A scientific monograph offers a comprehensive examination of crisis and disaster management policy in Serbia. Leveraging rich scientific research experience in the field of disaster studies, the authors critically assess the merits and demerits of various levels of crisis and disaster management. Crafted to address the subject matter, objectives, and methodologies employed, the monograph stands as a multidimensional, multimethod work primarily of a qualitative nature. Rooted in a qualitative approach, it scrutinizes the concept of crisis and disaster management policy across 23 cities in Serbia. Beyond enriching understanding in the intricate realm of crisis and disaster management policy at the local level, its aim extends to furnishing recommendations concerning necessary methodological and organizational shifts in the operations of local governance and decision-making bodies, legal frameworks and protocols, security strategies, decision-making processes, coordination efforts, collaborative initiatives, communication strategies, public engagement practices, educational endeavors, and information dissemination channels.
In terms of the societal justification for the research, derived from empirical findings, specific conclusions and proposals have been drawn regarding the efficacy, transparency, and deficiencies in the implementation of crisis management policy concepts within Serbian cities. Concrete recommendations and proposals are presented to enhance the qualitative aspects of the concept in areas where shortcomings or inadequacies are identified. The societal justification for this research primarily lies in augmenting the capacities of local self-governments to enhance preparedness, cope with, and overcome crises and disasters, fortify safety cultures, and foster the development of "resilient local communities."
Within the initial portion of the scientific monograph, the authors scrutinize and elaborate on five thematic units, each classified into corresponding chapters. The opening (first) chapter explores crises and disasters as political constructs. Delving into the concepts of crisis and disaster, the discussion navigates through theoretical distinctions among related phenomena such as disasters, emergencies, risks, accidents, and crises. Special emphasis is placed on examining the characteristics of disasters and emergencies, with reference to typologies such as classical, modern, and combined.
In the second chapter of the scientific monograph, the authors delve into theoretical concepts surrounding crisis and disaster management. They explore themes such as strategic management and leadership during crises and disasters, crisis management, emergency management, and related concepts. The chapter also examines the characteristics of crisis and disaster management, models of management processes during crises and disasters, crisis and disaster management within public administration, and organizational approaches to crisis and disaster management.
Moving on to the third chapter, the authors undertake a comprehensive examination of crisis and disaster management policy. Within this section, they scrutinize various issues pertaining to crisis and disaster identification, decision-making in crisis and disaster situations, interpretation of crises and disasters within the realm of political communications, risk communication regarding crises and disasters, resolution strategies for crises and disasters, as well as the assignment of blame and responsibilities. The chapter also highlights the potential for organizational learning and the implementation of reforms induced by crises and disasters.
The fourth chapter of the scientific monograph focuses on community resilience in crisis and disaster situations. Here, the authors outline the characteristics of resilient communities, with particular emphasis on urban safety and the criteria for designating cities as safe. Additionally, citizen responses to crises and disasters are examined within this context.
In the fifth chapter, the authors explore crisis and disaster management practices within the European Union and European countries, along with the institutional framework for such management within the EU. Special attention is given to the analysis and description of crisis and disaster management systems across European nations.
In the second part of the scientific monograph, a detailed methodological framework for the conducted research is presented. This includes discussions on research subjects, objectives, and tasks, as well as the hypothetical research framework, scientific and social justifications, sources and types of data, and methodologies for data collection and processing, alongside an overview of key indicators.
The third part of the scientific monograph comprehensively describes the analytical dimensions of the conducted research results. The first chapter of this section explores the cultural and historical dimensions of crisis and disaster management policy in Serbia, examining administrative-territorial frameworks, central and local levels of management and administrative structures, responsibilities and regulatory frameworks, legal reforms, and degrees of regulatory governance.
In the second chapter of the third part, the authors delve into the dimensions of crisis and disaster management as public policies, discussing the socio-economic context of crisis and disaster management in Serbian cities. They explore strategic frameworks, the development of strategic and institutional frameworks for security and crisis management at the local level, intersectoral collaboration, operational frameworks for disaster management, institutional frameworks, financing, coordination between agencies, supervision, evaluation of public policies, and resource monitoring.
In the third chapter, the exploration extends to partnerships and collaborative efforts in crisis and disaster management processes within Serbian municipalities. This encompasses the intricate dynamics between the state, local self-governance, and citizens concerning crisis management policies in Serbia. It further delves into the expectations that local self-governments hold towards citizens and vice versa, particularly regarding the safeguarding of their interests. Additionally, the chapter scrutinizes the typologies of crises and their perceptual reality among citizens in Serbia, as well as the identified risks delineated in national and local strategic documents. Furthermore, it examines scenarios in crisis and disaster management where volunteer engagement is integral, assessing the readiness level of citizens for such involvement within local communities. Moreover, the chapter explores collaborative initiatives with neighboring municipalities, ongoing projects concerning crisis management within Serbian local self-governments, and the scope and nature of regional or international cooperation pertaining to crisis and disaster management at the local level in Serbia.
Concluding with the fourth chapter, attention shifts towards the realm of information dissemination and educational endeavors concerning crises and disasters within Serbian municipalities. This includes the specialized training programs tailored for mayoral officials in navigating crisis and disaster scenarios effectively. Moreover, it encompasses the intricacies of crisis communication strategies deployed at the local level and the pivotal role of informative and educational initiatives as integral components of proactive crisis management strategies within local communities. Conclusion: The main objectives of this study were to critically analyze the existing concept of crisis and disaster management in Serbian cities, through the analysis of the existing state and interrelationships of examined phenomena (cultural-historical aspects, crisis management as public policy, partnerships, cooperation, education, and information) in the policy of crisis management. The research was multidimensional and multimethodological. The list of research questions was expanded during the study to include two additional questions. The first question related to the dilemma of whether local self-governments, especially Serbian cities, have fulfilled their responsibilities in crisis and disaster management in accordance with the principles of good governance. The second question concerned the manner and extent of decentralization of crisis and disaster management in relation to the existing monotypic type of local self-government. Data collected were analyzed using qualitative and quantitative approaches, through interviews, questionnaires, document analysis, and field observation. A literature review briefly outlined the historical context of crisis management development, crisis as a political construct, and crisis management policy. The review also addressed organizational crisis, resilient communities, with a brief overview of the institutional framework of crisis management in the European Union and the practices of European countries, including Serbia.
Specific research hypotheses anticipated and demonstrated deficiencies in the legal, operational, institutional, and strategic frameworks in crisis management policies, with a particular focus on the lack of prevention, indicating that the style of crisis management at the local level is predominantly reactive. It was also shown that voluntary citizen engagement in emergencies is not adequately normatively regulated or operationally standardized. Lastly, it was demonstrated that actors at the local self-government level have not undergone sufficient training and education in crisis management. The findings of the research align with the key deficiencies identified in the National Strategy for Protection and Rescue in Disasters (2011), which relate to institutional-organizational, material-technical, cooperation, coordination, and information availability deficiencies, as well as the lack of human resources and education. Seven years after the adoption of the Strategy and nine years after the adoption of the Law and the establishment of a unified system of crisis and disaster management, it can be said that the listed clusters of problems are still present at the local level. Public policies in Serbia since 2000 largely operate on the principles and rules of new public management, which represent a restrictive factor in implementing crisis management policies in some segments (relocating institutions from less populated, border areas to regional centers (schools, healthcare institutions, courts - so-called institutional optimization; lowest price in public procurement as the decisive criterion - e.g., pumps that failed shortly after installation during the 2014 crisis, etc.). Following the example and practice of the EU, since 2015, Serbia has continued with the reform of local self-government in line with the principles of good governance. Good governance is responsible, open, user-oriented, inclusive, and sensitive to the needs of the local community.
The general results of the study emphasize the political and public policy framework for the creation and implementation of crisis management as one of the public policies under the jurisdiction of local self-governments, with a focus on cities. Crisis management in Serbia generally exhibits characteristics of bureaucratic politics: there are numerous actors, none of whom have a significant influence, decisions are compromises, and their implementation is not efficient.
The results of this research demonstrate that in crisis management in Serbia, the influence of bureaucratic politics on political decision-making at the level of bureaucraticism is significant: there is a big difference between policy creation and implementation, compromises are difficult to achieve, and it is dysfunctional. Before the establishment of a unified system for disasters in 2009, the crisis policy network was fragmented among different policy players/sectors: defense, internal affairs, health, environment, agriculture, forestry, and water management, which, with the adoption of the Law (2009), formed a unified Sector for Emergencies with consolidated competencies within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After the May floods, another policy player was included in the crisis policy network: the newly established Office for Assistance and Reconstruction of Flooded Areas, which in 2015 grew into the Office for Public Investment Management. The evaluation of the existing legal solution and outcomes in the crisis of 2014 contributed to the approach of first amending and then drafting a new Law, which was not adopted by the beginning of 2018. The Draft Law text was not available until the beginning of the public consultation for experts and the general public. The period from 2014 to 2018 is characterized by bureaucratic inefficiency: much time and resources were lost in achieving consensus on the concept of a new legal solution for crisis and disaster management.
One of the main reasons for the failure to establish the system was the lack of secondary legislation and guidelines for their implementation. By the end of 2017, three secondary acts under the central authority's jurisdiction, which greatly influence the nature of crisis and disaster management—whether preventive and proactive—had not been adopted. Considering these acts regulate segments of crisis and disaster management systems related to the population (equipment and construction of shelters, citizen participation in civil protection units, and the establishment and functioning of observation, early warning, notification, and alert systems), it can be said that crisis and disaster management at the central level does not follow the principles of good governance in terms of accountability and user orientation.
The normative and functional incompleteness and partial non-establishment of the crisis and disaster management system at the central level have also resulted in the system not being significantly established at the local level. Crisis management at the local level is carried out uniformly: all local self-governments have the same type and scope of authority. Differences between cities and municipalities in terms of the level of established authority in normative, institutional, functional, operational, and financial frameworks generally do not exist, except in individual cases, favoring municipalities, which requires further research. Problems are universal, regardless of whether it is a city or a municipality (Kešetović, 2017). The philosophy of financing crisis and disaster management at the local level is almost exclusively reactive. Budget allocations are symbolic, below 1%, with municipalities allocating more than cities.
It is evident that cities differ significantly among themselves in terms of demographic, geographic, health, and socio-economic characteristics, and consequently, the conditions, requirements, and circumstances under which crisis and disaster management is conducted also differ. However, cities are at an advantage over municipalities, among other things, in terms of accessibility to public services for their residents, the existence of institutional capacities, level of development, concentration of economic and political power. Based on Giddens' systemic-strategic approach, it would be logical for cities to have developed strategic, technical and structural, evaluation and diagnostic, communication, psychological, and cultural capacities in crisis management, especially compared to municipalities (which proved to be incorrect). If they seriously apply one strategy from each cluster, they are considered prepared for a crisis. The analysis showed that cities in Serbia are crisis-prone systems, as they do not belong to any of the mentioned clusters of crisis and disaster management, except partially to the technical-structural one (existence of organizational structure and budget positions for emergencies).
Timely detection and preparedness for a crisis largely depend on the perception and experience of decision-makers, cultural patterns, and the way political elites set priorities. The results of this research support the thesis that the concepts of organizational structure and organizational culture are useful for understanding organizational crisis management and crisis management policy in all phases (Deverell, 2010). In this sense, Serbia is a country with a high degree of power distance and is a collectivist society (G. Hofstede): centralization is popular, subordinates expect orders from an ideal boss who is a benevolent autocrat, and rules and regulations are less important than individual loyalty to the group. The perception of crisis preparedness largely depends on an individual's position within the system. Surveyed mayors rated the level of preparedness and implementation of authorities in cities for emergencies, as well as the level of preparedness of city administration, extremely positively. Employees in local self-governments also rated the level of preparedness relatively high: none of the respondents assessed their local self-government as completely unprepared for emergencies.
Data from the Sector for Disasters presents a different, less positive picture. Strategic documents for community safety are not mandatory and do not exist in large numbers, while mandatory preventive documents: risk assessments and protection and rescue plans have been adopted in a worryingly low percentage. Cities' operational responsibilities are partially fulfilled, with an emphasis on formality: establishment of headquarters and accompanying documents. Responsibilities that mean functional establishment of authority and require full political, organizational, and financial commitment and integration of the security concept into the organizational system have not been established. This primarily refers to the functioning and equipping of general-purpose civil protection units, alerting funds, situational centers, education, etc. Oversight of the exercise of emergency authority by local self-governments is not visible in the system. Responsibility practically does not exist, nor do procedures and mechanisms for determining the fulfillment of legally prescribed obligations.
Personal responsibility, legal and criminal, is not practiced; presumed responsibility is primarily political in nature. Cooperation between different levels of government is rated as good, as is coordination. Cooperation with neighboring municipalities during crises is not pronounced (less than half of the surveyed local self-governments indicated that they cooperate), while preventive inter-municipal cooperation is almost symbolic. Cross-border cooperation exists but has significant room for improvement. Awareness of the existence of international funds for project financing is insufficient. Regarding project financing, city representatives are better informed than municipal representatives, but the interest in proposing and implementing projects is generally low. Employees in local self-governments are not additionally motivated to develop projects, as this typically means doing additional work for the same pay. Projects are primarily developed by Local Economic Development Offices (LED Offices) as development organizational units and are implemented by various parts of the local self-government in the area to which the project pertains. Additional motivation for employees in local self-governments to develop and implement projects in the field of crisis and disaster management is necessary.
On the other hand, cooperation and communication between actors at the local level are reduced to formal meetings without substantial insight into the actors' capacities and their risk assessments, and without developed informal contacts among people before a crisis. Databases of resources for crisis and disaster management do not exist as such. Based on conversations with actors at the central level, it is assumed that each institution and subject of protection and rescue at the local level knows what they possess and has some sort of resource database (not necessarily electronic). It is recommended to pay greater attention to establishing standardized, accessible, electronic databases of resources for crisis and disaster management at the local level.
Citizens are not sufficiently involved in planning and formulating crisis and disaster management policies, and the needs of vulnerable groups and the gender perspective are not adequately considered, despite mayors' unanimous opinion that the role of civil society organizations, volunteers, and citizens is very important in emergencies. The comparative perception of decision-makers/mayors, employees in local administrations, and members of the Ministry of Interior's Disasters Sector regarding the examined analytical dimensions indicates a consensus that is only vaguely connected to the needs of the given situation. Thus, the crisis management process at the city level is characterized by bureaucratic-political incompetence. Local self-governments often act as "lightning rods" in the strategy of delegating blame to lower levels of government and prominent representatives, which is one possible explanation for the often drastic differences in opinions between mayors and respondents from local self-governments and the Ministry of Interior on certain issues. Giving socially and politically desirable instead of realistic answers may be a sign of politicians' lack of information, but also a maneuver to avoid the possible role of a scapegoat in the evaluation of a future crisis. Therefore, the perception of performance by mayors and city administration employees serves more for impression management than for insight aimed at improving actual operational performance.
A critical review of crisis events is essential for system improvement. System improvement through learning from crises generally occurs in leaps, from crisis to crisis. For rigid bureaucratic systems to change their routines, the compulsion of an extraordinary event is needed, and the time for changes is limited, usually during or immediately after a crisis. If the "unfreezing" process passes, the likelihood of systemic changes occurring is low. This is precisely what happened with crisis and disaster management at the local level in Serbia. The evaluation of crisis events was conducted in 2014. Local self-governments entered election processes after 2016, when political priorities at the local level were redefined compared to those set immediately after the floods in 2014 and 2016. The promises made, especially those related to prevention in crisis and disaster management and the institutional, operational, and functional full establishment of local self-government capacities for disaster management, were neglected—the "unfreezing" period had passed. Another crucial point is perception. When a crisis does occur, all activities and changes focus on that type of event: after floods, actors predominantly deal with flood response (uniting local self-governments into river basins). Cities in Serbia have partially adopted the behavioral dimension of learning from crises: the institutional structure of city administrations has been partially adapted through job descriptions and the systematization of positions for crisis management.
Functional, financial, strategic, and operational frameworks are not fully established. The cognitive dimension of organizational learning, which consists of mental maps, memories, systems of norms and values, and relates to increasing insight and changing knowledge levels to apply learned lessons in the future, is not sufficiently expressed in cities. This was evident in the perception of crisis preparedness among mayors and representatives of local self-governments (LSGs). Organizational memory, as an integral part of the cognitive dimension of learning within LSGs in a crisis, and its explicit forms such as regulations, manuals, instructions, public policy strategic documents, and databases, is not sufficiently established. The implicit form of organizational memory management in crisis and disasters in cities (norms, beliefs, rituals) has been neglected. Additionally, it has been found that there is no collectively learned lesson by local self-government, the state, or the population related to crisis communication.
The cognitive dimension of learning involves handling information (acquisition, creation, and sharing) as a prerequisite for learning, and the content and exchange of communications, availability of information, and coordination are also weak points in crisis and disaster management in cities. The LSG system has not learned lessons from previous crises. A crisis contains a developmental element, being a transitional state. If the system does not learn lessons from the transitional state—crisis, does not integrate them into institutional memory, and does not move to a qualitatively higher level, it may indicate a lack of development capacity. On the other hand, the absence of responsibility in crisis and disaster management has further impacted the lack of prevention. Another dilemma is whether the absence of responsibility is a double-edged sword for political decision-makers, given that there are no clear legal and procedural mechanisms for evaluating crisis events, leaving them entirely to political blame games. These assumptions are topics for new research.
Regarding whether public administration reform follows the reform of crisis management at the local level, research has concluded that the principles and modern concept of crisis and disaster management and good governance as a new administrative doctrine are compatible: they require accountability; reducing uncertainty in the local community through strategic planning; responsible budgeting; information accessibility; predictability—the principle of legitimate expectations; citizen involvement in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of crisis and disaster management as public policy with an emphasis on gender perspective, as well as considering the needs of vulnerable groups. After the research was conducted, the conclusion is that the principles of good governance are not significantly applied in crisis management as public policy at the local level, focusing on Serbian cities.
Crisis management at the local level in Serbia is reactive and has not shown the capacity to learn from crises. The policy network is weak, as crisis and disaster management is not on the list of political priorities at the central, and consequently, not at the local level. This is concluded based on policy game outcomes: the existing legal framework is incomplete, and the new law has not yet been passed, although its development started in 2014. Budget allocations are symbolic and insufficient. What is good and encouraging is the establishment of an institutional framework within local self-government for crisis and disaster management, despite the reduction in the number of employees and the increase in LSG responsibilities. Crisis and disaster management tasks have become organizationally visible within the system through job classification and descriptions. Also, the program budget includes activities for disasters, which is a prerequisite for larger allocations for crisis and disaster management, especially concerning prevention. Therefore, it is important to adopt planning documents, which are one of the conditions for budgeting.
Comparing cities and municipalities, the level of their preparedness for emergencies, it was concluded that there are generally no statistically significant differences proving that cities as economic, demographic, political, and administrative centers are more prepared for crises than municipalities, which is the reason for their greater autonomy in crisis and disaster management. Differences exist in some dimensions, but in favor of municipalities, such as reporting and financing. This does not mean that municipalities are better, but that cities have not fully taken on the responsibility and exercised powers in crisis and disaster management in line with the advantages they have. Organizational limitations for crisis management relate to a lack of staff, uneducated staff, financial and technical constraints.
The failure to recognize the importance of prevention in crisis and disaster management by policymakers has been identified as one of the most significant organizational constraints. For the modern concept of crisis and disaster management to take root at the local self-government (LSG) level, employees see the solution in educating, primarily, the policymakers. Cities and municipalities require different forms of assistance in implementing the modern concept of crisis and disaster management and in establishing the responsibilities they have in the field of disasters. Cities need help in the legislative framework, while municipalities need assistance in the educational framework.
All of this suggests that the effective implementation of the crisis management policy concept in cities in Serbia requires continuous strategic, tactical, and operational transformation of the public administration and public management system to strengthen the capacity of local self-governments for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery from crises, thereby confirming the general hypothesis of the research.
This research has its limitations, primarily due to the broadly set research framework. There is a need for further investigation into the modern concept of crisis management as a reformed public policy at the local level. The presented results can be supplemented and further developed by testing hypotheses and deepening research questions. The next step could be the standardization of questionnaires, the so-called local crisis management index, which would address determining the level of crisis preparedness of local communities. An unresolved issue remains whether cities and municipalities should have the same level of authority in managing crises and disasters. Additionally, further research is needed on how local self-governments respond to organizational crises in relation to the political, institutional, temporal, informational, and complexity dimensions of crises.