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PEACE &
SECURITY
MONITOR
T H E
Issue 1
June 2024
The Indo-Pacific
peacehumanity.org
Project Coordinator
Aparimita Pandey
Editors
Chris Fitzgerald
Aparimita Pandey
Authors
Chris Fitzgerald
Robert Sutton
Ramsha Ali
Marion Musengy’a
Vittoria Cateni
Ojus Tyagi
Noor Afrose
Muhammad Reza Zaini
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
All rights reserved
© Platform for Peace and Humanity, 2024
Cover Photo: Oro Oro Ombo, Indonesia (2018), Ifan Bima
Table of contents
Disaster zone: Analysing the humanitarian response to the landslides in
Papua New Guinea...................................................................................................................................5
Chris Fitzgerald
Impacts of intensifying violence on civilians in West Papua............................................11
Robert Sutton
Analysing the rise of militancy in Pakistan................................................................................18
Ramsha Ali
Hong Kong's new security law and its impact on Hongkongers...................................25
Esm’eralda Marion
Forgotten crisis: The realities of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh...........................32
Vittoria Cateni
Sri Lanka's humanitarian crisis: An unfolding tragedy.......................................................39
Ojus Tyagi
The impact of Myanmar's mandatory conscription law on the country's
humanitarian crisis................................................................................................................................44
Noor Afrose
Downstreaming policy: The root cause of Indigenous clashes in
Indonesia’s Southeast Sulawesi Province..................................................................................50
Muhammad Reza Zaini
Issue 1 June 2024
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
The Indo-Pacific
Foreword
Thank you for taking the time to read the first issue of the Indo-Pacific
programme’s Peace and Security Monitor. The Indo-Pacific region is the most
dynamic and fasted-growing region in the world, home to the half the world’s
population and a myriad of peoples, faiths and political systems. This brings with
it complex human rights, humanitarian and geopolitical challenges, and the
ever-present threat of conflict. These issues will be the focus of this issue and the
many issues to come.
This issue begins with an analysis of the devastating landslides in Papua New
Guinea, which have raised questions about how best to help PNG deal with
natural disasters in a changing climate. The team also shines a light on ongoing
violence in West Papua, with a focus on abuses committed by Indonesian
security forces against civilians and a culture of impunity that needs to be
confronted by Jakarta.
Beijing continues to restrict freedom of speech, assembly and expression in Hong
Kong through its national security law and recent rollout of controversial Article
23, a thinly veiled attempt to crackdown on foreign influence. In the Philippines,
the Marcos Jr administration has not kept its promise to take a new approach to
the country’s decade-long drug war, with hundreds of Filipinos killed in anti-drug
operations and vigilante violence since Marcos’ inauguration in 2022.
In South Asia, Pakistan is dealing with a spike in terror attacks that have killed
scores of civilians and military personnel. The problem is the Taliban in
Afghanistan, who are actively supporting groups driven to destabilise Pakistan.
Both parties need to avoid aggression and find a mutually beneficial way of
tackling Islamic extremism. The team also takes a deep dive into the ongoing
humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and the insidious problem of sexual violence
against women and girls in India.
The Indo-Pacific
Issue 1 June 2024
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Key takeaways
Papua New Guinea has been devasted by its
latest natural disaster, with landslides killing
thousands and leaving more homeless and
lacking food, water and electricity.
The crisis threatens to get worse, with the
United Nations warning disease is spreading
due to a lack of clean drinking water and
few medical supplies reaching the region. A
rapid humanitarian response is crucial to
avoid the situation getting worse.
The landslides have again shown how the
country lacks the ability to prevent or
adequately deal with natural disasters,
relying on the international community to
provide aid and disaster relief.
Papua New Guinea needs help from its
neighbours, particularly Australia and New
Zealand, to develop adequate disaster
response mechanisms and to build
infrastructure that is not susceptible, or less
so, to natural disasters.
Introduction
Papua New Guinea (PNG) cannot catch a
break. Landslides in Maip-Mulitaka in Enga
province have destroyed homes and livelihoods
and lives have been lost. It is estimated that
more than 600 people out of 70,000 people
living in the area were killed.[1] The government
in Port Moresby and PNG’s neighbours have
scrambled to respond, but the survivors now live
in a disaster zone and face weeks of recovery
efforts and natural and man-made
impediments to humanitarian relief. This reflects
a trend in PNG, where the occurrence of
national disasters is commonplace and where
the country level of development, lack of
infrastructure and dysfunctional government
prevent adequate disaster relief operations. For
these reasons, this article will analyse the
humanitarian response from the government,
neighbouring countries and international aid
organisations to determine whether enough is
being done to solve this latest crisis and
whether lessons can be learned to properly
deal with the inevitable next one natural
disaster in PNG.
An Australian Aid delivers humanitarian assistance to PNG (AFP,
2024)
The landslide
A massive landslide hit several villages in PNG’s
highlands in Enga province in the early hours of
the morning on Friday 24 May. The region is 600
kilometres north of the capital Port Moresby.[i]
At the time, Al Jazeera reported that “authorities
say the scale of the landslide is massive” while
the governor of Enga province, Peter Ipatas told
media there was “loss of life and property”.[2]
Disaster zone: Analysing the humanitarian response to the
landslides in Papua New Guinea
Chris Fitzgerald
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
5
While there were initial fears the death toll would
be in the thousands, the PNG government has
revised its death toll to 670 people but there are
many still unaccounted for under the mud and
rubble. But, like all natural disasters, the effects
are far wider reaching, with an estimated 7,800
homeless and warnings over the outbreak of
disease due to a lack of clean water.[3] PNG
authorities claim up to 8,000 people might need
to be evacuated as boulders, earth and trees
become unstable and threaten to cause more
damage further down the hill where there are
more villages.[4] The level of destruction was
confirmed by an unnamed official from the PNG
national disaster centre, who stated the landslide
had ”caused major destruction to buildings, food
gardens and caused major impact on the
economic lifeline of the country”.[5]
The humanitarian response
Australia and New Zealand have been the
quickest to respond to the PNG landslides, with
Australia pledging an initial $2.5 million in
humanitarian assistance and by sending
technical experts to provide “incident
management assistance, support geohazard
assessments and to assist early recovery efforts.”
Canberra has also provided emergency relief
supplies in the form of shelters, hygiene kits and
specific supports for women and children.[6] In
response to the landslides, the Deputy Prime
Minister Richard Marles stated that “as a close
neighbour and friend, we will be doing all we can
to provide support” to PNG and that “Australia’s
Defence Force is working closely with the PNG
Defence Force to assist with the response. This
work is yet another demonstration of the close
partnership between our nations and militaries”.
[7] In a similar vein, Australia’s Minister for
International Development, Pat Conroy, stated on
27 May that “we will continue to work closely with
humanitarian partners and the government of
Papua New Guinea to support response and
recovery efforts.”[8]
New Zealand has responded in a similar manner,
pledging $1.5 million in assistance, including the
deployment of a C-130 aircraft to deliver aid to
affected areas and sending emergency
management teams to assist people already
at work on the ground.[9] New Zealand’s
Foreign Minister, Winston Peters told local
media on 28 May that “ever since learning of
the horrendous landslide on Friday, New
Zealand has been determined to play our part
in assisting Papua New Guinea’s response” and
that “we are ready to go and provide support
to PNG authorities when they are able to
receive it.”[10] This is not a surprise, with
Australia and New Zealand having a long
history of assisting PNG with disaster relief and
developmental assistance since its
independence in 1975.
The aftermath of a massive landslide that claimed lives in
Yambali and Kaundak wards (World Vision, 2024).
New Zealand has responded in a similar
manner, pledging $1.5 million in assistance,
including the deployment of a C-130 aircraft to
deliver aid to affected areas and sending
emergency management teams to assist
people already at work on the ground.[11] New
Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Winston Peters told
local media on 28 May that “ever since learning
of the horrendous landslide on Friday, New
Zealand has been determined to play our part
in assisting Papua New Guinea’s response” and
that “we are ready to go and provide support
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
6
to PNG authorities when they are able to receive
it.”[12] This is not a surprise, with Australia and
New Zealand having a long history of assisting
PNG with disaster relief and developmental
assistance since its independence in 1975.
The United Nations and international aid
organisations have also responded and quickly.
The UN Resident Coordinator for PNG, Richard
Howard, is on the ground working with local
rescue teams while the Chief of Mission in PNG
for the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), Serhan Aktoprak, is reportedly working
with local leadership.[13] All UN agencies,
including IOM, UNICEF, the United Nations
Development Programme, UN Population Fund
and UN Women have begun to provide relief
supplies, dignity and emergency health kits and
tents to effected communities.[14] UNICEF
representative Angela Kearney has told media
that “we are working closely with Papua New
Guinean authorities and community
organisations to provide vital support to survivors
of this terrible disaster.”[15]
Closer to home, the PNG government has been
criticised for what have called a slow response
to the disaster. Opposition politicians have
accused Prime Minister James Marape and his
government of focusing on political survival,
rather than an appropriate response to the
landslides. This is due to Marape languishing in
the polls and dealing with 18 MPs defecting to the
opposition in the week after the landslides.[16]
The Marape government narrowly survived a
motion of no confidence in the PNG parliament in
the first week of June, which was only prevented
by an apparent paperwork error.[17] PNG politics
is notorious for being chaotic in nature and
disaster relief for communities in Enga is
undeniably affected by political distractions in
Port Moresby. Marape did visit Enga at the end of
May, declaring he was determined for the
government to help in the recovery effort and
that "we will do our utmost to fast-track relief
work and ensure relief work goes on."[18]
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
7
What needs to be done?
PNG is vulnerable to natural disasters because
of its location, topography and climate. The
country’s mountainous terrain makes rural
areas isolated and without quality
infrastructure, and its high rainfall throughout
the year leaves it susceptible to landslides. This
was evident only last March and April, when
landslides killed 21 and 14 people respectively.
[19] This intersects with PNG’s high level of
seismic activity, which leads to regular
earthquakes, and its location in the path of
cyclones. In March, a 6.9 magnitude earthquake
hit East Sepik province, killing three people and
destroying 1,000 homes.[20] Both make
landslides more likely and cause damage to
infrastructure and makes landslides more likely.
[21] Like other developing countries, this has
been exacerbated and will continue to worsen
with the impacts of climate change. Making
matters worse, PNG is reliant on mining to drive
its economy, which had led to environmental
degradation and, along with heavy rains, has
seen increase in landslides in areas close to
mining operations. The landslide in Enga was in
close proximity to a gold mine operated by
Barrick Gold.[22]
The ongoing problem for PNG is two-fold, with
the country one of the most disaster prone in
the world but one of the least capable to deal
The aftermath of landslides in PNG in March 2024 (Al Jazeera,
2024).
with disasters from a prevention, resilience and
disaster preparedness perspective. PNG remains
a poor country with poor infrastructure,
particularly in rural areas, and its government
doesn’t have the interest or capability to solve
these problems. This has brought a decades
long reliance on aid for development and
disaster relief, particularly from neighbours
Australia and New Zealand, who are obliged to
respond after the inevitable and all too common
natural disaster in PNG. The solution then is for
the Australia, New Zealand and the wider
international community to do more to help PNG.
The first way of doing so is increasing
developmental assistance with a focus on
improving regional and rural infrastructure, like
paved roads and bridges, to enable local and
international relief efforts to access disaster
zones more easily. The Australian Infrastructure
Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) is a good
example of this as it is designed to respond to
critical infrastructure needs in PNG. In welcome
news the Australian Government committed $1
billion in funding for the AIFFP and it I crucial that
these funds go towards improving access to
isolated communities throughout PNG.[23]
Images from the disaster zone posted on social media (Al Jazeera,
2024).
On top of this, Australian and New Zealand
governments and the wider international
community need to provide adequate funding
for disaster resilience and preparedness to
enable local authorities to respond to natural
disasters quickly and effectively and lessen the
country’s reliance on international assistance
every time there is a disaster, which is often. The
problem is both Australia and New Zealand have
lowered their international aid budgets. New
Zealand’s 2024 budget revealed that aid
spending is in track to fall below $1 billion by
2026-27, only 0.2 per cent of GDP.[24] Australia
is no different, with its aid commitment projected
to stagnate for a decade, stalling at almost $5
billion per year until 2035.[25] While both
countries are happy to reactively fund aid and
disaster relief efforts when disasters occur, the
cutting of aid at a time when PNG needs long-
term solutions is counterproductive. This strategy
will not solve the underlying problems of PNG’s
vulnerability to natural disasters and will only
result in costlier and more common relief efforts.
Conclusion
Because of its geography, climate and poor level
of development, PNG has always been
vulnerable to natural disasters and a changing
climate will only make these events more
common over the coming decades. The
response to the deadly landslides in Enga by
neighbouring countries and UN agencies has
been quick and admirable, but it has revealed a
number of challenges and obscures the larger
problem of needing longer term solutions to
natural disasters in PNG. The PNG governments
political distractions have undeniably delayed
local relief efforts to affected areas and the
country’s poor infrastructure has made it difficult
for any local or international assistance to reach
affected areas. The best solution is to ensure
PNG is properly equipped to both prevent and
deal with natural disasters and this will only
come with more development funding from
Australia, New Zealand and the wider
international community. Australia in particular
has a proud history of helping PNG in times of
need and its reduction in aid is a betrayal of that
history. It is crucial that all parties help PNG
develop to an extent that it can stand on its own
and deal with these problems without relying on
outside help, which only delays delivery efforts
and costs lives and livelihoods.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
8
Policy recommendations
Australia and New Zealand need to increase
aid funding, including to PNG, rather than
following the global trend of decreasing. PNG
and the wider region is reliant on aid to
develop, and climate change only makes this
need more pressing. Both countries need to
show leadership and help PNG develop and
build resilience to natural disasters.
PNG needs assistance to help solve and
mitigate against the specific problems it
faces, namely earthquakes and landslides.
This is best addressed through a focus on
improving infrastructure for regional and
isolated communities and improving the
country’s disaster preparedness and
resilience for when disasters inevitably do
happen.
PNG needs to move away from mining
practices that harm the environment and
make natural disasters, like landslides, more
prevalent. The PNG government needs to
ensure that all mining projects meet strict
environmental standards that prevents the
degradation of the land and with it the
prevalence of natural disasters.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
9
People gather at the site of a landslide in Papua New Guinea's Enga Province (CNN, 2024).
[1] Guardian staff and agencies (29 May 2024) ‘Papua New Guinea
PM blames extraordinary rainfall for deadly landslide’, The Guardian
(Accessed 3 June 2024)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/29/papua
-new-guinea-png-landslides-pm-james-marape-weather-
rescue-efforts-death-toll.
[2] Al Jazeera (24 May 2024) ‘Dozens feared dead after massive
landslide hits Papua New Guinea’, Webpage (Accessed 3 June
2024) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/24/dozens-
feared-dead-after-landslide-hits-papua-new-guinea.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rod McGuirk (30 May 2024) ‘Papua New Guinea landslide
survivors slow to move to safer ground as hundreds buried’,
Associated Press (Accessed 3 June 2024)
https://apnews.com/article/papua-new-guinea-landslide-
7a25acb4fba78af6d95702e24d91e2e5.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Alice Thomas (27 May 2024) ‘Papua New Guinea disaster
agency tells UN 2,000 people are buried after landslide’, The
Guardian (Accessed 3 June 2024)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/27/papua
-new-guinea-landslides-death-toll-enga-province-rescue-
efforts.
[7] The Australian Government (27 May 2024) ‘Humanitarian
assistance in response to Papua New Guinea landslide’, Webpage
(Accessed 3 June 2024)
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-05-
27/humanitarian-assistance-response-papua-new-guinea-
landslide.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Hon Judith Collins KC and RT Hon Winston Peters (28 May
2024) ‘New Zealand to support PNG landslide response’, New
Zealand Government (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-support-png-
landslide-
response#:~:text=New%20Zealand's%20offer%20of%20support,hazar
ds%20and%20emergency%20management%3B%20and.
[11] Ibid.
[12] United Nations Development Coordination Office (4 June
2024) ‘United Nations rallies to support Papua New Guinea amid
devastating landslides’, Webpage (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://un-dco.org/stories/united-nations-rallies-support-
papua-new-guinea-amid-devastating-
landslides#:~:text=Beyond%20immediate%20relief%2C%20the%20UN,
and%20community%20rebuilding%2C%22%20Mr.
[13] United Nations Papua New Guinea (28 May 2024) ‘United
Nations and partners mobilised for Enga Province landslide
response in Papua New Guinea’, United Nations (Accessed 8 June
2024) https://papuanewguinea.un.org/en/269820-united-
nations-and-partners-mobilized-enga-province-landslide-
response-papua-new-guinea-may.
[14] VOA News (28 May 2024) ‘Aid efforts ramp up in Papua New
Guinea after deadly landslide’, Voice of America (Accessed 8 June
2024) https://www.voanews.com/a/aid-efforts-ramp-up-in-
papua-new-guinea-after-deadly-landslide/7630180.html.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
10
[5] Harlyne Joku and Stefan Armbruster (30 May 2024) ‘Facing
possible no-confidence vote, PNG prime minister defends record’,
Benar News (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/pacific/confidence-
vote-05302024141415.html.
[16] Belinda Kora (6 June 2024) ‘Motion to oust PM James Marape
halted in PNG’s parliament’, ABC (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/marape-
bougainville-png-politics/103942902.
[17] Stephen Dziedzic (31 May 2024) ‘PNG landslide survivors march
to mourn the dead as Prime Minister James Marape tours disaster
site’, ABC (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-31/first-look-at-the-png-
landslide-site/103920178.
[18] Al Jazeera (20 March 2024) ‘Papua New Guinea floods,
landslides leave at least 23 dead’, Webpage (Accessed 8 June
2024) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/20/papua-new-
guinea-floods-landslides-leave-at-least-23-dead?
traffic_source=KeepReading.
19] Doug Dingwall (25 March 2024) ‘Three people reported dead,
1,000 homes destroyed after earthquake hits PNG’s East Sepik
province’, ABC (Accessed 3 June 2024)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-25/papua-new-guinea-
earthquake-hits-east-sepik-province/103627820.
[20] Caritas Australia (2024) ‘Papua New Guinea landslide
disaster’, Webpage (Accessed 3 June 2024)
https://www.caritas.org.au/donate/emergency-appeals/papua-
new-guinea-landslide/.
[21] Jonathan Ritchie (29 May 2024) ‘Australia’s response to PNG
landslide: Adequate or not?’, The Mirage (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.miragenews.com/australias-response-to-png-
landslide-adequate-1244872/.
[22] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2024)
‘Development assistance in Papua New Guinea’, Australian
Government (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/papua-new-guinea/development-
assistance/papua-new-guinea/infrastructure-support-papua-
new-guinea.
[23] Terence Wood (4 June 2024) ‘Aid budget 2024: New Zealand
set to join Australia at the bottom’, Devpolicy Blog (Accessed 8
June 2024) https://devpolicy.org/aid-budget-2024-new-
zealand-set-to-join-australia-at-the-bottom-
20240604/#:~:text=The%20simple%20story%20is%20that,will%20be%
20a%20pitiful%200.2%25.
[24] Stephen Howes (15 May 2024) ‘2024 Australia aid spending
and effectiveness update’, Devpolicy Blog (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://devpolicy.org/2024-aid-spending-and-effectiveness-
update/#:~:text=The%20small%20increase%20this%20year,0.14%25%
20by%202035%2D36.
Key takeaways
Guerilla warfare in West Papua has been
slowly escalating in recent years, with
commensurate impacts on civilians caught
between rebels and security forces, leading
to death and displacement.
Indonesian military and security forces
maintain a culture of impunity and cases of
abuse, torture or extrajudicial killings of West
Papuan civilians during counter-insurgency
operations are not adequately investigated,
prosecuted or punished by Jakarta.
The highly controlled media environment in
West Papua by Jakarta has not helped, and
has led to a systematic acceptance of
human rights abuses and poor conduct of
Indonesia’s security forces in the region.
This opacity is highlighted by the recent case
of torture of a prisoner by Indonesian troops
and subsequent leak of video evidence
online. Although the military did respond,
with the arrest of troops involved and a
public apology, this is an anomaly to
numerous other unaddressed allegations of
human rights abuses in West Papua.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a steady escalation in
violence in Indonesia-controlled West Papua. An
expanding guerilla campaign by the West
Papua National Liberation Army (or TPNBP) has
been met by an intensifying military crackdown
in a region already infamous for being tightly
controlled. Indonesian control over the territory
has been reinforced through a long history of
military repression, and the maintenance of de
facto and de jure restrictions on media activity
and expression in West Papua, despite the
country’s own press laws that protect media
freedom.[1] Such repression has included both
large-scale massacres, as well as a consistent
pattern of casual violence and abuse towards
the population. Making matters worse, the
indigenous Papuan community has come
under increasing pressure from
developmentalist policies by the Indonesian
government, prioritising mining and monocrop
agriculture, displacing people from their
traditional farming and hunting areas, and has
been accompanied by rampant pollution and
deforestation.[2] This article will examine the
impact that this regime, and the growing violent
resistance to it, is having on the West Papuan
population, with the recent case of torture of
Defianus Kogoya serving as a useful case study
as to the Indonesia armed forces (TNI)
systematic acceptance of such crimes.
Pro-independence demonstrator next to Police officer in
Yogyakarta, Dec 2023 (Devi Rahman, AFP, 2023)
Impacts of intensifying violence on civilians in West Papua
Robert Sutton
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
11
Impact of armed conflict on
civilians
The escalation of violence between the TPNBP
and the TNI, although slow, has been
accompanied by a corresponding impact on
civilian life in the region. According to analysis
conducted in late 2023, some 76,000 people
have been internally displaced by clashes or
fears of being targeted by security forces or
militants since 2018.[3] On 8 April 2024, one child
was killed and another injured after being shot in
a hours long gunfight between rebels and
Indonesian security personnel. The rebels were
conducting a raid on a security post in Sugapa,
Intan Jaya Regency, allegedly in an attempt to
free a rebel supporter from the authorities.[4]
According to Adjunct Commissioner Bayu
Suseno, Head of the Cartenz Peace Public Affairs
Task Force, one of the two children, 12 year-old
Nando Diwitau, died as a result of his injuries,
while the other child, Nopina Diwitau, was
recovering.[5] Despite Suseno stating that the
Task Force was “…still investigating to determine
from which direction the shots came”, Indonesian
national newspaper Kompas ran with the
headline “a child dies from KKB gunfire in Intan
Jaya.” 30 April 2024 saw another attack in Intan
Jaya, this time in Homeo district, which led to the
shooting death of Alexsander Parapak, a 20 year
old from South Sulawesi. Suseno blamed the
event on a “KKB” group led by Keni Tipagau.[6]
Philip Merhtens with TPNPB fighters (RNZ,, 2023)
Additionally, New Zealand commercial air pilot
Philip Merhtens is still being held as a hostage by
elements of the TPNPB under the command of
Egianus Koyoga, more than a year after his
abduction in February 2023.[7] The TPNBP has
continued to use Merhtens in its media releases,
having him deliver statements and requests
from the group. Merhtens’ most recent
appearance in TPNPB media involve him
appealing to Indonesian and foreign official’s not
to conduct airstrikes in the region, stating that
the strikes were in fact a danger to his life. TNI
Spokesperson Nugraha Gumilar denied that
airstrikes were taking place in West Papua, telling
the Jakarta Post that the rebels “are always
reporting hoax news”.[8] While there is evidence
that as recently as 2022 that small drones and
helicopters were being used to conduct
improvised air raids, it is unclear if that practice
is what is being referred to.[9] Although rebel
claims are not by themselves proof, the reflexive
denial by the TNI fits into a potential pattern
when considering their denial, and subsequent
acknowledgment, of more clear-cut crimes,
which will be discussed below.
As rebel forces grow in capability, and begin to
target a wider spectrum of Indonesian forces
and infrastructure, the TNI will necessarily utilise
greater force in response. Higher intensity
fighting will inevitably have greater impacts on
civilians, increasing displacement and the risk of
being caught between belligerent actors. This
highlights the need for diplomatic pressure to
resolve the underlying tensions driving the
conflict without intensifying the violence.
Accustomed to impunity
Perhaps the most high-profile example of how
human rights abuses are normalised in support
Indonesia’s control over West Papua is the
torture of Papuan man Defianus Kogoya after he
was taken prisoner by TNI troops, who alleged he
was a rebel militant. Especially important is the
response of the TNI following the subsequent
leaking of video evidence of this event online,
providing a rare glimpse into the crimes
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
12
committed by soldiers or police. The incident
allegedly took place during a military operation
in the town of Gome, Puncak Regency, Central
Papua Province, on 3 February 2024. Video
evidence taken by the perpetrators depicts an
ethnically Papuan man, restrained and forced to
sit in a barrel filled with water, while men in
partial military uniform beat and slashed him
with a machete.[10] In its reporting of the
incident, The Guardian cited “West Papuan
sources” that alleged TNI soldiers also killed a
second man by dragging them behind a vehicle.
[11]
Still image from leaked footage of torture of Defianus Kogoya (The
Guardian, 2024)
According to Indonesian news site Ceposonline,
the videos were circulating through Whatsapp
groups and generating growing public
condemnation, leading rights groups to call for
an investigation.[12] Discussion of the videos
even prompted remarks from the office of the
President, with Deputy Chief of the Presidential
Staff, Rumadi Ahmad, being quoted as saying
“while we hold a strong hope that our soldiers are
not involved in such reprehensible acts, if proven
true, the individuals responsible must be held
accountable in accordance with the applicable
rules and regulations.”[13] As a result of the
sudden public scrutiny, the TNI held a press
conference on 25 March 2024 announcing the
arrest of 13 soldiers in connection to the incident,
as well issuing a public apology. Major General
Izak Pangemanan, the regional senior
commander, was quoted as saying “we regret
what happened, it shouldn't have happened”,
and that “we condemn this action. It's a violation
of the law and it has tarnished the military's
reputation,"... "We apologise to to (sic) all
Papuans".[14]
Despite the apology, the military’s statement
sought to excuse their soldier’s actions. The TNI
claimed that three men, the other two being
Warinus Kogoya and Alianus Mirok, were arrested
after they opened fire on troops responding to
an alleged arson threat to a health clinic.[15] The
TNI claims that, as the prisoners were being
taken to a police station, Warinus and Defianus
attempted to escape, resulting to Warinus’ death
and Defianus’ recapture and subsequent torture.
[16] According to Pangemanan, Warinus jumped
from a moving vehicle while restrained, striking
his head, and died en route to a health facility.
This is quite possibly the same death as
referenced by The Guardian, though a potentially
sanitised description. Furthermore, the soldiers
had become “emotional” after Defianus allegedly
admitted to involvement in previous acts of
violence, as well as to the supposed arson plot.
[17] The families of Defianus and Mirok have
disputed this account, asserting that they were
not even involved in the alleged shootout, but
instead working on the roof of a house when they
were arrested.[18] Certainly the Puncak
Regency’s Police didn’t seem to think they had a
case, and had released Defianus back to his
family on 6 February.[19] For many Papuan’s, the
claim that the soldiers involved were merely
“rogue” rings hollow in light of the long history
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
13
of similar alleged abuses by Indonesian forces in
the region, including a number from just the last
few years.[20]
Still image from leaked footage of torture of Defianus Kogoya (The
Guardian, 2024)
While news of these previous incidents has
circulated mainly through activist circles and
media, thanks to ongoing restrictions placed on
journalists, this is one of the first cases of which
incontrovertible evidence has emerged. This
likely forced the TNI’s hand to make some sort of
public response, as they were unable to simply
dismiss it has separatist propaganda. Even then,
Indonesia media continues to take the labelling
of the victims as “KKB members” at face value,
even if they condemn the act of torture.[21] The
initial dismissals of the leaked footage by Maj.
General Pangemanan as fabrications highlights
the TNI’s tendency to shy away from
accountability and underlines the need for a
broader investigation into TNI and police
behaviour in the region, as called for by activists
and civil society.[22]
Further highlighting the standalone nature of the
TNI’s response is the crackdown carried out by
security services on West Papuan protestors who
rallied in reaction to these events. The authorities
violent dispersal of rallies in Nabire, Central
Papua Province, in early April is an example of
this. Despite having legally registered for
permission, protestors were subjected to
arbitrary arrest, beating and firing “rubber bullets”
at them.
This is a common theme in West Papua, with the
Indonesian authorities having a long history of
cracking down on West Papuan protests and
any calls for independence.[23]
Prabowo’s imminent presidency
The upcoming presidential transition from
incumbent Joko Widodo to President-elect
Prabowo Subianto may also change the
dynamic of the situation in West Papua. During
the election campaign in February, Prabowo
announced his intention to offer dialogue and an
amnesty to separatist rebels, alluding to the
relatively successful 2005 policy conducted in
Aceh Province.[24] However, this would be
contingent on an immediate laying-down of
arms and an end to any separatist activism,
amounting in effect to a surrender to Indonesian
sovereignty.
Prabowo Subianto and VP-candidate Gibrung Rakabuming at a
presidential debate in 2023 (AFP, 2023)
However, Prabowo’s long career in the infamous
Kopassus Special Forces unit, serving the ‘New
Order’ regime of former President Suharto,
involved an extended tour in then-occupied East
Timor, during which he was allegedly involved in
the murder of President Nicolau Lobato and the
1983 Kraras Massacre.[25] Prabowo was
ultimately expelled from the military after turning
his skills against pro-democracy activists in
1998.[26] How the proposed amnesty would fare
remains to be seen, Prabowo’s term does not
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
14
begin until October, and no plan has been
released publicly. If it were to fail, or even just
never go ahead, then given Prabowo’s
background, the likely outcome is an
intensification of state repression and violence
towards dissidents and activists in Papua. The
TNI is already preparing for this eventuality, with
the Ministry of Defence (as of writing still officially
headed by Prabowo) petitioning the government
for increased funding explicitly in pursuit of
counter-insurgency objectives.[27]
Conclusion
The Kogoya Torture case highlights the difficulties
in obtaining clear information about abuses in
West Papua in the context of Indonesia’s media
controls. Without the leaked videos, it is almost
certain that most of these details would not have
been admitted to by the military. To elaborate
further, it was unclear if Defianus had even
survived. While the Sydney Morning Herald did
reasonably suppose that the shared last name
of two of the men arrested that was the source
of the conflicting reports, the confusion clearly
demonstrates the urgent need for free media
and journalistic access to the region.[28] In his
statement regarding the case, Benny Wenda,
President of the United Liberation Movement for
West Papua considered the “sadistic brutality on
display” to exemplify Indonesian rule over the
region.[29] When considering the denial and
excuses from the TNI, especially when taking into
account the plethora of other allegations against
the TNI and police, displays the urgent need for
investigation of Indonesia’s activities and policies
in West Papua.
It is highly unlikely that either West Papuan civil
society groups or the armed rebel movement will
be able to force Indonesia to make real
concessions or achieve independence by
themselves. Support or sponsorship from
regional powers would almost certainly be
needed, however, this would require those actors
to compromise their existing economic and
geopolitical relationships with Indonesia. As such,
little action beyond gentle diplomatic pressure is
to be expected. Without international pressure,
Indonesia will continue to exploit the opacity of
the situation and maintain its domination over
West Papua.
Policy recommendations
The Indonesian government should take all
possible measures to enforce greater
discipline amongst the ranks of its soldiers
and police, up to and including the prompt
and public prosecution of offenders. This
should be done to curb the culture of casual
violence and abuse towards both civilians
and suspected rebel combatants.
All belligerents in the conflict should take all
possible care to avoid civilian casualties as a
result of engagements between them, and
especially to refrain from targeting them
directly.
The TPNBP element holding Philip Mehrtens
should ensure his immediate safe release,
and further refrain from taking civilian
hostages in pursuit of leverage in
negotiations with Jakarta.
The Indonesian government should ensure
that the fundamental human rights of West
Papuans are upheld, including their right to
freedom of speech and assembly in regard
to the desire of some for independence.
Regional states, especially neighbouring
Australia, should utilise diplomatic pressure to
compel Indonesia to accept greater United
Nations supervision of the conflict area, as
proposed by both the West Papuan
sovereignty movement and the Pacific
Island’s Forum.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
15
[1] Bob Dietz (31 March 2015) “Media restrictions in Papua
underscore Indonesia’s wider problems”, Committee to Protect
Journalists, (accessed 23 May 2024)
https://cpj.org/2015/03/media-restrictions-in-papua-
underscore-indonesias-/.
[2] Klas Lundstrom (6 April 2024) “In West Papua, the Birth of a ‘Lost
Generation’”, The Diplomat, (accessed 21 May 2014)
https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/in-west-papua-the-birth-of-
a-lost-generation/.
[3] Humanrightsmonitor (10 April 2024) “Annual Report 2023:
Human Rights and Conflict in West Papua”, webpage (accessed 31
May 2024) https://humanrightsmonitor.org/reports/hrm-annual-
report-human-rights-and-conflict-in-west-papua-2023/.
[4] Pizaro Gozali Idrus (8 April 2024) “Child killed, another injured as
rebels, Indonesian soldiers clash in Papua”, Benar News (accessed
21 May 2024)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/deadly-
gunfight-04082024124642.html.
[5] Nasrun Katinga (9 April 2024) “A child dies from KKB gunfire in
Intan Jaya”, Kompas (accessed 21 May 2024)
https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2024/04/09/en-seorang-
anak-tewas-terkena-tembakan-kkb-di-intan-jaya.
[6] Sevianto Padiking (30 April 2024) “Civilian Killed as Armed
Group Attacks Homeyo Police Station in Intan Jaya”, Jakarta Globe
(accessed 21 May 2024) https://jakartaglobe.id/news/civilian-
killed-as-armed-group-attacks-homeyo-police-station-in-intan-
jaya.
[7] RNZ (13 April 2024) More videos of Kiwi hostage Philip Merhtens
in Papua warn against Indonesian military air strikes”, webpage
(accessed 14 May 2014)
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/514170/more-videos-of-kiwi-
hostage-philip-mehrtens-in-papua-warn-against-indonesian-
military-air-strikes.
[8] The Jakarta Post (13 April 2024) “TNI denies using air strikes in
Papua, where kidnapped NZ pilot is”, webpage (accessed 13 April
2024)
https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/04/14/tni-
denies-using-air-strikes-in-papua-where-kidnapped-nz-pilot-
is.html.
[9] Tom Allard & Stanley Widianto (3 June 2022) “Insight: Mystery
surrounds how munitions imported for Indonesia’s civilian spies
were used in attacks on villages”, Reuters, (accessed 30 May 2024)
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/mystery-surrounds-
how-munitions-imported-indonesias-civilian-spies-were-used-
2022-06-03/.
[10] Zach Hope & Karuni Rompies (25 March 2024) “Indonesian
military confirms authenticity of torture video, detains 13 of its own”,
Sydney Morning Herald (accessed 7 May 2024)
https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesian-military-
confirms-authenticity-of-torture-video-detains-13-of-its-own-
20240325-p5ff60.html.
[11] Ben Doherty (26 March 2024) “Indonesian military apologises
after West Papuan man filmed being tortured in water-filled barrel”,
The Guardian (accessed 7 May 2024)
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2024/mar/25/west-papuan-man-footage-torture-water-
allegedly-indonesia.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
16
[12] Ceposonline (22 March 2024) “Video of Torture of Civilians
Circulating, Paham Urges Commander in Chief to Conduct
Investigation”, webpage (accessed 9 May 2024)
https://www.ceposonline.com/papua/1994469571/video-
penyiksaan-terhadap-warga-sipil-beredar-paham-desak-
panglima-lakukan-investigasi.
[13] Pizaro Gozali Idrus (25 March 2024) “Indonesian military
apologises to Papuans, detains soldiers linked to tortured civilian”,
Benar News (accessed 7 May 2014)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/military-
apologizes-to-papuans-for-torture-03252024141011.html.
[14] Bill Birtles (25 March 2024) “More than a dozen soldier
detained as Indonesia’s military investigates brutal torture video of
Papuan man”, ABC (accessed 7 May 2024)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-25/indonesia-
investigate-viral-video-west-papua-torture/103630640.
[15] Pizaro Gozali Idrus (25 March 2024) “Indonesian military
apologises to Papuans, detains soldiers linked to tortured civilian”,
Benar News (accessed 7 May 2014)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/military-
apologizes-to-papuans-for-torture-03252024141011.html.
[16] Niniek Karmini (26 March 2024) “Indonesia’s military arrests 13
elite soldiers who are accused of involvement in a torture video”, AP
News (accessed 9 May 2024)
https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-papua-military-abuse-
b296bbf376208a0a7042be080a593d5b.
[17] Zach Hope & Karuni Rompies (25 March 2024) “Indonesian
military confirms authenticity of torture video, detains 13 of its own”,
Sydney Morning Herald (accessed 7 May 2024)
https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesian-military-
confirms-authenticity-of-torture-video-detains-13-of-its-own-
20240325-p5ff60.html.
[18] Pizaro Gozali Idrus (25 March 2024) “Indonesian military
apologises to Papuans, detains soldiers linked to tortured civilian”,
Benar News (accessed 7 May 2014)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/military-
apologizes-to-papuans-for-torture-03252024141011.html.
[19] Fransiskus Adryanto Pratama (26 March 2024) “Insufficient
Evidence, Police Release Definus Kogoya Who Was Tortured by TNI”,
Tirto news (accessed 21 May 2024) https://tirto.id/tak-cukup-
bukti-polisi-bebaskan-definus-kogoya-yang-disiksa-tni-gXir.
[20] Jubi, West Papua Daily (accessed 14 May 2024) “Again and
again: TNI tortures civilians in Papua”, webpage (accessed 9 May
2024) https://en.jubi.id/again-and-again-tni-tortures-civilians-
in-papua/.
[21] Dewi Augustina (27 March 2024) “The figure of Defianus
Kogoya: KKB member who set fire to the health centre which made
13 TNI suspects”, Tribunnews (accessed 21 May 2024)
https://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2024/03/27/sosok-
defianus-kogoya-anggota-kkb-pelaku-pembakaran-puskesmas-
yang-bikin-13-tni-jadi-tersangka.
[22] Jubi, West Papua Daily (31 March 2024) “Church calls for
independent probe into violence involving security forces in Papua”,
webpage (accessed 14 May 2024) https://en.jubi.id/church-calls-
for-independent-probe-into-violence-involving-security-forces-
in-papua/.
[23] Humanrightsmonitor (15 April 2024) “Security force members
ill-treat journalists and protestors during crackdown on peaceful
demonstration in Nabire”, webpage (accessed 23 May 2024)
https://humanrightsmonitor.org/case/security-force-members-
ill-treat-journalists-and-protesters-during-crackdown-on-
peaceful-demonstration-in-nabire/.
[24] The Jakarta Post (14 December 2023) “Prabowo plans
amnesty for armed, separatist groups in Papua, campaign team
says”, webpage (accessed 22 May 2024)
https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/12/14/prabowo-
plans-amnesty-for-armed-separatist-groups-in-papua-
campaign-team-says.html.
[25] John Martinkus (2 March 2024) “Prabowo Subianto’s human
rights abuses in Timor-Leste”, The Saturday Paper (accessed 24
May 2024) https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/law-
crime/2024/03/01/chasing-prabowo-timor-leste#hrd.
[26] Ahmad Syamsudin (14 February 2024) “Accused of atrocities,
fired from army, elected president: Prabowo’s unlikely rise”, Benar
News (accessed 24 May 2024)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/prabowo-
subianto-profile-new-president-02142024141502.html.
[27] Arie Firdaus (8 May 2024) “Indonesian defence ministry seeks
budget boost to counter Papuan insurgency”, Benar News
(accessed 31 May 2024)
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/ministry-
wants-more-funds-counter-papua-separatists-
05082024140604.html.
[28] Zach Hope & Karuni Rompies (25 March 2024) “Indonesian
military confirms authenticity of torture video, detains 13 of its own”,
Sydney Morning Herald (accessed 7 May 2024)
https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesian-military-
confirms-authenticity-of-torture-video-detains-13-of-its-own-
20240325-p5ff60.html.
[29] ULMWP (21 March 2024) “President Wenda: A crime against
humanity has been committed in West Papua”, webpage
(accessed 7 May 2024) https://www.ulmwp.org/president-
wenda-a-crime-against-humanity-has-been-committed-in-
west-papua.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
17
Key takeaways
Militancy has been on the rise in Pakistan.
Attacks on civilians and military personnel in
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)
have not only cost lives but also impacted
the security and economy of Pakistan.
The rise in militancy has been attributed to
the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan in
2021 and its support for terror groups such
as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The TTP is
ideologically opposite to Islamabad and has
carried out attacks on Pakistani soil.
The attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban and other
groups have led to a deterioration of the
once close relationship between Kabul and
Islamabad, with the latter demanding the
former reverse its policies that have turned
Afghanistan into a haven for terrorism.
The standoff between the two needs to be
addressed so that Pakistan can address its
security concerns and the human rights
violations in both countries can be stopped
following the recent resurfacing of militancy.
This will only occur through domestic and
international cooperation to tackle terrorism.
Introduction
Since the Taliban regained power in 2021, there
has been an upsurge in militant operations and
terror attacks in Pakistan. Groups like Tehreek-
e-Taliban (TTP), Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K),
Tehreek-e Jihad Pakistan, and Baloch militant
groups continue to use Afghan soil as a base to
coordinate attacks into Pakistan. This has been
reflected in the recent 60 percent increase in
fatalities from terror attacks since 2021.[1] The
TTP has proven the worst to handle from
Pakistan’s point of view, with the group allegedly
supported by the Afghan Taliban in Kabul and
allowed to use Afghanistan as a safe haven to
escape counter-terrorism operations in
Pakistan.[2] As a result, the country's security
situation has deteriorated, and thousands of
citizens and security personnel have been killed.
The already tattered economy of Pakistan has
also received a massive blow, and there is an
urgent need to upgrade the counter-terrorism
strategies at domestic and international levels.
This is particularly important if the world wants
to avoid the ripple effects generated by militant
activities in the region. This article explores the
reasons behind the recent resurfacing of
militant groups in Pakistan, as well as analysing
how Islamabad has cracked down on human
rights, with a focus on human rights violations
taking place because of terror attacks and
counter-terrorism operations. It will also shed
light on the policy recommendations to tackle
he monster of terrorism and improve diplomatic
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, far left, and top military officials
attend a funeral on March 17 for officers killed in a militant attack
(Reuters, March 2024).
Analysing the rise of militancy in Pakistan
Ramsha Ali
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
18
Why is militancy common in
Pakistan?
This area of Pakistan has always been a hotbed
of militancy and Islamic extremism, and both
have thrived for various reasons. This includes
the regions geography, which has played a
primary role in the rise of militancy and Islamic
extremism in Pakistan. The Durand Line that runs
through Pakistan and Afghanistan, which
includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(or FATA), has long been a haven for Islamic
groups and extremism, with the area isolated
from Islamabad and difficult to administer and
control. Madrassahs in Pakistan have also played
a historical role in fostering radical Islam due to
the prevalence of Deobandi ideologies and lack
educational opportunities and have attracted
young and naïve minds.[3]
The TTP and the recent targeting of
Pakistan
Pakistan has battled Islamic extremist groups
and their militancy for decades, but recent
events suggest a dramatic increase in attacks
on Pakistani soil, which is proving a significant
threat for Islamabad. The TTP has been the most
recent and active militant group in Pakistan’s
tribal belt. It has made Pakistan’s government its
number one enemy and aims to implement
Shariah Law throughout the country. The group is
Islamist and pro-Pashtun and was created in
2007 through an alliance of militant networks
from Pakistan.[4] The group is an offshoot of the
Taliban and therefore shares its ideology and
harsh interpretation of Islam. It is also actively
supported by the Taliban in Afghanistan, with a
United Nations report in January confirming
Kabul is financially backing the TTP, offering the
group a haven in Afghanistan and providing it
with men and arms to carry out attacks in
Pakistan.[5] When the Taliban returned to power
in Afghanistan in August 2021, there was also a
significant uptick in recruits for the TTP, including
when hundreds of TTP members detained by the
former Afghan government and United States
forces were released from Afghan prisons, giving
the group an immediate boost in manpower.
This included senior leader Maulawi Faqir
Muhammad, and Mufti Khalid Bulti, the group's
former spokesperson.[6]
Pakistan suicide bombing death toll rises to 63 (Al Jazeera, 2024).
The TTP has used its newfound support from
Kabul to carry out several recent attacks on
Pakistan soil. In the first quarter of 2024, Pakistan
witnessed 245 terrorist attacks and counter-
terrorism operations, with Balochistan and the
KPK accounting for 92 per cent of the total
fatalities.[7][8] This includes a suicide bombing
near Bisham city in northwest KPK on 26 March
2024 that killed five Chinese nationals and a
local bus driver.[9] At least eighteen people
were killed in five separate incidents between 16
and 26 March, including three attacks in KPK and
two in southwest Balochistan province.[10] More
recently in late May, an attack on a military
outpost in the Tirah Valley killed five soldiers and
seven militants.[11] In response to the attacks, the
media arm of the Pakistan armed forces, the
Inter Services Public Relations said the attacks
were "dastardly acts aimed at destabilising the
internal security situation.xii Pakistan has
responded quickly to these attacks. Since 2024,
more than 13,135 minor and large-scale
intelligence-based operations have been
conducted against extremists. In the first three
months of 2024, a total of 245 terrorist attacks
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
19
and military operations took place, while 432
people were reportedly killed and 370 injured.[12]
Attacker rams explosives-laden vehicle into convoy of Chinese
engineers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa hours after Baloch rebels
attacked a naval base. (Al Jazeera,, 2024).
How else has the rise in militancy
affected Pakistan?
Deteriorating relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan
The rise in militancy has caused the relationship
between Pakistan and the Taliban to deteriorate,
which has had serious consequences.
Islamabad has blamed the resurfacing of
militancy on the presence of 1.4 million Afghan
refugees in the country, along with the Taliban’s
support for the TTP. According to Zubair Jamali,
the Home Minister for Balochistan, Afghans are
responsible for "14 out of 24 suicide bombings in
Pakistan this year" and has stated that Afghans
are "destabilising the country and that it won't be
tolerated.’’[13] The response from Pakistan has
been to deport Afghans back to Afghanistan.
Amnesty International reports that since
September 2023 almost 530,000 Afghans have
been forcibly deported from Pakistan, with
international human rights organisations like
Amnesty International condemning the move.
[14] Pakistan has also reacted by carrying out
airstrikes on alleged TTP bases and hideouts in
Afghanistan, including on 18 March when an
airstrike reportedly killed 8 people.
The situation quickly escalated, with the Taliban
shelling border areas in Pakistan in response,
which wounded four civilians and three security
personnel.[14] The obvious victims of these
increased tensions between Afghanistan and
Pakistan are civilians suffering continuously and
indiscriminately from both sides. The Taliban’s
spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, denounced
the 18 March bombings as "reckless" a "violation
of Afghanistan's sovereignty" and warned
Pakistan of "bad consequences".[15]
Economic repercussions
The increased prevalence of attacks in Pakistan
has also had negative economic effects. This
includes a decreased rate of growth rate, capital
flight, and a lack of foreign investment.[16] In
response to the downturn, political economist
Yousuf Naza stated that "Pakistan, simply, has run
out of luck".[17] Infrastructure projects have also
been affected by the instability caused by the
increase in terror attacks and the military
designating at-risk areas as ‘no go’ zones.[18]
China put its three major hydroelectric projects
in Dassu, Tarbela and Diamere Bhasha on hold
following the forementioned attack on Chinese
nations in March.[19][20][21] This is a major
issue for Islamabad, with its economy desperate
for investment and long been in a state of
decline. It has also done more to damage to
Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban, accusing
Kabul and the TTP of intentionally targeting its
economic interests. An official statement from
the the Pakistan armed forces media arm, Inter
Services Public Relations, supports this: ‘’strategic
projects and sensitive sites vital for Pakistan’s
economic progress and the well-being of its
people are being targeted as a conscious effort
to retard our progress and sow discord between
Pakistan and its strategic allies and partners,
most notably China. Certain foreign elements
are complicit in aiding and abetting terrorism in
Pakistan, driven by their vested interests. Despite
the veneer of innocence, these elements are
being continuously exposed as sponsors of
terror.’’[22]
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
20
The site of a bomb blast outside the office of an independent
candidate in Pishin district, around 50km (30 miles) from Quetta on
February 7, on the eve of Pakistan’s national elections. (AFP, 2024).
Conclusion
There is no denial the return of the Taliban in
Afghanistan has seen a spike in militancy in
Pakistan. The spike is aided by the Taliban’s
support for the TTP and because western
Pakistan remains a ripe recruiting ground for
militants due to its isolation and prevalence of
Islamic extremism. This has resulted in death and
destruction, with attacks not only killing Pakistani
soldiers but also civilians and foreign nationals.
Pakistan’s response has only increased human
rights concern for both Pakistanis and Afghans.
Counterterrorism operations have cost civilian
lives and its reactionary response in forcibly
deporting Afghans back to Afghanistan hasn’t
just violated international law but left many
without their lives and livelihoods. The economic
consequences are also acute, leaving Pakistan
even more vulnerable from an economic
perspective as potential investors are scared
away by violence.
But there is still hope. Restoration of peace and
the security in Pakistan can be accomplished
with effective counter-terrorism measures. But to
achieve this aim, it is important to understand
that the militant landscape in Pakistan has
become complex and diverse. Pakistan should
work on its political stability and ensure effective
policies to combat the rise in terror in the region.
Weak links of communication between the public
and the state are always advantageous to
militant elements and this needs to be solved. To
avoid manipulation of its inhabitants by non-
state actors, the government should pay heed to
the demands and cries of its people, which
includes better development and educational
opportunities. Pakistan's security forces should
also prioritise rebuilding the nation's hopes and
beliefs over national security by effectively
tackling militancy without costing civilian lives
and it should do this in partnership with the
international community.
Policy recommendations
Although there may not be strong anti-
development sentiments in many areas, the
residents might see globalisation as a threat
to their beliefs and culture, and many think
that broader roads and dams will accelerate
the process of globalisation. This will lead to
women's liberation and modernism, which
are contrary to regional cultural practices. It
is imperative to actively debunk this extremist
narrative and educate people about the
essence and benefits of development and
globalisation. This would reduce the
possibility of recruiting volunteers from
nearby areas and foster a sense of solidarity
against non-state actors.
A suicide blast killed 101 in a mosque in Peshawar (Reuters, August
2021).
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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Regional partners like Afghanistan, China,
Russia, Iran, and the states of Central Asia
should work together to combat terrorism.
The Shanghai Corporation Organisation is an
important platform to coordinate efforts in
this regard and groups like TTP and IS-K
should be defunded and tackled effectively.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and
broader development is economically crucial
for Pakistan. In Balochistan and KPK, local
ownership and involvement and
development projects are crucial to meet the
demands of the local population from a
developmental and economic perspective.
Pakistan and the Taliban need to find
common ground to avoid further violence
and reactionary policies, like mass
deportations and airstrikes that violate the
sovereignty of their neighbours. Pakistan
should instead focus on having a close and
active dialogue with the Taliban leadership
over efficient border control and security,
including tackling militancy.
Pakistan’s counterterrorism measures need to
be reassessed. It is paramount that any
operations avoid civilian casualties at all
costs, including through landmines and air
and drone strikes that only leads more
people to take up arms. Islamabad should
work with local communities to tackle terror
groups.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
22
[1] The Express Tribune (07 June, 2024) ‘PM calls out Afghan
Taliban on terror spike’, Webpage (Accessed 25 April 2024)
‘https://tribune.com.pk/story/2445428/pm-calls-out-afghan-
taliban-on-terror-spike.
[2] K. Alan Kronstadt, (1 December, 2023) 'Terrorist and Other
Militant Groups in Pakistan', Congressional Research Service,
(Accessed 25 April 2024)
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11934.
[3] Muhammad Amir Rana (31 March 2024) ‘Targeting Chinese
nationals’, DAWN, (Accessed 30 May 2024)
https://www.dawn.com/news/1824814.
[4] National Counterterrorism Center, ‘Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan’,
Webpage (Accessed 6 June 2024)
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/ttp.html.
[5] United Nations Security Council (29 January 2024) ‘Letter dated
23 January 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee
pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015)
concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida
and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
addressed to the President of the Security Council’, Webpage
(Accessed 10 June 2024) https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2024/02/N2343179.pdf.
[6] Abdul Sayed, Tore Hamming, (23 May 2023), ‘The Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover’,
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, (Accessed 30 May
2024), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-
after-the-talibans-afghanistan-
takeover/%3E%20accessed%2030%20May%202024.
[7] Business Standard (9 June 2024), ‘Pak sees 245 terror attacks,
counter-terror operations in first qtr of 2024’, Webpage (Accessed
25 April 2024) https://www.business-standard.com/world-
news/pak-sees-245-terror-attacks-counter-terror-operations-in-
first-qtr-of-2024-124040100264_1.html.
[8] Ikram Junaidi ( Januray 1 2024), ‘‘Violence-Linked Fatalities Hit
Six-Year High’ DAWN (Accessed 25 April 2024)
https://www.dawn.com/news/1802262.
[9] Abid Hussain, (26 March 2024), ‘Five Chinese nationals among
six killed in suicide bomb attack in Pakistan’, Al Jazeera, (Accessed
28 May 2024) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/26/five-
chinese-nationals-killed-in-suicide-bomb-attack-in-pakistan-
police.
[10] Abid Hussain (29 March 2024), ‘March of ‘terror’: Pakistan
grapples with deadly attacks on China interests’, Al Jazeera,
(Accessed 28 May 2024),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/29/march-of-terror-
pakistan-grapples-with-deadly-attacks-on-china-interests.
[11] Ayaz Gul (27 May 2024), ‘Attack on Pakistani outpost near
Afghan border kills 5 soldiers, 7 militants’, Voice of America,
(Accessed 28 May 2024), https://www.voanews.com/a/attack-
on-pakistani-outpost-near-afghan-border-kills-5-soldiers-
5-/7628219.html.
[12] ‘Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan’ (26 March 2024) ‘The
recent incidents of terrorism in Pakistan, notably in Gwadar, Turbat,
and Besham, are dastardly acts aimed at destabilizing the internal
security situation.’ PRESS RELEASE, (Accessed 30 May 2024)
https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail?id=6795.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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[13] Iftikhar Hussain (9 May 2024), ‘Over 400 Killed in Pakistan as
Military Intensifies Operations in KP and Baluchistan’, Voice of
America , (Accessed 15 May 2024)
https://www.voanews.com/a/over-400-killed-in-pakistan-as-
military-intensifies-operations-in-kp-and-
baluchistan-/7605583.html.
[14] Marcus Andreopoulos (November 30 2023), ‘Pakistan’s
Expulsion of Afghan Refugees is Part of a Longstanding Crackdown’
INKSTICK, (Accessed 5 June 2024)
https://inkstickmedia.com/pakistans-expulsion-of-afghan-
refugees-is-part-of-a-longstanding-crackdown/.
[15] Amnesty International (April 4 2024), ‘Pakistan: Government
must stop ignoring global calls to halt unlawful deportation of
Afghan refugees’, Webpage, (Accessed June 3 2024)
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/pakistan-
government-must-halt-deportation-of-afghan-
refugees/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CPakistan's%20'Illegal%20Foreigners'%2
0Repatriation,women%20protestors%2C%20artists%2C%20and%20for
mer.
[16] Al Jazeera (18 March 2024), ‘Pakistan-Taliban attacks updates:
Exchange of fire at border after 8 killed’, Webpage (Accessed 2
June 2024)
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/18/pakistan-
taliban-attacks-live-exchange-of-fire-at-border-after-8-killed.
[17] Chris Fitzgerald, (25 March 2024), ‘Pakistan has run out of
patience with the Taliban over terrorism’, Modern Diplomacy,
(Accessed 7 June 2024),
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/03/25/pakistan-has-run-out-
of-patience-with-the-taliban-over-terrorism/.
[18] Arshad Ali (June 2014), ‘Economic cost of terrorism: A case
study of Pakistan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad,
(Accessed 27 May 2024) https://issi.org.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/1299569657_66503137.pdf.
[19] Dia Hadid, Abdul Sattar, (2 February 2023),’ Pakistan is roiled by
multiple crises at once, with little end in sight’, NPR, (Accessed 30
May 2024) https://www.npr.org/2023/02/02/1152917151/pakistan-
imf-peshawar-mosque-terrorist-attack-electricity-crisis.
[20] Iftikhar Hussain (9 May 2024), ‘Over 400 Killed in Pakistan as
Military Intensifies Operations in KP and Baluchistan’, Voice of
America , (Accessed 15 May 2024)
https://www.voanews.com/a/over-400-killed-in-pakistan-as-
military-intensifies-operations-in-kp-and-
baluchistan-/7605583.html.
[21] The Nation (29 March 2024), ‘Chinese companies temporarily
suspend work on Dasu, Diamer-Bhasha dams’, Webpage
(Accessed 28 May 2024) https://www.nation.com.pk/29-Mar-
2024/chinese-companies-temporarily-suspend-work-on-dasu-
diamer-bhasha-dams.
Key takeaways
The Chinese government continues to
restrict the rights of people in Hong Kong,
including freedom of speech, assembly,
expression and press freedom. Beijing’s
latest attempt, Article 23, is a potential
hammer blow to Hongkongers and their
once vibrant media and civil society.
Article 23 further criminalises espionage,
foreign interference, insurrection, sabotage
and treason. It allows police to detain
suspects without charge, allows for closed
door trials and can ban companies from
Hong Kong if linked with foreign entities or
states.
There are several examples of Beijing and
the Hong Kong government clamping down
on dissent and legitimate criticism of
government policy, seen with the closure of
Free Radio Asia and the prosecution and
imprisonment of activists and journalists.
The concern with Article 23 is Beijing will now
target those with connections to foreign
organisations or dissidents who have fled
abroad through harassment and
prosecution. With the mainland having an
increasingly strong hold on Hong Kong, this
will likely become more and more common.
Introduction
China has spent years gradually monopolizing
audacious measures to infringe on Hong Kong’s
polity and civil society. This has included
subduing any public discord like that witnessed
in 2020, which led to the arrest of journalists,
lawmakers and pro-democracy activists as
well as restricting voting rights and freedom of
press and speech. This has continued and
escalated in 2024, with Hong Kong’s legislators
ratifying new security legislation, Article 23,
which aims to reinforces China’s control on the
region’s rights and freedoms.[ 1 ]
Hong Kong officials have contended that the
new security law evens security with the rights
and freedom protection of residents. Hong
Kong's leader, John Lee, has also argued that
majority of the rights and freedoms were
provisory and an absence of national security
implied that freedoms and rights could not be
enjoyed.[ 2] Critics have argued the legislation
will be employed to oppress and limit the rights
and freedom of Hongkongers not only locally
but also internationally.[ 3] The critics have a
point, with the new legislation worsening an
already restrictive political and civil environment
in Hong Kong, there is legitimate fear of
persecution and criminalization of international
cooperation on the grounds of collusion with
external forces and expression based on the
Hong Kong’s new security legislation (Hong Kong Free Press,
2024)
Hong Kong's new security law and its impact on Hongkongers
Esm’eralda Marion
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
25
vague adoption of sedition has prompted the
closure of several civil society due to safety
concerns as the risk overshadow the anticipated
results. For these reasons this article will analyse
the new security legislation and its
consequences for Hongkongers at home and
abroad.
Hong Kong’s dwindling freedoms:
What led to Article 23?
Hong Kong’s dwindling freedoms can be back
tracked to the island’s handoff to China in 1997.
Ever since, Beijing has endeavoured to gain more
authority over the region thereby igniting mass
demonstrations and a subsequent clampdown
on freedom of press, expression and assembly.
The first attempt was in 2003, when security
legislation to outlaw secession, sedition,
subversion, and treason against Beijing was
tabled and later foiled following mass
demonstrations, which pressured the
government to change course, albeit
temporarily.[ 4 ][ 5 ] More recently, there was an
attempt to allow Hongkongers to vote for the
enclave’s chief executive, but where all
candidates were chosen by Beijing. This led to
widespread protests across Hong Kong, named
the Umbrella Movement that saw state
repression against peaceful protest.[ 6] Further,
2019 saw the government attempt to introduce
national security legislation that would have seen
Hongkongers tried in mainland China which lead
to an even larger outbreak of protest and unrest
in Hong Kong. Because of the protests, the
legislation was eventually withdrawn but raised
significant questions about Beijing’s intentions
and police violence against protestors.[ 7]
Despite events in 2019, the government
circumvented the Hong Kong legislature and
enforced a new national security law (NSL) in
2020. The NSL outlawed all discord and made it
easier to prosecute people for collusion,
secession, subversion and terrorism. It also
authorized Beijing to set up a security force in
Hong Kong, an unprecedented step, and
influence its judicial system.[ 8 ] Seen as Beijing’s
attempt to prevent further unrest and maintain
control over Hong Kong, [ 9] the NSL has so far
been employed alongside a colonial-era
sedition law to apprehend and silence
opposition. Dr. Yan-ho Lai, research fellow at
GCAL, argues “the national security law has
already silenced dissent and the voices of civil
society”.[ 10 ]
June 2019 demonstrations against the proposed extradition bill
(Tyrone Siu/Reuters, 2021)
What is Article 23?
To complement the NSL, March 2024 saw
legislators ratify an additional comprehensive
security law, Article 23,[ 11 ] which further
criminalises five offenses: espionage and theft of
state secrets, foreign interference in Hong Kong’s
matters, insurrection, sabotage threatening
national security and treason. The legislation
gives police the right to detain suspects for up to
16 days without charge, allowed for closed-door
trials and organisations and companies can be
banned from Hong Kong if they are found to be
connected to “foreign forces”.[ 12] The move
reinforces China’s desire to control and restrict
the fundamental rights of Hongkongers thereby
obtaining greater control over the region. Critics
have condemned the move and state the city’s
independence at risk.[ 13 ] Sarah Brooks, Amnesty
International's China Director, states Article 23 will
“take repression to the next level”.[14]
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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However, the authorities tried to justify the move
by asserting that a considerable number of
offences defined in the legislation are equally
captured under identical laws in Western
countries.[ 15] But the move undeniably puts
more restrictions on Hongkongers in terms of
their fundamental freedoms.
How China is using the NSL and
Article 23 to crackdown on
Hongkongers
Hong Kong’s Basic Law stipulates that
Hongkongers ought to be assured freedom of
assembly, expression and press in addition to
being safeguarded in accordance with
international law, which constitutes those
affirmed by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.[16] However, Beijing
continues to use the NSL, and now Article 23 to
restrict majority of the aforementioned rights.
This includes cracking down on peaceful protest
and civil society groups challenging government
policy.[ 17]
n January 2024, Hong Kong police criticised
Radio Free Asia for citing “baseless” statements
by Ted Hui, who was accused of slandering the
police force and petitioning foreign states to
place an embargo on China and Hong Kong.
Hong Kong police now have greater powers to crack down on
dissent (Amnesty International, 2024).
Hui is a foreign-based activist who the police
have put forward a reward of $128,000 USD.[ 18 ]
Under the new legislation, Activists stationed
abroad can have their passports revoked while
those accused of sponsoring external critics,
parents included, risk incarceration.[ 19]
On 25 March 2024, Ma Chun-man, a pan-
democrat activist, was the first Hongkonger to
have Article 23 retroactively effected on his
conviction. He was initially found guilty for inciting
secession and was scheduled to be freed 48
hours after the enforcement of Article 23.[ 20 ]
However, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, John
Lee responded to this case by stating “it’s been
made very clear that if a prisoner is serving a
sentence in respect to his conviction of an
offence endangering national security, the
prisoner is not entitled to remission.”[ 21 ] Hence,
Mr Ma was to serve an additional 20 months in
prison.[ 22] Freedom of the press was also
affected in March, with Radio Free Asia forced to
close its doors in Hong Kong due to safety
concerns of its personnel.[ 23] Although the
media outlet maintains its legitimate media
registration, it does not have full-time employees
operating in the city as its foreign affiliation
under Article 23 is a point of concern to its ability
to function in safety.[ 24]
On 8 May 2024, a court of appeal reversed a
prior lower court verdict that had dismissed the
government’s request to prohibit a protest
anthem, ‘Glory to Hong Kong’, which is affiliated
with the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement
attributed to secession.[25] The reversal means
the use of the anthem is now punishable by a
minimum prison sentence of three years to a
maximum life sentence.[ 26] On 28 May 2024, six
individuals were detained under the pretext of
sedition. Those detained include, Chow Hang-
tung, a pan-democrat activist, who is currently
incarcerated on other charges. The group is said
to have allegedly used social media to
“advocate hatred” against the governments of
China and Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s security
secretary declared “those intending to endanger
national security should not delude themselves
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
27
into thinking they can avoid police pursuit by
remaining anonymous online”.[27][ 28] Since the
posts were published with seditious intent and
featured a forthcoming sensitive date, the
offence is subject to a seven year maximum
sentence.[29 ]
On 30 May 2024, 14 pro-democracy lawmakers
and aspirants of the ‘Hong Kong 47’ were
convicted for subversion under the NSL for
attempting to “overthrow” the government by
conducting unauthorised primaries to select
opposition contenders for local elections which
would have in turn triggered a “constitutional
crisis” if the primary winners had been elected as
legislators.[ 30 ][ 31 ][ 32][ 33 ] Whereas the
sentencing is to be conducted on a later date,
the offence is punishable by a minimum of three
years prison sentence to a life sentence. The
ruling, along with the anticipated sentencing, will
break new ground for cases implicating activists,
journalists, lawmakers and trade unionists that
have been declared guilty for carry out their work
and engaging in events that are in accordance
with their universally protected freedoms and
rights.[ 34]
On 3 June 2024, Chinese and Hong Kong
administrations detained several dissenters
including Zhan Xianling, Pu Zhiqiang, a human
rights lawyer, and Ji Feng, a student activist, prior
to the memorial of the Tiananmen Square
massacre, an event outlawed from public
recognition in China.[35]
The Hong Kong 47, biggest crackdown under the National Security
Law (BBC, 2024)
What are the consequences for
Hong Kong moving forward?
The antagonistic political climate has had an
acute effect on Hong Kong’s civil society. Spurred
on by government measures, advocacy has
been severely impeded, particularly following the
disqualification and resignation of opposition
legislators. Organisations, groups and people
collaborating with the United Nations and those
involved in the policy process and coordination
of civil society initiatives, encounter considerable
risk under the security law amidst the fading civil
sphere and restrictive political environment. For
example, Amnesty International’s
recommendations tabled in the course of Article
23 consultation process was flagged as one
originating from a foreign organization that was
‘anti-China’ and was rejected despite the
submission examining the legislation’s
conformity with international human rights
standards.[ 36]
Freedom of press is also at risk and the attack in
radio Free Asia, on spurious claims of foreign
interference, is a good example of this.[ 37]
Article 23 goes further and includes Hongkongers
association with foreigners as a form of external
influence.[ 38] Consequently, organizations
obtaining financial support are more susceptible
to prosecution for their involvement with external
forces. What’s more, prolonged detention with
both long-term sentences once convicted, and
prolonged detention of defendants awaiting trial
will become more common in cases of
supposed foreign interference by the press and
individuals.[ 39] Additionally, the application of
Article 23 retroactively puts current political
detainees and those that have utilized their
freedoms and rights peacefully at greater risk.
[40]
Conclusion
The use of the NSL and now Article 23 has been
used to target civil society groups and the free
press to stifle dissent and increase Beijing’s
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
28
control over Hong Kong. This includes attacks on
activists, journalists and protesters, which has
seen monitoring, harassment, arrests and the
use of the judicial system. This attack on Hong
Kong’s fundamental freedoms paints a bleak
future for Hongkongers. While Beijing would
argue otherwise, these attempts to control Hong
Kong civil society is counter to Hong Kong’s
proud history of allowing fundamental freedoms,
at least compared to mainland China, and to
international legal obligations when it comes to
freedom of expression, assembly and the press.
Even with external pressure from the international
community and protests by brave Hongkongers,
this appears to be a long-term and irreversible
trend towards repression of independent civil
society groups and media organisations.
More power for the Hong Kong police (Candice Chau/HKFP, 2024)
Policy recommendations
The international community should lobby for
transparency in case proceedings and
convictions for individuals charged under
Article 23. This will not only be a window into
the court’s operation but also an avenue to
scrutinize judicial decisions. Human rights
groups in Hong Kong should be free to do the
same without fear of reprisal.
Representatives of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights should be
allowed to conduct a visitation to Beijing and
Hong Kong and not only assess the human
right situation but also follow-up on the city’s
civil society.
UNHRC should persuade the government to
modify its regulatory measures on Hong
Kong’s civil society through continual
engagement with China to establish
comprehensive policies that safeguard and
warrant the crucial work of human rights
defenders. The UNHRC should also urge the
administration to report on steps taken to
protect civil liberties and human rights as well
as prompt the authorities to adhere to its
international legal obligations.
The international community should pressure
Beijing to repeal these laws to ensure Hong
Kong’s one state two systems policy is
respected and so Hongkongers can enjoy
their fundamental freedoms. The
international community also needs to
ensure Hongkongers abroad are protected
from these security laws.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
29
[1] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong (19 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong’s
Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking Down’,
Council on Foreign Relations (Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-
democracy-protests-china-crackdown.
[2] Helen Davidson (30 January 2024) ‘Hong Kong’s Article 23:
What Is the New National Security Law and What Will It Mean for
Human Rights?’, The Guardian (Accessed 6 May 2024)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-
article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-
mean.
[3] Al Jazeera (19 March 2024) ‘What Is Article 23, Hong Kong’s New
Draconian National Security Law?’, webpage (Accessed 2 May
2024) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-
article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law.
[4] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong (19 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong’s
Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking Down’,
Council on Foreign Relations (Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-
democracy-protests-china-crackdown.
[5] Kelly Ng (25 March 2024) ‘Article 23: What Is Hong Kong’s Tough
New Security Law?’, BBC News (Accessed 4 May
2024)https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68508694.
[6] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong (19 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong’s
Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking Down’,
Council on Foreign Relations (Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-
democracy-protests-china-crackdown.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kelly Ng (25 March 2024) ‘Article 23: What Is Hong Kong’s
Tough New Security Law?’, BBC News (Accessed 4 May
2024)https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68508694.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong (19 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong’s
Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking Down’,
Council on Foreign Relations (Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-
democracy-protests-china-crackdown.
[12] Al Jazeera (19 March 2024) ‘What Is Article 23, Hong Kong’s
New Draconian National Security Law?’, webpage (Accessed 2 May
2024) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-
article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law.
[13] Kelly Ng (25 March 2024) ‘Article 23: What Is Hong Kong’s
Tough New Security Law?’, BBC News (Accessed 4 May
2024)https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68508694.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong (19 March 2024) ‘Hong
Kong’s Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking
Down’, Council on Foreign Relations (Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-
democracy-protests-china-crackdown.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
30
[17] Amnesty International (22 March 2024) ‘What Is Hong Kong’s
Article 23 Law? 10 Things You Need to Know’, webpage (Accessed 2
May
2024)https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/what-
is-hong-kongs-article-23-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/.
[18] Kanis Leung (30 March 2024) ‘US-Funded Radio Free Asia
Closes Its Hong Kong Bureau over Safety Concerns under New
Security Law’, AP News (Accessed 30 May 2024)
https://apnews.com/article/radio-free-asia-close-bureau-hong-
kong-eb5dcb279c29fcca223e2dabcca6d9b4.
[19] Helen Davidson (30 January 2024) ‘Hong Kong’s Article 23:
What Is the New National Security Law and What Will It Mean for
Human Rights?’, The Guardian (Accessed 6 May 2024)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-
article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-
mean.
[20] Hong Kong Watch (26 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong Watch
Condemns First Application of Article 23’, webpage (Accessed 31
May 2024)https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-
posts/2024/3/26/hong-kong-watch-condemns-first-application-
of-article-23.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Arthur Kaufman (1 April 1 2024) ‘RFA Leaves Hong Kong, Citing
Safety Concerns for Staff Amid Article 23’, China Digital Times
(Accessed 30 May 2024)
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/04/rfa-leaves-hong-kong-
citing-safety-concerns-for-staff-amid-article-23/.
[24] James Pomfret (29 March 2024) ‘US-Funded Radio Free Asia
Shuts Hong Kong Bureau, Citing Security Law Concerns’, Reuters,
(Accessed 30 May 2024)
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/us-funded-
radio-free-asia-shuts-hong-kong-bureau-citing-security-law-
concerns-2024-03-29/.
[25] Hong Kong Watch (8 May 2024) ‘Hong Kong court ban on
pro-democracy anthem ‘Glory to Hong Kong’ sparks new fears over
heightened censorship in Hong Kong’, webpage (Accessed: 31 May
2024)
https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2024/5/8/hong-
kong-court-ban-on-pro-democracy-anthem-glory-to-hong-
kong-sparks-new-fears-over-heightened-censorship-in-hong-
kong.
[26] Baker Mckenzie (2020) ‘National Security Law in Hong Kong’,
Report (Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publicatio
ns/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-
summary_160720.pdf.
[27] James Pomfret and Jessie Pang (30 March 2024) ‘Activist
among six held over new Hong Kong sedition law’, Harden
Murrumburrah Express. (Accessed 29 May 2024)
https://www.hardenexpress.com.au/story/8644556/activist-
among-six-held-over-new-hong-kong-sedition-law/.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Yvette Tan (30 May 2024) ‘The 47 Hong Kong Activists in the
City’s Largest National Security Case’, BBC (Accessed 4 June
2024)https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c722wq7rgqgo.
[31] Hong Kong Watch (30 May 2024) ‘Fourteen of ‘Hong Kong 47’
Found Guilty for Participating in pro-Democracy Primary Elections’,
webpage (Accessed 31 May 2024)
https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2024/5/30-fourteen-
of-hong-kong-47-found-guilty-for-participating-in-pro-
democracy-primary-election.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Hong Kong Watch (30 May 2024) ‘Fourteen of ‘Hong Kong 47’
Found Guilty for Participating in pro-Democracy Primary Elections’,
webpage (Accessed 31 May 2024)
https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2024/5/30-fourteen-
of-hong-kong-47-found-guilty-for-participating-in-pro-
democracy-primary-election.
[35] Helen Davidson (3 June 2024) ‘China and Hong Kong
reportedly detain dissidents before Tiananmen Square anniversary’,
The Guardian (Accessed 08 June 2024)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/03/china-
and-hong-kong-reportedly-detain-dissidents-ahead-of-
tiananmen-square-anniversary.
[36] Amnesty International (8 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong: Article 23
Legislation Takes Repression to ‘next Level’, webpage (Accessed 1
May 2024)
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/hong-kong-
article-23-legislation-takes-repression-to-next-level/.
[37] Kanis Leung (30 March 2024) ‘US-Funded Radio Free Asia
Closes Its Hong Kong Bureau over Safety Concerns under New
Security Law’, AP News (Accessed 30 May 2024)
https://apnews.com/article/radio-free-asia-close-bureau-hong-
kong-eb5dcb279c29fcca223e2dabcca6d9b4.
[38] Michael Davis (20 March 2024) ‘What Article 23 Means for the
Future of Hong Kong and Its Once Vibrant Pro-Democracy
Movement’, The Conversation (Accessed 2 May 2024)
https://theconversation.com/what-article-23-means-for-the-
future-of-hong-kong-and-its-once-vibrant-pro-democracy-
movement-226186.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Hong Kong Watch (26 March 2024) ‘Hong Kong Watch
Condemns First Application of Article 23’, webpage (Accessed 31
May 2024) https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all
posts/2024/3/26/hong-kong-watch-condemns-first-application-
of-article-23.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
11
Key takeaways
In August 2017, the biggest exodus of
Rohingya to Bangladesh from Myanmar
started, with most now living in poorly
equipped refugee camps. This has resulted
in years of displacement, persecution and
the violation of basic human rights, which
continues to this day.
Bangladesh has opted for a temporary
policy solution for displaced Rohingya, which
has led to an ongoing situation where this
cohort is denied basic human rights,
equipment to live comfortably in refugee
camps and a lack of longer-term options
like visas to live and work in Bangladesh. This
has been done to discourage future
refugees and has increased vulnerability
and insecurity within the camps.
Conditions in the camps are poor, due to the
lack of support from Bangladesh, including a
lack of equipment, foodstuffs and medicine.
This has meant natural disasters like
cyclones have an acute effect on the
camps, worsening the situation for displaced
Rohingyadue to their geographic location
and high population density.
Bangladesh and the international
community need to do more. After a period
of steady decline in humanitarian funding
from abroad, there is recent hope that
donors are beginning to increase assistance
by funding dietary and sanitary needs.
However, providing funding is only a short
term solution.
Introduction
Almost seven years have passed since the start
of the largest exodus of Rohingya, a Muslim
minority group from Myanmar.[1] Rohingya
have been discriminated against for decades,
with limitations on their freedom of movement
and severe violations of their economic, social
and political rights.[2] Due to this consistent
pattern of violence, “the most persecuted
population in the world” has migrated, or been
forcibly displaced out of Myanmar, with most
fleeing into neighboring Bangladesh.[3][4] The
largest displacement event was in 2017, when
the Burmese military launched a renewed
campaign of atrocities against Rohingya in
Rakhine state, which forced over a million
people to flee the country, with many settling in
Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.[5][6][7] Seven years
later has no seen an improvement in how the
Rohingya are treated in Bangladesh.
Camps are overcrowded, aid from abroad has
been steadily declining, and natural disasters
have only exacerbated these problems.[8] With
fighting in Northern Rakhine state expected to
lead to more Rohingya fleeing Myanmar, it’s
important to understand what are the current
living conditions in the camps, and what can
the international community do better in light of
the worsening of the crisis.[9]
Natural disaster vulnerability
Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to natural
disasters and ranked the 7th extreme disaster
risk-prone country in the world.[10]
Forgotten crisis: The realities of Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh
Vittoria Cateni
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
32
This came after another fire a week earlier left
more than 4,000 people homeless.[17] Overall,
there have been five fires in the Ukhiya camp
since the start of 2024.[18] The prevalence of
fires have been put down to the explosion of gas
cylinders and methods of generating electricity,
such as plugs and cables, which are
rudimentary, poorly designed and left uncovered.
[19] Matched with the high inflammability of
building materials, these conditions significantly
increase the likelihood of fires.
Cyclone Remal hitting the coast of Bangladesh (The Business
Standard,, 2024)
A temporary solution
It is undeniable that the conditions in which the
Rohingya live have increased the group’s
vulnerability to natural disasters. One of the main
causes of this are the short term, temporary
policies of the Bangladeshi government.
Bangladesh has made enormous efforts to
accommodate the Rohingya in the past decade,
but it has also firmly resisted any permanent
scenario where Rohingya are integrated into the
country’s society, insisting that repatriation
towards Myanmar would be the best solution.
[20] Bangladesh fears permitting Rohingya to
settle permanently would spark an increase in
the number of people crossing the border into
Bangladesh, and would enable the intention of
Myanmar’s junta to push Rohingya out of
Myanmar.[21] There is also a fear that high
numbers of Rohingya will spark hostilities
between local and host communities, as they
struggle for the limited resources.
The United Nations has condemned the latest violence against the
Rohingya in Myanmar (ABC, 2024)
The country’s geographic location makes it
susceptible to the yearly monsoon and its high
population density significantly increases the
chances of natural disasters. While Bangladesh
has been able to develop strong disaster
prevention and relief policies, this has not
translated to better protection for displaced
Rohingya in refugee camps.[11] The latest
phenomenon, Cyclone Remal, which hit
Bangladesh during the last week of May 2024,
had an enormous impact on the lives of people
within the camps. According to the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), the cyclone
has severely compromised the camps, with over
50,000 shelters now at risk of landslides and
7,000 people at risk of flooding.[12] Most shelters
are made out of materials like bamboo and
tarpaulins, which easily damaged by heavy
winds. The camps also have limited
infrastructure, including a lack of proper
drainage systems.[13][14] Camps are also built
in locations particularly prone to natural
disasters, which has meant refugees are bearing
the brunt of cyclones and flooding. For example,
camps around Cox’s Bazar have been flattened
to accommodate more refugees, making the soil
more vulnerable to climate.[15]
The cyclone is not the only phenomenon which
has hit the camps in recent weeks. On 1 June
2024, a fire broke out in camp 13 in Ukhiya, which
destroyed over 175 shelters and left 1,200
refugees homeless.[16]
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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Furthermore, members of the government have
used arguments tying the presence of Rohingya
to the increasing amounts of drugs coming into
the country.[22] Thus, the government is careful
in taking any steps that could lead to citizenship
and recognition of Rohingya’s refugee status. For
example, Bangladesh has adopted a policy of
“non-permanent materials”, prohibiting the use of
any stable construction materials such as bricks,
mud and concrete.[23]
Construction of shelters in Rohingya refugee camps (Arab News,
2021)
Bangladesh does not recognise Rohingya as
legitimate refugees and is not a signatory to the
1951 Refugee Convention, which has led to the
government prohibiting Rohingya from working in
Bangladesh. This has meant many Rohingya
families are being kept in poverty and pushed
towards the informal sector of the economy.[24]
High unemployment rates for young Rohingya is
one of the leading drivers to their involvement in
drugs and armed groups. The latter has become
increasingly prominent within the camps in
recent months, with members of those groups
recruiting or forcing many to fight back in
Myanmar.[25][26] This suggests there is a real
and urgent need to provide opportunities for
Rohingya in terms of education and work, in
order to provide livelihoods and also deter some
from involvement in illegal activities.
The role of the international
community
Bangladesh has taken on the burden of hosting
Rohingya, but it is reliant on the international
community to meet the needs of more than a
million refugees. The international community
has mobilized to provide assistance to the
affected camps in Bangladesh. For example, the
European Union provided 1.2 million Euros in
humanitarian aid in the aftermath of Cyclone
Remal.[27] Longer term, the international
community, to varying extents, has stepped
forward since 2017 by providing millions in
humanitarian aid, and by deploying technical
organizations such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and
IOM. But funding and attention to the crisis has
been in steady decline since. The latest 2023
Rohingya Humanitarian crisis response plan
required around $875 million to assist Rohingya
and this has only been quarter funded.[28] Part
of the reason for the decline in funding is due to
the Bangladeshi government’s behavior. The
administration has hindered the organizations’
work by limiting their presence in camps to
daylight hours and by adopting an approach of
securitization towards refugees, constructing
fences around camps and maximizing police
involvement.[29] For these reasons, donors have
been reluctant to provide consistent funding in
order to avoid being complicit in a policy
depriving refugees of their rights.
Fences constructed around the refugee camps to limit freedom of
movement (Human Rights Watch, 2021)
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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The international community has also been
involved in multiple humanitarian crises in recent
years, limiting the availability of resources for
Rohingya.
However, 2024 has seen an uptick in funding and
interest by the international community. May and
June 2024 saw the World Food Programme and
the European Commission provide funding to
increase the food ration per person from $8 to
$11, withthe full amount of $12 being the goal for
August.[30][31] The international community has
also strived to provide additional sanitary
assistance, seen with WHO implementing a
campaign to combat the spread of scabies, with
more than 70,000 people reported to be affected
by the contagious disease in October 2023.[32]
The campaign ran between November 2023 and
February 2024 and saw a dramatic drop in the
weekly prevalence of scabies.[33] Increasing aid
and funding is improving, at least partially, the
conditions Rohingya face within the camps. This
renewed spark in funding can be perhaps
attributed to the worsening of the civil war in
Myanmar, as well as the recent natural disasters
that have befallen the Rohingya in Bangladesh.
However, reactionary, post-disaster aid is not
sustainable and doesn’t provide Rohingya with a
long term solution.
Presence of WHO and other international organizations in
Bangladesh for the Mass Drug Administration campaign (WHO,
2024)
Conclusion
Rohingya have been persecuted for decades,
and have been forced to flee Myanmar for
Bangladesh because of extreme violence.
However, living conditions for Rohingya in
Bangladesh are poor, and leave people facing
serious humanitarian issues, made worse by
natural disasters. These problems are made
more acute through the unwillingness of the
Bangladeshi government to provide a
permanent solution to the problem and an equal
unwillingness by the international community to
adequately seek solutions beyond aid. With the
number of Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar
expected to exponentially grow in the coming
months, humanitarian aid alone cannot be
regarded as a sustainable solution to the crisis.
The world needs to work with Bangladesh to
solve the problem in the long term, meaning
ending the conflict in Myanmar, and working with
Bangladesh to re-home Rohingya in Bangladesh
or a third-party country.
Policy recommendations
The best solution is solving the problem at its
source, which is the treatment of Rohingya in
Myanmar and the ongoing civil conflict. The
international community needs to hold
Myanmar‘s junta accountable through the
International Court of Justice, like the Gambia
vs Myanmar case, and through economic
sanctions.
Bangladesh should be supported by the
international community in hosting Rohingya
refugees. Third-country repatriation could be
a solution to re-home thousands of Rohingya
and the onus needs to be on regional
partners and western governments to accept
refugees. Failing this, the international
community needs to remain focused on
adequately funding their humanitarian needs,
particularly when there are natural disasters,
and seeking to open a constructive debate
on how to move forward.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
35
The international community should also
maintain its support towards Bangladesh,
and continue on the recently-adopted path
of renewed attention. Innovative solutions,
looking beyond aid, could include incentives
such as the expansion of trade agreements
between Bangladesh and OECD countries, in
order to incentivize Bangladesh to adopt a
more inclusive approach towards refugees.
In the short-term, it is important to focus on
policies that can help with the situation in
Bangladesh. First, the Bangladeshi
government could engage in policies to
integrate refugees within the labor market,
which would decrease povery annd the level
of criminality within the camps. The
integration of refugees within the labor
market could also help raise productivity and
stimulate Bangladesh’s economy.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
36
[1] UNHCR, (23 August 2023) ‘Rohingya refugee crisis explained ‘,
Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-
explained/#RohingyainBangladesh.
[2] Amnesty International (n.d.) ‘Myanmar ‘s apartheid against the
Rohingya’, Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/myanmar-apartheid-against-
rohingya.
[3] Md. Kamrul Hasan Arif (25 September 2020) ‘The Rohingya
refugees in Bangladesh: Non-refoulement and legal obligation
under national and international law’, International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/27/4/article-p855_855.xml.
[4] Human Rights Watch (n.d.) ‘Historical background’, Webpage
(Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-
01.htm#:~:text=Thousands%20of%20Rohingya%20fled%20to,triggere
d%20by%20broader%20political%20struggles.
[5] Human Rights Watch (22 August 2024) ‘Myanmar: No justice,
no freedom for Rohingya 5 years on’, Webpage (Accessed 10 June
2024) https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/24/myanmar-no-
justice-no-freedom-rohingya-5-years.
[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (January 2021)
‘The displaced and stateless of Myanmar in the Asia-Pacific region’,
Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/The%20Displaced%2
0and%20Stateless%20of%20Myanmar%20in%20the%20Asia-
Pacific%20Region%20-%20January%202021.pdf.
.
[7] UNHCR (12 July 2022) ‘Rohingya refugee response/Bangladesh:
Rohingya population by location’, ReliefWeb (as of 30 June 2022)’
(Accessed 10 June 2024)
https://reliefweb.int/map/bangladesh/rohingya-refugee-
responsebangladesh-rohingya-population-location-30-june-
2022.
[8] UN news (28 May 2024) ‘UN supports response as Cyclone
Remal batters communities in Bangladesh, India’, Webpage
(Accessed 7 June 2024)
https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1150306.
[9] Crisis group (10 May 2024) ‘War in Western Myanmar: Avoiding
a Rakhine-Rohingya conflict’, Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-
asia/myanmar/war-western-myanmar-avoiding-rakhine-
rohingya-conflict.
[10] United Nations Development Program (22 March 2023)
‘Climate vulnerability index’, Webpage
https://www.undp.org/bangladesh/publications/climate-
vulnerability-index-draft.
[11] The Financial Times (26 October 2020) ‘Bangladesh succeeds
in effective disaster management’, Webpage (Accessed 9 June
2024)
https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/opinions/bangladesh-
succeeds-in-effective-disaster-management-1603722306.
[12] Ahtaram Shin (6 June 2024) ‘Rohingya refugee camps
devastated by cyclone Remal’, New Internationalist (Accessed 9
June 2024) https://newint.org/climate/2024/rohingya-refugee-
camps-devastated-cyclone-remal.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
37
[13] Shamrita Zaman, Peter Sammonds, Bayes Ahmed, Taifur
Rahman (November 2020) ‘Disaster risk reduction in conflict
contexts: Lessons learned from the lived experiences of Rohingya
refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh’, International Journal of
Disaster Risk Reduction (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420919317
145.
[14] Arafatul Islam (30 July 2021) ‘Bangladesh: Deforestation leaves
Rohingya refugees at risk’, Deutsche Welle (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.dw.com/en/bangladesh-deforestation-leaves-
rohingya-refugees-vulnerable/a-58703683.
[15] Ibid.
[16] SM Najmus Sakib (1 June 2024) ‘Fire leaves 1,200 Rohingya
homeless in Bangladesh camps’, Anadolu Ajansı (Accessed 8 June
2024) https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/fire-leaves-1-200-
rohingya-homeless-in-bangladesh-camps/3237335.
[17] Views Bangladesh (24 May 2024) ‘Fire in Rohingya camp
leaves 4,000 Rohingyas under open sky’, Website (Accessed 8 June
2024) https://viewsbangladesh.com/en/fire-in-rohingya-camp-
leaves-4000-rohingyas-under-open-sky/.
[18] Dhaka Tribune (3 June 2024) ‘Who are the ‘outsiders’ blamed
for Rohingya camp fires?’, Website (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/348217/who-
are-the-%E2%80%98outsiders%E2%80%99-blamed-for-rohingya-
camp.
[19] Shelter Projects (n.d.) ‘Bangladesh 2018-21 / Rohingya crisis’,
Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.shelterprojects.org/shelterprojects8/ref/A11-
bangladesh180821.pdf.
[20] Parimol Palma and Rejual Karim Byron (31 July 2021)
‘Rohingyas in Bangladesh: No question of their integration with
locals’, The Daily Star (Accessed 10 June 2024)
https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/rohingyas-
bangladesh-no-question-their-integration-locals-2141006#.
[21] Shaikh Abdur Rahman (18 August 2021) ‘Rohingya Crisis: Why
‘Local Integration’ Is The Wrong Policy’, Eurasia Review (Accessed 7
June 2024) https://www.eurasiareview.com/18082021-rohingya-
crisis-why-local-integration-is-the-wrong-policy-oped/.
[22] DD news (31 May 2024) ‘No more Rohingya will be allowed in
Bangladesh: Bangladesh home minister’ (Accessed 12 June 2024)
https://ddnews.gov.in/en/no-more-rohingya-will-be-allowed-in-
bangladesh-bangladesh-home-minister/.
[23] Shelter Projects (n.d.) ‘Bangladesh 2018-21 / Rohingya crisis’,
Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.shelterprojects.org/shelterprojects8/ref/A11-
bangladesh180821.pdf.
[24] Human Rights Watch (4 April 2022) ‘Bangladesh: New
restrictions on Rohingya camps’, Webpage (Accessed 8 June
2024)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/04/bangladesh-new-
restrictions-rohingya-camps.
[25] Center for Strategic and International Studies (1 May 2023)
‘The Rohingya’s plight in Bangladesh is not sustainable’, Webpage
(Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://www.csis.org/analysis/rohingyas-plight-bangladesh-not-
sustainable.
[26] The Economist (6 June 2024) ‘Rohingya are being forced to
fight in Myanmar’s civil war‘ (Accessed 10 June 2024)
https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/06/06/rohingya-are-
being-forced-to-fight-in-myanmars-civil-war.
[27] Sir Agenzia d’Informazione (3 June 2024) ‘EU: 1.2 million in
humanitarian aid to assist victims of cyclone Remal in Bangladesh
and India’, Webpage (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://www.agensir.it/quotidiano/2024/6/3/eu-1-2-million-in-
humanitarian-aid-to-assist-victims-of-cyclone-remal-in-
bangladesh-and-india/.
[28] UN news (20 July 2023) ‘Funding ‘simply not enough’ for
Rohingya refugees, UN agencies report’ (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138917.
[29] Katie Hatdash (21 December 2021) ‘Why international
assistance for the Rohingya in Bangladesh is declining’, The
Diplomat (Accessed 9 June 2024)
https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/why-international-assistance-
for-the-rohingya-in-bangladesh-is-declining/.
[30] World Food Program (31 December 2023) ‘WFP to increase
food ration from US$8 to US$10 for all Rohingya refugees in Cox’s
Bazar’ (Accessed 8 June 2024)
https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/wfp-increase-food-
ration-us8-us10-all-rohingya-refugees-coxs-bazar.
[31] European Commission (1 May 2024) ‘Food ration cuts in
Bangladesh: a year of struggles and hope for Rohingya refugees’,
Webpage (Accessed 8 June 2024) https://civil-protection-
humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/stories/food-ration-
cuts-bangladesh-year-struggles-and-hope-rohingya-
refugees_en.
[32] World Health Organization (29 January 2024) ‘WHO
implements large-scale Ivermectin-based MDA for one million
Rohingya refugees’, Webpage (Accessed 7 June 2024)
https://www.who.int/bangladesh/news/detail/29-01-2024-who-
implements-large-scale-ivermectin-based-mda-for-one-million-
rohingya-refugees\.
[33] Medicine for All People (8 May 2024) ‘MAP, WHO, and
Edenbridge help Rohingya refugees fight scabies outbreak with
mass drug administration’, Webpage (Accessed 7 June 2024)
https://www.map.org/blog/2024/05/08/map-who-edenbridge-
help-rohingya-refugees-fight-scabies-outbreak-mass-drug-
administration/.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
38
Key takeaways
Sri Lanka's economic problems have
troubled the island nation for years and has
escalated into a severe humanitarian crisis.
This has led to acute food insecurity,
widespread unrest, and ongoing resource
shortages, particularly in healthcare.
The humanitarian crisis is far reaching and
has disproportionately affected vulnerable
groups in Sri Lankan society, including those
in rural areas, the existing poor, and younger
adults attempting to find employment.
The government has attempted to solve this
crisis through the privatization of state-
owned entities and increased taxation. But
these measures have raised concerns about
whether they will solve the problem or
exacerbate existing inequalities for the
already economically disadvantaged.
Addressing the humanitarian crisis requires
a comprehensive and coordinated
approach, including immediate
humanitarian assistance, economic reforms,
and debt restructuring, climate change
adaptation, inclusive policy-making,
strengthening democratic institutions, and
international cooperation.
Introduction
Sri Lanka, an island nation once hailed as the
‘pearl of the Indian Ocean’ has been grappling
with a multifaceted humanitarian crisis,
stemming from a severe economic downturn
that began in 2019. The crisis, initially fueled by
poor economic management through ill-
advised tax cuts and a poorly managed shift to
organic farming intersected with and a series of
events. These included the 2019 easter
bombings, the COVID-19 pandemic, and
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[1] The crisis has
manifested itself in various forms, including
food insecurity, poverty, loss of livelihoods, and
attacks on the human rights of Sri Lankans.[2]
The government in Colombo has attempted to
solve the crisis through better economic
management and deals with neighboring
states and organisations like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). But concerns remain that
the thousands of Sri Lankans already affected
A man counts money at a marketplace in Colombo, Sri Lanka,
October 21, 2022 [Human Rights Watch 2023)
will not see any benefits due to the potential
solutions being reliant on privatization and with
few policies aimed at long term solutions when
it comes to alleviating poverty.[3] For this
reason, this article will analyse Sri Lanka’s
ongoing humanitarian crisis and the steps the
government is making to solve the problem.
Sri Lanka's humanitarian crisis: An unfolding tragedy
Ojus Tyagi
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
39
The economic crisis and its
humanitarian impact
Sri Lanka’s economic downturn led to high
foreign debt, high inflation, shortage of of
necessities, declined foreign currency reserves,
devaluation of the currency, and several
lockdowns during the pandemic, which contrarily
affected the country's economic growth.[4]
These issues have had far-reaching
consequences, affecting every aspect of society.
A 2022/2023 United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) survey found that 55.7 per
cent of the population, or 12.34 million people, are
"multidimensionally vulnerable" across various
dimensions due to the crisis.[5] Shockingly, 82
percent of those found vulnerable lived in rural
areas, highlighting the disproportionate impact
on the nation's rural population.[6]
Healthcare has also been affected by the ongoing humanitarian
crisis (The New Humanitarian, 2023)
According to the World Bank, three-fourths of
households have limited their expenditures or
changed their diets in response to higher living
costs.[7] Food security deteriorated again in the
second half of 2023, with 3.9 million people being
moderately food insecure and over 10,000
households facing severe food insecurity.[8]
Making matters worse, the impact of La Niña has
been felt across various agricultural products,
with the price of carrots, for example,
plummeting from a staggering Rs. 2,000 per kg
in January 2024 to Rs.360 by the end of the first
week of March.[9] Dr. Kumari Rathnayake,
Director of the Department of Agriculture Natural
Resources Management Centre, has warned the
southwest monsoon in June and July 2024 could
result in above-average rains, further impacting
crops.[10] The food crisis has caused
widespread hardship, including intersecting with
increased poverty rates, with 25.9 per cent of the
population living below the poverty line in 2023,
compared to pre-COVID levels of 11.3 per cent in
2019.[11] People grapple with inflated prices for
essential goods, facing long queues to secure
basic supplies.
How is the government solving the
problem?
Capitalisation and privatisation woes
The Sri Lankan government has attempted to
solve the crisis by focusing on an economic
solution. But the measures have drawn criticism,
with many accusing the government of
capitalizing on the crisis and exacerbating the
plight of the less affluent. To meet the conditions
set by the IMF for the March 2023 bailout, in
which a $3 billion package was planned, the
Wickremesinghe administration has
implemented significant reforms, including
unpopular measures such as major tax hikes
and debt restructuring. These tax hikes have
affected the daily life of the people and plunged
them into utter poverty. The government has
also embarked on a path of privatisation, with
the first target being Ceylon Petroleum. The
cabinet has approved licenses for foreign
companies like Sinopec, United Petroleum
Australia, and RM Parks of the US, in collaboration
with Shell, to enter the fuel retail market,
effectively privatizing a significant portion of the
state-owned Ceylon Petroleum.[12] This move
has raised concerns about the impact on the
livelihoods of thousands of employees and the
potential for further hardships for the
economically disadvantaged. These conditions
are leading people to seek better opportunities
by migrating to foreign countries
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
40
Additionally, the government has implemented a
significant increase in taxation, including
extending the value-added tax to payees and
raising the value-added tax rate to 18 per cent,
effective from January 2024.[13] These
measures, while aimed at fiscal consolidation,
have the potential to further strain the already-
burdened populace, raising concerns about their
impact on the most vulnerable segments of
society. This has led to protests, university staff
across the country protesting a recent tax
increase on their salaries.[14]
Geopolitical narratives
To solve the economic and humanitarian
problems Sri Lanka faces, the government is
trying to carefully manage its relationships with
its neighbors. This includes focusing and
revitalizing ties with its South Asian and East
Asian neighbors in an attempt to replenish its
financial coffers.[15] For example, in February
2024, Sri Lanka signed a Free Trade Agreement
with Thailand and is dealing with India and China
to obtain economic relief. In March 2024, Sri
Lankan Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena
visited China for a six-day visit, with discussions
revolving around revamping and rebuilding the
bilateral relationship with Premier Li Qiang and
Chinese President Xi Jinping.[16] China is crucial
The Sri Lankan Government had extended the Sri Lankan Airlines
privatization till January this year [SAV, 2023]
to Sri Lanka not just economically but also as a
way to counterbalance India during times when
ties are not always cordial. Also in March, a
delegation from Sri Lanka traveled to London to
meet with several investment funds that own the
country's government bonds, which are valued
at over $12 billion.[17] The delegation's
negotiations with investment funds holding Sri
Lankan government bonds could lead to debt
restructuring or relief, potentially freeing up
resources for social welfare programs and
economic recovery efforts that would directly
benefit the Sri Lankan people. However, it
remains to be seen whether the government
would be interested in policies like this after
being focused on privitisation.
Conclusion
The economic and humanitarian crises in Sri
Lanka are now years old but still present a
multifaceted and complex problem in need of a
solution. The economic downturn has had far-
reaching consequences, plunging millions into
poverty and increasing food insecurity,
particularly in rural areas. The situation has been
further exacerbated by climate change and
extreme weather events, as well as government
policies that have prioritized fiscal consolidation
over the well-being of the people. While the
challenges facing Sri Lanka are daunting, there
are glimmers of hope on the horizon. The IMF has
acknowledged that Sri Lanka's economic reform
program is starting to work, and the country is
expected to experience positive growth in 2024
as private consumption picks up from a low
base. But the IMF also claims that continued
reform efforts are needed for people to feel the
benefits.[18] The intervention of the IMF has led to
modest improvement in the previously difficult
living conditions faced by many Sri Lankan
people. Overcoming corruption and inefficiency
will be crucial for a sustainable recovery. The IMF
stresses that unethical practices such as
corruption, unjustified tax breaks, and unfair
procurement processes result in increased
financial burdens for the entire population. These
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
41
practices lead to higher taxes and elevated
costs, with the most severe impact falling on
society's most vulnerable members.[19]
Transparency, accountability, and good
governance must be prioritised to ensure that
economic reforms and development initiatives
truly benefit the people of Sri Lanka. Due to the
current economic crisis, Sri Lankans who were
impacted by the war are once again facing
significant challenges in fulfilling their basic
humanitarian needs, including food, education,
and healthcare. The road to recovery for Sri
Lanka will be long and arduous, but with a
comprehensive and coordinated approach,
involving all stakeholders and addressing the
multifaceted challenges, the country can emerge
from this crisis stronger and more resilient.
Policy recommendations
The international community, including
unilaterally and through the United Nations,
should scale up its humanitarian efforts to
provide immediate relief in the form of food,
healthcare, and necessities to the most
vulnerable populations. This needs to be
targeted at those most affected, such as Sri
Lankans living in rural areas.
The Sri Lankan government needs to continue
to work closely with the IMF, bilateral creditors,
and bondholders to restructure its debt and
implement economic reforms that prioritize
inclusive growth and social protection
programs. All economic reforms should focus
on rebuilding and safeguarding the economy
while also focusing on those most affected.
Sri Lanka needs to safeguard its agriculture-
dependent economy by investing in climate-
resilient agriculture, disaster preparedness,
and sustainable development initiatives to
mitigate the impact of extreme weather
events and ensure long-term food security.
The international community, particularly
developed states in the Indo-Pacific, can play
an important role here.
The government should engage in inclusive
policymaking, ensuring that the voices and
needs of all segments of society, including
minority communities, are considered in the
decision-making process. This will help
prevent discriminatory policies and promote
equitable development. More broadly, Sri
Lanka must strengthen its democratic
institutions, uphold the rule of law, and
protect civil liberties, including freedom of
expression and association.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
42
[1] ORF Special Report (2023) 'Sri Lankan economy: crisis,
consolidation, and collaboration'', Observer Research Foundation
(Accessed 20 June 2024) https://www.orfonline.org/research/sri-
lankan-economy-crisis-consolidation-and-collaboration/.
[2] UN News (2023) 'UN ramps up humanitarian appeal for life-
saving assistance to 3.4 million Sri Lankans', Webpage (Accessed
10 June 2024) UN ramps up humanitarian appeal for life-saving
assistance to 3.4 million Sri Lankans | UN News.
[3] ORF Special Report (2023) 'Sri Lankan economy: crisis,
consolidation, and collaboration'', Observer Research Foundation
(Accessed 20 June 2024) https://www.orfonline.org/research/sri-
lankan-economy-crisis-consolidation-and-collaboration/.
[4] Shivam Tripathi (2023) 'A Study of the economic crisis and its
impacts with special reference to Sri Lanka', ResearchGate
(Accessed 17 June 2024)
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shivam-Tripathi-
11/publication/366863980_A_STUDY_OF_THE_ECONOMIC_CRISIS
_AND_ITS_IMPACTS_WITH_SPECIAL_REFERENCE_TO_SRI_LANKA/li
nks/63b58f4d097c7832ca8d4cae/A-STUDY-OF-THE-ECONOMIC-
CRISIS-AND-ITS-IMPACTS-WITH-SPECIAL-REFERENCE-TO-SRI-
LANKA.pdf.
[5] The Hindu BusinessLine (2023) 'Sri Lanka's economic crisis
revealed: Over half the population 'multidimensionally vulnerable,'
says UNDP survey', Webpage (Accessed 18 June 2024) Sri Lanka’s
economic crisis revealed: Over half the population
‘multidimensionally vulnerable,’ says UNDP survey - The Hindu
BusinessLine.
[6] ibid.
[7] World Bank (2023) 'Sri Lanka Development Update', Webpage,
(Accessed 19 June 2024) Sri Lanka Development Update
worldbank.org.
[8] UNICEF (2023) 'Sri Lanka Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2
(Economic Crisis): January to December 2023', ReliefWeb
(Accessed 11 June 2024) https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-
lanka/unicef-sri-lanka-humanitarian-situation-report-no-2-
economic-crisis-january-december-2023.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Gunathilaka (2023) ‘Economic Security in the face of high tax
burden in Sri Lanka’, Webpage (Accessed 15 June 2024)
https://www.defence.lk/Article/view_article/27441.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Newsfirst (16 June 2024) 'University non-Academic staff strike
reaches day 46', Webpage (Accessed 16 June 2024)
https://www.newsfirst.lk/2024/06/16/university-non-academic-
staff-strike-reaches-day-46.
[15] Al Jazeera (2024) 'Sri Lanka signs free trade deal with Thailand
to revive economy', Webpage (Accessed 11 June 2024)
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/2/15/sri-lanka-signs-
free-trade-deal-with-thailand-to-revive-economy.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
43
[16] The Hindu (2024) 'Sri Lankan Prime Minister Dinesh
Gunawardena arrives on six-day visit to China', Webpage
(Accessed 11 June 2024) Sri Lankan Prime Minister Dinesh
Gunawardena arrives on six-day visit to China - The Hindu.
[17] Reuters (2024) 'Sri Lanka's economic crisis and debt
restructuring efforts', Webpage (Accessed 11 June 2024) Sri Lanka's
economic crisis and debt restructuring efforts | Reuters.
[18] IMF (2024) ‘Sri Lanka's Economic Reform Program is Starting to
Work—Keep at It for a Full Recovery', Webpage (Accessed 11 June
2024) Sri Lanka’s Economic Reform Program is Starting to Work—
Keep at It for a Full Recovery (imf.org).
[19] Ibid.
Key takeaways
On 10 February 2024, the State
Administration Council of Myanmar
announced the implementation of the
People's Military Service Law, also known as
the conscription law. The law mandates the
youth of Myanmar to serve in the junta
armed forces.
The new law is designed to strengthen the
Junta’s military position after recent
setbacks against separatist groups, but it
has had negative effects, including
exacerbating Myanmar’s already dire human
humanitarian crisis and pushing young
people to flee abroad legally or illegally.
This broader situation in Myanmar demands
prompt intervention from international
organisations like the United Nations and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) through targeted sanctions,
immediate ceasefire, and assigning envoys
to offer humanitarian aid.
Introduction
In February 2021, Myanmar entered the darkest
phase of its history when the Myanmar military
staged a coup, turning the country into a civil
war zone.[1] Subsequently, the military has
made every possible effort to gain dominance
over the nation through the implementation of
ruthless strategies, including mass killing,
arbitrary detentions, and displacement of
millions. Nevertheless, the circumstances have
shifted since October 2023 after the initiation of
'Operation 1027' by the Arakan Army, Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang
National Liberation Army.[2] Operation 1027 has
seen strategic positions seized and junta
commerce routes disrupted. The Junta has
suffered significant losses in northern Shan
State, including a drastic reduction in its military
strength, from 500,000 men to 150,000 or less.
[3] This has put a serious strain on the Junta's
resources and capabilities and has led to the
rolling out of the new conscription legislation.
Against this backdrop, this article will analyse
the impact of the conscription law on the
humanitarian crisis in Myanmar and analyse
the international response, and propose
recommendations to avert further humanitarian
catastrophes.
Trainees of the first batch of military conscripts have meals at an
opening ceremony for their training session at a military
compound (The Diplomat, 2024)
Overview of the conscription law
On 4 November 2010, the military regime in
Myanmar introduced a conscription law before
elections.[4] However, it remained inactive
during the civilian government's rule from 2011 to
2021.[5] Three years after a coup on 10 February
2024, Myanmar's military regime decided to
enforce the conscription law.Major General Zaw
Min Tun, the military government's
spokesperson, stated in February that the law
was activated to “prevent war” by “showing
The impact of Myanmar's mandatory conscription law on the
country's humanitarian crisis
Noor Afrose
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
44
strength to enemies.”[6] The conscription law
mandates individuals aged 18 to 35 for men and
18 to 27 for women to serve a minimum of two
years in the military, extendable to five years
when the state is under emergency.[7][8]
Professionals like doctors and engineers can be
drafted up to 45 years for men and 35 years for
women.[9] Violations of the conscription law
may result in up to 3 years of imprisonment, a
fine, or both.[10] To meet the annual goal of
recruiting 60,000 young individuals, the first
batch of 4,300 recruits began their training in
March 2024 in 15 military schools nationwide.[11]
In the second week of May, the Junta proceeded
to gather recruits for the second batch, however,
the exact number of recruits was not disclosed.
[12]
Youth migration and humanitarian
crisis
The United Nations Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has
said that the military in Myanmar has used
threats of violence, including the destruction of
towns, to recruit young people as part of the
latest conscription drive, creating an
environment of fear.[13] According to the Burma
Affairs and Conflict Study, since the Junta's
conscription law was enacted, approximately
85,000 young men and women have made
efforts to leave Myanmar and escape to
neighbouring countries, while another 3,500
people have sought refuge in areas liberated by
resistance forces.[14] It has also been reported
that at least 1,000 young people are forming long
daily queues outside the Thai embassy in
Yangon.[15] In February 2024, two women died in
a stampede at the Myanmar passport office due
to the rush of people applying for passports to
flee military conscription.[16] Furthermore, young
individuals attempting to avoid conscription by
illegally crossing the border are regularly being
arrested in the Thai provinces of Kanchanaburi
and Tak.[17] Following interrogation by Thai
immigration authorities, undocumented
Myanmar citizens are typically repatriated,
exacerbating their vulnerability and making them
targets for the junta.[18] Making matters worse,
in May 2024, the junta announced that it would
prohibit eligible males from traveling abroad for
employment if they are subject to military
conscription, prompting desperate measures like
bribery to flee the country.[19][20]
People gather outside the visa office of Thailand after the
announcement of conscription law (The Irrawaddy, 2024)
Brain drain's impact on the
economy
Myanmar’s already weak economy is facing
ongoing challenges and has been exacerbated
by the new law. A recent study by the Asian
Development Bank has revealed that increased
armed confrontations in various areas have
unsurprisingly harmed the growth of GDP.[21] It is
anticipated that actual GDP growth will continue
to be sluggish, standing at 1.2 per cent in 2024
and 2.2 per cent in 2025.[22] Furthermore,
inflation is anticipated to remain at a high rate of
15.5 per cent throughout 2024.[23] Experts have
raised concerns about the potential emigration
of highly trained individuals and young people
due to the conflict and the recent conscription
drive.[24] A recent report by regional media
outlet Than Lwin Times disclosed that since the
Junta implemented the conscription law,
approximately 30 to 50 percent of workers have
either left or are preparing to relocate overseas.
[25] The Institute for Strategy and Policy -
Myanmar has observed this could adversely
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
45
affect investment endeavours and disrupt
production, leading to a substantial rise in loss of
employment and a decline in growth across
multiple sectors.[26] Additionally, professionals
such as doctors along with students, are
emigrating from the country in large numbers
posing a threat to the well-being of the general
population.[27] The ongoing decline in the
economy combined with the loss of thousands
of young and education Burmese will likely lead
to a worse situation from an economic and
humanitarian perspective.
Conscription Law Pushes Myanmar Business to the Brink (Burma
News International, 2024)
Impacts on women and children
The conscription law is exposing women and
children to vulnerable conditions. In May 2024, a
report released by the non-governmental
organisation known as The Human Rights
Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) highlighted
the negative impact of the law, which has seen
an increase in child labour and forced children to
abandon schooling. With the enlistment of the
first and second cohorts of young people into the
military, and youth fleeing abroad, there are
vacancies in the labour market that need to be
filled and this has seen children employed to
address the shortage. HURFOM has highlighted a
concerning increase in the number of underage
children in Mon State being compelled to work
and provide for their families in various
establishments such as restaurants, tea shops,
bars, bike repair shops, and grocery stores.[28]
Additionally, these young workers are being
exploited by the service industry, with their wages
being unfairly taken advantage of.[29] Although
women were exempted from mandatory military
service during this recruitment period, the law still
impacts their lives.[30] The impact on women’s
lives arises from the conscription law stating that
married women are not required to enlist in the
military.[31] Consequently, some women are
choosing marriage to avoid conscription.[32]
Additionally, there is a potential risk that parents
may resort to child marriage to protect them
from military conscription. This shows the new
law has had significant flow on effects that are
impacting Burmese society.
Forced Rohingya enlistment
Despite being recognised as stateless under the
Citizenship Act of 1982, Rohingyas have been
forced to join the military and combat Rakhine
militants. According to Human Rights Watch, the
Myanmar military has forcibly recruited over
1,000 Rohingya Muslim individuals from refugee
camps in Kyaukphyu, Sittwe, Maungdaw and
Buthiduang townships since February 2024.[33]
Family members and victims recount being
forcefully taken during night-time raids, enticed
with false promises of citizenship benefits, and
compelled with the threat of being arrested, or
subjected to physical abuse if they refused or
attempted to escape.x[34] Furthermore,
according to the report, they are seeking to
recruit kids who are below the age of 15 which
contravenes both the national conscription law
and international law.[35] The rigorous two-
week training and recruitment endeavours led to
casualties as individuals faced intimidation, and
mistreatment, and were deprived of access to
food, worsening their vulnerability.[36] After
completing their training, a group of 100
Rohingya persons from the Sittwe camp were
sent to the front lines for battle, resulting in the
death of 5 individuals.[37] Furthermore, the
overall situation is posing a threat to the
Rohingya camps in Bangladesh, as the military's
forced recruitment drive may prompt more
Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh.[38]
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
46
International response
In response to the conscription law, numerous
global organisations have voiced their concerns.
In March, a collective of 397 civil groups from
various countries, urged the UN Security Council
(UNSC) to act and called for a resolution and
economic sanctions against the Junta.[39]
During a UNSC session on 4 April, members of
the council and other UN members raised
concerns on the matter.[40] Notably, the
representative from Japan called upon the
Council to back ASEAN's centrality and
advocated for the ASEAN Chair and its Special
Envoy to engage with all relevant parties in
Myanmar.[41] Despite the discussions at the
UNSC briefing and the expressed concerns from
representatives, both the UNSC and ASEAN have
refrained from appointing a UN Special Envoy or
enforcing sanctions, showcasing a lack of
political will from the global community.
Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine state undergo weapons training led
by junta military personnel (Berna News, 2024)
Conclusion
While conscription laws are not prohibited by
international law, the introduction of such
legislation in Myanmar during a period of
heightened civil conflict carries a significant risk
of worsening the existing humanitarian crisis.[42]
Forced conscription poses a direct threat to the
safety of young individuals, leading to serious
violations of their basic human rights, increased
mass displacement, and heightened vulnerability
of girls to early marriage. Therefore, it is
imperative for global communities, including the
UN, ASEAN, and various human rights groups, to
prioritize efforts to minimize the negative impact
of this conscription through diplomatic means,
the provision of aid, and the promotion of
peace-building initiatives aimed at fostering
stability in Myanmar.
Policy recommendations
There should be an immediate ceasefire
mediated by the international community to
halt conscription and violence, providing
temporary peace. The UNSC and ASEAN
could and should play significant roles in
mediation. This may involve appointing a
special envoy or establishing a peacekeeping
mission to oversee the ceasefire
implementation.
To ensure the safety of the young individuals
seeking refuge from neighbouring countries,
particularly the Thai government, they must
cease their practice of forcibly repatriating
them. To achieve its goals, UNHCR Thailand
must collaborate closely with the Thai
government and offer both accommodation
and humanitarian assistance.
It is crucial to impose targeted sanctions on
the Myanmar Military officials responsible for
imposing abusive laws including travel bans,
asset freezes, and restrictions on financial
transactions to exert international pressure.
Additionally, ASEAN countries can issue joint
statements condemning Myanmar's military
for its conscription law, offering incentives like
trade benefits and diplomatic support to
member states that cooperate in
condemnation efforts. Simultaneously, they
can impose penalties such as trade
restrictions on nations that fail to comply,
thereby incentivizing collective action.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
47
[1] Yun Sun, (13 February 2023) ‘‘’The civil war in Myanmar: No end in
sight’, Brookings (Accessed 25 April 2024)
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-civil-war-in-myanmar-
no-end-in-sight/.
[2] Rahman Yacoob (6 December 2023) ‘Commentary: Myanmar's
military stares at defeat as rebel forces go on the offensive’, CAN
(Accessed 26 April 2024)
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/myanmar-
military-coup-junta-rebel-offensive-fighting-3966751.
[3] Thitinan Pongsudhirak (11 January 2024) 'Myanmar’s military
junta is losing power', Project Syndicate (Accessed 26 April 2024)
https://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/myanmar-
resistance-could-topple-military-junta-reestablish-democracy-
by-thitinan-pongsudhirak-2024-01.
[4] Ye Myo Hein (26 February 2024) ‘Myanmar’s fateful conscription
law’, United Institute of Peace (Accessed 26 April 2024)
https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/myanmars-fateful-
conscription-law.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Sebastian Strangio (3 May 2024) ’Myanmar Junta bans men
from overseas work in bid to stymie draft dodgers, The Diplomat
(Accessed 9 May 2024)
https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/myanmar-junta-bans-men-
from-overseas-work-in-bid-to-stymie-draft-dodgers/.
[7] The People’s Military Law (State Peace and Development
Council Law No. 27/2010), s 3 (a).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Staff Correspondent (24 May 2024) ‘Junta orders recruitment
preparations for third conscription batch’, Burma News International,
(Accessed 24 May 2024)
https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/junta-orders-recruitment-
preparations-third-conscription-batch.
[12] Ibid.
[13] UNHRC (14 March 2024) 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews' UN
Doc A/HRC/55/65 (Accessed 24 May 2024).
[14] Ibid.
[15] Jurist Staff (19 Mach 2024) ‘Youth caught in the crossfire: The
devastating impact of Myanmar’s conscription law’, Jurist News
(Accessed 8 May 2024)
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2024/03/youth-caught-in-
the-crossfire-the-devastating-impact-of-myanmars-
conscription-law/.
[16] Agence France-Presse (19 February 2024) ‘Two killed in crush
as hundreds queue for passports in Myanmar’, VOA News
(Accessed 8 May 2024) https://www.voanews.com/a/two-killed-
in-crush-as-hundreds-queue-for-passports-in-
myanmar/7493200.html.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
48
[17] Brien Wei (22 February 2024) ‘Thai police round up Myanmar
citizens fleeing conscription’, The Irraweddy (Accessed 8 May
2024) https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-
world/thai-police-round-up-myanmar-citizens-fleeing-
conscription.html.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Staff Correspondent (23 February 2024) ‘Five negative
consequences of the Myanmar conscription law’, Mizzima
(Accessed 10 May 2024)
https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/23/7423.
[21] Asian Development Bank (April 2024) ‘Asian Development
Outlook April 2024: Myanmar’, Webpage (Accessed 13 May 2024)
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/957856/mya
-ado-april-2024.pdf.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Tual Swan Khai and Aung Mto Hitun (8 April 2024) 'Brain drain'
follows military coup', Bangkok Post (Accessed 13 May 2024)
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2772613/brain-
drain-follows-military-coup.
[25] Staff Correspondent (4 March 2024) 'Conscription law pushes
Myanmar business to the brink', Thanlwintimes (Accessed 12 May
2024) https://thanlwintimes.com/2024/03/04/conscription-law-
pushes-myanmar-business-to-the-brink/.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Emily Shah (15 May 2024) ‘In Myanmar, military drafts scare
away the educated’, Berkeley Political Review (Accessed 18 May
2024) https://bpr.studentorg.berkeley.edu/2024/05/15/in-
myanmar-military-drafts-scare-away-the-educated.
[28] HURFOM, (7 May 2024) ‘Force to fight: Military conscription in
Southeastern Burma’, Webpage (Accessed 14 May 2024)
https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-
content/uploads/2024/05/F2F_HURFOM.pdf.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Nikkei Staff Writers (14 May 2024) ‘Myanmar military exempts
women from draft for now’, Nikkei Asia (Accessed 14 May 2024)
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-
military-exempts-women-from-draft-for-now.
[31] The People’s Military Law (State Peace and Development
Council Law No. 27/2010), s 22 (b).
[32] Lauren Day and Supattra Vimonsuknopparat (24 April 2024)
‘In Myanmar, young people are fleeing the country or hastily
arranging shotgun weddings to avoid conscription’, ABC News
(Accessed 16 May 2024) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-04-
21/potential-conscripts-in-myanmars-war-are-avoiding-the-
draft/103645960.
[33] Human Rights Watch, ‘Myanmar: Military forcibly recruiting
Rohingya’, Human Rights Watch,(Accessed 14 May 2024)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/10/myanmar-military-
forcibly-recruiting-rohingya.
[34] Sreeparna Banerjee (24 May 2024) ‘Rohingya crisis:
Exploitation, recruitment, and challenges’, Observer Research
Foundation (Accessed 24 May 2024)
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/rohingya-crisis-
exploitation-recruitment-and-challenges.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Md Him Rahman (2 April 2024) 'Myanmar: The junta’s forced
conscription of Rohingyas', Lowy Institute (Accessed 10 May 2024)
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-junta-s-
forced-conscription-rohingyas.
[39] APHR (2 March 2024) 'Open Letter: Security Council must act
now as Myanmar military junta’s forced conscription endangers
peace, stability, and human security in Myanmar and the region',
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (Accessed 1 June 2024)
https://aseanmp.org/2024/03/02/open-letter-security-council-
must-act-now-as-myanmar-military-juntas-forced-conscription-
endangers-peace-stability-and-human-security-in-myanmar-
and-the-region/.
[40] UN Press (4 April 2024) 'As crisis in Myanmar worsens, security
council must take resolute action to end violence by country’s
military, address humanitarian situation, speakers urge' Webpage
(Accessed 2 June 2024)
https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15652.doc.htm.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Claude B. Mickelwait (1940) ‘Legal basis for conscription’,
American Bar Association Journal 26 (9) (Accessed 13 May 2024)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25712897.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
49
Key takeaways
The Indonesian government continues to
pursue a strategy of economic growth
through mining and forestry as part of its
downstreaming policy. The policy has had
negative consequences for indigenous
groups throughout Indonesia and has led to
environmental degradation.
This is particularly the case in Indonesia’s
Southeast Sulawesi Province, which has seen
increasing vertical and horizontal conflicts
amongst indigenous communities against
state apparatuses, the authorities and
workers. This is despite Jakarta having
comprehensive laws on Indigenous rights.
Clashes between the government and
Indigenous communities in Sulawesi has
been an increase in criminalisation for
Indigenous people, which reveals a trend
where Jakarta has decided to prioritise
economic gain over vulnerable and at-risk
groups. This is a policy that needs to be
reversed.
Introduction
IIndonesia’s downstreaming policy, popularly
known as 'Hilirisasi' in Indonesian, was enacted in
2013 and prohibits the export of raw materials in
wide varieties of industries, but most notably the
mining industries. The implementation of the
policy requires Indonesia to process its mining
products within the country after the extraction
process. The primary intention of the
downstreaming policy is to create jobs and
stimulate economic growth, meaning
Indonesian mining and plantation oligarchs
A nickel mine in Indonesia (East Asia Forum, 2024)
tend to support the initiative. President Joko
Widodo, in power since 2014, has been a strong
advocate for this policy as part of his ambition
to position Indonesia as a major world
economic power.[1] However, the policy has
resulted in a more aggressive resource
extraction activity, particularly in indigenous
lands, as seen in the exploitation of nickel mines
in Indonesia’s Sulawesi. The Indonesian
government's implementation of the policy has
led to increased vertical and horizontal conflicts
among indigenous communities, especially in
Southeast Sulawesi Province. The conflict and
violence are manifested through the rising
numbers of criminalisation against Indigenous
leaders as well as the rising numbers of violent
clashes involving the Indigenous communities.
This article will analyse how the downstreaming
policy is affecting indigenous communities in
Sulawesi and provide policy recommendations
on how to solve the problem.
Indigenous lands as economic
resources
In Indonesia, Indigenous land is often perceived
as a valuable asset for development, with this
Downstreaming policy: The root cause of Indigenous clashes in
Indonesia’s Southeast Sulawesi Province
Muhammad Reza Zaini
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
50
land seen as nothing more than a resource to
fuel the economy. This focus on development
can be traced back to the legacy of Dutch
colonialism in Indonesia, where anthropocentric
resource extraction was the core principle of
development and the policy continued post-
independence after 1945. In today's global
economy, the Indonesian need for
anthropocentric resource extraction will most
likely increase but this often results in the
demands of Indigenous communities being
disregarded. This colonial-era mindset is the
basis for the current downstreaming policy.
Indonesia’s Southeast Sulawesi Province has
been the centre of the nickel production.[2] A
2024 news article by Jakarta Globe reports that
Indonesia, which holds 15 per cent of the global
nickel reserve, will be a valuable producer for the
raw material to the global market. The growing
demand for nickel in the international market
means that nickel mining is the priority sector for
the downstreaming policy, which means more
mining companies. More mining companies
means that some of them will use Indigenous
lands as their mining sites.
Many Indigenous legal frameworks have been
dismantled in the name of development by the
government and corrupt local officials with ties
to mining and plantation interests have further
undermined Indigenous protection during
President Widodo's administration.[3] This has
led to new mining fields being established
without consideration for local boundaries or the
environment. In 2023, the regions Indigenous
fishermen reportedly experienced reduced
catches and did not receive any compensation
from the government.[4] While dome mining
companies have offered financial compensation
to the locals, although it is often deemed
insufficient.[5]
The absence of a legal resolution between the
nickel industries and Indigenous communities in
Southeast Sulawesi Province. In February 2024,
Baharuddin Maranai, a prominent Indigenous
leader representing the Mopute people,
highlighted that the nickel mining company has
not shown any intention to engage in discussions
with the Indigenous leaders regarding a legal
settlement. Maranai mentioned in an interview
with Project Multatuli that “the Indigenous
communities were never invited to negotiate
regarding plans to develop the nickel mining
area. This is a violation of the principle of
indigenous peoples' rights to be part of the
decision-making process based on
transparency…” Maranai lodged a complaint with
Indonesia's Human Rights Commission in
February 2024, and during an interview with
Project Multatuli, he emphasized that
confrontation remains the sole recourse to voice
their needs.[6][7]
Outgoing President Joko Widodo has urged his successor to
continue Indonesia’s downstreaming policies (Reuters, 2023)
Criminalisation and violence
against Indigenous communities
The downstreaming policy has led to clashes in
Sulawesi between the Indonesian authorities and
the criminalisation of Indigenous people
protesting against mines and deforestation. This
has particularly been the case since 2023 due to
an intensification of nickel mining in Sulawesi,
resulting in no compensation for the local people
and environmental neglect by the government.
[8] This includes In January 2024, with clashes
occurring in Southeast Sulawesi Province's
Konawe District that saw 32 people arrested,
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
51
accused of obstructing the company’s mining
activities.[9] The 32 Indigenous locals were taken
to the police as they were considered
obstructing the mining activity of the company.
The clashes were related to nickel mining
activities conducted on Indigenous lands,
leading to increased conflicts between the
government and Indigenous communities. 29
people on Wawonii Island were also arrested
after protests against local mining sites.[10] More
recently, clashes in Konawe Utara District saw 13
people arrested while Kompas has reported
members of a similar group protested against a
nickel mine in February 2024.[11] In May 2024, the
nickel downstreaming partnership in the Konawe
Industrial Area resulted in the logging and
removal of the Mopute Traditional Forest.[12] The
incident was followed by the apprehension of
several Mopute traditional custodians following
their protests against the mining activities. To
safeguard mining operations against local
communities, the Indonesian military has
reportedly been deployed to Sulawesi in greater
numbers in 2024 and reflects the increase in
unrest since these operations have increased,
particularly since 2023.[13] But this has brought
with it violence as well as arrests, with the
Indonesian Forum for Living Environment and
Kontras Indonesia both reporting instances of
violence against protests by local authorities.[14]
Future trends
Jakarta’s support for mining companies means
future clashes over mining and the environment
will become more common. The growing
demand for clean energy is fuelling the need for
Indonesian nickel, which is proving to be a
profitable revenue stream for the Indonesian
Government. S&P Global, a US-based capital
market analyst company, predicts that Indonesia
is expected to supply 46 per cent of the world's
nickel production by 2027.[15] With the backing
of local and central governments, companies
are working towards meeting the escalating
demands and targets, showing little regard for
the demands of the Indigenous peoples.
Furthermore, there is a notable absence of
proper monitoring of illegal mining by the
government authorities. While numerous
conflicts arise from legal mining operations, the
growing number of illegal mining sites further
amplifies the likelihood of conflicts. Notably,
some of these illegal mines encroach upon
Indigenous lands in Southeast Sulawesi Province.
Unfortunately, the lack of effective law
enforcement measures hinders the efficient
curbing of illegal mining activities. Consequently,
conflicts arise, particularly in relation to the influx
of migrant workers involved in illegal mining
operations.[16]
After the 2024 presidential elections, focus will now be directed to
how Indonesia’s newly elected leaders will harness the country’s
growing mining sector (Australia Institute for International Affairs,
2024)
The lack of attention to Indigenous rights in
support for the unsustainable mining activities
poses a problem for the Indigenous community
members. This is because the conflicts resulting
from the mining activities not only creates
casualties. The exacerbated conflict would lead
to the displacement of the Indigenous
community, which will most likely increase their
poverty rate. In Sulawesi, Indigenous people
whose villages has been impacted by mining will
move somewhere else.[17] Their displacement
will result in systemic poverty among the
Indigenous community members. Hence the
need for every relevant stakeholder to
implement immediate resolution. Furthermore,
there has been an increasing number of
Indigenous leaders apprehended by the
authorities in 2024.[18] This means that their
family is losing the breadwinners of the family,
which could further complicate their siuation.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
52
Conclusion
The downstreaming policy's implementation has
led to a surge in criminalization incidents
involving Indigenous populations in Southeast
Sulawesi Province. The establishment of new
mining areas has disregarded local boundaries,
resulting in an increase in instances of
opposition. Alongside the criminalization, there
has been a rise in conflicts between Indigenous
communities and mining personnel. The data
indicates a yearly rise in these occurrences. The
government's explicit support of mining
corporations is a significant factor contributing to
the expected escalation of conflicts among the
Indigenous communities. The growing demand
for resources needs to be met with a legal
solution that emphasizes peaceful solutions
between the government, mining companies
and Indigenous people and should focus on
resolving land acquisition disputes in indigenous
territories.
Policy recommendations
Enhancing the role of local civil society
organisations in supporting Indigenous
communities is important. These groups play
a crucial role in providing legal aid to
Indigenous individuals to ensure positive
outcomes and resolution through court. This
can be accomplished by offering capacity
building opportunities for legal professionals
or local civil society groups interested in
Indigenous Rights.
·The government needs to engage more in
peaceful talks with the indigenous leaders to
find peaceful solutions. Violent conflict arises
from the lack of dialogues between the
government, mining companies, and the
indigenous communities and it is the role of
the government to ensure there is no
violence.
There should be legal requirements for the
mining companies to strictly adhere to
implementing environmental impact
assessments. This solution of enforcing EIA’s
can serve as a mutually beneficial solution to
address environmental concerns while
respecting the rights of indigenous
communities.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
53
[1] Abdullah Fikri Ashri (23 August 2023) ‘Dukung Keberlanjutan
Pembangunan Jokowi, Jaman: Hilirisasi Masih Jadi Pekerjaan
Rumah’, Kompas (Accessed 10 June 2024)
https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2023/08/29/dukung-
keberlanjutan-pembangunan-jokowi-jaman-hilirisasi-masih-jadi-
pekerjaan-rumah.
[2] Garry Lotulung (21 March 2024) ‘Nickel in Sulawesi: The price of
the green economy’, Alternatives Humanitaires (Accessed 15 June
2024) https://www.alternatives-
humanitaires.org/en/2024/03/21/nickel-in-sulawesi-the-price-of-
the-green-economy/> accessed 15 June 2024.
[3] Linggua Sanjatya Usop, Tahinting Pali: Perjuangan Masyarakat
Adat dalam Mempertahankan Hak Atas Tanah (1st ed, Uwais
Inspirasi Indonesia 2024) (Accessed 10 June 2024).
[4] Ahmad Akbar Fua (24 September 2023) ‘Penjabat Gubernur
Sulawesi Tenggara Ingatkan Perusahaan Tambang Tidak Lari dari
Tanggungjawab’, Liputan (Accessed 5 May 2024)
https://www.liputan6.com/regional/read/5405514/penjabat-
gubernur-sulawesi-tenggara-ingatkan-perusahaan-tambang-
tidak-lari-dari-tanggungjawab#google_vignette.
[5] BBC Global Unit (1 May 2024) ‘Di balik tambang mineral milik
China yang menggurita di Indonesia, Argentina, dan Kongo’, BBC
News Indonesia, (Accessed 12 May 2024) Di balik tambang mineral
milik China yang menggurita di Indonesia, Argentina, dan Kongo.
[6] Franco B. Dengo and Ian Morse (7 February 2024) ‘Kongsi
Hilirisasi Nikel di Kawasan Industri Konawe Menggusur Hutan Adat
Mopute’, Project Multatuli (Accessed 15 April 2024)
https://projectmultatuli.org/kongsi-hilirisasi-nikel-di-kawasan-
industri-konawe-menggusur-hutan-adat-mopute.
[7] Ibid.
[8] TanahKita (31 December 2023) ‘Data Konflik’, Webpage
(Accessed 5 May 2024) https://tanahkita.id/data/konflik/?
tipe=1&tahun=2024&mmode=0&sektor=S2&konflik=&kd_prop=74.
[9] Riza Salman (15 February 2024) ‘Perusahaan Tambang Nikel di
Sulawesi Tenggara Kriminalisasi Warga Penolak Tambang’,
Mongabay (Accessed 5 May 2024)
https://www.mongabay.co.id/2024/02/15/perusahaan-tambang-
nikel-di-sulawesi-tenggara-kriminalisasi-warga-penolak-
tambang.
[10] Asyari Mukrim (3 March 2022) ‘Mendukung Kuasa Rakyat
Melawan Kuasa Tambang di Wawonii: Hentikan Segala Bentuk
Kekerasan terhadap Warga Penolak Tambang Wawonii, Kontras,
(Accessed 5 May 2024)
https://www.kontrassulawesi.org/blog/category/darurat-agraria.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Franco B. Dengo and Ian Morse (7 February 2024) ‘Kongsi
Hilirisasi Nikel di Kawasan Industri Konawe Menggusur Hutan Adat
Mopute’, Project Multatuli (Accessed 15 April 2024)
https://projectmultatuli.org/kongsi-hilirisasi-nikel-di-kawasan-
industri-konawe-menggusur-hutan-adat-mopute.
[13] BBC Global Unit (1 May 2024) ‘Di balik tambang mineral milik
China yang menggurita di Indonesia, Argentina, dan Kongo’, BBC
News Indonesia, (Accessed 12 May 2024) Di balik tambang mineral
milik China yang menggurita di Indonesia, Argentina, dan Kongo.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
54
[14] Asyari Mukrim (3 March 2022) ‘Mendukung Kuasa Rakyat
Melawan Kuasa Tambang di Wawonii: Hentikan Segala Bentuk
Kekerasan terhadap Warga Penolak Tambang Wawonii, Kontras,
(Accessed 5 May 2024)
https://www.kontrassulawesi.org/blog/category/darurat-agraria.
[15] Avery Chen (2 May 2023) ‘Nickel IPOs surging thanks to
Indonesian mining boom’, S&P Global (Accessed 9 May 2024)
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/latest-news-headlines/nickel-ipos-surging-thanks-to-
indonesian-mining-boom-
75424841#:~:text=Indonesia%2C%20which%20has%20the%20largest,
to%20Tsingshan%20Holding%20Group%20Co.
[16] Jusan Yusuf and Rasty Amalia (2024) ‘Politik ekologi dan
ekonomi pertambangan di Maluku Utara’, Geocivic (Accessed 12
June 2024)
https://ejournal.unkhair.ac.id/index.php/geocivic/article/view/8100
[17] Sutan Sorik and Anang Dwiatmoko (2023) ‘Pengaturan Hak
Asasi Manusia dan Perlindungan Hukum Masyarakat Adat di Sektor
Usaha Pertambangan’, Webpage (Accessed 12 June 2024)
https://journal.ugm.ac.id/v3/MH/article/view/6461.
[18] Jaring Nusa (12 March 2024) ‘Aktivis Jerman Suarakan
Kerusakan Tambang Nikel Sulawesi’, Webpage (Accessed 12 June
2024) https://jaringnusa.id/aktivis-jerman-suarakan-kerusakan-
tambang-nikel-sulawesi.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
55
The Peace & Security Monitor is produced by the Platform for Peace and Humanity
The Peace & Security Monitor
The Indo-Pacific
Issue 1
June 2024
Platform for Peace and Humanity
contact: office@peacehumanity.org
www.peacehumanity.org
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
