
individuals who have been without work for one year
or longer. This indicator is particularly important as it
highlights the diminishing employability of jobseekers
— the longer someone remains unemployed, the
lower their chances of getting employed again. This
issue is especially relevant for women, who often
face greater exclusion from the labour force due, for
instance, to family and caregiving responsibilities.
Gathering consistent data on long-term
unemployment rates across all G20 countries is
challenging, as such data are available for only a
limited number of countries. This might depend on
several reasons, including the fact that long-term
unemployment rate may not be harmonized across
countries, even though most countries collect this
information. Despite this, the results shown in Figure 37
reveal a clear divide between countries where women
are less likely to experience long-term unemployment
and those where they are disproportionately aected
by it.
In both France and Germany, men exhibited higher
long-term unemployment rates than women in 2014
and 2023. Over time, the gender gap narrowed in both
countries, bringing Germany close to meeting the
Brisbane-related target and enabling France to meet it,
further reducing the gender gap beyond the target.
Conversely, in countries where women are more
likely to experience long-term unemployment, the
gender gap has widened. In Italy, the gap grew by 0.4
percentage point in absolute terms over the past nine
years with women in long-term unemployment being
26.3% more than men in 2023, compared to 7.5 % in
2014. Despite this, overall female unemployment rate
in Italy has nearly halved, decreasing from 8.6% in 2014
to 4.8% in 2023. In Türkiye, the gap continued to widen
reaching 35% increase in relative terms since 2014.
Finally, on average, within the European Union (EU-
27), long-term unemployment rates have declined
substantially, dropping from 5.4% for both women and
men in 2014, to 2.2% for women and 2% for men in
2023.
Figure 37: Gender gap in long-term unemployment rate
S1b indicator
-0.5% 0 0.5% 1% 1.5% 2%
DE
FR
EUU
Average
IT
TR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in long-term unemployment rate is calculated as
dierence between women and men. The Target is calculated as 25%
reduction of the gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Eurostat data, 2024.
Temporary employment refers to work arrangements
where employees are engaged for a specic period
(e.g. xed-term project- or task-based contracts,
65
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
seasonal or casual work). It is measured as a percentage
of dependent employees (wage and salary workers).
While such arrangements provide exibility, they are
also associated with higher levels of insecurity.
Figure 38 shows that, on average, across the countries
for which data are available, the gender gap in
temporary employment reduced from 2 in 2014 to 0.45
percentage points in absolute terms in 2023 exceeding
the Brisbane-related target Yet, notable dierences
among countries emerge. While in Argentina, Germany,
Mexico, Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and
Türkiye, there are less women represented in temporary
employment, an opposite pattern can be observed in
the case of the other countries.
Figure 38: Gender gap in temporary employment rate
S2a indicator
-5% 0 5% 10%
KOR
RUS
MEX
ARG
TUR
DEU
CAN
GBR
ITA
ZAF
FRA
Average
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in temporary employment rate is calculated as dierence
between women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ILO data, 2024.
Over the past nine years, women in the Republic of
Korea reduced their participation in temporary work
from 84% in 2014 to 25% in 2023, becoming the most
present in this type of working arrangement. This
has ipped the direction of the gender gap which
changed from –5.5 in 2014 to 7.5 percentage points
in absolute terms. In other cases, such as the Russian
Federation and Mexico, the gender gap has narrowed
in 2023, going beyond the Brisbane-related target by,
respectively, 1.1 and 0.6 percentage points. Argentina
almost met the target in 2024. Türkiye’s gender gap
widened from 2014 to 2023, reaching –3 percentage
points. In Germany, women went from being the least
to the most represented in temporary work over the
past ten years.
Among the countries where women are more engaged
in temporary work, France is the only one meeting
the Brisbane-related target. Since 2014, the gender
gap progressively widened in Canada, Italy and South
Africa, respectively to 1.7, 2.7 and 3.4 percentage
points in absolute terms. While these gures can be
compared in percentage terms, it is important to note
that the overall situation for women in South Africa
reects greater eorts to increase their participation
in the labour market and a dierent starting point, as
compared to Canada and Italy. At the same time, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
has not shown signicant changes over the past
decade, but remains very close to the target.
Figure 39: Gender gap in informal employment
S2b indicator
-5% 05% 10% 15% 20%
BRA
ARG
MEX
ITA
Average
ZAF
FRA
TUR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in informal employment is calculated as dierence
between women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ILO data, 2024.
66
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Informal employment refers to working arrangements
that, either by practice or by law, are not covered
by national labour legislation, income taxation,
social protection, or other employment guarantees.
The literature is still debating whether informal
employment represents a strategy of last resort to
escape involuntary unemployment or is a voluntary
choice of workers, based on income and utility
maximization (Günther and Launov, 2012). In addition,
there are important challenges related to measurement
of informality, due to infrequent production or non-
compliance with international standards (Gardner
et al., 2018). Yet, engendering informality statistics
is paramount to understand how labour market (in)
security aects women and men.
As shown in Figure 39 women in informal employment,
on average, exceed men with a gender gap of 1.5
percentage point in absolute terms that narrowed by
3 percentage points over the last nine years. Out of the
seven countries for which data are available, most of
them have made signicant progress in reducing the
gender gap over the past nine years. For instance, in
France, 34% of women were in informal employment
compared to 19.3% of men in 2014. By 2022, this
share had dropped signicantly to approximately 4%
for both genders, with men showing a slightly higher
percentage. Italy followed a dierent pattern: although
it reduced its gender gap from 2 to 0.7 percentage
points since 2014, in 2022 men were more likely than
women to work in informal employment. This was the
opposite of 2014, when women were more likely to be
engaged in informal employment.
In South Africa, while the informal employment rate
remained above 40% for both women and men in
2022, women were slightly more likely to be in informal
employment. This represents a signicant reduction
since 2014, and beyond the Brisbane-related target. In
Türkiye, in 2014, 50% women were engaged in informal
employment, a share reduced by 24 percentage in
2022, thus bringing the country well beyond the
Brisbane-related target. Finally, Brazil is the only
country where the gender gap increased in 2022, while
remaining 1 percentage point away from the target.
Data on informal employment remain scarce and
scattered, especially in relation to migrant workers,
who often face signicant risks in regions with
large informal sectors and weak health and safety
regulations. (IOM, 2021). In this context, informal
workers are the most vulnerable and often exposed to
health risks, injuries at work, sexual abuse, or human
tracking (IOM, 2021). Gender dierences might also
inuence health outcomes. While men are more likely
to die or be injured at work due to their concentration
in dangerous jobs (IOM, 2021), migrant women
face distinct health challenges, including mental
health issues, reproductive concerns, and types of
occupational injuries (IOM, 2021). In female-dominated
sectors like domestic work, risks are heightened by
long hours, heavy lifting, and exposure to hazardous
chemicals. Women living in employer’s homes are
particularly vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and social
isolation (IOM, 2021). However, more data are needed
to track these trends and provide evidence-based
recommendations.
To summarize, the indicators related to the subdomain
of labour market security discussed so far, paint a
promising picture. In 2023, on average, unemployed
women outnumbered men by 7%, a gure that is
very close to the Brisbane-related target. However,
these data hide signicant cross-country variability.
Monitoring both unemployment and long-term
unemployment provides insight into a country’s ability
to oer employment to those seeking it. The longer
unemployment lasts, the harder it becomes to re-enter
the labour market. On average in 2023, the long-term
unemployment rate of women and men halved since
2014, while nevertheless remaining far from meeting
the Brisbane-related target. It is important to note that
collecting data on this indicator is challenging because
harmonised data are hard to nd, often due to low data
quality or infrequent data production. This explains the
limited number of countries represented in the analysis
and why this report can only provide a partial view of
long-term unemployment within G20 countries.
Among those employed but facing high job insecurity,
temporary workers make up just over 15% of
dependent employees, with women being slightly
more likely than men to be in this type of employment.
The last indicator monitored is informal employment,
which, in low-income economies, often serves as a
survival strategy in the absence of safety nets like
unemployment insurance. However, it can also involve
illicit activities, including drug tracking and human
tracking. Based on available data, in 2022, women
were 3.5% more likely than men to be involved in
informal employment. Yet, this data conceal signicant
dierences across countries, with men typically more
involved in informal activities in most countries. Türkiye
stands out, for signicantly reducing the gender gap in
informal employment, enabling the country to exceed
the Brisbane-related target.
67
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Working conditions (W)
The last dimension considered refers to working
conditions, which draws a picture of an unbalanced
workload between women and men in paid and
unpaid work. The rst indicator analysed is the gender
gap in long hours of work, as shown in Figure 42.
Academic research reveals a correlation between
excessive working hours and poor health outcomes
such as alcohol consumption, smoking, lack of exercise
(Ahn, 2016) as well as cardiovascular disease or stroke
related to inadequate physical exercise (Kivimäki et al.,
2015).
Results provide an interesting picture in the
comparison between 40 or more hours of work and
35-39 working hours. In the rst case (Figure 40), in
all countries for which data are available on average
in 2021 women worked longer than 40 hours 34.5%
less than men. This trend has not changed much
since 2014. Australia, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are
among the countries with the lowest share of women
engaged in long working hours, with a gender gap
in 2021 ranging between 16 percentage points in
France and 31.7 in Germany, with no country meeting
the Brisbane-related target. Among the 11 countries
analysed, Türkiye is the only country that met the
target, but 85% of men and 70% of women work
longer than 40 hours per week.
France, Mexico and the United States of America stand
out as they display the smaller gender gaps in both
reference years considered, and remain on average at
less than 2 percentage point from the Brisbane-related
target. The Republic of Korea and Italy have widened
the gap, with dierences of 7 and 8 percentage points,
respectively, in absolute terms, while in the remaining
countries’ gaps stayed almost unchanged.
Figure 40: Gender gap in long hours of work
(40 hours and above per week)
W1 indicator
015% 30%
KOR
USA
FRA
MEX
TUR
Average
AUS
CAN
JPN
DEU
GBR
ITA
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in long hours of work is calculated as dierence between
men and women. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the 2014
gender gap.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD Family Database, 2022.
Notes: For Australia, Japan, Korea data refer to all jobs rather than the main
job, for Japan and Korea data refer to actual weekly working hours rather
than usual weekly working hours, and for the United States of America data
refer to those in dependent employment only.
A completely dierent picture emerges from the
analysis of working hours between 35 to 39 hours
per week. Germany and France are characterised
by a relatively low proportion of women in working
activities occupying between 35 to 39 hours. As for the
rest of countries, Australia and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland successfully met the
Brisbane-related target and went beyond it. Yet results
show a slightly higher percentage of women working
between 35 to 39 hours per week. In the remaining
countries, almost all reduced the gap since 2014. Japan,
followed by Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Türkiye
are among those who reduced it the most and where
women are respectively 29.7%, 25.7%, 39.7% and 69%
more present than men in this working arrangement.
Yet, they managed to meet or almost meet the target.
68
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Canada recorded the highest gender gap in the
weekly 35-39 working hours category, amounting
of 11 percentage points followed by Italy with 5.4
percentage points in 2021, the widest distances from
the Brisbane-related target.
Results from both graphs evidence how, in the
countries analysed, women tend to be less represented
in long working hours, and more represented in the
35-39 weekly hours’ working range. Given that this
is about paid work, and despite the fact that long
working hours are unhealthy, it should be recalled that
women shoulder most of the burden of unpaid care
and domestic work (UNESCO, 2023a). This means that,
overall, women likely continue to work longer hours
than men, without necessarily getting paid for this.
Figure 41: Gender gap in 35-39 hours of work
(35-39 hours per week)
W1 indicator
05% 10% 15%
DEU
FRA
AUS
GBR
MEX
Average
KOR
TUR
JPN
ITA
USA
CAN
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in long hours of work is calculated as dierence between
women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the gender
gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD Family Database, 2022.
Notes: For Australia, Japan, Korea data refer to all jobs rather than the main
job, for Japan and Korea data refer to actual weekly working hours rather
than usual weekly working hours, and for the United States of America data
refer to those in dependent employment only.
The next indicator analysed is the share of women in
senior and middle management positions, as shown
in Figure 42. Since 2014, the share of women in these
roles has increased, though improvements have been
marginal. On average, across countries for which
data are available, women held 33.7% of senior and
middle management positions in 2022, reecting a
3-percentage-point increase since 2014.
Argentina and Germany are the only countries where
the proportion of women in these positions has slightly
decreased over the past eight years, now standing
at 37.9% and 26.5%, respectively. On the other hand,
France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland have seen the largest gains, with
increases of 6 to 7 percentage points, bringing their
shares up to 39.4% and 39%, respectively.
The Russian Federation surpassed the 40% threshold
in 2022, with an increase of 3 percentage points since
2014. The United States of America also surpassed
the 40% threshold in 2022, with an increase of 4
percentage points since 2014. Türkiye saw a signicant
increase from 15.5% in 2014 to 19.6% in 2022. In
contrast, Italy continues to have one of the lowest
shares of women in senior and middle management
positions, at 23%, with only a slight increase since 2014.
69
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Figure 42: Share of women in senior and middle management positions (%)
ARG
AUS BRA
DEU
FRA GBR
ITA
MEX
RUS
TUR
USA
ZAF
Average
10
20
30
40
50
2022 - percentage
10 20 30 40
2014 - percentage
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023.
Women’s leadership in decision-making is also reected
by the number of women holding ministerial-level
positions, which includes deputy prime ministers,
prime ministers, and heads of government who hold
ministerial portfolios, while excluding vice-presidents
and heads of government agencies. In 2024, data for a
subset of countries for which information is available,
show that, on average, women held 28% of ministerial
positions, marking an increase of 8 percentage points
since 2014 (Figure 43).
This average, however, conceals signicant cross-
country variations. Mexico ranks the highest, with
women holding 57.9% of ministerial positions in
2024—a 40-percentage-point increase since 2014
which marks the highest progress among the countries
considered. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, South Africa, and France follow
closely, with respectively 54.5% and 51.7%, 51.4%
of ministerial roles held by women with a progress
ranging from 38.9 percentage points of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to 2.8
percentage points of France since 2014.
In contrast, Italy has seen a slight 2-percentage-point
decrease in the share of women in ministerial positions
with 28% of women holding ministerial positions in
2024, in a country nevertheless led by a female Prime
Minister. Besides, Türkiye recorded an increase of
2.6 percentage points since 2014.
70
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 43: Share of women in ministerial-level positions (%)
EUU
DEU
FRA
GBR
ITA
ARG
AUS
Average
BRA
CAN
CHN
IDN
IND
JPN
KOR
MEX
RUS
SAU
TUR
USA
ZAF
0
20
40
60
Latest available year- percentage
0 10 20 30 40 50
2014 - percentage
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on own data collection on 2024 elections, the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) Gender Statistics
Database, and World Bank data, 2024.
Note: latest available year refers to: Germany (2024), France (2024), United Kingdom(2024), Italy (2024), Argentina (2024), Australia (2024), Indonesia
(2024), India (2024), Republic of Korea (2024), Mexico (2024), The Russia Federation (2024), Türkiye (2024), South Africa (2024), Brazil (2022), Canada
(2022), China (2022), Japan(2022), Saudi Arabia (2022), United States of America (2022).
When analysing data on self-employment among
women and men in G20 countries, results show that,
on average, women were 10% less likely than men
to be self-employed in 2022. In Figure 44 two groups
emerge. The rst group includes the majority of
countries, with women that are less likely than men to
be self-employed, and the gender gap narrowing only
slightly in 2022, compared to 2014. The widest gaps
were recorded in Australia, Brazil, Italy, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with a
gender gap that ranges between 6.7 and 8 percentage
points in absolute terms. Even though most countries
in this group reduced their gender gap since 2014, in
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa such gap
widened importantly over the last ten years, amounting
to, respectively, 2.8, 5.5, and 2.6 percentage points in
absolute terms. Yet, countries such as Argentina, China
and Germany met the Brisbane-related target already
in 2022.
The second group includes countries with a greater
percentage of self-employed women. Saudi Arabia
stands out with a reversal, whereby in 2022, women
were three times more likely than men to be self-
employed, compared to 2014 with 1.48% of self-
employed women and 3.26% of men. Türkiye appears
to have made the most signicant progress in reducing
the gender gap, narrowing it by 7.6 percentage points
since 2014, with women now 3% more likely to be self-
employed. China and Mexico have the smallest gender
gaps, with women being 1% and 1.6%, respectively,
more likely than men to be self-employed.
71
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Figure 44: Gender gap in self-employment
W3 indicator
-10% -5% 05% 10%
ITA
BRA
GBR
AUS
EUU
ARG
CAN
FRA
DEU
USA
KOR
Average
JPN
RUS
SAU
ZAF
CHN
MEX
IND
TUR
IDN
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in self employment is calculated as absolute dierence
between women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2023.
The employment gap in couples with children under
six years of age oers some insights into the division
of labour in the family (Figure 45). On average, across
countries for which data are available, mothers are
36.7% less likely to be employed than fathers. Over
the past nine years, this gap has not narrowed much,
remaining at an absolute distance of 7.4 percentage
points from the Brisbane-related target. However,
this average masks signicant dierences between
countries. The largest gap is seen in India, where,
in 2022, mothers in couples with children under six
worked 65.7% less than fathers. Mexico follows, with
a gender gap of 48 percentage points, although it
narrowed by 10 percentage points since 2014.
Argentina has seen the most signicant reduction
in this gap since 2014, and the country has met the
Brisbane-related target in 2022, although Argentinian
mothers in 2022 were still employed 32.4% less than
fathers in similar situations.
Italy and Brazil are close to the average, with mothers
being 36.6% and 33% less likely than fathers to be
employed, respectively, in families with children under
six. Among the countries with the smallest gender
gaps, France stands out, with mothers employed 13%
less than fathers. This is followed by Germany at 16%
and the United States of America at 23%.
Since the main activities for adults with young children
revolve around work and caregiving, this indicator
sheds light on who may take on primary family
responsibilities and reveals an unequal distribution of
both paid and unpaid work.
Figure 45: Employment gap in couples with children aged less
than six years old
W4 indicator
025% 50% 75%
FRA
DEU
USA
ITA
BRA
Average
ARG
MEX
IND
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in temporary employment rate is calculated as dierence
between men and women. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ILO data, 2024.
72
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
The time-related underemployment rate measures
labour underutilization by capturing the share of
employed individuals who are willing and available
to work more hours but are working fewer than
specied thresholds during the reference period.
This indicator highlights inadequate employment
and complements other measures of labour slack,
such as the unemployment rate and potential labour
force. Time-related underemployment statistics are
valuable because they oer a more comprehensive
view of labour market eciency and gender biases,
especially when analysed alongside employment and
unemployment data.
While the unemployment rate is the most commonly
used indicator to assess labour market performance,
this indicator alone does not oer a full understanding
of the market’s dynamics. Low unemployment
rates may mask the fact that many workers are
underemployed — working fewer hours, earning
lower incomes, underutilising their skills, and being
less productive than they could or would like to
be. These underemployed workers often compete
with the unemployed for better job opportunities. A
clearer picture of labour force underutilization can be
obtained by considering both the underemployed and
unemployed as a share of total labour force.
Results in Figure 46 show that, in 2022, 6.2% of women
versus 4.3% of men were underemployed, on average,
across the countries for which data are available. This
represents an improvement from 2014, when the gap
was 2.6 percentage points dierence, and a success,
as this implied that the Brisbane-related target was
already met in 2022.
Figure 46: Gender gap in time-related underemployment
(15-64 years old)
-2% 02% 4% 6%
USA
IDN
TUR
ITA
BRA
Average
DEU
AUS
FRA
JPN
ARG
W5 indicator
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in temporary employment rate is calculated as dierence
between women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ILO data, 2024.
The data show signicant cross-country variability
though. In some countries, women are less likely than
men to be underemployed. For example, in the United
States of America, the gender gap reduced enough
to meet the Brisbane-related target. In India, women
were 13.4% less likely than men to be underemployed
in 2022, though the gap has worsened since 2014,
increasing from a dierence of 0.24 to 0.83 percentage
points in absolute terms. A larger group of countries
sees women more likely than men to experience
underemployment.
73
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Australia, France, Germany, and Japan conversely
experienced important reductions in gender gaps
since 2014, allowing them to largely meet the Brisbane-
related target. In Germany, the gender gap narrowed
from 6.6% of women being underemployed in 2014
to 1.8% in 2022. Australia, France and Japan followed
similar patterns, with gender gaps of 2.5 percentage
points in both Australia and France, and 3.6 percentage
points in Japan in 2022.
Figure 47: Gender gap in time spent on unpaid work
(hours per day)
AW1 indicator - hours
0123456
JPN
KOR
CAN
FRA
USA
CHN
DEU
GBR
ZAF
Average
TUR
ITA
AUS
MEX
IND
Women Men
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD Times use survey
database, 2024.
Note: age of reference is 15-64, or if dierence it is reported in parenthesis;
years of reference changes country by country: Japan (2021), Republic of
Korea (2014), Canada (2015), France (2009/10), United States of America
(2022), China (2008, age of reference 15-74), Germany (2012/2013), United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2014/2015), South Africa
(2010), Türkiye (2014/2015), Italy (2013/2014), Australia (2006, age of
reference 15 and more), Mexico (2014), India (1998/99).
Unpaid care work refers to providing services within
households or for other households and community
members, without nancial compensation. This work
involves activities that directly support the well-being
of others, require time and energy, and often arise from
social or contractual obligations, such as marriage or
informal social relationships.
The economic value of unpaid work is estimated to
be between 10% and 39% of global GDP, yet it is not
included in GDP calculations (Antonopoulos, 2009;
United Nations, 2017). Despite being excluded from
national accounts and decision-making processes,
unpaid care work signicantly contributes to
household welfare, often at the expense of women’s
active participation in economic, social and political
life. This is a valid reason to keep a sharp focus on this
indicator and to improve the timeliness and accuracy
of its measurement.
The time spent on unpaid work directly inuences the
type, duration, and availability of paid employment
a person can pursue. As a result, it limits access to
social security benets and, since it oers no monetary
compensation, it diminishes the ability to participate
in decision-making, accumulate savings, or build
assets. Moreover, in many societies, unpaid care work is
predominantly seen as a woman’s responsibility, carried
out in the private sphere of the family. This perception
strips the work of its socio-economic signicance and
undermines its valuable contributions.
Although unpaid work is recognized as a key factor
in addressing gender equality and is included as an
indicator for the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG 5.4.1), measuring it primarily depends on time-
use surveys, which are both costly and complex
to conduct. As a result, the reference years for this
indicator vary, and there is currently no consistent time
series available, making it dicult to assess progress
toward the Brisbane-related target.
Figure 47 shows data from 14 G20 countries, where,
on average, women spend 2.5 times more time on
unpaid care work than men. In these countries, women
dedicate between 3 to 5 hours per day to unpaid work,
which is 4.4 to 6.7 times more than men. The countries
74
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
where women spend the most time on unpaid work
are India, Mexico, Australia, Italy and Türkiye, where
women average ve hours per day spent in such tasks.
The highest amount of unpaid work done by men
is around two hours per day, with Australia leading,
followed by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America. In contrast,
India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea exhibit wide
gender disparities, with men spending less than fteen
minutes per day on unpaid care work, while women
in these countries work between 4 and almost 7 times
more, respectively.
The last two indicators of the G20 Roadmap focus on
the gender gap in short working hours. In 2021, data
show that across all countries considered, women are
disproportionately engaged in working 20-29 hours per
week, with 14% of women working in this arrangement
versus 5.5 % of men, on average (Figure 48). In the last
ten years, this gap modestly decreased, thus remaining
far from the Brisbane-related target.
In nearly all countries, the gender gap has narrowed
since 2014, although there is signicant variation
between countries, reecting their unique
circumstances. Among the countries where the gap
widened since 2014, Germany and the Republic of
Korea are respectively 4 and 2.6 percentage points
away from the Brisbane-related target. The gender
gap in Australia and Canada remains unchanged since
2014, with women being respectively 2.6 and 2 times
more likely to work following such arrangement.
Germany shows the largest disparity, with women
working ve times more often than men in these short-
hour jobs. Türkiye overcame the Brisbane-related target
with 8.2% of women and 3.5% of men working 20-
29 hours per week.
Italy and Japan marginally narrowed the gender
gap in 2021, with absolute dierences of 15 and
15.7 percentage points between women and men,
respectively. They are 2.7 and 2.8 percentage points
away from meeting the target.
Figure 48: Gender gap in short hours of work
(20-29 hours per week)
AW2 indicator
010% 20%
KOR
MEX
USA
TUR
CAN
FRA
Average
AUS
GBR
DEU
ITA
JPN
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in short hours of work is calculated as dierence between
women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the gender
gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD Family Database, 2022.
Notes: For Australia, Japan, Korea data refer to all jobs rather than the main
job, for Japan and Korea data refer to actual weekly working hours rather
than usual weekly working hours, and for the United States of America data
refer to those in dependent employment only.
When looking at the gender gap in relation to 1-19
hour working arrangements, the data show that, on
average, women are 2.4 times more likely than men
to work 1 to 19 hours per week (Figure 49). This is
still 1 percentage point from the Brisbane-related
target. The Republic of Korea and Japan widened the
gender gap in 2021 to respectively 7 and 8 percentage
points absolute dierence, distancing the country
farthest from the target. In the remaining countries,
all managed to reduce the gap and get closer to the
target. In particular, the United States of America in
2021 with 6% of women and 3% of men in this working
arrangement met the target already in 2021. Australia,
Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland showed the largest reduction of the
gap since 2014, getting on average to one percentage
point dierence from reaching the goal.
75
Chapter 3: Women in the labour market 3
Figure 49: Gender gap in short hours of work
(1-9 hours per week)
AW2 indicator
05% 10% 15%
USA
KOR
FRA
CAN
TUR
JPN
ITA
Average
MEX
AUS
DEU
GBR
Gender gap 2014 Gender gap 2022 Target
Gender dierence in short hours of work is calculated as dierence
between women and men. The Target is calculated as 25% reduction of the
gender gap in 2014.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD Family Database, 2022.
Notes: For Australia, Japan, Korea data refer to all jobs rather than the main
job, for Japan and Korea data refer to actual weekly working hours rather
than usual weekly working hours, and for the United States of America data
refer to those in dependent employment only.
In summary, the results for the working conditions
sub-domain reveal signicant gender disparities. On
average, women are 34.7% less likely than men to
be engaged in working arrangements of 40 or more
hours per week. Conversely, women are 2.4 times
more likely than men to be involved in shorter working
arrangements of 1-19 weekly hours, and are 10%
less likely to be self-employed. In addition to this,
women remain over-represented in unpaid work,
spending 2.35 times more time on it than men. This
unpaid labour aects their paid work opportunities,
inuencing the type, duration, and availability of paid
employment, as well as their ability to develop needed
skills and competencies. In the long term, this has
consequences for social security benets, savings, asset
accumulation, and participation in decision-making
processes, thus hindering women’s empowerment and
well-being.
The data also show that in households with children
under six, mothers are 36.7% less likely to be employed
than fathers. Additionally, women are 44% more likely
than men to be underemployed, meaning they are
often trapped in roles oering fewer hours than they
desire. Overall, women face greater exclusion from the
labour market, a trend that intensies when caregiving
responsibilities are involved. Work remains to be done
to meet the Brisbane-related targets.
77
Chapter 4.
Women in innovation,
the digital world and AI
78
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Gender, technological change and
innovation
Technological progress has consistently accompanied
humanity, transforming all areas of science, shaping
economies and societies, and ultimately impacting the
lives of all individuals. Technology elds as diverse as
biology, engineering, computer science, economics,
journalism, politics, and social sciences have all shaped
and have been deeply impacted by technological
progress (Emmert-Streib, 2021), in turn contributing to
craft the world as we know it.
Today, as societies become increasingly digital,
technological development oers unprecedented
opportunities but also poses important ethical
challenges related to the development, deployment
and use of transformational technologies such as
articial intelligence (AI) (Chang et al., 2014).
As the UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of
Articial Intelligence (UNESCO, 2021) - the only global
normative instrument that exists to date, applicable
to the 194 Member States of UNESCO – underlines,
while AI technologies can be of great service to
humanity and all countries can benet from them, they
nevertheless raise fundamental ethical concerns. These
regard the biases that AI can embed and exacerbate,
potentially resulting in discrimination, inequality,
digital divides, exclusion and a threat to cultural, social
and biological diversity, as well as widening existing
social or economic divides or creating new ones. AI
technologies have the potential to impact human
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms,
gender equality, democracy, social, economic, political
and cultural processes, scientic and engineering
practices, and the environment and ecosystems.
The UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of
Articial Intelligence (henceforth the UNESCO
Recommendation on the Ethics of AI) devotes an
entire policy area, namely policy area 6, to gender and
to stressing the need for AI to be gender inclusive. It
starts by encouraging Member States to ensure that
the potential for digital technologies and articial
intelligence to contribute to achieving gender equality
is fully maximized, alongside guaranteeing that the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of girls and
women, and their safety and integrity are not violated
at any stage of the AI system life cycle.
It emphasizes the need to invest in targeted
programmes and gender-specic language, to
increase the opportunities of girls’ and women’s
participation in science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics (STEM), including information
and communication technologies (ICT) disciplines,
preparedness, employability, equal career development
and professional growth of girls and women It further
emphasizes the need for Member States to promote
gender diversity in AI research, in both academia and
industry, by giving incentives to girls and women to
enter the eld, putting in place mechanisms to ght
gender stereotyping and harassment within the AI
research community and encouraging academic and
private entities to share best practices on how to
enhance gender diversity.
UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of AI invites
Member States to have dedicated funds from their
public budgets linked to nancing gender-responsive
schemes, to ensure that national digital policies include a
gender action plan, and to develop relevant policies, for
example, on labour education, targeted at supporting
girls and women, to make sure they are not left out of
the digital economy powered by AI.
The Recommendation further asks Member States to
ensure that the potential of AI systems to advance the
achievement of gender equality is realized and that
these technologies do not exacerbate the already wide
gender gaps existing in several elds in the analogue
world and instead eliminate those gaps. Among
the gaps mentioned, some of which were already
investigated in earlier parts of this report, there are: the
gender wage gap; the unequal representation in certain
professions and activities; the lack of representation
at top management positions, boards of directors, or
research teams in the AI eld; the education gap; the
digital and AI access, adoption, usage and aordability
gap; and the unequal distribution of unpaid work and of
the caring responsibilities in our societies.
Member States should ensure that gender stereotyping
and discriminatory biases are not translated into AI
systems and instead identify and proactively redress
these. Eorts are necessary to avoid the compounding
negative eect of technological divides in achieving
gender equality and avoiding violence such as
harassment, bullying or tracking of girls and women
and under-represented groups, including in the online
domain.
In addition to the above, UNESCO’s Recommendation
on the Ethics of AI further invites Member States to
encourage female entrepreneurship, participation and
engagement in all stages of an AI system life cycle. This
could be achieved through oering and promoting
economic, regulatory incentives, among other
79
Chapter 4: Women in innovation, the digital world and AI 4
incentives and support schemes, as well as policies that
aim at a balanced gender participation in AI research
in academia, gender representation on digital and
AI companies’ top management positions, boards
of directors and research teams. Member States, it
argues, should ensure that public funds (for innovation,
research and technologies) are channelled to inclusive
programmes and companies, with clear gender
representation, and that private funds are similarly
encouraged through armative action principles.
As AI can also help fuel online violence, and enable or
amplify misinformation, disinformation and deepfakes,
the Recommendation advocates for policies on
harassment-free environments to be developed and
enforced, and encourages the sharing of best practices
on how to promote diversity in AI systems.
Being involved in, and contributing to, what some call
the AI revolution17 (e.g. Harari, 2017, G20 Brazil, 2024) is
key to ensure that these transformative technologies
account for the need, desiderata and perspectives of
women and girls, and cater for humanity as a whole,
including under-represented groups. Evidence shows
that AI systems and applications leveraging AI are
already widespread in both the public and the private
sectors, spanning domains as dierent as healthcare,
nance or agriculture (G7 2024; G20 Brazilian
Presidency 2024). For instance, in healthcare, AI aids
the advancement of patient-tailored medicine (Ying Liu
et al., 2019), in economics AI models have been helping
optimize production processes, improve robotics, and
facilitate automation in manufacturing and service
industries (Mnih et al., 2015).
In addition to the challenges mentioned above, it
is important to also highlight that the widespread
use of AI can trigger a number of other challenges,
some of which are briey mentioned in what follows.
These include sustainability challenges: training
large AI models demands substantial computational
power, leading to high energy consumption. This
raises environmental concerns, particularly regarding
carbon emissions, as computational centres often rely
on non-renewable energy sources (Nzubechukwu
Chukwudum Ohalete et al., 2023).
Moreover, the widespread use of AI in customer service
and caregiving, particularly in contexts involving direct
interaction between humans and machines, risks
dehumanizing these relationships and diminishing the
value of human connections (Oldeld, 2023). AI can
also enable automated targeting and inuencing of
17 https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/paving-way-responsible-ai-unesco-and-g7-toolkit-initiative
individuals, particularly through highly personalized
search algorithms and micro-targeted advertising. This
raises concerns about the potential for manipulation
and exploitation of personal data (Ienca, 2023).
Additionally, AI can be weaponized in cybersecurity,
enhancing the eectiveness of cyberattacks, phishing
schemes, and malware campaigns. In military contexts,
the deployment of autonomous weapons poses
serious threats to global security and defence (Burton
and Soare, 2019; Guembe et al., 2022).
At a macro level, AI may widen economic inequalities
within and between countries, and at the n a micro
level, it can exacerbate divides within societies,
whereby those with the relevant skills (also digital skills)
gain opportunities, while those without face a higher
risk of unemployment or displacement if they fail to
reskill. This highlights the importance of prioritizing
education, digital literacy, and infrastructure to bridge
the digital divide and protect vulnerable populations in
an AI-driven economy (Bongs, 2023; Dr. A.Shaji George,
2024).
AI systems can perpetuate and even amplify societal
biases when trained on non-diverse datasets. These
biases, rooted in existing social inequalities, can lead to
unfair and opaque decision-making in AI applications,
such as hiring, law enforcement, and lending, where
individuals may be disadvantaged based on race,
gender, or socioeconomic status (Nadeem et al., 2020).
As an example, in hiring, law enforcement, or lending
money, AI may unfairly disadvantage individuals based
on race, gender, or socioeconomic status.
To this end, it is paramount to ensure the widest
participation of diverse people in designing and
training AI algorithms. Yet, AI is a discipline highly
connected with computer science, a subject mainly
studied in bachelor’s degrees in informatics or
mathematics and statistics. The majority of students
in these branches are male, fact that raises concerns
about the low inuence that women may have
in shaping AI and, consequently, the design and
applications of AI powered tools (Gibert and Valls,
2022). This often is the result of stereotypes holding
that women are not very gifted when it comes to
mathematics of other natural sciences subjects, and of
the family pressure and professional orientation that
girls receive (OECD, 2018; OECD 2020).
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Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 50: Girls and Boys achievement in mathematics
programme (PISA - 2022)
0 100 200 300 400
500
PISA score
LAC
C&SA
NA&WA
E&SEA
E&NA
Oceania
Girls Boys
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on OECD PISA data, 2022.
Figure 50 nevertheless suggests this to be a false
myth. Evidence gathered in the context of the OECD
Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA), shows that 15-year-old girls and boys achieve
very similar scores when it comes to mathematics, thus
pointing to the fact that both girls and boys are equally
likely to succeed in Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Mathematics (STEM) subjects, if performance in
maths can be considered as a predictor.
Figure 51 shows that the share of female graduates
from STEM in all UNESCO countries for which data are
available for the last twenty-four years does not exceed
35%. In 2000, female graduated in STEM subjects were
28%. Although their percentage has been constantly
growing over the years, STEMs are far from being a
popular choice among young women, as it is for young
men.
Female graduates in STEM
Figure 51: Female share of graduates from Science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
20
25
30
35
40
Percentage
2000 2005 2010 2015
2020
Year
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on World Bank data, 2022.
Career aspirations are often shaped by societal
gender stereotypes and not by talent (Gibert and
Valls, 2022; UNESCO, 2023a). The stereotype that men
are inherently better at mathematics than women
hinders women’s performance in this subject and
diminishes their interest in math-intensive elds
(Abbate, 2012; Charles and Bradley, 2009). Family and
cultural inuences also play a signicant role, often
associating technology-related roles with boys, while
girls are steered towards care and humanistic activities
(Bian et al., 2017). This gendered division of roles is
further reinforced by mainstream media, where women
are underrepresented and frequently portrayed in
traditional caregiving roles, with characters often
limited to stereotypes about beauty and sex appeal
(Ward and Grower, 2020). The general lack of female
role models in STEM, whether in media or in real
life, impacts the aspirations of girls and perpetuates
gendered career interests. This vicious cycle contributes
to the gradual exclusion of women from elds like
machine learning and data science, at a time when
their contributions are crucial for reducing the bias in
designing and training AI algorithms and ensuring the
full potential of global talent in the AI era.
Furthermore, evidence shows that women working in
male-dominated STEM elds, being both outnumbered
and negatively stereotyped, experience high levels
of what can be called “gender identity threats” in
psychology, which further fuels the ‘leaky pipeline’ and
prevents their retention in STEM elds (Van Veelen
et al., 2019).
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Chapter 4: Women in innovation, the digital world and AI 4
Women in the digital world and AI
AI is growing rapidly, with estimates suggesting
that global GDP could increase by up to 14%, or
approximately 15.7 trillion USD, by 2030 due to
the accelerating development and adoption of AI
technologies (PwC, 2018). By that time, around 70% of
companies worldwide are expected to have adopted
at least one type of AI technology, although less than
half of large companies are likely to fully harness the
potential of AI across its various applications (Chui et al.,
2023).
AI is transforming nearly every sector, making life easier,
safer, healthier, and more ecient, it also exposes
society to signicant ethical, technical, and legal
challenges that call for suitable governance ensuring
that AI is built, used and leveraged in an ethical fashion
and that it abides by human rights, human dignity and
fundamental freedoms .
Despite the rapid expansion of AI, or also because
of it, the eld faces a critical diversity crisis, marked
by the underrepresentation of women and of other
demographic groups. This lack of diversity poses a
serious challenge, as it biases AI outcomes (Roopaei
et al., 2021). Diversity is essential for AI, reecting the
statistical foundation of the technology, where the
composition of the data and the representation of
individuals directly shape the algorithm’s learning
process. When AI systems are trained without equitable
consideration of all demographic groups, this can result
in biases, leading to signicant performance disparities
and potential harm to underrepresented populations
(Leavy, 2018).
To try and measure several of the facets that the
gender bias in AI may take, including lack of diversity
in leadership, we collected available gender-
disaggregated data related to the decision-making
bodies of the 100 top high-tech companies ranked in
the MarketCap index18.
18 https://companiesmarketcap.com/tech/most-protable-tech-companies/#google_vignette
Figure 52: Decision-making bodies in
top 100 high-tech companies
CEO by gender
8%
92%
Executive board by gender
22%
78%
Board of Directors by gender
30%
70%
Women Men
Source: : UNESCO’s own data collection and analysis based on companies’
annual report, 2023.
As can be seen from Figure 52, the 100 companies
at the edge of technology and innovation exhibit
a heavy underrepresentation of women in their
decision-making bodies. Women represent only 8%
of CEO roles, 22% of Executive boards members and
30% in the Boards of Directors. This not only provides
evidence in relation to the lack of gender diversity in
such companies, with the consequent decrease in
the wealth of ideas and creativity that lack of diversity
implies. It further points to the the possible limited
82
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
capacity or engagement of such companies to
promote role models and a culture where women feel
welcomed, safe and heard, and that allows them to
perform at their best. Evidence shows that prioritizing
diversity in leadership are more likely to outperform
their peers: in the AI context, diversity in development
and implementation becomes imperative to avoid
perpetuating biases and promoting fairness (Ferrara,
2023).
When analysing the distribution of employees
by gender, the gender gap appears slightly less
pronounced. According to the annual report of the
top 100 high-tech companies, women are 37% of the
overall labour force, which includes employees in retail,
administrative, leadership as well as technical roles.
When focusing on positions that require high-tech
competencies, women represent only 9% of overall
employees. This may partially reect the relatively lower
share of women who graduated in STEM subjects
as shown in Figure 51, but can also be the result
of conscious or unconscious biases characterizing
hiring and promotion dynamics, whereby women are
considered less able and competent for tech roles
as compared to men. This may translate into men’s
applications being preferred to equally or even more
qualied female applicants, thus contributing to
tangible discriminations in employment and the career
opportunities of women (Zhang, 2024).
Embracing gender diversity in tech is not just an ethical
imperative but also a strategic move for sustained
and inclusive economic growth. Gender diversity in
technology enhances team dynamics, and stimulates
out-of-the-box and creative thinking (Wynn, 2020).
In inclusive work environments, women often bring
unique viewpoints and approaches, fostering a
richer pool of ideas within tech teams. This diversity
in thoughts and approaches becomes a catalyst for
creativity and innovation, enabling companies to
develop solutions that are more comprehensive and
adaptable to a variety of scenarios (Ezeugwa et al.,
2024).
Figure 53: Gender distribution of employees in the
top 100 high-tech companies
Employees in high-tech positions by gender
Overall employees by gender
36%
64%
9%
91%
Women Men
Source: : UNESCO’s own data collection and analysis based on companies’
annual report, 2023.
The underrepresentation of women in decision-making
bodies appears to be uncorrelated with the size of the
company, as proxied by the number of employees and
the total revenues, as results show in Figure 53. This
points to the existence of a structural problem, rather
than on constraints based on e.g. overall number of
employees or paucity of opportunities.
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Chapter 4: Women in innovation, the digital world and AI 4
Figure 54: Decision making bodies by numeber of employees and total revenues
Board of Directors in high-tech companies by # employees
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
Average number of Board Members
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high)
100 top high-tech comapnies with employees between 5000 to 1050000
Board of Directors by total revenues
0
2
4
6
8
10
Average number of Board of Directors
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high)
100 top high-tech comapnies with revenues from 1230 to 604000 USD million
Executive boards in high-tech companies by # employees
Average number of Executive Board members
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high)
100 top high-tech comapnies with employees between 5000 to 1050000
Executive boards by total revenues
0
2
4
6
8
10
Average number of Executive Board members
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high)
100 top high-tech comapnies with revenues from 1230 to 604000 USD million
Women Men
Source: UNESCO’s own data collection and analysis based on companies’ annual report, 2023.
Traditional hiring practices may further contribute to
limiting women’s career advancements in companies
positioned at the edge of innovation. The complexity of
the organizational structure of these companies, their
being structured along multiple layers of management,
where the promotion of qualied women may
challenge entrenched hierarchies, established cultures
and long-lasting patriarchal practices, may further
contribute to explain the deceiving statistics observed.
Furthermore, the under- representation of women in
technical roles as shown as in Figure 54, may contribute
to explain or is itself explained by the leaky pipeline
eect, whereby a fewer women progress in the career
ladder within these high-tech companies (Parsheera,
2018). Finally, although large high-tech companies
may have the resources, they need to foster inclusion
and diversity, such initiatives might take time to be
fully eective and enable women to progress towards
a leadership career, especially if starting from an entry
level position.
When zooming on the top seven big tech companies,
namely Amazon, Apple, Google (Alphabet), Meta
(Facebook), Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla, as shown in
Figure 55, a clear picture emerges, whereby gender
inclusion remains low, both within decision-making
bodies and among employees. The top seven dominate
the high-tech industry worldwide and exercise their
inuence not only thanks to their market power and size -
Amazon alone counts more than one million employees
worldwide -, but mainly because they set the pace of in
relation to industry standards, innovation and corporate
culture. While the topic of diversity and gender inclusion
became increasingly important within this core group
of companies, concrete progress remains uneven.
Among the seven, Apple is the only company exhibiting
gender parity in the Board of Directors, while nevertheless
counting only 30% of women in the Executive Board.
84
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 55: Women’s representation in the top 7
high-tech companies
0
20% 40% 60%
Percentage
Amazon
Apple
Google
Meta
Microsoft
Nvidia
Tesla
Board of Directors Executive Board
Women employed Women in high tech position
Source: UNESCO’s own data collection and analysis based on companies’
annual report, 2023.
Note: Google has no women on the Executive Board, while Testa has no
Executive Board. Amazon has no high-tech positions.
Based on the information gathered from the before
cited report and from their websites and annual
reports, the top seven high-tech companies did work
towards more gender and racial diversity and inclusion.
Yet, according to their 2023 annual report, women only
make up 33% of their workforce, with 25% employed in
technical roles. Among the top 7, Amazon, which has
made of inclusion one of its top corporate priorities,
reports 46% of women employed. This is described by
the company as a result of the inclusion and diversity
initiatives they put in place to attract, retain and
advance women. While this company is on a good
path in terms of overall women’s representation, they
would still need to improve the gender balance of their
decision-making bodies, as they currently have 29% of
women in the Executive Board and 42% in the Board of
Directors.
Microsoft is among the most vocal about its
commitment to diversity and inclusion, and counts
42% of women in the Board of Directors and 28.5% in
the Executive Board. Overall, women represent 33%
of the workforce, with 29% in technical roles, where
women’s representation remains a challenge.
In the case of NVIDIA, there are 33% of women in
decision-making bodies. Women represent only one-
fth of the total workforce, and just 15% of women
appear in technical roles.
Women make up one third of Google’s total workforce
and 25% Google’s technical roles. Leadership positions
are predominantly dominated by men: only one in ve
members of the Board of Directors is a woman, and
there are no women in the Executive Board. This has
attracted many criticisms, also in relation to the slow
pace of improvement.
Regarding Meta, although it claims to have made
heavy investment to foster inclusion and diversity,
results show that women make 37% of the total
workforce, and around 30% of decision-making bodies.
Also, the company seemingly struggles to increase
women’s employment rate in technical roles, currently
set at 26%.
Last, Tesla lags behind other tech giants with regards
to diversity and inclusion. They do not publish detailed
diversity reports like their peers, but results show that
women make 22% of the overall workforce, with only
9% of women in technical roles. The representation of
women in leadership likely remains at about 20%.
The role of women in AI-related
innovations: Evidence from patents
The literature has long established that patents can
represent a good proxy for innovative output (see, e.g.
Griliches, 1984; Nagaoka, Motohashi and Goto, 2010)
and they have been used, together with other research
and innovation indicators such as publications and
software packages, to identify and measure innovative
output related to AI (Barualdi et al., 2020). In what
follows, we leverage data about patent documents
published worldwide in 2022 and 2023 to assess the
extent to which women participate in inventive and
innovative activities in relation to transformational
technologies such as AI.
85
Chapter 4: Women in innovation, the digital world and AI 4
Being part of inventive activities is a must if we want
future technologies to be inclusive in approach
and scope, and for them to mirror women’s beliefs,
approaches, desiderata and needs. This is not only
good for women inventors, but for all women and,
more broadly, for society as a whole, as existing
evidence shows. For instance, Koning, Samila and
Ferguson (2021) nd that, across biomedical research
areas, patents featuring all-female inventor teams
are 35% more likely than all-male teams to focus
on women’s health, and that female researchers are
more likely to discover female-focused ideas. They
conclude wondering how much societies may have
lost due to the inventors’ gender gap. Agrawal et al.
(2024), investigate and nd evidence about the fact
that stronger intellectual property rights can help
increase the participation of women in innovative
activities related to AI and, in turn, the quality of the
innovative output produced, thus benetting society
and innovation.
Brouillette (2024) further argues that, as women and
men inventors are similarly educated and productive,
the underrepresentation of women in innovation is
likely to be blamed to lack of exposure to innovation,
which may partially operate through (distorted)
selection of human capital. The author nds that
lifting barriers to female innovation may increase long
run U.S. income per person by 8.6% or, equivalently,
permanently raising everyone’s consumption by 2.7%.
In addition, ndings like those of Wu et al. (2021), who
show that rms having female chief technology ocers
(CTOs) are more innovative than rms with male CTOs,
and that corporate innovation is more pronounced for
rms featuring stronger innovation-supportive culture,
female CEOs, or more empowered female CTOs,
point to sever societal losses driven by the insucient
empowerment of women in tech and innovation.
Fuentes-Fuentes et al. (2023), provide additional
evidence about the positive eect that gender diversity
in management, as proxied by the presence of at least
one woman on the board of directors, has on inclusive
innovation, also showing that inclusive innovation
positively inuences performance.
We leverage an approach similar to the one of
Barualdi et al.’ (2020), improved applying Large
Language Models (LLMs) to check on patent content,
on data from the ORBIS Intellectual Property Database
related to patents published in 2022 and 2023. This
allows identifying 59132 patents as being AI-related.
Looking at the gender of the inventors of such AI
patents we see that, overall, women account for 46,1%
of total number of inventors. Patents featuring women
inventors only account for 10,14% of the sample, while
men-only teams of inventors account for 31,32% of all
patents identied as being AI-related. This entails that,
while almost 60% of AI patents see the presence of at
least one woman in the teams of inventors, almost one
third of all AI-related patents mirror men and men-only
criteria and approaches.
Figure 56 and Table 5 show, in fractional counts, how
women and men inventors contribute to dierent
types of innovations in AI, identied leveraging the
Internatioanl Patent Classication (IPC) categories. IPC
are used to classify patents according to the dierent
areas of technology to which they belong.
T able 5: Number of AI-related patents by IPC class, women and men’s contribution, 2022-2023
IPC category Women Men Number of Patent
Bioinformatics-related ICT 39,13 60,87 733
Computer systems based on biological model 38,28 61,72 36091
Digital computers in general 13,99 86,01 28
Healthcare informatics 47,56 52,44 663
Image data processing 44,19 55,81 341
Knowledge-based models 36,16 63,84 5944
Machine Learning 33,90 66,10 15332
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ORBIS Intellectual Property database, 2024.
86
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
Figure 56: Inventors in AI patents, by gender and technology
class, fractional counts (2022-2023)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Percentage
Digital computers
in general
Computer systems
based on biological
models
Knowledge-based
models
Image data
processing
Healthcare
informatics
Bioinformatics
-related ICT
Machine Learning
Women Men
Source: Authors’ own analysis based on ORBIS Intellectual Property database,
2024.
As can be seen, the highest number of AI patents relate
to computer systems based on biological models
(more than 36,000), to machine learning (more than
15,000) and to knowledge-based models (about 6,000).
All together these three subelds account for about
97% of all AI-related patents identied in the period
considered. The presence of women inventors in these
areas ranges between about 34% and 38%. in line
with what found by existing literature, the presence
of women inventors is highest in relation to AI-related
healthcare informatics, at about 48%, although in this
case we are talking about 700 innovations overall.
Table 6 sheds further light in relation to the type of
innovations that men inventor and women inventor-
only teams focus on, in terms of technology areas in AI
innovations.
Tab le 6: Patents in AI by teams of only men or only women inventors, by technology class, fractional counts (2022-2023)
IPC categories Only men Only women
Bioinformatics-related ICT 180 62
Computer systems based on biological model 10809 3835
Digital computers in general 18
Healthcare informatics 125 73
Image data processing 80 61
Knowledge-based models 1924 572
Machine Learning 5481 1425
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on ORBIS Intellectual Property database, 2024.
As Table 6 shows, about one third or more of all
AI patents related to computer systems based on
biological models, to machine learning and to
knowledge-based models is the result of men-only
teams of inventors. As patents represent innovations
that are very likely to reach the market in the near
future, the patterns observed basically entail that at
least one third of all the machines and algorithms
that we will be using or rely upon will follow a men-
like logic only, and likely overlook any women related
perspective, constraint or need. If we want the future
to be inclusive and reect, account and cater for the
needs of all, this needs to change. Existing evidence in
addition shows that making AI-related technologies
more inclusive by design will benet all, and not only
those that will be more included (see e.g. Grin, Li and
Xu, 2020).
87
Chapter 4: Women in innovation, the digital world and AI 4
Prioritizing gender equality in AI policy
frameworks
Improving gender equality in and through AI requires
more than technical solutions. It demands political
commitment at the highest level and concerted eorts,
actions, and budgets to make the structural changes
needed to increase gender equality in AI, its lifecycle,
and related governance mechanisms.
While the governance of AI and AI governance
framework models have been developed and
discussed globally in recent years, eorts to analyse the
AI policy landscape and assess countries readiness to
develop, deploy and use AI, and do so ethically – i.e. in
a way that upholds human rights, human dignity and
fundamental freedoms - only seldom take gender into
account.
For example, the Oxford Insights’ AI Readiness Index
uses only two gender-related indicators — equality of
Internet usage and the percentage of women and girls
in STEM (Oxford Insights, 2023). Similarly, the AI and
Democratic Values Index (CAIDP, 2024) only includes
an indirect examination of gender, with no explicit
mention of gender equality in the methodology used.
The OECD AI Observatory Database of AI Policies, which
contains information about over 1000 policy initiatives
from 69 countries, highlights «women» in only 47 of
the initiatives considered (OECD.AI, 2021).
This represents a mere 4.7% of all observations, thus
underscoring the lack of focus on gender equality in
the AI policy debate. Additionally, it is unclear how and
when women are included in AI policy agendas.
The recently launched UNESCO Gender and AI Outlook
shows that only 24 out of 138 countries assessed had
government frameworks in place, with 37 governments
demonstrating evidence of initiatives promoting
gender equality in the context of AI, while 67 had
non-state actors in place working on the topic. To
understand how women are represented in the AI
governance discourse and throughout the design,
practice and evaluation of AI governance mechanisms,
the Outlook analysed the 20 available government
frameworks that the Global Index on Responsible AI
(GIRAI) identied as including gender equity (Adams
et al. 2024).
The analysis revealed that many policy documents did
not mention women or relegated them to appendices.
Even when gender was acknowledged, there was often
no commitment to address gender-related issues.
These ndings point to the need for real eorts
integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue in AI
governance. UNESCO’s Readiness Assessment
Methodology (RAM) provides an opportunity for
Member States to identify potential gaps and (better)
incorporate gender considerations and gender equality
into their AI strategies (UNESCO, 2023b). Without
understanding and addressing these gaps, minimal
progress can be made in achieving gender equality
both in and through AI.
Towards the gender-based resilient
future we want: some conclusions and
policy implications
Making women able to actively and relevantly
participate in decision-making, in both policy and
the economy, in the workforce, or technology and
innovation hinges on tackling persistent gender
disparities across all sectors. As we look to shape
the future for good and for all, embracing a gender-
transformative resilience approach becomes essential
to navigating the profound transitions that the twin
green and tech transitions entail, and to address social
challenges. For this, creating the conditions for women
to not only be included but also lead cannot be further
delayed.
The ongoing technological and AI transformation
is reshaping how people work, learn, and interact.
This coupled with climate change, demographic
pressures, and ongoing conicts, further stress-
test societal resilience, heightening vulnerabilities.
Creating a resilient and inclusive future requires a shift
in established paradigms and the empowerment of
women in the political, economic, and technological
spheres, ensuring their voices can shape the systems,
policies, and technologies of tomorrow.
Central to this is the adoption of the gender-based
resilience approach which highlights how new
crises, entrenched structural changes and systemic
inequalities stem from and perpetuate gender
disparity. To this end, it is paramount to stop gender-
based violence, which severely curbs women’s full
participation in society. Whatever the form it takes,
violence not only constitutes a violation of human
rights, but also an aront to women’s dignity and
integrity, impacting every aspect of their lives — from
economic opportunities to political empowerment.
Only a comprehensive approach that prioritises the
eradication of violence against women can eectively
88
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
advance gender equality, against data that continue to
show alarming paths. While fewer and fewer women
nd domestic violence acceptable, progress remains
too slow. This calls for comprehensive legal frameworks
and enforcement mechanisms, complemented by
targeted education programmes aimed at transforming
MEN’talities and changing societal attitudes.
We must further address the underlying causes of
inequalities, to ensure that systems are more inclusive
and resilient in the future. This calls for greater women’s
representation in leadership and policy-making,
which is a condition needed to design and implement
policies that are inclusive and attuned to the needs
of all citizens. Evidence from this report indicates
that countries with a greater presence of women
in leadership positions tend to achieve stronger
governance outcomes, including reduced corruption,
enhanced democratic practices, and greater
investment in social welfare.
Achieving gender parity in democratic representation
stands out as one of the most urgent goals for the
future. Despite some progress, women remain
signicantly underrepresented in the policy
environment. In 2024, many and many large countries
held elections, bringing thousands of women into
political decision-making roles. However, as we saw,
women still represent a minority: during the 2024
presidential elections, 4 women out of 27 candidates
have been elected, and in 14 countries, no woman
featured among the candidates. While recent
developments point to an ongoing transformation,
the road ahead is long and steep, if we want to move
beyond «business as usual» and have more inclusive
policy-making systems.
Women’s economic empowerment is another
cornerstone of achieving gender equality. The Brisbane
target set by the G20 in 2014, aiming to reduce the
gender gap in workforce participation by 25% by 2025,
is an essential benchmark. Assessing the extent to
which countries have been able to meet the Brisbane
Target and the additional targets set later under the
G20 Italian Presidency, shows that when there is a
will there is a way, and that agreeing on targets does
help moving the gender agenda forward. However,
while most G20 countries showed notable advances
in relation to several indicators, disparities persist, and
the analysis shows that women’s participation in the
labour market continues to be hindered by persistent
structural barriers that conne relatively more women
in vulnerable jobs and fuel the gender pay gaps.
19 Here’s Why We Need More Women and Girls in STEM.” February 11, 2023. McKinsey and Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/themes/heres-why-we-
need-more-women-and-girls-in-stem
Moving forward, it will be critical to not only have
more women participate in the labour market, but
also ensure that they can lead. Women’s inclusion
in high-tech industries such as AI, but also the clean
energy sector, will be pivotal to achieving broader
economic inclusiveness and sustainability, and better
economic performance. The analysis we perform on
rst-hand data nds that women hold only 8% of CEO
positions, 22% of the Executive Boards‘ members and
30% of the Boards of Directors in the top 100 high-tech
companies.
As we navigate the AI era, new opportunities as well
as challenges arise, and women remain signicantly
underrepresented in STEM elds, with only 28% of
STEM workers globally being women (UNESCO, 2022c).
This disparity is exacerbated in AI, where women
represent only 22% of professionals19. and account for
about 37% of innovation related to AI. To shape a more
equitable and fair future, it is imperative to increase
women’s representation in innovative sectors. Gender-
diverse teams are more creative and productive, and
the absence of women in these elds is likely to result
in technologies that perpetuate biases and overlook
needs and desiderata. This is especially true in AI
systems, which tend to replicate the patterns contained
in the data on which they are trained: if the data are
biased or non-representative (as it is the case when
women are not or only partially accounted for), the
resulting algorithms and predictions will be biased too.
Concluding, the evidence proposed here is clear:
No (leadership) share no gain (for societies and
economies), and policy has an important role to play
and to make this possible.
89
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97
Annex I.
Details of the gender
distribution of
employees by company
98
Gender-based resilience — Fostering women’s leadership
100 top high-tech comapnies with employees between 5000 to 18000
0
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
MediaTek
ASML
Applied Materials
AMD
Renesas Electronics
Lumen
Xiaomi
ServiceNow
Texas Instruments
NetEase
Adobe
Quanta Computer
NXP Semiconductors
Baidu
Rakuten
Alog Devices
Paypal
Global Payments
Uber
On Semiconductor
Kuaishou Technology
Booking Holdings
Hello Fresh
100 top high-tech comapnies with employees between 19000 to 38600
0
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Jingdong Mail
Tesla
Nokia
Ericsson
Samsung
Nec Corp
Intel
Apple
Microsoft
Google
Sap
Schneider Electric
Sony
TSMC
Dell
Canon
Meituan
Foxconn
Amazon
ASE group
Delta Eletronics
Alibaba
IQVIA
Women Men
Women and men employed in hight tech companies by # employees
99
Annex I. Details of the gender distribution of employees by company
100 top high-tech comapnies with employees between 76700 to 1050000
0
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
LG Eletronics
Tencent
Micron Technology
Cisco
IBM
HPE
Hisense Visual Technology
Inneon
Oracle
STMicroelectronics
Leidos
SK Hynix
Salesforce
Meta
Lenovo
HP
Fidelity tiol Information Services
Fiserv
TE Connectivity
MercadoLibre
Sea
Murata Manufacturing
Automatic Data Processing
100 top high-tech comapnies with employees between 39800 to 73400
0
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Tokyo Electron
Broadcom
KLA
Nvidia
Lam Research
Qualcomm
Constellation Software
Electronics Art
Equinix
Zoom
Nintendo
Acer
ASUS
eBay
Didi
Intuit
Spotify
Doordash
Zalando
Block
Wayfair
Expedia Group
Vipshop
Netix
Women Men
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