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ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
Professor Emerita
Jagiellonian University in Krakow
Translated by Anna Partyka-Sitek (Big Little Talks)
Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman
Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
Abstract: Works written in the cognitivist vein have been clearly inspired by and connected
with Gestalt psychology – a fact recognized by scholars who describe the beginnings and sub-
sequent development of cognitive theories of language. However, the discoverers of hidden
aspects of the history of Cognitive Linguistics hardly ever put on their lists of forerunners the
name of Roman Ingarden. And yet many of fundamental principles that underlie cognitivist
theories of language and grammar can be found in Ingarden’s writings, notably in his The
Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, rst published in 1937 – exactly half a century before the
year 1987, the annus mirabilis of Cognitive Linguistics, when its founding fathers published
their groundbreaking monographs. Ingarden wrote about “literature”, while Langacker and his
followers focus upon “non-literature”, i.e. text and discourse as elements of everyday com-
munication. But both the (narrower) aesthetic concepts of Ingarden and the wider (linguistic)
notions of Langacker, Lako or Talmy are based upon the fundamental opposition between the
objectivist and the subjectivist approach. Most striking is the convergence of their view upon
the shape of language as it occurs in verbal expression, inevitably connected with conscious-
ness and mental activity of the producer: a cognizant subject of perception, conceptualization
and expression. Deeper knowledge of Ingarden’s phenomenological thought might enrich cog-
nitivist reection on language and by taking account of phenomenological aspects of language
use promote the search for markers of “everyday literariness”.
Keywords: cognitive linguistics, Gestalt psychology, imagery, instantiation, indeterminate-
ness, intentionality, mental spaces, objectivism, places of indeterminacy, subjectivism
Abstrakt: Śledząc prace powstające w nurcie kognitywistycznych rozważań o języku, trud-
no nie zauważyć wyraźnych powiązań z tezami psychologii Gestalt, co dostrzegają badacze
początków i rozwoju kognitywistycznej teorii języka. Odkrywcy nieznanych kart z dziejów
językoznawstwa kognitywnego nie wymieniają jednak wśród jego prekursorów Romana In-
gardena. Tymczasem wiele z podstawowych tez kognitywnej teorii języka i gramatyki można
odnaleźć w myśli Ingardena, zwłaszcza w książce O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego (The
Studia Litteraria Universitatis Iagellonicae Cracoviensis 19 (2024), z. 1, s. 31–48
10.4467/20843933ST.24.004.20371
www.ejournals.eu/Studia-Litteraria
http://orcid.org/ 0000-0002-3676-792X
32 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
Cognition of the Literary Work of Art), wydanej w 1937 roku, a więc dokładnie pół wieku przed
rokiem 1987 – annus mirabilis językoznawstwa kognitywnego, w którym ukazały się przeło-
mowe prace jego amerykańskich ojców założycieli. Przedmiotem dociekań Ingardena jest „li-
teratura”, podczas gdy Langacker i zwolennicy jego teorii zajmują się „nie-literaturą” – tekstem
i dyskursem jako elementami codziennej komunikacji. Zarówno (węższa) estetyczna koncepcja
Ingardena, jak i (szersza) językoznawcza koncepcja Langackera, Lakoa czy Talmy’ego opie-
rają się na fundamentalnej opozycji między podejściem obiektywistycznym i subiektywistycz-
nym. Uderzająca jest też zbieżność w patrzeniu na kształt, jaki język przyjmuje w wypowie-
dzi, nieuchronnie związanej ze świadomością i aktywnością umysłową jej twórcy – podmiotu
percepcji, konceptualizacji i ekspresji. Szersza znajomość fenomenologicznej myśli Ingarde-
na mogłaby wzbogacić rozważania teoretyków językoznawstwa kognitywnego o lozoczne
podstawy, a ich poszukiwania językowych wyznaczników „potocznej literackości” zyskałyby
walor w postaci fenomenologicznego aspektu użycia języka.
Słowa kluczowe: intencjonalność, językoznawstwo kognitywne, konkretyzacja, miejsca
niedookreślenia, niedookreśloność, obiektywizm, obrazowanie, przestrzenie mentalne, psy-
chologia postaci (Gestalt), subiektywizm
I. Langacker
In the search for roots of the cognitivist theory of language, commonly known
today as Cognitive Linguistics, researchers tend to turn to writings in the eld of
cognitive psychology from the second part of the 20th century. It is a demonstrably
correct approach: for example the research by an American psychologist Eleanor
Rosch (1977), focusing on the way the processes of categorization work, remains
to this day a pillar of the radial category theory and prototype theory-based cogni-
tive semantics, which recognizes the primacy the cognitive processes of human
mind have in creating, acquiring and using languages (Lako 1987; Langacker
1987, 2008).
Other inspirations and borrowings abound, Gestalt psychology being an ex-
ceptionally rich source of groundbreaking ideas for Cognitive Linguistics; almost
all concepts vital for the cognitivist theory of natural language essentially have
a form of gestalts, and at the very core of the model of Cognitive Grammar creat-
ed by Ronald W. Langacker lie the main principles of gestaltism. The fundamental
thesis of Gestalt psychology is famously the statement that human mind compre-
hends individual external stimuli, especially the visual ones, as wholes, rather
than sums of respective parts. The basic process of such “merging” is arranging
and organizing impressions, and one of the most important criteria is the similar-
ity of connected elements. It comes as no surprise then that a theory of language
description formulated with respect to basic cognitive processes of human mind
must draw on similar premises. What also seems obvious is that the said premises
will be reflected in the plane of expression: the structure of an utterance.
Visual perception, the key area of interest of Gestalt psychology, plays a major
part in Cognitive Grammar. Although Langacker cautions against equating ele-
ments of his model with facets of visual perception (2008, 55), it is impossible to
miss the analogies between the two. Terms constituting the instruments of Cog-
nitive Grammar verge on being terminological borrowings, and parameters of
33Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
Langacker’s imagery find their equivalents in respective principles of gestaltism.
The most basic parameter, the Figure/Ground alignment, described as conceptual
relationship between profile and base, corresponds with gestaltism’s most impor-
tant principle, one claiming that people perceive objects in sight as diversified
system of foreground and backgrounds. The said diversification is reflected in
Langacker’s model of grammar in the form of syntactic structures as the opposi-
tion between trajector and landmark and stands e.g. for distribution of subjects
and objects in a sentence.
Additionally, cognitive linguists remark on the existence of linguistic corre-
lates of the psychological concept of salience, a property because of which the
description of items which are positioned in the foreground and are perceived
as more pronounced will be more detailed and shall include a greater number
of features in comparison to the objects placed in the background by the author
of the utterance. The linguists working in the cognitive vein point to structures
analogous to this one both on the level of lexicon and syntax.
Yet another principle, known as the principle of proximity, states that elements
placed close to one another are perceived as related and belonging to the same
group. As analysis of such languages as English shows (which nonetheless can
pertain to e.g. Polish), such groups of objects are frequently described with col-
lective nouns (cf. Langacker, passim) in the singular form.
The idea of contour, one of the instruments of Cognitive Grammar, is quite
closely related to Gestalt psychology. Contour is a semantic property attributed
to objects seen as separate regions in (physical or abstract) space occupied by
sets of elements (physical or abstract) and combined into conceptual wholes, be
it thanks to a difference between the given configuration and its surroundings, or
the inner structure of the configuration, meaning the perceived linkages between
the individual elements. When considered within Cognitive Grammar, the con-
ceptual contour relates to concepts expressed by countable nouns and verbs in the
perfective aspect (cf. Langacker 1987, 4.1.2.) Bounding, a process of giving ob-
jects more or less abstract contours in spaces in which they exist, is prompted by
the structure of objects in the physical world (e.g. the term “cherry” has a spatial
contour as opposed to “cherry juice”; the concept expressed by the verb “read”
in the past tense has a temporal contour in contrast to the concept associated
with the form “was reading”). The process of bounding can find its equivalent in
Gestalt psychology in the principle of reification according to which “the eye rec-
ognizes disparate shapes as <belonging> to a single shape, […] complete three-
dimensional shape is seen, where in actuality no such thing is drawn” (Wikipedia
2024). A fragment of a brief overview of Gestalt principles found on the Internet
could easily be taken for a quote from Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction
by Langacker: “Ideally an object has an outline, but this is not always true […].
When there is no outline, we use both the closeness and separation of shapes
contained within the item to help spot the larger shape” (Changing Minds n.d.; cf.
Langacker 1987, 196).
One of very important elements of cognitivist theory of grammar is a thesis
claiming that vantage points and the perspective visible as a consequence of their
34 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
choice are distinct for different observers, the effect being various representations
pertaining to the given object, be it subject, visual or language oriented. For Lan-
gacker the vantage point constitutes the basic parameter of linguistic scene con-
struction – imagery. In gestaltism it refers to multistability, a potential existence
of (two) different ways of interpreting an object resulting mostly from a shift in
the Figure/Ground alignment, as an effect of which the figure starts being viewed
as the background, and the background as the figure. Although to my knowledge
no Cognitive Grammar theorists make direct references to multistability, linguis-
tic realization of such a modification in the structure of an utterance can easily
be found in cognitive descriptions of alternate construals (Langacker 1995, 99;
example 13a).
Analogies between Gestalt psychology and Cognitive Linguistics are easily
noticeable on the level of lexicon and morphosyntax. What seems even more in-
teresting, however, is tracking the ways in which they correspond to each other on
higher levels of systems organization. A significant, albeit quite a lone one in the
matter, is the voice of a German linguist Andreas Hölzl, who in the works from
the first part of the 20th century finds foreshadowing of the elements present in the
future theories of cognitive linguists: conceptual metaphor (Asch 1955 vs. Lakoff
1987; Hölzl 2020, 2), image schemas (Lewin 1936 vs. Langacker passim), force
dynamics (Lewin 1936 vs. Lakoff 1987 vs. Fauconnier 1985; Talmy 1988; Hölzl
2020, 3), mental spaces and conceptual integration (Arnheim 2011 vs. Fauconnier
1985, Fauconnier, Turner 2003; Hölzl 2020, 4).
Hölzl concludes his overview of the forerunners of Cognitive Linguistics with
a sentiment that “a general re-evaluation of the origins of Cognitive Linguistics
is long overdue” (2020, 5). A step in that direction is a recently published article
“Roman Ingarden’s Theory of the Literary Work of Art: a Cognitive Grammar
Reassessment” (Kardela et al. 2023) whose authors ponder over Ingarden’s theory
of places of indeterminacy in the context of the principle of grouping, described in
one of the newer versions of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2016).
Two phases can be distinguished in the development of the theory of Cognitive
Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar. The first phase, initiated in 1987 by Ron-
ald Langacker’s monumental monograph (Langacker 1987), saw formalization
of the theoretical overview; Langacker’s book presents integrated descriptions of
language structures as meaning-bearing continuum of lexicon, morphology and
syntax. Research from this period was born out of cognitivists’ radical opposition
to what was then mainstream linguistics: generative theory of language based
on the principles of modularity, compositionality, and autonomy of syntax. The
second phase, beginning of which can be traced back to research on conceptual
metaphor and construction of the foundation for conceptual integration theory
(Lakoff 1987; Fauconnier, Turner 2003) is a time of interdisciplinary synthesis
and of growing interest in the processes of processing (linguistic) information,
the importance of context and structure of discourse. It comes as no surprise then
that it is this stage that brings the cognitivist theory of language and of grammar
closer to the phenomenological aesthetic theory of structure and cognition of the
literary work of art.
35Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
The researchers working in the cognitive vein and representing the “second
phase”, while observing the rule of embedding language structures within context
as a fundamental one, underline the importance of substrate, a context without
explicit boundaries which includes the knowledge of background and the circum-
stances of the utterance. As an effect of discourse that evolves in time, they de-
scribe the process of meaning negotiation. In the research on cognitive processes
an interactivity postulate appears, accompanied by a stipulation that interactivity
of linguistic expressions is an element of meaning of an utterance even when it is
not directly indicated and remains implied. It is worth reminding of a significant
difference: in linguistic analyses, especially those concerning discourse, interac-
tivity is understood as a mutual relationship between the interlocutors, constitut-
ing a basis for meaning negotiation. In more broadly understood cognitive studies
,however, it is the interactions between language and the cognitive process that
are studied (cf. e.g. Spivey 2023).
When following the more recent research written in the cognitivist vein, one
cannot help but notice that there still appear clear connections to theses from
Gestalt psychology, especially the principles of closure and continuity. The term
closure refers to tendency of the mind to eliminate conceptual gaps, so as to cre-
ate a coherent whole. Langacker’s bounding (cf. above) is a process of conceptual
“closing up” of a region containing elements characterized by conceptual conti-
nuity in physical, temporal or abstract space (Langacker 1987, 200). On higher
organization levels such “closing up” would probably mean complementing con-
ceptual metonymies. Cognitivists believe metonymy to be an obligatory and in-
dispensable feature of each and every expression, a claim repeated by linguists
studying language within this theory (Langacker 2009; Radden, Kövecses 2007),
indicated by the very father of general semantics, Alfred Korzybski (Korzybski
1933), and finally underlined by the authors of canonical research on concep-
tual metonymy (cf. e.g. Barcelona 2000). In real-life situations the participants
of (speech) communication acts very rarely receive information that could be
deemed as (nearly) complete, which makes it necessary for them to fill the gaps as
mind dictates it, using to that end the aforementioned conceptual substrate. Tak-
ing substrate into consideration in various aspects allows to solve problems which
could not be tackled if the expressions in question were examined in isolation,
whereas the principle of closure itself determines the process in which the meto-
nymical information is “closed up”. As we said, in contrast to previous theories
Cognitive Linguistics does not think metonymy a linguistics ornament fit for po-
etry only, but rather sees it as a phenomenon of conceptual nature, a fundamental
cognitive process moulding the relationship between users of natural languages
and the reality surrounding them, which additionally enables cognitive insight
into the world thanks to selection and hierarchization of stimuli.
36 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
II. Ingarden
The discoverers of hidden aspects of the history of Cognitive Linguistics hardly
ever put on their lists of forerunners the name of Roman Ingarden; the aforemen-
tioned research (Kardela et al. 2023) is a valuable exception. And yet many of the
fundamental principles that underlie cognitivist theories of language and grammar
can be found in Ingarden’s writings, notably in his The Cognition of the Literary
Work of Art (Ingarden 1973a), first published in 1937 – exactly half a century be-
fore 1987, the annus mirabilis of Cognitive Linguistics, when its founding fathers
and creators of the cognitivist theory of language and model of Cognitive Gram-
mar published their groundbreaking monographs (Langacker 1987; Lakoff 1987).
As we know, 6 years earlier, in 1931 (in Lviv), the first edition of Ingarden’s
monograph The Literary Work of Art (Ingarden 1973b) appeared, being an intro-
duction of sorts to his upcoming reflections. Attempting to satisfy, as least to an
extent, Andreas Hölzl’s postulate according to which “a general re-evaluation of
the origins of Cognitive Linguistics is long overdue”, let us try and find in both
of these volumes if not “the beginnings” then certainly insightful flashes of intui-
tion and announcements of things to come.
Roman Ingarden was neither a cognitivist nor a linguist. He was not a psy-
chologist. A literary scholar and a philosopher, a distinguished representative of
Polish phenomenology, in his research on literary work of art he concentrated on
the aesthetic dimension of literary work, trying to reconcile the objectivist and
subjectivist approach. In the former the focus is on the intentional object which
for Ingarden was the literary work, in the latter on the subject getting to know
the work of art and their “aesthetic experience” as an aftermath of the encounter.
Objectivism (obiectivus = pertaining to the object) assumes that the object of cog-
nition exists outside of the subject getting to know it and independently from it,
whereas subjectivism (subiectivus = subjective) presumes that cognition depends
on the structure of the cogniziant subject and on the context within which this
process takes place. Both of these approaches can be found, mutatis mutandis, in
the opposition postulated by theoreticians of Cognitive Linguistics between ob-
jectification (a process as a result of which the author of the expression performs
a dual role of a subject and an object of conceptualization) and subjectification
(a process in which the author of the expression is given only the role of a sub-
ject). It is my opinion that the relationship between the subject and the object acts
as an axis of the analogy between Ingarden’s thought and the ideas Cognitive
Linguistics theoreticians put forward.
Ingarden wrote about “literature”, while Langacker and his followers focus
upon “non-literature”, i.e. text and discourse as elements of everyday communi-
cation. Most striking is the convergence of their view upon the shape of language
as it occurs in verbal expressions, inevitably connected with consciousness and
mental activity of the producer: a cognizant subject of perception, conceptualiza-
tion and expression. As per Ingarden’s definition, work of art is an intentional
object, called into existence as a result of active involvement of mind. It seems
that intentionality understood in this way, even though not explicitly voiced, can
37Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
be applied to the “non-literary” expressions analysed by the linguists carrying
out the research within the scope set out by Langacker. Blurring the line between
“literature” and “non-literature”, believed to be a feature of postmodernism (cf.
e.g. Mitosek 1999) which could lead to scientifically undesired relativism, while
in fact can call into question some aspects of literary theory analyses, broadens the
horizons from the linguistic point of view. Since the theory of cognition of literary
work of art can be applied to the structure of every (complex) linguistic expres-
sion, it grants “the literary work of art” a special status and allows for examina-
tion of most striking differences, mostly quantity-wise. A text deemed “literary”
would therefore be filled with a greater number of unconventional metaphors,
unconventionalized extensions of grammatical rules, cases of conceptual metony-
mies and so on. Looked at from this perspective, Ingarden’s considerations would
gain the status of statements on linguistic expressions as intentional objects “in
general”, and would be undertaken from the position of a cognitive scientist.
Similarly to the creator of Cognitive Grammar, Ingarden presumes language
to be action-oriented, to reflect human activities. In Langacker’s Cognitive Gram-
mar this thesis translates into a postulate according to which two universal gram-
matical categories of schematic meaning exist, “nouns” and “verbs”. Calling for
an analogically dichotomous division, Ingarden talks about “names” (broadening
this traditional linguistic category in such a way that it almost overlaps with Lan-
gacker’s category of objects-nouns, (cf. Ingarden 1973b, 63 and ff.; Langacker
2023, 12) and about “finite verbs” which he defines analogically to Langacker’s
events – verbs in the finite form (Ingarden 1973b, 75 and ff.; Langacker 2023,
12). Just like Langacker, Ingarden defines grammatical categories according to
semantic-pragmatic criteria and assumes that “a formal content that is often found
in nominal word meanings also appears in a <verb>” (1973b, 76) and also that “it
is possible to use the finite verb in the nominal function” (1973b, 77, footnote 2).
That is, after all, one of the main – and most controversial – claims of Cognitive
Grammar; the fragment concerning the semantic status of elements belonging
to both categories reads as if it was not penned by Ingarden, but typed by Lan-
gacker: “the difference between nominal and verbal word meanings will appear
[…] if one observes that each finite verb, taken in isolation, has a meaning that
is complementation-requiring (<dependent> in the Husserlian sense), whereas,
at the very least, there can be independent nominal word meanings” (Ingarden
1973b, 82).
Examples of Ingarden’s postulates resonating in Langacker’s model of gram-
mar abound. What seems especially perceptive are the philosopher’s observations
concerning “higher meaning units” (Ingarden 1973b, 94), i.e. Langacker’s gram-
matical constructions (see below), for example the semantics of Polish nomina-
tive and accusative cases as vehicles of specific semantic functions. As per Ingar-
den’s analysis, the nominative case expresses the perceiving subject, whereas the
accusative case signals loss of semantic autonomy of a referent (of a noun) while
retaining the status of “a carrier of properties” (Ingarden 1973b, 94).
38 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
What seems most interesting in this context are the juxtapositions occurring on
the level of higher strata of (literary) text organisation. According to Ingarden’s
theory, a work of art has a multi-stratal structure in which the author distinguished:
“a) the stratum of verbal sounds and phonetic formations and phenomena of
a higher order;
b) the stratum of semantic units: of sentence meanings and the meanings of
whole groups of sentences;
c) the stratum of schematized aspects, in which objects of various kinds por-
trayed in the work come to appearance; and
d) the stratum of the objectivities portrayed in the [pure] intentional states of
affairs projected by the [meanings of] sentences [within the literary work]”
(Ingarden 1973a, 12).
Ingarden adds temporal parameter to the list of these strata. “In addition to its
stratified structure, the literary work is distinguished by an ordered sequence of
its parts […] Consequently, the work possesses a peculiar quasi-temporal <exten-
sion> from beginning to end, as well as certain properties of composition which
arise from this <extension>” (1973a, 12). He additionally assigns the literary
work with “<two dimensions>: the one is which the total stock of all the strata
extends simultaneously and the second, in which the parts succeed one another”
(Ingarden 1973a, 12). That is, mutatis mutandis, Langacker’s differentiation be-
tween conceived time and processing time, namely time understood as an object
or/and as a medium of conceptualization (cf. e.g. Langacker 1987, 4.3.1; 1991,
78). One may notice this division appears also in Ingarden’s reasoning pertaining
to “time perspective” (1973b, 233–243). He postulates the necessity to distinguish
“the <objective> time of the real world” from “represented time” (in the literary
work), but also from “concrete intuitively apprehendable intersubjective time in
which we all live collectively” and finally from “strictly subjective time” (Ingar-
den 1973b, 233–234). Phenomenologically speaking, it is a distinction a bit more
nuanced than Langacker’s dichotomy. When considered in respect to the shape of
linguistic expressions it allows Ingarden a subtle description of semantics of such
occasional time adverbs as “now”, “before” or “after”. The analysis of the expres-
sion “now” conducted in categories of “real time and represented time (intersub-
jective or subjective)” (Ingarden 1973b, 235) is something that many professional
cognitive linguists could boast about.
When describing a literary work from temporal perspective, Ingarden writes
that “the events in which the represented objects take part are by their very essence
temporal and, moreover, are represented as consecutive or simultaneous. Hence,
a temporal order is established among them” (1973b, 233). This also could well
be a direct quote from Langacker’s writings. As his reflections on temporal per-
spective progress, Ingarden foreshadows what Langacker calls “temporal iconic-
ity”, “a natural tendency for conceived time and processing time to be coaligned,
such that the order in which events are conceived as occurring dovetails with
the order in which they are conceptualized and described” (Langacker 2008, 79).
Langacker hints at the possibility of a change, of diverging from “the order of oc-
currence” in a sentence (2008, 79), pointing to grammatical means (in English e.g.
39Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
Present Perfect tense) with help of which an author can achieve such an effect.
Finding analogues grammatical means in the Polish language would be a valu-
able illustration of Ingarden’s insightful remarks indeed. It is worth mentioning
one of the previous attempts to describe the meaning of time phenomenologically
“as flux of perceptual intake in the here-and-now (present), and as stored and re-
activated intake that is now-and-given-but-not-here (past)” (Paprotté 1988, 486).
Ingarden in turn writes about represented time: “we remain grounded in the given
present and look back into the past from there. We can, however, step back, as it
were, into a specific time moment in the past and from there […] recollect past
events or experiences” (1973b, 239).
Yet another interesting convergence between Ingarden and Langacker can be
found in their analysis of, to use the former’s words, “appearance of represented
objectivities” (Ingarden 1973b, 282). Ingarden differentiates between two dimen-
sions; in the first “we see a nearly continuous occurring; in the second, how-
ever, there is only a loose succession of momentary situations, of turning points”
(1973b, 283). What one sees in Langacker’s thinking is an opposition between
perfective and imperfective structures, in English expressed through, respective-
ly, continuous tenses and simple tenses (cf. e.g. Langacker 2009, 5.2.). Ingarden
comments on this type of opposition by quoting Jerzy Kuryłowicz, who stated
that “aorist captures the past in one fell swoop, as if in a way that is point-oriented
and distanced from the present. Imperfect tense on the other hand does it as if
<linearly> presenting processes and events taking place in the past in the entire
course of it happening” (Ingarden 1960, 308–309, footnote 3, transl. APS). The
opposition between continuous and momentary appearance of represented objects
is something described by Ingarden in the context of compression of represented
time; it retains conceptual continuity despite point-like structure in a process in
which “aspects […] are torn, as it were, from the continua which they are transi-
tory phases and […] follow upon one another in sudden leaps” (Ingarden 1973b,
283). It is exactly this trait of temporal course of events in represented time that
is “one of the essential features of literary expressionism” according to Ingar-
den (1973b, 283); arguably that would be also Langacker’s point of view had his
analyses included multi-sentenced texts, especially literary ones.
In Cognitive Grammar the difference between continuity and discreteness of
events taking place in (inter)subjective represented time is described as an effect
of scanning of perceived scenes: summary scanning underlies conceptualization
in which all aspects of the perceived scene seem simultaneous, while sequen-
tial scanning assesses events unfolding through time and undergoing consecutive
transformations. The way in which scanning of perceived scenes occurs obviously
results in specific counterparts on the expression plane. And so beings described
by countable nouns constitute conceptual wholes, sums of perceived aspects; so
do perfective verbs, which present consecutive phases of processes “telescopical-
ly” briefly. Verbal description of an object in turn, due to linear nature of natural
languages, requires an analogue of sequential scanning, similarly to a description
of a process occurring as a progression of successive phases. Thanks to these two
distinct processes of information processing the creators of Cognitive Grammar
40 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
are enabled to justify the conceptual basis for differences between specific gram-
matical structures.
Ingarden’s conception saw organic “internal relationship between strata” and
therefore also a structural “unity of the entire literary work” (Ingarden 1960, 359,
transl. APS) as resulting from features of each individual structural stratum of
literary work of art. In this context it seems instinctual to compare two first strata
of Ingarden’s model with the cognitivist definition of language as an inventory of
semantic, phonological and symbolic structures. Phonology, Ingarden’s “stratum
of verbal sounds”, in Cognitive Grammar is just as “meaningful” as semantics or
syntax. A symbolic structure is defined as bipolar, consisting of (motivated) con-
nection of semantic and phonological pole and is inscribed into the continuum of
lexical and grammatical entities (Langacker 1987, 76 et seq.). Grammar studies
“the syntagmatic combination of morphemes and larger expressions to form pro-
gressively more elaborate symbolic structures. These structures are called gram-
matical constructions. Constructions are therefore symbolically complex, in the
sense of containing two or more symbolic structures as components. There is
no fundamental distinction between morphological and syntactic constructions,
which are fully parallel in all immediately relevant respects” (Langacker 1987,
82).
This concepts appears in newer versions of Langacker’s model of grammar
as the term of baseline (Langacker 2016, 2023), whereas in Ingarden’s delibera-
tions represented objects “themselves require for their own constitution the first
nominal projection of the same objectivities as they were <at the beginning>”
(Ingarden 1973b, 190). The said “beginning” conditions the creation of higher
levels of text organization, defined by Ingarden’s strata c) and d). Schematized
aspects “constitute the skeleton of the concrete aspects” (Ingarden 1973b, 263),
as the literary work is a schematic formation. That is turn means that “at least
some of its strata, especially the objective stratum, contain a series of <places
of indeterminacy>” (Ingarden 1973a, 50). According to Ingarden “we find such
a place of indeterminacy wherever it is impossible, on the basis of the sentences
in the work, to say whether a certain object or objective situation has a certain
attribute” (1973a, 50). It is Langacker’s belief that such an indeterminacy is an
inherent property of grammar of natural languages and correspondingly all texts
and discourses created in them. “Precise, determinate connections between spe-
cific elements represent a special and perhaps unusual case”, writes Langacker.
“It is more common for there to be some vagueness or indeterminacy in regard
to either the elements participating in grammatical relationships or the specific
nature of their connection” (Langacker 2009, 41). In other words, grammar is
in its very nature metonymic, hence indeterminacy is a property shared by all
expressions. Once more it turns out that Ingarden’s thoughts concerning liter-
ary work superimpose on Langacker’s reflections about “language in general”.
For both of the researchers the existence of places of indeterminacy, and thence
metonymy, does not stem from imperfections of language usage, be it in literary
work or in everyday speech, but is simply necessary. “With the finite number of
sentences and – respectively – words comprising the literary work one cannot
41Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
conclusively and fully determine the infinite multitude of properties and states
of individual portrayed objectivities” (Ingarden 1936, 177, transl. APS). In yet
another fragment we can read “however many determinations of a given object
are apprehended up to a given moment, there are always other determinations still
to be apprehended” (Ingarden 1973b, 247). On the plane of linguistic expression
the inability to achieve full cognition signifies the impossibility to say everything
that could be said about a given object (which is one of the principles of general
semantics by Alfred Korzybski; cf. Korzybski 1933, passim; Kaczmarek 2016,
217).
In both of Ingarden’s monographs devoted to literary work he contemplates
the relationship between literary work as an intentional object and the readers,
whose job is to reconstruct the represented world (in the literary work). The rep-
resented objectivities existing in the represented world occupy space which is
neither “real world space, which is unique” (Ingarden 1973b, 222) nor “<imagina-
tional space> which essentially belongs to every intuitive imagining of extensive
objects” (Ingarden 1973b, 223); it is even not “orientational space” devoid of
any reference to “perceiving subject” (Ingarden 1973b, 222–223). It is similar to
“perceptible orientational space” (Ingarden 1973b, 223) known to us from every-
day experience. The prerequisite to orient space means that the beginning of the
reference system lies in the perceiving subject. The orienting is intersubjective
as it is associated with general human understanding of the space in the (real)
world. In non-literary narrations the centre of orientation (the beginning of refer-
ence system) lies usually inside the represented world, whereas in literary work
Ingarden distinguishes other cases known to literature theoreticians (third-person
narration, authorial narration) (1973b, 230–231). Looking for linguistic indica-
tors of reference point orientation Langacker talks about the category of vantage
point (a term, nota bene, also used by Ingarden in the Polish version of the text:
1960, 287; sadly lost in translation in Ingarden 1973b – translator’s note) and
about perspective, two of which constitute foreground parameters (Langacker’s
dimensions) of alternative scene construction (Langacker’s alternate construal).
The very creation of represented spaces (in non-literary narration) is the essence
and raison d’être of the theory of conceptual integration, that is mental spaces
(Fauconnier 1985; Turner 1998). To present it in detail would mean going beyond
the scope of this essay; one must do with just a reminder that conceptual integra-
tion theory describes the meaning creation process as consecutive acts of blending
(amalgamation) of elements bound by meaning (on the level of conceptualization)
in different mental spaces (according to the classic definition “small conceptual
packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and
action” (Fauconnier, Turner 2002, 102), which leads to creation of new mean-
ings (known as emergent structures). Ingarden stated that “while reading literary
work <sentence after sentence> and carrying out in each phase the previously
described, complex operations which provide us with relevant parts of all the
strata of the literary work, the only thing that is directly and vividly present is the
part of the text currently being read; admittedly the other ones (previous ones or
the upcoming ones) do not disappear entirely from the scope of our awareness yet
42 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
they are not vividly present unless appropriate actions on our part are performed”
(1936, 184, transl. APS). That is almost a complete definition of mental space; as
was already said, in cognitivist theory of language “conceptual packets are cre-
ated <on-line> during thought process or discourse in order to grant mutual un-
derstanding to interlocutors and bring about desired actions” (Tabakowska 2010,
596, transl. APS).
The way its proponents ntended it, conceptual integration theory is supposed
to explain the process of creating new meanings (an example of which is meta-
phor); theory of literary work on the other hand is meant to describe the process
of reconstruction of the world portrayed. The advocates of cognitivist theory of
language obviously notice the need to consider the features of the represented
worlds. Langacker finds linguistic correlates of constructs called “virtual reality”
in relation to “the world around us” (1999). Quarter of a century ago he wrote:
“Language tends to be seen primarily as a device for reporting on the nature of
the world around us. This view engenders the default assumption that linguistic
expressions normally refer directly to actual individuals and actual relationships
in which they participate. […] I suggest that departures from the direct description
of ACTUALITY are ubiquitous and fundamental in language. Surprisingly much
of our linguistic effort goes into the description of VIRTUAL entities” (Langacker
1999, 77, emphasis in original). 25 years later he already writes about “levels of
reality”. His definition of reality is now based on “human experience as reflected
in language structure” (Langacker 2023, 12), and dependent on the level of com-
plexity of linguistic expressions he differentiates between different organizational
levels which he calls, just like Ingarden, strata (Langacker 2023, 12). The key to
describe propositions is interactivity (discourse, negotiation of meaning), the ba-
sic theoretical construct being propositional reality differing for the speaker and
the hearer, or being intersubjective (so comprising what is presumably shared for
both members of the communication act) (Langacker 2023, 28). Langacker pre-
sents elements of English grammar which allow for conveying respective types
of reality and for signalling the process of meaning negotiation (e.g. clausal nega-
tion, modal constructions, questions, complementation) but, mutatis mutandis, his
deliberations revolve around (re)construction of the world portrayed, the (inter)
subjective “linguistic image of the world” (cf. ethnolinguistic theory of linguistic
image of the world, e.g Bartmiński 2009, as developed on the ground of cognitive
studies). The material analysed by Langacker includes isolated complex sentenc-
es because of which the represented worlds are small and fragmentary. Ingarden
looks further. If only these two perspectives could be combined…
In Ingarden’s theory “the world of represented objectivities” can always be
accessed “through conceptual schemas” (Ingarden 1960, 221, transl. APS), con-
structs analogues to schematic semantic structures present in Langacker’s model
of grammar. Ingarded also stated that “the represented objects […] do not lie
isolated and alien alongside one another but, thanks to the manifold ontic connec-
tions, unite into a uniform ontic sphere” (1973b, 218); if transported onto a higher
realm of abstraction they could well be Langacker’s domains: “segments of the
world”, conceptually coherent but devoid of clear boundaries (Langacker 1987,
43Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
passim; Ingarden 1960, 218–282). Schematicity which as per Ingarden’s theory is
granted to “the world of represented objects” as opposed to real objects (Ingarden
1960, 319, transl. APS), in Langacker’s theory becomes a ubiquitous quality of
every object of linguistic expression. Every text therefore is schematic, every text
is indeterminate.
It is indeterminacy that in Ingarden’s eyes is the most basic quality of every lit-
erary work of art, a quality thanks to which the possibilities for background-con-
ditioned concretization in literary work are limitless. In concretizations of literary
work, therefore, places of indeterminacy are “filled out”, although not all and not
always in the same way. In Cognitive Grammar the selection of these “fillings” –
subjective or intersubjective – conditions the choice of specific structures in the
process of structuring linguistic images; elements deemed as “more important”
(which can be suggested by e.g. word order in a sentence) have greater salience.
This is exactly the type of salience that Ingarden wrote about: “in experiencing
some of these aspects, the particularly characteristic [element] that expresses the
entire essence of the thing <catches our eye>” (1973b, 282).
Concretization of literary work therefore is also “a schematic entity, albeit
to a lesser degree than the literary work itself” (Ingarden 1936, 165–166, transl.
APS); an entity from Langacker’s model of grammar that has the same effect
is instantiation, linguistic image of higher or smaller (but never highest in the
absolute sense) level of detail. Langacker’s considers instantiation to be one of
levels of imagery, described through the metaphor of fine-grained and coarse-
grained photographic images. His opposition between schema and instantiation
is reflected in Inarden’s writing exactly as concretization of the literary work
(it is worth noting that in Polish Ingarden’s “concretization” and translation of
Langacker’s “instantiation” share the same name – “konkretyzacja”). For reasons
stated above, in neither theory full instantiation/concretization is possible, just
like it is not possible to reduce all types of instantiation/concretization to a com-
mon denominator. The only thing that makes mutual understanding between the
sender (author) and the recipient (reader) possible is the presence of “objective
properties (existing in themselves and pertaining to the given object itself) of
a perceived thing” (Ingarden 1973b, 263). On the other hand, one cannot but
admit the inherently subjective nature of instantiation/concretization. To avoid
more or less radical relativism, both theories make use of the term “intersubjectiv-
ity” and the “objective” structure of common knowledge about the world which,
in Ingarden’s words, forces or imposes such and no other aspects (1973a, 60).
The “forcing” in question is significantly conditioned by Aristotelian “nature of
things” and pragmatic factors (environmental, historical, social, psychological),
a fact underlined also by linguistic cognitivism which refers to the rule of using
statistical methods to study intersubjectivity (in everyday language the principle
of “forcing aspects” is included in e.g. the saying “when you hear hoofbeats, think
horses, not zebras”). When writing about literary works which bring about certain
aspects, and therefore are not “lifeless”, Ingarden states that “the reader is bound
by the text to a much greater degree than in the case of works that are lifeless in
this regard. He is under the power of the various sorts of aspects which are forced
44 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
upon him; and, the more he succumbs to them, the more vividly, distinctly, and
fully the portrayed world appears to him” (1973a, 61). This quote could easily be
mistaken for Langacker’s words, just as could the statement that when confronted
with indeterminacy “the reader becomes to a certain extent a co-creator of the
literary work” (Ingarden 1936, 173, transl. APS)
Relations between literary work in “schematic formation”, as such being “an
intersubjective being on the one hand, and a monosubjective (individual) concept
of the author and the recipient on the other”, highlight the importance of “creative
individuals”. It is an issue discussed by Zygmunt Łempicki in his review (1938)
of Ingarden’s groundbreaking article (1936); Łempicki “translates” the shift from
mono- to inter-subjectivism as objectification, to use “terminology from different
philosophy”, which means a process of creating or re-creating certain objects “to
cognize them anew when they are created as <ready>, to intentionally transform
them at times in this process of cognition and then to succumb to them in aesthetic
perception, again in a rather receiving manner” (Łempicki in: Ingarden 1936, 175,
all transl. from Łempicki by APS).
When writing about aesthetic perception Ingarden has in mind the reader’s
perception of a literary text as a work of art. Transposition of his theories onto
the plane of linguistic expressions traditionally defined as “non-literary” seems
to be a daunting task at best. And yet the rule, accepted by both the creators and
promoters of linguistic cognitivism, stating that every conscious use of language
is intentional thus is intrinsically connected with the subject of (per)ception al-
lows for the traditional line between “literature” and “non-literature” to disap-
pear. Cognitivists’ “inclinations” towards “literaturization” of discourse (cf. e.g.
Mitosek 1999), deemed as postmodern, usually apply to academic discourse (cf.
e.g. Ulicka 2007); in the context of this essay it may be worth taking a closer look
at the attempts to view literature (especially poetry) through the lens of cognitiv-
ist theory of language. One of pioneering works on this topic is Peter Stockwell’s
monograph Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction (2002/2020), already a classic.
Ingarden’s theory of operationalization of literariness underlined by Mitosek as
achieved “by imparting a subject-object character of interaction to it” (1999, 85,
transl. APS) is of course one of fundamental rules among cognitivists as well. To
Ingarden the relationship between strata constituting the multistratal construction
of literary work includes the sphere of a “meeting between a certain object and
a certain subject who is experiencing it” (Ingarden 1970, 9, transl. APS). The
abovementioned “experiencing” appears at times in linguists’ deliberations about
language of emotions and ways of expressing them (cf. e.g. Kövecses 2020).
Emotions – especially the aesthetic ones – are not, however, the sole object of
analyses. In cognitive poetics a breakthrough in this area was achieved by an
American cognitivist and a scholar of poetry Margaret Freeman for whom ex-
periencing “a poem as an icon” means simulation of an actual communion with
the portrayed world (Freeman 2020). To frame Freeman’s thesis into Ingarden’s
words, the reader of a poem is “dealing with a unique, live quasi-reality” (Ingar-
den 1973b, 277). Its “palpability, strict individuality, vibrancy, its <embodiment>
of sorts” manifest themselves in actualization of text; “one should say that a spe-
45Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics
cial form of <imagining> exists, making these objects present” (Ingarden 1936,
185, transl. APS). “In active reading of literary work”, writes Ingarden “we must
fake all of these changes in the represented world, petrify them and become wit-
nesses of sorts of what is and what is happening in the world portrayed” (1936,
174, transl. APS) – speaking Margaret Freeman’s language, it is a first step to-
wards literary work becoming an icon of an experience.
When carefully reading Peter Stockwell’s monograph (2002), a book that was
groundbreaking at the time of its creation, one has no choice but to agree with
Zofia Mitosek when she writes “as a matter of fact each modern notion concern-
ing speech and literature is supported by something in Ingarden’s writings” (1999,
89, transl. APS). And conversely. Cognitivist theory of language is no exception.
III. Conclusions
The best summary of the above reections will be a quote from the already men-
tioned text by Zoa Mitosek: “Ingarden’s most important book The Literary Work
of Art turned out to be a text concerning structures of all linguistic expressions”
(1999, 85, transl. APS). This statement, however, has raison d’être only in the
context of cognitivist theory of language of today. As opposed to traditional struc-
turalism, its main premise is that every expression/text is schematic and (inter)
subjective, and each instantiation is by denition incomplete. Ingarden believed
language to be subordinate to the eects of cognition; Langacker writes that cog-
nitive processes lie at the very core of it. Both researchers think the cognitive
process takes place in interplay between the object and consciousness. Those
studying Ingarden’s writings praise him for the postulate of “schematic” character
of literary work; schematicity of language structures is the cornerstone of Lan-
gacker’s theory of language.
Ingarden’s considerations circle around theory of language, not theory of
grammar. And yet some of his statements read as if they were not penned by
him, but typed by Langacker “we do remove, by the addition of […] attributive
expressions, certain spots of indeterminacy; but an infinite number still remains
to be removed. They would disappear only in an infinite series of determinations”
(Ingarden 1973b, 249).
Even though they systematically dismissed sentential grammar, rarely did
Langacker and his followers venture outside the realms of (English) (complex)
sentence. The principle of interactivity prompts them, however, to enter more and
more frequently onto the territory previously reserved for ill-defined “pragmat-
ics”; newer texts concerned with Cognitive Grammar tend to show a growing
interest in pragmatic circumstances of discourse (cf. e.g. Langacker 2016, 2023).
Ingarden writes that by performing the act of concretization, an effect of
which is an aesthetic object, the recipient of the work of art enters quasi-reality
– “virtual reality” from Langacker’s texts. Aesthetic experience from Freeman’s
monograph is perhaps granted to – albeit to a lesser extent – empathic discourses
of “average Joes”. That would be yet another step on the road to postmodern
“literaturization” of linguistic reflection. One might wonder whether intensity of
46 ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
“aesthetic experience” could not be of use to two groups: to literature theoreti-
cians to operationalize “literariness”, and to linguists to describe its determinants.
It would be worthwhile then to familiarize oneself with Ingarden’s writings. On
the other hand, deeper knowledge of Ingarden’s phenomenological thought might
enrich cognitivist reflection with philosophical foundation, a lack of which has
sometimes been pointed out by those criticizing cognitive approach in modern
linguistics.
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