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International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 • https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2024.6.2.12
International Journal of Disaster
Risk Management
Journal homepage: hps://internationaljournalofdisasterriskmanagement.com
Publisher: Scientic-Professional Society for Disaster Risk Management
Research Article
Optimising Disaster Resilience Through Advanced Risk
Management and Financial Analysis of Critical Infrastructure
in the Serbian Defence Industry
Nikola Vidović1, Hatidža Beriša1,2*, Vladimir M. Cvetković2,3,4,5
1 University of Defence, Military Academy – Belgrade, Republic of Serbia; vidovicnikola.nance@gmail.com
(N.V.); berisa.hatidza@gmail.com (H.B.)
2 Department of Disaster Management and Environmental Security Studies, Faculty of Security Studies,
University of Belgrade, Gospodara Vucica 50, 11040 Belgrade, Serbia; vmc@.bg.ac.rs;
3 Safety and Disaster Studies, Department of Environmental and Energy Process Engineering,
Montanuniversität of Leoben, Franz Josef-Straße 18, 8700 Leoben, Austria; vladimir.cvetkovic@unileoben.ac.at
4 Scientic-Professional Society for Disaster Risk Management, Dimitrija Tucovića 121, 11040 Belgrade,
Serbia;
5 International Institute for Disaster Research, Dimitrija Tucovića 121, 11040 Belgrade, Serbia.
* Correspondence: berisa.hatidza@gmail.com
Received: 2 August 2024; Revised: 5 September 2024; Accepted 28 October; Published: 25 December
Abstract
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the nancial factors and risk management strat-
egies essential for optimizing disaster resilience within the Serbian defence industry’s critical infra-
structure. The signicance of this sector is multi-faceted, impacting national security, economic sta-
bility, and technological advancement. Primarily, the Serbian defence industry ensures the preserva-
tion of vital defence interests, maintaining Serbia’s independence from foreign sources for weapons
and military equipment in both peacetime and wartime. Economically, it is a signicant employer
of the working-age population, directly aecting local employment rates, fostering economic devel-
opment, and ensuring the sustainable growth of this crucial sector. This, in turn, stimulates broader
economic activity and enhances social cohesion while strengthening the national balance of pay-
ments through increased export potential. From a technological perspective, the defence industry
drives scientic, technological, and industrial development, reinforcing Serbia’s global political and
military standing within the Western Balkans and on the international stage. Consequently, the pa-
per aims to examine the risk management and protection of the Serbian defence industry’s critical
infrastructure, oering concrete and actionable measures to improve and develop these systems
with a particular emphasis on security. The research’s utility and contribution lie in identifying sim-
ilarities and dierences in the operational performance of defence industry companies, a vital seg-
ment of the national economy. The presentation of these ndings focuses on the protection of critical
infrastructure. The results will form the basis for further investigation into the underlying causes of
business performance and the eective management of critical infrastructure security.
Keywords
Disaster risk management; resilience; risk management, nancial analysis, critical infrastructure,
security, defence, Serbia.
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
184
1. Introduction
National security, as well as overall security, heavily depends on the robustness of critical infra-
structure. Initially viewed as a logistical function that supports other logistical operations, critical
infrastructure has gained prominence due to the rising threat of asymmetric aacks, particularly
terrorism. Both theoretical analyses and practical experiences have shown that critical infrastructure
systems, services, and assets—whether physical or virtual—are crucial for societal well-being. The
disruption or destruction of these systems can severely impact citizens’ health, safety, economic sta-
bility, and the eective functioning of government (Škero & Ateljević, 2015).
Critical infrastructure comprises large-scale, man-made systems that are crucial for the produc-
tion and distribution of essential goods and services. These systems include but are not limited
to, the provision of energy, water, data, transportation, nance, and healthcare. According to the
Council Directive 2008/114/EC, an infrastructure is deemed critical if its incapacitation or destruc-
tion would have a signicant impact on public health, safety, security, economic stability, and social
well-being. The failure or disruption of critical infrastructure can lead to severe societal and econom-
ic repercussions, potentially causing cascading failures across other interconnected infrastructures,
and resulting in catastrophic consequences (Carreras et al., 2004; Zio, 2016).
Recent research underscores the growing interconnectedness of critical infrastructure systems,
which heightens their susceptibility to both natural and human-made hazards. For instance, the
rising integration of information and communication technologies has introduced new cyber risks
that could jeopardize physical infrastructure (Petit et al., 2015). Additionally, climate change has
brought about new challenges, such as extreme weather events, that can disrupt essential servic-
es and demand stronger resilience planning (Rinaldi et al., 2001). Hence, a thorough approach to
risk management is crucial to safeguarding these essential systems and maintaining their operation
amid various threats.
Regarding that, the objective of this paper is to systematically examine the vulnerabilities and risk
factors associated with the critical infrastructure of the Serbian defence industry through a nancial
performance analysis. This study reects on the inherent complexities of these systems, identies
related challenges, and proposes potential solutions for their analysis and management. Specical-
ly, the paper explores the framework of vulnerability and risk analysis in protecting and enhancing
the resilience of six key entities within Serbia’s defence industry. Given the complexity of these
systems, the study argues for the integration of various modelling perspectives and innovative ana-
lytical approaches (Bouchon, 2006). This integration is crucial for accurately capturing the structural
and dynamic complexities of critical infrastructures, thereby enabling condent decision-making
regarding protection and resilience actions (Zio, 2016).
2. Critical Infrastructure Resilience: A Risk and Vulnerability Approach
The Republic of Serbia has a wealth of experience in handling disasters, particularly those stem-
ming from electrical incidents. In the last ten years, the country has recorded over 150,000 res (Cv-
etković, Pavlović, & Janković, 2021; Cvetković, Pavlović, & Janković, 2021; Cvetković et al., 2022; Cv-
etković & Marković, 2021; Cvetković & Janković, 2021). Signicant incidents, such as the 2014 oods
in Obrenovac and the 2009 earthquakes in Kraljevo, have driven Serbia to establish a comprehensive
protection and rescue system to eectively address threats to critical national resources (Cvetković,
Babić, & Gačić, 2017; Cvetković, Bošković, & Ocal, 2021; Cvetković & Martinović, 2020; Cvetković,
2016; Cvetković, 2024). The legislative framework, including the Law on Emergency Situations and
various strategic documents, lays the groundwork for adopting the Critical Infrastructure Law and
aligns with numerous European regulations in this area (Cvetković & Synodinou, 2024; Cvetković,
Nikolić, & Lukić, 2024; Cvetković, Nikolić, & Lukić, 2024; Cvetković & Šišović, 2023; Cvetković &
Šišović, 2024; Cvetković et al., 2021).
Serbia’s defence industry’s critical infrastructure faces numerous hazards, risks, and threats, in-
cluding natural disasters, ageing components, increased load demands, climate change, intentional
Optimising Disaster Resilience Through Advanced Risk Management and
Financial Analysis of Critical Infrastructure in the Serbian Defence Industry
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
185
aacks, and terrorism. As a result, protecting critical infrastructure (CIP) has become a major global
priority. Regional countries like Slovenia and Croatia are actively addressing these issues through
specic legislation that outlines institutional roles during disasters (Lewis, 2006), with a focus on
physical protection and asset reinforcement (Cimellaro et al., 2010). To protect the defence indus-
try’s critical infrastructure, it is crucial to model its components under various threats and perform
thorough risk and vulnerability assessments at the system level.
The importance of resilience in critical infrastructure—its ability to endure, adapt, and quickly
recover from disruptions—has been highlighted by recent catastrophic disasters (Mote, 2012). The
2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction emphasized the need for disaster resilience, fostering
a new culture of disaster response (Zio, 2016). Systems must be not only reliable but also capable
of recovering from disruptions. Government policies now encourage eorts to ensure systems can
continue operating at some level or return to full functionality after a disruption (Cvetković, Rikano-
vić, & Knežević; Cvetković & Šišović, 2024; Grozdanić & Cvetković, 2024). Consequently, resilience
is now seen as an essential aribute for critical infrastructure, integrated into its design, operation,
and management. Serbia should play a signicant role in further dening and regulating this area.
The national well-being of Serbia’s defence industry, along with all interconnected entities and
stakeholders, relies on secure and resilient critical infrastructure—resources, systems, and networks
crucial for the seamless functioning of society. To achieve security and resilience, critical infrastruc-
ture partners must collaboratively prioritize goals, mitigate risks, measure progress, and adapt to
changing conditions (U.S. DHS, 2013). Although Serbia has recently established and prioritized crit-
ical infrastructure compared to the European Union, the United States, and neighbouring countries,
substantial eorts by the academic, professional, and scientic communities, along with institution-
al support, guide national eorts toward critical infrastructure risk management.
Figure 1. The interdependence of risk components: a comprehensive analysis of
their interconnected nature and implications for eective risk management.
The community involved in critical infrastructure risk management is diverse, including partner-
ships between owners and operators, government entities at various levels, regional organizations,
non-prot groups, and academia. Eective risk management requires an integrated approach across
this community (Carla, 2019; Cvetković, 2019; Goyal, 2019; Mano & Rapaport, 2019; Öcal, 2019; Vib-
has, Bismark, Ruiyi, Anwaar, & Rajib, 2019; Xuesong & Kapucu, 2019): a) identify, deter, detect, dis-
rupt, and prepare for threats against the state’s critical infrastructure, including the defence system,
the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces of Serbia, and the defence industry; b) reduce the vul-
nerability of critical assets, systems, and networks within the defence industry and its external rela-
tions; c) mitigate the potential impacts of incidents or adverse events on critical infrastructure. The
success of this integrated approach depends on leveraging a broad spectrum of skills, expertise, and
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
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experience within the critical infrastructure community and related stakeholders. This has become
increasingly evident in Serbia in recent years. Eective information sharing among partners is cru-
cial for building situational awareness and enabling risk-based decision-making (U.S. DHS, 2013).
Traditionally, risk has been dened as a function of three elements: the threats to which an asset
is susceptible, the asset’s vulnerabilities to the threat, and the potential consequences of asset deg-
radation (Petit et al., 2013). Today, resilience has emerged as a fourth component, alongside vulner-
ability, threat/hazard, and consequences, forming the comprehensive risk function. In the context
of critical infrastructure, risk at an asset (such as an oce building, hangar, factory, or machinery)
for a given threat/hazard type is a function of the threat/hazard likelihood (Carlson et al., 2012),
the asset’s vulnerability (the likelihood of a successful threat event), the asset’s resilience, and the
magnitude of the resulting consequences (Petit et al., 2013). As depicted in Figure 1, the risk com-
ponents are inherently interdependent. When considering a threat or hazard—whether manmade
or natural—the vulnerability and resilience of the asset (infrastructure) will determine the resultant
consequences. The intrinsic complexity of risk is amplied by dependencies and interdependencies
that aect the components of risk (Petit et al., 2015). In today’s interconnected world, the potential
impacts are exacerbated by these dependencies and the diverse range of threats capable of exploit-
ing them. Critical infrastructure now spans national borders and global supply chains, a crucial
point in this case study.
Within the context of the risk framework depicted, policy, and operating environments, the struc-
tures of critical infrastructure sectors and cross-sector partnerships provide a framework to guide
the collective eorts of partners. The national eort to enhance critical infrastructure security and
resilience relies on the ability of public and private critical infrastructure owners and operators to
make risk-informed decisions when allocating limited resources during both steady-state and crisis
operations (U.S. DHS, 2013). The complex and uncertain risk environment aecting critical infra-
structure, particularly the defence industry, has evolved signicantly over the past decade. Daily
threats to vital state entities have become increasingly relevant, as evidenced by developments glob-
ally, regionally, and in Serbia’s southern province. For example, critical infrastructure that has long
faced physical threats and natural disasters is now increasingly exposed to cyber risks, stemming
from the integration of information and communication technologies with critical infrastructure
operations and the hostile exploitation of potential cyber vulnerabilities.
As the number of threats in modern analyses and practice continues to grow, protecting critical
infrastructure becomes increasingly important (Carla S., 2019; Cvetković, 2019; Frosdick, 1997; Ku-
miko & Shaw, 2019; Öcal, 2019; Perić & Cvetković, 2019; Vibhas et al., 2019). This protection is crucial
not only because of the potential damage to the infrastructure itself but also because of the broader
societal and economic consequences such damage can cause. Protecting critical infrastructure dur-
ing emergencies should be viewed as part of a comprehensive prevention process and emergency
response strategy. In this context, organizations establish, implement, and maintain procedures to
identify potential incidents that could negatively impact them, their activities, and the environment
(Cvetković, 2024b). These procedures aim to protect lives and property, prevent emergencies or dis-
asters, minimize operational downtime, recover critical activities, return to normal operations, and
safeguard the organization’s reputation. As Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly note, “It is impossible
to adequately analyze or understand the behaviour of a given infrastructure [organization] in isola-
tion from the environment or other infrastructures” (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, 2001). Critical
infrastructure constantly interacts with its environment, utilizing and transforming inputs from the
environment to provide outputs back to it. Figure 1 illustrates how the critical infrastructure of Ser-
bia’s defence industry inuences and interacts with its environment.
Optimising Disaster Resilience Through Advanced Risk Management and
Financial Analysis of Critical Infrastructure in the Serbian Defence Industry
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
187
Figure 2. Inuence and interaction between critical infrastructure of
Serbian defence industry and environment.
These interactions can be classied into three main categories: a) upstream dependencies: which
refer to the essential products or services provided to one infrastructure by another external infra-
structure. In the context of the Serbian defence industry, there is a direct dependency on companies
and entities that supply vital raw materials, supplies, and resources for the production of weapons
and military equipment. Additionally, these external entities oer services that the defence industry
cannot provide independently.
Protecting these upstream dependencies from various risks and threats across all operational
domains is crucial; b) internal dependencies: involve the interactions among the internal opera-
tions, functions, and missions within the infrastructure itself. Internal dependencies are the internal
connections among the assets that make up critical infrastructure. For example, the production of
ammunition at “Prvi Partizan” a.d. Užice is directly reliant on the propulsion machinery and the
moulds that determine the calibre; c) downstream dependencies: These pertain to the eects on a
critical infrastructure’s consumers or recipients resulting from the degradation of the resources pro-
vided by that infrastructure. In a more specic sense, the Ministry of Defence and all units of the Ser-
bian Armed Forces would be directly impacted. In a broader sense, the entire state, the population,
the environment, and the functioning of interstate entities and organizations would also be aected.
3. Improving National Eorts for Strengthening the Security of
Critical Infrastructure
The government, particularly through the Ministry of Defence and the defence industry sector,
has a vested interest in ensuring the robustness of critical infrastructure and the continuous provi-
sion of essential services under all conditions. Owners and operators of critical infrastructure often
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
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stand to gain the most from investing in their security and resilience. They are motivated by both
the direct benets and a sense of social responsibility to adopt these practices. However, production
sectors and companies may be rightfully concerned about the return on investments in security and
resilience, as these may not yield immediately measurable benets. Eective incentives can help
justify the costs associated with enhanced security and resilience by balancing short-term expenses
with near-term benets (U.S. DHS, 2013).
Market-based incentives can drive signicant changes in business practices and foster the de-
velopment of markets such as insurance for cyber, chemical, biological, or radiological risks. Addi-
tionally, the Republic of Serbia and local governments can explore oering incentives to encourage
investment in security and resilience measures. Eective measures and activities for implementation
include: a) continuously identifying, analyzing, and, where appropriate, implementing incentives;
b) supporting research and data collection to quantify the potential costs resulting from inadequate
critical infrastructure security and resilience, and insucient cyber preparedness; c) establishing in-
novation challenge programs to incentivize new solutions for strengthening infrastructure security
and resilience during the planning, design, and redesign phases, including technological, engineer-
ing, and process improvements.
The dependencies and interdependencies of critical infrastructure represent complex elements
that are challenging to identify and analyze. They are characterized by various interactions (e.g.,
upstream, internal, and downstream), classes (e.g., physical, cyber, logical, and geoFigureic), and di-
mensions (e.g., operating environment, coupling and response behaviour, type of failure, infrastruc-
ture characteristics, and state of operation). These factors inuence all components of risk (threat/
hazard, vulnerability, resilience, and consequence), can themselves become threats or hazards, aect
the resilience and protection performance of critical infrastructure, and lead to cascading and esca-
lating failures. It is essential to integrate dependencies and interdependencies into risk and resil-
ience methodologies.
A data-driven capability that operationalizes the analysis of dependencies and interdepend-
encies would not only provide an unprecedented level of situational awareness but also enable
decision-makers to anticipate disruptions. Achieving this ultimate goal requires the development
of a comprehensive and interactive assessment of critical infrastructure dependencies and interde-
pendencies. This necessitates the combination of multiple areas of expertise (e.g., engineering, social
sciences, business continuity, and emergency management) within an adaptive and exible assess-
ment framework (Petit et al., 2015).
Furthermore, the integration of advanced technologies and innovative methodologies plays a
crucial role in enhancing the security and resilience of critical infrastructure (Vladimir Cvetković,
2024a, 2024b). Emerging technologies such as articial intelligence, machine learning, and big data
analytics can be leveraged to predict and mitigate potential risks more eectively (V. Cvetković
& Filipović, 2017). By utilizing these technologies, critical infrastructure systems can benet from
real-time monitoring, predictive maintenance, and automated response mechanisms that can signif-
icantly reduce vulnerabilities and enhance overall resilience. Additionally, collaboration with inter-
national partners and participation in global initiatives can provide valuable insights and best prac-
tices, fostering a more comprehensive approach to critical infrastructure protection (Baruh, Dey, &
Dua, 2023; V. M. Cvetković, 2023; El-Mougher, Abu Sharekh, Abu Ali, & Zuhud, 2023; Rajani, Tu-
hin, & Rina, 2023; Sudar, Cvetković, & Ivanov, 2024). The Republic of Serbia, by embracing these ad-
vancements and fostering a culture of continuous improvement, can strengthen its national eorts
to secure and sustain its critical infrastructure, ultimately contributing to the stability and prosperity
of the nation (Cvetković & Kezunović, 2021; Hromada & Lukas, 2012; Murray & Grubesic, 2012).
4. Comprehensive Financial Analysis of Entities in the Defence Industry
The Defence Industrial Base Sector in Serbia is the national industrial complex responsible for
research and development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons sys-
tems, subsystems, and components or parts. This complex aims to meet the military requirements
Optimising Disaster Resilience Through Advanced Risk Management and
Financial Analysis of Critical Infrastructure in the Serbian Defence Industry
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
189
of the Serbian Armed Forces, third countries, and developing nations, as well as some of the most
powerful armies worldwide, including the U.S. military and security sectors (Table 1). The defence
industry in Serbia comprises numerous companies engaged in the production and trade of weapons,
military equipment, and dual-purpose goods (items usable for both military and civilian purposes).
These companies are both state-owned and privately owned (Radić & Radić, 2018). The Ministry of
Defence of the Republic of Serbia has signicant authority over the majority of state-owned compa-
nies, managing and supervising their operations following the Law on Defence.
Table 1. Comparative Financial Analysis of Serbian Defence Industry Companies (2014-2017).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on nancial reports.
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Company of Serbi-
an defence industry
Holding
corporation
“Krušik” a.d.
“Milan Blagojević
- Namenska” a.d.
“Prva Iskra
namenska”
a.d.
“Prvi
Partizan”
a.d.
“Sloboda”
a.d. “Zastava
oružje” a.d.
City Valjevo Lučani Barič Užice Čačak Kragujevac
INDICATOR RATIO OF CURRENT LIQUIDITY
Business
year
2014 0.9871 0.8361 2.3003 1.2667 1.0889 0.7228
2015 0.9862 0.7259 2.5965 1.3680 1.0259 0.6938
2016 0.9919 0.7895 1.9366 1.7782 1.0279 0.5769
2017 0.9739 0.9151 3.3162 1.7924 0.9813 0.5768
INDICATOR BUSINESS PROFIT RATIO
Business
year
2014 -0.0181 0.1490 -0.0972 0.0801 0.1565 -0.0407
2015 0.1400 0.1376 -0.0481 0.1702 0.0249 0.0675
2016 0.0971 0.1745 0.1650 0.1666 0.1607 -0.0335
2017 0.1184 0.2340 0.1476 0.0424 0.1052 -0.0128
INDICATOR TURNOVER RATIO OF TOTAL ASSETS
Business
year
2014 0.3277 0.4795 0.2602 0.6015 0.4398 0.2725
2015 0.4735 0.5670 0.2927 0.7162 0.3823 0.2800
2016 0.4701 0.7196 0.6947 0.6820 0.5034 0.2298
2017 0.7534 0.6927 0.7222 0.4068 0.5752 0.1989
INDICATOR DEBT RATIO
Business
year
2014 0.2896 0.4783 0.6173 0.5436 0.4355 0.2538
2015 0.2760 0.4678 0.6622 0.5986 0.4229 0.1961
2016 0.2107 0.5002 0.7271 0.6894 0.3787 0.1262
2017 0.1820 0.5238 0.6804 0.4619 0.3659 0.0863
INDICATOR LEVERAGE
Business
year
2014 3.4529 2.0907 1.6200 1.8396 2.2962 3.9401
2015 3.6232 2.1375 1.5102 1.6704 2.3647 5.1001
2016 4.7472 1.9993 1.3754 1.4506 2.6407 7.9249
2017 5.4934 1.9093 1.4697 2.1648 2.7333 11.5905
INDICATOR ROE (Return on Equity)
Business
year
2014 -0.1617 0.0087 0.0136 0.1241 0.0073 -0.4573
2015 0.1076 0.0146 0.0076 0.2189 0.0149 -0.0617
2016 0.2056 0.1372 0.0354 0.1604 0.1143 -0.3887
2017 0.3482 0.2418 0.1046 0.0701 0.0850 -0.3132
INDICATOR ROA (Return on Assets)
Business
year
2014 -0.0059 0.0714 -0.0253 0.0482 0.0688 -0.0111
2015 0.0663 0.0780 -0.0141 0.1219 0.0095 0.0189
2016 0.0456 0.1256 0.1146 0.1137 0.0809 -0.0077
2017 0.0892 0.1621 0.1066 0.0173 0.0605 -0.0025
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
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A special group called the “Defence Industry of Serbia,” which includes seven state-owned enter-
prises, is allocated by the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence, report, 2018). These companies
are HK “Krušik” a.d. Valjevo, “Milan Blagojević – namenska” a.d. Lučani, “Prva Iskra” a.d. Barič,
“Prvi partizan” a.d. Užice, “Sloboda” a.d. Čačak, “Zastava oružje” a.d. Kragujevac, and “Yugoim-
port” SDPR (Figure 3). Beyond this group, another 216 companies, licensed for the production and
trade of weapons and military equipment, cooperate closely with the dedicated defence industry
(Ministry of Trade, Tourism, and Telecommunications, 2018). These companies, which include nu-
merous institutes and faculties from the professional and academic community as subcontractors,
vary in ownership structure, core business, and size. Predominantly small enterprises, and to a
lesser extent medium-sized enterprises, they are mostly privately owned and collectively employ
around 8,000 people.
This second segment of the Serbian defence industry includes companies primarily belonging
to the metal complex, electrocomplex, and chemical complex. These entities, along with the afore-
mentioned seven primary factories, form a robust industrial base for defence capacities. The third
segment focuses on the development and enhancement of resources and comprises the Military
Technical Institute, the Technical Expert Center, and three technical repair institutes within the de-
fence system, namely the Ministry of Defence and the Army of Serbia.
Figure 3. Current Liquidity Ratio: A Comprehensive Measure of Financial Health and
Short-term Solvency. Source: Authors
Nowadays world is moving rapidly toward globalization, and the fact is that business perfor-
mance evaluation of the defence industry’s companies through nancial analysis its importance.
The nancial ratios involved in this research, provide useful quantitative and qualitative nancial
information so we can evaluate the operation of a defence industry enterprise and analyze its nan-
cial position within a sector (Figure 4).
Optimising Disaster Resilience Through Advanced Risk Management and
Financial Analysis of Critical Infrastructure in the Serbian Defence Industry
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
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Figure 4. Analysis of Business Prot Ratio. Source: Authors.
This type of analytic nancial research brings awareness to managers as to which features they
have to focus on. As shown in Table 1, nancial analysis was carried out for 6 companies from the
group “Defence Industry of Serbia” in the period from 31 December 2014 to 31 December 2017
business year, where, based on the indicators of protability, indebtedness, liquidity and business
eciency, we can valorize the achieved results and perceive the nancial position of the companies
concerned. At the same time, we can also see the risk of business assets and capital, as well as the
sustainability of these companies’ operations.
Figure 5. Total Asset Turnover Ratio Analysis. Source: Authors
The research ndings have demonstrated the impact of structural and dynamic changes in bal-
ance sheets and income statements on the business performance of the analyzed subjects. Financial
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
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ratios, serving as reliable indicators, reveal specic trends in business operations and provide critical
signals for making informed business decisions within the company. These ratios not only track the
historical performance but also predict future trends, enabling management to identify potential
opportunities and risks. As a result, they form an essential part of the strategic decision-making
process, guiding companies toward sustainable growth and operational eciency.
The nancial leverage indicator shows the value of total capital (total liabilities) supported in a
monetary unit of a shareholder or own capital, and at the same time, the purposefulness of the same
is reected in the fact that it limits the excessive reliance on borrowing to minimize risk-taking in the
search for higher yields. Indicator values in enterprises “Milan Blagojević-namenska” a.d. and “Prva
iskra namenska” a.d. have a downward trend, with a small level of variation of value. A constant
trend of growth of this coecient was observed in “Zastava oružje” a.d., and in the other entities of
the Serbian defence industry some level of variations, which is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Leverage Analysis. Source: Authors.
The indicators return on equity - ROE and return on assets – ROA, represent the indicators of
protability, that is, the performance of the business, in which the values of these are specically
reduced to the requirement to achieve the maximum prot and return from the least engaged funds
in the business process. The rate of ROE is the return on capital invested, which is obtained when
the operating result is allocated to the capital, ie it is an indicator of the protability of own capital.
Figure 7. Return on Equity (ROE): An In-Depth Analysis.
Optimising Disaster Resilience Through Advanced Risk Management and
Financial Analysis of Critical Infrastructure in the Serbian Defence Industry
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
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This indicator shows how much prot is generated on the invested equity capital, or how much
the company will earn by investing the invested funds of the shareholders. The highest level of
ROE has entreprice “Krušik” a.d., then follow “Milan Blagojević – namenska” a.d. and “Prva iskra
namenska” a.d. with constant growth, which indicates great business operations, and sustain de-
velopment of the companies. Great variations of indicators during the researched period have “Prvi
partisan” a.d., a company which had great business results in 2014 and 2015, and “Sloboda” a.d. The
lowest value, as we can see in Figure 6 has “Zastava oružje”., with constant negative results. This is
due to large customer receivables, whereby current liabilities can not be seled, which in turn aects
the company’s nal business result and income (Figure 7).
The rate of return on total assets is the return on the invested assets, ie the total assets involved,
ie the degree of eciency. This indicator shows how much the company’s management manages
eectively to maximize prots (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Return on assets (ROA). Source: Authors
Comparative advantage is the systematization of experience in a rounded cycle of independent
development and production of a wide range of assets, weapons and military equipment, as well
as complex combat systems. Knowledge of standards for development and technologies for the
production of Eastern and Western origin. High-quality human capital is also distinguished by ded-
icated industries.
Table 2. Analysis of Employment Levels in Serbia’s Leading Defence Industry Companies During
the 2015-2017 Business Years.
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
TOTAL
Company of
Serbian defence
industry
Holding
corporation
“Krušik” a.d.
“Milan
Blagojević -
Namenska”
a.d.
“Prva Iskra
namenska”
a.d.
“Prvi
Partizan”
a.d.
“Sloboda”
a.d.
“Zastava
oružje”
a.d.
City Valjevo Lučani Barič Užice Čačak Kraguje-
vac
INDICATOR Employment
Business
year
2015 1385 1121 149 933 1621 2300 7509
2016 1922 1202 151 1541 1803 2375 8994
2017 2615 1297 152 1546 2015 2422 10047
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
194
As illustrated in Table 2, the analysis of employment based on annual nancial statements, pub-
licly available on the Business Registers Agency’s website, reveals a notable trend. During the period
from 2015 to 2017, the level of employment in the analyzed companies within Serbia’s defence in-
dustry increased by approximately 30%, which is an extremely positive development. The defence
industry directly employs over 10,000 individuals, and when considering its cooperative companies,
this number exceeds 20,000 people. Economically, this industry’s restructuring and the rising de-
mand for both professional and junior personnel signicantly benet the entire Serbian economy by
fostering sustainable development.
From the perspective of critical infrastructure security, the Serbian defence industry has made
substantial eorts in recent years, drawing from past experiences and disasters. These eorts are fo-
cused on modernizing existing protection capacities, with active participation from Serbia’s profes-
sional and academic communities. This modernization not only enhances the industry’s resilience
but also supports broader national security objectives.
4. Recommendations for Enhancing the Security and Resilience of
Critical Infrastructure in Serbia’s Defence Industry
The following recommendations aim to bolster the security and resilience of critical infrastruc-
ture within Serbia’s defence industry, ensuring robust protection and sustained functionality:
a) Continuously identify, analyze, and implement incentives to justify the costs of improved secu-
rity and resilience;
b) Balance short-term expenses with near-term benets to support additional investments;
c) Develop market-based incentives to drive signicant changes in business practices and foster
markets for insurance against cyber, chemical, biological, and radiological risks;
d) Support research and data collection to quantify the potential costs of inadequate infrastructure
security, resilience, and cyber preparedness;
e) Utilize collected data to enhance risk management strategies and enable data-driven deci-
sion-making;
f) Establish innovation challenge programs to incentivize new solutions for infrastructure security
and resilience during the planning, design, and redesign phases;
g) Collaborate with international partners and participate in global initiatives to gain valuable in-
sights and best practices;
h) Apply emerging technologies such as articial intelligence, machine learning, and big data ana-
lytics to predict and mitigate potential risks more eectively;
i) Use these technologies for real-time monitoring, predictive maintenance, and automated re-
sponse mechanisms to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance resilience;
j) Continue national eorts in Serbia to propose a resilience assessment framework for critical
infrastructures, focusing on risk assessment to address identied gaps;
k) Ensure this framework captures interdependencies across dierent infrastructures, sectors, and
borders, with a particular focus on resilience;
l) Promote eective information sharing among partners to build situational awareness and en-
able risk-based decision-making;
m) Foster collaboration between infrastructure owners and operators, government entities, aca-
demia, and non-prots to ensure successful risk management;
n) Achieve consensus on common risk metrics across sectors to ensure consistency and eective-
ness in measuring and managing risks;
o) Harmonize the national risk assessment framework with EU policies and strategies for critical
infrastructure;
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p) Recognize the rapid integration of the defence industry into economic ows as a vital element
of Serbia’s national security policy;
q) Align with European standards and regulations, and establish preventive and control mecha-
nisms for critical defence infrastructure to maintain Serbia’s defence, security, and foreign pol-
icy interests;
r) Develop mechanisms to protect critical infrastructure from global, regional, and internal threats,
making this a national security priority for Serbia;
s) By implementing these recommendations, Serbia can signicantly enhance its eorts to secure
and sustain critical infrastructure, contributing to national stability and prosperity.
By implementing these recommendations, Serbia can signicantly enhance its eorts to secure
and sustain critical infrastructure, contributing to national stability and prosperity.
5. Conclusion
The impact of infrastructure disruption is typically quantied in terms of aggregated gures that
represent economic losses. This approach allows policymakers to evaluate various disruption sce-
narios, including cascading eects across sectors, and to assess the costs and benets of mitigation
measures (Giannopoulos et al., 2012). A comprehensive risk assessment is achievable when the im-
pact data is combined with the likelihood of these scenarios. Without this information, the analysis
remains an impact assessment and cannot eectively prioritize risk mitigation measures, especially
for High Impact Low Probability (HILF) events. A signicant challenge for risk assessment method-
ologies is to address these gaps and develop a harmonized framework at the national level, extend-
ing to the defence industry.
Such a framework should accurately capture interdependencies across dierent infrastructures,
sectors, and borders—a critical requirement for the West Balkan countries in coordination with EU
critical infrastructure policies and strategies. Additionally, there must be consensus on a common
risk metric across sectors. In summary, risk assessment for critical infrastructures should be an in-
tegral part of a broader framework, with resilience analysis as the primary tool. The continuation
of this work at the national level in Serbia should focus on proposing a resilience assessment frame-
work for critical infrastructures, where risk assessment serves as a subset to bridge the gaps identi-
ed in this research.
The social and economic stability of the world now heavily relies on the reliable supply of ba-
sic goods and services, transported and distributed through extensive technological network infra-
structures. National security today depends signicantly on these capacities, including the smooth
functioning of the defence industry’s complexes, as seen in Serbia. These critical infrastructures
are subject to potential disruptive factors from hazardous natural and human environments, such
as the global political climate, human capital, nancial crises, severe damage, explosions in ware-
houses, and organized (cyber) crime or cyber warfare (Zio, 2016). The infrastructure systems within
the Serbian defence industry are exposed to numerous external and internal inuences, creating a
potential base from which dangerous hazards and harmful events can quickly and globally spread
throughout the system. This has increased systemic risk exposure, characterized by cascading fail-
ures that can signicantly impact both national and regional levels. Indeed, signicant disruptions
have highlighted the need for the protection and resilience of critical infrastructures as a national
and international priority.
In conclusion, the integrity, economic, and security stability of Serbia is closely tied to the state
and developmental potential of the defence industry. Its rapid development and integration into
national and international economic ows, through the acquisition of new technologies, has been
recognized as a vital element of Serbia’s national security policy. Aligning with European standards
and regulations, and establishing preventive and control mechanisms for critical defence infrastruc-
ture, are fundamental prerequisites for maintaining the integrity of defence, security, and foreign
policy interests, as well as enhancing the overall credibility of Serbia. Given the context of global,
Nikola Vidović, Hatidža Beriša, Vladimir M. Cvetković
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management • Vol. 6, No. 2 •
196
regional, and internal threats, developing adequate mechanisms for the protection of critical infra-
structure has become a national security priority for Serbia.
Funding: This research was funded by the Scientic–Professional Society for Disaster Risk Man-
agement, Belgrade (hps://upravljanje-rizicima.com/, accessed on 10 July 2024) and the Internation-
al Institute for Disaster Research (hps://idr.edu.rs/, accessed on 10 July 2024), Belgrade, Serbia.
Conicts of Interest: The authors declare no conicts of interest.
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