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Can information, compensation and party cues
increase mass support for green taxes?
Reto Bürgisser
a
, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steen
b
and
Klaus Armingeon
a
a
Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland;
b
Institute of
Political Science, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy presents a major challenge,
with green taxes often seen as an ecient policy to promote environmentally
friendly behaviour. However, these taxes are dicult to implement due to
public concerns about immediate costs versus future environmental benefits. To
address this, we conducted a survey experiment in Switzerland to investigate
whether information on green tax eectiveness, compensation through revenue
recycling, and party cues can make green taxes more attractive to citizens. Our
findings indicate that information about compensation mechanisms and party
cues can enhance support for green taxes, while single instances of information
on green tax eectiveness do not significantly aect beliefs or policy support.
Green tax proposals are more popular when compensation strategies address
climate change or mitigate social risks and when there is broad party consensus
providing clear cues to citizens. However, our findings also underscore the
potential trade-o associated with a broad coalition of parties supporting green
tax reform, which may lead to diminished support from the left. These insights
have important implications for designing and communicating green taxes,
highlighting the role of informed beliefs and political signals in shaping public
attitudes toward environmental policies.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 6 June 2024; Accepted 15 December 2024
KEYWORDS Green taxation; survey experiment; revenue recycling; party cues; effectiveness beliefs;
knowledge
Introduction
Industrialised countries face a major challenge in transitioning from fossil
fuels to renewable energy, requiring innovation and promotion of new
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the
posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
CONTACT Reto Bürgisser buergisser@ipz.uzh.ch Department of Political Science, University of
Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, Zürich 8050, Switzerland
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.
2444332.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2444332
technologies to achieve rapid and substantial decarbonisation. Market-based
steering policies, such as incentives and green taxes, are widely recognised as
eective and economically ecient tools, providing continuous and long-
term incentives for environmentally friendly innovation and practices (Carat-
tini et al., 2017; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Jae et al., 2002; Parry & Williams,
1999). Even though market-based approaches alone are unlikely to achieve
the necessary fundamental transition, they should be part of the climate
policy toolkit and have been shown to produce economic benefits (Carattini
et al., 2017; Cullenward & Victor, 2020; Rausch & Karplus, 2014).
Despite this, green taxes have proven dicult to implement politically,
while conventional regulatory approaches seem more popular due to practi-
cal implementation (Felder & Schleiniger, 2002; Kirchgässner & Schneider,
2003). One compelling reason stems from the limited popularity of these pol-
icies (Stadelmann-Steen & Dermont, 2018). The lack of widespread public
support presents a formidable obstacle (Fremstad et al., 2022). Research on
green taxes underscores that the perceived socioeconomic inequalities
resulting from their implementation can render them politically risky for gov-
erning parties (Beiser-McGrath & Busemeyer, 2023) and even favour the elec-
toral prospects of the radical right (Colantone et al., 2024; Voeten, 2024).
Scholars have extensively explored how to make ‘carbon pricing work for
citizens’ (Klenert et al., 2018). Drawing on the public choice approach (Kirch-
gässner & Schneider, 2003), they highlight the pivotal role of cost perceptions
for the unpopularity of incentive-based policy instruments. In the realm of
environmental policy, voters often face a trade-o between a better environ-
ment in the future and higher income in the present, and they frequently
prioritise the latter (see also Bornstein & Lanz, 2008). Furthermore, individual
cost–benefit calculations may favour traditional regulatory policies, where
costs are less visible to voters compared to incentive-based instruments. As
Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003:, p. 375) observe, ‘voters may have the
impression that an improvement of the environment could be reached by
means of regulations and prohibitions without costs’. This perception of
cost illusion implies that traditional policies are often perceived as more equi-
table and fairer (Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006). In contrast, the immediate visi-
bility of costs for households in green tax proposals, coupled with less
apparent benefits, has consistently resulted in reduced public support, irre-
spective of ideological background (Stadelmann-Steen & Dermont, 2018).
Consequently, the perception of cost plays a crucial role in determining the
political viability of incentive-based environmental policy instruments.
It has been argued that the perceived reasonableness and eectiveness of
a new or higher green tax could engender public support if citizens perceive
it as beneficial to themselves or society at large (Stadelmann-Steen &
Dermont, 2018). However, many citizens do not comprehend or believe in
the underlying mechanisms of green taxes and their eectiveness in
2 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
curbing energy consumption. Recent studies have therefore examined
whether increased information and more visible policy benefits could
enhance policy support (Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer, 2019; Fremstad et al.,
2022; Klenert et al., 2018; Mildenberger et al., 2022).
In this article, our primary objective is to explore the determinants that
shape citizens’ support for green tax policies, with a particular and dieren-
tiated focus on the role of information. We investigate three types of infor-
mation that could aect policy support: (1) general information concerning
the eectiveness of green taxes, (2) specific information about the policy
design of green taxes, particularly their potential benefits through revenue
recycling, and (3) party cues, i.e., information about which political parties
are in favour or against a reform proposal. Recent research has shown that
the perceived costs and benefits of these policies are heavily inuenced by
their politicisation (Dermont & Stadelmann-Steen, 2020; Fremstad et al.,
2022; Mildenberger et al., 2022). However, most previous studies have
largely analysed public preference towards green taxes without considering
explicitly the role of political parties in shaping public opinion (Carattini et al.,
2017). In this paper, we contribute to existing research by also integrating the
often-neglected role of political parties in opinion formation.
While research on tax preferences has underscored the significance of party
cues (Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2018), the applicability of these findings from the
broader tax literature to the domain of green taxation remains uncertain. In
contrast to general taxes, green taxes primarily seek to induce behavioural
changes at the individual level. This demarcates a substantial departure in
both rationale and design from conventional taxes. Consequently, the
dynamics of preference formation and political competition surrounding
green taxes may be inuenced not only by the economic dimension but also
by the green-libertarian- vs. traditional-authoritarian (GAL-TAN) dimension.
We conducted an original survey experiment in Switzerland in 2020,
employing both a randomised information treatment and a conjoint exper-
iment to study individual beliefs about the eectiveness of green taxes (here-
after eectiveness beliefs) and support for green taxes. Our findings suggest
three key conclusions. First, providing information about how green taxes
work does not significantly aect individual green tax eectiveness beliefs,
questioning the expectation that informing the public about green taxes
will readily lead to higher policy support. Second, designing the right form
of compensation is key to increasing support for green taxes. Individuals
prefer taxes that redistribute revenues to measures addressing the central
problem of climate change and/or alleviating social risks. Third, individual
support for green taxes is notably inuenced by party politics and policy
coalitions. Political allegiance plays a crucial role in shaping individuals’ per-
spectives on policies, with citizens often diverging on policy stances when
party elites exhibit discord over the instruments and objectives of
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 3
environmental policies. If leaders of dierent parties coalesce in policymak-
ing, the support base among citizens has the potential to increase.
However, our findings also underscore the potential trade-o associated
with an excessive number of parties supporting green tax reform, leading
to diminished support from the left. This trade-o is likely due to the percep-
tion among left-wing individuals that the coalition is overly expansive and
consequently less likely to prioritise their environmental protection concerns.
Besides analyzing the support base for green taxes, this article contributes
to the broader literature on public opinion formation in at least three
respects. First, the experimental study of information eects provides new
insights into the extent to which citizens are receptive to new arguments
and how new information changes their previous political beliefs. Second,
our analysis adds to the literature on policy trade-os and compensation
mechanisms that have been shown to inuence reform potentials in public
policy (Häusermann et al., 2019). Finally, our study informs about the relative
explanatory power of arguments, interests, and party cues for citizens’
approval of policy changes, and more specifically the role of elite consensus.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the
case of green taxes and introduce the three mechanisms that may increase
support for green taxes. Afterward, we present the research design and
discuss the empirical findings. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the
policy implications regarding the design of green taxes and the role of knowl-
edge and beliefs in shaping environmental attitudes and behaviour.
Theory
The case for green taxes
While carbon pricing policies alone are unlikely to drive rapid and extensive
decarbonisation and innovation (Cullenward & Victor, 2020; Tvinnereim &
Mehling, 2018), and therefore need to be complemented by other policy
instruments, such as regulations, industrial policies, and research and devel-
opment initiatives, economists and policymakers widely recognise carbon
pricing as a cost-eective approach to address negative externalities (Nord-
haus, 2019). However, the implementation of green tax policies faces
public opposition due to visible consumer costs, setting it apart from other
instruments like subsidies or bans (Harrison, 2012; Mildenberger et al.,
2016; Schaer, 2021; Stadelmann-Steen & Dermont, 2018).
Research on green taxes has focused on identifying the factors that hinder
the acceptance of these policies and exploring ways to overcome these bar-
riers. One approach is revenue recycling through dividends or lump-sum
rebates. By making the benefit side of these taxes visible to citizens, advo-
cates argue that it could render them politically feasible (Amdur et al.,
4 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
2014; Bachus et al., 2019; Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer, 2019; Carattini et al.,
2019, 2017; Dolšak et al., 2020; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Klenert et al., 2018).
Evidence from Canada and Switzerland, the only countries where such
rebates have been implemented in practice, reveal that the relationship
between dividends and public support for green taxes is not as straightfor-
ward as previously thought. Even after the schemes have been introduced,
individuals often do not know about the benefits or misconceive the
benefits (Mildenberger et al., 2022). This suggests that the eectiveness of
revenue recycling in promoting public acceptance of green taxes depends
on the communication strategy to highlight the subjectively perceived
costs and benefits.
Thus, a critical mechanism behind public resistance to green taxes can be
attributed to the limited understanding citizens have of how such
instruments work and the benefits they can bring (Huber et al., 2020; Stadel-
mann-Steen & Dermont, 2018). As Rhodes et al. (2014) and Stoutenborough
and Vedlitz (2014) have pointed out, a knowledge deficit can be a significant
barrier to public support for reform measures. In situations where citizens lack
knowledge, political parties and their communication strategies can play a
vital role in shaping public opinion (Dermont & Stadelmann-Steen, 2020).
Building on the existing literature (for an extensive overview, see Schaer,
2021), we focus on the role of three potential mechanisms to enhance
support for green taxes (see Figure 1): arguments, interests, and cues. First,
improving citizens’ understanding of the eectiveness of green taxes
through information can increase their support by addressing the knowledge
deficit. Second, making the costs and benefits of green taxes more visible, in
particular by informing citizens how the revenue generated from the taxes is
used to compensate for costs, can increase their support. Third, leveraging
party cues can play a vital role in inuencing citizens’ attitudes toward
green taxes, particularly on a complex policy issue where citizens lack the
knowledge and time to form an informed opinion. While information about
compensation and party positions are linked to specific tax proposals, the
mechanisms through eectiveness information and eectiveness beliefs
Figure 1. Theoretical mechanisms to increase support for green taxes.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 5
concerns the perception of this type of proposals in general. Next, we will delve
into these three mechanisms in greater detail.
Information about green tax eectiveness
A key tenet of democratic theory is the power of superior argumentation.
Ideally, citizens in a democracy have access to enough information and
diverse perspectives, enabling them to form ‘enlightened’ opinions (Dahl,
1998) on policy alternatives by pondering the dierent arguments
(Zumofen et al., 2023). This principle underpins the knowledge deficit
model, which suggests that a lack of relevant information often leads to
policy rejection (Rhodes et al., 2014; Stoutenborough & Vedlitz, 2014).
Indeed, perceived eectiveness has been identified as a main driver for the
acceptance of green taxes (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017), while a lack of eec-
tiveness seems to be an important reason for the unpopularity of the instru-
ments (Mildenberger et al., 2022; Umit & Schaer, 2020). Moreover, there is
some evidence that imparting information to citizens regarding the mech-
anics of tax systems or illuminating insights on income inequality shapes
their taxation preferences (Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2018; Krupnikov et al.,
2006). Taking these arguments together, by addressing the knowledge
deficit, i.e., providing citizens with information regarding the mechanisms
and benefits of green taxes, policymakers can create a more informed and
engaged citizenry that recognises the eectiveness of green taxes in addres-
sing environmental challenges. This in turn can be expected to elevate their
levels of acceptance.
Despite its widespread use, the knowledge deficit model has faced criti-
cism for its oversimplified nature, with several alternative views being pro-
posed to conceptualise the link between knowledge and policy support
(Armingeon & Bürgisser, 2021; Flynn et al., 2017; Nyhan & Reier, 2010;
Rhodes et al., 2014). According to the knowledge deficit model, the relation-
ship between information and policy support is indirect: individuals who
receive more or new information should develop a more accurate under-
standing of how the policy works, i.e., perceive the instrument as eective,
leading to increased policy support. However, some scholars argue that pro-
viding information may only alter factual perceptions and not necessarily
increase policy support (Flynn et al., 2017). Depending on the strength of
prior beliefs, correct information on the workings of green taxes may lead
to attitudinal backlash, resulting in a shift away from policy support, or polar-
isation, where group support moves in opposite directions (Druckman &
McGrath, 2019).
Hence, we conclude that individual beliefs about the eectiveness of a
policy are crucial for green taxes’ public support. A promising mechanism
for information provision to increased public support is if this information
6 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
increases the beliefs that green taxes are eective. To our knowledge, no
study has tested the causal link from information provision to green tax eec-
tiveness beliefs to policy support. According to the knowledge deficit model,
we expect that providing information on green taxes will enhance policy
support by strengthening eectiveness beliefs.
Green tax design and the role of compensation
The implementation of green taxes generates visible and short-term costs for
households and firms, while the primary benefit of a better climate will only
be achieved after several years or even decades. Thus, green taxes are an
exemplary case study of what Jacobs (2016) described as ‘intertemporal
trade-os between maximising social welfare in the present and investing
in the future’ (p. 434). In addition, green taxes are often regressive (Baranzini
& Carattini, 2017; Kallbekken & Sæælen, 2011), leading to concerns about
unjust distributional eects (Cullenward & Victor, 2020) and potential political
backlash (Tatham & Peters, 2023).
To address potential distributive conicts, revenue recycling has been pro-
posed as a compensation mechanism (Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer, 2019; Kall-
bekken et al., 2011). Green taxes can oer both long-term immaterial benefits
and immediate material gains through revenue redistribution, especially ben-
efiting low-income households. However, even where such mechanisms exist
(like in Canada or Switzerland), they are often not very visible in public
debates (Mildenberger et al., 2022). Moreover, the preferred type of
revenue recycling remains uncertain, with existing studies focused mainly
on rebates showing inconsistent results (Amdur et al., 2014; Bachus et al.,
2019; Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer, 2019; Carattini et al., 2019, 2017; Dolšak
et al., 2020; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Klenert et al., 2018).
We expect that the specific policy design, especially regarding revenue
recycling, aects public support (Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer, 2019;
Dermont & Stadelmann-Steen, 2020). Theoretically, dierent forms of
revenue recycling may yield varying success. From a rational choice perspec-
tive, ego-tropic cost–benefit considerations (Armingeon & Bürgisser, 2021;
Kirchgässner & Schneider, 2003; Stadelmann-Steen & Dermont, 2018)
suggest that information on personal material benefits is most eective in
gaining support. Consequently, redistributing tax revenues is often high-
lighted as a key strategy to enhance the acceptability of green taxes,
especially for lower-income groups (Bachus et al., 2019; Beiser-McGrath & Ber-
nauer, 2019; Carattini et al., 2019, 2017; Dolšak et al., 2020; Fremstad et al.,
2022; Klenert et al., 2018).
An alternative view posits that citizens are not solely driven by ego-tropic
cost–benefit analyses but are more supportive of policies when revenues are
earmarked for specific goals (Huber et al., 2020), known as hypothecation in
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 7
public finance (Bachus et al., 2019). Unlike ego-tropic motivations focused on
direct material gains, this socio-tropic mechanism implies that revenue recy-
cling for collective issues – such as climate change, renewable energy, and
pensions – can garner more support. In contrast, channeling revenues into
the general budget without hypothecation fails to constitute revenue recy-
cling and is unlikely to boost support (Bachus et al., 2019). Thus, implement-
ing either ego-tropic or socio-tropic revenue recycling is expected to boost
support for green taxes compared to scenarios without recycling or those
benefiting only a narrow subset of the population.
Party cues
There is ample evidence that many citizens have limited political knowledge
(Achen & Bartels, 2017) and may lack the time, knowledge, and experience to
develop informed opinions on complex policy issues (De Vries et al., 2011;
Hobolt, 2007). In this context, party cues from elite politicians can help citi-
zens make inferences about policies that they otherwise would be unable
to make (Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2014). Reviewing the literature on cues,
Colombo and Steenbergen (2020) report that using heuristic shortcuts is per-
vasive in political decision-making and enables citizens to make reasonable, if
not always unbiased, decisions.
However, these cues may also lead to mindless support for policies
(Bullock, 2020) and empower political elites to inuence or even manipulate
citizens’ policy positions (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021;
Stoeckel & Kuhn, 2018; Zaller, 1992). The mere presence of party-political
information can inuence how individuals process policy-related information
(Fremstad et al., 2022).
Drawing from dual-process models of persuasion (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), we can distinguish between two modes
of information processing employed by individuals. While information on
green tax eectiveness and cost-benefits of specific policy designs elicits
systematic thinking and reasoning, information on party positions likely
activates a more heuristic mode of information processing (Zaller, 1992).
In this vein, party cues serve as timesaving and cost-reducing cognitive
shortcuts for individuals navigating an otherwise complex decision-
making process.
We expect that by using information on party positions towards green tax
proposals, citizens can adjust their level of support based on their anity (in-
party cues) or opposition (out-party cues) towards a given political party
(Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2018). Overall, the provision of information on
broad-party coalitions is expected to boost support for green taxes among
large parts of the population. However, the potential inuence of out-party
cues may dampen policy support (Ahn et al., 2021).
8 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
Research design
Case selection
Switzerland has implemented a CO2 levy since 2008, which serves as an
incentive tax on fossil fuels such as heating oil and natural gas (see Appendix
A.1 for more detailed information about the history of the Swiss CO2 levy).
This tax aims to increase the cost of fossil fuels and encourage the utilisation
of more carbon-neutral energy sources. Roughly two-thirds of the revenue
generated by the CO2 levy is redistributed to the population and economy,
regardless of the amount of energy consumed. The population receives its
share through the health insurance system, specifically as a monthly per
capita deduction on the mandatory fee for health insurance. The design of
the scheme ensures that individuals with below-average CO2 emissions, typi-
cally low-income groups, pay less in taxes than they receive as a dividend.
However, a significant portion of the population remains unaware of this
mechanism (Mildenberger et al., 2022). The remaining one-third, up to a
maximum of CHF 450 million, is invested in programmes that promote
CO2-eective measures, including energy-ecient renovations or renewable
energies. In addition, CHF 25 million is allocated to a technology fund. Oper-
ators of greenhouse gas-intensive installations may receive an exemption
from the CO2 levy if they agree to reduce their emissions. Operators of
large greenhouse gas-intensive installations are required to participate in
the emissions trading scheme and may also receive an exemption from the
CO2 levy.
The case of Switzerland provides favourable conditions for investigating
citizens’ opinion formation. Due to the country’s strong reliance on direct-
democratic decisions (Leemann & Stadelmann-Steen, 2022), citizens are fre-
quently confronted with popular initiatives and government proposals on a
variety of issues and dierent levels of government. Therefore, they are accus-
tomed to expressing their opinions on complex issues (Linder & Mueller,
2017). In the context of energy and climate policy, recent examples are the
vote on the new energy law in 2017 (Dermont & Stadelmann-Steen, 2020)
or on the new CO2 law in June 2021. These public votes share significant simi-
larities with hypothetical proposals generated in the conjoint experiment.
Both proposals involved specific policy mixes and a multidimensional
decision context and took place in a highly politicised context, characterised
by significant polarisation along party lines.
The experimental setup employed in our study closely resembles the
decision-making process that occurs in direct-democratic Switzerland, specifi-
cally when the government presents a counterproposal to a popular initiative.
In this scenario, citizens are asked two questions: (1) whether they support each
of the presented policy proposals individually, and (2) which of the two policy
proposals they prefer if both receive a majority of votes. In such cases, the
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 9
proposal that receives the most votes is implemented. Since direct-democratic
ballots are relatively frequent in Switzerland – about eight times per year at the
federal level alone in the last decade – the respondents in our study are likely
familiar with the decision-making situation of a conjoint experiment. This fam-
iliarity can be expected to enhance the validity and consistency of their
responses.
1
Although we contend that the high level of realism in our exper-
imental set-up improves both internal and external validity, we acknowledge
that caution is required when generalising our findings to other contexts.
Overall, we consider Switzerland a most likely case in two respects. First, it
is in settings like Switzerland, with a strong participatory political system,
where public opinion is likely most important for the implementation of
green taxes. Second, as the conjoint analysis mimics real decision situations,
a conjoint analysis should ‘work’ particularly well, with survey respondents
providing dierentiated responses to the varying conjoint tasks (Stadel-
mann-Steen, 2019). Put dierently, if we do not find systematic information
eects in a Swiss survey context, it is rather unlikely that such eects would
materialise in real-world processes and other countries.
Survey
We rely on an original survey experiment that was embedded in the Swiss
version of the 2020 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which
had a thematic focus on environmental issues.
2
The survey questionnaire
was internationally harmonised and supplemented by a module comprising
questions specific to Switzerland.
3
The survey sample was drawn from a prob-
abilistic sample that represented the Swiss population from the age of 18,
with individuals randomly selected from the Swiss Federal Statistical
Oce’s sampling register.
Due to the survey’s comprehensive coverage and length, it was fielded in
two parts. The first wave contained the ISSP module and background infor-
mation on the respondents, while the second wave contained the experimen-
tal design used in this study. The two parts were administered in sequential
order, with only respondents who completed Part 1 being invited to com-
plete Part 2. Wave 1 was conducted from February to April 2020 and had a
response rate of 42.3 per cent (N = 4281). Wave 2 was conducted between
April and July 2020 and had a response rate of 30.4 per cent (N = 3083), repre-
senting an attrition rate of 27.7 per cent. Of the 3083 respondents, 2445 com-
pleted the survey online and were therefore exposed to our experimental
design, which was not included in the paper version. The sampling method
used in this study was designed to match the demographic margins of the
Swiss population aged 18 and above, and thus, the findings from this
study can be largely generalised to the population. Moreover, the high
response rates and low attrition rates bolster the quality of this survey.
4
10 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
We focus on three components of the survey. First, an information treat-
ment was randomly assigned to 50 per cent of the respondents, which pro-
vided information on how green taxes operate. Second, a battery of
questions captured the extent to which respondents believed in the eec-
tiveness of green taxes. Finally, a conjoint experiment was conducted to
elicit support for specific green tax proposals, with a primary interest in
how visible compensation strategies and party elite cues inuence support.
The information treatment, the eectiveness beliefs and the conjoint exper-
iment allow for a comprehensive examination of the factors that inuence
support for green taxes as illustrated in Figure 1.
Information treatment
To test the eect of information about policy eectiveness on the evaluation
of green taxes, we randomly assigned 50 per cent of the respondents to
receive an information treatment. The treatment consisted of a short over-
view of how green taxes are intended to inuence people’s behaviour and
what environmental economists think about these instruments: Environ-
mental taxes are intended to inuence the behaviour of the population. By
imposing a tax on electricity, the cost of electricity increases. Then we use less
electricity because it becomes more expensive. The revenue generated from an
electricity tax can be used to promote renewable energy sources like hydro-
power, solar energy, and wind energy. Some scientists say: ‘It’s beneficial to dis-
tribute the revenue generated from an electricity tax back to the population. By
doing so, people who consume less electricity will be rewarded, and there are no
additional costs for the state’.
Given that previous studies from Switzerland indicate a lack of under-
standing or belief in the eectiveness of green taxes among large portions
of the population (Stadelmann-Steen & Dermont, 2018), we expect that
the information treatment would provide new information for most respon-
dents. Therefore, the treatment should enable us to analyze the eect of new
knowledge on the evaluation of dierent green tax designs and their support,
as measured in the conjoint analysis. Additionally, we seek to investigate the
link between information provision and individual beliefs in the eectiveness
of green taxes to test the assumptions of the knowledge deficit model. If we
observe that the treatment group not only exhibits higher support for green
taxes but is also more likely to rate the eectiveness belief items in line with
the economic model assumptions, this would corroborate the suggested
theoretical mechanism: Information provision increases the knowledge
about green tax models as well as the acceptance of their intended
benefits, leading to higher policy support. Conversely, if we observe a treat-
ment eect on eectiveness beliefs but not on policy support, this would
indicate that more knowledge and information do not necessarily translate
into higher policy support.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 11
Beliefs in the eectiveness of green taxes
To measure the eectiveness evaluation of green taxes, we asked respon-
dents to what extent they agree on a five-point Likert scale (from absolutely
true to absolutely false) with the five statements meant to emphasise
dierent aspects of green tax eectiveness:
(1) Even if electricity becomes more expensive due to a new electricity tax,
people will still consume the same amount of electricity.
(2) A new electricity tax will reduce electricity consumption, even if the state
redistributes the tax revenue to the population.
(3) A tax on electricity is a way to impose higher costs on those who
consume greater amounts of electricity.
(4) Redistributing the revenue from a new electricity tax to the population
may place additional strain on public finances.
(5) The revenue from a new electricity tax could be used to lower employers’
contributions to old-age insurance (AHV). This oers a double benefit:
reduced electricity consumption due to the tax and increased job cre-
ation or preservation thanks to lower employers contributions.
These eectiveness beliefs embody the core mechanisms by which green
taxes, as per economic theory, inuence behaviour. Many environmental
economists would argue these statements are objective truths, not matters
of belief. However, citizens may disagree not out of misunderstanding but
due to criticisms of mainstream economic theory. In reality, only statement
3 is factually correct, while agreement with the others depends on the validity
of economic assumptions. Thus, these statements capture belief in a tax’s
ability to inuence behaviour per economic theory. As outlined in our theor-
etical section, this belief is key to perceived tax eectiveness and policy
support. Crucially, whether low eectiveness beliefs stem from misunder-
standing or skepticism, the central factor for policy acceptance – perceived
eectiveness – is missing in both cases.
Conjoint experiment
Conjoint analysis has become increasingly important for studying individual
preferences for green taxes, particularly for dierent variants of green taxes
that involve more or less visible cost compensation. This approach is preferred
over unidimensional questions – such as whether one would support a tax to
reduce energy consumption – as it mimics a more realistic decision for which
not a single attribute, but a combination of multiple factors is relevant to the
overall assessment (Bremer & Bürgisser, 2023). The approach recognises that
opinion formation on green taxes is a multidimensional process, where a
specific reform proposal consists of various elements out of which a citizen
12 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
may like some while rejecting others. Thus, an individual decision is a result of
balancing the pros and cons of a specific green tax proposal.
Table 1 shows the conjoint attributes of interest and their levels. The
experimental manipulation encompasses five attributes of policy design,
coupled with an additional attribute related to party cues. Each attribute
and its levels were carefully selected to closely mimic the real-world discus-
sion in Switzerland regarding the implementation of such a tax. The initial
attribute pertains to the subject of taxation, whereas the second and third
attributes elucidate the net costs associated with the policy for both an
average household and an energy-ecient household. The fourth attribute
scrutinizes the provision of tax exemptions for energy-intensive industries.
Subsequently, the fifth attribute delves into the nuanced aspect of revenue
recycling, distinguishing between ego-tropic compensation (entailing a
reduction in health insurance premiums), socio-tropic compensation (encom-
passing subsidies for renewable energy or augmentation of the overall
pension budget), absence of direct compensation (leading to an increase in
the government budget), or compensation tailored for employers (involving
a reduction in employer contributions to pension systems).
Finally, the last attribute introduces variability concerning the parties
advocating for the proposed policy. We have deliberately chosen not to
include the SVP (far-right Swiss People’s Party) as a potential supporter for
Table 1. Attributes and levels of the conjoint experiment.
Attribute Levels
What is taxed Tax on CO2
Tax on electricity
Tax on gas
Tax on kerosene
Tax on heating oil
Net cost for average household As until now
CHF 8 more per month
CHF 15 more per month
CHF 23 more per month
CHF 30 more per month
Net cost for low-energy household CHF 15 less per month
CHF 8 less per month
As until now
CHF 8 more per month
CHF 15 more per month
Tax exceptions No exceptions
Exceptions for energy-intensive industries
Use of tax revenues Subsidies for renewable electricity
Reduction in health insurance premiums
Into the old-age pension insurance (AHV) budget
Reduction of employer contribution to the AHV
Into the federal government budget
Parties in favour Greens & Social Democratic Party (SP)
Greens, SP & Green Liberal Party (GLP)
Greens, SP, GLP & Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP)
Greens, SP, GLP, CVP & Free Democratic Party (FDP)
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 13
any conjoint proposal to avoid highly unrealistic scenarios that may confuse
respondents. However, we refrain from imposing further restrictions on the
party positions. The fact that we can create scenarios, which are to date
less realistic or hypothetical is a strength of the design. It is particularly rel-
evant to learn more about whether people would accept more far-reaching
tax proposals if party support increased. The position of the GLP (green liber-
als), CVP (Christian Democrats, since 2021 merged to the new Center party),
and the FDP (liberals) towards taxes may vary across proposals and over time,
and therefore we let the positions of these parties vary.
To implement the conjoint experiment, we follow the fully randomised
approach proposed by Bechtel and Scheve (2013) and Hainmueller et al.
(2014) except for a few logically implausible profile combinations. Profiles
with higher costs for a cost-saving household than for an average household
are excluded. The sequence of attributes was randomised, except for party
positions, which always appeared at the bottom of the conjoint table, as it
does not describe the tax design but rather its degree of political support.
Respondents were asked to indicate which of the two proposals they
would prefer if they had to choose (choice answer) and to what extent
they would support or reject each proposal on a scale from 0 (fully against)
to 10 (fully supportive) (rating answer).
5
The rating captures support levels,
while the choice reveals relative preferences. We primarily use the rating
question to analyze how information aects eectiveness beliefs and
support for green taxes, aligning with the idea that information inuences
eectiveness beliefs and overall support. For policy design and party cue
eects, we focus on the choice question. Results for both variables are
included in the appendix to ensure robustness.
6
Each respondent was exposed to five paired policy proposals, generating
24,010 observations. By randomly combining dierent attribute levels, the
conjoint experiment includes almost 5,000 possible policy proposals. The
causal quantities of interest are the average marginal component eect
(AMCE) and the marginal means, which represent the marginal eect and
marginal mean of an attribute level averaged over the joint distribution of
the remaining attributes. Due to the virtue of the random assignment of attri-
butes and the resulting orthogonality of each attribute to every other, we can
nonparametrically identify and estimate the causal eects of multiple treat-
ment components simultaneously.
Results
As shown in Figure 1, we discuss three mechanisms behind policy support.
First, we examine the impact of information on eectiveness beliefs and
support for policies. Subsequently, two sections analyze how various forms
of compensation and party cues shape policy support.
14 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
Eectiveness beliefs and the role of information
In the first stage of our study, we examine the eectiveness beliefs of citizens
concerning five statements on green taxes, and we investigate the extent to
which an information treatment can alter these beliefs. Figure 2 illustrates the
distribution of eectiveness beliefs among our respondents. A clear majority
of 70 per cent correctly agree with the basic mechanism that a tax on electri-
city is a means of making those who consume a lot of electricity pay even
more. However, most respondents do not understand or believe in the eec-
tiveness of green taxes, especially if tax revenues are redistributed to the
population. For example, 67 per cent of the respondents believe that a tax
on electricity does not reduce electricity consumption. This means that a
two-thirds majority does not believe in the central mechanism on which
the introduction of green taxes is based. Moreover, only 30 per cent of the
respondents believe that a tax on electricity would decrease consumption
if tax revenues were redistributed and only 25 per cent believe in a double
dividend, i.e., that the tax can reduce electricity consumption and, thanks
to lower pension contributions, employers can create jobs.
7
The relatively low levels of eectiveness beliefs suggest the possibility of
observing an information eect. Panel A in Figure 3 displays the distribution
of eectiveness beliefs among respondents who were exposed to our infor-
mation treatment on the working of green taxes compared to those who
were not. Panel B shows the treatment and control group’s predicted
mean support in eectiveness beliefs. It is evident from the distribution
and predicted means that there is hardly any dierence between the
Figure 2. Effectiveness beliefs about green taxes and revenue recycling (RR).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 15
treatment and control groups. Both MannWhitney-Wilcoxon tests and t-tests
show that there are no statistically significant dierences in eectiveness
beliefs in items 1, 2, and 5. Although there are some significant dierences
for items 3 and 4, they are not substantial (see de Winter & Dodou, 2010).
8
Moreover, as documented in Figures A.3 and A.4 in the appendix, the infor-
mation treatment does also not significantly inuence respondents’ assess-
ment of green tax proposals. This lack of impact is consistent across all
measured conjoint attributes, indicating that brief, one-time exposure to
information through a survey fails to shift respondents’ eectiveness beliefs
and boost their support for green tax policies.
The theorised relationship between beliefs in the eectiveness of green
taxes and support for green tax proposals is strongly supported. We computed
the average level of perceived eectiveness across the five items capturing
eectiveness beliefs (see Figure A.5 in the Appendix). Then we divided the
sample into three equally sized terciles: low, middle, and high levels of eective-
ness beliefs. Figure 4 illustrates the average rating of a green tax conjoint pro-
posal across these three levels. The results clearly demonstrate a strong
association between perceived eectiveness and support for green taxes. In
addition, Figures A.6, A.7, A.8, A.9, A.10, and A.11 show how strongly the eec-
tiveness beliefs are associated with the conjoint attributes. Overall, this indicates
that when respondents believe in the eectiveness of green taxes across mul-
tiple dimensions, their level of support for such policies rises substantially.
9
Figure 3. Distribution (left) and predicted means (right) of effectiveness beliefs by treat-
ment and control group.
16 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
The role of compensation
Figure 5 presents the marginal means obtained from the conjoint experiment
conducted to elicit respondents’ relative support patterns. We exposed
respondents to information on the specific policy design of green taxes
and also informed them about which parties supported the proposal. The
average marginal component eects (AMCEs) can be found in Figure A.11
in the Appendix. Moreover, using the rating instead of the choice variable
yields largely identical results (see Figure A.13 and A.14 in the Appendix).
The level of endorsement for a green tax is intricately tied to the specific
nature of the taxed commodity. Notably, proposals to levy taxes on Kerosene
and CO2 command the highest degree of approval, contrasting starkly with
the diminished enthusiasm for an electricity tax, which emerges as the
least favoured option among survey participants. Similarly, endeavours to
impose taxes on heating oil and gas encounter resistance. Furthermore,
our findings underscore the pervasive unpopularity of tax exemptions for
energy-intensive industries, a prevailing feature of the current regulatory
landscape.
Moreover, our study reveals a notable eect of the net cost implications
associated with the proposed policies. Aligned with a straightforward
material self-interest mechanism, we observe a modest rise in support
when the net costs for an average household experience a marginal increase.
However, this favourable disposition diminishes considerably when con-
fronted with substantial cost escalations. Additionally, the results demon-
strate a pronounced aversion to heightened net costs for low-energy
households, whereas a reduction in costs enjoys more widespread support.
In line with our theoretical expectations, our study highlights the critical
role of compensation through revenue recycling in shaping public support
for green tax proposals. As anticipated, both ego-tropic recycling mechan-
isms, aimed at reducing individual healthcare costs, and socio-tropic recy-
cling mechanisms, directing funds towards renewable energy subsidies or
the public pension budget, emerge as highly favoured among respondents.
Figure 4. Average rating of a green tax conjoint proposal, by effectiveness belief.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 17
In stark contrast, proposals that neglect revenue recycling, opting to provide
funds solely to the government or benefiting employers exclusively, face con-
siderable disapproval.
These findings imply that tax revenues, which not only address individual
concerns but also contribute to collective benefits linked to the core issue of
climate change or the mitigation of widespread social risks such as old-age
poverty, are instrumental in garnering public support for green taxes. Relative
support levels rise when individuals recognise that the proposed policy
specifically targets the central challenge of climate change or aids in alleviat-
ing social risks. Conversely, support diminishes when funds are perceived as
not directly benefiting individuals or society at large but rather contributing
to the general public budget or employers without tangible returns. Notably,
the impact of revenue recycling appears to outweigh that of net costs, irre-
spective of the respondent’s income level (see Figure A.15 in the Appendix).
Figure 5. Marginal means of choice variable, full sample.
Notes: SP (Social Democrats), GLP (Green Liberals), CVP (Christian Democrats), FDP (Liberals).
18 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
The role of party cues
The last attribute in the conjoint experiment sheds light on the relevance of
elite party cues in shaping public opinion regarding green taxes. The left
panel of Figure 6 presents the average marginal means of elite party cues.
A green tax proposal exclusively endorsed by left-wing parties (Social Demo-
crats (SP) and the Greens) or a coalition that also includes the Green Liberals
(GLP) has a much lower chance of being supported. To garner broader
support, a green tax proposal needs a broader coalition that encompasses
not only left-wing parties but also Christian Democrats (CVP) and Liberals
(FDP). This finding aligns with research on mainstream eects in attitude for-
mation (Zaller, 1992, pp. 97–117). Support for green taxes increases with elite
consensus. When environmental policies face minimal elite contention, many
citizens adopt cues from ideologically unified parties. However, if only left-
green parties promote these policies, it is likely that skepticism intensifies
among center-right voters, while left-green voters show stronger support.
To assess whether the results are driven by increased coalition size or the
inclusion of specific parties, the right panel of Figure 6 presents the marginal
means of party cues for ideological subgroups based on vote choice. We
classified parties into three broader political camps: left, center-right and
far-right.
10
This reveals how voters react to party cues. Our analysis shows
that the policy support among center-right and far-right voters increases
almost linearly with the expansion of the reform coalition and center-right
Figure 6. Marginal means of elite party cues (choice variable), overall and by vote
choice.
Notes: SP (Social Democrats), GLP (Green Liberals), CVP (Christian Democrats), FDP (Liberals).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 19
party cues. Intriguingly, however, a broader coalition reduces the probability
of left-wing voters endorsing the green tax proposal. When the Christian
Democrats (CVP) join the reform coalition, left-wing support decreases
slightly compared to policies supported solely by left or green parties. The
inclusion of the market-liberal FDP in the coalition significantly decreases
their support.
The near-linear increase in support from center-right and far-right voters,
contrasted with the lack of a similar response from left voters, suggests that
left voters react more to the specific parties included in the coalition than to
its size. This likely reects an out-party cue eect, as the coalition size expla-
nation cannot account for the decline in left-wing support when the CVP and
FDP is added to the coalition. This suggests a trade-o between broad
coalitions and left-wing support. Given their preference for robust environ-
mental policies, left voters may perceive proposals backed by center-right
parties as less eective than those supported solely by left-green parties.
Thus, our findings also emphasise the relevance of out-party cues, where
their impact is not restricted to sources they trust (in-party cues) but also
extends to sources they distrust (out-party cues). It is important to note
that this trade-o emerges only in choice-based settings. As shown in
Figure A.16 in the Appendix, left-wing voters consistently support all green
tax proposals regardless of the coalition, while far-right voters uniformly
oppose them.
Ideology not only inuences how citizens respond to party cues but also
significantly shapes their evaluations of other conjoint attributes. As shown
in Figure A.17 in the Appendix, the far-right is more supportive of a kerosene
tax but opposes a gas or CO2 tax. Conversely, the left is more firmly against a
heating oil or electricity tax. Regarding net costs, the far-right is more sensi-
tive to higher net costs for an average household, while net costs for a low-
energy household generate few partisan dierences. The left also strongly
opposes exempting energy-intensive industries from green tax proposals,
an issue of less concern for center-right and far-right respondents. On
revenue recycling, far-right voters resist investments in renewable energy,
while the left opposes reductions in employers’ pension contributions.
Conclusion
This study aimed to investigate whether and under what conditions mass
support for green taxes can be increased. We dierentiated between three
types of mechanisms: general information on green tax eectiveness, com-
pensation, and party cues.
First, we found no empirical support for the expectation that information
on policy mechanisms enhances eectiveness beliefs and increases policy
support. Our information treatment, which can be considered a highly
20 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
probable scenario for discovering an information eect, showed no impact
on eectiveness beliefs or policy evaluations. Unlike real-world scenarios
where individuals selectively engage with information or encounter opposing
views, our respondents were exposed to a clear and unambiguous treatment.
Yet, even under these controlled conditions, the information failed to
inuence beliefs or evaluations, with no evidence of heterogeneous treat-
ment eects. These results, consistent with findings from Canada and Swit-
zerland (Mildenberger et al., 2022), suggest that one-shot information is
insucient to shift beliefs and preferences on complex issues like green taxes.
Our results show that eectiveness beliefs are closely tied to policy
support and that party aliation strongly inuences beliefs about policy
eectiveness. This suggests a high level of stability in individual policy prefer-
ences, as citizens are unlikely to alter their views in response to new infor-
mation due to entrenched eectiveness beliefs. Our conjoint analysis
further indicates that party information reinforces ideology-based opinions.
Similarly, Fremstad et al. (2022) found that while informing respondents
about household dividends increased support for carbon taxes, this eect
vanished when party divisions were emphasised (see also Aitor Marcos &
Hartmann, 2023). These findings underscore the need for a deeper under-
standing of how individuals process information and why it often fails to
change eectiveness beliefs and policy support as anticipated.
Second, we provide evidence that public support for green taxes is shaped
by the specific green tax design, particularly its net cost implications to
households and the nature of revenue recycling. Our results indicate that
the negative impact of higher net costs can be mitigated by eective
revenue recycling. Individuals are more likely to support green tax if the
recycled revenues address both ego-tropic and socio-tropic concerns, such
as tackling climate change or reducing social risks. In contrast, support is
low when revenues are directed to the public budget or employers
without clear benefits. Therefore, our research underscores the importance
of considering collective benefits and social risks, which are just as critical
as individual material ones, when designing eective green tax policies
that can garner public support. Thus, policymakers must carefully consider
the net cost implications of green taxes and the types of compensation
oered through revenue recycling.
Finally, highlights a critical but understudied factor in the literature on
public preferences for green taxation: the role of political parties and the
cues they provide. While previous research has largely focused on the
cost–benefit design of green taxes, our findings underscore the central role
of parties in shaping public opinion and determining the success or failure
of such policies. We show that the polarisation of climate and energy
issues significantly impedes the implementation of green taxes. Without
broad party consensus and consistent cues, advancing green tax proposals
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 21
is unlikely. However, we also identify a trade-o in coalition building: inclusive
coalitions, particularly with market-liberal parties, may provoke criticism from
the left. This aligns with recent studies showing polarisation’s negative
impact on carbon tax acceptance (Aitor Marcos & Hartmann, 2023; Fremstad
et al., 2022). Further research is needed to understand whether this resistance
stems from general party system polarisation or specific left-wing concerns
about suboptimal reform outcomes. A nuanced understanding of party
dynamics and cues is crucial for designing green taxes that gain public
support. Policymakers must weigh coalition-building trade-os while striving
for a consensus that oers clear, consistent cues to citizens.
Moving beyond the case of green taxes, we oer three insights: First, even
when arguments are presented with simplicity and clarity within a highly con-
ducive setting for information dissemination, such as a survey context where
respondents are compelled to engage with the information, these arguments
often fail to alter the underlying preference structures. This observation aligns
with a substantial body of recent empirical research (see Achen & Bartels,
2017). However, our article does not delve into the reasons behind citizens’
general reluctance to adopt clear and logically consistent arguments. The
examination of motivated reasoning, as explored by (Lodge & Taber, 2013),
may oer insights into resolving this puzzle. Second, when citizens perceive
potential losses due to a policy, their support for such policy hinges on two
interdependent conditions: On the one hand, the policy must be impeccably
designed to achieve its objectives, for instance, through tax revenue utilis-
ation that reinforces the policy’s goals, thereby compensating for the per-
ceived losses. On the other hand, the policy should provide compensation
aligned with the either ego-tropic or broader socio-tropic interests of the
respondents. Third, our findings concerning party cues indicate that in the
current climate of increasing polarisation observed across various countries
and policy issues (Aitor Marcos & Hartmann, 2023; Grumbach, 2018; Hacker
& Pierson, 2019), partisan cues may simultaneously exert a ‘mainstream
eect’ and a ‘polarisation eect’ (Zaller, 1992). While substantial policy
change is likely unattainable without a unified elite triggering a ‘mainstream
eect’ and garnering cross-party popular support, cues from the out-party
possess the potential to incite polarisation among voters at the ideological
extremes. Consequently, achieving widespread support for significant
reform initiatives necessitates more than a tactical and temporary alliance;
it is contingent upon sustained eorts aimed at reducing polarisation over
the long term.
Notes
1. Not all citizens participate equally in ballot decisions, though most engage
occasionally. The high visibility of direct democratic votes and campaigns
22 R. BÜRGISSER ET AL.
ensures that even non-voters have some familiarity with the process. However,
citizens’ opinions on green tax proposals vary, and it remains unclear in the
survey whether they are imagining hypothetical scenarios, comparing them
to the current system, or are unfamiliar with certain taxes.
2. Data, codebook and additional information is available at: https://doi.org/10.
23662/FORS-DS-1232-1.
3. As our experiment was only included in the Swiss version of the ISSP survey, our
study cannot be comparative but will focus on the Swiss case.
4. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows that respondents from both survey waves (W2-
all) are broadly similar to those who participated only in the first wave (W1-all)
in terms of gender, age, income, place of residence, education, and vote choice.
While wave 2 web respondents (those in the experimental part) tend to be
slightly younger, more likely male, have higher incomes, and are marginally
more educated compared to W1-all and W2-all, these dierences are minor.
5. Respondents could also opt out of answering the question. As shown in the
Figure A.1 in the Appendix, lower educated, far-right, and politically disinter-
ested individuals were slightly more likely to skip the question, a common
trend in surveys, though the dierences are minimal.
6. All respondents completed the conjoint module after the eectiveness belief
questions. While reecting on eectiveness beliefs might have inuenced
responses, our focus is mainly on dierences between tax designs, not absolute
support levels. Since the eectiveness items address general tax mechanisms
rather than specific designs, there is little theoretical basis to suggest they
would impact these choice settings.
7. Arguably, the link between reducing employers’ pension contribution and job
creation is not necessarily true if employers do not invest the saved resources
for job creation.
8. In addition, Figure A.2 in the Appendix illustrates that eectiveness beliefs
exhibit clear partisan patterns, while the treatment eect does not.
9. While our findings indicate that one-time information treatments may be
ineective, long-term strategies to build or reinforce eectiveness beliefs
remain vital for boosting public support for green taxes. Recent evidence by
Ruprecht (2023) also shows that the same information treatment significantly
increased the willingness of less-educated individuals to pay higher environ-
mental taxes, but not among the more educated. We conclude that the infor-
mation treatment can inuence less-educated individuals by raising
awareness of green taxes, but it fails to shift underlying belief structures.
10. The Left includes the Social Democrats (SP) and the Greens; the center-right
encompasses the Green Liberals (GLP), Christian Democrats (CVP), Conserva-
tives (BDP), and Liberals (FDP); and the far-right comprises the Swiss Peoples
Party (SVP), the Federal Democratic Union (EDU), and the Lega. Combining
vote choice with a measure of party closeness to reduce missing values
yields identical results (see Figure A.18 in the Appendix).
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful for insightful comments and feedback from Despina Alexiadou,
Lucy Barnes, Diane Bolet, Michele Fenzl, Jared J. Finnegan, Julian Garritzmann,
Timothy Hicks, Vera Huwe, Olivier Jacques, Philipp Kerler, Peter Loewen, Catherine
Moury, Stephanie Mudge, Thomas Prosser, Katrijn Siderius, Christina L. Toensho
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 23
and all the participants at the 2022 ‘Politics of the Long-Term’ Workshop at NOVA Uni-
versity in Lisbon, the 2022 ECPR General Conference in Innsbruck, the ‘How People
Think about the Economy’ Workshop at UCL, and the 2024 Progressive Politics
Research Network Meeting at Nueld College, Oxford. Isabelle Stadelmann-Steen
acknowledges that this research has been conducted in cooperation with the consor-
tium EDGE, funded by the SWEET programme of the Swiss Federal Oce of Energy.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
The data collection has been financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF) and coordinated by the Swiss Centre of Expertise in Social Sciences (FORS).
Data availability
The data and replication files are available at https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-
DS-1232-1 and the corresponding author’s Harvard Dataverse.
Notes on contributors
Reto Bürgisser is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science at
the University of Zurich.
Isabelle Stadelmann-Steen is Full Professor at the Institute of Political Science and
the Oeschger Center of Climate Change Research at the University of Bern.
Klaus Armingeon is an Associated Researcher at the Department of Political Science at
the University of Zurich and a Professor Emeritus at the University of Bern.
ORCID
Reto Bürgisser http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5913-6808
Isabelle Stadelmann-Steen http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3441-4757
Klaus Armingeon http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4186-3155
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