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Confronting Armageddon
Wargaming Nuclear Deterrence and Its Failures in a U.S.–
China Conict over Taiwan
AUTHORS
Mark Cancian
Matthew Cancian
Eric Heginbotham
DECEMBER 2024
A Report of the CSIS Defense and Security Department and the MIT Security Studies Program
Wargaming Lab
Confronting Armageddon
Wargaming Nuclear Deterrence and Its Failures in a U.S.–
China Conict over Taiwan
AUTHORS
Mark Cancian
Matthew Cancian
Eric Heginbotham
DECEMBER 2024
A Report of the CSIS Defense and Security Department and the MIT Security Studies Program
Wargaming Lab
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | II
About CSIS
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprot policy research
organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges.
Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former
U.S. senator Sam Nunn (DGA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as
president and chief executive ocer since 2000.
CSIS’s purpose is to dene the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of
values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship,
integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the
goal of making real-world impact.
CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research,
analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media
appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with
relevant stakeholders and the interested public.
CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the
thinking of key inuencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.
CSIS does not take specic policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be
understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
2028870200 | www.csis.org
MIT Security Studies Program Wargaming Lab
1 Amherst St., E40, 4th oor
Cambridge, MA 02139
ssp-info@mit.edu
Confronting Armageddon | III
About the MIT Wargaming Lab
The MIT Security Studies Program (SSP) Wargaming Lab is a research group that seeks to innovate
war-gaming to better understand how to deter conict and preserve peace. The lab strives to be
a center of excellence that advances the practice of wargaming and builds networks of scholars
and practitioners.
Leveraging SSP’s expertise in security studies and its extensive network of scholars and national
security practitioners, the Wargaming Lab engages policymakers, informs public policy, and
advances academic research on critical national security issues. To do this, the lab designs and runs
wargames and simulations, develops wargaming best practices, and hosts scholarly conferences
and workshops that support research and help train the next generation of wargaming experts.
Through these eorts, the SSP Wargaming Lab develops the use of wargames and simulations
as rigorous, accessible, and transparent tools to enhance understanding of international politics
and security.
This report does not represent the views of the U.S. government or any part thereof.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | IV
Acknowledgments
The research for this project was funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense. The
MIT Wargaming Lab supported the completion of this report and is grateful for generous family
foundation support.
Chris Park (CSIS) was instrumental in helping to run the wargames and contributed substantially to
the research. Suzanne Freeman (MIT), Ben Harris (MIT), Emily Ezratty (CSIS), Emmett Stern (CSIS),
and Nick Blanchette (MIT) helped with research design and to run wargame iterations. Nina Miller,
Kathryn Dura, Michael Aspinall, Andrew Ortendahl, Elena Capuzzo, Wright Smith, Marcus Gillett,
and Julia Lodoen (all from MIT) helped run the wargame iterations. Professor Erik Lin Greenberg
(MIT) was central in organizing several wargame iterations.
The authors thank the many wargame players who took a day out of their busy schedules to
participate in a game iteration. They not only played the game, thus providing the data on
which this report is based, but also provided constructive feedback to identify strategic insights
arising from gameplay. The authors appreciate the extensive discussions with the sta at the U.S.
Department of Defense. These discussions were particularly helpful in understanding the eects of
nuclear weapons. Finally, the authors thank the working group members and reviewers—inside and
outside CSIS—who answered questions, read the draft report, and provided valuable comments.
The contributions of these participants and discussants improved the research and nal report, but
the content presented here, including any errors, remains solely the responsibility of the authors.
Confronting Armageddon | V
Contents
Executive Summary 1
Chapter 1: Background—Why This Report? 7
China’s Nuclear Modernization 8
U.S. Responses 11
Chapter 2: Literature Review—What Creates the Greatest Pressure for Nuclear First Use? 14
The Nuclear Revolution 14
The Nuclear Taboo 15
Inadvertent Escalation 15
Mainland Strikes 16
Gambling for Resurrection 16
Deliberate Conventional Attacks on Nuclear Forces 17
Counterforce Capabilities 17
Quantitative Nuclear Superiority 18
Chinese Tactical Nuclear Forces 18
Substitution for Conventional Munitions 19
Chapter 3: Literature Review—What Happens If Nuclear Weapons Are Used? 20
What Could Be Targeted During First Use? 20
How Does the Adversary Respond? 25
How Does the Conflict End? 28
Chapter 4: Research Design 31
Scenario Variations 35
Chinese Nuclear Forces 36
U.S. Nuclear Forces 38
Methodological Dierences with Other Wargames 39
Scope Conditions 41
Chapter 5: Game Results 43
Chapter 6: Analysis—What Creates the Greatest Pressure for Nuclear First Use? 46
Supported Hypotheses 47
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | VI
Unsupported Hypotheses 51
Chapter 7: Analysis—What Happens If Nuclear Weapons Are Used? 53
What Did First Use Target? 53
How Did the Adversary Respond? 58
How Did the Conflict End? 62
Chapter 8: Recommendations 66
To Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence 66
To Prepare Should Nuclear Deterrence Fail 70
Appendix A: Individual Game Descriptions 73
Appendix B: Summary of Nuclear Use 78
Appendix C: Nuclear Weapons Use and Eects 80
Appendix D: Glossary 80
About the Authors 86
Endnotes 87
Confronting Armageddon | 1
Executive Summary
This study examines nuclear dynamics in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a war that the
authors hope will never occur. What creates the greatest pressure for nuclear weapons use
in such a conict? What happens if nuclear weapons are used? To answer these questions,
the CSISMIT team modied its existing U.S.-China wargame to include nuclear weapons and ran it
15 times.
The greatest pressure for nuclear use came when China teams reached a crisis: their invasion
of Taiwan was in danger of a defeat that might threaten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule.
To dissuade China from gambling for resurrection—using nuclear weapons to salvage a failing
conventional campaign—U.S. diplomacy was much more important than nuclear brinksmanship.
Favorable outcomes were possible, but total victory was unachievable. The United States must
therefore be prepared to successfully prosecute a high-end conventional war while at the same
time providing face-saving o-ramps to the adversary. To do otherwise risks a nuclear holocaust, as
indeed occurred in three game iterations.
The Challenge
The conuence of Chinese nuclear force development and the increasing risk of conict over
Taiwan makes study of nuclear escalation imperative. China’s nuclear forces are developing at a
rapid rate, acquiring capabilities that may increase the chance of nuclear use in war. Although
China has maintained a no-rst-use policy regarding nuclear weapons, extreme circumstances
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 2
might cause it to override this commitment. Some analysts suggest that the prospect of failing in an
invasion of Taiwan might be such a circumstance.
Others have worried that the United States might incite Chinese nuclear use during a conventional
conict either by striking the Chinese mainland or by degrading (inadvertently or intentionally)
Chinese nuclear capabilities—for example, by destroying dual-use missiles or command and
control networks. Alternatively, the United States might use nuclear weapons rst. U.S. Nuclear
Posture Reviews (NPRs) have not ruled out nuclear rst use.1 Indeed, some U.S. strategists have
suggested using nuclear weapons against a Chinese invasion eet to compensate for perceived
conventional weakness.2
Key Questions
These trends create two research questions about nuclear escalation in a Taiwan invasion scenario:
1. What creates the greatest pressure for nuclear weapons use? The literature on this
subject proposes many hypotheses. Separating the more important from the less
important is critical to designing policy that reduces the likelihood of nuclear use during a
conventional conict.
2. What happens if nuclear weapons are used? Although it would be too late to avoid the
tragedy of nuclear use, there is a range of outcomes. Consider the dierence in destruction
from a single high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) followed by a ceasere versus the
mutual destruction of urban populations. Better-prepared decisionmaking could reduce the
damage of nuclear conict while still producing favorable outcomes.
The Wargame
To investigate these research questions, the project employed a series of wargames including
conventional and nuclear elements to assess the potential actions of China, the United States, and
Japan in an operationally realistic and competitive environment. The wargame built on a previous
U.S.-China conventional wargame developed by the authors.3 This project added nuclear elements,
updated the wargame for a 2028 time frame, and then ran the game 15 times, varying U.S. mainland
strike authorities and Chinese nuclear posture. Game participants had expertise in regional aairs,
military operations, and nuclear stratey, many at a senior level, but gameplay represented their
individual perspectives, not the policies or plans of the U.S. government.
By placing players in the role of operational commanders with the latitude to recommend nuclear
use and negotiated settlements, the wargames explored the military considerations of nuclear use
and their eect on the campaign. The study did not address the likelihood of nuclear use, focusing
instead on military factors and minimizing political factors.
Confronting Armageddon | 3
The Results
The Sankey diagram (Figure 1) shows the game outcomes and the many paths taken to them.
Although complex, the chart captures a key point: initiating nuclear use is truly a roll of the “iron
dice.” (A full discussion of the chart and pathways is in the main text under Game Results.)
Figure 1: Game Pathways and Outcomes
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
The game outcomes (listed on the right side of Figure 1) were as follows:
▪People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Phased Withdrawal (5 outcomes): a ceasere with
a People’s Republic of China (PRC) withdrawal from Taiwan and the return of Chinese
prisoners of war (POWs)
▪Status Quo Ante (1 outcome): destruction of Chinese forces on Taiwan but no
Taiwanese independence
▪Conagration (3 outcomes): strategic nuclear exchange with millions of casualties
▪PRC Enclave (5 outcomes): a ceasere with the establishment of a PRC enclave on Taiwan
▪Inconclusive (1 outcome): no settlement or nuclear conagration by the end of gameplay
Although each game started in the same place, gameplay took many pathways to arrive at the ve
outcomes. Similar pathways could lead to dierent outcomes. For example, in two iterations, China
teams opened with a nuclear-created HEMP. In one of the iterations, the U.S. team responded
with its own HEMP, and in the other the U.S. team did not respond. Both iterations continued with
conventional operations until the China team experienced a crisis as its invasion failed.
In twelve games, China teams experienced a crisis as their invasion forces faced defeat on Taiwan.
Seven games saw China teams recommending nuclear use, leading to the following results:
▪In two, the U.S. team withdrew from the conict, accepting a PRC enclave on Taiwan.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 4
▪In one, the U.S. team responded with a total counterforce attack, which similarly led to a
PRC enclave.
▪In three, the U.S. team conducted a countervalue attack, leading to a global conagration.
▪In one, the U.S. team attacked Chinese operational targets with nuclear weapons, resulting in
the status quo ante.
No set of circumstances allowed a complete U.S. coalition or Chinese victory. All victories were partial.
It is important to note that the probability of nuclear use cannot be inferred from these results. A
game with political authorities fully represented might produce a dierent frequency of nuclear
use. Further, using nuclear weapons would produce unpredictable and momentous political eects
not modeled in the game. Thus, the ultimate political eect of the conict would depend on actions
taken after the point at which gameplay ended.
Analysis and Recommendations
The greatest pressure for nuclear weapons use came from imminent conventional defeat. In
seven of eight cases of nuclear use, China teams employed nuclear weapons rst when they were
facing conventional defeat on Taiwan and decided to gamble for resurrection; the only other case
of nuclear use was by one U.S. team when it mistakenly believed it was losing the conict. This
occurred because the models of conventional conict employed in the game tended to produce
early Chinese success but subsequent setbacks.
The Chinese amphibious eet was particularly vulnerable. Between weeks three and ve of conict,
losses to the amphibious eet made China teams’ positions increasingly unsustainable. Regarding
decisive defeat as a potential existential threat to the CCP, many China teams decided to risk nuclear
escalation to change the dynamics of conict. China teams typically employed between 12 and 30
weapons in these cases. This leads to our recommendations:
▪Prepare o-ramps for a conict with China. There can be no complete victory in a
conict between nuclear powers. Magnanimity in victory—agreeing to settlement terms that
are advantageous to the United States but do not humiliate China—could allow Beijing to back
down without facing a decision on nuclear use versus possible regime collapse.4 The United
States must work with allies and partners ahead of time to evaluate what face-saving o-
ramps they could oer China in exchange for the substantive victory of ending the conict
with an autonomous Taiwan. Without having thought through these proposals ahead of
time, there is a real danger that events will outpace U.S.-coalition diplomacy.
▪Do not preclude the U.S. military from striking the Chinese mainland with
conventional weapons. Several factors sometimes said to either encourage or discourage
the use of nuclear weapons did not play a decisive role. Decisions to escalate or not were
driven primarily by an evaluation of the stakes of defeat and the o-ramps available. Chinese
access to low-yield nuclear weapons was marginally inuential. Other hypothesized drivers
of nuclear escalation that the results did not support included inadvertent escalation from
Confronting Armageddon | 5
attacks on nuclear systems, U.S. conventional attacks on the Chinese mainland, substitution
for dwindling stocks of conventional munitions, and deliberate conventional attacks on
nuclear capabilities. As strikes on the Chinese mainland did not evoke a nuclear response,
U.S. war plans should be more accepting of risk in that domain.
▪Do not pursue quantitative nuclear superiority with the expectation that it will
deter China from using nuclear weapons. Enduring U.S. quantitative nuclear superiority
and counterforce capabilities similarly played no role in the China teams’ calculations.
China teams that recommended nuclear use knew that they were embarking on a risky
course of action given that the United States could devastate China with a nuclear attack;
however, whether the risk of devastation was from 300 or 1,000 nuclear weapons, they
accepted it. There was no evidence that a deeper U.S. nuclear inventory would have
strengthened deterrence.
▪Accustom U.S. military and political leaders to the possibility of large initial losses
in the event of a war with China. Many U.S. teams were shocked at their large losses early
in the conict. By the end of the rst week, the United States and Japan typically lost 270
aircraft and 20 ships, including two carriers. Shaken by these large losses, two U.S. teams
believed they were headed toward defeat. In both cases, game adjudicators saw the course
of conict as unexceptional and believed the United States would regain conventional
advantage without nuclear use. However, shock led one team to accept an adverse
settlement early in the conict, while another used nuclear weapons to redress a perceived
weakness in the conventional balance. Experience in wargames could accustom leaders to
the likely contours of the conict.
▪Continue extended deterrence messaging. Extended deterrence proved generally
successful. During early phases of the games, before any nuclear use, all U.S. teams
reiterated statements of extended deterrence covering Japan. Most China teams regarded a
nuclear attack on Japan as tantamount to a nuclear strike on the United States. China teams
refrained from attacking Japan with nuclear weapons in all but one case (compared with ve
instances of nuclear use against the United States).
▪Develop an understanding with Japan on the nuclear environment. Major changes to
regional nuclear posture (e.g., basing nuclear weapons in Japan) are not necessary to deter
an attack on Japan. However, even if extended deterrence works, Japan might face a region
in which nuclear weapons are used. This diers in key aspects from what the United States
and Japan have discussed and exercised in the past.
▪Develop nuclear branch plans for Chinese operational targets. When faced with
Chinese rst use, all responses carried risk, though of dierent kinds. A nuclear strike against
Chinese operational targets was the best nuclear option. These plans should therefore be
rened and exercised.
▪Withdrawal: In response to China’s rst use, some U.S. teams, averse to the risks of
continuing nuclear conict in any form, accepted unfavorable ceasere terms to end the
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 6
conict. However, most U.S. teams were unwilling to do this, believing doing so would
sacrice a U.S. partner and undermine the U.S. global position.
▪Continuing Conventionally: Some U.S. teams tried to ignore China’s use of nuclear
weapons and continued the conventional campaign. However, this invited further
Chinese nuclear use, eectively forcing the U.S. teams to choose between a nuclear
response or withdrawal.
▪Countervalue: Some U.S. teams pursued countervalue responses, either by deliberate
nuclear attacks on Chinese urban populations or by targeting military or economic
infrastructure located in Chinese cities and thus inicting high civilian casualties.
Countervalue responses always led to a cycle of escalation that resulted in the deaths of
hundreds of millions.
▪Counterforce: The Chinese nuclear buildup precluded a disarming nuclear attack by the
United States. Thus, any counterforce attack would have to aim at the narrower goal of
damage limitation. However, these attacks still left China with enough nuclear weapons to
retaliate against the United States and force a negotiated settlement.
▪Operational Forces: A limited U.S. nuclear response against Chinese conventional operational
forces did not surrender Taiwan to Chinese rule and did not lead inexorably to countervalue
exchanges. Destroying the Chinese amphibious eet or forces ashore on Taiwan neutralized
any advantages that Chinese nuclear use gained. The single instance of a U.S. tactical nuclear
strike against Chinese operational targets on Taiwan employed fewer than 10 weapons.
▪Do not develop additional nuclear weapons for a conict with China beyond current
nuclear modernization plans. U.S. teams did not lack the tactical nuclear means to
conduct the limited nuclear attacks on operational targets described above. Executing the
current nuclear modernization plans provided sucient tools for a 2028 time frame.
▪Rebalance nuclear inventories over time, from gravity bombs to air-launched cruise
missiles. As with conventional attacks, the U.S. teams needed to use long-range nuclear
systems to stay outside China’s air defense zone. U.S. teams rarely used nuclear bombs because
of their short range. However, U.S. modernization plans are weighted heavily toward bombs.
Over time, this distribution should be shifted toward long-range air-launched cruise missiles.
▪Work with China to facilitate mutual understanding about deterrence and the
unpredictability of nuclear escalation. Nuclear escalation is inherently unpredictable
and dicult to control. This is particularly true if U.S. and Chinese leaders lack a shared
understanding of escalation dynamics. During the Cold War, Soviet rhetoric about the
ultimate victory of socialism led some Western thinkers to believe the Soviet Union
was pursuing a rst-strike capability. In a similar way, China’s opacity in nuclear force
development and doctrine could create misunderstandings. Furthermore, China’s apparent
faith in its capability to manage nuclear crises could prove disastrous in an actual conict.
China’s key concern is for the United States to recognize mutual vulnerability. A series of
nuclear talks might make progress on these concerns, facilitate mutual understanding, and
help prevent arms racing, crisis instability, and ultimate catastrophe.
Confronting Armageddon | 7
1
Background
Why This Report?
The United States and China have profound interests in peace, but conict is far from
unthinkable. The United States has ve treaty allies in the Indo-Pacic and commitments
to their security, as well as broader interests in maintaining a regional balance of power.
China, for its part, seeks to redress what it views as historical grievances. Both states now openly
acknowledge that they are engaged in strategic competition with each other. They highlight the
other as their primary strategic competitor and operate military forces in close proximity. Nowhere
is the risk of conict higher than Taiwan. China seeks reunication with the island, peacefully if
possible but through force if necessary. It has employed diplomatic and military tools to signal its
unwillingness to see Taiwan move toward independence.
Taiwan is not a treaty ally of the United States, which maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity”
toward events there.5 But Washington insists that any change to the status quo be peaceful and that
the United States might intervene in the event of Chinese attack. Because both the United States and
China are nuclear powers, the question of nuclear use or threats of nuclear use would loom large if
a conict over Taiwan were to pit U.S. and Chinese forces against each other. Coupled with China’s
ongoing nuclear modernization, this creates an important area for study.
The goal of this project was to employ wargaming to inform U.S. policy regarding potential nuclear
escalation during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Chapter 1 outlines the background events that
motivated the study. Chapters 2 and 3 summarize the literature and hypotheses associated with
nuclear deterrence and use, particularly as these topics relate to a potential Taiwan conict.
Chapter 4 details the research design and addresses scenario variations, orders of battle,
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 8
comparisons to other recent wargames, and the scope conditions associated with this study.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the 15 wargames conducted with a total of 85 participants.
Chapter 6 draws on game results to assess hypotheses about what creates the greatest pressure
for nuclear rst use. Chapter 7 assesses hypotheses about what happens if nuclear weapons are
used, including the targets that might be attacked, adversary responses, and the factors that shape
military and political outcomes. Finally, Chapter 8 presents policy recommendations for U.S.
military and political leaders in light of the analysis. Four appendices summarize the course of the
games, nuclear use, nuclear eects modeling, and the terms employed in the study.
China’s Nuclear Modernization
China’s nuclear forces are growing and evolving rapidly. What are the contours of that change? Is
Chinese nuclear policy changing? What is driving change? And what are the implications for stability
and nuclear dynamics between China and the United States? The answers to some of these questions,
particularly those related to observable changes, are relatively clear, while others represent signicant
areas of uncertainty.6 All these questions are interconnected; understanding how China’s nuclear
forces might evolve and how that evolution might impact nuclear escalation dynamics is, for example,
closely connected to the drivers and motivations for these nuclear force changes.
CONTOURS OF CHANGE
Historically, China has elded what many Western observers have described as a “minimum nuclear
deterrent.”7 Chinese nuclear strategists describe the objective as a “lean and eective” force,
meaning one that is, at the minimum level, sucient to ensure retaliatory capability in the event of
rst use against China.8 However, that denition can be operationalized in various ways. Over the
last two decades, China’s nuclear forces have grown in size and sophistication. China has deployed
new families of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a new class of ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs, the Jin class), new classes of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
air-launched ballistic missiles, giving China a nascent nuclear triad. As the force has grown in size
and capability, Western analysts have suggested that its capabilities endow China with an “assured
retaliation” capability.9
Recent events have raised the possibility that growth is accelerating. In 2021, open-source
intelligence revealed that China was building hundreds of new silos deep in the country’s interior.10
With the construction of new nuclear reactors in China, more than doubling capacity since 2014,
and the opening of its rst breeder reactor in 2023, China can produce ssile material for many new
warheads.11 The 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR) projects that China’s warhead inventory
will grow from an estimated 500 in May 2023 to 1,000 by 2030, with growth continuing apace
through at least 2035.12
It is unknown whether China’s intent is to become a “near peer” to the United States in the nuclear
domain or whether its intentions are greater. However, examining the drivers of change gives
some insights.
Confronting Armageddon | 9
DRIVERS OF CHANGE
What is motivating the qualitative improvements and expansion of China’s nuclear forces? While
the question is impossible to answer with certainty, some combination of the following four drivers
is probably at work.13 The rst driver is the need to maintain a secure and credible second-strike
capability against technological and capability uncertainty. Chinese nuclear strategists highlight the
perceived insecurity of this capability in the face of improved U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.14 Long before China’s
nuclear buildup accelerated, some Western observers predicted that improved U.S. counterforce
capabilities would pressure China to expand its arsenal and adopt higher levels of readiness.15
A second driver is to support great power status and what Chinese president Xi Jinping16 calls a
“new type of major power relations.”17 At the ceremony creating the People’s Liberation Army
Rocket Force (PLARF) in December 2015, he said the force would increase “support for our
country’s major power status.”18 The 2013 Science of Military Stratey asserts that China’s nuclear
forces play a role in “guaranteeing that [China’s] status as a powerful country does not waver.”19
Some Chinese pundits have asserted that the inventory should be “commensurate with China’s
standing as a country . . . and the international obligations it shoulders.”20 U.S. realists have argued
that China, like past great powers, is unlikely to accept nuclear inferiority indenitely.21
The third driver may be deterring U.S. tactical nuclear use, particularly in a Taiwan contingency.
Chinese leaders and strategists and the Chinese public are aware of increased U.S. discussion of
tactical nuclear options in a Taiwan contingency.22 Denying the United States escalation dominance
would discourage U.S. nuclear tactical use. U.S. analysts have therefore asked: Does Beijing
believe that possessing more advanced nuclear technologies will allow it to go on the oensive
conventionally while deterring U.S. entry?23
Finally, domestic factors, such as changes to the bureaucratic politics of nuclear decisionmaking in
China, also likely play a role. Specically, the role of the competing military services is thought to
have grown in policymaking relative to the nuclear specialist community.24 Determining the relative
weight of these explanations is not possible, though all probably play a role.
CHINESE NUCLEAR POLICY
China’s nuclear policy and lexicon remain ostensibly unchanged, anchored to a no-rst-use
retaliatory policy under which China stipulates it will not be the rst to employ nuclear weapons
in conict but will respond in kind if attacked. At the same time, however, China’s nuclear
modernization has signicantly enhanced its military capabilities, potentially enabling it to execute
a wider range of strategies.25 Some Chinese analysts have suggested that China, as the weaker party,
might initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conict with the United States over Taiwan if U.S.
missiles target the mainland or if Chinese forces are defeated on Taiwan.26 Although individuals
making such comments acknowledge that their comments do not reect Chinese policy, several U.S.
analysts have suggested that the stakes in a Taiwan conict could, under the right circumstances,
lead China to violate its own policy.27
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 10
UNCERTAINTY IN CHINESE NUCLEAR PRIORITIES
All else equal, the quantitative increase in warhead numbers makes China’s second-strike
capability more survivable, but the degree of the survivability enhancement and doctrinal
changes are uncertain.
There is speculation about China moving a portion of the force to a launch-on-warning (LOW)
posture. Between 2017 and 2021, China deployed a large P-band phased array radar (so-called
“Chinese PAVE PAWS”), X-band radar oriented toward Alaska, an S-band phased array radar capable
of detecting stealth aircraft and cruise missiles, and seven FireEye infrared detection satellites.28
The 2023 CMPR concludes that the PLA has a “developing ‘Early Warning Counterstrike’ (预警反击)
posture,” which “allows the Rocket Force to maintain a portion of its units on a heightened state of
readiness while leaving the other portion . . . with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.”29
However, China has not announced an LOW policy, and it is uncertain how much of the force would
be aected by such a shift or on what time scale.
There is also uncertainty about the specic changes to the nuclear force structure underway. Three
new silo elds may accommodate 350 silos, most of which will house solid-fueled DF31s and DF41s,
though silos for liquid-fueled DF5s will also increase from 18 to 48.30 It is possible that not all silos
will be lled.31 New road-mobile DF26 units have been established, as have new brigades, to be
equipped with as yet unknown weapons. Notably, dierent sources at dierent times have asserted
that various missiles (including the DF5, DF31, DF41, and JL2) have multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), with the number of warheads at between 3 and 10 depending
on the missile and source.
Given the number of permutations and combinations—basing modes, warheads per missile, and
readiness—the same inventory of 1,000 warheads may be more or less survivable. All else equal,
a force of 1,000 warheads deployed largely on silo-based missiles, many or most of which are
MIRVed, will not be as survivable as the same 1,000 warheads deployed on mobile missiles and with
fewer warheads per missile. Higher readiness postures would greatly improve survivability, though
LOW would carry externalities, including greatly increased risks of an accidental launch.
A second area of uncertainty is the extent of Chinese emphasis on nuclear warghting capabilities.
Chinese nuclear doctrine has always included rudimentary warghting. For example, doctrine
mandates strategic forces be capable of surviving to engage in several rounds of nuclear exchanges.
Potential targets include military infrastructure targets, such as naval and air bases.32 In recent
years, China has deployed more accurate missiles and improved the ability of missile forces to
maneuver. Both changes derive largely from the conventional functions of the PLARF but allow
China to conduct a wider variety of counterforce attacks over a more prolonged nuclear ght.33
Future changes are more speculative. Recent iterations of the CMPR, citing “PRC military writings,”
argue that China “probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead capabilities.”34 There are reasons
why China might wish to acquire lower-yield nuclear weapons, though similar motivations
would have existed in the past.35 Assuming China does deploy such weapons, it is unclear how it
Confronting Armageddon | 11
would plan to use these weapons and the extent to which Chinese thinking about tactical nuclear
warghting might change.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE
Assessments of the implications of China’s nuclear buildup, like those of Soviet eorts to catch
up to the United States in nuclear forces during the early Cold War, are unclear. On the one hand,
when both sides in a military competition have assured retaliatory capability, deliberate escalation
to the nuclear level becomes less likely.36 On the other hand, most scholars also acknowledge the
workings of a so-called stability-instability paradox: knowing that higher levels of warfare are less
likely because of nuclear risks, nuclear-armed states are paradoxically more prone to initiate low-
level conicts.37 Hence, robust nuclear capabilities may embolden those in China who advocate for
conventional action against Taiwan.38
A key element of uncertainty is whether and how China’s no-rst-use policy might aect its
actions during war. No scenario would test that policy more than a Taiwan conict, given that
China considers Taiwan one of its “core interests.”39 Chinese strategists disagree on the response.
Famously, in 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu warned that China would use nuclear weapons if
the United States targeted the mainland during a Taiwan conict.40 Shen Dingli of Fudan University
has also said that China would likely resort to nuclear weapons if its conventional forces were
devastated and Taiwan moved toward independence.41
However, Chinese ocials quickly disavowed Zhu’s comments in 2005, and individuals within
China’s strategic community continue to assert that Chinese policy has not changed. U.S. analysts
disagree on whether a no-rst-use policy continues to constrain Chinese action. However, even
many of those who nd that Chinese policy is unlikely to change warn that the exigencies of a
Taiwan conict make predictions dicult and that the United States should be prepared for all
possibilities.42 Brad Roberts, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and
missile defense policy, warns that although experts “can make many predictions about China’s
nuclear future,” that future is “littered with uncertainties.”43
U.S. Responses
Until at least the 2010s, U.S. nuclear policy was not driven primarily by China-related concerns, and
nuclear issues played a secondary role within the U.S.-China military dynamic. Since the late 2010s,
a variety of developments have converged to dramatically change U.S. nuclear calculations and
spark debates in the United States about nuclear forces and stratey.
Historically, Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) has been the “pacing threat” in the
nuclear domain and remains so today.44 Russia’s 4,300 warhead inventory greatly exceeds that of
China, which the Department of Defense’s CMPR listed as more than 400 in 2022 and more than
500 in 2023.45 The United States and Russia/Soviet Union greatly reduced the number of warheads
under START I, SORT (Treaty on Moscow), and New START. The United States went further through
unilateral actions, such as taking nuclear weapons o ships and submarines, and policies designed
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 12
to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security stratey outlined in successive post–
Cold War iterations of the NPR.
The Chinese nuclear buildup has upset this long history of U.S.-Russia/Soviet bilateral nuclear
policies and negotiations. It means that U.S. nuclear relations have become a “three-body problem,”
even if China’s arsenal does not yet rise to the level of the U.S. or Russian arsenals.
As a result, several recent analyses published by the Heritage Foundation, the Atlantic Council,
and the Institute for Defense Analyses call for an increase in the number and variety of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons and platforms beyond those currently planned. The authors oer two rationales.
The rst is that the United States must be prepared to deter two simultaneous wars with major
powers, and tactical nuclear weapons could compensate for conventional limitations.46 U.S.
rst use might be presumed in that case.47 The second rationale is that the United States should
have a credible nuclear answer to the limited use of nuclear weapons.48 The 2023 Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommended that tactical nuclear
weapons be forward deployable, survivable against preemptive attack, and capable of penetrating
advanced missile defenses.49 For similar purposes, a 2024 Heritage Foundation report recommends
reviving the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCMN) while continuing to introduce a
low-yield SLBM.50 Opponents argue that the addition of both the B21 and the long-range stando
weapon (LRSO) made the SLCMN “excessive to need.”51
Other opponents emphasize operational opportunity costs in terms of munitions carried at sea, as
well as nancial trade-os, estimated at $2.1 billion over ve years.52 Finally, some argue that the
focus on nuclear warghting will drive an arms race.53
Administrations have always disagreed somewhat about how much the United States should
emphasize nuclear weapons in its national security stratey—a disagreement reected in dierent
iterations of the NPR. By the mid-2010s, Russian nuclear modernization had proceeded to the point
where successive administrations from both U.S. parties had supported modernizing much of the
aging U.S. nuclear inventory. In 2023, the Congressional Budget Oce estimated 10-year costs for
nuclear forces between 2023 and 2032 at $756 billion, of which $355 billion would be spent on
modernizing weapons, warheads, platforms, and laboratories.54
Publicly available descriptions of modernization include production of the following elements:
▪650 Sentinel ICBMs (400 in silos and 250 spares) to replace Minuteman III
▪new or modied warheads (W871) for Sentinel ICBMs
▪12 Columbia-class SSBNs to replace the retiring Ohio class
▪new or modied Trident II (D5LE2) SLBMs for the Columbia class
▪new or modied warheads (W93 and W762) for the Trident II SLBM
▪upgraded radar and other equipment on the B52 (to produce the B52J)
▪100 B21 bombers to replace the B2 and nonnuclear B1B
▪LRSOs to replace the AGM86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)
Confronting Armageddon | 13
▪new or modied warheads (W804) for the LRSO
▪new versions of the B61 bomb (12 and 13) to replace older versions55
Over the last several years, new pressures have prompted reevaluation of U.S. nuclear forces
and policy. Russia’s hesitation to negotiate a replacement for the New START treaty signaled that
strategic arms control between the United States and Russia might crumble after the current ve-
year extension (to 2026). The continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine underscores that possibility.
The growth of China’s nuclear forces, especially after the revelation of large new silo elds in 2021,
raises the prospect that China will become a near-peer competitor in the nuclear domain earlier
than expected. That, in turn, confronts the United States with two near-peer nuclear competitors
for the rst time in its history. The possibility of facing two peer nuclear powers has engendered
calls to expand U.S. nuclear forces.56 Conversely, dissenters believe that as long as the United
States does not require damage-limiting capabilities against the nuclear forces of adversaries, it
already possesses sucient forces to threaten devastating attacks on the civilian infrastructure
(and populations) of both adversaries.57 U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan said, “I want
to be clear here—the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the
combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them.”58
Finally, characterization of the U.S.-China strategic relationship has changed. In 2015, senior
defense ocials began describing the U.S.-China relationship as a “great power competition,” and
“strategic competition” became enshrined in U.S. policy under the 2018 National Security Stratey.59
Relentless, rapid increases to China’s defense budget made China the pacing threat in conventional
terms. Eying eroding conventional advantage, some U.S. strategists argue that U.S. nuclear
advantage could restore deterrence, while others worry that China’s improved nuclear capabilities
might signal a shift in its willingness to employ nuclear weapons to backstop conventional power.
These factors have renewed attention to debates about nuclear escalation that began in the Cold
War and continue to this day.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 14
2
Literature Review
What Creates the Greatest Pressure for Nuclear
First Use?
There is an immense body of literature on nuclear weapons stratey and employment
stretching over 80 years. This chapter reviews prominent theories about factors that
create pressure for or against nuclear rst use. Rather than take an a priori stance on each
subject, each section concludes with a positive hypothesis—that a given theory is correct. Chapter
3 addresses the literature and hypothesis about what might happen after the rst use of nuclear
weapons. The analysis chapters then test the hypotheses.
The Nuclear Revolution
In 1946, Bernard Brodie wrote, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been
to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”60 Over his tenure as secretary
of defense, Robert McNamara shifted away from counterforce strategies to focus on “assured
destruction” of Soviet cities and later stipulated that “Mutual Assured Destruction is the foundation
of deterrence.”61
At the end of the Cold War, Robert Jervis argued, “Nuclear weapons have drastically altered
statecraft.”62 Summarizing the logic of a nuclear revolution, he argued that war among nuclear
powers had become so destructive it was unthinkable, easing the security dilemma and the impetus
for arms racing and making the status quo relatively easy to maintain.63
Recent critics of the idea of a nuclear revolution observe a puzzle: there has been a high degree of
military insecurity and competition among major powers during the nuclear era despite no large-scale
Confronting Armageddon | 15
war between these actors.64 These critics argue that acquiring and maintaining a robust and survivable
second-strike capability is dicult, time consuming, and impermanent.65 Proponents counter that
maintaining assured retaliatory capability was never said to be automatic but that wealthy major
powers could aord adaptations that would keep retaliatory forces survivable and viable.66
The Nuclear Taboo
Another possible restraining factor is the “nuclear taboo,” the idea that norms against nuclear use
have become deeply rooted since the end of World War II.67 As evidence, proponents point to the
nonuse of nuclear weapons since World War II, despite numerous wars involving nuclear powers.
These normative considerations have created reputational costs of nuclear use that may also help
explain the historical nonuse of nuclear weapons, especially against nonnuclear powers.68 Others
suggest that state policies, such as policies of no rst use, discourage use outside the parameters of
that policy, especially when force structure and practice are consistent with the stipulated policy.69
China has maintained a consistent no-rst-use retaliatory policy for six decades since rst testing
nuclear weapons in 1964, and its force structure has historically been consistent with the policy.70
The concept of a generalized nuclear taboo has been contested on several grounds. Public opinion
in the United States might be more accepting of nuclear use than the term “taboo” would suggest,
particularly when nuclear use is perceived as necessary for national security.71 As a result, the U.S.
attitude is mixed. The United States has never ascribed to a no-rst-use policy, and its forces have
been designed for a wide variety of missions. Its current policy, outlined in the 2022 NPR, allows
nuclear use, though only in a narrow range of cases. Research on public opinion in Europe and
China demonstrates a similar willingness to use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances.72
Hypothesis: Teams will be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons, even in situations where nuclear use
would be militarily advantageous.
Inadvertent Escalation
Large-scale conventional military operations might inadvertently threaten core components of a
state’s nuclear arsenal, pressuring the target state to escalate to the nuclear level.73 In the Taiwan
context, U.S. incentives to attack China’s conventionally armed ballistic missile forces would be
high, but China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces are dicult to distinguish from one
another.74 Hence, the United States might destroy nuclear-armed missiles incidental to the campaign
against conventional missiles and create pressure on China to escalate (“use or lose”). Similar issues
surround potential attacks on Chinese command and control, which may use the same systems
for nuclear and conventional forces.75 Some have argued that incidental attacks on nuclear forces,
combined with uncertainty over the intent of those attacks, could spark escalation.76 Chinese
attacks on U.S. early warning satellites would carry similar risks. U.S. ocials have warned their
Chinese counterparts that attacks on space-based early warning systems, such as U.S. Space-Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) constellations, would constitute a red line. Chinese strategists counter
that since those satellites would also be used to cue attacks against conventional targets, they are
legitimate targets.77
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 16
Hypothesis: Conventional U.S. strikes on China’s nuclear forces will pressure China teams to respond
with nuclear weapons.78
Mainland Strikes
Separate from inadvertent escalation is a concern that any conventional strike on the homeland of a
nuclear power would pressure the target state to respond with nuclear weapons.79 In the context of
a war over Taiwan, China possesses some conventional ability to attack the U.S. homeland, but the
United States has much greater ability to attack the Chinese mainland. Some argue that restricting
such attacks would prolong the conict and lead to a long, drawn-out war.80 Jan van Tol and his
coauthors warn that granting sanctuary status to high-leverage targets inside China would severely
undermine U.S. eorts to maintain strategic stability in the region.81 They argue that the United
States might need to strike specic targets in China to preserve its military advantage, though such
strikes should be geographically limited to the areas near the conict site to minimize escalation
risks. Critics argue that attacking the Chinese mainland could provoke escalation, including a
nuclear response.82 In any case, this would be a major presidential decision during a war. It is
impossible to predict ahead of time where the sitting president will come out.83
Hypothesis: U.S. conventional strikes on nonnuclear targets on the Chinese mainland will pressure China
teams to respond with nuclear weapons.
Gambling for Resurrection
Faced with the apparent superiority of Soviet conventional forces during the Cold War, the United
States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developed strategies that included
the potential use of nuclear weapons to buttress deterrence.84 To strengthen credibility, the
strategies emphasized a willingness to employ nuclear weapons and took measures to underscore
the likelihood of use. China, in contrast, maintains a no-rst-use doctrine and foreswears the
acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in the event of a failed attempt to invade
Taiwan, China might be tempted to resort to nuclear weapons to gamble for resurrection.85 As
discussed in the Background section of this report, some Chinese and Western analysts question
whether a no-rst-use policy would necessarily survive a looming military defeat in Taiwan.86
Matthew Kroenig, for example, argues, “If Chinese leadership believed that it was losing a
conventional war over Taiwan, it might seek to escalate to nuclear use in hopes of compelling
negotiations for a settlement.”87 According to the 2023 CMPR, Beijing “probably would . . . consider
nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP
regime survival.”88 However, nuclear use would also carry major risks, most obviously the risk of
nuclear retaliation by the adversary. This would threaten regime (and national) survival. Thus, some
analysts believe nuclear use, though possible, is unlikely and depends on the Chinese leadership
seeing no viable o-ramp for the regime’s survival.89
Hypothesis: Conventional defeat will pressure teams to use nuclear weapons.
Confronting Armageddon | 17
Deliberate Conventional Attacks on Nuclear Forces
Some strategists have advocated conventional attacks on strategic assets to pressure adversaries.
The U.S. Maritime Stratey of the 1980s called for attacks on the Soviets’ far eastern SSBN bastion.
The intent was to alter Soviet perceptions of the nuclear balance “by destroying their SSBNs” and
thereby “encourag[e] war termination.”90 After the Cold War, some saw conventional strike as a
substitute for nuclear weapons. Conventional Prompt Global Strike could “cover practically one-
hundred (100) percent of the North Korean, Iranian and Syrian target bases previously covered
by nuclear forces.”91 New technologies, such as hypersonic weapons, could further enhance
conventional counterforce.92 Chinese and Western analysts have considered whether such
capabilities would be directed at Chinese strategic targets. Some U.S. analysts have suggested
reprising the 1980s Maritime Stratey, this time directing it against Chinese SSBNs in the South
China Sea. U.S. commanders would “keep any conict conventional as long as possible” to allow the
search for “Chinese SSBNs in coastal waters within the protection of Chinese ASW assets.”93 Public
advocacy of the idea is not widespread, so few have written against it. Nevertheless, many of the
same arguments about the escalatory potential of incidental attacks on nuclear systems would apply
with even greater force to more systematic attacks.94
Hypothesis: Deliberate conventional attacks on nuclear capabilities will create pressure for nuclear use.
Counterforce Capabilities
The Cold War witnessed a debate between advocates of countervalue and counterforce doctrines,
and a similar debate is currently playing out over nuclear stratey vis-à-vis China. During the Cold
War, some strategists held that the nuclear revolution (discussed previously) made counterforce
both futile and dangerous because it encouraged arms racing. In their view, “Deterrence comes
from having enough weapons to destroy the other’s cities; this capability is an absolute, not a
relative, one.”95 Advocates of damage limitation argued that moving to a purely countervalue
stratey provided a choice only between suicide and surrender. Such a stratey, they held, therefore
lacked credibility.96
Through the early 2010s, residual Cold War capabilities endowed the United States with
counterforce capabilities for damage limitation against China’s relatively small nuclear forces. More
recently, the acceleration of China’s nuclear modernization has revived the debate over nuclear
stratey. Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, for example, argue that China’s deployment of more
missiles in dierent basing modes has eroded prospects for meaningful damage limitation and that
pursuing damage-limiting capabilities could usher in an arms race.97 These commentators also
argue that the economic costs and political risks of pursuing damage limitation are not worth the
marginal gains to survivability in the highly unlikely event of nuclear conict. While no one has
argued explicitly for returning to the countervalue stratey of the early Cold War, that approach is
the natural corollary of many of these arguments.
Critics of this position counter that advances in space-based ISR, computation, and stealth
technoloy provide new opportunities for counterforce strategies. They suggest that nuclear
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 18
superiority would provide deterrent leverage, especially against the employment of limited
nuclear options (LNOs), since China would understand it is at a disadvantage at higher levels.98 The
emergence of two nuclear peers—Russia and China—has reignited debate over the size of the U.S.
arsenal. The 2023 NPR notes that Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons present “new stresses on
strategic stability.”99 The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report calls for increased deployment
of nuclear warheads and enhanced industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons.100 A study
group at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory echoes these recommendations.101 The critical
assumption in both of these reports is that a damage-limiting stratey, which can require large
numbers of warheads, is a continuing requirement.102
Hypothesis: U.S. counterforce capabilities will deter China teams from nuclear use.
Quantitative Nuclear Superiority
Scholars generally dispute the linkage between nuclear superiority and deterrence. Lauren
Sukin, employing a large set of cases from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set,
concludes that resolve often trumps material advantage in the nuclear domain.103 Proponents of
the “nuclear revolution” emphasize the primacy of resolve, arguing that beyond a certain point,
more nuclear weapons do not contribute further to deterrent or coercive capability. As Henry
Kissinger put the case in 1977, “The essence of the contemporary problem in the military eld
is that the term ‘supremacy,’ when casualties will be in the tens of millions, has practically no
operational signicance.”104
However, some strategists argue that strategic nuclear superiority is important to deterrence
and successful resolution of crises. As Elbridge Colby argues, “Nuclear weapons are, after all, the
ultimate trump card: if you can convince your enemy that you have a way to play the card and
are actually prepared to go through with it, nothing is more powerful.”105 Kroenig denes nuclear
superiority as “a military nuclear advantage over an opponent” that is operationalized “according
to a state’s expected cost of nuclear war.” Specically, he measures advantage in terms of cities
struck and casualties suered.106 Quantitative comparisons, superiority, and overmatch are also
frequent themes in the U.S. political and public media discourse on nuclear weapons.107 Indeed,
players in previous U.S.-China wargames often believed U.S. nuclear superiority would deter China
from nuclear use.108
Hypothesis: U.S. quantitative nuclear superiority will deter China teams from nuclear use.
Chinese Tactical Nuclear Forces
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union elded tactical nuclear weapons in
large numbers. Proponents of such weapons argued they provide an intermediate step between
suicide (a massive nuclear exchange) and surrender. Others argued that possession of low-yield
nuclear weapons lowers the threshold for nuclear use and creates risks of relatively quick nuclear
escalation. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia’s weakened military adopted an “escalate to
Confronting Armageddon | 19
de-escalate” policy—use nuclear weapons to oset conventional weakness and force a favorable
settlement. This engendered concerns that Russia would use nuclear weapons early in a conict.109
This concern has carried over to China’s nuclear buildup as some nuclear experts suggest China
may be developing low-yield nuclear weapons.110 While China does not currently eld low-yield
nuclear weapons, analysts are watching carefully. A Chinese decision to deploy low-yield nuclear
weapons could also indicate a shift in nuclear warghting concepts that imagines a more central
role of nuclear weapons in its defense planning.111
Hypothesis: China teams will be more likely to use nuclear weapons if they possess low-yield
nuclear weapons.
Substitution for Conventional Munitions
Some commentators have speculated that combatants might use nuclear weapons when their
inventories of conventional munitions run out. Nuclear use was almost always part of NATO’s
plan to counter Soviet conventional dominance, particularly if conventional munitions were
insucient to prevent Soviet forces from massing. Kroenig draws a parallel to a potential attack
on Taiwan: “Similarly, the United States could rely on threatening nonstrategic nuclear strikes
to deter and, as a last resort, thwart a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan or a Russian tank
incursion into Europe.”112 Likewise, a Center for a New American Security (CNAS) study speculated
after conducting tabletop exercises (TTXs) on a U.S.-China conict over Taiwan: “There might be
increased pressure to use nuclear weapons as conventional weapons stocks became depleted.”113
Hypothesis: Shortages of conventional munitions will create pressure for nuclear use.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 20
3
Literature Review
What Happens If Nuclear Weapons Are Used?
The challenge for strategists is that nuclear weapons can kill most of an adversary’s
population but not change the minds of its people or leaders. Thus, nuclear use must be
applied in ways to compel the other side to acquiesce to a political outcome they oppose.
For this reason, conict between nuclear powers has long been described by nuclear theorists as
coercive bargaining.114
This chapter reviews the literature on what might happen after nuclear use. It is divided into three
sections. The rst addresses what targets might be struck during nuclear rst use. It then surveys
how the adversary might respond to nuclear use. It concludes with an assessment of how the
conict might end. Chapter 7: Analysis—What Happens If Nuclear Weapons Are Used? describes
how the games provide insights into these questions. Appendix C: Nuclear Weapons Use and Eects
contains details on nuclear weapon capabilities.
What Could Be Targeted During First Use?
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the question of targeting has generated heated debates.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons to strike
a wide variety of targets on land, at sea, and in the air. Targeting was not just a technical judgment
of connecting weapons with aiming points. In peacetime, targeting plans drove decisions about the
types of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms needed. In wartime, targeting would determine
the course of conict, the number of civilian casualties, and eects on other countries.With the end
Confronting Armageddon | 21
of the Cold War, many target sets were put aside. For example, the United States no longer has any
nuclear weapons designed to target ships, aircraft, or missiles in ight. China never had any.
Three target sets can be struck with today’s nuclear weapons: cities/population (countervalue),
nuclear forces (counterforce), and operational conventional forces—ports and airelds, ground
forces, and ships at sea. Attacks on command and communications (through high-altitude
electromagnetic pulses, HEMP) and targeting of nonnuclear allies are addressed as special cases.
POPULATION AND CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE COUNTERVALUE
The aim of countervalue rst use would be to cause pain by attacking the enemy’s population. This
was the motivation for the United States in targeting Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II
and is the most common usage in the minds of the general public. The primary eect was not in the
material damage of destroying two large cities, but in the promise of more pain to come if Japanese
decisionmakers did not comply.115 A countervalue targeting stratey would not accomplish its goal if
it destroyed all of an enemy’s urban centers, as there would then be nothing left to hold at risk. The
most sophisticated formulations of countervalue targeting call for a menu of infrastructure targets,
ranging from remote sites causing few civilians deaths to society-destroying target sets.116 However,
these strategies are often dicult to discuss because of their moral implications.117 For this reason,
the United States (at least during the late Cold War) ocially abjured the targeting of civilians in
countervalue strikes; however, by targeting military and economic targets in cities, the United States
kept an essentially countervalue option while allowing some psychic distance from mass murder.118
Whether the actual target is a rocket factory in a city or the population of a city itself, China would
likely react with a nuclear attack of its own on or near population centers.
Of note, none of the recent wargames or studies of nuclear use in a Taiwan scenario have postulated
a countervalue rst strike by either side, perhaps because it is unclear how a countervalue attack
could compel an adversary to withdraw from the conict.
Hypothesis: Neither team will launch countervalue rst strikes.
ENEMY NUCLEAR FORCES COUNTERFORCE
As discussed earlier, the eectiveness of damage-limiting counterforce attacks was a key debate in
the Cold War and continues to this day. China does not possess today, nor will it possess in 2028,
the ability to launch a disarming counterforce attack against the United States. Conversely, given the
expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, the United States could not disarm China in retaliation for a
Chinese nuclear attack, although it could destroy many Chinese nuclear ICBMs. This is true even if
it were done early in the conict, before China’s nuclear arsenal is dispersed. As RAND argues, “The
United States must treat Beijing as if it already has a second strike capability—especially by 2030.”119
Thus, the most likely scenario for counterforce rst strikes would be an attempt by the United States
to limit damage from China’s arsenal and communicate a threat of continued attacks if China did
not withdraw.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 22
As with countervalue targeting, none of the recent wargames or studies of nuclear use in a Taiwan
scenario have postulated a counterforce rst strike by either side, likely because of the inability of
either side to disarm the other.
Hypothesis: Neither team will launch counterforce rst strikes.
OPERATIONAL CONVENTIONAL TARGETS
During World War II, General George Marshall argued that U.S. nuclear weapons should be
employed against Japanese military targets, such as naval installations or outlying islands with
military facilities, rather than against industrial targets or cities.120 Discussions about employment
options against conventional targets continued after the war and included the use of large-yield
weapons in tactical roles. Starting in 1952, the United States began to produce and deploy tactical
nuclear weapons with reduced yields. Both the United States and, later, the Soviet Union deployed
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War.121 Although many Western
military leaders and theorists during the Cold War believed that tactical use would benet the
defender, Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources indicate that they believed that the attacker could
also benet.122
A variety of targets are possible in the context of a Taiwan conict. The discussion of tactical
nuclear options and doctrine, then and now, can be divided into thinking on deterrence questions
(discussed earlier) and thinking about wartime use. The latter can be further divided into the
assessment of operational eects, on the one hand, and their political impact and inuence on
wartime outcomes, on the other. The former is discussed below, while the latter is addressed in a
later section (see How Did the Conict End?).
Ports and Airelds: Ports and airelds oer signicant benets to the conventional ght, as
one nuclear weapon could achieve the eect of many conventional ballistic missiles. The RAND
Corporation, for example, did an extensive and highly inuential series of studies in the 1950s
on the vulnerability of bomber bases to nuclear attack.123 Recently, Russia has reintroduced the
concept of using nuclear weapons as part of a conventional conict, with NATO airelds as a
potential target.124 Table C4 in Appendix C shows the reason that airbase attacks are attractive:
Even a relatively small nuclear detonations are devastating for unprotected aircraft on the ground.
For example, a 10 kiloton (kt) detonation will destroy nearly all aircraft, even at large air bases
where aircraft can spread out. This is not surprising since aircraft are complex, sensitive, and thin-
skinned.125 Ports are also attractive targets because ships there are stationary and easily located by
overhead surveillance, and therefore vulnerable to attack by GPS-guided munitions. Commentators
have therefore speculated that ports might be good nuclear targets.126
For this reason, nuclear attacks against airelds have been a common part of previous wargames.
Three previous wargames have resulted in nuclear attacks against Guam (either as part of the
scenario designed by the researchers or independently decided on by players).127 On the other
hand, bases further aeld (in the continental United States or Australia) have not been targeted.
Confronting Armageddon | 23
Hypothesis: Teams will target ports or airelds in the theater with nuclear weapons to gain an
operational advantage despite the retaliation risk.
Ground Forces: Targeting enemy ground forces with nuclear weapons can provide signicant
operational benets while limiting the likelihood of enemy retaliation. One weapon can have an
outsized eect on enemy forces because of its great power. A single 10 kt weapon has the explosive
power of 20,000 1,000-pound bombs. By using air bursts, attackers can destroy adversary forces
without causing a lot of radioactivity. They can then move around the relatively small radioactive
area and attack into an adversary’s rear. On the assurance side, battleeld use has less eect on
civilians than strategic attacks on cities or nuclear forces. However, even limited eects can be
devastating; Appendix C describes these eects on civilians from battleeld usage of nuclear
weapons on Taiwan.
Because of the battleeld advantages of using nuclear weapons, many commentators have
speculated that China might use them on Taiwan, particularly if the invasion force gets
stalemated.128 Matthew Kroenig argues that if Chinese forces had landed on Taiwan but not yet
broken out of their bridgeheads, the Taiwanese defending units might be lucrative targets for U.S.
nuclear strikes.129
Hypothesis: Both teams are likely to use nuclear weapons against ground troops on Taiwan.
Ships at Sea: The possibility of using nuclear weapons against ships at sea is appealing because
it oers the potential to communicate resolve by attacking a strictly military target while avoiding
a homeland attack that might provoke a general nuclear conict.130 Discussion of this possibility
has resurfaced in the context of a U.S.-China war. Several analysts have posited that China would
act on this logic to attack U.S. ships during a war over Taiwan. For example, Andrew Metrick et al.
argue that a nuclear attack on U.S. carrier strike groups “would limit casualties and infrastructure
damage, improve the conventional balance, and destroy an asset with signicant prestige value.”131
Similarly, Jacob Stokes argues that U.S. ships at sea are an attractive target because “China’s leaders
would be looking for a way to take limited action that the United States would not be willing to
match or exceed.”1 32
The challenge is that ships are robust targets. A 15 pounds per square inch (PSI) shockwave is
needed to incapacitate most ships. This requires a nuclear weapon to detonate near the target ship,
about 800 m for a Hiroshima-sized weapon. Without terminal guidance on nuclear missiles, which
both sides lack, this is nearly impossible to do without using a pattern of detonations. (See Tables C2
and C3 in Appendix C for details.)
Several commentators have suggested that the United States use nuclear weapons against Chinese
amphibious ships o the beach. George Weaver of the Atlantic Council has stated: “[The option]
that combines the highest eectiveness with the least escalation potential would be a nuclear
strike on China’s amphibious force as it prepares to ooad near the Taiwanese shore.”133 China
has noticed these discussions: “By late 2018, PRC concerns began to emerge that the United States
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 24
would use low-yield weapons against its Taiwan invasion eet, with related commentary in ocial
media calling for proportionate response capabilities.”134
The reason for U.S. nuclear use against Chinese amphibious ships is that such attacks would not
suer from these same diculties as attacks against ships at sea. During a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan, many amphibious vessels must be accommodated o narrow beaches. These vessels
cannot spread out as much as ships at sea and need to stay relatively stationary while o-loading.
This eases the ISR problem. Being stationary and bunched together, these ships would be targetable
by the coordinate-seeking nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal; one nuclear weapon might even
neutralize multiple ships. Nuclear detonations oshore would also be less damaging to Taiwan
and its population than detonations ashore. There are some downsides. As with ground use, many
nuclear weapons must be used against the Chinese amphibious ships to destroy enough capability
to have an operational eect. Also, oshore nuclear attacks would still aect Taiwan through blast
and radiation eects.135
Nevertheless, because the amphibious eet is critical to the invasion’s success, it will be an
attractive target.
Hypothesis: U.S. teams will target Chinese ships, but only during the amphibious ooading. China teams
will not use nuclear weapons at sea.
SPECIAL CASES
High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP): HEMP occurs when a specially designed nuclear
weapon detonates high in the atmosphere. The resulting electronic pulses disrupt electronics and
communications.136 It is attractive because the disruption provides a military advantage without
causing kinetic or thermal damage to civilians or military forces. Its eects were demonstrated
dramatically by the 1962 Starsh Prime nuclear test in space, which aected radio signals on Hawaii
900 miles away.137 Other nuclear tests also showed the phenomenon. Nuclear weapons testing in
space ended in 1963 with the Partial Test Ban Treaty, but lab experiments have been ongoing to the
present day.138
It is unclear whether HEMP usage would be treated the same as nuclear weapons that cause direct
eects. For example, the U.S. EMP Commission warned: “Our increasing dependence on advanced
electronics systems results in the potential for an increased EMP vulnerability of our technologically
advanced [military] forces, and, if unaddressed, makes EMP employment by an adversary an
attractive asymmetric option.”139 HEMP also appears frequently in the popular literature as a trigger
for social and economic collapse.140 The Congressional Research Service summarized the threat:
“An EMP attack directed at the United States involving no violent destruction, nor instant death for
large numbers of U.S. citizens, may not necessarily evoke massive retaliation by the U.S. military.”141
In a previous wargame by the Center for New American Security, the China team used a HEMP to
communicate resolve.142
Hypothesis: Both teams will conduct HEMP attacks because they are perceived as less escalatory than
other nuclear options.
Confronting Armageddon | 25
Targeting Nonnuclear Allies: Although they are not a distinct target type, the special nature
of nonnuclear allies must be addressed. Extended nuclear deterrence refers to the provision of
deterrent guarantees, backed by the threat of response, by one country to another. In the nuclear
context, extended deterrence is provided by a nuclear state to protect a nonnuclear partner or
ally. It has been practiced primarily by the United States. After the Soviet Union gained the ability
to strike U.S. cities with large numbers of ICBMs in the mid-1960s, strategists questioned whether
nuclear guarantees to NATO were credible in light of likely counterstrike by the Soviets.143 Tactical
nuclear weapons were deployed to Europe and South Korea to increase credibility by making it
more likely that nuclear weapons would be used in defense of allies.144 In the immediate aftermath
of the Cold War, the United States deemphasized nuclear weapons in its national security stratey
and removed them from warships. However, the growth of Chinese military power has prompted
concerns on the part of Asian allies. In 2010, the United States began an Extended Deterrence
Dialogue with Japan and established an Extended Deterrence Policy Committee with South Korea.145
Nevertheless, insecurity among allies persist, and some U.S. and regional analysts have called for
stronger measures to buttress credibility, lest Seoul explores indigenous nuclear options.146
In the context of a Taiwan invasion, China could attack Japan with nuclear weapons to compel
its withdrawal from the war. Losing Japanese access, basing, and overight would doom the U.S.
conventional campaign.147 Kroenig tacitly treats extended deterrence as strong, bundling U.S. and
Japanese territory in the same category of targets.148 None of the previous wargames postulate a
nuclear attack on Japan.
Hypothesis: China teams will avoid targeting Japan because of the logic of extended deterrence.
How Does the Adversary Respond?
After nuclear rst use, what happens? While there are an innite variety of responses, this section
groups them into ve categories, describes each category, and highlights the most relevant
considerations for or against each. The two nonnuclear responses include withdrawing from the
conict and continuing the conventional campaign. The three nuclear responses are grouped by
target: operational, countervalue, or counterforce.149
NONNUCLEAR RESPONSES
Withdrawing: One response to nuclear rst use is to withdraw from the conict. “Withdrawal”
is more accurate than “surrender” because a country targeted by the threat of nuclear use (made
credible by actual nuclear use somewhere) need not change its form of government and accept
occupation to avoid the threatened pain of continued nuclear use. It would not be necessary to
choose to be “Better Red than Dead.”150 Assuming that the terms demanded by the nuclear rst user
are limited and understood correctly, acquiescing to them could spare the target of nuclear use the
pain of further nuclear attacks. For example, in the face of Soviet nuclear use during an invasion,
the United States could have withdrawn from Western Europe without surrendering Washington to
the Soviet Union. However, the balance of global power would have been profoundly aected. And
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 26
the Soviets could not have provided meaningful assurances that occupying Western Europe (or any
portion thereof) would end Soviet ambitions.151
In a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the stakes are dierent for the two sides. PRC withdrawal following
U.S. nuclear use might threaten Chinese regime survival. U.S. withdrawal would be unlikely to
threaten the U.S. form of government, although it might strain the credibility of its other security
commitments, trigger extensive nuclear proliferation, and set a precedent for other states’ pursuing
conquest backed by nuclear threats or use. Osetting this, U.S. withdrawal in the face of PRC
nuclear rst use in an oensive war might give the United States the moral high ground in world
opinion. Moreover, unlike the Cold War, changing ownership of Taiwan would not substantively
aect the international balance of power.152 However, this might count for little in what would surely
be a transformed international system.
Hypothesis: China teams will be less likely than U.S. teams to withdraw from the conict in response to
nuclear rst use.
Continuing the Conventional Campaign: Alternatively, an adversary could continue the ght
at the conventional level. This oers the prospect of obtaining victory without suering the moral
stigma of employing nuclear weapons. While continuing the war conventionally was not considered
in the Cold War due to the perceived superiority of Soviet conventional power, it might be feasible
in a conict between the United States and a smaller adversary, such as North Korea. For this
option to be successful, two conditions would have to hold. First, initial nuclear use could not have
decisively changed the conventional balance of power. Second, the rst user could not be willing
and able to use additional nuclear weapons in ways that would subsequently change the balance of
conventional power.153 For example, if the nuclear rst use took the form of a nuclear demonstration
or HEMP and the rst user was not willing to use nuclear weapons in direct strikes, continuing
the conventional campaign would be a way for the targeted adversary to call the rst user’s blu.
However, just as with withdrawal, there is no assurance that the nuclear rst user would not
continue using nuclear weapons.
Hypothesis: Continuing the conventional campaign will not lead to successful outcomes unless the
adversary cannot continue nuclear attacks.
NUCLEAR RESPONSES
All nuclear responses to nuclear rst use have benets by signaling resolve, reassuring allies and
partners, and discouraging future proliferation.154 They also have costs and risks. They contribute
to nuclear destruction and risk further nuclear use or escalation by the adversary, together with its
attendant destruction.155
Use Against Operational Conventional Targets: The advantages of attacking conventional
battleeld targets as part of rst use apply equally to the adversary’s nuclear retaliation. Indeed,
depending on the nature of operations and the target set available to the adversary, nuclear
retaliation could generate operational eects greater than those gained in nuclear rst use. During
European Cold War scenarios, many nuclear strategists felt that the “massed troops” of Soviet
Confronting Armageddon | 27
attacking forces, “would be an inviting target for NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons.”156 However,
it is also possible that the Soviets might have gained more operational advantages from nuclear
use either because higher casualty rates would favor the manpower-rich Soviets or because static
defensive positions would be more vulnerable than mobile, oensive columns.157 The conclusion
of NATO studies was that “large-scale use of nuclear weapons against a massive Warsaw Pact attack
in Europe was unlikely to produce a decisive military victory.”158 Echoing NATO’s assessments,
Soviet war plans assumed that they would be able to retake the initiative with nuclear retaliation to
NATO’s nuclear rst use.159 Therefore, at the operational level, a nuclear retaliation targeted at the
rst user’s conventional forces might be able to overcome the tactical advantages that the rst user
gained in the initial strike.
In the context of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, both sides have operational nuclear targets that
could, if struck, help them regain the initiative following nuclear rst use by the adversary. Many
operational targets for the United States (ports, airelds, and missile bases) are on the Chinese
mainland, and the same targets for China are largely in Japan or Guam. However, such targets
would require many nuclear weapons and carry a high risk of escalation. There are also Chinese
ships at sea, although these would be dicult to target with the United States’s current arsenal of
coordinate-seeking weapons; furthermore, destroying them would not be decisive. The exception
is the amphibious eet and the lodgment itself on Taiwan; as discussed above, these targets are
relatively compact and their destruction is more likely to be decisive for the conventional campaign.
China’s target set for operational nuclear retaliation looks similar: there are bomber bases in the
United States and ghter bases in Japan, striking either of which would make another round of
nuclear use by the United States likely. China similarly lacks nuclear weapons suited for targeting
U.S. ships and submarines. Taiwanese ground forces are vulnerable to many Chinese nuclear
weapons, although they would be more dispersed than the Chinese lodgment and therefore
require a larger strike to neutralize. To return to the larger point, any retaliation would have to
communicate resolve and have a political eect, lest the rst user simply continue.
Hypothesis: Operational nuclear retaliation will prevent rst users from gaining decisive
military advantage.
Countervalue: As in the case of rst use, countervalue retaliation would aim to compel the rst
user to cease military operations on favorable terms. During the early Cold War, countervalue
attacks were considered in the context of “limited strategic war” but fell out of favor as the scale of
nuclear armament increased. The same logic that makes countervalue targeting in rst use risky—
that it might create an escalatory spiral—should logically hold for countervalue retaliations.160
Hypothesis: Countervalue retaliation will not achieve anticipated political results and will produce
escalatory spirals.
Counterforce: A counterforce retaliation would seek to limit further nuclear damage. As the
rst user has already demonstrated that they are prepared to use nuclear weapons, their nuclear
capability is demonstrably a threat. Although Kroenig postulates two variants of counterforce
retaliations against Chinese rst use (either against the Chinese facility generating the strike or as
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 28
part of a broader damage-limitation stratey), he notes the risks that this would entail because of
the survivability of Chinese road-mobile ICBMs.161 Whether a damage-limiting counterforce attack
could coerce war termination has been debated. On balance, the literature suggests that teams will
be dissuaded by the risks of counterforce retaliations.
Hypothesis: Counterforce retaliation will not achieve the anticipated political result of coercing the
adversary into favorable war termination.
How Does the Conflict End?
This section examines debates about conict termination and generates associated hypotheses.
First, the conventional balance created by nuclear use might not aect the bargaining outcome.
Second, nuclear superiority and escalation dominance might determine the outcome, not any
targeting or negotiating decisions. Third, any nuclear use might ineluctably end in conagration,
making any attempt at bargaining pointless. Finally, neither side might be able to achieve complete
victory; either a compromise will be struck, or a general nuclear war will occur.
BARGAINING AND NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY
Many strategists, such as Robert Jervis and Thomas Schelling, emphasize non-military factors in
nuclear bargaining, especially when both sides have an assured retaliatory capability. Schelling
famously contrasted the relative nature of conventional arms and the absolute nature of nuclear
weapons: “Brute strength is usually measured relative to enemy strength, the one directly
opposing the other, while the power to hurt is typically not reduced by the enemy’s power to
hurt in return.”162 Jervis puts the case directly, “if the arguments about the nuclear revolution are
correct, there should be only tenuous links between the details of the military balance and political
outcomes.”163 Empirical studies on whether nuclear advantage, variously dened, correlates with
successful outcomes have come to diering conclusions.164
Strategists sympathetic to the nuclear revolution have tended to view nuclear bargaining and
outcomes as largely contests of resolve, within which interests, signals of commitment, and
strategies of brinksmanship are critical to outcomes. To a point, resolve will depend on material
interests, such as geographic or historical proximity to the subject at stake. But both sides are likely
to assert the importance of interests, and, as Robert Jervis has observed, statements of commitment
can themselves become interests.165 Moreover, brinksmanship and the manipulation of risk can
also be employed to demonstrate commitment and gain bargaining leverage, regardless of their
respective military strengths. Indeed, much of U.S. deterrence stratey in Europe during the Cold
War rested on an engineered risk of tactical nuclear use that would not require a presidential
order. This is, in Schelling’s words, the “rationality of irrationality.” One recent empirical study on
nuclear advantage and outcomes nds that attempts at coercion against those with much weaker
(asymmetric) nuclear capabilities are likely to fail due to some combination of the stakes involved
for those countries and the need for weaker parties to demonstrate extreme resolve.166
However, while many observers have stressed the roles of non-military factors in bargaining stratey,
others have emphasized nuclear capabilities.167 If one side enjoys escalation dominance, an advantage
Confronting Armageddon | 29
at the current and higher levels of warfare, then a positive political outcome is presumably more
likely. For example, in the Taiwan context, Kroenig’s writing about deliberate nuclear use largely
focuses on escalation dominance. “In the event of Chinese nuclear use during a war over Taiwan,” he
writes, “the United States would need to convince China that any further nuclear use would be met by
a decisive US response and would, therefore, not advance Chinese objectives.”168
Hypothesis: Nuclear superiority will be important in bargaining outcomes.
BATTLEFIELD STATUS AND THE WAR’S OUTCOME
While the nuclear balance is often emphasized in the literature on nuclear outcomes, less has
been said about the status of the operational ght and its impact. Thomas Schelling, for example,
writes that “What happens on the battleeld may be of only moderate interest compared with
the conduct of such a nuclear war of nerve and endurance.” Some, however, have touched on
the issue. In his discussion of ve possible positions that nuclear adversaries might adopt during
nuclear conict bargaining, Herman Kahn lists “compromise settlement that more or less reects
the current status of occupied and unoccupied territory … but also includes some quid pro quo
trades.”169 Although this position does not have a privileged position in Kahn’s list, prospect
theory might suggest that it is a likely option for any contenders seeking an o-ramp. Prospect
theory, an idea originating in behavioral economics, suggests that actors are willing to run higher
risks to defend or protect what they already have than to gain something new.170 Theories of
deterrence and compellence, which reference prospect theory, suggest that attempts to compel
an adversary to surrender values in its possession will be more dicult than eorts to deter an
adversary from attempting to seize what it does not.171
Hypothesis: Battleeld advantage will convey some benet in shaping positive outcomes to the side
holding that advantage.
CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WAR
Implicit in nuclear use as a form of military bargaining is the question of controllability of nuclear
conict. Some have argued that nuclear war, once begun, is exceedingly dicult, if not impossible,
to control. These individuals view the critical threshold not between tactical and strategic use
but rather between conventional and nuclear conict. As Alain Enthoven put it in 1975, “nuclear
war is indivisible.” “Once it starts, there are no recognizable rebreaks or stopping points,” and,
he concluded, “general nuclear war . . . will ensue.”172 Lawrence Freedman and Jerey Michaels
expressed the problem that both sides must understand the need for limitations, writing, “It takes
two to keep a war limited.”173 For these reasons, Enthoven and like-minded thinkers opposed
deployment or reliance on nuclear weapons.174 The fear of unlimited war was also prevalent in the
popular imagination.175
However, for precisely the same reasons, many, especially in Europe, supported the deployment
of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe and the delegation of their use to battleeld commanders.176
If tactical nuclear weapons might be employed and if the use of these weapons will lead eventually
to strategic nuclear exchanges, then tactical nuclear weapons provide a credible and relatively
inexpensive deterrent against attack.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 30
Others have argued that nuclear war may be controllable, but, in contrast to the escalation
dominance school, emphasize the importance of proportionality and restraint in the weapons
employed and targets struck. Brodie wrote that “[t]here was no problem in distinguishing between
tactical and strategic bombing in World War II, and in avoiding the latter where it seemed politically
desirable.” Brodie believed “it is hardly self-evident that the distinction would be more dicult
where nuclear weapons are involved.”177
As Vincent Manzo writes, “[e]very deterrent threat contains a promise of restraint: do not attack
us, and we will not attack you.” Following from this, escalation management, “requires combatants
not to use certain types of weapons and avoid attacks on certain types of targets even after eorts to
deter conict in the rst place fail.”178
Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. planners struggled to develop more exible and nuanced
nuclear plans with options between “surrender and suicide.” These eorts reached their
most advanced state under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s doctrine of limited and
controlled nuclear strikes.179 Schlesinger developed this concept while at RAND and implemented
it as Secretary of Defense in NSDM242: “Plans should be developed for limited employment
options which enable the United States to conduct selected nuclear operations, in concert with
conventional forces.”180 The nuclear war plan SIOP5 reportedly turned this guidance into specic
targeting.181 The literature is severely divided on this subject without a clear consensus.
Hypothesis: Nuclear wars cannot reliably be controlled.
THE VALUE OF OFFRAMPS
Assuming that war does prove controllable, there is, nally, the question of o-ramps, war
termination, and what form conict termination might take. Just as many argue that limits on the
means of nuclear conict (i.e., the use of smaller-yield or smaller numbers of nuclear weapons)
might make nuclear war more controllable, many also argue that limiting the ends of nuclear
conict would be central to terminating conict and preventing general nuclear war. Herman Kahn,
for example, wrote “neither side should attempt to force the other to unconditional surrender,” and
“successful negotiations require some compromises even by the ‘winning’ side.”182 Given both the
stakes and the time pressures of nuclear conict, one cannot “ght a war to a conclusion and then
settle most of the details of the peace,” but rather necessary to “start negotiations at the onset of
wa r.” 183 During the Cold War, the need for limiting objectives in nuclear conict was also emphasized
by Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, and many other prominent practitioners and theorists.184
Hypothesis: Neither side will achieve complete victory; they will reach a settlement or general nuclear
war will occur.
Confronting Armageddon | 31
4
Research Design
This project examines policy-relevant nuclear aspects of a hypothetical Chinese invasion
of Taiwan in order to inform U.S. policy regarding nuclear deterrence and escalation.
The authors do not argue that an invasion is inevitable or even likely, but they do argue
that invasion is plausible. China could decide to invade Taiwan for a variety of reasons: domestic
political needs, the personal priorities of President Xi Jinping, perceived Taiwanese provocation,
perceptions by Beijing that Washington has fundamentally abandoned its One China policy,
misestimation of the military balance, or fear that time Taiwanese unication would only get
harder over time. The authors chose the year 2028 for two reasons. First, it is during the “Davidson
window,” the period when many U.S. ocials have said there is risk of an invasion.185 Second, 2028
was the end of the Department of Defense’s Future Years Defense Program, which allows enough
time for current programs to mature and policy changes to take hold. Yet it was not so far in the
future that U.S. and Chinese capabilities became uncertain.
The research focused on two questions about nuclear escalation in a Taiwan invasion scenario:
1. What creates the greatest pressure for nuclear rst use?
2. What happens if nuclear weapons are used?
To address these questions, the research team adapted its Taiwan Operational Wargame (TOW) for
nuclear play and conducted 15 iterations of the new wargame.186 TOW was developed for a previous
project examining a conventional conict over Taiwan in 2026. The adaptation updated the orders
of battle and inventories of key conventional munitions to estimated 2028 gures, developed
estimates for nuclear weapons inventories, rened game mechanics based on lessons from the rst
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 32
project, simplied the conventional warghting mechanics, incorporated nuclear weapon eects,
and added modules for political bargaining and nuclear posture changes.187
The games were conducted at CSIS in Washington, D.C., at MIT in Cambridge, MA, at the Naval War
College in Newport, RI, and at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Two iterations took
place at MIT’s Endicott House Conference Center, the same location where Thomas Schelling and
other nuclear strategists ran POLEX nuclear wargames in the 1950s and 1960s.188 The picture below
on the left shows a nuclear wargame from the 1960s; the picture on the right is from this project in
2024. The challenges of nuclear weapons have plagued the world for a long time.
The base assumptions for all 15 game iterations came from the original wargame. These
assumptions included China mobilizing 30 days out, the United States responding after 15 days,
Japan remaining neutral unless attacked but allowing the United States to use its bases in Japan, and
no opportunistic aggression by other hostile powers.189 China, seeking to maintain ambiguity about
its intentions, did not increase its nuclear posture before the invasion. Similarly, the United States
refrained from increasing its nuclear posture to avoid escalating the crisis.
Players were divided into three teams: the United States, Japan, and China. For the sake of
convenience and playing speed, the U.S. team controlled Taiwanese forces. Participants took the
role of military theater commanders: the Indo-Pacic Command (INDOPACOM) for the United
States, the Eastern Theater Command for China, and an ad hoc Joint Forces Command for Japan.190
The order of battle for each country assumed that, in addition to the peacetime forces from the
respective commands, signicant forces arrived from other commands.
As with the previous project, the 85 game participants were experts from a variety of governmental,
think tank, academic, and military backgrounds. All participants had expertise in relevant elds
Left: Participants debate their next move in a 1963 wargame run by Professors Lincoln Bloomeld and
Thomas Schelling at MIT’s Endicott House. Right: Participants study the map in the same room 61 years
later during one iteration for this project.
Source: MIT Security Studies Program; and CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Confronting Armageddon | 33
such as military operations, Asian aairs, and nuclear capabilities. Players on the Japan team had at
least some background in Japanese security policy, and most had extensive expertise in that area.
China teams generally included some country expertise. Many nuclear stratey experts participated
to ensure realistic consideration of strategic issues. With one exception, participants played only
once each. About one-third of the participants were considered senior ag/general ocers, senior
scholars with government experience, or former government ocials at the assistant secretary of
defense (ASD) level or above. This meant that most teams had at least one senior member.
Game participants were told to play their best game. Decisions therefore came from the
participants’ individual perspectives and were not based on the policies of the U.S. government
or any plans that government agencies might have. The high degree of expertise and experience
among the participants meant that gameplay reected plausible courses of action.
The high degree of expertise and experience among the
participants meant that gameplay reflected plausible courses
of action.
Teams had full control over conventional forces—naval, air, and ground—as well as cyber, space, and
counterspace capabilities. Each turn represented 3.5 days. Engagements (e.g., missile attacks on
air bases and antisubmarine operations) were adjudicated using probability tables that the authors
derived from operations research.
Teams did not have ultimate authority over nuclear posture, nuclear use, or political o-ramps,
which are the purview of the national command authority (NCA) in both the U.S. and Chinese
systems.191 Instead, they provided recommendations to their respective NCAs about these actions
based on the expected military utility and the adversary’s likely response (including nuclear
responses). The teams were told that their NCA would address political and moral considerations
related to nuclear use.
The teams were instructed to meet campaign objectives “preferably without the use of nuclear
weapons,” but failure to achieve objectives “would carry national and personal consequences.”
The control team, in its additional capacity as the NCAs for China and the United States, decided
all requests for nuclear posture changes, nuclear weapons employment, and negotiated o-ramps.
To explore as many instances of nuclear escalation and nuclear operational eects as possible, the
control team approved all such requests, though the players were not told that this would be the case.
To calculate nuclear weapon eects, the project worked with the U.S. Department of Defense to
use the Mission Impacts of Nuclear Events Software (MINES) tool.192 The team developed simplied
tables covering the employment of nuclear weapons against operational targets. Where data from
MINES was unavailable or impractical, publicly available tools such as NukeMap and Nuclear
War Simulator were substituted.193 In the case of targeting ships at sea, the project also employed
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 34
original modeling to analyze target movement and the kill chain. Adjudication rules employed these
MINES-derived algorithms to cover nuclear attacks on ports, airelds, and frontline troops, as well
as strategic attacks against cities and nuclear forces. The results were expressed in terms of civilian
casualties and the destruction of or damage to operational targets.
Finally, the game included political-military decisionmaking related to war termination. Without the
possibility of ceasere o-ramps, every iteration could lead to total nuclear war as each side sought
a nal resolution to the conict. Therefore, at the end of every turn, each team could send a note to
the other team explaining its position and oering a ceasere with one of four conditions (though
teams could, and sometimes did, oer modied conditions):
1. PLA Surrender: PLA troops ashore surrender and become prisoners.
2. PLA Phased Withdrawal: Taiwan and the United States allow PLA troops to withdraw from
Taiwan, and any Chinese prisoners of war (POWs) are returned in stages.
3. PRC Enclave: All forces maintain their current positions, and mutual resupply is allowed.
This creates a PRC-controlled enclave on Taiwan.
4. U.S. Withdrawal: The United States agrees to withdraw from the area around Taiwan during
ceasere, presumably leading to CCP dominance over the island.
Conditions two and three represent outcomes that are substantively similar to conditions one and
four but with face-saving modications. A phased withdrawal from Taiwan would mark substantive
failure for the CCP but allow it to claim victory. Chinese leaders would worry that a failed invasion
would undermine its domestic legitimacy. It would be particularly dicult to deny defeat if there
were scenes of captured PLA POWs being paraded through Taiwan. Absent such stark, undeniable
scenes, the Chinese leadership could claim it had always intended its invasion to be a punishment
campaign and that, having accomplished this goal, it was ending the operation. Thus, by returning
PLA POWs and allowing uncaptured PLA soldiers to return (presumably via small boats, leaving
most of their equipment behind), Taiwan and the United States would be forgoing one of the fruits
of victory without substantively undermining their overall operational success.
On the other side, allowing a PRC enclave on Taiwan represents a partial victory for China, one
that might, over time, become a fuller victory. The PLA could build up considerable forces and
supplies in this enclave and perhaps coerce a substantive takeover of the whole island. On the
other hand, Washington might change its China and Taiwan policies in response to the conict and
deploy troops to the island. In any case, this was a better outcome for the United States than an
unconditional withdrawal.
All of these oers assume some kind of follow-on negotiations that were not part of the wargame.
Gameplay continued until the teams agreed to a settlement or nuclear use escalated to a general
nuclear exchange.
Confronting Armageddon | 35
Scenario Variations
The project varied scenarios along two dimensions in the 15 iterations: U.S. rules of engagement
(ROEs) concerning conventional strikes against the Chinese mainland and the evolution of Chinese
nuclear capabilities. These factors are believed to aect decisionmaking on nuclear escalation and
would be outside the span of control of military commanders during a conict.194 Thus, they were
appropriate for scenario construction rather than gameplay.
The literature and previous wargames suggest three levels of U.S. ROEs to explore both the impact
of conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland and the risk of inadvertent escalation. In the rst
condition, the NCA does not allow any U.S. conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland. This
limits U.S. military options against the Chinese invasion but avoids both escalation from striking
Chinese territory and inadvertent escalation from accidentally striking Chinese nuclear forces. In the
second condition, the NCA allows conventional strikes on mainland targets that are unambiguously
nonnuclear in nature (e.g., Chinese ports used for the loading of amphibious ships). This grants
military advantages at the risk of incurring Chinese escalation in response to strikes on the mainland
but again avoids inadvertent escalation. In the third condition, U.S. conventional forces can strike any
targets on the mainland, even if those strikes could aect Chinese dual-use systems and nuclear early
warning and command and control facilities. This grants maximum U.S. warghting advantage while
risking a nuclear response both for mainland strikes and inadvertent escalation.
Two variations involve Chinese nuclear capabilities: Assured Retaliation Focused and Low Yield
Enabled. Both variants posited that by 2028 China will have expanded the number of warheads
in its arsenal in accordance with the most recent CMPR.195 In Assured Retaliation Focused, China
continues its traditional assured-retaliation nuclear posture. By improving early warning systems
and spreading its warheads onto more missiles by reducing the proportion of missiles with MIRVs,
China gains a signicantly more secure second-strike capability than it has today. However, in this
variant, China does not deploy low-yield nuclear weapons.
In Low Yield Enabled, China has changed its nuclear posture to become more like the United States
by deploying low-yield weapons. If China developed low-yield weapons, it would possibly reect a
change in attitude toward nuclear use that could not be modeled by non-Chinese players; however,
by giving China teams low-yield weapons, it was possible to test whether the possession of these
options changed deterrence and use patterns. Although China would still possess a secure second-
strike capability in the Low Yield Enabled posture, this second strike is weaker than for the Assured
Retaliation Focused variant.
Each of the three ROE cases was run with the two potential Chinese nuclear force structures to
produce six distinct scenarios. With 15 iterations, three of the scenarios were run twice each, and
the other three were run three times each to explore the impact on nuclear thinking and use.
Prior to the 15 games for record, beta testing was conducted at MIT on January 1920, 2024, and a
series of six ground-only games were conducted as pilots to test new game procedures and then
continued to gain additional observations.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 36
Chinese Nuclear Forces
To implement these dierent trajectories in Chinese nuclear posture, the project created two variants
of Chinese nuclear forces with the same number of total warheads but with dierent allocations, one
consistent with greater emphasis on survivability (Assured Retaliation Focused) and one consistent
with greater emphasis on the deployment of tactical, or low yield, capabilities (Low Yield Enabled).196
The primary source for these projections was the most recent CMPR, informed by the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists and feedback from experts in the eld.197 To avoid giving the appearance of a
government-funded project taking a specic position on the yield, number of warheads, and ranges of
specic Chinese systems, the project parameterized weapon yields to low yield or high yield, all MIRVs
to three warheads, and all ranges to short, medium, intermediate, or intercontinental. The project
standardized the quantities of each relevant category to increments of 24 to facilitate gameplay.
The means of delivery for Chinese weapons was as important as the range, yield, and number
of warheads because each delivery method has advantages and disadvantages. Placing nuclear
missiles on mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs) allows missiles to be dispersed and hidden
This image shows the elements of Chinese nuclear posture in game: green ready-to-re missiles in the
foreground, yellow unmated but collocated missiles and warheads, red warheads in central storage, and
red missiles without warheads.
Photo: CSIS Defense and Security Department sta
Confronting Armageddon | 37
from enemy surveillance. Basing nuclear missiles in silos is cheaper, can accommodate even the
largest missiles, and can be hardened so that, on average, more than one missile is required to
destroy each with condence, However, their static nature makes them vulnerable to counterforce
attacks. Missiles in SSBNs are survivable as long as a country can get them safely out of port and
foil the enemy’s antisubmarine warfare eorts in open waters. Finally, air-launched missiles can
be delivered en masse and might be more dicult to intercept, but the bombers themselves are
vulnerable and slow. Table 1 shows the resulting inventories for the two variants.
China’s historic assured-retaliation posture meant that the readiness of each missile must also be
tracked. Although China’s nuclear posture and doctrine are evolving, there are no indications China
has abandoned its historical adherence to centralized storage of warheads. If, as postulated by Wu
Riqiang, only one-sixth of Chinese warheads are deployed to their ring units, then a large and
highly visible eort is required to deploy the remaining warheads.198 Having been moved to ring
units, those warheads would have to be prepared and mated. In the case of mobile launchers, the
TELs would then need to be dispersed. While this might take only a week for a single warhead, the
large number of warheads in an expanded Chinese arsenal means China would likely need a month
to transition from a peacetime posture to fully deployed. It would be impossible to conceal this
Table 1: Chinese Nuclear Weapons Inventories
Note: ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile;
MRBM = medium-range ballistic missile; SSBN = ballistic missile submarine; TEL = transporter erector launcher.
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Chinese Nuclear Weapons
Variant 1 Variant 2
Assured Retaliation Focused Low Yield Enabled
Range Delivery Yield Warheads 2028
missiles
2028
warheads Warheads 2028
missiles
2028
warheads
MRBM /
IRBM
TEL Low 1 0 0 1 24 24
MRBM /
IRBM
TEL High 1 96 96 1 96 96
ICBM TEL High 1 144 144 1 144 144
ICBM TEL High 3 48 144 3 24 72
ICBM Silo High 1 288 288 1 24 24
ICBM Silo High 3 24 72 3 120 360
ICBM SSBN High 1 72 72 1 72 72
ALCM Air Lo w 1 0 0 1 24 24
ALCM Air High 1 24 24 1 24 24
Tot al 696 840 552 840
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 38
change in posture. Therefore, it was important to capture the interaction between the China teams’
deployment decisions and the U.S. coalition teams’ reactions.
To show this transition, the project developed a system of displaying Chinese warheads by color,
iconography, and location on a board. Warheads and missiles were represented in increments of
24 using 3D-printed models by igMakes.199 Missiles ready to re with mated warheads were shown
in green, but only a proportion of the Chinese arsenal started that way. Many warheads are held in
central or regional storage, and even some of the deployed warheads are not mated at any given
time. To get ready to re, an unmated warhead and unmated missile had to be collocated at a ring
unit; once collocated the unmated warhead and missile were replaced with yellow pieces. To be
collocated, a red warhead from central storage had to be shipped to a ring unit with an unmated
red missile without a warhead. The games, therefore, always began with a Chinese nuclear status
board mostly populated by red warheads and missiles in separate areas. Most China teams opted to
ship and mate missiles, producing higher levels of readiness (with green missiles), which worried
U.S. coalition teams.
U.S. Nuclear Forces
The key elements of the U.S. nuclear order of battle for this project were the weapons and delivery
platforms available in 2028. The estimates used in the study assumed execution of the nuclear
modernization and force structure plans as they stood in 2024 (see Table 2). Changes to those plans
by the new Trump administration would be unlikely to have a major eect by 2028. All information
used for the game came from unclassied sources (as indicated in the notes to Tables 2 and 3). To
comply with DOD’s security requirements, the tables do not include yields, even those available in
unclassied documents.
Table 2: U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Weapon Compatible with Reported number
available Comments
B61-11200 B-2, F-15E, F-16C/D, F-35
(future), B-21 (future)201
50 Continuing; earth
penetrating
B61-12 B-2, F-15E, F-16C/D,
F-35 (future), B-52, B-21
(future)202
250, including Europe Replacing B61-3, 4, 7;
fully fielded by FY 2028
B61-13203 Air delivered — For “harder and large-area
military targets”; unlikely
to be available within the
timeline of the wargame
B83 B-2, B-52 Few Small numbers
maintained for hardened
underground targets
W76-1 Trident204 240
Confronting Armageddon | 39
W76-2 Trident Only a few W76-2
warheads for specialized
targets
W88 Trident205
W78 Minuteman206 400
W87-1 Minuteman207
W80 ALCM, B-52 300 plus 200 in reserve208
W80-4 Long-range cruise
missile, B-52209
None available in 2028210 LRSO replacing ALCM
Total deployed 1,550211
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
This listing includes only weapons in the active inventory.212 In addition to weapons in the active
inventory, 1,938 warheads are reported to be in “reserve (hedge and spares),” and another 1,536 are
“retired, awaiting dismantlement.”213 The reserve category has three levels of readiness from “ready
to deploy” to various stages of disassembly.214 The project assumed that 20 percent of the inactive
inventory would be available—5 percent each week for four weeks.
Table 3 presents all expected U.S. nuclear platforms in 2028.
Table 3: U.S. Nuclear Platforms in 2028
Platform Number Max Load Out Comments
B-2 20 total, 12
available
16 gravity bombs B61 series
B-52 46 nuclear
capable, 26
available
20 cruise missiles
each
W80 series, either on ALCM or LRSO;
B61 series
B-21 A few215 — Not used in game because of limited
numbers
SSBNs 14 90 warheads each Mix of W76-1/2, W88
ICBMs 400 1 warhead each Mix of W78 and W87-1
Fighters Many 5 B61s each F-35s, F-15s, and F-16s have nuclear
capability216
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
The key conclusion from Tables 2 and 3 is that by 2028, the United States will have a variety of
delivery options and will still possess quantitative nuclear superiority over China (about 1,550
versus 840 warheads).
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 40
Methodological Dierences with Other Wargames
Some of the hypotheses examined by this project relate to topics treated by four other recent
projects that have used wargames to explore the nuclear dimensions of a near-future U.S.-China war
over Taiwan:
▪A 2022 Center for New American Security (CNAS) wargame concluded with the China team
using a HEMP near Hawaii. The report recommended further research into the nuclear
dimensions of a Taiwan conict.217
▪In 2023, a CNAS team conducted two TTXs to explore pressures that might lead to nuclear
deterrence failure.218 The project highlighted the impact of dierences in the future Chinese
arsenal; the China team used a nuclear weapon in the 2030 TTX with a more developed
Chinese nuclear arsenal but did not in the 2027 TTX with a less developed arsenal.
▪CNAS’s most recent 2024 project explored the consequences of nuclear rst use in two
TTXs.219 The underlying analysis appears to have been extensive, but the project report
contained few details on the course of events during the TTXs. The report suggested that the
intersection of conventional and nuclear escalation deserved analysis.
▪A 2024 Atlantic Council report featured a TTX to explore U.S. reactions after China employed
nuclear weapons rst during a Taiwan conict.220
Dierences in focus mean that some conclusions of other projects lie outside of this project’s scope.
For example, the Atlantic Council project drew lessons about the broader diplomatic context
of Chinese nuclear escalation decisions, whereas this project focused on military operations,
nuclear decisionmaking, and the consequences of nuclear weapon use. The Atlantic Council TTX
featured dierent cells within the Blue team to draw insights into U.S. decisionmaking, which was
similarly beyond the scope of this project. The present study also did not model the possibility of
opportunistic aggression by Russia or other powers, a possibility discussed by the Atlantic Council
in a 2024 article.221
To strengthen rigor, this project contained several methodological enhancements.222 First, the
project used multiple iterations; having 15 iterations allowed a more thorough analysis of the range
of possible pathways and outcomes. Second, the game used operations research and rules-based
adjudication to assess the outcomes of military interactions. This allowed a closer tie between
the conventional operations driving the war and nuclear escalation decisionmaking. Finally, the
wargame addressed both the drivers and consequences of nuclear weapon use. Although allowing
the players to decide on nuclear rst use meant that many wargames would see no nuclear play, it
gave players more context for their nuclear decisions and a stronger sense of ownership since the
decisions were not scripted.
Having 15 iterations allowed a more thorough analysis of the
range of possible pathways and outcomes.
Confronting Armageddon | 41
Scope Conditions
This study focused on the military dimensions of nuclear weapon use and the results. It did not
include other issues critical to a full understanding of nuclear use and its consequences. A full
description of these scoping conditions is needed to set out what the study did and did not do.
▪The project did not address the likelihood of nuclear use in a Taiwan scenario. Wargame
design choices were optimized to understand the military logic of using nuclear
weapons. Dening players as operational commanders and telling them to base nuclear
recommendations on the military utility of employing nuclear weapons minimized political
factors (though, as the analysis chapters demonstrate, some players nevertheless considered
political factors). The frequency of nuclear weapon use in the game iterations, therefore, did
not indicate the probability of their use in an actual conict.223
The project did not address the likelihood of nuclear use in a
Taiwan scenario.
▪Political considerations might lead to nuclear use at times or in ways contrary to military
advice. Political leaders might want to use nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve, cause
shock, or force surrender. However, it is more likely that political leaders would act as
a brake, vetoing nuclear use even when militarily advisable. Factors pushing this way
include fears of escalation, the likelihood of worldwide moral opprobrium, state interests
in maintaining a global nuclear taboo, and the potential loss of domestic support. Nuclear
powers have been involved in conventional wars many times since 1945, and although
some may have considered using nuclear weapons, none have.224 In the event of nuclear
use, political leaders might also employ nuclear weapons dierently than operational
commanders recommend—for example, by vetoing targets that cause high civilian casualties.
▪China players were not all experts on Chinese aairs, though a sizable minority (roughly 25
percent) were, giving half the teams a China expert. Several China experts posited that nuclear
attacks on Taiwan, regarded as an integral part of China, would be anathema to Beijing. China
experts also tended to be more sensitive to China’s commitment to a no-rst-use policy, which
has historically guided its decisions on force structure, posture, and command authorities.
▪The game did not have a separate Taiwan team and, therefore, did not cover Taiwanese
political decisionmaking, including the possibility of surrender. The logic behind not modeling
Taiwanese political decisionmaking during conict was driven by the intended focus on
U.S.-China strategic dynamics, the limited operational decisions available to Taiwan, and the
diculty of credibly assessing the pressures Taipei might experience during conventional,
much less nuclear, conict. The U.S. coalition team made decisions about Taiwanese actions
assuming Taiwan would continue to resist. However, it is unknowable whether Taipei would
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 42
continue resistance if, for example, its territory were struck by a dozen or more nuclear
weapons, each somewhat larger than the bombs employed against Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
The game did not have a separate Taiwan team and therefore
did not cover Taiwanese political decisionmaking, including the
possibility of surrender.
▪More broadly, the game did not force players to consider popular reaction, the
destructiveness of nuclear (or conventional) weapons use, or the likely second- and third-
order economic, social, and political eects use when making nuclear decisions. In a world
with ubiquitous cameras, social media, and other powerful means to mobilize opinion,
pressures on governments after nuclear use could be truly unprecedented. However, it is
unclear how those pressures would inuence decisionmakers and over what timeline.
▪This report addresses one scenario: invasion. China might employ force against Taiwan in
other ways (e.g., a blockade or coercive repower strikes). In those cases, nuclear use seems
less likely and, if it occurs, might follow patterns not covered by this project.
▪Like the original project modeling conventional combat (summarized in the First Battle of
the Next War report), this adaptation used only unclassied data so that its results could
inform public debate.225 This does not necessarily limit the accuracy of the analysis. Much
information is available from open sources. The appropriate use of historical data, because
it incorporates all the friction of real-world operations, can sometimes be more accurate
in modeling future conicts than classied information, which suers from a lack of broad
review and scrutiny.
▪The wargame assumed that neither side had a secret, exquisite capability that allowed a
disarming counterforce attack.226 Such a capability is highly unlikely to exist because it would
require high eectiveness against all arms of an adversary’s nuclear forces simultaneously.
Although both sides are undoubtedly pursuing such capabilities, the history of the Cold War
suggests that they are unlikely to be acquired in quantity and kept secret for long periods.
For example, the United States developed the rst stealth (low observable) aircraft in secret:
the F117. Though highly successful, the capability was limited (59 aircraft built), and its
existence soon became known, though not all the technical parameters.227
Confronting Armageddon | 43
5
Game Results
The ve outcomes are described below along with the number of times that each occurred.
No outcome constituted a total victory for the U.S. coalition (e.g., overthrow of the CCP and
redirection of Chinese foreign policy) or for China (i.e., U.S. withdrawal from the Western
Pacic and U.S. acknowledgment of China’s sphere of inuence). These were out of reach.
▪PLA Phased Withdrawal (5): A ceasere occurred, with PRC withdrawal from Taiwan and
the return of Chinese POWs.
▪Status Quo Ante (1): The prewar status was reinforced. Chinese forces on Taiwan were
destroyed, but China gained a commitment that Taiwan would not seek independence.
▪Conagration (3): A strategic nuclear exchange occurred, with hundreds of millions
of casualties.
▪PRC Enclave (5): A ceasere occurred, with the establishment of a PRC enclave on Taiwan.
Some games had player-created amendments to the generic peace conditions. One game saw
the United States and Taiwan allowing a PRC enclave but with the establishment of a formal
U.S.-Taiwan alliance and a U.S. force permanently deployed on Taiwan.
▪Inconclusive (1): No ceasere deal had been reached and no nuclear conagration had
occurred by the time gameplay ended.
Because the game did not assess political approval or disapproval of nuclear use, outcomes did
not represent the probability of nuclear use but rather potential military recommendations for
nuclear use.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 44
Figure 2: Game Pathways
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Figure 2 shows the pathways and outcomes for the 15 games.
As noted in the scope conditions, the wargame did not model Taiwanese decisionmaking during
the conict. Chinese nuclear use could induce the Taiwanese to surrender. The China teams
sometimes made nuclear threats and attacks directly aimed at forcing Taiwanese capitulation
(Game 2). Even if China aimed only to have operational eects with its nuclear use (Games 4, 5,
9, 11, and 13), Taiwan might still decide the cost of nuclear attacks on its territory outweighed the
benet of continued resistance.
The outcomes represented only agreements between the respective adversaries; the second-
and third-order political and economic consequences were not treated and would certainly be
momentous. Economic and political isolation of China, signicant nuclear proliferation to states
in the region (or beyond), and a possible strengthening of the U.S. alliance system are among the
many possible negative consequences for China. Hence, the idea of a Chinese “victory” or “success”
through nuclear use should be understood in the limited sense of immediate conict settlement.
Economic disruption would aect all nations but was not estimated.
Intermediate waypoints show the many paths that conicts could take from start to outcome:
▪Early HEMP:Two China teams used HEMP at the outset of conict (Turn 1 HEMP); the
United States responded with its own HEMP in one game (U.S. HEMP) but did nothing in the
other (No U.S. Response). Both games continued without further immediate nuclear use.
▪U.S. Panic:Two U.S. teams, shocked by high early losses, incorrectly believed they were
losing the conventional ght; most teams correctly assessed that their position would
improve (U.S. Calm).
Confronting Armageddon | 45
▪Chinese Crisis:Around weeks three to ve, the China teams realized they were losing the
conventional war.
▪One China team used a HEMP (Chinese HEMP), to which the United States responded with
attacks on Chinese command and control with hypersonic weapons (U.S. Conventional
Escalation).
▪Many other China teams used nuclear weapons to cause physical destruction
(Chinese First Use); in response, the United States launched a damage-limiting nuclear
counterforce attack (Total Counterforce), sought an immediate ceasere (U.S. Surrender),
attacked Chinese cities with nuclear weapons (U.S. Countervalue), or used nuclear
weapons operationally on Taiwan (U.S. Operational).
▪U.S. Nuclear Operational:The U.S. team attacked the Chinese lodgment with nuclear
weapons.
▪TotalCounterforce:The U.S. team used nuclear weapons to attack Chinese nuclear
capabilities.
▪U.S. Countervalue:The U.S. team used nuclear weapons on Chinese cities or on military
targets within cities.
▪U.S. ConventionalEscalation:The U.S. team responded with conventional attacks on high-
value targets such as early warning radars.
▪U.S. Yields: The United States accepted an unfavorable outcome rather than continue the
ght.
Similar pathways could lead to dierent outcomes. For example, the pathway U.S. Calm Chinese
Crisis Chinese First Use produced three dierent outcomes. The key takeaway is the diculty
in predicting how nuclear escalation will end. There was one exception to this rule of uncertainty:
countervalue strikes always engendered countervalue responses and the “deaths” of millions.
The key takeaway is the diculty in predicting how nuclear
escalation will end.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 46
6
Analysis
What Creates the Greatest Pressure for Nuclear
First Use?
The wargame results support several hypotheses developed in Chapter 2; they do not
support others. The strength of these ndings must be viewed in light of the scenarios,
methodoloy, and scope conditions outlined earlier.228
The wargames supported three such hypotheses, fully or partly:
▪When nuclear use occurred, the rst use (other than a HEMP) was always initiated by a
team that believed it was losing on the conventional battleeld and wanted to gamble for
resurrection.
▪Players showed some deference to a nuclear taboo despite the fact that ethical
considerations and broader politics were not an explicit part of the game.
▪Finally, there was limited support for the hypothesis that China’s possession of tactical
nuclear options would make nuclear weapon use more likely.
Most hypothesized drivers of nuclear rst use were not supported. Table 4 lays out all the
hypotheses and whether game outcomes supported them.
Confronting Armageddon | 47
Table 4: Nuclear Use Hypotheses and Wargame Results
Title Hypothesis Supported?
Gambling for
resurrection
Teams will use nuclear weapons when they are
faced with conventional defeat.
Yes
Nuclear revolution
Nuclear taboo
Teams will be reluctant to employ nuclear
weapons, even in situations where nuclear use
would be militarily advantageous.
Yes
Chinese tactical
nuclear forces
China teams will be more likely to use nuclear
weapons if they possess low-yield nuclear
weapons.
Partial
Mainland strikes U.S. strikes on nonnuclear Chinese targets on
the mainland will increase the likelihood of
China teams initiating nuclear use.
No
Inadvertent escalation U.S. strikes on Chinese nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3) will
increase the likelihood of China teams
initiating nuclear use.
No
Deliberate
conventional attacks
on nuclear forces
Deliberate conventional attacks on nuclear
capabilities will create pressure for nuclear
use.
No
Counterforce
capabilities
China teams will be deterred from nuclear use
by U.S. counterforce capabilities.
No
Quantitative nuclear
superiority
China teams will be deterred by U.S.
quantitative and qualitative nuclear superiority.
No
Substitution for
conventional munitions
Teams will use nuclear weapons to substitute
for conventional munitions that have been
exhausted.
No
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Supported Hypotheses
The wargames supported two hypotheses—gambling for resurrection and the nuclear taboo—and
partially supported a third—Chinese possession of tactical nuclear forces.
CHINA TEAMS GAMBLING FOR RESURRECTION
Nuclear rst use was most often initiated by China teams that believed conventional defeat had
become inevitable. The models of conventional conict employed in the game—which the authors
believe reect the most likely case—tended to produce early successes but steadily mounting
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 48
setbacks for the China teams. The Chinese amphibious eet was particularly vulnerable and
suered attrition over time while the lodgment’s logistical needs grew. Between weeks three and
ve of the conict, the Chinese ow of logistics onto the island declined below the level needed
to sustain troops already on the island. Thus, no additional troops could then be transported with
the available lift. After this point, with further losses to the amphibious eet and the absence of a
functioning captured port or aireld, Chinese supplies became increasingly inadequate, so units
lost combat power and could no longer attack. Defeat became imminent, leading to a crisis for the
China teams and a harsh choice: agree to an adverse settlement, ght on to likely defeat, or use
nuclear weapons.
Nuclear first use was most oen initiated by China teams that
believed conventional defeat had become inevitable.
Conventional defeat for China could pose an existential risk for the CCP, particularly if no face-
saving o-ramp is available. If the invasion force surrenders due to lack of supplies, tens of
thousands of soldiers would march into captivity. The resulting visuals would make it impossible for
Chinese leaders to spin results or deny catastrophic defeat. As Brad Roberts, director of the Center
for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, points out, “Concerns
about domestic political stability also factor into Chinese leadership perspectives in a way few
Americans appreciate.”229 China teams that perceived this risk as existential were tempted to gamble
for resurrection by using nuclear weapons.230 As discussed in Chapter 7: What Happens If Nuclear
Weapons are Used?, sometimes this gamble worked, leading the U.S. team to withdraw from a
conventional war it was winning and granting the China team an advantageous settlement (though
no U.S. team conceded completely). However, at other times, the China team’s gamble backred,
leading to a sounder defeat or even to a global nuclear cataclysm.
It is unclear whether this pressure for nuclear use would override restraining factors in an actual
crisis. Sinologists who participated in the game disagreed on whether Chinese leaders would
resort to nuclear use in such a situation. Some believed that they would be willing to gamble for
resurrection to protect the regime. Others cited a belief in the security of the CCP’s hold on power
and its ability to potentially reconstitute for a renewed invasion following a ceasere.231
PANICKED U.S. TEAMS GAMBLING FOR RESURRECTION
Many U.S. teams were shocked at their large losses early in the conict. These losses included at
least one carrier in the rst week (sunk or critically damaged) and a second carrier in 9 of 15 games.
The last time the United States lost a eet carrier in combat was the USS Princeton in October 1944.
By the end of the rst week of the game, the United States and Japan typically lost 270 aircraft and
20 ships. Shaken by these large losses, several teams believed they were headed toward defeat.
Some were alarmed enough to believe they faced essentially the same choices discussed in the
Chinese context: agree to an adverse settlement, accept defeat, or use nuclear weapons. Although
Confronting Armageddon | 49
U.S. teams, unlike the China teams, did not believe defeat would threaten the United States’ form
of government, defeat would nevertheless carry grave domestic and international consequences,
including the collapse of the U.S. alliance system.
The reaction of the U.S. teams that believed they were losing varied. Some persevered in the
conventional conict without pursuing either nuclear use or negotiated o-ramps and were pleasantly
surprised by their improving conventional situation later in the games. One U.S. team (Game 7) chose
to withdraw from the conict, granting a PRC enclave on Taiwan after only a week of combat.
Another U.S. team (Game 6) undertook a damage-limiting nuclear counterforce strike against
Chinese nuclear and nuclear-related targets. The attack involved more than a thousand U.S.
warheads, which would likely have caused at least 10 million prompt deaths in China and several
times that many deaths from radiation and other causes.232 The goal of this preemptive counterforce
attack was to force the China team to capitulate on the theory that it could not retaliate with its
nuclear weapons without eectively committing national suicide. The U.S. team still held hundreds
of nuclear weapons and could retaliate against any Chinese response with a massive strike against
Chinese cities. However, with China’s expanding nuclear arsenal and investment in ICBMs launched
from TELs, the authors modeled that it would be impossible for the United States to disarm China’s
nuclear force completely; it could only hope to coerce China into capitulation and, if that failed,
limit damage from China’s nuclear retaliation. When the China team failed to capitulate as planned,
a nuclear exchange ensued that led to several million U.S. civilian casualties and eventual U.S.
concession to a PRC enclave on Taiwan.233
NUCLEAR TABOO AS DRIVER OF NONUSE OR LATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Despite instructions to players that nuclear recommendations should be based on military
utility—a mechanism designed to study potential military drivers of nuclear weapons use—many
players said during the game or postgame hotwash that they were committed to not using nuclear
weapons.234 Their rationales included (variously) the likelihood of escalation to the strategic level,
the importance of maintaining a global nuclear taboo, and, among U.S. players, the importance of
the United States not being the rst to use nuclear weapons since World War II. Some China teams
(Games 1 and 12) refrained from even mating warheads, signaling that they would not escalate to the
nuclear level. Most Sinologists who played the game suggested Chinese leaders would view nuclear
use against their 同胞 (tóngbāo, or compatriots) on Taiwan as anathema. Similarly, China’s no-rst-
use policy, which, unlike Russia’s, has historically driven nuclear force structure decisions, provides
a soft constraint. Whether the actual U.S. or Chinese leadership would feel the same normative
constraints is unclear, but the game results show the taboo’s broad strength.
CHINESE POSSESSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The games only partially supported the hypothesis that Chinese possession of tactical nuclear
weapons would increase Chinese propensity for nuclear rst use—a principal assumption of the
game scenarios. As shown in Table 5, China teams decided on nuclear rst use ve times despite
not possessing low-yield weapons compared to four times when they did. Whenever a China team
believed it should gamble for resurrection, possessing low-yield weapons had some inuence but
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 50
was not determinative. Instead, conversations principally revolved around the trajectory of the
conventional campaign and the implications of a defeat for the CCP.
Although possession or lack of low-yield options did not determine nuclear use, it did aect
gameplay. When China teams had low-yield nuclear weapons and decided on nuclear escalation,
they almost always used low-yield weapons on rst use. One China team that did not have low-
yield nuclear weapons (Game 3) said that having tactical nuclear weapons might have prompted
them to consider nuclear use earlier or more seriously. Another China team with lower-yield
nuclear weapons (Game 14) decided against use based on the probability of high civilian casualties
and political damage in the event of urban use, even though lower-yield weapons would reduce
these eects. Thus, Chinese possession of lower-yield weapons had some inuence on military
decisionmakers, albeit not a decisive one.235
Political leaders (unmodeled, as the control group implemented the majority recommendations of
both sides) might view nuclear use dierently than the game players, rejecting the use of high-yield
weapons but accepting the use of low-yield weapons. This perception might make nuclear use with
low-yield weapons more likely than portrayed in the games. Nevertheless, the plurality of games
indicated that possession of low-yield weapons was not as central to operational commanders’
thinking on nuclear use as assessments of the conventional conict. Table 5 shows game outcomes
and nuclear use by scenario. It shows all six scenarios, whether nuclear weapons were used, who
used them rst, and the outcome.
Table 5: Game Outcomes and Nuclear Use by Scenario
1: Assured Retaliation
Focused
2: Low-Yield Enabled
No mainland strike Nuclear (China) Nuclear (U.S.)
Nuclear (China)
Only unambiguously
conventional mainland
strikes
Nuclear (China) Nuclear (China)
Nuclear (China)
All mainland strikes allowed Nuclear (China) Inconclusive (China)
Nuclear (China)
Note: Blue = U.S. coalition victory; red = Chinese victory; gray = conflagration; Nuclear = nuclear weapons used. The country name
in parentheses indicates which side used nuclear weapons first. This table does not count HEMP as nuclear use. Status quo ante
was considered a U.S. coalition victory.
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Confronting Armageddon | 51
Unsupported Hypotheses
MAINLAND STRIKES
U.S. conventional strikes on unambiguously nonnuclear targets on the Chinese mainland never led
China teams to seriously consider nuclear rst use. Although China teams always regarded such
strikes as escalatory, they considered conventional responses only. In iterations where the game
scenario restricted U.S. teams from attacking the Chinese mainland, the China team sometimes
reciprocated and refrained from attacking Guam or Japan.
When U.S. teams were allowed to strike the mainland and did so, China teams frequently cited these
mainland strikes in their justications for attacking Japan with conventional weapons. However, at
no point were nuclear attacks ordered or even seriously considered.
INADVERTENT ESCALATION
Inadvertent destruction of limited numbers of Chinese strategic assets did not lead China teams to a
nuclear response. Chinese SSBNs were sunk with conventional weapons during U.S. antisubmarine
warfare operations against Chinese attack submarines (Games 1 and 2), nuclear IRBM warheads
were destroyed during attacks on conventional PLA rockets (Game 3), satellite-based ISR was
disrupted to increase U.S. freedom of maneuver (Games 5 and 7), and dual-purpose command
and control nodes were targeted for their conventional eects (Games 3 and 14). None of these
provoked a Chinese nuclear response or even serious consideration of a nuclear response. China
teams invariably concluded that these attacks did not threaten their second strike, regardless of the
Chinese force posture in the scenario. Likewise, Chinese kinetic antisatellite attacks, including those
that destroyed early warning capabilities, prompted U.S. escalation to counterspace attacks of their
own but did not prompt consideration of nuclear use.
DELIBERATE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FORCES
China did not respond with nuclear weapons in the one game in which the U.S. team embarked on
a deliberate conventional counterforce campaign. In Game 2, the U.S. team attacked all the Chinese
nuclear platforms that it could reach (particularly SSBNs and bombers), attempted to disrupt
Chinese nuclear command and control, and even struck Chinese leadership targets. The China team
took these attacks in stride, noting it still retained sucient nuclear forces to destroy a large number
of U.S. cities. The losses to nuclear systems were modest in scale; larger-scale losses might produce
dierent results.
QUANTITATIVE NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY
All teams understood that the United States continued to hold advantages in the nuclear domain
despite a major and accelerating expansion of PLA nuclear inventories over the decade before
2028.236 Even in the Low Yield Enabled scenarios, China would have many fewer low-yield options
than the United States. Although China might possess more types of ICBMs, this would not translate
into qualitative or quantitative parity. Moreover, China’s peacetime readiness is far lower than that
of the United States, and the game assumed (for reasons outlined earlier) that its nuclear posture
was unchanged in the lead-up to war.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 52
Nevertheless, U.S. quantitative nuclear superiority did not deter China teams from employing
nuclear weapons. China teams knew that using nuclear weapons risked nuclear retaliation by the
United States and that the United States possessed more escalatory options and the ability to launch
a damage-limiting counterforce strike against China. But so long as the United States could not
launch a disarming counterforce strike, the China teams judged that the United States would not
launch strategic nuclear attacks. Thus, U.S. qualitative and quantitative nuclear superiority was not
central in its calculations. Echoing the results of Hannah Dennis and Stacie Pettyjohn, the number
of nuclear weapons that the United States could hit China with was not crucial to China teams.237
China teams that decided not to use nuclear weapons were dissuaded by considerations other than
their nuclear inferiority.
U.S. COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES
The powerful U.S. nuclear counterforce capability was not enough to deter the China teams from
using nuclear weapons when they faced a crisis. No matter how capable U.S. forces were, they
could not destroy all Chinese ICBMs, particularly those based on mobile systems. As long as the
China teams believed they had a secure second strike of any magnitude, they were not deterred
from using nuclear weapons.
SHORTAGES OF CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS
No team opted for nuclear use as a substitute for depleted stocks of conventional weapons during
the game. Despite the United States running out of Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) in the
rst few days of combat, no U.S. team considered using nuclear weapons to sink the rest of the
Chinese amphibious eet as it sat anchored to debark; teams always had other options. Conversely,
no China team reached for nuclear weapons to replace the exhausted magazines of theater
ballistic missiles.
Confronting Armageddon | 53
7
Analysis
What Happens If Nuclear Weapons Are Used?
This chapter focuses on the consequences of nuclear use. Because only one U.S. team
initiated nuclear use, whereas seven China teams did, it focuses primarily on Chinese use
and U.S. responses. This chapter walks through the consequences of nuclear rst use in
three stages:
1. What did the rst use target?
2. How did the adversary respond?
3. How did the conict end?
What Did First Use Target?
In selecting targets for nuclear attack, China teams never initiated nuclear use with either a
counterforce or countervalue attack. Even with an expanded arsenal, China could not have
achieved an eective damage-limiting counterforce attack on the larger U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Additionally, China teams never initially launched a countervalue attack or attacked military targets
in U.S. cities because they believed this would inevitably provoke an immediate and potentially
massive U.S. retaliation. Similarly, China teams believed that using nuclear weapons against Japan,
even if aimed at U.S. bases, would be equivalent to a nuclear attack on U.S. territory and would also
provoke U.S. nuclear retaliation. Thus, the China teams focused on attacking operational targets
with their rst use of nuclear weapons.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 54
China teams believed that using nuclear weapons against Japan,
even if aimed at U.S. bases, would be equivalent to a nuclear
attack on U.S. territory and would provoke immediate and
potentially massive retaliation.
Most China teams decided that ships at sea, airelds, and ports were either unprotable or too
escalatory as nuclear targets. This left nuclear attacks on Taiwanese ground forces as the best of
several bad options. Although China would prefer not to risk collateral damage to its ground forces
or kill large numbers of ostensibly Chinese civilians, Taiwanese ground forces oered the best
operational utility with the lowest risk of U.S. retaliation.
Table 6: Hypotheses About Targeting
Target Hypothesis Supported (U.S. /
Chinese First Use)
Countervalue Neither team will launch
countervalue first strikes.
Supported (0 / 0)
Counterforce Neither team will launch
counterforce first strikes.
Not supported (1 / 0)
Operational
Targets
Ports and
Airfields
Teams will target ports or
airfields in the theater with
nuclear weapons to gain an
operational advantage despite
the retaliation risk.
Weakly supported (0 / 1)
Ground
Forces
Both teams are likely to use
nuclear weapons against ground
troops on Taiwan.
Supported (0 / 6)
Ships at Sea
U.S. teams will target Chinese
ships, but only during the
amphibious ooading. China
teams will not use nuclear
weapons at sea.
Not supported (0 / 1)
Special Cases
HEMP
Both teams will conduct HEMP
attacks because they are
perceived as less escalatory
than other nuclear options.
Weakly supported (0 / 3)
U.S.
Nonnuclear
Allies
China teams will avoid targeting
Japan because of the logic of
extended deterrence.
Supported (1 case of 7)
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Confronting Armageddon | 55
FREQUENT CHINESE TARGETING OF GROUND FORCES ON TAIWAN
In six of seven games during which China teams initiated nuclear use, they targeted Taiwanese
ground forces. Most teams saw little point in crossing the nuclear threshold unless such use
provided major battleeld advantages. Knocking out a few enemy battalions would not produce
signicant results because reserves and reinforcements would move into the gaps created by the
attack. Thus, when the China teams used nuclear weapons, they used them extensively in ve of
six instances, employing either large numbers (35 weapons in Game 6 and 19 weapons in Game
13) or large-yield weapons (5 high-yield warheads in Game 9, 8 in Game 11, and 3 in Game 5).238 The
exception was in Game 2, where the China team launched a single nuclear weapon against the
Taiwanese leadership bunker in Taipei.239
In six of seven games where China teams initiated nuclear use,
they targeted Taiwanese ground forces. . . . When the China
teams used nuclear weapons, they used them extensively.
Using nuclear weapons on the front lines—particularly high-yield weapons—caused friendly
casualties as well as enemy casualties. For example, in Game 5, in which China did not have low-
yield weapons, it lost ve battalions in addition to the casualties inicted on the Taiwanese. Thus,
most China teams targeted Taiwanese units away from the front lines.
When used on the ground, Chinese nuclear attacks destroyed between 6 and 38 Taiwanese
battalions, with an average of 18, all from a single salvo of strikes. The number varied with targeting
and the number of weapons employed. Eighteen battalions represented 15 percent of Taiwan’s 120
battalion total, roughly equaling Taiwan’s losses in conventional conict (17) at that point in the
games. Therefore, the single strike was not decisive but severely weakened the Taiwanese defenses;
a second such strike would have been decisive in the absence of U.S. retaliation.240
Each battalion represented about 1,000 military personnel, including associated support, so
military casualties from a nuclear strike could be estimated at 6,00038,000. Casualties from
conventional operations averaged 17 battalions, or 17,000 personnel.
The project also estimated civilian casualties on Taiwan using average population density in dierent
types of terrain and the lethal range of each weapon yield. (See Table CI in Appendix C for details.)
The total number of civilian fatalities from nuclear weapons varied from an estimated 80,000 (under
10 low-yield weapons) to 350,000 (45 large-yield weapons or very large numbers [35] of low-yield
weapons). The single low-yield weapon striking an urban area in Game 2 caused 80,000 fatalities,
about the same level of casualties as inicted by the atomic weapons in World War II.241
Civilian casualties from nuclear use thus greatly outnumbered military casualties from all sources.
This was true even though the weapons were aimed almost entirely at military targets in exurban
and rural areas. Military forces are typically spread out and dug in, thus providing protection
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 56
against nuclear attacks. The civilian population is unprotected, and even the rural areas where
ghting generally took place were relatively densely populated.
In general, China teams used nuclear weapons on Taiwanese troop concentrations to inict
maximum losses per weapon. The Taiwanese responded by spreading their forces out, which
reduced vulnerability but also their combat eectiveness. However, because the situation quickly
moved to either strategic exchanges or negotiated o-ramps, the games ended before the extent of
this reduction became relevant.
ONLY ONE CHINESE USE AGAINST SHIPS AT SEA
Many China teams considered using nuclear weapons against U.S. ships, particularly aircraft
carriers, which are high-value targets because of their military capability and symbolism of U.S.
power. However, only one China team did so. The lack of nuclear attacks at sea was surprising since
the literature regards this as an attractive option because of the absence of civilians, the ability to
strike solely military targets, and the limited radioactive fallout. The limited use of nuclear weapons
against ships at sea resulted from a lack of need and a lack of eectiveness.
The limited use of nuclear weapons against ships at sea resulted
from a lack of need and a lack of eectiveness.
There was a lack of need because conventional munitions were highly eective in sinking
surface ships on both sides during the initial weeks of the conict. China has many conventional
weapons that were eective against ships, so there was little operational advantage from using
nuclear weapons. U.S. surface forces were highly vulnerable when inside Chinese missile weapon
employment zones. For example, U.S. carriers operating west of Guam generally launched only
a handful of sorties before being sunk or otherwise neutralized. Conversely, Taiwan’s ground-
launched antiship missiles, U.S. submarines, and U.S. bomber-launched antiship missiles could
grind down the Chinese eet over the course of weeks.
At the same time, nuclear weapons lacked eectiveness against ships at sea, making them a less
appealing option. The Crossroads nuclear tests in 1946 showed that nuclear weapons must strike
near a ship to disable it, necessitating precision.242 Conventional antiship missiles have terminal
guidance to achieve this precision. However, neither the U.S. nor Chinese military has nuclear
missiles with terminal seekers (most commonly an active radar) that can update the target
location as the missile approaches a moving ship.243 Without such guidance, time delays in the kill
chain and the target’s movement made such attacks dicult. Table C3 in Appendix C shows the
quantity of weapons needed. This uncertainty also makes nuclear rst use at sea a risky signal of
commitment and seriousness because of the high probability of failing to inict damage and then
looking ineective.244
Confronting Armageddon | 57
In the one iteration where the China team used nuclear weapons against U.S. ships at sea (Game 10),
the China team dropped patterns of nuclear weapons to cover all possible locations—48 high-yield
weapons against a U.S. carrier and surface action group. Although they successfully destroyed their
target, this did not signicantly aect the conventional balance of power since China had already
sunk many U.S. and Japanese ships with conventional weapons and viewed the nuclear strike as a
one-time event.
PORTS AND AIRFIELDS
Contrary to the expectations generated by the literature, there was only one targeting of airelds.
In that case, the China team targeted U.S. airbases on Japan. Consistent with the logic of extended
deterrence, the United States retaliated with a counterforce attack. Guam, the target of nuclear
attack in three previous wargame projects by other organizations, was never targeted in the series
of wargames run for this project.
The reason for this infrequent targeting was twofold. First, both ports and airelds are in or near
cities, so attacks would likely engender retaliation. For example, a single 10 kt weapon dropped on
a ship at the Chinese port at Quanzhou, the nearest to Taiwan and likely to be used in an invasion,
would produce 77,000 civilian casualties.245 For China teams, the ports and airelds most relevant
for U.S. power projection are either on U.S. or Japanese territory; this makes a Chinese rst strike on
them likely to engender retaliation. Second, as with ships at sea, China already possesses a robust
arsenal of conventionally armed ballistic missiles that could neutralize airbases and ports without
nuclear escalation. Third, a major drawback of ports is that ships are spread out for loading and
relatively resistant to nuclear attacks.246 Thus, more nuclear repower would be needed, increasing
civilian casualties.
HIGHALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE HEMP
In two games, China teams began the conict by using a HEMP over Taiwan. In one iteration (Game
4), the U.S. team responded with a HEMP of its own, and in the other (Game 14), the U.S. team
continued the conventional war without a nuclear response. In both cases, the conict continued as
in other games. In another iteration (Game 12), the China team used a HEMP later in the campaign
when it believed its conventional campaign was failing; the U.S. team continued the conventional
campaign, and the China team accepted an unfavorable peace oer. The use of HEMP, therefore,
did not move the conict toward a conclusion, either an o-ramp or nuclear escalation, in the same
way nuclear weapons did when used to create direct eects.
TARGETING OF JAPAN
Despite having ports and airelds that were attractive targets, Japan was attacked only once with
nuclear weapons.247 There was a strong belief by China teams that an attack on Japan would prompt
U.S. nuclear retaliation. As a result, the only attack against Japan was in Game 11, in which the China
team attacked multiple Japanese airbases as part of a broader nuclear attack. Furthermore, no
China team believed it could split the U.S.-Japan alliance with a nuclear attack on Japan. Indeed,
when the China team attacked Japan, the U.S. team honored its extended deterrence commitment
and responded with a large counterforce attack against China.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 58
How Did the Adversary Respond?
This section examines responses to nuclear use and characterizes these responses as withdrawal
from conict, continuing the conventional ght, or nuclear retaliation. Nuclear retaliation is
further characterized as operational (against conventional forces), countervalue (against cities or
infrastructure in cities), or counterforce (against nuclear weapons capabilities). Of the resulting
ve options, operational nuclear responses to adversary rst use appeared to lead to the most
favorable results in terms of agreements or outcomes on Taiwan. However, each has advantages and
disadvantages across a broader spectrum of values and risks.
Table 7: Hypotheses About Retaliation
Reaction Hypothesis Supported?
Nonnuclear
Responses
Withdrawal China teams will be less
likely than U.S. teams
to withdraw from the
conflict in response to
nuclear first use.
Supported (2 U.S.
withdrawals)
Continuing
Conventional
Continuing the
conventional campaign
will not lead to
successful outcomes
unless the adversary
cannot continue nuclear
attacks.
Supported (1 failed
attempt)
Nuclear
Responses
Operational
Retaliation
Operational nuclear
retaliation will prevent
first users from gaining
a decisive military
advantage.
Supported (1 U.S.
Nuclear Operational
Retaliation led to status
quo ante)
Countervalue
Retaliation
Countervalue retaliation
will not achieve
anticipated political
results and will produce
escalatory spirals.
Supported (All three
countervalue retaliations
led to conflagrations)
Counterforce
Retaliation
Counterforce retaliation
will not achieve the
anticipated political
result of coercing the
adversary into favorable
war terminations.
Supported (1 iteration)
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Confronting Armageddon | 59
NONNUCLEAR RESPONSES
The least risky response to Chinese nuclear rst use was withdrawal. However, that did not preserve
an autonomous Taiwan. Continuing the conventional ght produced unfavorable outcomes and
risked further nuclear use.
Withdrawal: Some U.S. teams withdrew from the conict in response to Chinese nuclear use.
In Game 13, the U.S. team accepted a Chinese ultimatum for a PRC enclave after Chinese nuclear
use on Taiwan and a nuclear demonstration over the Pacic. In Game 9, the U.S. team eventually
accepted a PRC enclave after initially attempting to continue the war conventionally. In both
cases, China did not gain a total victory. However, some participants judged a PRC enclave to be a
precursor to the eventual Chinese takeover of Taiwan. If the United States responded to China’s rst
use by accepting an unfavorable peace settlement, then China would have salvaged its conventional
campaign via nuclear escalation. This was the best possible outcome for Chinese nuclear rst use
and achieved a successful roll of the iron dice in the gamble for resurrection. For U.S. teams, this
represented the least-risky option with regard to the probability of further nuclear use or escalation
in the short term, though longer-term consequences of defeat would be dicult to predict.
Continuing the Conventional Campaign: In Game 12, the U.S. team continued its conventional
operations in response to a Chinese HEMP over the Pacic. A nonnuclear response by the U.S. team
forced the China team to escalate or back down, leading them to accept a PLA-phased withdrawal.
However, in the face of a committed China, attempting to continue the conventional campaign after
Chinese nuclear rst use was not successful. In Game 2, after the China team attacked Taiwanese
leadership with a nuclear weapon and the U.S. team attempted to continue the conventional war,
the China team made nuclear threats against Japan. The U.S. team responded with a countervalue
attack to signal resolve, resulting in a general nuclear exchange.
Japan’s inuence is also important. In Game 9, after Chinese nuclear rst use, the U.S. team
continued the conventional campaign until Japan, fearing further escalation, demanded the United
States accept a PRC enclave. The U.S. team acquiesced. Thus, continuing the conventional campaign
in the face of adversary rst use was successful only if the adversary conducted a strike that did not
produce decisive operational eects, the adversary lacked the intent or means to escalate further
and create such eects, and allies and partners were willing to continue ghting in the face of one-
sided nuclear use.
NUCLEAR RETALIATION
Players never opted for nuclear demonstrations in response to adversary nuclear rst use. Although
players were assigned roles as military commanders, many considered the impact on the credibility
of U.S. security commitments if the United States did not respond to nuclear use with nuclear
strikes of its own. Japan was at the forefront of U.S. thoughts, as losing Japanese access, basing,
and overight would doom the U.S. conventional campaign.248 However, Japan teams did not
unanimously support nuclear retaliation; some were concerned that Japan might become a nuclear
target if nuclear exchanges continued.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 60
Beyond these regional considerations, many U.S. players expressed concern that a nonnuclear
response to Chinese nuclear rst use would create global doubts about U.S. extended deterrence
elsewhere, from South Korea to Europe. Finally, many U.S. teams were motivated by the idea
that nuclear retaliation discouraged future nuclear proliferation and use by powers outside of
the current conict. However, nuclear retaliation could continue an escalatory spiral beyond the
respondent’s control.
The risks and benets of a nuclear response varied based on the target selected. Retaliation against
operational targets produced the best U.S. outcomes in the ght for Taiwan.
Operational: Just as with nuclear rst use, nuclear retaliation targeting enemy conventional forces
can achieve signicant operational eects. Among all options other than withdrawal, an operational
nuclear response is also often the least escalatory, especially if it does not threaten adversary
population centers or nuclear capabilities.
Such a response can signal that the responder wants the nuclear exchange to remain limited. Its
feasibility relies on having an operationally relevant target that is not on adversary territory. If
nuclear use had occurred early in the conict, Chinese amphibious ships o Taiwan would have
been an attractive target, but because destruction of this capability usually triggered Chinese
nuclear use, the amphibious eet was not available as a target in practice.
The lodgment on Taiwan was a compact target critical to Chinese operations. In the one game
(Game 5) the U.S. team retaliated against Chinese rst use by striking the Chinese lodgment on
Taiwan with nuclear weapons. The attack caused a near complete loss of China’s operational
capabilities on Taiwan and led to Chinese withdrawal from the campaign and a status quo ante
peace. However, this nuclear option for the United States would inevitably cause signicant
collateral damage to Taiwan.
The lodgment on Taiwan was a compact target that was critical
to Chinese operations.
Counterforce: Most U.S. teams considered a counterforce retaliation to Chinese rst use, aiming
to limit damage from further Chinese strikes by destroying a large portion of Chinese nuclear
warheads, delivery systems, and NC3.249 However, even when Chinese nuclear forces were targeted
with counterforce attacks (Games 6 and 11), the China teams retained enough nuclear capability
to launch nuclear counterattacks on the U.S. homeland. The China teams rode out the U.S.
counterforce attack and used their residual mobile ICBMs to coerce an advantageous outcome (PRC
Enclave) in both games. Thus, a counterforce retaliation to Chinese nuclear use did not produce
war-winning advantages for U.S. teams.250
Confronting Armageddon | 61
Countervalue: In contrast to the restraint of an operational retaliation, a countervalue retaliation
maximizes the resolve communicated to the adversary but also carries the highest likelihood of
adversary nuclear escalation. As cities are destroyed back and forth, it becomes harder to stop the
cycle because only committed adversaries will continue and the destruction creates animus on both
sides, even in a wargame. In all three games in which the U.S. team responded to the China team’s
rst use with countervalue attacks, the result was general strategic nuclear exchanges. In two of these
games, the U.S. teams targeted Chinese military facilities in cities. Although the U.S. team justied this
on military grounds, it caused massive civilian casualties. To the China teams, these civilian casualties
constituted a countervalue attack, regardless of how the U.S. teams might have conceived it.
Escalation to conagration after countervalue-countervalue retaliations might be due to the
articial nature of the game, in which players do not suer the real consequences of nuclear war. It
is possible that upon observing the actual eects of a countervalue retaliation, a nuclear rst user
would decide to exit the escalatory spiral and seek an o-ramp. Nevertheless, with all instances of
countervalue strikes ending in conagration, nuclear attacks on civilians appeared unlikely to lead
to a favorable outcome and highly likely to start an escalatory spiral that ended in a conagration.
With all instances of countervalue strikes ending in
conflagration, nuclear attacks on civilians appear unlikely to lead
to a favorable outcome and highly likely to start an escalatory
spiral that ends in a conflagration.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL
The wargames did not indicate a need for more or dierent nuclear weapons beyond those already
in current U.S. programs. Historically, China’s limited arsenal and readiness posture might have
allowed a disarming strike by the United States. However, the authors estimated that China’s nuclear
buildup precluded that possibility by 2028. Although China’s integrated air defense system required
U.S. nuclear responses to use stando weapons like ALCMs and low-yield SLBMs, there were
enough of these to conduct any desired U.S. nuclear response. Nor did U.S. teams express a belief
that an expanded strategic arsenal and the ability to inict more pain on China would have been
benecial. U.S. teams focused broadly on the benets and risks of nuclear use. The specic extent of
anticipated damage to the respective sides was not central to their calculations. No U.S. team asked
for more or dierent types of nuclear weapons during the game.
Gravity bombs were not used much. As with conventional attacks, both the U.S. and China teams
needed to deliver nuclear weapons with stando systems because of the adversary’s air defenses.
For U.S. teams, this put heavy demands on ALCMs and low-yield SLBMs in tactical usage. Players
rarely used bombs like the B61 because of the need for proximity to the target.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 62
Players also did not distinguish between the risks posed by varying magnitudes of countervalue attacks.
Within each of the game iterations, the China teams’ countervalue and second-strike capabilities varied
over time. At the start of each iteration, as the China teams’ nuclear forces were at low readiness, the U.S.
teams could plausibly have launched a damage-limiting counterforce strike that would have destroyed
most Chinese nuclear weapons. However, the China teams could still have launched a countervalue
second strike that would have destroyed around 1030 U.S. cities. The China teams’ ability to survive and
retaliate against a U.S. damage-limiting counterforce strike increased over time during most iterations as
China mated and dispersed more warheads. China’s ability to execute a countervalue retaliation against
a U.S. nuclear attack, therefore, varied between threatening tens of cities to hundreds.
However, no U.S. team believed that the certainty of losing 1030 cities to a nuclear attack was better
than continuing an uncertain conventional campaign. It is possible that a future U.S. president,
channeling the controversial nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, would be willing to embark on such a
damage-limiting rst strike at the outset of a war over Taiwan.251 There were no such players in these
games. Recognizing this, China teams were therefore not deterred by intra-game variations in the
eectiveness of U.S. counterforce options.252 To paraphrase McGeorge Bundy, in the real world of real
political leaders—whether in the United States or in China—a decision that brings even one hydrogen
bomb on one city of one’s own country would be considered a catastrophic blunder, 10 bombs on 10
cities would be a disaster beyond history, and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.253
How Did the Conflict End?
Gambling for resurrection with nuclear rst use led to a diverse and unforeseeable set of outcomes.
Depending on the adversary’s response, this gamble could pay o with a favorable outcome
(although not a total victory), lead to a conagration, or end somewhere in between. The status of
conventional forces was important in guiding outcomes; nuclear superiority was not. After nuclear
use, rm resolve and openness to o-ramps were critical to avoiding the worst outcomes.
Table 8: Hypotheses About Outcomes
Question Hypothesis Result
Does the status of conventional
forces matter to the outcome of a
nuclear exchange?
Battlefield advantage will convey
some benefit in shaping positive
outcomes to the side holding that
advantage.
Supported
Does nuclear superiority aect the
outcome of a nuclear conflict?
Nuclear superiority will be
important in bargaining outcomes.
Unsupported
Can nuclear wars be controlled? Nuclear wars cannot reliably be
controlled.
Supported
Can complete victories be
achieved?
Neither side will achieve complete
victory; a settlement will be reached,
or general nuclear war will occur.
Supported
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Confronting Armageddon | 63
THE STATUS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT SHAPES OUTCOMES AFTER
NUCLEAR USE
Political outcomes in the case of nuclear use reected not only diplomacy and nuclear
brinksmanship but also the nal balance of conventional forces. Even in games where the China
team began nuclear use, and the U.S. team was unwilling to respond in kind (e.g., Games 6, 9, 11,
and 13), negotiated settlements resulted in partial Chinese success (e.g., PRC Enclave) rather than
unconditional U.S. withdrawal from conict. This occurred because China teams could not quickly
occupy the remainder of Taiwan by the time they had resorted to nuclear use in weeks three or
four of the games. While these teams may have been motivated to avoid U.S. nuclear use (or further
use), they frequently also considered their weak battleeld position. China teams believed they
could make a deterrent demand of U.S. teams (“Stop the ghting in place”) but not a compellent
demand (“Taiwanese forces should surrender”). Similarly, when the U.S. team responded to
China’s rst use by launching tactical nuclear weapons against the Chinese lodgment in Game 5,
the near-complete destruction of Chinese forces ashore on Taiwan made any further demands by
the China team compellent demands, which are inherently less likely to succeed than deterrent
demands. The China team extracted an agreement from the U.S. team that it would not recognize
Taiwanese independence, thus returning to the prewar status quo ante. Overall, however, this was
an unfavorable outcome for China.
Political outcomes in the case of nuclear use reflected not only
diplomacy and nuclear brinksmanship but also the final balance
of conventional forces.
NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY DID NOT DRIVE BARGAINING
Just as the United States’ damage-limiting capabilities and quantitative nuclear superiority did
not deter China teams from nuclear use, so too nuclear superiority did not drive bargaining
outcomes. Game 5 saw the best scenario for U.S. damage limitation (a counterforce attack early in
the campaign before Chinese warhead dispersion against a Chinese low-yield-enabled posture).
However, the China team used a portion of its surviving warheads to coerce a U.S. withdrawal
from the conict. In general, the status of the conventional campaign, the employment of nuclear
weapons, and the threat of mutually destructive escalation shaped bargaining behavior, and neither
team considered the relative number of weapons as important to those dynamics.
NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT RELIABLY BE CONTROLLED
In support of the hypothesis, only some nuclear wars remained limited. “Gambling for
resurrection” was truly a roll of the nuclear dice, as some attempts were successful and others came
up as catastrophic snake eyes.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 64
Some China teams successfully employed limited nuclear attacks to coerce U.S. teams into
reversing the outcome of the conventional war. First use by China teams in three games (9, 11,
13) led to a favorable settlement (a PRC enclave on Taiwan) against U.S. teams unwilling to climb
the escalation ladder. In Game 9, the U.S. team attempted to continue the war conventionally but
later relented in the face of escalating Chinese threats. In Game 11, the U.S. team responded with
a nuclear counterforce attack, but the China team’s intransigence, even with a severely depleted
nuclear and conventional arsenal, led the U.S. team to accept an unfavorable settlement. Game 13
saw immediate U.S. acceptance of a PRC enclave in response to Chinese nuclear rst use. Nuclear
escalation, therefore, oered a conventionally defeated China the prospect of gambling for
resurrection by transforming the conict into a contest of resolve that, should the United States be
irresolute, could be kept limited.
However, nuclear use also risked creating an uncontrolled spiral that led to the worst outcome for
both sides: a nuclear conagration. In Games 2, 4, and 10, rst use by China teams led to a general
countervalue exchange with the United States that would have resulted in hundreds of millions of
Chinese civilians dying from the prompt eects and many more from delayed eects. Broad swathes
of China would be uninhabitable. This outcome was orders of magnitude worse than the losses from
a failed invasion attempt—both for the Chinese people and their leaders.
OFFRAMPS WERE NEEDED
Even after nuclear use, o-ramps remained critical to preventing uncontrolled escalation. As
discussed above, nuclear rst use by China could not compel the United States to withdraw
and could only deter continued U.S. intervention against a Chinese lodgment. There were also
cases of successful U.S. navigation of Chinese nuclear rst use that avoided U.S. withdrawal and
conagration.
First, if China teams resorted to demonstrations of HEMP, the U.S. teams could ignore the threat
and continue the conventional campaign in the face of Chinese rst use (Game 12). If the China team
was not committed to the extensive and escalatory nuclear use required to salvage its conventional
forces, then it had to accept an unfavorable settlement.
Alternatively, if the U.S. team responded to Chinese nuclear escalation by using nuclear weapons
against the Chinese lodgment (Game 5), then there was no way for the China team to continue
its invasion attempt; the invasion would fail while provoking the global opprobrium of starting
a nuclear war. Thus, nuclear rst use sometimes resulted in a settlement advantageous to the
United States, either through (1) a lack of Chinese resolve or (2) U.S. nuclear use against the
Chinese lodgment. However, both cases fell short of total U.S. victory: Even when the United
States destroyed the Chinese lodgment in retaliation for Chinese rst use, the China team
almost countered with continued nuclear use. Only a U.S. promise not to recognize Taiwanese
independence (game 5) prevented a continued nuclear exchange.
UNCERTAINTY AND THE NEED FOR ANALYTIC CAUTION
Nuclear use often produced results that surprised the team that rst employed nuclear weapons.
The considerations players believed might drive the other side often did not, and the beliefs and
Confronting Armageddon | 65
background of individual players were often as important in shaping outcomes as the structure
of the situation. Such human factors can never be fully predicted. However, the fact that three
games—all played by professionals with signicant expertise in regional and nuclear issues—resulted
in large-scale strategic nuclear exchanges and the “deaths” of hundreds of millions should provide
cause for circumspection.
Nuclear use oen produced results that surprised the team that
first employed nuclear weapons.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 66
8
Recommendations
The following recommendations build on the analysis of wargame results. The
recommendations aim to strengthen deterrence and better prepare the United States in
case nuclear weapons are used.
To Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence
Five recommendations aim to strengthen deterrence so that conict is less likely to occur: (1)
Prepare o-ramps for a conict with China, (2) do not preclude the U.S. military from striking the
Chinese mainland with conventional weapons, (3) do not pursue quantitative nuclear superiority
with the expectation that it will deter China from using nuclear weapons, (4) accustom U.S. military
and political leaders to the possibility of large initial losses in the event of a war with China, and (5)
continue extended deterrence messaging.
Prepare o-ramps for a conict with China.
As the greatest risk of nuclear rst use in a Taiwan scenario comes from Chinese leaders gambling
for resurrection, U.S. planners should study and prepare o-ramps beforehand. Total victory—
regime change, limits on Chinese armaments, war guilt, or the renunciation of sovereignty over
Taiwan—is unachievable in a nuclear environment. This was one of U.S. Attorney General Robert
Kennedy’s main takeaways from the Cuban Missile Crisis when he noted “the importance of placing
one’s self in the adversary’s shoes, of not humiliating him, and of leaving him a way out of the crisis
short of disaster for all parties.”254 A recent Atlantic Council project similarly concluded, “China may
Confronting Armageddon | 67
be open to a ‘face-saving’ resolution that would stave o a nuclear exchange.”255 This is compatible
with U.S. nuclear employment guidance: “[T]he United States seeks to end any conict at the lowest
level possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its allies and partners.”256 This
series of wargames provides analytic support for the guidance’s approach.
However, even a face-saving o-ramp requires some real concessions. The United States and its
coalition will not be inclined to make any concessions to an authoritarian regime that has just
launched an unsuccessful war of aggression against a democratic neighbor. Waiting until a bloody
war begins to think about potential face-saving o-ramps would risk emotions overwhelming
analysis. Further, time will be short, given how quickly nuclear events move. Armistice negotiations
in the last Sino-U.S. war took nearly two years, from October 25, 1951, to July 27, 1953. There would
not be that kind of time in any future war with China.
In thinking about o-ramps, it may be helpful to imagine the scene: A high-level White House
meeting is held two weeks after a Chinese invasion begins. The INDOPACOM commander briefs
over video: “Mister President, we have suered about 10,000 casualties and lost 25 percent of our
air force and two dozen ships, including two aircraft carriers. There is a humanitarian disaster
unfolding on Taiwan, and our Japanese allies have been struck hard by China’s missiles. However,
we assess that the Chinese forces on Taiwan are out of supplies and, according to reports, have
begun surrendering to Taiwanese forces.”
A similar meeting is playing out in the Central Military Commission bunker outside Beijing:
“Comrade chairman of the commission, our invasion force commander has been killed. His
commissar reports that supplies are short, and morale is low. Our joint theater commander says
that the only way to stabilize the situation is with nuclear weapons.” The party secretary turns to
the minister of foreign aairs: “What messages have we heard from the Americans?”
The United States should study beforehand what messages or terms would successfully terminate
the conict under terms that maintain U.S. interests but do not fuel Chinese temptation to gamble
on nuclear use.257 Some messages are likely to increase the temptation to resort to nuclear arms:
“Chairman, we have heard nothing, but the U.S. Congress has just voted to recognize Taiwanese
independence.” Others are likely to decrease the risks: “We have received a message via the
Indian ambassador that the United States and Taiwan are willing to agree to a ceasere and allow
our forces to withdraw, with all prisoners of war released.” As Brad Roberts points out, “There is
historical evidence pointing to the willingness of China’s leaders to accept military losses as long
as political points have been won.”258 China’s militarily unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam in 1979 is
an example. Research and wargaming are needed to conceptualize a settlement that oers China a
face-saving o-ramp while still accomplishing key U.S. and coalition goals.
Potential settlements must be acceptable to allies, partners, and domestic audiences, lest their
opposition derail negotiations. It would be tempting for the United States to give China concessions
that clash with allied interests—for example, agreeing that Japan should immediately and
permanently close its representative oce in Taiwan. Such a concession would be perfect from the
U.S. standpoint: highly visible, symbolic, face-saving for China, and costless for the United States.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 68
Japan might not see it the same way. During the Korean War, disagreement between the United
States and South Korea over the treatment of POWs was central to prolonging the war.259 A delay
caused by disagreement with the Taiwanese or Japanese government could be catastrophic in a war
where both sides are armed with nuclear weapons.
The study of o-ramps must therefore consider the relative valuation of concessions to the United
States, China, Taiwan, and U.S. allies. Selecting from the menu of concessions built by research and
wargaming would still require great diplomatic skill, but having such a menu ahead of time would
be far better than attempting to build it under the time constraints and duress of an ongoing war.
Do not preclude the U.S. military from striking the Chinese mainland with conventional
weapons in the event of war.
Conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland, such as attacks on Chinese amphibious ships in port
and Chinese airplanes at their airbases, could inict signicant damage while the ships and aircraft
are stationary and vulnerable. Even limited mainland strikes would inict virtual attrition on
Chinese forces by requiring them to divert forces to homeland defense.
The First Battle of the Next War noted the uncertainty of authorization for mainland strikes because
of escalation fears.260 This wargaming series suggests the escalation risks are lower than the
previous study and others believed. In the current study’s wargames, amphibious ships in port,
airbases, and command and control nodes were struck with conventional weapons in various
games. Neither Chinese concerns about attacks on the mainland nor inadvertent escalation caused
any China team to seriously consider nuclear rst use in response.
There are drawbacks to such U.S. attacks. Chinese air defenses, other demands on U.S. airpower,
and Chinese attacks on U.S. airbases would constrain the scale and frequency of mainland strikes.
Striking the Chinese mainland could incite Chinese domestic opinion, potentially prolonging the
war and reducing China’s restraint in its attacks on U.S. and allied territory. However, the risk of
nuclear retaliation by China seems to be lower than previously believed.
Nevertheless, authorization for such strikes would require a political decision at the highest levels
weighing potential benets against risks. Because of the uncertainty of this political decision,
military planners should develop branch plans and capabilities that are exible and capable of
achieving objectives with or without conventional mainland strikes.261 Force planners should keep
in mind the need for exibility: Force structure optimized for mainland attack may be less useful or
even useless if authorization is not granted.
Do not pursue quantitative nuclear superiority with the expectation that it will deter China
from using nuclear weapons.
Expanding the size of the U.S. nuclear inventory or the types of nuclear systems would not produce
a military or political advantage in this scenario. As with previous wargames at CNAS, players
in these games often believed that U.S. nuclear superiority would deter China from nuclear use.
Confronting Armageddon | 69
However, within this project’s 15 wargames, neither quantitative U.S. superiority nor damage-
limiting capabilities produced psychological advantages in deterrence or bargaining.
As long as China teams thought they possessed a secure second-strike capability, the balance of
nuclear power did not deter them from nuclear use. Both times that U.S. teams launched damage-
limiting counterforce attacks on China, China teams retained sucient nuclear weapons to retaliate
against the U.S. homeland, continue nuclear bargaining, and achieve a favorable (if incomplete)
settlement on Taiwan.
Accustom U.S. military and political leaders to the possibility of large initial losses in the
event of a war with China.
Part of preparing for rapid and eective policymaking during such a conict is psychologically
preparing for the scale of the ghting. U.S. military and political leaders should not panic because
of high early losses and take hasty and irreversible actions like accepting an adverse ceasere or
resorting to nuclear weapons. Historically, the United States has recovered from early defeats in
conventional war when cool heads prevailed in council.262
This preparation must take place at multiple levels, both domestically and with allies and partners.
For example, U.S. military planners should expect that China will attack communication and
intelligence platforms like SBIRS as part of a conventional campaign and not interpret such moves
as proof that China is inevitably moving toward nuclear rst use. U.S. war colleges should include in
their wargaming repertoires scenarios with high initial losses. Historical case studies should include
high-intensity conventional conicts that saw early setbacks and later recovery.
U.S. engagement with Taiwan should emphasize the time required for the United States to achieve
operational eects that would bring relief to Taiwan. Combined wargames would be one way to do
this. In the Monterey Talks and other engagements with Taiwan, the United States should share and
support policies that enhance resilience so that Taiwan can persevere through this interval.263
Continue extended deterrence messaging.
The United States should continue messaging its commitment to extended deterrence. Improving the
ability of allied (especially Japanese and Australian) political and military leaders to communicate on
pressing nuclear questions during crises and wartime will both reassure allies and demonstrate to
China that Washington takes its nuclear commitment to Japan and other allies seriously.
Regardless of how such discussions and preparations proceed, much uncertainty will continue to
surround the future nuclear order in northeast Asia. If, as conditions evolve, Tokyo and Washington
believe the political and military advantages of basing nuclear weapons in Japan exceed the
drawbacks, they should make such changes as part of routine peacetime posture adjustments.
Results of game iterations suggest that the United States and Japan should be cautious about doing
so during crisis or conict. Such moves during wartime could be seen in Beijing as preparation for a
nuclear attack from Japanese soil and might compromise the protections that extended deterrence
oers for that ally.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 70
To Prepare Should Nuclear Deterrence Fail
Although the U.S. aim is deterrence, the possibility of its failure cannot be dismissed. This section
lays out ve actions that will help bring about a favorable outcome for the United States while
reducing the length and severity of a conict involving nuclear weapons.
Develop nuclear branch plans for Chinese operational targets.
The United States should not start a nuclear conict by using nuclear weapons rst during a
Taiwan conict. Such use would have inevitably unpredictable (and potentially calamitous)
consequences. The U.S. and coalition conventional capabilities are strong and have a high
probability of prevailing over time.
If the United States decides to respond to Chinese nuclear rst use with nuclear weapons, then a
limited nuclear strike against Chinese operational forces is the best option. Other targeting had severe
downsides. Countervalue retaliations led to nuclear conagrations, damage-limiting counterforce
attacks led to Chinese attacks on the U.S. homeland, and HEMP detonations did not drive outcomes.
If the United States decides to respond to Chinese nuclear
use with nuclear weapons, then a limited nuclear strike against
Chinese operational forces is the best option.
Two operational targets were most favorable. If the Chinese amphibious eet still exists when China
initiates nuclear use, then the United States could launch a nuclear attack on the amphibious eet
moored o the coast of Taiwan. Such an attack would accomplish the broader strategic goals of
nuclear use (e.g., demonstrating resolve, reassuring allies), cripple Chinese military operations, and
minimize collateral damage. However, if the Chinese amphibious eet is essentially destroyed by the
time of Chinese nuclear escalation (as was always the case in the games), then a U.S. nuclear attack
on the Chinese lodgment would denitively end China’s ground operations.
STRATCOM should have branch plans to its main war plan that describe nuclear support to
conventional operations during a Taiwan scenario.264 The current nuclear employment stratey
discusses the importance of nonnuclear support of the nuclear deterrence mission, but planning
for nuclear support of the nonnuclear mission is just as critical.265 These plans will need extensive
interagency coordination, but it is far better to coordinate before a war rather than during a war.
Any attack aecting the territory of Taiwan would need to be coordinated with authorities there.
U.S. deterrence messaging in policy statements such as the INDOPACOM and U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) annual posture statements and public documents such as the NPR should
be clear about the eectiveness of possible U.S. responses to nuclear rst use by any adversary,
including China.
Confronting Armageddon | 71
Develop an understanding with Japan on the nuclear environment.
Because Japan had a critical role in supporting conventional operations against China, Japan
had a powerful (if unpredictable) inuence on U.S. nuclear decisionmaking.266 In some cases,
particularly prior to nuclear use, Japan teams were more forward leaning than U.S. teams and were,
for example, more inclined to strike targets on mainland China. Once nuclear use occurred, the
opposite pattern sometimes resulted. Several Japan teams asserted that they would withhold basing
access if Washington did not nd an o-ramp that would terminate the conict.
The United States and Japan should conduct joint analysis of nuclear escalation during Taiwan
invasion scenarios and discuss possible joint plans of action. DOD should sponsor collaborative
U.S.-Japan wargaming that would enhance mutual understanding of national perspectives in
nuclear deterrence and escalation scenarios. Such engagement should not be limited to Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces, as civilian ocials will likely have primary inuence on broader national security
policy once nuclear use occurs. It should also include individuals who serve (or who have served)
in political advisory capacities from the U.S. and Japanese think tank and academic communities.
More immediately, U.S. policymakers should be cautious in interpreting Japanese statements of
commitment to participation in a Taiwan scenario and whether that commitment would persist in
the face of nuclear threats or use.
Do not develop additional nuclear weapons for a conict with China beyond current
nuclear modernization plans.
U.S. teams did not feel constrained by the available nuclear delivery mechanisms. U.S. players
generally avoided using land-based ICBMs because of the necessity to overy Russia on the way
to China. However, they always found submarine- or air-launched nuclear weapons sucient
for retaliation against Chinese theater targets. At no point did players lament their inability to
access new or dierent nuclear weapons, like the SLCMN. Nor did China teams perceive any U.S.
constraints in delivery mechanisms when deciding to initiate nuclear use.
All this must be noted with appropriate caveats. The wargames modeled U.S. nuclear forces as being
modernized in accordance with the existing Future Years Defense Program. The results here therefore
do not support the cancellation of these eorts. Second, ndings on the suciency of the U.S. arsenal
apply only to deterring China in a Taiwan invasion scenario. A more diverse nuclear arsenal might be
needed for other contingencies or other actors. Players frequently discussed Russia’s possible actions
in this scenario, echoing other analyses that treat the two-peer nuclear problem.267
If the United States changes its planning guidelines for two simultaneous wars with China and
Russia, then more nuclear weapons might be required, especially if it envisions maintaining
damage-limiting counterforce capability for those scenarios.268 But developing new nuclear
weapons is both costly, taking resources away from conventional forces, and potentially
destabilizing, leading to arms racing and proliferation pressures for third countries. These costs and
risks, added to the lack of clear benets in the pacing U.S. scenario, mean that proposals for nuclear
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 72
expansion need to be accompanied by clearer explanations of what scenarios an expanded U.S.
nuclear arsenal would benet and discussions of potential negative externalities.
Rebalance nuclear inventories over time, from gravity bombs to air-launched cruise
missiles.
Although U.S. teams did not experience a lack of delivery options in this Taiwan invasion scenario,
it was evident that Chinese surface-to-air missile capabilities had made air delivery of gravity bombs
very dicult, even for stealthy platforms. Indeed, except for B2s during total counterforce attacks,
no U.S. team directed missions that used gravity bombs, opting instead for long-range missiles. The
United States should, therefore, plan to rebalance the air-delivered inventory with more LRSO-like
weapons and fewer nuclear gravity bombs.
Over time, the United States will need to extend the range and reduce the vulnerability of air-
delivered nuclear munitions to allow delivery in the face of increasingly sophisticated Chinese air
defenses. The United States does not have enough bombers and tactical nuclear missiles to sustain
heavy attrition to air defenses.
Work with China to facilitate mutual understanding about deterrence and the
unpredictability of nuclear escalation.
The United States should push for meaningful nuclear arms dialogue with China. Chinese
scholarship on nuclear deterrence is condent about China’s ability to manage nuclear escalation
during a conict.269 Such condence is misplaced. A common understanding of the language of
nuclear signaling and countries’ shared interests in avoiding and managing nuclear escalation is
critically important. China’s nuclear buildup ensures that the United States will be vulnerable to
Chinese nuclear attack, just as China has always been vulnerable to U.S. nuclear attack. China has
persistently asked the United States to acknowledge this mutual vulnerability.270 The PRC claims that
U.S. refusal to acknowledge mutual vulnerability has been a stumbling block in advancing nuclear
dialogue. Of course, it is unclear whether acknowledging mutual vulnerability would pave the way
for substantive discussions that reduce the likelihood of nuclear escalation during a conict. The
United States has concerns about the transparency and purpose of the Chinese nuclear buildup.
Track 1.5 discussions should explore what the United States could realistically expect from an
ocial acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability. Expanded nuclear talks might make progress on
these concerns, facilitate mutual understanding, and help prevent arms racing, crisis instability,
and ultimate catastrophe.
Confronting Armageddon | 73
Appendix A
Individual Game Descriptions
This section provides a brief record of each iteration, designated by location and sequence
number, and includes a summary of gameplay and the maximum extent of nuclear use. The
scenario is described in two ways: rst, by the U.S. ROEs (Max—all Chinese targets allowed;
Mid—only unambiguously nonnuclear Chinese targets allowed; or Min—no Chinese mainland or
SSBNs may be targeted); and, second, by the Chinese order of battle (ARFAssured Retaliation
Focused, with launch-on-warning capability, no low-yield weapons, and many missiles with single
warheads; or LYE—low-yield weapons with no launch-on-warning capability and many MIRV-
equipped missiles).
1. Naval Postgraduate School
▪Scenario: Max ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: China declined to substantially increase its nuclear readiness because it
believed that it would win conventionally and that the United States had superior nuclear
forces. A Chinese SSBN was sunk without provoking a reaction.
▪Outcome: Inconclusive
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: None
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 74
2. CSIS
▪Scenario: Max ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: Seeing conventional failure ahead, China attacked the Taiwanese leadership
bunker with nuclear weapons on D+12. On D+21, China threatened to use nuclear
weapons against Japan if Japan did not withdraw from the war. The United States
preemptively launched a nuclear attack on Ningbo; China responded with a general
countervalue attack.
▪Outcome: Conagration
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Countervalue
3. CSIS
▪Scenario: Max ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: Chinese conventional attacks on Alaska did not prompt U.S. nuclear
use. Chinese position on Taiwan deteriorated. On D+22, China accepted a PLA
phased withdrawal.
▪Outcome: PLA Phased Withdrawal
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: None
4. CSIS
▪Scenario: Mid ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: On DDay, China used a HEMP over Taiwan, to which the United States
responded in kind. On D+14, China attacked Taiwanese ground forces with nuclear
weapons. The United States responded with nuclear attacks on Chinese nuclear forces.
China responded with nuclear attacks against U.S. nuclear forces. The United States
responded with 10 countervalue attacks; a general countervalue exchange ensued.
▪Outcome: Conagration
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Countervalue
5. MIT
▪Scenario: Max ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: On D+31, China launched three strategic nuclear weapons against Taiwanese
ground forces. The United States responded with 10 tactical nuclear weapons against the
Chinese lodgment. China accepted the status quo ante but successfully insisted on no
Taiwanese independence.
▪Outcome: Status Quo Ante
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Operational use by both sides
Confronting Armageddon | 75
6. MIT
▪Scenario: Min ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: On D+8, the United States launched a general nuclear counterforce attack on
China. China responded with half of its surviving ICBMs launching counterforce attacks
on the United States and launched 35 low-yield nuclear weapons against Taiwanese
forces. China responded with half of its surviving ICBMs launching counterforce attacks
on the United States. China demanded a PRC enclave; the United States declined. China
attacked Honolulu with a nuclear weapon; the United States accepted the PRC enclave.
▪Outcome: PRC Enclave
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: U.S. counterforce use; China counterforce and
countervalue against Honolulu
7. MIT
▪Scenario: Max ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: On D+20, the United States oered a PRC enclave. Shaken by high early losses,
the United States saw itself losing a conventional battle and did not want to use nuclear
weapons. China accepted, believing its amphibious eet was about to be destroyed.
▪Outcome: PRC Enclave
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: None
8. Naval War College
▪Scenario: Min ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: On D+36, China accepted PLA phased withdrawal.
▪Outcome: PLA Phased Withdrawal
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: None
9. MIT
▪Scenario: Min ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: On D+36, China launched ve high-yield warheads against Taiwanese ground
forces and conducted a nuclear demonstration o Hawaii. Japan convinced a divided U.S.
team to accept a PRC enclave.
▪Outcome: PRC Enclave
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Chinese operational use
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 76
10. CSIS
▪Scenario: Mid ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: On D+21, China launched 50 nuclear weapons at U.S. surface ships
and destroyed a U.S. carrier strike group (CSG). The United States responded with
conventional strikes on Chinese early warning assets. China issued a 24-hour ultimatum to
the United States. After no response, China launched a full strategic countervalue attack
on the United States, and the United States retaliated in kind.
▪Outcome: Conagration
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Complete global countervalue
11. CSIS
▪Scenario: Mid ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: On D+10, the United States moved tactical nuclear bombs to Japan. On D+15,
China attacked all the air bases in Japan and many military targets on Taiwan with nuclear
weapons. The United States responded with SLBMs against xed ICBM sites; central
nuclear weapons storage; and NC3 nodes. China responded with direct-ascent weapons,
a cyberattack against the SBIRS, and nuclear weapons against Alaska and Hawaii. The
United States decided against further nuclear retaliation and accepted a PRC enclave.
▪Outcome: PRC Enclave
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: U.S. counterforce attacks; China used nuclear
weapons against Japan, Taiwan, Alaska, and Hawaii.
12. CSIS
▪Scenario: Mid ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: On D+22, China used a HEMP over the Pacic during the transit of a
B52 squadron, causing it to abort. The United States responded with conventional
hypersonic attacks against Chinese command and control nodes. China accepted a PLA
phased withdrawal.
▪Outcome: PLA Phased Withdrawal
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Single Chinese HEMP over the Pacic
13. CSIS
▪Scenario: Min ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: On D+15, China launched 19 low-yield nuclear weapons against Taiwanese
ground forces and a HEMP over the Pacic. The United States accepted a PRC enclave.
▪Outcome: PRC Enclave
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: Operational against Taiwan and demonstration
Confronting Armageddon | 77
14. MIT Endicott House
▪Scenario: Max ROE, China LYE
▪Summary: On DDay, China launched a HEMP over Taiwan. On D+25, China conducted
a nuclear test. The conventional campaign on Taiwan went badly for China, as its
amphibious eet was attrited. On D+30, China accepted a PLA phased withdrawal.
▪Outcome: PLA Phased Withdrawal
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: HEMP over Taiwan and nuclear test
15. MIT Endicott House
▪Scenario: Min ROE, China ARF
▪Summary: With a dwindling amphibious eet, China was unable to enlarge its lodgment
northwest of Taipei; on D+15, China accepted a PLA phased withdrawal.
▪Outcome: PLA Phased Withdrawal
▪Maximum extent of nuclear use: None
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 78
Appendix B
Summary of Nuclear Use
The table below lays out nuclear use for each game iteration. The type of nuclear use
is categorized as high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), operational use against
conventional forces (Op), counterforce (CF), or countervalue (CV).
Table B-1: Summary of Nuclear Use
Game
iteration
Nuclear
use
First
user
Type of
use
Location
of first
use
Nuke
response
Max
extent of
use
Outcome
1 No — — — — — Inconclusive
2 Yes China Op Taiwan Yes CV Conflagration
3 No — — — — — PLA Phased
Withdrawal
4 Yes China HEMP Taiwan Yes CV Conflagration
5 Yes China Op Taiwan Yes Op Status Quo
Ante
6 Yes U.S. CF China Yes CF, small
CV
PRC Enclave
7 No — — — — — PRC Enclave
Confronting Armageddon | 79
8 No — — — — — PLA Phased
Withdrawal
9 Yes China Op Taiwan,
plus demo
o Hawaii
No — PRC Enclave
10 Yes China Op CSG No,
conven-
tional
attack on
early warn-
ing
CV Conflagration
11 Yes China Op Japan/
Taiwan
Yes (CF) CV
(Alaska/
Hawaii)
PRC Enclave
12 Yes China HEMP B-52 in
flight
No HEMP PLA Phased
Withdrawal
13 Yes China Op Taiwan,
Pacific
No Op PRC Enclave
14 Yes China HEMP Taiwan No Op PLA Phased
Withdrawal
15 No — — — — — PLA Phased
Withdrawal
Source: CSIS Defense and Security Department.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 80
Appendix C
Nuclear Weapons Use and Eects
This appendix provides details on the use of nuclear weapons and their eects on ground forces, on
ships at sea, and on airelds.
Ground Forces: During the Cold War, the United States developed many systems for employing
nuclear weapons on the battleeld. Weapons ranged from the tactical Davy Crockett (range 1.25
miles, yield 0.02 kt) to the continent-spanning Pershing II (range 1,500 miles, yield 80 kt).271
The United States also developed doctrine for operating on a nuclear battleeld and applied the
doctrine in training exercises, even detonating nuclear weapons and having troops maneuver
through them. The Soviets similarly developed a wide range of tactical nuclear weapons.
The United States retired all ground-to-ground tactical nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War
but has retained air- and sea-delivered systems as described in Chapter 4: Research Design. Nuclear
weapons on the battleeld have three advantages. First, one weapon can have an outsized eect on
enemy forces because of its great power. Second, countries often develop nuclear weapons with a
wide range of yields that can be tailored to the needs of a particular target. Finally, battleeld use
has less eect on civilians than strategic attacks on cities or nuclear forces.
There are several disadvantages. The rst is that nuclear weapons will aect friendly forces as well
as adversaries. That means that friendly forces must be warned before a strike and, if possible,
pulled back. However, the adversary might pick up on this warning and make its own preparations.
Second, although troops in the open are very vulnerable, dug-in troops are relatively well protected,
and troops inside armored vehicles are extremely well protected. For example, a 10 kt burst air
Confronting Armageddon | 81
burst will inict 50 percent casualties on troops in the open to 2 km, on dug-in troops to 1 km, and
on troops in armored vehicles to just 0.5 km. The corollary to this is that to produce a signicant
battleeld advantage, an attacker needs to use a lot of nuclear weapons. Opening a 30 km gap in
a front defended by dug-in troops (a gap wide enough to prevent easy plugging by reserves and
reinforcements) requires fteen 10 kt weapons or ve 100 kt weapons.272
The nal disadvantage is casualties inicted on civilians. Although military forces are trained and
equipped to deal with nuclear attacks, civilians are not and will suer much higher casualties than
military forces. Table C1 shows estimated civilian casualties for nuclear detonations on Taiwan.
Even if cities are not targeted, civilian casualties would be high. A 10 kt weapon detonated in a
rural area would produce 4,800 casualties (cell highlighted). Fifteen 10 kt weapons would produce
72,000 casualties. Five 100 kt weapons would produce 113,000 casualties.
Table C-1: Estimated Civilian Casualties for Nuclear Detonations on Taiwan
Air Burst
PD (in
km2)1 kt 3 kt 10 kt 30 kt 100 kt 300 kt 1 MT 3 MT
Large
City:
Taipei
9,000 31177 64778 144,509 301,039 675,242 1,394,598 3,136,388 6,501,012
Medium
City:
Keelung,
Taoyuan
2,500 8,660 8,868 40,142 83,622 187,567 387,388 871,219 1,805,837
Small
City:
Taichung,
Penghu,
Tainan,
Kaoshun
1,000 3,464 7,198 16,057 33,449 75,027 154,955 348,488 722,335
Rural 300 1,039 2,159 4,817 10,035 22,508 46,487 104,546 216,700
Mountain 100 346 720 1,606 3,345 7,503 15,496 34,849 16,451
Note: PD = Population density in people per square kilometer.
Source: CSIS calculations based on nuclear lethality radii from Alex Wellerstein, “NukeMap,” NukeMap, https://nuclearsecrecy.
com/nukemap/. Taiwan population density based on “Population Density in Taiwan in 2023,” Statista, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/1317802/taiwan-population-density-by-region/; and census data published on websites of Taiwan’s provincial and special
municipal governments.
Ships at Sea: During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union deployed antiship
and antisubmarine nuclear weapons. This thinking, and the weapons to implement it, faded away
after the Cold War since conventional weapons were adequate for the naval threats that remained.
The rise of China as a great power with nuclear weapons has renewed interest.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 82
A key employment consideration is how near nuclear weapons must land to damage ships. Table
C2 shows these eects by weapon yield. The key insight from the table is how close a nuclear
detonation must be to a ship to cause signicant damage.
Table C-2: Eects on Ships by Nuclear Weapons Yield
10 kt 30 kt 100 kt 300 kt 1,000 kt
Lethal radius 250 m 400 m 600 m 850 m 1,300 m
Incapacitating
damage
500 m 800 m 1,200 m 1,700 m 2,600 m
Note: Lethal radius = sinking or in a sinking condition. Incapacitating damage = unable to continue missions without extensive
repairs.
Source: Crossroads test and DOD supplied data.
Because neither side has terminal guidance for nuclear weapons and uses GPS or inertial guidance
instead, a large shot pattern with many weapons is needed to cover all possible locations. Table
C3 combines the distance estimates from Table 2 with kill chain assumptions to show how many
nuclear weapons would be needed. The resulting numbers are very large, from 22 to 178.
Table C-3: Number of Nuclear Weapons Needed to Be Certain of Destroying Ships
at Sea
Time from Observation to Missile
Arrival at Targeted Point (“Kill Chain”)
30 minutes 60 minutes
1 km lethal radius SSPK = 0.011
89 warheads to cover
SSPK = 0.006
178 warheads to cover
2 km lethal radius SSPK = 0.045
22 warheads to cover
SSPK = 0.022
45 warheads to cover
Note: SSPK = single shot kill probability. Lethal radius depended on the type of ship and the yield of the nuclear weapon. In general,
weapons with 100 kt yields had a 1 km lethal radius, and those of 300 kt had a 2 km lethal radius, though the radius also depended
on ship type. Calculations assume: (1) target ships are traveling at 25 nautical miles per hour, plus or minus 5 knots; (2) ships are
zigzagging with alternating st arboard and port turns of 25 degrees, plus or minus 5 degrees; and (3) 30 or 60 minutes of elapsed
time from the last observed location of the target and the missile’s arrival at the targeted area (including analysis, communications,
command, launch preparation, and flight time). At 30 minutes, the number of warheads required would range from 22 to 89, at 60
minutes from 45 to 178.
Source: MIT calculations.
Airelds: Chapter 3 describes airelds as an attractive target. Table C4 shows the reason: Even
relatively small nuclear detonations are devastating for unprotected aircraft on the ground. For
example, a 10 kt detonation (column highlighted) will destroy nearly all aircraft, even at large air
bases where aircraft can spread out.273
Confronting Armageddon | 83
Table C-4: Nuclear Eects Against Aircra on Airbases (Percentage of Aircra
Destroyed)
Small Airbase
3 KT 10 KT 30 KT 100 KT 300 KT 1000 KT
Light A/C 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Heavy
A/C
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HAS 55% 90% 95% 100% 100% 100%
Medium Airbase
3 KT 10 KT 30 KT 100 KT 300 KT 1000 KT
Light A/C 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Heavy
A/C
95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HAS 40% 75% 85% 95% 100% 100%
Large Airbase
3 KT 10 KT 30 KT 100 KT 300 KT 1000 KT
Light A/C 60% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Heavy
A/C
90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HAS 25% 55% 70% 85% 100% 100%
Note: Assumed burst mode: Anti-infrastructure. HAS = hardened aircra shelter. Light A/C = light aircra-like fighters. Heavy A/C =
heavy aircra-like multiengine bombers and tankers.
Source: Provided by DOD based on calculations from its MINES model.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 84
Appendix D
Glossary
Assured Retaliation Focus: A postulated future Chinese nuclear force that has focused on
enhancing its ability to endure counterforce attacks.
China: The People’s Republic of China
Conagration: A general exchange of countervalue attacks.
Counterforce: An attack against the nuclear forces of an adversary. It is assumed to be made with
nuclear weapons, unless a “conventional counterforce” attack is specied.
Countervalue: An attack with nuclear weapons against the cities of an adversary. In this report,
this includes attacks against economic and military targets whereby the direct eects of nuclear
weapons would aect metropolitan areas.
Damage-limiting strike: A counterforce attack that will limit but not eliminate the nuclear
retaliatory capability of an adversary.
Disarming strike: A counterforce attack that is expected to eliminate the adversary’s nuclear
retaliatory capability.
Escalation: A change in nuclear posture or the use of nuclear weapons.
High-yield: For this game, nuclear weapons of 300 kilotons.
Confronting Armageddon | 85
Infrastructure targeting: A more sophisticated formulation of countervalue targeting that
proposes to target an adversary’s infrastructure, ranging from remote sites causing few civilians
deaths to society-destroying target sets. For the purposes of this report, it is subsumed into
countervalue targeting.
Low-yield: There is no generally accepted denition.274 For this game, nuclear weapons of 30 kt.
Note that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of ~15 kt and ~20 kt, respectively.
Low-yield enabled: Refers to a postulated future Chinese nuclear force that has focused on
becoming more like the United States, particularly in the acquisition of low-yield nuclear weapons.
This posture still gives China a secure second strike, although that second strike is not as potent as
in the alternate posture.
Operational nuclear use: An attack with nuclear weapons against the conventional forces of an
adversary.
Retaliation: A nuclear attack launched in response to nuclear rst use.
Secure second strike: The ability of a country’s nuclear forces to endure an adversary’s
counterforce rst strike (so that the adversary’s attack is only damage-limiting and not disarming).
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 86
About the Authors
Mark Cancian (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He joined CSIS in
April 2015 from the Oce of Management and Budget, where he spent more than seven years as
chief of the Force Structure and Investment Division. Previously, he worked on force structure and
acquisition issues in the Oce of the Secretary of Defense and ran research and executive programs
at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. In the military, Colonel Cancian spent over
three decades in the U.S. Marine Corps, active and reserve, serving as an infantry, artillery, and civil
aairs ocer and on overseas tours in Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq (twice). Since 2000, he has
been an adjunct faculty member at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
where he teaches a course on the connection between policy and analysis. A prolic author, he has
published over a dozen CSIS research reports and 40 articles on military operations, acquisition,
budgets, and stratey and has received numerous writing awards. He graduated with high honors
(magna cum laude) from Harvard College and with highest honors (Baker Scholar) from Harvard
Business School.
Matthew Cancian is an associate professor at the Naval War College, specializing in conducting
wargames. He earned a PhD in political science from MIT, where he concentrated in security
studies and comparative politics. His thesis was about the motivations of combatants and the
eects of training, based on a survey of 2,301 Kurdish ghters (Peshmerga) during their war
against the Islamic State. Before attending MIT, he earned a master of arts in law and diplomacy
from the Fletcher School and a bachelor of arts in history from the University of Virginia. Between
those educational experiences, he served as a U.S. Marine Corps captain, deploying to Sangin,
Afghanistan, as a forward observer in 2011 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Eric Heginbotham is a principal research scientist at the MIT Center for International Studies
and a specialist in Asian security issues. Before joining MIT, he was a senior political scientist at
the RAND Corporation, where he was the lead author of China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent and
The U.S.-China Military Scorecard. He participated in ve iterations of DTRA’s Track 1.5 U.S.-China
Strategic Dialogue and iterations of the Track 1.5 U.S.-Australia Indo-Pacic Deterrence Dialogue.
He is the coauthor (with George Gilboy) of Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power
and Alarm (Cambridge University Press, 2012) and is an editor of China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major
Power Engagement with the Developing World (Routledge, 2018). Before that, he was a senior fellow
of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. After graduating from Swarthmore College,
Heginbotham earned his PhD in political science from MIT. He is uent in Chinese and Japanese and
was a captain in the U.S. Army Reserve.
Confronting Armageddon | 87
Endnotes
1 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: DOD, 2022), 8, https://
media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022NATIONALDEFENSESTRATEGYNPRMDR.
PDF. The 2018 NPR had similar language.
2 Gregory Weaver focuses on the possibility that a United States already at war with Russia (or another
power) might be forced to use nuclear weapons against a Chinese invasion. See Gregory Weaver,
“The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” Atlantic Council, November 2023, 12, https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-role-of-nuclear-weapons-in-a-
taiwan-crisis/. Matthew Kroenig has the most thorough study of nuclear use in this scenario, although
he leaves ambiguous the reason why the United States might fail to defeat an invasion with solely
conventional means. See Matthew Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use in a War Over Taiwan: Scenarios and
Considerations for the United States (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, November 2023), 10, https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/deliberate-nuclear-use-in-a-war-over-
taiwan-scenarios-and-considerations-for-the-united-states/. The Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States also saw a role for nuclear weapons in a conventional conict, to
“compensate for any shortfall in US and allied non-nuclear capabilities in a sequential or simultaneous
two-theater conict against Russia and China.” Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States,America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States(Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, October 2023), viii, 2630,https://
armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/les/Strategic-Posture-Committee-
Report-Final.pdf.
3 Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming
a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2023), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rst-
battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
4 As recently argued in Jacob L. Heim, Zachary Burdette, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “U.S.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 88
Military Theories of Victory for a War with the People’s Republic of China,” RAND Corporation, February
21, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA17431.html.
5 For a holistic review of United States policy toward Taiwan, see: “Taiwan Policy Database,” Asia Society,
accessed November 12, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/taiwan-policy-database.
6 Fiona S. Cunningham, “The Unknowns about China’s Nuclear Modernization Program,” Arms Control
Today, June 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/202306/features/unknowns-about-chinas-nuclear-
modernization-program.
7 On early characterizations of Chinese deterrence policy, see Michael S. Chase, “China’s Transition to a
More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States,” Asia Policy 16 (July
2013): 69102, https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-transition-to-a-more-credible-nuclear-deterrent-
implications-and-challenges-for-the-united-states/.
8 Sun Xiangli, 核时代的战略选择: 中国核战略问题是研究 [Strategic Choices in the Nuclear Era: Research
on Issues in China’s Nuclear Stratey] (Beijing: China Academy of Engineering Physics Research Center,
2013).
9 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and
U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 750, https://doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00215.
10 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (March 2023): 10833, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713.
11 “China Continues Rapid Growth of Nuclear Power Capacity,” U.S. Enery Information Administration,
May 6, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenery/detail.php?id=61927; and Hui Zhang, “China Started
Operation of Its First CFR600 Breeder Reactor,” International Panel on Fissile Material, December 15,
2023, https://ssilematerials.org/blog/2023/12/china_started_operation_o.html.
12 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2023 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2023), viii, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-
MILITARYANDSECURITYDEVELOPMENTSINVOLVINGTHEPEOPLESREPUBLICOFCHINA.PDF.
13 This section draws heavily on David C. Logan and Phillip C. Saunders, Discerning the Drivers of China’s
Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data, China Strategic Perspectives 18 (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/3471053/discerning-
the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/.
14 Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue: Phase VIII Report
(Monterey, CA: PASCC, December 2014), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA619699.
15 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,”
International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 744, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.7. See also M. Taylor
Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear
Stratey and Force Structure,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 4887, https://doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00016.
16 In Chinese names, this paper follows the convention of using family name rst and given name second
(except in cases where the individual lives outside of China or is known in the West primarily for their
work in English). For example, in the name Sun Xiangli, Sun is the family name.
17 See David Shambaugh, “China’s Long March to Global Power,” in China and the World, ed. David
Shambaugh (New York: Oxford, 2020), 324, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190062316.003.0001.
18 “陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行: 习近平向中国人民解放军陆军火箭军战略支援部队
Confronting Armageddon | 89
授予军旗并致训词” [Meeting to establish the PLA Army General Command, Rocket Force, and Strategic
Support Group held in Beijing: Xi Jinping confers ag and makes address], People’s Daily, January 2,
2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0102/c6409428003839.html.
19 Shou Xiaosong, 战略学 [The Science of Military Stratey] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press,
2013), 148, https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/sms-2013.pdf.
20 “环球时报：中国需要多少枚核弹才够” [Huanqiu Shibao: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does China Need],
Sina, December 18, 2014, https://news.sina.cn/pl/20141218/detail-icczmvun2945942.d.html?from=wap.
21 Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence,
Counterforce, and Nuclear Stratey,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 12 (February 2015): 3873,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150.
22 The popular Chinese media reports regularly on U.S. statements. See, for example, “美智库喊话用核武
器保卫台湾，台湾专家警告：除非美国也想吃核弹” [U.S. think tank shouts about using nuclear weapons
to protect Taiwan: Taiwan specialist warns, “not unless the U.S. wants to eat warheads also”], Tencent,
August 5, 2024, https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20240805A07DPR00. See also, U.S. Department of Defense,
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022 (Washington, DC: DOD,
2022), 98, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022MILITARYANDSECURITY-
DEVELOPMENTSINVOLVINGTHEPEOPLESREPUBLICOFCHINA.PDF.
23 Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner, “The Meaning of China’s Nuclear Modernization,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 46, no. 67 (2023): 111648, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2212871. See also
Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled
Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” International Security 47, no. 4 (2023): 14787,
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00457.
24 Tong Zhao, Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-China Nuclear
Relations and International Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2024),
https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/les/Zhao_Political%20Drivers_nal-2024.
pdf; and Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, and Christopher P. Twomey, “Of Bombs and Bureaucrats:
Internal Drivers of Nuclear Force Building in China and the United States,” Journal of Contemporary
China 28, no. 118 (2019): 53857, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1557945.
25 Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, March 2017), xii, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html.
26 See comments by Zhu Chenghu and Shen Dingli in Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens Use
of ABombs If U.S. Intrudes,” New York Times, July 15, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/
washington/world/chinese-general-threatens-use-of-abombs-if-us-intrudes.html; and U.S. Department of
Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2008), 28, https://
nuke.fas.org/guide/china/dod-2008.pdf.
27 Bruce M. Sugden, “A Primer on Analyzing Nuclear Competitions,” Texas National Security Review 2, no.
3 (May 2019): 10426, http://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/2925; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of
the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), 103;
Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Stratey: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (New York:
Oxford Academic Books, 2018), 10; and DOD, Military and Security Developments 2023, 106.
28 Hsiao-Huang Shu, “China’s Missile Defense Capability,” in 2021 Report on the Defense Technoloy Trend
Assessment, ed. Tzu-Yun Su and Jui-Min Hung (Taipei: INDSR, 2021), 7980, https://indsr.org.tw/uploads/
enindsr/les/202206/fe289bec-3b2f-43ab-b2b60aa5cedac64f.pdf.
29 DOD, Military and Security Developments 2022, 106.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 90
30 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “Chinese Nuclear
Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 1 ( January 2024): 62, https://doi.
org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206.
31 Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” 111.
32 Yu Jixun ed., 第二炮兵战役学 [The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004),
3068.
33 Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent.
34 DOD, Military and Security Developments 2023, 111.
35 For example, China reportedly developed enhanced radiation (or neutron) weapons in 1988. It was
capable of MIRVing missiles long before it did and could have deployed a nuclear-armed cruise missile
years ago. Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, 100.
36 Fravel and Cunningham argue for a relatively defensive view of Chinese military modernization and,
consequently, are relatively sanguine about its implications, though they acknowledge ambiguity.
Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” 3250.
37 As rst elucidated in Glenn Herald Snyder, The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror (San Francisco:
Chandler, 1965).
38 See, for example, Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why China Wants More and Better Nukes,”
Foreign Aairs, November 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaairs.com/china/why-china-wants-more-and-
better-nukes; see also comments by STRATCOM commander Adm. Charles Richard, cited in Aaron
Mehta, “STRATCOM Chief Warns Of Chinese ‘Strategic Breakout’,” Breaking Defense, August 12, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/stratcom-chief-warns-of-chinese-strategic-breakout/.
39 Taiwan has been central to Beijing’s discussions of “core national interests” since the term was rst
applied to China’s foreign policy interests during the early 2000s. See Michael D. Swaine, “China’s
Assertive Behavior, Part One: On ‘Core Interests’,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, Winter 2011,
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/les/uploads/documents/CLM34MS.pdf.
40 Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens.”
41 DOD, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, 28.
42 Hearing on China’s Nuclear Forces, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., (2021) (statement of Dr. Christopher P. Twomey, Associate Professor of National Security
Aairs, Naval Postgraduate School), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/les/202106/Christopher_
Twomey_Testimony.pdf; and David O. Shullman et al., Adapting US Stratey to Account for China’s
Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2024), https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/adapting-us-stratey-to-account-for-chinas-
transformation-into-a-peer-nuclear-power/.
43 Hearing on China and the 2021 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Brad Roberts, Director of the Center for Global
Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
les/202106/Brad_Roberts_Testimony.pdf.
44 Ibid.
45 Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 2
(2024): 11845, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2314437; DOD, Military and Security Developments
2022; and DOD, Military and Security Developments 2023.
Confronting Armageddon | 91
46 See, for example, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s
Strategic Posture; Robert Peters, A Nuclear Posture Review for the Next Administration: Building the Nuclear
Arsenal of the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, July 2024), https://www.heritage.org/
defense/report/nuclear-posture-review-the-next-administration-building-the-nuclear-arsenal-the-21st;
and Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf, Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control in a Two-
Nuclear-Peer Environment (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2024), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
in-depth-research-reports/report/requirements-for-nuclear-deterrence-and-arms-control-in-a-two-peer-
nuclear-peer-environment/.
47 Although this is not necessarily the only possibility in a scenario of two simultaneous wars, the idea of
compensating for conventional weakness would imply rst use against an adversary winning a nuclear
conict. Weaver and Woolf come close to stating this explicitly when they write, “If the United States
and its allies and partners cannot (or will not) maintain conventional superiority in a second theater
conict, deterring or defeating opportunistic or collaborative aggression will require reliance on nuclear
weapons to counter adversary conventional superiority.” Weaver and Woolf, Requirements for Nuclear
Deterrence, 10.
48 See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, “The Case for Tactical U.S. Nukes,” Wall Street Journal, January 24,
2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-tactical-u-s-nukes-1516836395.
49 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture, viii, 49.
50 Peters, A Nuclear Posture Review.
51 Eric Gomez, “SLCMN: Necessary or Excessive,” CBNW Magazine, April 23, 2023, https://www.cato.org/
commentary/slcm-n-necessary-or-excessive.
52 Anya L. Fink, “Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCMN),” Congressional Research Service,
IF12084, October 17, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25239430/nuclear-armed-sea-
launched-cruise-missile.pdf.
53 Tara Drozdenko, “Why the Congressional Strategic Posture Report Is Not about Nuclear Deterrence, but
Warghting,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 8, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/11/why-the-
congressional-strategic-posture-report-is-not-about-nuclear-deterrence-but-warghting/.
54 Congressional Budget Oce, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2023 to 2032 (Washington, DC: CBO,
July 2023), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59365.
55 Two DOD documents describe the Biden administration’s nuclear modernization program, which
diered in minor ways from the Trump administration’s program: DOD, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,
2022; and Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / Chief Financial Ocer, Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request (Washington, DC:
DOD, March 2024), 2223, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/deudget/FY2025/
FY2025_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For a consolidated enumeration, see Xiaodon Liang, “U.S.
Nuclear Modernization Programs,” Arms Control Association, August 2024, https://www.armscontrol.
org/factsheets/us-modernization-2024-update.
56 Center for Global Security Research, China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for
U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Stratey (Livermore, CA: CGSR, Spring 2023), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/
assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf; Weaver and Woolf, Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence; and
Christopher P. Twomey, “Dangerous Dynamism in Asia’s Nuclear Future,” Asia Policy 19 (2015): 24,
https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2015.0004.
57 Charles L. Glaser, James M. Acton, and Steve Fetter, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Can Deter Both China
and Russia,” Foreign Aairs, October 5, 2023, https://www.foreignaairs.com/united-states/us-nuclear-
arsenal-can-deter-both-china-and-russia.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 92
58 The White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association
(ACA) Annual Forum,” press release, June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieng-room/speeches-
remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-
aca-annual-forum/.
59 President of the United States, National Security Stratey of the United States of America (Washington,
DC: White House, December 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
NSSFinal-121820170905.pdf; Andrew Clevenger “‘Great Power Competition Has Returned,’ Says
DEPSECDEF,” C4ISRNET, November 23, 2015, https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2015/11/23/great-
power-competition-has-returned-says-depsecdef/; and Max Fisher, “The New Era of Great Power
Competition,” Vox, April 13, 2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/4/13/11421352/ash-carter-deterrence-
power-competition.
60 Bernard Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute
of International Studies, 1946).
61 John T. Correll, “The Making of MAD,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, July 27, 2018, https://www.
airandspaceforces.com/article/the-making-of-mad/.
62 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 2.
63 Ibid., 46. See also Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Stratey (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1984).
64 Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, 1625.
65 Ibid., 2530. For similar arguments, see Brendan Rittenhouse Green, The Revolution That Failed: Nuclear
Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
66 Charles L. Glaser, “Nuclear Revolution Theory Marches Forward,” in Book Review Roundtable: The
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution 30 Years Later, ed. Francis J. Gavin (Austin, TX: Texas National Security
Review, April 2020), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-the-meaning-of-the-nuclear-
revolution-30-years-later/#essay3.
67 Nina Tannenwald has been a forceful proponent, though many others have discussed the concept. Nina
Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use,”
International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 43368, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550959.
68 T.V. Paul, “Taboo or Tradition? The Non-use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics,” Review of
International Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2010): 85363, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001336.
69 Scott D. Sagan and Jane Vaynman, “Introduction: Reviewing the Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation
Review 18, no. 1 (March 2011): 1737, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2011.549169; and Caitlin Talmadge,
Lisa Michelini, and Vipin Narang, “When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Adversary Perceptions of
Nuclear No-First-Use Pledges,” International Security 48, no. 4 (Spring 2024): 746, https://doi.org/10.1162/
isec_a_00482.
70 Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, 117.
71 Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think
about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer
2017): 4179, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00284.
72 Joshua A. Schwartz, “When Foreign Countries Push the Button,” International Security 48, no. 4
(Spring 2024): 4786, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00483; Chanwook Ju and Joshua Byun, “Under
No Circumstances? What the Chinese Really Think about the Wartime Use of Nuclear Weapons,”
Confronting Armageddon | 93
International Studies Quarterly 68, no. 2 (June 2024): 113, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae037; and
Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco, “I Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too”: Experimental
Evidence on Russian Public Support for Nuclear Use after the Invasion of Ukraine (Rochester, NY: SSRN,
September 2024), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4906365.
73 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991). For a review of these issues, see Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?
Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,”
International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 5092, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.
74 In the case of the DF21, some brigades are equipped with conventionally armed warheads, while in
other brigades similar missiles are equipped with nuclear warheads. In a second case, the DF26, the
warheads on individual missiles may be either nuclear or conventional, and the two may be exchanged
as requirements demand. P. W. Singer and Ma Xiu, “China’s Ambiguous Missile Stratey Is Risky,”
Popular Science, May 11, 2020, https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/china-
nuclear-conventional-missiles/; Ankit Panda, “China’s Dual-Capable Missiles: A Dangerous Feature, Not
a Bug,” The Diplomat, May 13, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/chinas-dual-capable-missiles-
a-dangerous-feature-not-a-bug/; and Matthew Kroenig and Mark J. Massa, Are Dual-Capable Weapon
Systems Destabilizing? Questioning Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement and Inadvertent Escalation
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, June 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-
reports/ issue-brief/are-dual-capable-weapon-systems-destabilizing/.
75 See Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” 4041. In addition, a former commander of
U.S. Pacic Command argues that such inadvertent escalation is unlikely because the United States will
be careful to avoid striking Chinese nuclear forces. See also Dennis C. Blair, “Would China Go Nuclear?,”
Foreign Aairs, December 11, 2018, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/china/20181211/would-
china-go-nuclear; Amitai Etzioni “The Air-Sea Battle ‘Concept’: A Critique,” International Politics 51, no. 5
(2014): 63441, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.27; and Joshua Rovner, “Three Paths to Nuclear Escalation
with China,” National Interest, July 19, 2012, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/three-paths-
nuclear-escalation-china-7216.
76 James M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), https://carnegieendowment.
org/research/2014/11/silver-bullet-asking-the-right-questions-about-conventional-prompt-global-
strike?lang=en; and Pavel Podvig, “Blurring the Line between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons:
Increasing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 3 (May 3, 2016):
14549, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170363.
77 Participant notes from Eric Heginbotham, “Chinese Nuclear Policy/Posture (and US Concerns),”
(discussion, 11th U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Maui, Hawaii, June 17, 2019).
78 Teams are referred to as “China teams” and “Japan teams” rather than “Chinese teams” and
Japanese teams” to avoid any implication that the teams were ethnically Chinese or Japanese.
79 For commentary on the risks of mainland strikes, see John Speed Meyers, “The Real Problem with
Strikes on Mainland China,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/the-
real-problem-with-strikes-on-mainland-china/; and Dehlia Anne Goldfeld et al., Denial Without Disaster:
Keeping a U.S.-China Conict Over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold, Vol. 1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA23121.html.
80 See the discussion of trade-os with regard to targeting in Andrew Metrick, Rolling the Iron Dice: The
Increasing Chance of Conict Protraction (Washington, DC: CNAS, November 2023), https://www.cnas.
org/publications/reports/rolling-the-iron-dice.
81 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 94
Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May
2010), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
82 This risk was noted as early as 1999. See Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., The United States and a Rising China:
Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 47, https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1082.pdf.
83 John Speed Meyers, Planning War with a Nuclear China: US Military Stratey and Mainland Strikes
(Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2023).
84 See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Stratey (London: Macmillan, 1989); and Beatrice
Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 19492000
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997).
85 “Gambling for resurrection” is a political science term of art meaning to take high-risk actions to restore
a deteriorating political, diplomatic, or, in this case, military situation. For the initial theorizing of
gambling for resurrection, see George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, “Conict, Agency, and Gambling
for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no.
2 (May 1994): 36280, https://doi.org/10.2307/2111408.
86 Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, 103; Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The
Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 (April 2013):
8889, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24480620; and Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens.”
87 Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 10.
88 DOD, Military and Security Developments 2023. The wording is confusing since it is really discussing
“compellence” rather than “deterrence.”
89 China experts and retired ocials, discussions with author, September 9, 2024.
90 The Maritime Stratey: Global Maritime Elements for U.S. National Stratey, 1985, as reprinted in John B.
Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., U.S. Naval Stratey in the 1980s: Selected Documents, Naval War
College Newport Papers 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2008): 198, https://digital-
commons.usnwc.edu/newport-papers/21/.
91 Global Zero, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Stratey, Force
Structure and Posture (Washington, DC: Global Zero, May 2012), 11, https://www.globalzero.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf.
92 Eli Sanchez, “Conventional Precision-Guided Hypersonic Weapons: An Unconventional Threat to
Strategic Stability,” (PhD thesis, MIT, 2024), https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155606; and Justin Katz,
“Navy Seeks $3.6 Billion over 5 Years for 64 Hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike Rounds,” Breaking
Defense, March 22, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/navy-seeks-36-billion-over-5-years-for-
64-hypersonic-conventional-prompt-strike-rounds/.
93 Matthew Harris, “Rig for Sea: Countering the Deployment of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines,”
Comparative Stratey 35, no. 5 (2016): 351, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1240972. See also
Christopher McConnaughy, “China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?,” in
China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, eds. Andrew S. Erickson et al. (New York: Naval Institute Press,
2012), 77113.
94 The analyst who addresses the risks most directly is Tong Zhao. See Tong Zhao, Tides of Change: China’s
Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Strategic Stability (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2018), 3550, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/10/tides-of-change-
chinas-nuclear-ballistic-missile-submarines-and-strategic-stability?lang=en.
Confronting Armageddon | 95
95 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (Winter
197980): 618, https://doi.org/10.2307/2149629; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United
States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. National Stratey toward China,” International Security
41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 5253, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00248; Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and
Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution
(Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); and Gregory Giles, Christine Cleary, and Michele
Ledgerwood, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Research (Fort Belvoir, VA: DTRA, May 2003), https://apps.
dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA460103.
96 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld,
1989). For other arguments against accepting mutual vulnerability, see Richard Perle, “Mutually Assured
Destruction as a Strategic Policy,” American Journal of International Law 67, no. 5 (November 1973):
3940, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0002930000264555.
97 Glaser and Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD?,” 5253.
98 See letter by Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long and letter by Matthew Kroenig in Charles L.
Glaser and Steve Fetter, “The Limits of Damage Limitation,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer
2017): 193207, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_c_00279.
99 DOD, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 4.
100 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,America’s Strategic Posture.
101 CGSR, China’s Emergence.
102 Glaser and Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD?,” 5253; Goldstein, Deterrence and Security;
and Giles, Cleary, and Ledgerwood, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Research.
103 Lauren Sukin, “When Nuclear Superiority Isn’t Superior: Revisiting the Nuclear Balance of Power,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 17, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.
org/research/2023/10/when-nuclear-superiority-isnt-superior-revisiting-the-nuclear-balance-of-
power?lang=en.
104 Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger Says Idea of Supremacy Makes No Sense in a Nuclear Age,” New York
Times, January 11, 1977, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/01/11/archives/kissinger-says-idea-of-supremacy-
makes-no-sense-in-a-nuclear-age.html.
105 Elbridge Colby, “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War,” Foreign Aairs, October 15, 2018, https://
www.foreignaairs.com/articles/china/20181015/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war.
106 Kroenig, Logic of American Nuclear Stratey. See also Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, “How to Think
about Nuclear Crises,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 2 (February 2019): 4064, http://doi.
org/10.26153/tsw/1944.
107 For example, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2021, Senator Tom Cotton asked
Admiral Philip S. Davidson whether “China, unconstrained by this treaty, if they triple or quadruple their
stockpile, could possibly have nuclear overmatch against the United States before the end of this decade.
Is that correct?” Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Indo-Pacic Command in Review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program, Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021) (statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander of U.S.
Indo-Pacic Command), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2110_03092021.pdf.
108 Stacie Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis, Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend
Taiwan (Washington, DC: CNAS, February 2023), 6, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/avoiding-
the-brink.
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109 Ivan Safranchuk, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective,” in Tactical
Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security, ed. Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2003), 53.
110 Kristensen, Korda, Johns, and Knight, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024.”
111 Fiona S. Cunningham, “The Unknown about China’s Nuclear Modernization Program,” Arms Control
Association, June 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/202306/features/unknowns-about-chinas-
nuclear-modernization-program; and Logan and Saunders, Discerning the Drivers, 2, 31.
112 Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Must Prepare for War with Both Russia and China,” Foreign Policy,
February 18, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/us-russia-china-war-nato-quadrilateral-security-
dialogue/.
113 Andrew Metrick, Philip Sheers, and Stacie Pettyjohn, Over the Brink: Escalation Management in a
Protracted War (Washington, DC: CNAS, August 2024), 4, 13, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/
over-the-brink.
114 During the Cold War, Thomas Schelling, Thornton Read, and Herman Kahn, among others, employed
these concepts.
115 For an in-depth treatment of the evidence on Japanese decisionmaking, see Richard B. Frank, Downfall:
The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin, 2001).
116 Charles L. Glaser, James M. Acton, and Steve Fetter, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Can Deter Both China
and Russia,” Foreign Aairs, October 5, 2023, https://www.foreignaairs.com/united-states/us-nuclear-
arsenal-can-deter-both-china-and-russia.
117 Hermann Kahn (in his usual style) asserts that, “experts [cannot] be expected to repeat, ‘If, heaven
forbid . . .,’ before every sentence.” Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon
Press, 1962), 37.
118 For a discussion of the evolution of U.S. targeting policy in the Cold War, see Jerey Richelson,
“Population Targeting and U.S. Strategic Doctrine” in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Jerey Richelson
and Desmond Ball, 1st ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).
119 Dahlia Anne Goldfeld et al., Denial Without Disaster: Keeping a U.S.-China Conict over Taiwan Under
the Nuclear Threshold, vol. 1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024), 3, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_
reports/RRA23123.html.
120 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, “Memorandum of Conversation with George Marshall,” May
29, 1945, Declassied Document, https://nsarchive.wu.edu/document/28518-document-17-assistant-
secretary-war-john-j-mccloy-memorandum-conversation-general.
121 In 1952, the United States began production of two types of lower-yield nuclear weapons: the Mark
7 nuclear bomb (to be dropped by large aircraft) and the W9 nuclear shell (to be red by 280 mm
howitzers). During the 1950s, the United States and NATO were keen to use tactical nuclear weapons
to compensate for conventional weakness and, later, to make nuclear threats more credible. At the
height of the Cold War, NATO deployed some 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons, with yields as low as 0.1
kt, on European territory. The Soviets lagged somewhat in deploying nuclear weapons but responded
to the stratey of exible response by deploying large numbers of its own tactical nuclear weapons and
integrating them with conventional warghting doctrines.
122 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Stratey, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),
101111.
123 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 99124.
Confronting Armageddon | 97
124 Heather Williams, “Why Russia is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine Now,” CSIS, Commentary, September
27, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-changing-its-nuclear-doctrine-now.
125 It is worth noting from the table that hardened shelters (HASs) greatly increase aircraft survivability. The
First Battle of the Next War report emphasized this as a recommendation in the context of a conventional
conict (p. 125127).
126 Defense Intelligence Agency, Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and
Regional Rivals (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, August 2024), 17, https://www.dia.mil/
Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Nuclear-Challenges-2024.pdf.
127 Pettyjohn and Dennis, Avoiding the Brink; Metrick, Sheers, and Pettyjohn, Over the Brink; and Shullman
et al., Adapting US Stratey.
128 Weaver, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” 12.
129 Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 15.
130 See Desmond Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” International Security 10, no. 3 (1985): 331, https://doi.
org/10.2307/2538940. Ball suggests that ships make good nuclear targets because they represent large
capital investments and have the potential to represent a limited attack due to the lack of civilian
casualties. Richard Fieldhouse, “Nuclear Weapons at Sea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, no. 7
(1987): 1923, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1987.11459566. Fieldhouse lays out the Soviet thinking
on using nuclear weapons at sea to overcome U.S. naval superiority.
131 Metrick, Sheers, and Pettyjohn, Over the Brink, 7.
132 Jacob Stokes, Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the
United States (Washington, DC: CNAS, February 2023), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/
atomic-strait-how-chinas-nuclear-buildup-shapes-security-dynamics-with-taiwan-and-the-united-states.
133 Weaver, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” 12. Also, Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use,
14. Both authors oer nuance to this suggestion: Weaver by proposing it only if the United States is
distracted by a contemporary war against Russia, and Kroenig by noting the technical and operational
diculties.
134 Department of Defense, 2023 Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China
(Washington, DC: DOD, October 2023), 111112, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-
1/1/2023MILITARYANDSECURITYDEVELOPMENTSINVOLVINGTHEPEOPLESREPUBLICOFCHINA.
PDF.
135 Nuclear attacks against amphibious ships or landing craft would still aect Taiwan itself through blast
and radiation eects. A 300 kt detonation 6 km oshore (a standard ship ooading distance) would
injure 2,500 in a surface burst; it would kill 2,500 and injure 33,000 in an air burst. It would also send a
fallout plume across the entire island. Data from NukeMap calculations.
136 Clay Wilson, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat
Assessments, CRS Report No. RL32544 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2008),
68, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL32544.pdf; and Edward Savage et al., “The Early-Time (E1) High-
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power Grid,” Metatech Corporation,
January 2010, https://securethegrid.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2010Metatech-HEMPImpact-on-
USPower-Grid.pdf.
137 DOD, A ‘Quick Look” at the Technical Results of Starsh Prime (Washington, DC: August
1962), 19, https://web.archive.org/web/20101105204805/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?AD=ADA955411&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 98
138 The treaty is formally known as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water. See https://20092017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm.
139 William Graham et. al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from
Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, Volume 1: Executive Report 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, July
2004), 47 https://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf. Cited in Wilson, High Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices.
140 For example, William R. Forstchen hypothesizes in One Second After that three nuclear weapons
detonated high in the atmosphere cause a HEMP that destroys all digital equipment in the United States.
William R. Forstchen, One Second After (New York: Forge Books, 2009).
141 Wilson, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices, 56.
142 Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty, Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conict
with Taiwan (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2022), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
les.cnas.org/CNAS+Report-Dangerous+Straits-Defense-Jun+2022FINAL-print.pdf.
143 Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Stratey, 276.
144 See, for example, Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Stratey and Theater
Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); and ibid.
145 Brad Roberts, Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia (Tokyo: National Institute for
Defense Studies, 2013), https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf.
146 Choe Sang-Hun, “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option,” New York Times,
January 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html;
Mitch Shin, “The Great Debate Over South Korea Developing Nuclear Weapons is Back,” The Diplomat,
May 16, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/the-great-debate-over-south-korea-developing-nuclear-
weapons-is-back/; Iku Tsujihiro, “Exploring Tactical Nuclear Possibilities in Japan,” CSIS, May 15, 2024,
https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/exploring-tactical-nuclear-possibilities-in-japan/; Eric Heginbotham and
Richard J. Samuels, “Vulnerable US Alliances in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Implications,” Washington
Quarterly 44, no. 1 (March 23, 2021): 157175, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894709.
147 For a full description of Japan’s importance in a U.S.-China conict, see Cancian, Cancian, and
Heginbotham, First Battle of the Next War, 99, 116117.
148 Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 910
149 This categorization largely follows Lieber and Press’s formulation. See Keir Lieber and Daryl Press,
“Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation,” Presented at the Center for Global Security Research
(CGSR), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, October 23, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QAhCIiNmjv0.
150 William Sare, Sare’s Political Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4950.
151 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Inuence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
152 Talmadge and Green argue that a PRC-controlled Taiwan would threaten U.S. naval forces in the
Philippine Sea; however, our modeling suggests that U.S. surface ships there are already extremely
vulnerable within DF26B range. See Brendan Green and Caitlin Talmadge, “Then What? Assessing the
Strategic Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,” International Security 47, no. 1 (2022): 745, https://
doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00437. For a longer treatment of this issue, see Jonathan D. Caverley, “The Taiwan
Fallacy,” Foreign Aairs, August 7, 2024, https://www-foreignaairs-com.usnwc.idm.oclc.org/taiwan/
taiwan-fallacy.
Confronting Armageddon | 99
153 Alternatively, it would have to be possible that a conventional-only response could disarm the nuclear
forces of an adversary. While this might be possible in U.S.–North Korea scenarios, it is not possible for
either side in the U.S.-China scenario.
154 For recent articles about U.S. considerations in response to a North Korean or Russian rst use, see
Vince A. Manzo and John K. Warden, “After Nuclear First Use, What?,” Survival 60, no. 3 (May 4, 2018):
13360, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1470770; and Erin Hahn and James Scouras, Responding
to North Korean Nuclear First Use: So Many Imperatives, So Little Time (El Segundo, CA: John Hopkins
University, Advanced Physics Laboratory, 2020), https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/les/202212/
NorthKoreanNuclearFirstUse.pdf.
155 Much of the same logic was drawn out by Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 12.
156 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (Winter
19791980), 624, https://doi.org/10.2307/2149629. See also Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear
Options (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
157 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005),
284185. The argument was rst published in 1983. Similarly, Soviet Major-General Pokrovsky wrote
that “atomic weapons signicantly increase the oensive potentialities of the ground troops” by
oering the means of “a swift breakthrough of defensive lines and the destruction of the tactical and
close operational reserves of the enemy.” See Major General G. I. Pokrovsky, Science and Technoloy in
Contemporary War (New York: Frederick A Praeger, Inc., 1959), as cited in Lawrence Freedman, The
Evolution of Nuclear Stratey, 106.
158 J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Stratey of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, January 1983), 27, https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2964.html.
159 Vojtech Mastny, Petr Luñák, and William E. Odom, Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day? The 1964 Warsaw
Pact Plan for a Nuclear War in Europe and Related Documents (Washington, DC, and Zurich: Center for
Security Studies at ETH Zürich, 2000), https://www.les.ethz.ch/isn/108642/warplan_dossier.pdf.
160 On the problems of keeping nuclear conict limited after counterforce use, see Freedman, The Evolution
of Nuclear Stratey, 363365.
161 Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 16.
162 Schelling, Arms and Inuence, 2.
163 Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 42.
164 For an assessment that supports positive correlation, see Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear
Stratey. For analyses that do not, see Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and
Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Abby Fanlo and Lauren Sukin,
“The Disadvantage of Nuclear Superiority,” Security Studies 32, no. 3 (May 27, 2023): 44675, https://doi.
org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225779.
165 Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 40.
166 Fanlo and Sukin, “The Disadvantage of Nuclear Superiority.”
167 Those who emphasize the role of nuclear capabilities in bargaining outcomes often dene nuclear
advantage in dierent ways, with some emphasizing damage-limiting capabilities while others stress the
ability to inict more damage or casualties than an adversary. (Those concepts are described earlier, in
Chapter 2.) For the classic formulation of rungs on a metaphorical escalation ladder, see Herman Kahn,
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Routledge, 2010). The term “escalation dominance” is
seldom applied today (and might be regarded as unnecessarily inammatory). Nevertheless, the focus
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 100
on military capabilities for “deterring escalation in war” and ensuring that an adversary would “incur
costs that far exceed any benets they can achieve through aggression or escalation” within recent
reports on nuclear force building suggest similar principles. Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture, 25.
168 Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 11.
169 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Taylor and Francis, Kindle Edition),
202.
170 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,”
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979), https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185.
171 Gary Schaub Jr., “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory,” Political Psycholoy 25, no. 3 (May
2004), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679221.2004.00377.x.
172 Alain C. Enthoven, “U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?,” Foreign Aairs, April 1, 1975,
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/europe/19750401/us-forces-europe-how-many-doing-what.
173 Lawrence Freedman and Jerey Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Stratey, 4th ed. (London: Palgracve
Macmillan, 2019), Chapter 9 (“Limited Means”).
174 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-
1969 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1971), https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/
CB403.html; Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Routledge, 1983). Nina
Tannenwald, “‘Limited’ Tactical Nuclear Weapons Would be Catastrophic,” Scientic American, March
10, 2022, https://www.scienticamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-
catastrophic/.
175 See, for example, On The Beach, 1957 book by Nevil Shute, movie released in 1959, https://www.
imdb.com/title/tt0053137/; The Day After, movie released in 1982, https://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0085404/, and the movie classic on the subject, Dr. Strangelove, 1964, https://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0057012/?ref_=ls_t_7.
176 Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Stratey,” International Security 2, no. 4 (Spring 1978), 76,
https://doi.org/10.2307/2538458.
177 Ibid., 76.
178 Vincent A. Manzo, “After the First Shots: Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia,” Joint Forces Quarterly,
vol. 77 April 2015, 94, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-77/jfq-77_91100_Manzo.
pdf.
179 Jerey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, Kindle Edition).
180 “Foreign Relations of the United States, 19691976, Volume XXV, National Security Policy, 19731976,” Oce
of the Historian, January 27, 1974, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v35/d31.
181 Peter Pringle and William Arkin, S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War (New York: Norton, 1983),
17.
182 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Taylor and Francis, Kindle Edition),
200.
183 Ibid., 201.
184 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1957); Robert Osgood, Limited
Confronting Armageddon | 101
War Revisited (London: Routledge, 1979); Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Stratey, 101111; Klaus
Knorr and Thornton Read, Limited Strategic War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 2022.
185 Shorthand for a near-term attack on Taiwan, in reference to comments by Admiral Davidson, then
commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacic Command, in a congressional hearing. See Hearing to Receive
Testimony on United States Indo-Pacic Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program, 48.
186 TOW is a proprietary game by the authors. See Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, First Battle of the
Next War.
187 Notes on unclassied sources for order of battle: Chinese nuclear forces’ order of battle reected
authors’ projections using the following sources as a baseline: DOD, Military and Security Developments
2023; and Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023.” U.S. nuclear forces’
order of battle reected authors’ calculations from scal year 2025 budget documents, DOD Selected
Acquisition Reports, and Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: United States
Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/
premium/202301/nuclear-notebook-united-states-nuclear-weapons-2023/.
188 On these games, see Reid B.C. Pauly, “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources
of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018), https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00333.
189 The wargame had dozens of assumptions. For a full description of these assumptions and the reasons
behind them, see Chapter 4, “Base Cases and Excursion Cases,” in Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham,
First Battle of the Next War, 5283. In the current wargame series, the only modication to the base
assumptions was that the Joint Air-to-Surface Stando Missile–Extended Range (JASSMER) could not
target ships at sea.
190 Brad Glosserman, “Let the Real Work on Japan’s Defense Modernization Begin,” Japan Times, May 14,
2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/05/14/japan/japan-defense-modernization/.
191 The NCA represented the highest source for making national security decisions. For the United States,
it was dened as “the president and the secretary of defense or their duly deputized alternates or
successor.” The term has fallen out of use in favor of referring to the ocials directly. Thus, the term
appears in the 2004 version of the DoD Dictionary but drops out by 2010 and thereafter.
192 DOD reviewed all orders of battle and the MINES data provided to the project to ensure they were
unclassied.
193 Alex Wellerstein, “Nukemap,” Nukemap, https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/. Although the
methodoloy for the Nuclear War Simulator is not as well documented as for Nukemap, it was close
enough to other methods to provide estimates of the millions of casualties that would result from
strategic nuclear exchanges. See “Nuclear War Simulator,” Nuclear War Simulator, accessed August 26,
2024, https://nuclearwarsimulator.com/.
194 For example, see Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Dangerous Condence? Chinese Views
on Nuclear Escalation,” International Security 44, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 61109, https://doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00359; and Panda, “China’s Dual-Capable Missiles.”
195 DOD, Military and Security Developments 2023, 8.
196 Note that the two postures dier in their emphasis relative to one another, not relative to the current
inventory. Both postures are improved in both dimensions relative to the current force structure.
197 Kristensen, Korda, Johns, and Knight, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024.”
198 Wu Riqiang, “Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China’s Nuclear Survivability,” International Security 44,
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 102
no. 4 (Spring 2020): 84118, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00376.
199 igMakes is a U.S.-based company that designs and fabricates premium war-gaming miniatures. See
“igMakes,” Etsy, https://www.igmakes.com.
200 Terry Michael Josserand, “R&A for UUR_Weapon_History_Phases_20170206,” Sandia National Labs,
March 1, 2017, https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1429158.
201 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), B6112 Life Extension Program (Washington, DC: NNSA,
April 2023), https://www.enery.gov/sites/default/les/202304/B6112%20042023.pdf.
202 Ibid.
203 DOD, “Department of Defense Announces Pursuit of B61 Gravity Bomb Variant,” Press release, October
27, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3571660/department-of-defense-
announces-pursuit-of-b61-gravity-bomb-variant/; and DOD, “Fact Sheet on B61 Variant Development,”
Press release, October, 27, 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/27/2003329624/-1/-1/1/B6113FACT-
SHEET.PDF.
204 NNSA, W761 Life Extension Program (Washington, DC: NNSA, January 2022), https://www.enery.gov/
nnsa/articles/w761-life-extension-program-lep.
205 NNSA, W88 Alteration 370 Program (Washington, DC: NNSA, November 2023), https://www.enery.gov/
sites/default/les/202311/W88ALT370_1123.pdf.
206 “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” NNSA, accessed November 12, 2024, https://
www.enery.gov/nnsa/nuclear-stockpile-transparency.
207 NNSA, W761 Life Extension Program.
208 Kristensen and Korda, “Nuclear Notebook,” 71; and Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces:
Background, Developments, and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, December
2021), 43, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL33640.
209 NNSA, W804 Life Extension Program (Washington, DC: NNSA, November 2023), https://www.enery.gov/
sites/default/les/202311/W804_1123.pdf.
210 The LRSO Selected Acquisition Report indicates initial production will begin in 2027, so no systems
would be available in 2028. See DOD, Long Range Stand O (LRSO): Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
(Washington, DC: DOD, April 2022), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20
Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2021_SARS/22F0762_LRSO_SAR_2021.pdf.
211 This is the limit placed by the New START treaty, though some counting rules make a denitive count
using only government-released sources impossible. For example, the treaty counts bombers as one
deployed warhead. See “New START Treaty,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 12, 2024,
https://www.state.gov/new-start/.
212 NNSA denitions from “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile”: “The nuclear stockpile
includes both active and inactive warheads. Active warheads include strategic and non-strategic
weapons maintained in an operational, ready-for-use conguration, warheads that must be ready for
possible deployment within a short timeframe, and logistics spares. They have tritium bottles and other
Limited Life Components installed. Inactive warheads are maintained at a depot in a non-operational
status and have their tritium bottles removed. A retired warhead is removed from its delivery platform,
is not functional, and is not considered part of the nuclear stockpile. A dismantled warhead is a warhead
reduced to its component parts.”
213 Kristensen and Korda, “Nuclear Notebook,” 4.
Confronting Armageddon | 103
214 Oce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs,
“Nuclear Weapons” in The Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 Revised (Washington, DC: Oce of the
Secretary of Defense, 2020), 3149, https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/
chapter4.html.
215 The B21 production schedule is still classied. The U.S. Air Force fact sheet says that the B21 will
be operational in the “mid-2020s.” See “B21 Raider,” U.S. Air Force, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/
Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2682973/b-21-raider/. A Northrop Grumman fact sheet says that the initial
aircraft are in production, and press reports state that the rst six aircraft are in production. However,
the aircraft is still in ight testing. See “B21 Raider Frequently Asked Questions,” Northrop Grumman,
accessed November 12, 2024, https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-21-raider/b-21-faqs.
The assumption for the wargame was that there would not be enough operational B21s in 2028 to form
even a half squadron.
216 Michael Marrow, “F35A Ocially Certied to Carry Nuclear Bomb,” Breaking Defense, March 8, 2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/exclusive-f-35a-ocially-certied-to-carry-nuclear-bomb/.
217 Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty, Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conict
with Taiwan (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2022), https://s3.amazonaws.com/les.cnas.org/CNAS+Report-
Dangerous+Straits-Defense-Jun+2022FINAL-print.pdf.
218 Pettyjohn and Dennis, Avoiding the Brink.
219 Metrick, Sheers, and Pettyjohn, Over the Brink.
220 Shullman, Culver, Liao, and Wong, Adapting US Stratey.
221 Weaver, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” 12.
222 For more on the authors’ view of the epistemoloy of wargames, see Chapter 2 in Cancian, Cancian, and
Heginbotham, First Battle of the Next War.
223 On the general futility of estimating the likelihood of nuclear use, see Amy J. Nelson and Alexander H.
Montgomery, “How Not to Estimate the Likelihood of Nuclear War,” Brookings Institute, October 19,
2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-not-to-estimate-the-likelihood-of-nuclear-war/.
224 The United States, for example, considered using nuclear weapons during the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. See Daniel Calingaert, “Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 2
(1988): 177202, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398808437337; and Robert Jervis et al., “Nuclear Weapons,
Coercive Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War: Perspectives on Nixon’s Nuclear Specter,” Journal of Cold
War Studies 19, no. 4 (2017): 192210, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_c_00770.
225 Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, First Battle of the Next War.
226 For examples of historical attempts to gain such an advantage against one element of an adversary’s
nuclear forces, see Long and Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike.”
227 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed (Boston: Little
Brown, 1994). See especially Chapter 2, “Swatting at Mosquitos.” The aircraft became operational in
1984, and DOD acknowledged its existence in 1988.
228 As in all social science endeavors, hypotheses can be supported or not; they cannot be proved or
disproved. The degree of condence in the support should be based on the rigor and methodoloy of
the project. Although 15 game iterations may not be enough to make conclusive judgments about all
these complex issues, as discussed in the Chapter 4, this project’s background research and iterated play
strengthen the level of condence in its ndings. Some hypotheses are more rigorously or extensively
examined than others.
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 104
229 Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 170.
230 Lieber and Press, Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, 117. The authors argue that China’s poor conventional
matchup against the United States and the high costs of defeat might pressure China to nuclear
escalation.
231 There is an increasing recognition for the need to study protracted scenarios. For example, see Andrew
F. Krepinevich, Protracted Great-Power War (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2020),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/protracted-great-power-war.
232 The authors did not estimate civilian casualties from nuclear conict, which in this case clearly would
have been horric. A 2006 study by the Federation of American Scientists estimated that just 60 W88
warheads employed against China’s DF5 silos would kill 11 million people, mostly from radiation.
Strikes in Game 6 were far more extensive, involving roughly 20 times the number of weapons.
To the extent that they focused on attacking silo-based weapons, casualties per warhead would
have been lower, given the remote locations of newer missile silos. However, to the extent that the
headquarters for mobile missile brigades, submarine bases, bomber bases, or national command,
control, communication, and intelligence (NC3I) were attacked, casualties per warhead would likely
have been higher, as these locations tend to be close to heavily populated areas. Hans M. Kristensen,
Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
(Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists / Natural Resources Defense Council, November
2006), 185, https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/Book2006.pdf. For modeling eects against Chinese silos,
see Sébastien Philippe and Ivan Stepanov, “Radioactive Fallout and Potential Fatalities from Nuclear
Attacks on China’s New Missile Silo Fields,” Science and Global Security 31, no. 12 (2023): 315, https://
doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2023.2215590.
233 The participants in these two iterations were less experienced than those in other games. Experience in
wargames or other forms of exposure to the scenario might moderate the response.
234 This reluctance has historical parallels. Robert McNamara reported, “Not only Field Marshal Lord
Carver, but Lord Louis Mountbatten and several other of the eight retired Chiefs of the British Defence
Sta as well . . . indicate[d] that under no circumstances would they have recommended that NATO
initiate the use of nuclear weapons.” He further stated his own views: “In long private conversations
with successive Presidents—Kennedy and Johnson—I recommended, without qualication, that they
never initiate, under any circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my
recommendation.” Robert S. McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and
Misperceptions,” Foreign Aairs, September 1, 1983, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/19830901/
military-role-nuclear-weapons-perceptions-and-misperceptions.
235 Table 5 seems to suggest that Chinese possession of low-yield nuclear weapons led to better Chinese
outcomes (four victories with versus one victory without), even when nuclear weapons were not used.
One could hypothesize that possession of low-yield nuclear weapons intimidated the United States
into accepting unfavorable settlements. However, no U.S. player remarked on Chinese possession of
low-yield weapons in deciding to accept disadvantageous settlements. Therefore, the seemingly better
Chinese outcomes appear to be unrelated to Chinese possession of low-yield weapons. More research is
needed to establish whether a causal connection exists.
236 Center for Global Security Research, China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S.
Nuclear Deterrence Stratey (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2023), 13, https://
cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf.
237 Pettyjohn and Dennis observed from their games that, “Whereas Blue players often focused on the
quantitative inferiority of even an expanded Chinese nuclear arsenal to that of the United States or
Russia, Red players did not believe they needed parity to insulate themselves from American nuclear
Confronting Armageddon | 105
coercion and to be empowered to issue nuclear threats or even employ nuclear weapons.” Pettyjohn
and Dennis, Avoiding the Brink, 6.
238 “Extensive” is relative. This represents 3050 times as much nuclear repower as was used to end World
War II. However, it is a fraction of what might have been used in a NATOSoviet Union war. For example,
one NATO exercise envisioned 335 atomic bombs being used. See “Überholt wie Pfeil und Bogen”
[Outdated Like a Bow and Arrow], Der Spiegel, July 12, 1955, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ueberholt-
wie-pfeil-und-bogen-a-8282a95e-000200010000000031970707.
239 The bunker was assumed to be impervious to conventional attack. Israel reportedly used 80 specialized
2,000-pound bombs to destroy the Hezbollah command center in Beirut. They could y that many
sorties on a single target because they faced no air defenses. That would not be the case for Chinese
air attacks on Taiwan. Graham Scarbro, “A Closer Look at Israel’s Use of 80 Bunker-Buster JDAMs in
Beirut,” U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings 150, no. 10, October 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/
proceedings/2024/october/closer-look-israels-use-80-bunker-buster-jdams-beirut.
240 These insights come from the results of the 15 full games. The results of the six ground-only games were
identical.
241 There would also have been many civilian casualties from conventional attacks, but the project did not
estimate these. Also, there are many uncertainties in estimating civilian casualties from nuclear use. Not
the least of these is how many civilians might self-evacuate from the battle area prior to use.
242 See William A. Shurcli, Technical Report of Operation Crossroads (Washington, DC: Defense Atomic
Support Agency, 1946), 6, table, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD0367496. The Crossroads nuclear
tests showed serious damage to ships at about 900 m, sinking at about 400 m, for a 23 kt weapon.
243 This numbers assumes (1) target ships are traveling at 25 nautical miles per hour, plus or minus 5 knots;
(2) ships are zigzagging with alternating starboard and port turns of 25 degrees, plus or minus 5 degrees;
and (3) the time from the last observed location of the target and the missile’s arrival at the targeted area
is 30 minutes (including analysis, communications, command, launch preparation, and ight time). At
60 minutes, the number of warheads required would range from 45 to 178.
244 For these reasons, it is implausible that one Chinese low-yield nuclear weapon could destroy a U.S.
carrier as postulated in recent wargames. Metrick, Philip Sheers, and Stacie Pettyjohn, Over the Brink, 6.
245 Wellerstein, “Nukemap.”
246 A major constraint on loading amphibious ships appears to be port access and vehicle trac ow, so
ships need to spread out. This inference arises from a study on Chinese exercises to use civilian shipping
for amphibious operations. J. Michael Dahm, “China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales:
China’s Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 20212022,”U.S. Naval War College, CMSI China
Maritime Reports, no. 25, January 2023, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/25.
247 Japan was frequently attacked with conventional weapons. See Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham,
First Battle of the Next War, 11214.
248 For a full description of Japan’s importance in a U.S.-China conict, see Cancian, Cancian, and
Heginbotham, First Battle of the Next War, 99, 11617.
249 The Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 denes counterforce as counterforce targeting plans to destroy
the military capabilities of an enemy force. Typical counterforce targets include bomber bases, ballistic
missile submarine bases, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) silos, air-defense installations,
command and control centers, and weapons of mass destruction storage facilities. Because these
types of targets may be hardened, buried, masked, mobile, and defended, the forces required to
implement this stratey need to be diverse, numerous, and accurate. (DOD, Nuclear Matters, 14) Air
Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham | 106
Force Doctrine Document 21.5 denes counterforce as “the employment of strategic air and missile
forces in an eort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an enemy force under
any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated. U.S. Air Force, Nuclear Operations, Air
Force Doctrine Document 21.5 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center, July 15, 1998),
35, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUBD301PURLLPS96209/pdf/GOVPUBD301PURL-
LPS96209.pdf.
250 Surprisingly, one China team made a highly risky counterforce strike that led to a successful outcome
in Game 6; the China team responded to a U.S. counterforce rst strike with a counterforce strike of
its own. Although the China team could not hope to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal, a counterforce
response to counterforce rst use communicated a balance of resolve and restraint. This led to a
favorable operational outcome for China (PRC Enclave), despite it being in an unfavorable conventional
position and suering an extensive nuclear rst strike.
251 Kahn began analyzing nuclear stratey at RAND and later founded the Hudson Institute. He became
controversial for his willingness to consider and analyze nuclear warghting, expressed most forcefully
in his 1960 book Thinking about the Unthinkable and his 1962 book On Thermonuclear War.
252 Nor did China teams discuss the prospects of U.S. counterforce attacks when they were in crisis and
deciding between accepting an o-ramp or using nuclear weapons. In those situations, discussions
always centered on the conventional battle and its implications for regime survival, not on the enhanced
resilience of Chinese nuclear forces following dispersal.
253 McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Aairs, October 1969, https://www.foreignaairs.com/
russian-federation/cap-volcano.
254 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days in October: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1969),
128.
255 Shullman, Culver, Liao, and Wong, Adapting US Stratey, 14.
256 Department of Defense, Report on the Nuclear Employment stratey of the United States (Washington, DC:
DOD, November 2024), 2, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/15/2003584623/-1/-1/1/REPORTONTHE-
NUCLEAREMPLOYMENTSTRATEGYOFTHEUNITEDSTATES.PDF.
257 During the Cold War, Schelling proposed a similar study oriented on Soviet leadership during a potential
nuclear crisis. See Thomas C. Schelling, “The Role of Wargames and Exercises,” in Managing Nuclear
Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1987), 44344.
258 Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.
259 The United States wanted a prompt prisoner swap. The South Koreans wanted to give North Korean
prisoners the option of remaining in the South. David Vergun, “Long Diplomatic Wrangling Finally Led
to Korean Armistice 70 Years Ago,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 24, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/
News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3423473/.
260 Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, First Battle of the Next War, 7172.
261 The authors thus diverge slightly from authors like Kroenig who recommend to axiomatically plan on
mainland strikes. Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 13.
262 For example, the disastrous battles in New York during the American Revolution, the First Battle of Bull
Run in the Civil War, and Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in World War II. The classic examination of
rst battles is Charles E. Heller and William A. Stot, eds., America’s First Battles, 17761965 (Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986). John Shy’s essay “First Battles in Retrospect” (pp. 32752) notes
Confronting Armageddon | 107
that rst battles are always bloodier than the peacetime military anticipates. In half of the rst battles
studied, the United States lost; in four cases it went on to victory, and in another it was able to achieve a
status quo ante (the War of 1812).
263 Such eorts would include stockpiling of supplies, which would also be helpful to endure a blockade.
Taiwan has already taken steps in this direction.
264 Seconding one of Kroenig’s recommendations. Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use, 17.
265 DOD, Nuclear Employment Guidance, p. 2, directs “the integration of non-nuclear capabilities into U.S.
nuclear planning where non-nuclear capabilities can support the nuclear deterrence mission.”
266 Shullman, Culver, Liao, and Wong had a similar nding in Adapting US Stratey. Cancian, Cancian, and
Heginbotham’s First Battles of the Next War describes how critical Japan is for the conventional ght.
267 For example, Shullman, Culver, Liao, and Wong, Adapting US Stratey, 1213. The Strategic Posture
Commission raised similar concerns.
268 Kahn argued that most people he discussed the question with believe that nuclear war against the Soviet
Union to preserve Western Europe would be acceptable if less than half of the U.S. population would
die (On Thermonuclear War, p. 30). If that is true today of Americans and their views on Taiwan and
Ukraine, then U.S. policy should prepare for that contingency.
269 Most recently, see Lyle J. Morris and Rakesh Sood, Understanding China’s Perceptions and Stratey
toward Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study Approach (New York: Asia Society, 2024), https://asiasociety.org/
policy-institute/understanding-chinas-perceptions-and-stratey-toward-nuclear-weapons-case-study-
approach. For an earlier study drawing the same conclusion, see Cunningham and Fravel, “Dangerous
Condence?”
270 For a whole volume on this topic, see David Santoro ed., USChina Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on
the Debate, Issues and Insights 22, SR 2 (Honolulu, HI: Pacic Forum International, May 2022), https://
pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Issues-Insights-Vol.-22SR2.pdf.
271 Matthew Seelinger, “The M28/M29 Davy Crockett Nuclear Weapon System,” The Army Historical
Foundation, accessed November 12, 2024, https://armyhistory.org/the-m28m29-davy-crockett-nuclear-
weapon-system/; Matthew Seelinger, “MGM31 Pershing Missile,” The Army Historical Foundation,
accessed November 12, 2024, https://armyhistory.org/mgm-31-pershing-missile/.
272 Data from DOD. Cleared for public release.
273 It is worth noting from the table that hardened shelters (HASs) increase aircraft survivability even
under the extreme stress of a nuclear detonation. The First Battles of the Next War report recommended
building HASs in the context of a conventional conict (p. 125127).
274 Amy Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, CRS Report No. RL32572 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32572/46.
