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Dmitri Teperik
LOCAL POPULISTS
OR RUSSIAN AGENTS
OF INFLUENCE?
The strength of pro-Kremlin
inuence in the Baltics
2
Local populists or Russian agents of influence?
Main theses
1. Using divisive narratives in their political communication and spreading anti-establishment
messages, populist parties are empowering threats to democracy in the Baltics, which
continue to be targeted by pro-Russian malign inuence, albeit of a less visible nature.
2. Visible Russian interference in the Baltic information space has decreased since 2022, as
the countries have gradually improved countermeasures against malicious disinformation
in the public sphere.
3. Some groups of ethno-linguistic minorities (especially among Russian speakers1) in the
Baltics were instrumentalised by pro-Kremlin actors and became vulnerable communities
on sensitive issues of language, religion and culture.
4. The populist rhetoric of some domestic parties (e.g. EKRE in Estonia, LPV in Latvia, and Dawn
of Nemunas in Lithuania) in the Baltics is sometimes thematically aligned with pro-Kremlin
narratives, but this is rather marginal as the mainstream political consensus remains
strongly pro-Western and oriented towards national security.
Introduction
Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has prompted a new series of defensive measu-
res aimed at neutralising or reducing Moscow’s malign inuence across a range of domains
in the Baltics, including culture, education, the economy, energy, the public environment
and communications. Although the process of “de-russication”, as part of a broader strate-
gy of de-occupation and westernisation, has been underway in the Baltic states for several
decades since the restoration of independence, its implementation has not been uniform,
with varying degrees of success in dierent areas. Given the extensive documentation and
study of Kremlin interference in the domestic aairs of the Baltics, Russia’s advancement of
information warfare in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been constrained, though it has
targeted specic ethnolinguistic or professional groups within these societies.2
The war waged by Russia against Ukraine has rendered almost all matters pertaining
to Russia increasingly toxic, thereby accelerating the development and implementation of
a range of restrictions within the information environment, in addition to the economic
sanctions. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has been developing and actively coordinating plans
to maintain its inuence in all three Baltic countries.3 As countermeasures for foreign in-
formation manipulation and interference in the Baltics have made it more challenging for
Russia to conduct its overt large-scale disinformation campaigns, the limited amount of
inuence may still be present in other forms, including public discourse that features some
ambiguous narratives that align with the pro-Kremlin agenda. By fostering polarisation
1 As of 2024, around 37% of Latvia’s population are non-ethnic Latvians, 32% of Estonia’s population are non-ethnic
Estonians, and of 15% Lithuania’s population are non-ethnic Lithuanians.
2 Monika Hanley, Disinformation Landscape in Latvia, EU Disinfo Lab, September 2023. www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2023/09/20230919_LV_DisinfoFS.pdf
3 Indrė Makaraitytė et al., Secret Kremlin document reveals Russia’s plans for Baltic states, LRT, 01.05.2023. www.lrt.lt/
en/news-in-english/19/1973471/secret-kremlin-document-reveals-russia-s-plans-for-baltic-states-lrt-investigation
3
Local populists or Russian agents of influence?
and echoing pro-Kremlin messages, some political parties oen exploit anti-establishment
sentiment to promote authoritarian ideologies, thereby strengthening Russia’s geopolitical
ambitions and jeopardising the democratic values upheld by the European Union.
To gain insight into the reasons behind the resemblance between some political rhetoric
and the Kremlin agenda, and to demonstrate how the visible part of pro-Kremlin inuence
adapts to new circumstances, it is helpful to consider below a number of illustrative cases
from the Baltic states.
Estonia
The Church
The Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate represents one of the most si-
gnicant organisations with a direct connection to Russia’s geopolitical and ideological am-
bitions. Consequently, it is well-positioned to disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives among
its followers. In May 2024, the Estonian Parliament – Riigikogu – designated the Moscow
Patriarchate as an entity that supports military aggression.4 The Estonian Orthodox Church
of the Moscow Patriarchate comprises 35 congregations in Estonia, each of which is registe-
red as an independent legal entity. Nevertheless, as a result of the canonical connection be-
tween the Church and the Moscow Patriarchate, all congregations are considered to be part
of a unied whole, with strict canonical subordination. In light of the religious sensitivity
surrounding this issue, the Estonian Ministry of the Interior has initiated the amendment
of the Law on Churches and Congregations with the aim of completely separating the Esto-
nian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate, both canonically and legally. This is
in accordance with the state’s obligation to protect the Estonian population from the inu-
ences of hostile regimes. The public debate has elicited a multitude of adverse responses
from the local Russian-speaking population of Estonia, who have disseminated messages
pertaining to the “persecution of Orthodox believers in Estonia” and the infringement of
the right to freedom of religion.
Politicians
An in-depth review of the communications and programmes of the mainstream Estonian
political parties reveals no evidence of direct pro-Russian rhetoric. Nevertheless, there are
instances when certain political views and statements lend themselves sometimes to pro
-Kremlin narratives. To illustrate, the anti-Ukrainian, anti-liberal and Eurosceptic agenda
of the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE, Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond)
contributes to Russia-promoted narratives that seek to weaken the European Union, exert
control over Ukraine and establish Russia as a defender of “traditional values”. Following
the 2024 European Parliament election, EKRE experienced a schism, resulting in the expul-
sion of several parliamentarians from the party. As of autumn 2024, EKRE has 11 national
MPs out of 101 and no MEPs. Furthermore, the party’s public rating has decreased over the
past year, reaching approximately 12% in Autumn 2024.
Furthermore, there has been an illustration of protest voting for a candidate who has
been accused by counterintelligence services of engaging in activities that are detrimental
4 Riigitetaja, www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/308052024001, Moscow Patriarchate declared an institution supporting the
military aggression of the Russian Federation, 6 May 2024
4
Local populists or Russian agents of influence?
to Estonia. In 2023, Aivo Peterson, the leader of the marginal party “Together” (Koos/
Вместе), was detained and charged with treason by the State Prosecutor’s Oce of Estonia.
However, as there is no nal court decision, the party was permitted to stand in the Europe-
an Parliament elections, with its overall result being 3%. The party’s political programme is
characterised by a Russophilic orientation, a non-interventionist stance and opposition to
NATO. Despite its relatively low national rating, the main concern relates to the municipal
elections scheduled for October 2025, as in some Russian-speaking local communities it
may garner more support than anticipated.5
Latvia
Culture and media
Russia has been engaged in the strategic projection of its so power through the mediums
of culture, education and the media sphere for several decades. For instance, the Russian
Cultural Centre in Latvia has long been associated with the promotion of the Russian lan-
guage and culture within the country’s Russian-speaking community. However, it has also
been perceived as a platform for the dissemination of pro-Russian narratives, particularly
in relation to the defence of the Russian language in Latvia and the critique of Latvian poli-
cies that restrict the use of the Russian language in education and media. Similarly, the cul-
tural issue is a highly sensitive topic for many local Russian speakers, who have expressed
a growing sense of injustice and oence at the actions of the Latvian state.6 Depending on
one’s political views and previous experience of social integration, some of the claims may
be seen as fully or partially justied, or completely unreasonable. The potential elimination
of Russian-language public broadcasting in Latvia could have signicant implications for
the country’s social cohesion, crisis communication, and ability to counter pro-Kremlin
disinformation campaigns.7
Notwithstanding the ocial prohibition, Russian state media channels, a number of
portals (e.g. Baltnews, Baltija and IMHOclub) and analogous outlets persist in dissemina-
ting pro-Russian narratives online, particularly on social media via YouTube, a multitude
of Telegram groups and Facebook communities, as well as through proxy websites. These
channels and groups have continued to disseminate disinformation regarding the war in
Ukraine, challenging the legitimacy of Ukrainian sovereignty and promoting anti-Western
sentiment. Similar channels and groups with pro-Kremlin content are active also in Estonia
and Lithuania. As previously suggested, the inuence of long-term Russian propaganda is
reected in the fragmentation of Latvian society over important topics.
5 KOOS leader Ivanov threatens, “We will create a Popular Front to protect Russians in Estonia!”, Propastop blog, 15.11.2024.
www.propastop.org/eng/2024/11/15/koos-leader-ivanov-threatens-we-will-create-a-popular-front-to-protect-russians-
in-estonia
6 Anchal Vohra. Latvia Is Going on Oense Against Russian Culture. The Baltic nation is taking cultural cohesion into
its own hands—and risking backlash. Foreign Policy, 21.03.2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/21/latvia-is-going-
on-oense-against-russian-culture
7 International media organizations extremely concerned by Latvian proposal to ban Russian-language content on
PSM from 2026, Press release, European Broadcasting Union, 06.10.2023. www.ebu.ch/news/2023/10/international-
media-organizations-extremely-concerned-by-latvian-proposal-to-ban-russian-language-content-on-psm-from-2026
5
Local populists or Russian agents of influence?
Politicians
The national-conservative and right-wing populist political party LPV – Latvia First (Latvija
Pirmajā Vieta) has been in opposition since 2023. As of autumn 2024, the party has nine
members of parliament out of 100 and one member of the European Parliament. At the end
of 2024 it enjoyed the support of more than 10% of voters.
Similarly to the EKRE case, LPV does not disseminate direct pro-Kremlin disinformation.
However, it does employ rhetoric that occasionally aligns with the hostile narratives of an
anti-liberal and anti-European agenda. As previously noted, LPV has expressed support for
a more nuanced approach to sanctions against Russia, with the objective of maintaining
some economic activity across the border. Furthermore, an earlier investigation revealed
the existence of a network of information manipulators who were aliated with the party
and its leader, Ainārs Šlesers.8
Some pro-Russian sentiment in other political movements (e.g. the Harmony Party and
Latvian Russian Union) is represented mostly in the form of greater protection of minority
rights, including the use of the Russian language. This has been a particularly resonant issue
for many in the Russian-speaking community of Latvia. It would be erroneous to assume
that these parties are directly involved in pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns. However,
they are oen perceived as platforms that serve to amplify pro-Russian sentiment within
Latvia. Nevertheless, Ms. Tatjana Ždanoka, a former Member of the European Parliament
and a member of the Latvian Russian Union, espoused political views that have been sym-
pathetic to Russian policies in Europe and the Baltics in particular. In 2024, she was accused
by the media of being a Russian intelligence agent since at least 2004.9
Lithuania
Minorities
The war in Ukraine has contributed to the emergence of a stronger anti-Russian sentiment,
which has, in turn, led to some instances of ethnic prejudice against Russian-speaking in-
dividuals in Lithuania. Furthermore, the loyalties of Russian speakers are frequently called
into question by certain politicians who associate them with the Kremlin’s policies.10 The
local Russian-speaking minority constitutes a signicant proportion of the population in
locations such as Vilnius, Klaipėda and Visaginas. In the context of the recent Russian full
-scale invasion of Ukraine, the community has expressed concerns regarding the treatment
of local Russian-speaking individuals and has, on occasion, lobbied for enhanced rights
and cultural recognition. Over the past six years, tens of thousands of Russian-speaking
migrants have arrived in Lithuania from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. This has led to an
increase in the use of the Russian language, which has caused some irritation among the
country’s ethnic Lithuanian population. On the other hand, given the securitisation of the
8 Who are the main disinformation spreaders in Latvia and how do they support themselves?, Re:Baltica, 09.12.2021.
https://en.rebaltica.lv/2021/12/who-are-the-main-disinformation-spreaders-in-latvia-and-how-do-they-support-
themselves
9 Roman Dobrokhotov, Michael Weiss and Christo Grozev. Exclusive: Latvian Member of European Parliament is an
agent of Russian intelligence, leaked emails conrm, The Insider, 29.01.2024. https://theins.ru/en/politics/268694
10 Domantė Platūkytė, Lithuania’s Russian speakers hesitant to use their language in public amid pressure to prove
loyalty, LRT, 13.12.2023. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2148591/lithuania-s-russian-speakers-hesitant-to-
use-their-language-in-public-amid-pressure-to-prove-loyalty
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Local populists or Russian agents of influence?
Russian language and culture in the Baltics, expressing views exaggerating the problems
of the Russian speakers may be perceived as aligning with Moscow’s rhetoric, particularly
with regard to historical memory and geopolitical orientation.
Politicians
The promotion of anti-government sentiment constituted a signicant element of the oper-
ational agenda pursued by the Kremlin-aligned media and some forces in Lithuania during
the summer and autumn months of 2024. The results of the recent parliamentary elections
in Lithuania saw a populist party, Dawn of Nemunas (Nemuno Aušra), secure 20 seats in the
Seimas out of a total of 141. The Social Democratic Party of Lithuania has extended an invi-
tation to this party to become part of the ruling coalition and to nominate their candidates
for three ministers. Despite the president of Lithuania’s assertion that he will not conrm
the candidates from the Dawn of Nemunas, the manner in which the coalition will address
this situation was condently dynamic. The Dawn of Nemunas is not a party with an open
pro-Russian agenda. However, its leader, Remigijus Žemaitaitis, espouses nationalistic and
Eurosceptic views and has employed hate speech on some occasions in the past. Moreover,
he also declared his willingness to cooperate with the Lukashenka regime in Belarus.
The Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga) holds
eight of the 141 seats in the national parliament and one seat in the European Parliament.
The representatives of this political party have articulated signicant concerns regarding
the severity of sanctions imposed on Russia and have highlighted the potential economic
implications for Lithuania. Their statements have, on occasion, been aligned with Russian
narratives emphasising the advantages of maintaining economic ties with Moscow. It is
worth noting that the leader of the party, Ramūnas Karbauskis, had some business ties in
Russia and Belarus that could be perceived as excessive.11
Conclusions
Governments and various organizations in the Baltic states have been actively investigating
and countering pro-Russian disinformation, particularly since Moscow’s military aggres-
sion against Ukraine in 2014. While the national governments and most of the mainstream
political entities and elites strongly support NATO and the EU, there are still some actors
that have been promoting pro-Russian narratives or spreading Kremlin-backed disinforma-
tion. The main focus of these campaigns has been issues concerning the Orthodox religion
and language rights; minority concerns; liing sanctions and re-establishing economic
ties with Russia; an anti-Ukrainian agenda; and “traditional” and “national” values, etc. Ne-
vertheless, open sympathy for Russia or the promotion of pro-Kremlin positions has been
more visibly marginalized since 2022 as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are largely united in
their support for Ukraine and strong pro-Western policies.
Far-right and far-le parties in the Baltics continue to occupy a rather marginal position
within the political landscapes of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Yet they remain visible
and vocal actors within the political sphere, and their anti-establishment, Eurosceptic and
populistic rhetoric aligns with some ideological points seen in pro-Kremlin narratives.
11 Agota Beresnevičiūtė. Karbauskio „valstiečių“ skandalai: nuo seksualinio priekabiavimo ir pandemijos kuriozų, TV3,
04.10.2024. https://www.tv3.lt/naujiena/lietuva/karbauskio-valstieciu-skandalai-nuo-seksualinio-priekabiavimo-
ir-pandemijos-kuriozu-n1368671
Local populists or Russian agents of influence?
The phenomenon of political polarisation is discernible in all three Baltic states. Howe-
ver, it does not currently pose an imminent threat to the democratic governance of the-
se countries. Nevertheless, the potential for socio-economic challenges and decreasing
wellbeing to provoke a sense of dissatisfaction and insecurity among the Baltic popula-
tions should not be overlooked, as this could be exploited by both domestic populists and
pro-Kremlin actors.
ANNEX
According to GLOBSEC Trends 2024,12 a majority of Estonians (83%), Latvians (80%) and
Lithuanians (74%) believe that liberal democracy is a system of governance that protects
individual rights and freedoms. However, a mere 54% of Estonians, 50% of Latvians and
49% of Lithuanians expressed satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their re-
spective countries. Furthermore, 58% of Estonians, 50% of Lithuanians and 32% of Latvi-
ans perceive far-right nationalists as a threat to their identity and values. This suggests that
the public in Estonia and Lithuania are more concerned about the inuence of far-right
political movements than those in Latvia.
In addition to perceived threats in the domestic political landscape, Russia is regarded
as a security risk by the majority of residents in the Baltic states. In Lithuania 82% of re-
spondents, in Estonia 71% and in Latvia 70% viewed Russia as a potential threat in 2024. It
is noteworthy that only 9% of Estonians, 8% of Latvians and 2% of Lithuanians considered
Russia as a potential strategic partner for their country. The signicant discrepancies in
Lithuanian perceptions, on the one hand, and those in Estonia and Latvia on the other,
suggest the probable inuence of local ethnolinguistic minorities. The proportion of this
group is larger in these last two countries, which have been targeted by pro-Kremlin disin-
formation campaigns.
Dmitri Teperik is Co-founder and Director of National Centre of Defence & Security Awareness
based in Estonia.
12 GLOBSEC Trends 2024, https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/les/2024-05/GLOBSEC%20TRENDS%202024.pdf
Edited by Adam Balcer
Proofreading: Niall Gray
ISBN 978-83-7893-357-1
DTP: Dolasu