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All Talk, No Action? Politicians’ Agenda Responsiveness to Citizens’ Engagement on Social Media

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Studies have shown that citizens’ engagement on social media drives politicians to adapt the issues they discuss online. However, for representative democracy to function effectively, politicians must not only discuss these issues but also act on them. This paper explores whether higher citizens’ engagement on social media shapes the issues politicians address online and leads to substantive agenda responsiveness, such as proposing legislation or raising issues in parliament. To do this, we examined over 370,000 Facebook posts by more than 350 politicians in Australia, Belgium, and the United States. Our results indicate that higher citizens’ engagement on politicians’ own social media regarding an issue increases the likelihood of politicians promoting concrete legislative or parliamentary actions related to that issue, regardless of the issue’s salience. These findings highlight social media’s role in informing and motivating politicians’ agenda responsiveness, with important implications for the current state of representative democracy.
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All Talk, No Action? Politicians' Agenda Responsiveness to
Citizens' Engagement on Social Media
Željko Poljak
Department of Political Science
University of Antwerp
zeljko.poljak@uantwerpen.be
Annelise Russell
Associate Professor
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
University of Kentucky
arussell@uky.edu
Forthcoming in Political Research Quarterly
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241309296
Abstract
Studies have shown that citizens' engagement on social media drives politicians to adapt the issues
they discuss online. However, for representative democracy to function effectively, politicians
must not only discuss these issues but also act on them. This paper explores whether higher
citizens' engagement on social media shapes the issues politicians address online and leads to
substantive agenda responsiveness, such as proposing legislation or raising issues in parliament.
To do this, we examined over 370,000 Facebook posts by more than 350 politicians in Australia,
Belgium, and the United States. Our results indicate that higher citizens' engagement on
politicians’ own social media regarding an issue increases the likelihood of politicians promoting
concrete legislative or parliamentary actions related to that issue, regardless of the issue's salience.
These findings highlight social media's role in informing and motivating politicians' agenda
responsiveness, with important implications for the current state of representative democracy.
Key-words
Agenda-Setting; Agenda Responsiveness; Public Opinion; Social Media; Citizens' Engagement
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Introduction
For representative democracy to function effectively, politicians' responsiveness to citizens'
concerns is crucial (Pitkin, 1969; Mansbridge, 2003; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010).i As such, despite
constantly grappling with an overload of information (Walgrave and Dejaeghere, 2016), politicians
heavily rely on signals from constituents to determine when to be responsive (Miller and Stokes,
1963). This reliance has intensified in recent years with the rise of social media, which establishes
a two-way information exchange between politicians and the public. Politicians and their staff use
social media platforms to frame issues and policy information for the public, reflecting their
individual agendas (Blum et al. 2023; Feezell 2018; Peeters et al., 2022; Russell 2018; 2021;
Sulkin, 2011). Conversely, a positive digital engagement that affirms a politician’s policy priorities
can influence the future issues they discuss online (Barbera et al., 2019; Ennser-Jedenastik et al.,
2022a).
Despite social media providing representatives with valuable feedback on public opinion
about their policy priorities (Walgrave and Soontjens, 2023), which undoubtedly impacts priorities
they address online, an increasing number of citizens worldwide remain dissatisfied with
democracy (Foa et al., 2020). This dissatisfaction may stem from the perception that, although
politicians may talk about issues that engage citizens online, they do not always take concrete
action on those issues. Therefore, this paper seeks to understand (i) whether politicians adapt their
rhetorical agendas — the policies they convey online — based on citizens' engagement on social
media, and (ii) whether this engagement correlates with moving from mere policy attention to
actual legislative or parliamentary action. By investigating the posts of elected officials, the
research aims to unravel the underlying dynamics of how political actors respond to online
engagement and whether this, in turn, is associated with tangible legislative measures.
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To do this, we use a novel dataset comprising over 370,000 Facebook posts by more than
350 individual politicians in Australia, Belgium, and the US. We systematically content-coded
these posts to identify the presence of 21 policy issues, such as the economy, welfare, education,
health, and foreign affairs. Furthermore, we identified posts that address substantive agenda
responses or actions on an issue, such as participation in parliamentary debates, working on
legislative proposals (bills, amendments), participation in congressional hearings, or involvement
in parliamentary committees.
The findings from all three countries confirm that politicians tend to prioritize issues with
higher citizen engagement on social media. Politicians are more inclined to revisit and discuss an
issue if it garnered greater citizens' engagement in the preceding month. Moreover, increased
engagement correlates with a higher likelihood of politicians promoting parliamentary or
legislative action on a particular issue online.
These empirical findings underscore the significant role of social media in shaping
politicians' online presence and influencing political and policymaking processes. As digital
platforms increasingly shape the norms of legislative institutions and representation, this research
contributes to the ongoing discourse on the impact of social media on political and policymaking
landscapes, offering insights into the dynamics that underpin contemporary political
communication and legislative initiatives. Specifically, our results highlight how social media
metrics can serve as public opinion cues for lawmakers and politicians, helping them shape not
only their communication strategies (see Jost, 2023) and policy priorities (Ennser-Jedenastik et al.
2022a) but also actual concrete legislative and parliamentary actions on an issue. However, these
findings also pose challenges, as overreliance on citizen engagement with politicians' profiles may
reinforce existing inequalities in political representation (e.g., Ansell and Gingrich, 2024).
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Social Media as a Public Opinion Source
Politicians grapple with an oversupply of information (Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Jones and
Baumgartner 2005). Information about constituents, the preferences of special interest groups, and
key features of the political environment are constantly moving through political institutions, and
politicians are tasked with taking all that information in and using it to shape their lawmaking
strategy and policy agenda. Because of this information oversupply, actors must rank information
by its relevance and find strategies to prioritize policy and political signals (Workman et al. 2009).
Policymakers predominantly rely on information from and about their constituencies,
namely public opinion, to shape the lawmaking process (Miller and Stokes, 1963). This is because
politicians are not only intrinsically motivated by their own ideology but also extrinsically
motivated to secure re-election (Mayhew 1974). Therefore, monitoring public opinion on policies
and adapting policy accordingly is crucial for their electoral success. Consequently, it's not
surprising that a significant portion of the literature on policy and agenda responsiveness suggests
politicians are indeed responsive to the preferences of the public (Jones and Baumgartner 2005;
Erikson et al. 2002; Geer, 1996; Senninger and Seeberg, 2024; Sevenans, 2021; Stimson et al.
1995). When surveyed, an overwhelming majority of politicians indicate that they continuously
assess public opinion and engage in discussions about it with their colleagues (Walgrave et al.,
2022).
While it's evident that public opinion matters significantly in politicians' day-to-day
policymaking activities, the sources through which politicians gauge public opinion information
are less clear. Politicians have the option to invest in various sources of public opinion data to
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understand the preferences of their constituents or the wider public they represent. These sources
can vary from engaging directly with ordinary citizens at town meetings to monitoring mass media
coverage or analyzing election results (Kingdon, 1984). Indeed, traditional literature has largely
focused on the influence of mass media, journalists, interest groups, consultants, social
movements, and direct citizen interactions or surveys (Andre et al., 2014; Druckman and Jacobs,
2006; Herbst, 1998). However, many of these sources require considerable effort and can be costly
to access.
In contrast, today’s hybrid media environment (Chadwick et al. 2015) offers politicians
real-time, low-cost alternatives for gathering public opinion amid the information deluge. Namely,
digital platforms, such as social media, offer valuable feedback through metrics like likes,
comments, and shares, allowing politicians and their staff to gauge constituent communication and
understand responses to their priorities (Barbera et al., 2019). In essence, online citizens’
engagement provides readily accessible information on public opinion (Anstead and O'Loughlin,
2015; McGregor, 2019), helping politicians adapt their policy agendas (Ennser-Jedenastik et al.,
2022a). While many politicians still consider direct contact with citizens and traditional media
crucial for understanding public opinion, they do find social media more useful than other sources,
such as public opinion polls or interactions with journalists (Walgrave and Soontjens, 2023).
Citizens’ Engagement and Agenda Responsiveness
Despite the growing role of social media as a source of public opinion—where politicians can
track what the public deems important through citizen engagement—a more critical question is
whether this leads to actual behavioral shifts in politicians. In this paper, we argue that public
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opinion data derived from online metrics and citizen engagement can drive substantive agenda
responsiveness. By agenda responsiveness, we mean the process through which public concerns
become priorities for politicians (Jones et al., 2009; Bevan and Jennings, 2014). As such, this
concept does not focus on policy changes but on the attention individual politicians give to public
concerns in their day-to-day activities—both in terms of talking about an issue and taking action
to address the issue (e.g. Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). As we outline below, the impact of
citizen engagement on politicians' agenda responsiveness—both in talk and in action—can unfold
through a three-way process.
Firstly, elected officials strategically communicate their dynamic and variable individual
agendas for political success. Most politicians adopt a set of priorities and goals for their time in
office that directly and indirectly shape how they communicate with their constituents and when
(Grimmer, 2013; Grose et al., 2015; Sellers, 2009). For example, a politician may prioritize issues
such as environment or social welfare, resulting in these topics being prominently featured in their
communications with both local constituents and on a national scale. Increasingly, this is done
through social media (e.g. Eriksen, 2024; Peeters et al., 2022). By conveying their individual
agenda online, politicians aim to elevate the issues they care about on the public agenda, which
can lead to substantive policy changes and may boost their re-election prospects among
constituents who care about these issues (Blum et al. 2023; Feezell 2018; Russell 2018; 2021;
Sulkin, 2011).
Secondly, once these policy agendas and priorities are communicated and promoted on
politicians' online profiles, this communication receives almost immediate feedback from the
public. For instance, on platforms like Facebook, citizens can express their opinions through the
comments section on policymakers' posts, facilitating discussions among citizens and allowing
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direct interaction with politicians (e.g. Enli and Skogerbø, 2013; Kalsnes et al., 2017).
Additionally, citizens can provide likes and shares of posts, indicating approval or, at the very
least, drawing attention to the post and politicians' policy views. Consequently, political actors
gather digital citizens’ reactions to assess responses and receive immediate feedback (Bene, 2017).
Thirdly, as many politicians and their offices regularly collect these engagement metrics,
this information is evaluated and utilized to adapt agenda-setting and policymaking strategies
while in office. A social media post that garners significant traction—such as an increased number
of likes, comments, and shares—will likely reinforce a politician’s agenda priorities, whereas posts
that receive little attention may be reconsidered over time if they fail to generate the desired
interactions. Consequently, it should not be surprising that several studies have demonstrated how
both politicians and parties are responsive to issues that citizens engage with online (Barbera et al.
2019; Ennser-Jedenastik et al. 2022a). Overall, the goal of securing tangible policy changes and
re-election on concrete issues conveyed online (step one) can be adapted based on the citizens'
engagement received online (step two).
As a result, our initial expectation is that higher online citizens' engagement predicts the
topics politicians communicate about. This expectation, as explained previously, is based on the
notion that politicians view evidence of public engagement as a means of gauging public opinion,
allowing them to adjust their communication and agenda. If politicians fail to continue
communicating about issues that garner engagement, they may risk losing their aspirations, such
as re-election. For example, ignoring issues that are popular with supporters can lead to the
perception of being "indifferent" (Sides, 2006). To avoid any appearance of disconnect with their
supporters, politicians use engagement on social media to gather feedback on issue priorities, thus
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attempting to mitigate any criticism of being out of touch. Consequently, the online rhetorical
agenda of political elites should be responsive to public opinion, that is, citizens' engagement.
Hypothesis 1: The more online citizens' engagement an issue generates, the more likely a
politician will continue to communicate on that issue.
Beyond simply engaging with citizens online by talking about an issue that has previously
garnered online attention (Hypothesis 1), a more critical question is whether this translates into
tangible agenda action beyond talking. Recent research does suggest that what politicians say
online is not just ephemera a politician who is regularly talking about immigration online is
likely to address those issues in office (Russell and Wen 2021; Sulkin 2005). Yet, establishing a
clear association between previous public opinion online and subsequent agenda responsiveness
in terms of acting on an issue that politicians promote online has remained unexplored. Namely,
much of the literature on general sources of public opinion information suffers from external
validity issues, making it difficult to ascertain whether an opinion on an issue translates into action
(but see Butler and Nickerson, 2011). Nonetheless, if social media metrics and online citizens'
engagement serve as a public opinion cue (Anstead and O'Loughlin, 2015; McGregor, 2019), we
can reasonably expect that politicians will respond by acting on these issues, such as proposing
legislation or raising them in parliament. Consequently, such legislative or parliamentary actions
are likely to be promoted online.
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Hypothesis 2: The more online citizens' engagement an issue generates, the probability
increases that a politician will promote legislative or parliamentary action on that issue.
Finally, it's worth noting how our theoretical framework reshapes the understanding of
political representation and responsiveness to public opinion. Traditionally, politicians prioritized
the concerns of their own constituency (Miller and Stokes, 1963). However, with the rise of social
media, their responsiveness may increasingly extend to an "anonymous" online public outside their
constituency. Our framework suggests that politicians are responsive to such public opinion,
whether it originates from their constituents or not (Hypothesis 1; Hypothesis 2). We argue that
this mechanism is driven by the fact that such responsiveness can benefit their re-election
prospects. For instance, when politicians engage with popular social media content by talking and
by acting on it, it can lead to broader, even global, public support, which in turn boosts media
attention—a major source of political power (Tresch, 2008). This media exposure is crucial for
politicians seeking to stay relevant in the political arena (van Erkel and Thijssen, 2016; Van
Remoortere et al., 2023).
Methodology
Cases
We tested our expectations on members of legislatures in three distinct countries with varying
incentives for individual politicians to respond to online citizens' engagement on issues: Australia,
Belgium, and the US. The inclusion of this diverse country sample enables us to make certain
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general claims regarding the potential impact of citizens' engagement on issues and politicians'
propensity to take action on those same issues (Willems et al., 2024). Namely, politicians in both
Australia and Belgium operate under a parliamentary system, however, Belgium has a party-
centered parliament, while Australia follows the Westminster model, fostering a more
individualized approach (Proksch and Slapin, 2012). This implies a higher likelihood of individual
politicians in parliament acting independently in Australia compared to Belgium (see also
Fernandes et al., 2021).ii Nevertheless, both countries share a parliamentary system, prompting us
to include the US as an important point of comparison. The US operates under a presidential
system, where members of the US Congress act independently. However, the strong presence of
partisan two-bloc politics in the US may limit excessive independence. Consequently, we consider
the US a mid-case scenario, bridging the gap between the individualized approach of Australia and
the party-driven dynamics of Belgium.
In each country, we focused on Facebook, a strategic choice given its status as the most
widely used social network among the general public (Digital News Report 2023 - Reuters
Institute). Due to its broad reach, Facebook has become the primary platform where we expect
politicians to gauge public opinion and communicate their actions. In contrast, other social
networks like X (formerly Twitter) or TikTok serve more niche audiences, such as journalists (X)
or younger users (TikTok), and may not fully capture the broader public opinion that politicians
seek.
Raw data
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In Australia, our analysis covers all Facebook posts made by members of the 46th Australian
Parliament throughout the entire electoral cycle, spanning from July 2019 to April 2022. In
Belgium, our focus is on all members of the 6th Flemish Parliament, where legislative matters and
issues related to the Dutch-speaking region in Belgium are discussed, during the period from June
2019 to July 2022. For the US, we examine all Senators in the 117th US Congress, analyzing
content posted between January 2021 and January 2023. In total, our study encompasses 371,277
Facebook posts by 351 politicians generated across 408 Facebook pages (some politicians have
more than one page) during the specified period (see Table 1). The data collection involved the
use of the CrowdTangle tool from META, providing us with information on the messages posted
on individual Facebook profiles.
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Table 1. Overview of the cases and number of Facebook posts by politicians
Term
Start date
End date
N (Facebook
pages)
N (Facebook
posts)
Australia (House of
Commons)
46
2 July 2019
11 April 2022
127
170,114
Belgium (Flemish
Parliament)
6
18 June 2019
22 July 2022
124
54,108
US (Senate)
117
3 January 2021
3 January 2023
157
147,054
Note: The number of Facebook pages for the US Senate is higher than the total number of Senators,
as some Senators have more than one individual profile (we account for this in our models; see the
Analysis section).
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Automated coding
To identify issues featured in politicians' Facebook posts, we initially employ bag-of-words
dictionaries in English (Australia; US) and Dutch (Belgium) languages. These dictionaries adhere
to the coding scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) issue codebook, encompassing
major policy issues such as economy, health, environment, energy, crime, or defense (Bevan,
2019). Both English and Dutch dictionaries include keywords aligned with the CAP coding
scheme. For instance, keywords like "foreigner" or "asylum" denote immigration issues, while
terms like "pension" or "poverty" signify social welfare concerns. By applying this dictionary to
Facebook posts, we can quantify the presence of various issues across all Facebook posts in our
sample. Previous studies have validated CAP dictionaries as a reliable alternative to manual coding
(Albaugh, 2013).
After identifying the specific issues featured in Facebook posts, our next step was to
determine whether these posts indicated a concrete legislative or parliamentary action taken on the
issues in question. To achieve this, we filtered all posts containing keywords associated with acting
on an issue, such as "legislation", "bill", "amendment", "hearing", "committee”, “parliamentary
question” etc. This methodology enables us to map instances where a politician has either taken or
promoted a specific legislative action or activity related to an issue in a parliament (congress). This
approach allows us to test the expectation that politicians are inclined to promote issues they
actively engage in through parliament or legislation when they observe high citizens' engagement
surrounding those issues. In other words, this allows us to see not only if they talk, but if they act
on an issue. An example of coding both issues and legislative actions in posts is available in Table
2.
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Table 2. Example of coding issues and legislative actions on politicians’ Facebook posts
Country
Politician (Date)
Post
Australia
Mike Freelander
(25.3.2020)
These are extremely difficult times, and my
thoughts are with all of those who have
already been so negatively affected by the
outbreak of COVID-19 and the state of the
economy.
Mike Freelander
(10.6.2020)
I took the opportunity to speak to the House
about the state of Macarthur's economy.
Macarthur residents need greater access to
good, local jobs, if we are to recover in the
wake of COVID-19.
Adam Bandt (5.9.2019)
The second oldest living trees in the world
could be extinct within 50 years because of
the climate crisis.
Adam Bandt
(24.2.2020)
I'm moving the 'Make the Polluters Pay' bill so
people and businesses hurt by climate crisis
can sue the big polluters. The law made
asbestos companies pay.
Belgium
Sarah Smeyers
(12.9.2020)
N-VA wants illegal immigrants to be
criminally prosecuted.
Sarah Smeyers
(7.1.2021)
As a representative in the Flemish Parliament,
I called on Fedasil and the federal government
to look into fraudulent real estate practices
among candidate refugees.
Maurits Vande Reyde
(22.04.2020)
Octavie (103!) left the Corona department of
the hospital after three weeks of fighting👏.
Maurits Vande Reyde
(20.3.2021)
This is really urgent. In recent months, I have
made proposals every week in parliament to
give people with disabilities a vaccine.
United States
Marco Rubio
(26.10.2021)
Floridians deserve to know: Does Demings
also believe parents should stay out of
schools?
Marco Rubio
(21.1.2022)
My bill is commonsense if a school keeps
students out of the classroom, it won’t receive
any unspent federal relief funding.
Amy Klobuchar
(28.8.2021)
Just met Emily and her steer, and it’s great to
see the future of Minnesota agriculture in such
good hands.
Amy Klobuchar
(30.6.2022)
Looking forward to working on the next Farm
Bill
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Validity of coding parliamentary and legislative activity
Given our decision to automatically code politicians’ social media content to identify
parliamentary and legislative activity, the validity of this approach can be questioned. First, by
filtering keywords related to legislation or parliamentary activities, we may inadvertently capture
the actions of other political actors rather than the politicians' own activities on an issue. Second,
by focusing on activity promoted on social media only, we may overlook actual parliamentary
behavior. We address both concerns below.
First, to address the concern that we may falsely code parliamentary and legislative
activities of politicians, we manually content-coded a random sample of 300 Facebook posts from
all three countries that were classified as promoting legislative or parliamentary actions.
Specifically, we coded whether the post indicated the politician’s own action (e.g., "my new bill")
or someone else’s (e.g., "person X’s bill"). Across all three countries, over 70% of the randomly
selected posts on legislative and parliamentary actions indicated the politician’s own activity
(Australia 71%; Belgium 79%; US 80%). This aligns with other studies on political
communication online, which show that the promotion of one’s own actions, rather than negative
attacks on opponents, is prevalent on politicians' social media profiles (see e.g., Ceccobelli 2018;
Vasko and Trilling 2019). Moreover, even when the legislative or parliamentary action wasn’t
initiated by the politician, we argue it still allows us to test our main expectation. For instance, if
an opposition politician posts about participating in a committee on new health reform, it promotes
their active engagement with the issue, even if the reform was proposed by the governing cabinet.
Second, regarding the concern that we are not studying actual parliamentary activity (e.g.,
parliamentary questions) but rather activity on social media, we argue that this approach allows us
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to test our main expectation. Our theoretical framework focuses on politicians' communication
about an issue (Hypothesis 1) and the promotion of their activity on an issue (Hypothesis 2), which
are directed towards citizens. Therefore, it is crucial to examine this communication and promotion
in a setting that is explicitly visible to the public. If we had relied on other forms of parliamentary
activity, such as participation in a debate, we could not be certain that it reached citizens as
parliamentary behavior and coverage that citizens see are not always aligned (e.g. Poljak, 2024a;
Yildirim et al., 2022). Additionally, in all three countries we study, over 70% of citizens report
receiving news through social media (71% in Australia, 76% in Belgium, and 72% in the US;
Digital News Report 2023 - Reuters Institute). Therefore, if parliamentary activity on issues does
reach the public, it is more likely to be consumed via social media. Finally, we believe our measure
of activity would likely correlate strongly with other forms of parliamentary activity. For instance,
studies have shown a clear link between issues debated in parliament and their subsequent
promotion on social media (Poljak, 2024b).
Final data
After coding all Facebook posts to include precise information on the issues present and whether
there is any mention of concrete parliamentary or legislative action on those issues, we compile a
final dataset. This dataset organizes individual politician profiles nested by the issues per month,
serving as the unit of observation. In other words, for each month a politician posts about a specific
issue, such as Bernie Sanders posting about health, we create an observation for this politician on
an issue in a month. For instance, if Bernie Sanders has posts on health in January and February
2022, it results in a minimum of two observations for him on the health issue. In total, we have
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66,871 observations of politicians posting about an issue in a given month (Australia N = 30,701;
Belgium N = 12,273; US N = 23,897).
Variables
There are two primary dependent variables in our analysis. Firstly, we have a variable "Following
up on an issue," indicating whether politicians address an issue they previously posted about. For
instance, if Mitch McConnell addressed transport policy in October 2021 and also did so in
September 2021, it suggests follow-up (coded as 1 = Yes). On average, 57.01% of observations
across months show politicians following up on the same issue they posted about the previous
month (58.93% in Australia, 40.56% in Belgium, and 63.01% in the US).
Secondly, we have a variable "Taking up action on an issue," which indicates whether a
politician posted anything regarding legislative or parliamentary action on a specific issue in a
given month. For example, considering Mitch McConnell again, we not only examine whether he
posted about transport in October 2021 but also whether this included a legislative or parliamentary
action on transport policy (coded as 1 = Yes). Overall, 33.55% of observations of politicians per
issue and month include a post indicating a concrete action or activity on the respective issue.
Notably, the highest level of promotion comes from the US, where 48.81% of observations include
such promotion, followed by 28.28% from Australia. The lowest promotion comes from politicians
in Belgium, with only 17.01%.
The main independent variable gauges the citizens' engagement a politician received on an
issue in the preceding month. This encompasses user engagement, representing the sum of likes,
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comments, and shares in the month before.iii For instance, in the case of Bernie Sanders and health
in February 2022, a citizens' engagement score of 358,363 indicates the engagement Sanders
garnered on the posts involving health in the month before (January 2022). On average, posts on
an issue in a month receive 2,629 likes, shares, and comments (SD = 16,514) and there is
considerable variation across countries, with the highest average engagement in the US at 5,528
(SD = 26,597), followed by Australia at 1,132 (SD = 5,541), and Belgium at 730 (SD = 2,498).
Additionally, we incorporate four separate independent variables measuring (i) the log
transformation of the engagement variable (due to the standard deviations being higher than the
mean), as well as the number of (ii) likes, (iii) shares, and (iv) comments (see Supplementary
Materials - D). Given the lagged nature of these independent variables, it's important to note that
all initial observations of politicians on a particular issue are excluded from the analysis (final N
= 60,018; Australia N = 28,210; Belgium N = 10,471; US N = 21,337).
Endogeneity concerns
Naturally, it is difficult to envision that politicians act in a vacuum and do not observe what is
happening in the outside world beyond their own engagement on social media (e.g. Eriksen, 2024).
Therefore, to avoid endogeneity issues where our main independent variable of politicians’ own
citizens' engagement on social media may be correlated with external events, we generate two
fundamental control variables: issue salience and politicians’ interest in the issue.
Firstly, issue salience measures the engagement an issue receives across other politicians'
Facebook profiles in the previous month within a country. A higher value indicates greater salience
of the issue among all citizens who interact with politicians' Facebook posts. The average
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engagement an issue receives across all Facebook profiles is 205,477 (SD = 388,823) and it varies
across countries (Australia Mean = 86,712; SD = 105,726; Belgium Mean = 17,960; SD = 19,159;
US Mean = 458,310; SD = 558,158). To mitigate multicollinearity in our models (see next section),
we examined the correlation between issue salience and the main independent variable, politicians’
own citizens' engagement. Pearson's pairwise coefficient is 0.249, indicating a positive but weak
relationship between issue salience—measured by overall engagement on an issue across all posts
by politicians—and the citizens' engagement a politician received on that issue. Therefore, it is
safe to assume that our main independent measure of citizens' engagement on politicians’ own
social media is a distinct predictor from the general issue salience across the social media profiles
of other politicians.
This measure of issue salience, which captures what citizens interact with online, likely
reflects potential omitted variables related to the general media agenda—a factor that may
influence some (but not all) politicians (Zoizner et al., 2017). This is due to the strong interplay
and mutual influence between the media agenda and public opinion (McCombs, 1977; Weaver,
1991). Media influences issues people think about, while also responding to what citizens deem
important (Uscinski, 2009). These effects are likely even more pronounced with the rise of social
media and modern technologies. For instance, news stories with high citizens’ engagement metrics
are more likely to be prioritized by journalists, compared to those that do not gain traction (Lamot
and Van Aelst, 2020). Therefore, there is a credible expectation that this measure of issue salience
captures both media and public agendas.
Secondly, politicians’ interest in the issue is measured by the number of politicians who
posted about the issue in the previous month within a country. In essence, this variable represents
the political social media agenda, where higher numbers indicate that more politicians were
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interested in discussing the issue. On average, 56 politicians posted about the same issue a month
prior (SD = 32). Once again, we record variations across countries (Australia Mean = 62; SD =
30; Belgium Mean = 23; SD = 11; US Mean = 67; SD = 31). The correlation between politicians'
interest in an issue and engagement in a post is also positive but weak, with Pearson's pairwise
coefficient at 0.100.
Analysis
We assess our expectations through logistic regression models, given the binary nature of the
dependent variables. These models enable us to predict the likelihood of politicians following up
on an issue and promoting action on an issue based on citizens' engagement on their Facebook
profiles in the preceding month. Since the hierarchical structure of our data, where Facebook posts
are clustered within each politician, we incorporate multilevel models with random intercepts at
the Facebook profile level. This decision is crucial as it allows us to account for the variability that
exists between the Facebook pages of individual politicians—some post frequently, others less so,
some have high citizen engagement, while others have minimal engagement, etc. Thus, with this
approach, we ensure that the probabilities we generate are applicable across pages, preventing any
single Facebook page from unduly influencing our results. That is, any variation between
politicians, such as their age, gender, or ideological position, is accounted for through model
specification.
Furthermore, to address potential autocorrelation in the models, we incorporate the lagged
dependent variable as a control. This is important because politicians might generally promote
acting on an issue each month, and by controlling for this pattern, we ensure that the results apply
20
to issues that have and have not been acted upon in the past. All our models include issue- and
country-fixed effects, making our results applicable across multiple issues and countries (e.g.
Uscinski, 2009). However, we do conduct separate tests across countries (see Supplementary
Materials - A) and exclude the top five issues with the most engagement (see Supplementary
Materials - B) to ensure that our results are not influenced by country-specific factors (e.g., the
role of a US Senator versus a Member of Parliament in Australia/Belgium) or the salience of
prominent topics like the COVID-19 pandemic during our study period (see later Robustness
checks).
Additionally, all models control for the electoral cycle, considering that politicians’ policy
actions may shift at different stages of the cycle (e.g., Berz and Kroeber, 2023). While including
the electoral cycle variable accounts for the panel nature of our data, we also re-ran all models
using time-series cross-sectional analysis (see Beck et al., 1998), incorporating the time dimension
(i.e., months) for each observation of a politician’s engagement with an issue in the model
specification (see Supplementary Materials - C).
Results
The results of our regression models are summarized in Table 3. In Model 1, we examined our
Hypothesis 1 that increased citizens' engagement on an issue prompts politicians to follow up on
the same issue. This hypothesis is supported by our findings, as indicated by a positive and
statistically significant coefficient for citizens' engagement. Specifically, a higher level of citizens'
engagement on an issue in the previous month (t-1) significantly enhances the likelihood that a
21
politician will revisit the issue in the subsequent month. Conversely, if a post about an issue
performs poorly, politicians are less inclined to revisit the issue in the following month.
In Model 2, we evaluated our Hypothesis 2 suggesting that increased citizens' engagement
on an issue prompts politicians to act on that issue. Consistent with our hypothesis, we obtained a
positive and statistically significant coefficient for citizens' engagement. This suggests that as the
level of citizens' engagement on an issue in the previous month (t-1) rises, there is a corresponding
increase in the likelihood of a politician acting and advocating for it online in the current month
(t). In turn, minimal interaction on a post diminishes the probability of acting on the issue.
22
Table 3. The results of two multilevel logistic regressions testing the impact of online citizens'
engagement on politicians following up on an issue (Model 1) and acting upon an issue (Model 2)
MODEL 1
MODEL 2
Dependent Variable: Following up on an
issue (t) (1=Yes)
Dependent Variable: Taking up action on an
issue (t) (1=Yes)
Independent Variables
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)
Citizens' engagement (t-1)
0.0000122***
0.00000326***
(0.00000197)
(0.000000833)
Taking up action on an issue (t-1)
0.316***
0.272***
(0.0227)
(0.0217)
Following up on an issue (t-1)
0.673***
0.471***
(0.0205)
(0.0204)
Issue salience (t-1)
0.000000295***
0.00000033***
(0.0000000512)
(0.0000000366)
Politicians’ interest (t-1)
0.0323***
0.00441***
(0.000685)
(0.000639)
Belgium (ref. Australia)
0.571***
-0.192*
(0.0872)
(0.0905)
United States (ref. Australia)
-0.328***
0.612***
(0.0794)
(0.0791)
Electoral cycle
-0.0221***
-0.00538***
(0.00121)
(0.00124)
Issue Fixed-Effects
Yes
Yes
Variance (Facebook pages)
0.360***
0.363***
(0.0336)
(0.0337)
Constant
-1.308***
-1.712***
(0.0789)
(0.0826)
N (total)
60,018
60,018
N (Facebook pages)
397
397
AIC (empty model)
64328.6 (87835.92)
67206.31 (78181.64)
Note: †p<0.1 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.00
23
Essentially, our main theoretical hypothesis is confirmed: higher citizen engagement with
a post on a specific issue increases the likelihood that politicians will follow up on the issue and
take active measures, such as working on legislation or discussing the issue in parliament or
congress, while promoting these actions online. These findings remain robust when using time-
series models and applying a log transformation to citizens’ engagement (see Supplementary
Materials – C and Supplementary Materials - D).
Furthermore, in line with other studies that highlight the importance of issue salience
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994) and political competition over issues (Green-Pedersen, 2007;
Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2024), we show that both the salience of issues on social media overall
and the number of politicians featuring these issues also play a role in shaping the probability of
politicians following up and taking action. If an issue garners more likes, comments, and shares
across the profiles of all politicians on social media within a month, and if more politicians discuss
the issue in a given month, both factors will increase the probability of a politician following up
and taking action on that issue in the following month (for interaction effects with politicians’ own
citizens' engagement on their profiles, see below).
To present our key findings visually, we conducted post-estimation predicted probability
scores based on the regression models outlined in Table 3. Figure 1 illustrates a gradual increase
in the probability of politicians following up and promoting action on an issue based on citizens'
engagement on the issue in the previous month. Focusing on the left side of the figure, where we
predict scores for following up on an issue, we observe that comparing no citizens' engagement to
above-average engagement (mean + standard deviation) of ≈20.000 comments, likes, and shares
results in an 8.46% increase in probability (from .614 to .666). Therefore, the greater the
engagement, the more likely a follow-up on the issue. Moving to the right side of the figure, where
24
predicted scores for acting on an issue are depicted, we also note an increase, albeit a more
moderate one. Once again, comparing no interaction to above-average engagement, the probability
increases by 4.21% (from .312 to .325). Given that posts can achieve citizens' engagement well
above 20.000 interactions, these effects are substantial.
25
Figure 1. Predicted probability of following up and taking up action on an issue (t) based on
citizens' engagement on their own profile in the previous month (t-1)
Note: 95% confidence intervals holding other variables at their mean (Table 3)
.6 .7 .8 .9
Predicted probability
010000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
Citizens' engagement on an issue (t-1)
Model 1 - Following up on an issue (t)
.3 .35 .4 .45
Predicted probability
010000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
Citizens' engagement on an issue (t-1)
Model 2 - Taking up action on an issue (t)
26
Robustness checks
We consistently find these patterns across countries when running separate models that omit each
country (see Supplementary Materials - A). Interestingly, removing the US from our models results
in the non-significance of the control variable of issue salience on social media. This indicates that
US Senators, compared to parliamentary members in Australia and Belgium, are more prone to
react to trending topics on social media. This difference may be related to the leadership roles that
US Senators hold, making them more responsive to salient issues than regular members of
parliament in Australia or Belgium, where lower-ranked positions in a party may lower the
pressure to respond to salient concerns (see also Ennser-Jedenastik et al., 2022b).
To further explore salience effects, we excluded the top five most salient issues in each
country (see Supplementary Materials - B). Namely, despite our fixed effects on issues, prominent
issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which emerged during
our study period, may have influenced our findings. It is possible that people reacted more strongly
to these issues, and politicians felt compelled to act on them, potentially making our relationships
spurious. Indeed, the top issues that citizens interacted with online across all three countries
included health and international affairs. However, even when the top five issues are excluded,
individual citizens' engagement on politicians' profiles still impacts politicians' likelihood of
following up and taking action on issues. This indicates that politicians engage with or act on less
salient issues if they see these issues perform well on their social media profiles.
Moreover, we explored whether our results hold not only for general citizen engagement
but also when this variable is log-transformed to account for skewed data. Additionally, we also
examined likes, comments, and shares separately (see Supplementary Materials - D). We
27
confirmed our main expectations regardless of the engagement measure, but likes appear to be the
most effective in predicting politicians' actions on issues, while shares are less effective. This
finding may be due to the ease of interpreting likes, which provides politicians with straightforward
feedback on how many people approve of a post on an issue. In contrast, shares can be more
complex to analyze, as people might share a post to express disagreement or for other reasons that
are not as immediately clear.
Finally, we conducted additional models where the main predictor, own citizens'
engagement on an issue, is interacted with salience (Supplementary Materials - E) or politicians'
interest in a particular issue (Supplementary Materials - F) both of which were operationalized in
the Endogeneity concerns section. These models illustrate that citizens' engagement indeed propels
follow-up and action on issues, irrespective of issue salience (see Figure 2). However, we
demonstrate that following up on an issue due to higher citizens' engagement is more pronounced
when other politicians' interest in the issue is low (see left side of Figure 3). This may relate to
politicians' aspirations to develop individual specialization on particular issues (see Huber et al.,
2022; Peeters et al., 2022). As a result, when issues are not covered by other politicians, it allows
politicians to develop competencies by following up on neglected issues. Conversely, promoting
action on an issue due to higher citizens' engagement occurs more frequently when other
politicians' interest in the issue is high (see right side of Figure 3). This finding highlights how
acting on an issue is challenging without the interest of other key political actors. Namely, if
Senators or members of parliament want to push for new legislation or a debate on an issue,
acquiring support among fellow party members or politicians in general is crucial.
28
Figure 2. Predicted probability of following up and taking up action on an issue (t) based on the
interaction of citizens' engagement on their own profile and issue salience in the previous month
(t-1)
Note: 95% confidence intervals holding other variables at their mean (full output in Supplementary
Materials - E)
.6 .7 .8 .9
Predicted probability
010000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
Citizens' engagement on an issue (t-1)
Low salience = 300,000 High salience = 600,000
Following up on an issue (t)
.3 .35 .4 .45 .5
Predicted probability
010000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
Citizens' engagement on an issue (t-1)
Low salience = 300,000 High salience = 600,000
Taking up action on an issue (t)
29
Figure 3. Predicted probability of following up and taking up action on an issue (t) based on the
interaction of citizens' engagement on their own profile and politicians’ interest in the issue in the
previous month (t-1)
Note: 95% confidence intervals holding other variables at their mean (full output in Supplementary
Materials - F)
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted probability
010000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
Citizens' engagement on an issue (t-1)
Low politicians' interest = 20 High politicians' interest = 80
Following up on an issue (t)
.2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45
Predicted probability
010000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000
Citizens' engagement on an issue (t-1)
Low politicians' interest = 20 High politicians' interest = 80
Taking up action on an issue (t)
30
Discussion and Conclusion
Inherent to representative democracies is the relationship between politicians and their constituents
(e.g. Dahl, 1991; Kingdon, 1968). Increasingly, those connections are digitally driven. Substantive
representation is dynamic, with citizens using social media to signal their opinion to policymakers,
who in turn receive information about the electorate’s policy priorities. However, little is known
about what happens after politicians receive this immediate online feedback in the form of citizen
engagement.
Therefore, this study aimed to uncover two main points: (i) whether politicians' policy
priorities are influenced by positive engagement from digital publics, and (ii) whether this
engagement is likely to prompt politicians to transition from mere policy positions to signaling
legislative and parliamentary activity. By analyzing novel data on the online issue priorities of
politicians across three distinct countries, we were able to demonstrate how politicians not only
follow up on issues that receive higher engagement but also promote action on those issues as well.
Naturally, these findings should be interpreted with caution. While we demonstrate that
social media metrics can serve as an information cue for politicians to gauge public priorities and
responses to issues, there's a probability that their actions are also influenced by other factors.
Many politicians across different countries do not view social media as their primary source of
public opinion (Walgrave and Soontjens, 2023). For instance, many prioritize direct contact with
citizens. Therefore, while online metrics likely offer insights into which issues to pursue, they
likely overlap with other factors that influence politicians' agendas (see also Gilardi et al., 2022).
Nevertheless, politicians do recognize that social media can be a more relevant public opinion cue
compared to opinion polls or conversations with journalists (Walgrave and Soontjens, 2023),
31
which supports our finding that social media metrics are significant for politicians' agenda
priorities.
Additionally, although we demonstrate that politicians prioritize responding to issues that
citizens care about, in our case issues with higher online metrics, we don't determine if they alter
their positions on these issues, especially when there is incongruence (Sevenans, 2021).
Nevertheless, considering the ample literature suggesting that politicians often align with public
positions (e.g., Beyer and Hänni, 2018), we have reasonable confidence that our findings would
likely remain consistent. For instance, if citizens engage significantly with a post advocating
reduced government spending, we could anticipate politicians pushing for decreased government
spending in their legislative actions (Wlezien, 1995).
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the current literature in several ways.
Specifically, we add to the emerging body of research on politicians' behavior in an increasingly
digital world, where there is direct contact between politicians and citizens online. Our findings
not only support previous studies emphasizing the importance of citizens' engagement for
politicians' individual online agendas (e.g. Barbera et al., 2019; Bene, 2017; Ennser-Jedenastik et
al., 2022a; Jost, 2023) but also demonstrate how this engagement translates into the promotion of
substantive action on issues. Furthermore, our study lends external validity to existing public
opinion research that experimentally confirms politicians' adaptation to public preferences (e.g.
Sevenans, 2021). By utilizing observational data, we confirm that much of the literature on
politicians aligning their policy priorities with public sentiment holds when examining their online
engagement. Therefore, we illustrate how politicians' promotion of legislative activities is
associated with public interaction online.
32
Additionally, our results offer a nuanced view of the current state of representative
democracy. Our findings indicate that politicians are, to some extent, responsive to issues that
generate online engagement. This highlights a beneficial aspect of social media: it provides an
accessible information environment that allows politicians to gauge the salience of issues,
particularly among citizens who follow them online. Yet, our results also highlight how social
media may reinforce inequalities in representation (Ansell and Gingrich, 2024; Bartels, 2008). For
instance, politicians’ interpretation of public opinion can often be skewed toward the views of
highly politically engaged citizens (Sevenans et al., 2022). Since engagement on politicians' social
media posts is frequently driven by specific groups of citizens that follow politicians online, it may
lead to inaccurate perceptions of broader public opinion.
33
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i Data and replication materials for this paper can be accessed at
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7DNAO2
ii Acting independently, however, does not imply that members of parliament in Australia engage
in intra-party dissent (see Kam, 2009). Rather, it illustrates that Australian politicians may have
more room to maneuver regarding their individual agendas compared to Belgium, where
politicians are expected to adhere strictly to the party line on issues.
iii We opted to work with the sum, rather than average scores, to ensure that various types of
engagement—such as intense but short-lived viral posts with high engagement—are fully
captured. This makes it a more holistic measure of how much attention an issue is receiving on
social media. Using averages would risk undervaluing relevant viral posts that gain significant
traction compared to others that perform poorly, thereby losing key insights from high-impact
posts. Still, we do perform a log transformation of this variable and use it as a robustness check in
several models (see Supplementary Materials – C and Supplementary Materials - D).
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