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Contemporary Italian Politics
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rita20
A change of paradigm? How the Russian invasion
of Ukraine influenced Italian memory laws
Polina Zavershinskaia & Francesco Spera
To cite this article: Polina Zavershinskaia & Francesco Spera (12 Dec 2024): A change
of paradigm? How the Russian invasion of Ukraine influenced Italian memory laws,
Contemporary Italian Politics, DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2024.2439175
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2024.2439175
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UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
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A change of paradigm? How the Russian invasion of Ukraine
inuenced Italian memory laws
Polina Zavershinskaia
a
and Francesco Spera
b
a
Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Leipzig, Leipzig, Saxony,
Germany;
b
Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, Facoltà di Scienze Giuridiche, Università del Salento, Salento,
Italy
ABSTRACT
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has profoundly reshaped the global
socio-political landscape. Since its onset in 2022, democracies
worldwide have responded decisively by imposing unprecedented
sanctions on Russia, severing diplomatic ties, and supporting
Ukraine’s self-defence eorts. This article examines the symbolic
impact of this violent event on Italy’s contemporary mnemonic
framework. Specically, we explore how Italy’s memory landscape –
shaped by its reckoning with fascism and communism after World
War II – has been inuenced by the invasion. Using qualitative and
quantitative narrative analysis, we analyse the mnemonic narratives
embedded in Italian memory laws enacted or amended in response
to the invasion. Our ndings reveal that the Russian invasion has
disrupted these narratives, producing notable discrepancies. While
some memory laws depict Russia’s aggression as a threat to the
post-war international order, others portray Western sanctions
against Russia as detrimental to European coexistence, criticizing
political leaders for undermining peace and exacerbating tensions.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 31 July 2024
Accepted 26 November 2024
KEYWORDS
Memory laws; mnemonic
narratives; Russian invasion
of Ukraine; Italy
Introduction
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered the global geopolitical
landscape. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion in February 2022, many demo-
cratic nations, including Italy, imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia and swiftly
cut numerous diplomatic and economic ties. The invasion was widely framed within
democratic discourse as an existential battle between democracy and autocracy, as
exemplified by the parliamentary address of then-Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi
in 2022. Against this backdrop, we propose that the invasion may have also sparked shifts
in the symbolic frameworks that shape contemporary socio-political communities.
The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and escalated with
the full-scale invasion in 2022, has been extensively examined in scholarly research
regarding the mnemonic frameworks of Russia and Ukraine (e.g. Belavusau,
CONTACT Polina Zavershinskaia zavershinskaia@studserv.uni-leipzig.de Institut für Politikwissenschaft,
Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Leipzig, Beethovenstrasse 15, Leipzig, Saxony, Germany
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2024.2439175.
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2024.2439175
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or
with their consent.
Gliszczynska-Grabias, and Mälksoo 2021; Dekel 2022; Koposov 2018; Mälksoo 2023;
McGlynn 2020; Nekoliak 2022; Noordenbos 2022). However, relatively little attention
has been paid to how this conflict has shaped the mnemonic trajectories of major
Western European democracies, such as Italy.
1
To explore these dynamics, our analysis
focuses specifically on the memory laws enacted or amended following the onset of the
invasion.
Scholars (e.g. Cram 2016; Loytomaki 2012; Nekoliak 2022; Wójcik 2023) often view
memory laws as expressions of the dominant vision of a collective past within socio-
political communities. However, drawing on recent sociological research in Memory
Studies (Gensburger and Lefranc 2020; see also Adams 2024; Koposov 2018; Tirosh
and Reading 2023; Olick 2016), we suggest a different perspective. That is, memory
policies, and memory laws in particular, represent contested arenas where competing
representations of the past – such as those between ‘dominant’ and ‘subaltern’
collective memories (Barkan and Lang 2022; Binder 2021; Rigney 2021, 2022; Ruiz
2024) – are negotiated. Consequently, analysing the mnemonic narratives embedded
in memory laws provides valuable insight into the conflicts and debates that shape the
current mnemonic frameworks of contemporary European socio-political commu-
nities, including Italy.
We therefore ask: ‘How did Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine impact Italian
memory laws?’ To address this question, we examine legislative and non-legislative acts,
official declarations, and proposals from the Italian parliament that promoted specific
collective narratives about Italy’s past, and that were proposed, enacted, or amended in
response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, beginning on 24 February 2022. Using
qualitative and quantitative narrative analysis, we explore the collective mnemonic
narratives embedded in these memory laws. Specifically, we identify the key narrative
themes conveyed by these laws and assess whether, and in what ways, the Russian
invasion influenced these narratives.
We begin by introducing the theoretical framework of memory laws, approaching this
phenomenon from the cultural sociological perspective of Memory Studies.
2
Next, we
outline the evolution of Italy’s mnemonic framework, focusing on the emergence of post-
World War II memory legislation. We then detail our data selection process and
methodological approach, which addresses our research question by combining qualita-
tive and quantitative narrative analysis. This is followed by a presentation of our findings,
highlighting the collective narratives shaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine as
reflected in the selected Italian memory laws. In the conclusion, we summarize our
findings and offer suggestions for future research.
Theoretical framework of memory laws
Laws and collective memory
The ‘cultural sociology of retrospection’ (Olick 2016) offers a robust framework for
understanding collective memory in contemporary societies. From this theoretical per-
spective, Olick (2016) defines collective memory as the representation of events deemed
collectively significant, along with the practices that legitimize those representations. He
2P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
argues that collective memory is grounded in cultural codes of civil solidarity, which help
transcend individual identification and foster a sense of collective unity within society.
Scholars (e.g. Erll 2011; Olick 2016; Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991; Wagner‐
Pacifici 2010) argue that collective narratives embody both a society’s images of the past
and its visions for the future. These mnemonic narratives, along with their ‘mnemonic
standoffs’ with opposing counter-narratives (Wertsch 2021), shape the prevailing mne-
monic framework of a society. Reconfigurations of these narratives, often triggered by
significant events such as acts of violence, can drive transformative changes within this
framework (Assmann 2013; Binder 2021; Giesen 2004; Olick 2016; Simko and Olick
2020; Wertsch 2021).
Mnemonic narratives can be mobilized by social and political actors to construct
a ‘usable past’ that serves the needs of the present (Olick 2007). In other words, these
narratives can play a key role in supporting specific memory policies and legitimizing
particular interpretations of the past within society (see Adams 2024; Gensburger and
Lefranc 2020; Olick 2016). Memory laws, as part of the broader repertoire of memory
policies (or as one of its ‘vectors’, in Henry Rousso’s terminology, cited in Cooke 2011),
can be seen as vehicles for transmitting these narratives, which are strategically mobilized
by actors to influence society. While this idea is widely accepted in scholarly discourse,
the significance of such policies, particularly laws, and the role of the narratives they
convey, remain debated and under-theorized. Legal scholarship (e.g. Cram 2016;
Loytomaki 2012; Nekoliak 2022; Wójcik 2023) typically adopts a ‘top-down’ perspective,
viewing memory laws as instruments whereby political actors seek to promote the state’s
position and dominant narratives. In contrast, recent sociological studies express scepti-
cism about the ‘top-down’ nature of these laws (Gensburger and Lefranc 2020; Tirosh
and Reading 2023; see also Osiel 1997) These studies argue that memory laws do not
necessarily enforce a singular, official interpretation of the past but rather reflect ongoing
struggles and negotiations within collective memory (Gensburger and Lefranc 2020).
Thus, memory laws not only defend the dominant state-sponsored narratives, such as
laws criminalizing Holocaust denial (see Koposov 2018, 27), but also reflect symbolic
battles between competing representations of historical events supported by different
societal groups.
We propose that analysing memory laws offers a valuable opportunity to examine the
contentious dynamics of collective memory in contemporary socio-political commu-
nities. It may also reveal shifts in their mnemonic frameworks, influenced by significant
and violent events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In doing so, we move beyond the
legal definition of memory laws as legislation that penalizes certain retrospective dis-
courses (Nekoliak 2022; Wójcik 2023), typically aimed at providing ‘historical clarifica-
tion and even justice to victims’ (Barkan and Lang 2022, 1; see criticisms in Gensburger
and Lefranc 2020). We also include ‘declarative’ memory laws, such as commemorative
resolutions, which are primarily descriptive. These laws can reflect not only dominant
narratives but also counter-narratives and ‘subaltern’ memories (Koposov 2018; see also
Kończal 2021; Lucksted 2022).
We argue that memory laws serve as symbolic mirrors, reflecting the contentions and
debates that shape society’s current mnemonic framework. To illustrate this, we describe
Italian collective memory after WWII and the development of the first memory laws,
which capture the contentious dynamics of Italy’s post-war mnemonic framework. This
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 3
historical explanation is crucial for our empirical investigation into whether and how the
Russian invasion of Ukraine has influenced collective narratives in Italian memory laws.
The evolution of the Italian mnemonic framework
The formation of the Italian mnemonic framework has been deeply influenced by
conflicts between competing memories of Italy’s role in WWII (De Luna 2010; Focardi
2020; see also Bottici and Challand 2013; Griffini 2023; Manucci 2020; Henneberg and
Clara 2004; Koposov 2018; Traverso 2016). These symbolic dynamics underwent sig-
nificant changes, particularly following Italy’s shift in political alignment from fascism to
the Allies in 1943. This shift was later reflected in efforts to nationalize the Allied victory
in WWII.
3
The symbolic dynamics that shaped post-war Italian memory were reflected in contra-
dictory narratives that downplayed or ignored fascist atrocities while promoting histor-
ical revisionism (Focardi 2020; Schwarz 2010). This re-enactment of the Risorgimento
(Resistance)
4
myth and the narrative of Italian innocence (italiani brava gente [good
Italian people] versus tedeschi cattivi [bad Germans])
5
have been present in Italian public
discourse to this day (Cooke 2011; Cooke 2012; Del Boca 2005; De Luna 2010; Focardi
2013, 2020; see also Petrusewicz 2004). As a result, these post-war dynamics were also
evident in an incomplete process of fascist lustration, which largely attributed the crimes
of WWII to Nazi Germany (Caroli 2016; Focardi 2005; Caroli 2016).
6
From the 1960s
onward, the Christian Democratic Party (DC), as the ruling party, monopolized official
commemorations, infusing the Risorgimento and italiani brava gente narratives with
additional religious connotations: ‘Christian community of those fallen for the father-
land’ (Koposov 2018, 30). This gave the narratives greater appeal and helped them gain
further traction in Italian society (Cooke 2011; Garau 2015, 55; Pezzino 2005).
The narratives mentioned above were countered by another mnemonic narrative,
particularly championed by the Italian left (Focardi 2020; Pezzino 2005). The polariza-
tion of these narratives reflected the deep symbolic conflict at the heart of Italian
collective memory. Similar to the Risorgimento narrative, this one focused on the
collective remembrance of the Italian Resistance to fascism (Cooke 2011; Pezzino
2005). However, this narrative emphasized the commemoration of the partisan move-
ment and the promotion of anti-fascist values, especially by the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) (Focardi 2020; Garau 2015; Koposov 2018).
7
Nonetheless, scholars (Pezzino 2005,
403; see also Cooke 2011; Focardi 2020; Bobbio and Rusconi 1992) argue that post-war
hostility to communism, especially during the Cold War, prevented this version of the
Resistance narrative (with the exception of the anti-fascist paradigm) from becoming
dominant in Italian society.
The divisions between conflicting narratives in the Italian mnemonic frame-
work also influenced the memory laws of post-war Italy, highlighting deep rup-
tures within Italian society (De Luna and Revelli 1995). On one hand, strict
regulations were established regarding the commemoration of Italy’s fascist past.
In 1947, Disposition XII of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the
Constitution (see La Costituzione, Senato della Repubblica 1948) criminalized
any attempt to reorganize fascist parties (Koposov 2018, 64). In 1952, the
Italian parliament enacted the Scelba Law, named after Mario Scelba, the Italian
4P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
Interior Minister, which implemented Disposition XII. This law is considered one
of the ‘most comprehensive post-war anti-fascist laws’ (64). It prohibited both the
reorganization of the fascist party and the endorsement of fascist methods,
including any justification of fascism (65). In relation the atrocities of fascism,
including its involvement in crimes against humanity, Italy also passed laws aimed
at preventing genocide.
8
Additionally, in 1975, Italy ratified the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),
which criminalized the spread of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred
towards specific national, ethnic, and racial groups (ICERD, cited in Koposov
2018, 70–73).
On the other hand, despite the existence of these laws, the failure properly to prosecute
fascists – due to the incomplete lustration process that should have helped Italy confront
its fascist past – reinforced the italiani brava gente narrative. Additionally, the amnesty
law
9
introduced by then-Minister of Justice and PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti (Pezzino
2005, 400), played a dual role: it both facilitated the rehabilitation of fascism (Caroli 2016;
see also Petrusewicz 2004) and contributed to the discrimination of communists (Pezzino
2005, 400).
These divided narrative dynamics continue to shape the Italian mnemonic framework
today, reflecting ongoing tensions between competing memories of the Resistance.
Furthermore, efforts to confront Italy’s troubled past by incorporating narratives that
condemn the actions of the ‘losers’ and ‘executioners’ (e.g. the fascists) during WWII
10
have had an ambivalent effect, further deepening the polarization of Italy’s collective
memory.
With the decline of traditional parties like the DC and PCI in the 1990s, new
socio-political actors have emerged, further intensifying the contestation of mne-
monic narratives about the violent past of WWII. In this context, the PCI’s
legacy – marked by anti-American and pacifist ideologies – has left a lasting
influence on Italy’s contemporary collective memory (Cooke 2011; Morini 2023).
11
In particular, until 2014 and especially in 2022, segments of the Italian socio-
political landscape maintained a somewhat sympathetic attitude towards the com-
munist past and the Soviet Union, reflected in pacifist stances towards Russia
(Biancalana 2023; Makarychev and Terry 2020; Morini 2023).
12
The rise of the far-right in Italy also influenced the country’s mnemonic
landscape, as it sought to challenge post-war liberal values (Griffini 2023;
Manucci 2020; Marchese and Tortola 2024) and left-wing ideologies – as did
the anti-communism promoted by Silvio Berlusconi (Diodato and Niglia 2019).
The far-right’s narrative aimed to popularize the Risorgimento and italiani brava
gente stories, while simultaneously downplaying Italy’s fascist past by presenting
all Italians as victims. This rhetoric amplified anti-communist sentiment and
deepened the divide in collective memory, relativizing the Holocaust while
emphasizing the Foibe massacres (Focardi 2005, 2020; De Luna 2010).
13
As demonstrated by the example of post-war Italy, memory laws are not simply ‘top-
down’ political tools used to enforce a dominant narrative. Instead, they serve as sym-
bolic vessels that contain multiple mnemonic narratives, reflecting the conflicts between
differing interpretations of the collective past. Before exploring how the invasion may
have influenced the Italian mnemonic framework, particularly through changes to
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 5
memory laws in response to this violent event, we will first outline the logic and the
methodology underlying our empirical analysis.
Methodology: qualitative and quantitative narrative analysis
This article explores the collective mnemonic narratives reflected in Italian memory laws
and examines how violent events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, can influence
the narrative content of these laws. To analyse these dynamics, we conduct both
qualitative and quantitative assessments of the narrative content in memory laws
(referred to here as ‘documents’) that were proposed, altered, or modified in Italy
following the start of the Russian invasion.
Data collection
The choice of country for analysis
We argue that Italy is a particularly important case study for examining the impact of the
Russian invasion of Ukraine on European mnemonic frameworks and memory laws. As a key
political entity in Europe, Italy’s national memory policies have played a significant role in
shaping European integration (Bottici and Challand 2013, 114). This includes Italy’s influence
in shaping the divided European mnemonic framework (Pezzino 2005) and its contribution
to the construction of Holocaust identity in Europe (Koposov 2018, 81).
The choice of memory laws
In this study, we examined both criminal and declarative memory laws, which criminalize,
legitimize, and voice specific politically significant events. Using the theoretical framework
outlined above, we treated these memory laws as both legislative and non-legislative acts,
political declarations, and proposals put forth by national decision-making bodies. To gather
relevant data, we used the websites of the Italian parliament,
14
given its central role in Italy’s
political decision-making, as defined by the Constitution (La Costituzione, Senato della
Repubblica 1948). After the initial data collection, we manually filtered the documents to
ensure they aligned with our definition of ‘memory laws’, excluding those that did not
reference memory-related issues. Our dataset (available in the Online Appendix) includes
memory laws proposed (both accepted and rejected) from the beginning of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, up until the end of our data collection on
5 November 2024. In total, we selected 18 memory laws.
15
Analysing mnemonic narratives in memory laws
Qualitative narrative analysis
To address our research question, we employed a narrative analysis structured as follows.
Using MAXQDA software for mixed-methods research, we manually coded the content
of the selected memory laws by assigning specific mnemonic narratives to each docu-
ment. These narratives were identified post hoc following an initial reading of the
selected materials. Rather than relying on predefined narrative frameworks or matrices
to categorize attributes and metaphors (as seen, for example, in Zavershinskaia 2024), we
derived and articulated the narratives based on this preliminary review, informed by the
6P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
scholarly literature on collective memory and mnemonic narratives in Italy discussed
earlier.
Quantitative narrative analysis
Next, to substantiate the findings of our qualitative analysis, we conducted a quantitative
narrative analysis using MAXQDA (Franzosi et al. 2013). Leveraging the MAXDictio
(Word Combinations) tool, we identified and calculated up to ten of the most frequently
used collocations (comprising two to four words) in the documents, grouped by party
alignments based on their stance towards Ukraine (as outlined in Bruno and Fazio 2024;
further details are provided in the Online Appendix). We then compared these frequently
occurring collocations with the narratives identified during the qualitative analysis to
evaluate their alignment and compatibility.
Findings: Italian memory laws during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
The mnemonic narratives reflected in Italian memory laws concerning the invasion can
be grouped into two opposing sets, each deployed either to advocate for or to resist
support for Ukraine. Both sets drew on WWII-era narratives and those related to
Europe’s and Italy’s post-war development – many of which have been discussed
above – to justify and promote specific collective actions in response to the invasion.
We refer to the first set of narratives as ‘Supporting Ukraine’s Self-Defence Against
Reborn Autocracy’. This set encompasses narratives primarily advanced by the ruling
right-wing coalition and liberal-centrist parties.
16
Similar narratives also appear, though
less frequently, in documents produced by AVeS and the M5s.
We called the second narrative, ‘Peace to Prevent Another War in Europe’. This set
comprises narratives opposing Italian and EU decisions to support Ukraine. Elements of
these narratives appear partially in documents proposed by AVeS and more prominently
in those submitted by the M5s.
The rst set: supporting Ukraine’s self-defence against the reborn autocracy
One of the most prominent narratives within the first set is the notion of a paradigm
shift. This narrative underscores the historical significance of the invasion in reshaping
Italy’s and the EU’s security policies and altering their stance towards Russia. It highlights
the importance of supporting Ukraine’s legittima difesa (right to self-defence) and
reducing Italy’s economic reliance on Russia. The right-wing coalition, for instance,
invoked the memory of World War II, stating that ‘this aggression has brought war
back to the heart of Europe, threatening international peace and stability’ (Camera dei
Deputati 2022c, 5).
17
This theme of war’s return to Europe also resonated in documents produced by the
liberal democratic parties. Drawing on Prime Minister Draghi’s (2022) speech, Azione,
IV, and RE advocated a transformation of European defence strategies and increased
support for Ukraine. They invoked a cautionary mnemonic narrative, reflecting on the
fragile assumptions of lasting peace:
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 7
Many had deluded themselves that war would no longer have a place in Europe; that the
horrors that characterised the last century were unrepeatable monstrosities; that the eco-
nomic and political integration pursued by the EU would protect us from violence, and that,
ultimately, ‘we could take for granted the achievements of peace, security, and well-being that
the generations before us had secured through enormous sacrifices’. Yet war has once again
knocked on Europe’s doors [. . .] (Camera dei Deputati 2022b, 4).
18
The second narrative within the first set, termed the ‘Russia’s Responsibility’ narrative,
focused on condemning Russia’s actions through its historical ties to the Soviet past. For
example, the Italian Senate formally condemned the Holodomor,
19
recognizing it as an
act of genocide committed by the Soviet Union (Senato della Repubblica 2023).
20
The
resolution also placed responsibility for the Holodomor on Russia as the Soviet Union’s
successor state, stating:
The years 2022–2023 mark the 90th anniversary of the Holodomor, coinciding with a period
when the Ukrainian people are enduring the suffering of a war of aggression initiated by the
Russian Federation. A segment of its ruling class has never fully severed its connection to the
Soviet past and continues to pursue an imperialistic and hegemonic agenda aimed at
expanding Russia’s sphere of influence over territories once part of the former Soviet Union,
particularly Ukraine. Symbolic of this are the images of red flags bearing the hammer and
sickle of the Soviet Union, waved by Russian tanks advancing into Ukrainian territory and
raised on the town halls of several occupied cities [. . .] (Senato della Repubblica 2023, 2).
21
This document highlights Russia’s responsibility for the aggression in Ukraine, draw-
ing parallels with the actions of the Soviet government during the Holodomor. It
portrays the invasion as a continuation of Soviet authoritarian policies aimed at
erasing ‘Ukrainian national identity’ – framing it as ‘Vladimir Putin’s imperialist
plan [. . .] to annihilate Ukraine militarily and culturally’ (Camera dei Deputati
2022b, 4).
22
Furthermore, in line with the post-war Italian tradition of collective
memory, this and other documents that echoed Russia’s responsibility also celebrated
the Ukrainian resistance to Russian imperialism and the renewed efforts to spread
authoritarianism across Europe.
The first set of narratives also included the ‘just peace’ narrative, which advocated for
peace on the European continent through the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integ-
rity. However, these narratives did not rule out continued military support for Ukraine
from the EU and the US, as Ukraine was seen as defending European democratic values
that had emerged after two devastating wars (Camera dei Deputati 2024a).
23
Additionally, the documents advocating support for Ukraine invoked human rights
legislation and the words of its founders, who played a key role in shaping the post-war
European order (Gensburger and Lefranc 2020; Koposov 2018; Lucksted 2022; Tirosh
and Reading 2023). These references strengthened the arguments put forth in the first set
of narratives, which condemned Russian aggression and called for a shift in the European
defence paradigm to counter the resurgence of authoritarianism. For example, the
Holodomor motion cited Raphael Lemkin, the lawyer who coined the term ‘genocide’
and helped establish the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide in response to WWII atrocities, specifically referencing Article II
24
of the
Convention to frame Soviet and Russian actions as acts of genocide against the
Ukrainian people.
8P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
The quantitative analysis also highlights the common collocations associated with the
narratives mentioned above. For example, equipaggiamento militare (military equip-
ment) and legittima difesa (self-defence) were linked to the narrative of a paradigm
shift. Meanwhile, the phrase aggressione russa (Russian aggression) attributed responsi-
bility for the invasion to Russia. Lastly, pace giusta (a just peace) was associated with the
final narrative in this set.
The second set: peace to prevent another war in Europe
The majority of opposing narratives – the second set – were predominantly found in the
unsuccessful motions proposed by the M5s and, less frequently, in motions proposed by
the AVeS. The first narrative within this set was the escalation narrative. This argued that
‘NATO eastward expansion’ and US ‘proxy wars’ (Senato della Repubblica 2022, 88)
25
could provoke military and nuclear escalation (Camera dei Deputati 2022a, 4).
26
It
sharply criticized US action as anti-pacifist and hegemonic, echoing the anti-
imperialist sentiments of Italian left-wing discourse that emerged after the Vietnam
War. The M5s further contended that the Cold War power imbalance between the US
and Russia was a root cause of the current conflict:
The reasons that triggered the ongoing conflict tend to be represented by the media in our
country with propagandistic simplification, obscuring the antecedents of the war that began in
2014, as well as the deeper causes stemming from a geopolitical conflict rooted in the fragile
balances established after the end of the Cold War (Senato della Repubblica 2022, 115).
27
The escalation narrative, which framed the invasion as a conflict between Russia and the
United States, can also be seen as a modern revival of the Risorgimento narrative. This
perspective criticized the Italian and EU governments for entangling Italy in the affairs of
other nations.
However, this narrative was problematic as it echoed the Russian strategic narrative,
which portrayed the United States as pursuing a hegemonic expansionist agenda while
claiming that Russia’s sovereignty was under threat from this alleged imperialist ambi-
tion (Zavershinskaia 2024b). The similarity to the Russian narrative can be attributed,
first, to the party’s anti-American stance, rooted not only in Italy’s communist history
but also in anti-globalist rhetoric. This rhetoric opposed the perceived imposition of US-
Western values as universal (see Diodato and Niglia 2019) and included Euroscepticism
as a populist reaction against the political establishment (Chryssogelos, Giurlando, and
Wajner 2023). Second, these dynamics may have been reinforced by Russian soft-power
efforts, such as the ‘From Russia with Love’ initiative mentioned earlier.
The first narrative was accompanied by proposals advocating a diplomatic resolution
to the conflict, encapsulated in the peace instead of war narrative. For example, the AVeS
(Camera dei Deputati 2024b)
28
argued that Ukraine, supported by the EU, should pursue
negotiations with Russia to end the bloodshed. This stance was also underpinned by the
Alliance’s ideological reasoning, which included calls for diplomacy to avert an ecological
catastrophe.
In M5s documents, this narrative was further reinforced by elements of Russian
strategic discourse, as evidenced by statements like: ‘to promote Ukraine’s neutrality
internationally as a peaceful way to resolve the conflict’ (Senato della Repubblica 2022).
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 9
Additionally, it included claims that the war in Ukraine had obstructed Europe’s – and
particularly Italy’s – social and economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic
(Senato della Repubblica 2022, 120).
29
Interestingly, the peace instead of war narrative also emphasized Italy’s pivotal role in
mediating peace between Ukraine and Russia. This portrayal of Italy as a peacemaker
evoked the contentious mnemonic narratives of the Italian Resistance, which suggest
that, following its triumph in the ‘war of liberation’ (Pavone 1991), Italy contributed
significantly to shaping the peaceful post-WWII order. In a similar vein, these documents
highlighted Italy’s and the EU’s ‘leading role’ in facilitating peace agreements (Senato
della Repubblica 2022, 88).
30
In contrast to the first set of narratives, where human rights legislation was invoked to
justify the necessity of supporting Ukraine, here such legislation was used to highlight the
perceived inconsistency between the actions of the Italian and EU governments and the
principles underpinning the post-WWII order. For example, the M5s cited the Helsinki
Conference of 1975 and Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union to emphasize the
importance of fostering cooperation to achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine – an
approach they claimed the Italian and EU governments had neglected (Senato della
Repubblica 2022, 118).
31
Furthermore, the M5s argued that the Italian government’s
approval of military aid to Ukraine violated Article 11 of the Italian Constitution.
32
The quantitative analysis of the second set reveals a strong alignment between
frequently occurring collocations and the alternative narratives. The term sforzi diplo-
matici (‘diplomatic efforts’) aligns with the peace instead of war narrative, while escala-
tion militare (‘military escalation’) and armi nucleari (‘nuclear weapons’) correspond to
the escalation narrative.
Discussion: discursive deviations – between memory laws and parties’ media
discourses
It is worth noting that some parties did not consistently align with either of the two
narrative sets outlined above. This ambivalence in discourse was particularly evident in
the case of the League and, to a lesser extent, that of the PD.
The League demonstrated a notably contradictory stance on the invasion. For exam-
ple, while documents on the Italian parliament’s website indicated verbal support for
Ukraine, the League often displayed resistance to providing military assistance. The
party’s position diverged even further in its official media channels and those of its
leader, Matteo Salvini. There, the League embraced narratives resembling those of
the second set, closely aligned with the M5s. For instance, Salvini called for immediate
peace negotiations with Russia and criticized EU support for Ukraine. He drew on an
anti-communist and anti-socialist narrative, claiming that EU ‘left-socialists’ were under-
mining peace in Europe and dragging Italy into another war (Zavershinskaia 2024a).
The League’s contradictory rhetoric, particularly from Salvini, can be attributed to the
party’s longstanding ties with Russia’s political sphere and the historical right-wing
opposition to communism. This antagonism was further intensified by the late leader
of FI and former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, during the period of party-system
transformation in the 1990s (Diodato and Niglia 2019).
10 P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
Second, while the PD generally aligned with the narratives of the first set, its stance
diverged slightly on the issue of peace negotiations. Specifically, although acknowledging
Ukraine’s right to self-defence, the PD emphasized the need to ‘intensify diplomatic
initiatives’ (Camera dei Deputati 2024a).
33
Bruno and Fazio (2024, 276) suggest that this stance reflects the PD’s lack of a fully
developed position on the invasion and its broader implications. This ambiguity may be
rooted in the party’s historical legacy, as it emerged from the efforts at compromesso
storico (historic compromise) of the PCI and the DC (Berlinguer 1973). However, a more
extensive longitudinal analysis of the PD’s narratives on the invasion would be necessary
to substantiate this interpretation with additional examples and clearer evidence.
Conclusion
We have argued that the Russian invasion of Ukraine significantly influenced Italy’s
mnemonic framework. To support this claim, we analysed memory laws, proposing that
these laws offer a useful perspective from which to examine fractures and tensions in
contemporary collective memory. Drawing on the recent sociological literature in
Memory Studies, we suggested that memory laws serve as symbolic vessels, encapsulating
specific mnemonic narratives that assert legitimacy over competing interpretations. As
such, they provide insight into the dynamics and disputes shaping the modern mnemo-
nic framework.
To illustrate this, we positioned Italy as a representative European case, noting that
‘diverging memories are not an Italian speciality but belong to every European country’
(Pezzino 2005, 406). We argued that this approach could shed light on emerging ruptures
in dominant and alternative representations of Europe’s past. Our analysis focused on
both successful and unsuccessful Italian non-legislative acts that referenced Italy’s col-
lective history and were proposed or amended in response to the invasion. The findings
confirm that the invasion has indeed had a discernible impact on Italy’s mnemonic
framework.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered new ruptures in Italy’s mnemonic frame-
work, as reflected in the country’s memory laws concerning the invasion. These laws
highlighted competing narratives: those in support of Ukraine were set against those
opposing it, and in some cases, even justifying Russia’s actions. These opposing narra-
tives drew on divided memories of Italy’s post-WWII history, at times altering the
meanings of these historical references.
The narratives supporting Ukraine’s resistance to Russia were primarily found in the
documents of the ruling right-wing coalition and liberal-centrist parties. Drawing on the
cautionary lessons of WWII, the first narrative emphasized the need to revise Europe’s
defence strategy to counter Russia’s imperial ambitions. The second narrative con-
demned Russia’s aggression, likening it to Soviet-era crimes (e.g. the Holodomor),
while celebrating Ukraine’s resistance to the resurgence of autocracy. The third narrative
advocated for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, but with the stipulation that peace
could only be achieved if Ukraine’s territorial integrity were restored.
These narratives were countered by arguments framing the invasion as an external
issue between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between the US and Russia. These
opposing narratives appeared in the documents of the AVeS and, more frequently, in
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 11
those of the M5s. The narratives supporting this viewpoint were also rooted in post-
war Italian collective memory. For example, the first narrative suggested that con-
tinued Italian involvement could escalate the situation, emphasizing the external
nature of the conflict and attributing much of the blame to the US. This narrative
could be seen as a reinterpretation of the Risorgimento mnemonic, which criticized
the Italian and EU authorities for once again dragging Italy into an external conflict.
It also called for immediate peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, positioning Italy
as a potential historical mediator. These narratives were also closely aligned with
those found in Russian strategic discourse. This connection can be traced to Italy’s
historic anti-Americanism and more recent efforts by Russia to exert soft power in
Italy.
Interestingly, both sets of conflicting narratives invoked post-WWII human rights
legislation. In the case of the first set, such references strengthened the argument for
supporting Ukraine against the ultimate aggressor. In contrast, the second set appealed to
this same legislation to justify the need for immediate peace, oversimplifying the com-
plexity of the situation.
Finally, it is worth noting that the mnemonic narratives of certain parties, particularly
the League and the PD, reflected ambivalence regarding the invasion. While both the
League and PD generally aligned with the government and the EU’s position in support-
ing Ukraine, some narratives within the PD leaned towards opposing views that advo-
cated for an immediate negotiated peace. The League’s position was even more
contradictory: while it officially supported the governing coalition in parliamentary
documents, its media outlets sharply criticized the EU’s support for Ukraine, and its
narrative closely resembled that of the M5s (Zavershinskaia 2024a).
Our research has outlined these preliminary arguments regarding the shifts in the
Italian mnemonic framework due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, this
study also reveals several limitations that warrant further investigation. While we have
focused solely on memory laws, we suggest that a more comprehensive analysis of
parliamentary party media outlets, as well as those of other Italian social and political
actors, could provide deeper insights into how the Russian invasion has further frag-
mented Italy’s mnemonic framework.
Notes
1. This study proposes that examining the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Italy’s
mnemonic framework offers a compelling empirical case for understanding how this violent
event has shaped the divided symbolic frameworks of European societies. As Pezzino (2005,
406) observes, ‘diverging memories are not an Italian speciality but belong to every
European country’. The collective yet conflicting tendencies to silence or erase certain
historical events while amplifying others may signal a new shift – or even
a transformation – in European mnemonic frameworks.
2. This article explores memory laws from a sociological perspective, treating ‘collective
memory’ as an autonomous phenomenon with the capacity to shape socio-political deci-
sions. Consequently, we do not engage with the legal debates that emerged in countries like
France and Germany during the 1990s (e.g. the Gayssot Act [Law No. 90–615 of
13 July 1990, aimed at suppressing racist, anti-Semitic, or xenophobic acts]; see Koposov
2018). Nor do we address discussions in legal scholarship that frame ‘collective memory’
merely as a political ‘tool’ (e.g. Cram 2016; Loytomaki 2012; Wójcik 2023).
12 P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
3. This was also expressed in the appearance of multiple and, at times, conflicting narratives
regarding the Italian Resistance during WWII (see Cooke 2011; Pezzino 2005, for more
details).
4. According to the Risorgimento narrative, most of the Italian population was antifascist
and – in what was framed ‘as a civil war as well as a war of liberation’ (Pezzino 2005,
396; see also Pavone 1991) – fought against a ‘small’ group of collaborators (fascists)
and German invaders. Furthermore, with regard to the Italians (allegedly a ‘small’
group of fascists) who fought alongside the Germans, the Risorgimento narrative also
denied their agency, framing them as merely the subjects of foreign powers (Pezzino
2005, 397).
5. The Risorgimento narrative often complemented the italiani brava gente versus tedeschi
cattivi narrative, which sought to whitewash Italy’s actions during WWII. In this frame-
work, the Italian army was portrayed as benevolent and humanitarian, while German
soldiers were demonized as the embodiment of evil.
6. This also reflects a form of relativism in the memory of the Holocaust in Italy, where Italians
are portrayed as ‘saviours’ and Germans as ‘executioners’ (Focardi 2005, 2013, 2020).
7. Despite being excluded from the Italian government, the PCI, supported by the USSR, was
the largest and most influential communist party in Western Europe (Aga-Rossi and
Zaslavsky 1996; Cooke 2011; Pezzino 2005; Riva and Bigazzi 1999; Wagner-Pacifici 1986).
8. Legge 9 ottobre 1967, n. 962 Prevenzione e repressione del delitto di genocidio (Law
9 October 1967, n. 962 Prevention and repression of the crime of genocide; Gazzetta
Ufficiale 1967).
9. Decreto presidenziale 22 giugno 1946, n. 4 Amnistia e indulto per reati comuni, politici
e militari (Presidential Decree 22 June 1946, n. 4 Amnesty and pardon for common, political
and military crimes; Gazzetta Ufficiale 1946).
10. However, this issue was not fully addressed or adequately integrated into Italy’s collective
memory (see Focardi 2020; Pezzino 2005).
11. This particularly encompasses the anti-imperialist and anti-American versions of the
Resistance narrative promoted by the PCI, such as those featured in the party’s journal,
Critica Marxista (Marxist Critique), which emerged in response to the Vietnam War
(1954–1975). This narrative drew retrospective comparisons between US actions in
Vietnam and the Nazis’ actions in Europe (Cooke 2011, 97).
12. The recent embrace of Russia can be seen as part of the creation of a ‘Russia-as-saviour’
narrative by Giuseppe Conte’s government (2018–2021), led by the Five-star Movement
(M5s), during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ‘From Russia with Love’ campaign, organized
by the Russian government supposedly to help Italy combat the spread of COVID-19, was
a key element of Russia’s soft-power strategy. A fleet of trucks delivering COVID-19-related
aid to Italy, which was severely impacted by the pandemic, was accompanied by extensive
advertising both in Russia and internationally. This campaign aimed not only to foster pro-
Russian sentiment in Italy but also to portray the EU as incapable of providing support, thus
positioning Russia as a more reliable ally (Ventsel 2023).
13. These dynamics were evident in, for example, the emphasis on crimes committed by left-
wing Yugoslav partisans against Italians during WWII, which served to overshadow the
atrocities perpetrated by fascists. This narrative is present in the discourse of the Italian far
right, including that of current Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, as well as in the controversy
surrounding the annual Giorno del Ricordo (Day of Remembrance) on 10 February (Cooke
2011; Gobetti 2020; Greppi, Falanga, and Gobetti 2023).
14. The documents produced by the political parties elected to the Italian parliament during the
period studied were taken from the official websites of the Italian Parliament: the Senate of
the Republic (Senato della Repubblica, https://www.senato.it.) and the Chamber of Deputies
(Camera dei Deputati, https://www.camera.it). We used the keyword ‘Ucraina’ (Ukraine)
for our search. In this article, we refer to the parliamentary parties using their official
abbreviations: FdI for Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy); FI for Forza Italia; Lega (League);
Azione (Action); IV for Italia Viva; PER for Popolari Europeisti Riformatori; RE for Renew
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 13
Europe; PD for Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), AVeS for Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra
(Green-Left Alliance), and M5s for Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement).
15. By the conclusion of our data collection, we identified only non-legislative acts – such as
motions and resolutions – that met the proposed definition of memory laws. Rather than
restricting the dataset to a predetermined number of documents, we manually reviewed all
legislative and non-legislative materials produced, amended or modified during the period
analysed (from 24 February 2022 to 5 November 2024). Documents that referenced the
Russian invasion of Ukraine but lacked connections to the collective past were excluded
from our analysis.
16. The Draghi government was sustained in office by left-wing and liberal-centrist
parties (the M5s, the PD, IV, and Articolo Uno) as well as by right-wing parties
(the League and FI). Its collapse in 2022 was precipitated by the actions of the M5s,
the League and FI. This political upheaval led to a governmental crisis and the
subsequent replacement of Draghi’s government by a right-wing coalition headed by
Giorgia Meloni (see Bressanelli and de Candia 2023; Garzia 2023; Tocci and Goretti
2023). Despite this transition, Meloni’s coalition largely upheld the pro-Ukraine
stance of Draghi’s government, despite the high-profile criticisms of the League
(discussed below).
17. Motion 1/00031, first signatory – Tremonti Giulio, co-signatory party – FdI. All direct
citations from the documents have been translated from Italian by the authors. Additionally,
the authors have italicized certain phrases to highlight key collocations relevant to the
narrative analysis.
18. Motion 1/00022, first signatory – Richetti Matteo, co-signatory parties – Azione, IV, RE.
19. The Holodomor (‘death by hunger’) was a mass killing of the Ukrainian population through
starvation, orchestrated by the Soviet Union in the 1930s. On 15 December 2022, the
European Parliament formally recognized it as an act of genocide in its resolution on the
90th anniversary of the Holodomor (European Parliament resolution 2022/3001(RSP);
European Parliament (2022).
20. Act n. 1–00,045, signatory party – FdI.
21. Act n. 1–00,045, signatory party – FdI.
22. Motion 1/00022, first signatory – Richetti Matteo, co-signatory parties – Azione, IV, RE.
23. Resolution 6/00082, first signatory – Richetti Matteo, co-signatory parties – Azione, IV, RE.
24. Article II of the Genocide Convention specifically defines genocide as ‘any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’ (United
Nations 1951, 3).
25. Resolution 6–00,223 n. 2, first signatory – Elena Fattori, co-signatory party – M5s.
26. Motion 1/00010, first signatory Giuseppe Conte, co-signatory party – M5s. Narratives
concerning NATO’s expansion and speculation about potential nuclear escalation between
NATO and Russia were widely propagated by pro-Russian actors in Italy (Bruno and Fazio
2024). Moreover, these narratives mirrored Russia’s strategic use of nuclear threats as a tool
of coercion (Zavershinskaia 2024b).
27. Resolution 6–00,222 n. 1, signatory party – M5s.
28. Resolution 6/00083, first signatory Luana Zanella, co-signatory party AVeS.
29. Resolution 6–00,223 n. 2, first signatory – Elena Fattori, co-signatory party – M5S.
30. Resolution 6–00,223 n. 2, first signatory – Elena Fattori, co-signatory party – M5S.
31. Resolution 6–00,223 n. 2, first signatory – Elena Fattori, co-signatory party – M5S.
32. Article 11 states, ‘Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of
other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on
conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be
14 P. ZAVERSHINSKAIA AND F. SPERA
necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes
and encourages international organisations furthering such ends’ (La Costituzione, Senato
della Repubblica 1948).
33. Resolution 6/00080, first signatory – Chiara Braga, co-signatory party – PD.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the valuable suggestions of Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Ubaldo Villani-
Lubelli, Susanna Cafaro, Giuseppe Sciortino, Fulvio Cortese, Angelo Jr. Golia, Vincenzo Desantis,
Maria Mälksoo and Lisa Gaufman. We also express our gratitude to the editor and anonymous
reviewers for their insightful feedback. The first author wrote the following sections:
‘Introduction’; ‘Theoretical Framework of Memory Laws’ (the subsection ‘Laws and Collective
Memory’ and the second draft of the subsection ‘The evolution of the Italian mnemonic frame-
work’); ‘Methodology: Qualitative and Quantitative Narrative Analysis’ (the subsection ‘Analysing
Mnemonic Narratives in Memory Laws’), and ‘Findings: Italian Memory Laws during the Russian
Invasion of Ukraine’. The second author wrote the following sections: ‘Theoretical Framework of
Memory Laws’ (the first draft of the subsection ‘The evolution of the Italian mnemonic frame-
work’); ‘Methodology: Qualitative and Quantitative Narrative Analysis’ (the subsection ‘Data
Collection’), and ‘Conclusion’.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Polina Zavershinskaia is finishing her PhD at the Institute for Political Science, Leipzig University,
Germany. She has been a visiting scholar at the Department of Sociology and Social Research at the
University of Trento, Italy, and is a fellow of the Far-Right Analysis Network (FRAN) and the
COST Action ‘CA22165 - Redressing Radical Polarisation: Strengthening European Civil Spheres
facing Illiberal Digital Media (DepolarisingEU)’. In her research, she examines how far-right and
authoritarian actors sacralise violence in Russian, German and Italian societies by utilizing
particular narrative templates. She has recently published in the American Journal of Cultural
Sociology, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics and The International Spectator.
Francesco Spera is finishing his PhD the in the Department of Legal Sciences, University of
Salento, Italy. He has been a visiting scholar at the Centre for Europe at the University of
Warsaw, Poland, and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law in Heidelberg, Germany. His expertise covers EU institutional law, EU constitutional law, EU
Environmental Law, and EU external relations law. He has recently published in the Austrian
Review of International and European Law (ARIEL) and Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo
(DPCE Online).
ORCID
Polina Zavershinskaia http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6525-5501
Francesco Spera http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3714-8012
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 15
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