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Intra-Party Leadership Contests and Effect on Levels of Satisfaction with Democracy on Party Voters

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This article investigates the relationship between intra-party leadership contestations on levels of satisfaction with democracy among party voters, trying to identify the impact of the former on the latter. The article draws on empirical data for a cross-sectional analysis from three different data sets that cover 11 countries, including a more case-specific analysis that utilizes panel data from Germany. Overall, the study aims to capture the dynamics of intra-party politics and the magnitude of its effect on perceptions of democracy among parties' voters. We find that intra-party politics at its probably most competitive version, that is elections for the head of the party, does not seem to exercise any significant influence on voters' satisfaction with democracy.
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ARTICLE
Intra-Party Leadership Contests and Effect on
Levels of Satisfaction with Democracy on Party
Voters
Yiannos Katsourides1and Nikandros Ioannidis2
1
Department of Politics and Governance, University of Nicosia, Nicosia, Cyprus and
2
Faculty of Politics
and Social Sciences, Cyprus University of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
Corresponding author: Yiannos Katsourides; Email: katsourides.y@unic.ac.cy
(Received 12 January 2024; revised 18 September 2024; accepted 24 September 2024)
Abstract
This article investigates the relationship between intra-party leadership contestations on
levels of satisfaction with democracy among party voters, trying to identify the impact
of the former on the latter. The article draws on empirical data for a cross-sectional ana-
lysis from three different data sets that cover 11 countries, including a more case-specific
analysis that utilizes panel data from Germany. Overall, the study aims to capture the
dynamics of intra-party politics and the magnitude of its effect on perceptions of democ-
racy among partiesvoters. We find that intra-party politics at its probably most competi-
tive version, that is elections for the head of the party, does not seem to exercise any
significant influence on voterssatisfaction with democracy.
Keywords: political parties; democracy; intra-party elections; party leaders; competitiveness
The study of democracy and democratization, and in recent years satisfaction with
democracy (SWD), is at the centre of scholarly work in political science but is of
importance to other disciplines as well. At the heart of contemporary democratic
politics we find the institution of political parties. Modern democracy cannot
work without political parties and it does not perform well if these parties are
not stable or if they are weak. This has been a strong consensus among scholars
of political parties and democracy for more than half a century; arguably, it still
holds, as many surveys (e.g. V-DEM) still measure democratization in terms of
party existence and free and unobstructed functioning. This is not without reason.
Political parties emerged and evolved as institutions that helped legislators, candi-
dates and voters overcome a variety of challenges associated with democracy
(Hicken 2020: 1). Parties pioneered the democratization of the political process
in the twentieth century, bringing new social classes and strata into the political
system (Katz 2006; Katz and Crotty 2006; Mozaffar 2006).
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Ltd. This is an
Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.
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properly cited.
Government and Opposition (2024), 122
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However, for many years now, political parties have taken the lead in the list of
the least trusted institutions worldwide, and their influence has been constantly on
the decline (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Moreover, they are often blamed for
most of the flaws of contemporary democratic politics (Webb et al. 2022: 151).
This process raises a series of challenges not only for political parties but more
crucially to liberal, representative democracies. One such challenge is the waning
of democratic accountability, which, in turn, affects voters and citizensSWD. Yet,
this has not changed the fact that political parties remain the key actors of politics.
Satisfaction with democracy is considered a crucial measure of the political
health of any given political system (Singh and Mayne 2023). In media and public
discourse, lack of satisfaction with democratic politics and processes, political insti-
tutions and the political elites has been cited as a cause and an outcome of the rise
of challenger parties, the bewilderment of institutions that symbolize the status quo,
and the catalyst of events such as Brexit, the Trump presidency, the rise of far-
right populist parties, and so on (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Kaltwasser and
Van Hauwaert 2020; McCall 2020). It also links with wider debates on such issues
as the crisis of partyor a legitimacy crisisof liberal, representative democracies
(Merkel 2014).
Resulting from the above, research on SWD has been growing over the years.
This research examined a number of variables and their effect on SWD and on
many levels. Different angles were adopted and have provided various explanations
for levels of SWD. On the other hand, scholarly work on the relationship between
intra-party politics and workings and their impact on SWD are significantly fewer.
Although we know a lot of things about the workings of political parties, we know
very little about how parties help to shape citizensattitudes towards the democra-
cies in which they compete(Webb et al. 2022: 152). Moreover, although scholar-
ship has advanced on issues related to the context and results of intra-party
leadership contests, it has progressed little regarding their consequences on ordin-
ary party voters. This is the gap this article aims to fill in by examining how intra-
party workings, and particularly leadership contestations, may affect SWD among
voters. Our main task is not to explain the levels of SWD per se, but to examine
whether specific intra-party factors in this case intra-party leadership contests
might affect such attitudes.
Previous research has shown that intra-party democracy can positively influence
SWD by improving citizensevaluation of democratic processes (Farrell and
McAllister 2006; Put et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2022). Given that intra-party leader-
ship elections are arguably the most significant intra-party events, we anticipate
that their competitive nature will have a measurable impact on SWD among
party voters. Specifically, we expect that highly contested intra-party leadership
elections will improve votersperceptions of democracy by signalling the partys
commitment to accountability and democratic norms. However, our main finding
is that intra-party politics at its probably most competitive form that is, elections
for the head of the party does not seem to exercise any significant influence on
votersSWD.
The focus on intra-party leadership politics is timely and important not only
because political parties continue to dominate politics in most countries of the
globe and particularly in liberal European democracies, thus exercising a significant
2 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
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influence on citizensquality of life. More crucially, the way politics unfolds in con-
temporary times, largely focusing on personalities and individual leadership char-
acteristics, is an additional, vital factor that invites attention to party leadership
contests. A notable illustration of this phenomenon occurred during the intra-party
leadership contest within the Greek radical left party SYRIZA, a party which has
been the subject of considerable scholarly scrutiny in recent years. In an unexpected
turn of events, Stefanos Kasselakis, a complete outsider hailing from the USA, won
the elections. His candidacy garnered significant media coverage and captured the
attention of citizens, adding a unique dimension to the campaign.
The definitional part of social sciences is usually a minefield. Our endeavour in
this article is not theoretical: it is not to discuss and debate the problems in con-
ceptualizing democracy and SWD (for this debate see Linde and Ekman 2003).
Nonetheless, in order to proceed we need to establish a minimum definitional
understanding of the basic concepts we utilize in this article. The first such concept
is SWD. Although being far from a perfect indicator of support for the performance
of democratic regimes, since it is highly sensitive to different institutional contexts
(Linde and Ekman 2003), political scientists usually define this as the support citi-
zens have for their political institutions, which in turn indicates the political health
of a democratic society (Valgarðsson and Devine 2021). Most scholars treat SWD
as an item that taps into the level of support for the way a democratic regime works
in practice and not as an indicator of support for the principles of democracy. This
is the definition we adopt too, as it fits well with our unit of analysis: political par-
ties, a key institution for contemporary liberal democracies.
Competitive intra-party elections is a second concept. There is a widely held
belief, dating back at least to Schumpeter (1942), that competitive elections are
necessary for a well-functioning democracy. Nonetheless, there have been surpris-
ingly few attempts to define precisely what requirements must be followed to make
an election competitive (Klingelhöfer 2021: 1). Thomas Brunell and Harold Clarke
(2012: 125) give a good description of a widespread understanding, which equates
competitiveness with small margins of victory. Justin Buchler (2007) suggests defin-
ing competitive elections as elections in which all sides involved have more or less
equal chances to win. The number of competing candidates is also important, as well
as the preconditions provided for candidacies (i.e. are they really equal and uniform to
all?) and the body that ultimate votes for the new party leader in terms of inclusive-
ness and/or exclusiveness. Although not all these criteria relate directly to intra-party
elections, they can apply in intra-party contests too. Therefore, we acknowledge the
above criteria as basic components of competitive intra-party elections too.
The article draws on empirical data for a cross-sectional analysis from three dif-
ferent datasets: one providing information on a significant number of intra-party
leadership contestations among parties of different ideological outlooks in 11 dif-
ferent countries over the period 19652019 (COmparative Study or PArty
Leaders COSPAL) (Pilet et al. 2021); and two measuring SWD (Mannheim
Eurobarometer ΜΕ and the European Social Survey ESS) (see section on
methodology). The 11 countries examined are: Norway, Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Denmark, UK, Italy, Hungary, Israel, Portugal and Spain. For a longitu-
dinal investigation of the relationship under examination, we use data from the
German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). The article is structured as follows.
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In the next section, we review existing literature to which this study contributes, and
in the third section we discuss our cases selection, data and methods. The fourth
part is empirical, showing the results of our research, which we also discuss. The
final part concludes the discussion.
Party politics and satisfaction with democracy
Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is a common measure of public opinion in
social science surveys (Singh and Mayne 2023; Valgarðsson and Devine 2021: 1),
often used to gauge political support and the health of a democratic society
(Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Dassonneville and
McAllister 2020). It serves as both an explanatory and outcome variable in research
on public support for political institutions, elites and democratic performance
(Valgarðsson and Devine 2021: 1). For stable democracy, it is required that citizens
believe in democratic principles, and for consolidated democracies a majority must
share this belief (Linde and Ekman 2003: 392). However, there are complexities in
measuring SWD (see Linde and Ekman 2003).
SWD is seen as a mid-level indicator of political support, lying between regime-
type preferences and support for specific actors and institutions (Easton 1975;
Norris 1999), crucial in debates about democratic legitimacy crises (Singh and
Mayne 2023: 194). Research on SWD focuses on a number of things: its relation
to vote choice, citizen participation, governance support and institutional reforms
(Singh and Mayne 2023: 166199). It also examines factors affecting SWD and
democratic politics, such as ideology (Lisi et al. 2015; Poguntke et al. 2016), election
outcomes (Anderson et al. 2005), democratic representation (Reher 2015), account-
ability (Aarts and Thomassen 2008), electoral systems (Aarts and Thomassen
2008), participation (Blais and Gélineau 2007), quality of governance (Webb
et al. 2022: 152153) and economic performance (Quaranta and Martini 2016).
Political parties play a central role in democracy, influencing voter satisfaction
through their functioning and organization. Well-functioning party systems, repre-
senting population preferences and maintaining accountability, are associated with
higher SWD (Hicken 2020: 3) and increased democracy legitimization (Mair 2013).
Strong parties are linked to more durable democracies and reduced success of
populists (Self and Hicken 2018). Parties also function as democracys transmission
belt that is, connecting voters to government by representing their interests in
the policymaking process and holding policymakers accountable (Hicken 2020:3).
Effective party organizations influence votersattitudes towards democracy (Webb
et al. 2022). Intra-party workings also affect citizensperceptions of democracy.
Partiesareoftenseenasdemocraticsystemsen miniature and their internal function-
ing influences citizensperception of and satisfaction with democracy too. Perceived
internal divisions, corruption, unfulfilled promises and unresponsiveness can under-
mine public trust and lead to dissatisfaction with democracy.
Intra-party leadership politics, competition and democracy
The study of party leadership, neglected until a few years ago albeit with some
exceptions mostly related to intra-party democracy and selection of candidates
4 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
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(Cross and Blais 2012; Cross and Katz 2013; Rahat and Hazan 2007)has gained
prominence largely due to such processes as the presidentialization (Poguntke
and Webb 2005) and personalization of political parties (Karvonen 2010). This is
not without reason. Party leaders control ministerial selections (Dowding and
Dumont 2009), decisively influence candidate selections (Hazan and Rahat 2010),
define party policies and bring new issues in the agenda (Scarrow et al. 2000).
Crucially, party leaders are often the public face of the party conveying its message
to voters and the media both between elections and during campaigns (Pilet and
Cross 2015:2).
The emphasis on intra-party elections is timely for another reason too. The per-
sonalization thesis of Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (2005) highlights the grow-
ing importance of party leaders and the consequent attention that must be paid to
the politics of party leadership. In highly individualized societies with political
landscapes largely centred on personalized parties and presidentialized govern-
ments (Poguntke and Webb 2005), political elites not only attach their message
to latent or full-fledged lines of division, but often become lines of division them-
selves (Bordignon 2020). The role of party leaders has grown in importance,
impacting voter decisions and party image (Aarts et al. 2011). As such, we expect
that intra-party leadership elections will have an effect beyond merely intra-party
affairs. Given the enhanced role of party leaders, it is a logical assumption to
infer that party voters and not only the membership would be interested in
party leadership electoral contests.
Most publications on party leadership examine specific contests and in specific
countries, selection criteria and mechanisms, institutional rules, characteristics of
party leaders and so on (Cross and Pilet 2015: 34). Very few studies have examined
how party leadership politics impacts on votersSWD. This is where the present
article aims to make a contribution. Party leadership politics involves a number
of things. In this article we examine intra-party election measured by the degree
of competitiveness and ask how this impacts SWD. We expect intra-party compe-
tition as it is expressed in intra-party leadership contests to exercise a positive influ-
ence on SWD among party voters.
Previous research focused on other aspects and dimensions of party workings
and impacts on votersSWD. For example, David Farrell and Ian McAllister
(2006) found that preferential voting in candidate-centred systems promotes a
greater sense of fairness about election outcomes, which in turn increases satisfac-
tion with the democratic system. Miroslav Nemčok (2020) further emphasized the
role of parties, noting that voters who support the winning party are generally more
satisfied with democracy. Gert-Jan Put et al. (2014) highlighted the potential posi-
tive effects of democratizing candidate selection procedures on citizensviews on
democracy, suggesting that more open and democratized processes could lead to
greater political participation and SWD. André Blais et al. (2017) found that elec-
tion outcomes, particularly voting for winning parties, and deficits in representa-
tion, can also impact SWD. Given the lack of literature and empirical data on
the specific issue of intra-party leadership contests and SWD beyond the winners
and losersframework, we believe that the answer lies with the fundamental prem-
ises of democratic theory in general and its application in party workings more par-
ticularly and mainly the effect of competition (see below).
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The selectorate those eligible to vote is another crucial parameter in the
entire process. The open and participatory nature of (American) primaries, for
example, means that many more members and supporters will be engaged directly
in the intra-party contest as opposed to a closed, parliamentarian caucus voting for
the next party leader. The more open and inclusive the body that elects the party
leader, the more the process is externalized beyond party elites to the society (Cross
and Pruysers 2019: 484). At the same time, the entire process is not kept behind
closed doors but is open for everyone to see and judge.
Looking at the competitiveness of leadership races, Ofer Kenig et al. (2015) show
that these result in different outcomes: some contests typically look like corona-
tions, others are actual, and sometimes contests are really close, thus enhancing
competitiveness. Indicators of competitiveness include the likelihood of a coron-
ation, the number of competing candidates, the margin between the votes won
by the top two candidates and the likelihood of the incumbents success (Kenig
et al. 2015). The degree of competitiveness in leadership contests is affected by vari-
ous factors that include, inter alia: the political system in which the party operates;
the time (year) the selection process took place; the type of selectorate; the ideo-
logical position of the party; and the partys governing position.
Intra-party leadership contests are a significant aspect of intra-party politics
and can impact on SWD, as they can provide citizens with an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the democratic process and have a say in the direction of their party
and, potentially, the government. In fact, intra-party leadership contests can be
seen as a healthy and necessary aspect of democratic politics, as they promote
competition, accountability and legitimacy within political parties. They can
also serve as a mechanism for parties to renew and refresh their leadership,
which can be important for staying responsive to the changing needs and con-
cerns of the electorate. On the other hand, if leadership contests are particularly
virulent or divisive, it can contribute to perceptions of instability and gridlock,
which can further erode confidence in the democratic process both within the
party and in the broader political system. The repercussions of the aforemen-
tioned developments are anticipated to extend far beyond the confines of the
party membership or the selectorate involved in a particular intra-party competi-
tion. These consequences are expected to have a broader impact, influencing a
much larger population. If parties are indeed a transition belt from and to society,
then we should expect that it would affect the way citizens view not only one
partys workings but also how they view the political system overall, which cru-
cially includes SWD.
The way that leadership contests are conducted within a political party can sig-
nal to its voters and the wider public whether the party is committed to democratic
values and processes, which can impact votersperceptions of the partys legitimacy
and trustworthiness. When a party holds a leadership contest, it can generate media
attention and public discourse around its internal workings. For example, if the
leadership contest is conducted in a fair and transparent manner, it can demon-
strate the partys commitment to democratic values and principles, which can
increase public trust in the party and in the democratic system more broadly.
This can, in turn, increase satisfaction with the overall functioning of democracy
and thus indirectly affect party votersSWD.
6 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
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It is obvious that research on the effect of party organizational resources on
electoral politics and how they affect citizens perceptions about their political systems
has progressed. The same cannot be said about scholarly work on the link between
intra-party developments and politics and their relationship with SWD (Webb et al.
2022). However, there are assumptions embedded in the study of democratic and
party politics that link intra-party politics with a better working of democracy. For
example, campaigning by party candidates produces positive externalities or spill-
overs for other members of the same party ticket (Aldrich 1995). In the context
of intra-party elections, we contend that competitive intra-party elections can
enhance satisfaction among voters. Even those not eligible to cast a vote often har-
bour a consolidated preference for one candidate. Competition is crucial in making
the process more engaging and arguably more democratized.
Liberal democracies rest on several core principles and features, which collect-
ively ensure the functioning of a democratic system. Crucial among these is com-
petition. The concept of competition in liberal democracies has been explored from
various angles. Jonathan Hearn (2021) argues that the decline of aristocratic and
religious authority, and the national subordination of martial power, opened the
way for more liberal forms of society in which authority is routinely contested
through competition across economy, politics, culture and beliefs. Nicholas Gane
(2020) provides a historical analysis of competition, tracing its evolution and its
role in neoliberal economic thought. Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast
(1996) argue that liberal democracies have a long-term advantage in international
competition due to their ability to establish credible limited government. Moreover,
liberal democracies rely on free-market economies where businesses and indivi-
duals can compete in the economic sphere, fostering innovation and efficiency.
Stefano Bartolini (1999,2000) discusses the relationship between competition
and democracy, highlighting the dimensions of contestability, availability, decid-
ability and vulnerability. Terence Qualter (1991) emphasizes the centrality of elect-
oral competition in liberal democracy, viewing free elections as a defining feature.
These studies collectively underscore the complex and multifaceted nature of com-
petition within liberal democracies.
Competition is of central importance in both democratic theory and empirical
studies of party behaviour (Bartolini 2002). Free and fair elections are the primary
mechanism for political competition, allowing different parties and candidates to
compete for public office. Multiparty systems and plurality of choice are a usual
outcome. A healthy liberal democracy also presupposes and encourages competi-
tion among various civil society organizations and interest groups which advocate
for different causes and represent diverse interests. All the above aim to ensure peo-
ples satisfaction with the system in which they live in, as competition in its various
forms is vital for ensuring that the system remains dynamic, responsive and true to
its core principles of individual liberty and democratic governance.
Given that political parties represent the basic pillar of liberal democracy, which
is fundamentally based and structured upon competition in all its functions includ-
ing the political arena, this should equally apply for intra-party workings.
Therefore, we expect intra-party competition and leadership elections to positively
influence voterssatisfaction with democracy. When multiple candidates within a
party compete for leadership positions, it signals to voters that the party is open
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to diverse viewpoints and encourages debate. This can enhance the perception that
the party, and by extension the democratic system, is more responsive to different
interests within the electorate and committed to democratic principles. Transparent
and competitive leadership elections can make voters feel that leaders are chosen
based on merit and popular support rather than backroom deals, enhancing the
legitimacy of the leadership.
Our focus is with party voters. Although not necessarily directly engaged in
intra-party leadership contests, and most often they are not, we expect that party
voters will be interested and to some extent affected by what happens internally
to the party they support and vote in. This, in turn, might affect their perceptions
and SWD, given the central role parties have in contemporary liberal democracies.
Party voters who do not partake in intra-party elections, not only often have a pref-
erence for the leader of the party they vote for, but frequently acknowledge that
party leaders influence national politics, sometimes more than parties as organiza-
tions. When there are contested elections, it unavoidably affects not only the mem-
bership, but also the voters due to the spillover effects of the process. To put it
differently, in the same way that we expect norms and behaviours that appear at
the system level to affect the party as an open subsystem that reacts to changes
in its environment (Barnea and Rahat 2007), we also expect the opposite direction
of influence. Based on the discussion above we expect that:
Hypothesis: The more contested the intra-party leadership election, the greater the
levels of SWD among party voters.
Case selection and methodology
Our case selection for the cross-sectional analysis includes 11 of the countries
included in the Comparative Study or Party Leaders (COSPAL). The countries
examined are Norway, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, UK, Hungary,
Israel, Portugal, Spain and Italy. These countries share a number of common char-
acteristics that allow a meaningful comparison: they are parliamentary democracies,
and they have multiparty systems and membership-based party organizations. As
such, the findings presented here are likely to be more generalizable for countries
with similar institutional characteristics.
The main objective of this research is to examine whether the degree of competi-
tiveness in intra-party elections for the partys leadership potentially impacts party
votersSWD.
1
The primary hypothesis is that there is an increase in mean SWD
among party voters whose parties had competitive intra-party elections for the
party leadership. To arrive at tangible results, we need two sources of data: (a)
data on the timing when each party held intra-party elections for party leadership;
and (b) surveys of SWD among party voters before and after the intra-party elections.
With regard to the inventory of intra-party elections for the party leadership, we
use the COSPAL, which contains information on intra-party elections from 11
countries. For data on SWD, we relied on the Mannheim Eurobarometer (ΜΕ)
Trend File 19702002 and all nine waves of the European Social Survey (ESS)
(20022018). In a sequential format, the ME contains the Eurobarometers con-
ducted from 1970 to 2002. From around the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the survey
8 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
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asked European voters how satisfied they were with democracy (on a scale of 1 to 4,
where 1 corresponds to very unsatisfiedand 4 to very satisfied) and which party
they voted for in the last national election.
2
The ESS includes the same question, but
the time gap between its waves is two years. Our analysis acknowledges this differ-
ence and controls for any implications (see below). Due to the combination of these
datasets, the analysis only employs data from countries where the Eurobarometer
and the ESS were conducted on a regular basis.
To examine whether competitiveness in intra-party elections affects SWD, we
estimated the mean value of SWD of party voters before and after the intra-party
elections. The outcome variable is the difference between the two mean values of
SWD (before and after t). The two main explanatory variables capture the level
of competition in the intra-party elections. The first explanatory variable is a cat-
egorical variable with three categories: Coronation(baseline level), Dueland
Multi-competitive. Coronations are intra-party elections with only one candidate
(regardless of whether this is the existing party leader or a new party leader), duels
are intra-party elections with only two candidates, and multi-competitive elections
are intra-party leadership races with more than two candidates. Alongside the cat-
egorical assessment of competition, the establishment of a systematic method for
quantifying the extent of intra-party competition for party leadership in various
electoral formulas is essential. For this purpose, we employed Markku Laakso
and Rein Taageperas(1979) effective number of parties (hereafter ENC)
3
equation:
ENC =
1
n
i=1C2
i
where nis the number of candidates with at least one vote and C2
ithe square of
each candidates vote share. The equation yields higher values in intra-party elec-
tions with many candidates competing for the partys leadership, and each acquires
a substantial proportion of the votes. The lower values come from intra-party elec-
tions where the winning candidate won by a significant margin from the rest. Thus,
higher values of ENC indicate more significant intra-party competition.
In many cases, intra-party elections for the partys leadership are foreseen by the
party statutes at specific intervals. They do not occur solely due to an electoral failure
or an unanticipated development. Hence, our data contain intra-party elections
where the incumbent party leadership faced no opposition (which are the intra-party
events that we classify as coronations). We chose not to exclude these cases as the
hypothesized mechanism, which may link intra-party contestations and change in
SWD, can be evident. In these cases, the ENC value is 1 (the lowest possible).
The statistical models included relevant control variables to control for any
latent source of SWD variation unrelated to intra-party elections for party leader-
ship. A principal finding in the literature is that voters of parties that won elections
are more satisfied with democracy (Anderson et al. 2005; Blais and Gélineau 2007;
Singh et al. 2012). Therefore, two essential control variables we included are
whether the party is in government and the difference in the partys electoral results
in the last two national elections. We have added the ideological parameter as one
can presume that partiesideological affiliations directly influence how their voters
perceive intra-party procedures.
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To control for possible effects of events that took place between the two survey
waves, we first added a variable measuring the length of time, in calendar days,
between the two waves and a variable measuring the length of time between the
leadership race and the second wave. We also added a variable in the models
that measure the difference between the last national legislative elections and the
intra-party leadership race (also in calendar days). Furthermore, a dichotomous
variable was added that takes values when there were national legislative elections
between the two waves. Finally, we added a variable that takes value if there was a
change in the party leader or if the incumbent remained in office.
Table 1 summarizes the number of observations per country and time period. It
should be noted that there are no observations between 1996 and 2002. The reason
is that although the two mass surveys we used (ME and ESS) cover the last four
decades, not all Eurobarometer waves combine questions on SWD and voting in
the last national elections. Unfortunately, between 1996 and 2002, no
Eurobarometer wave included both questions of interest. In addition, out of the
186 observations of the independent variable (holding intra-party elections or
not), only 56 elections were contested by more than one candidate, and we have
data for the vote shares of all candidates. The remaining 130 intra-party elections
had one candidate; therefore, the ENC value in these cases is 1.
Furthermore, we ran an individual-level analysis, using panel data from the
German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). More specifically, waves 14 and 15
of GLES were conducted before and after the January 2021 Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) leadership election. The ruling centre-right party was in the midst
of a crisis as its new leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, was challenged and
eventually forced to resign after a series of negative results in regional elections.
The new intra-party election was held on 15 January 2021. None of the three can-
didates secured 50% of the votes, so the first two candidates advanced to the second
Table 1. Summary of the Countries and Years of Observations
Country Time period Number of elections
Austria 20042017 13
Belgium 19832016 35
Denmark 19892012 13
Germany 19892017 28
Hungary 20042009 3
Israel 20112014 3
Italy 19892017 13
Norway 19912012 22
Portugal 19862011 28
Spain 19882017 21
UK 19892007 7
Total 186
10 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.27 Published online by Cambridge University Press
round. There, Armin Laschet defeated Friedrich Merz by 5.58%. In addition to the
question of SWD, the GLES provides participantsevaluations of the two candi-
dates, thus enabling us to identify which CDU voters preferred the winning or los-
ing candidate in the intra-party election. The two waves conducted between the
intra-party election allow us to examine whether CDU voters were more likely to
state that they were less satisfied with democracy than before the intra-party elec-
tion. This individual-level analysis complements the first and permits us to reach
more conclusive findings on the main research question, as it allows us to examine
whether there was any effect on SWD for voters of a party having an arguably very
competitive intra-party election compared to voters of other parties who did not
experience an equivalent situation.
Results and analysis
Intra-party elections are often, and at least in some European countries, a note-
worthy political development. However, there are significant differences in the fre-
quency of intra-party elections between countries, types of parties and time periods.
Based on the descriptive evidence from the sample, competitive intra-party elec-
tions are much more usual in some countries than in others. This suggests that
the particular features of each party system may drive different intra-party dynam-
ics and developments.
For example, in our sample, the countries with the highest numbers of competi-
tive intra-party elections are Belgium (14) and Portugal (12). In Belgium, intra-party
elections seem quite widespread. Given that the Belgian party system is one of the
most fragmented in Europe, the high number of competitive intra-party elections
is not so unexpected. In Norway, in all 22 sample cases, the intra-party elections
had only one candidate. However, a leadership change was observed in 7 of these
22 cases. The above suggests that there are significant differences between countries
regarding the frequency with which parties hold competitive intra-party elections.
The total number of intra-party elections included in our sample is 186; 93 of
them took place after 2000 and 93 before 2000. Among the 56 elections that
were competitive (i.e. had at least two candidates), 33 were held after 2000 and
only 23 before the start of the current millennium. This may suggest that the con-
tinuing decline in the publics contempt for political parties, which has intensified
over the last two decades, has created deeper tensions within parties, thus resulting
in increased intra-party activity and division.
Figure 1 presents the variance of ΔSWD based on the three groups of the inde-
pendent variable that reports the type of the leadership race that is, whether or
not the intra-party elections had only one candidate, only two candidates or
more than two candidates. The range of values for the parties that did not have con-
tested intra-party elections appears to be wider. However, the mean values (repre-
sented by the large white dot for each of the three groups) are nearly identical. The
mean value for parties that did not have contested intra-party elections is only
slightly higher than the other two categories (differences 0.064 and 0.088 respect-
ively). Therefore, prima facie, there does not seem to be a significant decrease in
SWD for partiesvoters that had contested internal elections compared to parties
that did not.
Government and Opposition 11
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Figure 2 shows the association between ΔSWD and ENC. First, we observe that
most of the ENC values are 1, as most intra-party elections of our sample had only
one candidate that is, they were coronations. Beyond that, we observe that many
ENC values are around 2. This may arise because, in most intra-party elections with
more than one candidate in our sample, the total number of candidates is two.
Based on the equation we use to impute competition in intra-party elections for
party leadership, the value of ENC cannot exceed the value of 2 when there are
only two candidates. Based on Pearsons correlation result, the relationship between
the two variables is negative but very weak (R=0.1). The correlation is not stat-
istically significant. Hence, it does not seem that the magnitude of the intra-party
competition affects the SWD.
Table 2 presents the results of country/survey wave fixed-effects OLS models.
4
We chose to control for any differences that may arise between countries and
Figure 1. Distribution of ΔSWD and Leadership Race Categories.
Figure 2. Scatterplot of ΔSWD and Effective Number of Candidates Regression Line.
12 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.27 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Table 2. OLS Country/Year Fixed-Effect Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duel (ref:
Coronation)
0.032 0.052 0.015
(0.054) (0.080) (0.036)
Multi-competitive
(ref: Coronation)
0.064 0.065 0.171*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.064)
ENC 0.033 0.035 0.047
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
Party in
government
0.004 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.005
(0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.032) (0.099) (0.032)
Closed selectorate 0.056 0.058 0.072 0.058 0.058 0.109
(0.084) (0.083) (0.114) (0.081) (0.081) (0.196)
Centrist party (ref:
Left)
0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.063
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037)
Right party (ref:
Left)
0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052)
Vote share change 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008
+
0.008
+
0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Gap in days 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GE between 0.026 0.028 0.036 0.024 0.025 0.025
(0.086) (0.088) (0.096) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088)
Days between LR
and GE
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Days between LR
and post-LR survey
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change of leader 0.018 0.024 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.017
(0.047) (0.053) (0.047) (0.035) (0.036) (0.044)
Duel × Party in
government
0.065
(0.103)
Duel × Closed
selectorate
0.098
(0.103)
Multi-competitive ×
Party in
government
0.002
(0.087)
Multi-competitive ×
Closed selectorate
0.221
+
(0.111)
(Continued)
Government and Opposition 13
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time periods, since, as we explained above, intra-party leadership elections are not
equally frequent throughout our sample. The dependent variable (DV) in all mod-
els is ΔSWD.
In Models 13, we examine whether the type of the leadership race affects voters
SWD. The reference level of the main independent variable in these models is
Coronations. In Model 1, the coefficient of Duels and Multi-competitive leader-
ship races are negative but non-significant. This does not alter when we add in
Model 2 the interaction between the type of the leadership race and the govern-
ment/opposition status of the party (i.e. whether the party is in government).
The coefficients of Duels and Multi-competitive races remain negative and non-
significant. The interaction coefficients are also non-significant. Adding the
interaction between selectorate type and the type of the leadership race makes
the coefficient of Multi-competitive races statistically significant. However, the
interaction coefficient is of similar magnitude, positive and barely not statistically
significant at the 95% level ( p-value: 0.071), indicating a possible cross-
cancellationof the two coefficients of this interaction. Moreover, the interaction
coefficient between Duels and selectorate type is not statistically significant.
In Models 46, we examine whether the level of competition in intra-party elec-
tions (i.e. the level of ENC) affects votersSWD.
5
In Model 4, the coefficient of ENC
is negative but non-significant. This does not alter when we add in Model 5 the inter-
action between ENC and the government/opposition status of the party (i.e. whether
the party is in government). The coefficient of ENC remains negative and non-
significant. The interaction coefficient is non-significant and negative, showing that
highly competitive intra-party elections of parties in government are associated
with lower ΔSWD. Adding the interaction between selectorate type and ENC in
Model 6 does not change the previous results. Once again, the interaction coefficient
between ENC and selectorate type is not statistically significant.
6
Table 2. (Continued.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ENC × Party in
government
0.013
(0.073)
ENC × Closed
selectorate
0.036
(0.096)
Num. obs. 191 191 191 181 181 181
R
2
0.370 0.372 0.394 0.379 0.379 0.380
R
2
Adj. 0.146 0.135 0.166 0.146 0.140 0.141
AIC 1.8 1.7 5.1 6.2 4.3 4.5
BIC 164.1 174.1 167.2 153.7 158.9 158.6
RMSE 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Dependent variable: ΔSWD.
Notes: Models include fixed effects for country and survey wave.
+
p<0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. GE = general
election; LR = leadership race.
14 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.27 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Turning to individual-level analysis, Table 3 presents the results of the
individual-level analysis we performed using data from GLES waves 14 and 15.
The two survey waves were conducted immediately before and after the CDUs
intra-party election for the party leadership on 15 January 2021.
7
In this election,
crucial for the political trajectory of the CDU, the primary contenders were Armin
Laschet and Friedrich Merz. Our analysis focuses on the impact of this leadership
battle on the SWD of voters for the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU) alliance, always compared to the voters of the other parties.
Table 3. OLS Models Using GLES Panel Data
(7) (8) (9)
Survey wave (post LR) 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CDU/CSU voter 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Merz support 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.010)
Leftright position 0.02
+
0.02
+
0.02
+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.26)
Gender 0.37 0.37 0.37
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Political interest 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Survey wave ( post LR) × CDU/CSU voter 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Survey wave ( post LR) × Merz support 0.00
(0.00)
CDU/CSU voter × Merz support 0.01
(0.01)
Survey wave ( post-LR) × CDU/CSU voter × Merz support 0.00
(0.01)
Num. obs. 12,951 12,951 12,951
R
2
0.893 0.893 0.893
R
2
Adj. 0.769 0.769 0.769
AIC 24,022.3 24,024.0 24,025.4
BIC 75,923.9 75,933.0 75,956.9
RMSE 0.36 0.36 0.36
Dependent variables: ΔSWD and Vote-switching.
Notes: Models include fixed effects for country and survey wave.
+
p<0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. GE = general
election; LR = leadership race.
Government and Opposition 15
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The main explanatory variable is CDU/CSU voter, which denotes if the
respondent intends to vote for CDU/CSU (=1) or not (=0). The primary interest
is in the interaction between Survey wave (post LR)and CDU/CSU voteras this
will show if CDU/CSU voters are more satisfied with democracy after a very com-
petitive leadership race. Model 7 includes the main effects of the survey wave,
CDU/CSU voter status, and control variables such as support for Friedrich
Merz (over Armin Laschet), leftright position, gender and political interest.
Model 8 adds the interaction term between the survey wave and CDU/CSU
voter status to examine how an arguably competitive leadership race influences
SWD among CDU/CSU voters compared to other party voters. Model 9 further
includes a three-way interaction term among the survey wave, CDU/CSU voter
status and support for Merz to explore if the interaction effect varies by the degree
of support for the two main candidates. Moreover, including individual fixed
effects in these models is crucial as it controls for unobserved individual-specific
factors that could influence SWD, thereby isolating the impact of the variables of
interest. This approach helps in accounting for potential biases due to time-
invariant characteristics of the respondents, leading to more accurate estimates
of the causal effects.
The results in Model 7 show a significant negative effect of the survey wave (post-
leadership race) on SWD, indicating a general decrease in satisfaction after the leader-
ship race across all voters. However, the coefficient for CDU/CSU voteris not signifi-
cant, suggesting no overall difference in SWD between CDU/CSU voters and other
party voters. In Model 8, the interaction term between the survey wave and CDU/
CSU voter status is negative but not statistically significant, implying that the competi-
tive leadership race did not significantly change the SWD for CDU/CSU voters relative
to other party voters. Model 9 includes additional interaction terms, but none is stat-
istically significant, indicating that neither support for Merz nor its interaction with the
survey wave and CDU/CSU voter status significantly affected SWD.
Furthermore, we examine whether the running of the leadership race was likely
to have other similar effects on party voters. Expanding on our main hypothesis, we
expect that CDU/CSU voters are less likely, in the post-leadership race survey wave,
to switch to other parties or to abstain, as the highly competitive internal party pro-
cess enhanced their perception of their partys levels of internal democracy and, by
extension, their perception of the party in general. To test this hypothesis, we com-
pare CDU/CSU voters to the rest of the respondents who stated a voting intention
in the pre-leadership race survey wave to see if they stuck to their party or deflected
in the post-race survey wave. The logistic regression model presented in Table 4
assesses the likelihood of voter deflection, with a particular focus on the level of
support for Friedrich Merz over Armin Laschet to check whether a possible positive
effect is homogenous among all CDU/CSU voters.
In Model 10, the dependent variable is Deflect, which indicates whether a voter
changed their voting intention from the pre-race survey to the post-race survey
wave, coded as 1 if deflected and 0 if not. The main explanatory variable is
CDU/CSU voter (lagged), which indicates whether the respondent was a CDU/
CSU voter in the pre-leadership race survey (coded as 1 if yes, 0 if no). Another
key variable is Merz support, which measures the respondents support for
Friedrich Merz over Armin Laschet.
16 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.27 Published online by Cambridge University Press
The coefficients for CDU/CSU voter status, Leftright position, Gender and
Political interest are statistically significant, indicating their relevance in predicting
vote-switching. The coefficient for CDU/CSU voter status (lagged) is negative and
statistically significant, suggesting that CDU/CSU voters are less likely to deflect
compared to non-CDU/CSU voters. The coefficient for Merz support is not statis-
tically significant, implying that the support for Merz over Laschet does not have a
direct effect on voter deflection. However, the interaction term between CDU/CSU
voter status (lagged) and support for Merz is positive and marginally significant,
suggesting that among CDU/CSU voters, higher support for Merz may slightly
increase the likelihood of deflection.
To better understand the above interaction, we illustrate the relationship graph-
ically, as interpreting the interaction term from the regression table can be challen-
ging. Figure 3 provides the visual representation of the interaction. The x-axis
represents the preference among the two main CDU candidates, with negative
values indicating a preference for Laschet and positive values indicating a prefer-
ence for Merz. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of deflection, the likeli-
hood that a voter will change their voting intention from the pre-leadership race
survey wave to the post-race survey wave. Overall CDU/CSU voters are less likely
to deflect compared to the other participants. However, the predicted probability
Table 4. Logistic Regression Predicting Voter Deflection by CDU/CSU Pre-Leadership Race Status and
Support for Friedrich Merz (over Armin Laschet)
(10)
CDU/CSU voter (lagged) 0.248**
(0.081)
Merz support 0.005
(0.013)
Leftright position 0.042*
(0.018)
Gender 0.185**
(0.070)
Political interest 0.265***
(0.039)
CDU/CSU voter (lagged) × Merz support 0.045
+
(0.025)
Num. obs. 5,166
AIC 5,414.1
BIC 5,460.0
Log. likelihood 2,700.073
RMSE 0.41
Notes:
+
p<0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
Government and Opposition 17
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of deflection slightly increases as support for Merz increases, suggesting that those
who preferred Merz were marginally more likely to change their voting intention.
This finding suggests that indeed CDU/CSU voters are more likely to stick to their
party but if this is the impact of holding a competitive intra-party election, this does
not have homogeneous effects as Merz supporters are more likely to deflect.
Overall, the coefficients of the primary explanatory variable the type and level
of competitiveness of intra-party elections are negative but non-significant. This
common pattern leads us to conclude that intra-party competitiveness and SWD
may be negatively correlated, but we cannot prove a causal link between them.
The individual-level analysis results confirm no causal relationship between
competitive intra-party elections and levels of SWD. The magnitude of the respect-
ive coefficients is minimal and also not statistically significant, indicating that there
is no direct impact on voters of parties holding intra-party elections characterized
by high levels of contestation.
Conclusions
The present article examined the effect of intra-party elections for the party leadership
on SWD. The results partly contradict the existing, limited literature. Οur hypothesis is
refuted. There is a negative (not statistically significant) correlation between levels of
contestation in intra-party elections and SWD. Our findings also suggest that the type
of the selectorate has no effect on the association between contestation in intra-party
elections and SWD. Taken together, the findings of the cross-sectional analysis provide
evidence that intra-party leadership contestations do not affect party votersSWD levels.
This outcome may be attributed to the limitations of our study. One possible
limitation is the aggregated nature of the analysis, which cannot capture how
much voters are engaged in intra-party processes. This aggregation can obscure
votersattitudes, leading to an incomplete understanding of the effects of intra-
party elections. Furthermore, the existing datasets lack comprehensive data on
Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Deflection by Merz Support, Differentiating between CDU/CSU and
Non-CDU/CSU Voters.
18 Yiannos Katsourides and Nikandros Ioannidis
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.27 Published online by Cambridge University Press
voter engagement and attitudes toward intra-party contests, which are crucial for a
more detailed analysis. These limitations underline the need for more detailed data
on votersattitudes towards intra-party democratic procedures.
Possibly, our results indicate that the continuous disdain for parties has ultim-
ately led to a significant distance between parties and voters, a distance capable of
mitigating or nullifying any possible effects on voters stemming from intra-party
processes. It also confirms the evidence suggesting that the level of SWD is mainly
susceptible to macro-factors (such as the governments overall performance and the
countrys economic situation) rather than micro-developments primarily related to
the configuration of the party system and partiesinternal politics.
Additionally, the panel analysis, emphasizing the January 2021 CDU intra-party
election, mostly confirms the results of the initial aggregated study. The findings
from GLES waves 14 and 15 confirm that intra-party election outcomes do not sig-
nificantly impact overall SWD. They may well suggest a strengthening of voters
proximity to their party, but this does not seem to be a homogeneous effect as it
was mainly observed among Armin Laschets supporters. However, both cross-
sectional and longitudinal analyses align in demonstrating the lack of a statistically
significant relationship between intra-party contestation and SWD.
However, the absence of acausal link must not detract from the fact that, despitethe
small number of observations, the association between the two variables is barely non-
statistically significant. Contrary to what we anticipated, we believe that the results of
this study lead us to infer a possible negative correlation between intra-party elections
and SWD. The increased intra-party competition tends to be weakly associated with a
decrease in votersSWD. Future research should examine what factors cause these two
variables to coincide, as this study has shown that one does not cause the other, but
rather both emerge based on common determinants. One possible explanation for
this negative correlation is the winners and losersmechanism, where supporters of los-
ing candidates in competitive leadership contests may become disillusioned, impacting
their SWD. However, this effect may be more pronounced at a lower level, particularly
among party members who are more directly involved in the intra-party competition,
and as such, it could not be fully explored within the scope of this research.
The results of this study indicate a necessity for further research that delves into
individual-level analyses. Such investigations could offer a more comprehensive
insight into how intra-party dynamics, such as leadership contests, influence voters.
It is crucial to explore the psychological and perceptual mechanisms at play in these
phenomena. By so doing, future research can shed light on the more nuanced ways
in which intra-party politics mould democratic engagement and voter satisfaction.
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.
1017/gov.2024.27.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank the three anonymous referees for their constructive
comments.
Notes
1When referring to party votersin the context of this study, it implies the survey respondents who expli-
citly stated that they have voted (or in some cases intended to vote) for the specific party in question.
Government and Opposition 19
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.27 Published online by Cambridge University Press
2We are aware of the continuation of the Eurobarometer after 2002. However, the question on voting
choice, crucial for our analysis, is only sporadically included after 2002. This intermittent inclusion
makes the Eurobarometer data after 2002 not suitable for our study. Our reliance on the Mannheim
Eurobarometer trend file for the period 19702002 and the European Social Survey for the period
20022018 is due to the consistent inclusion of both SWD and vote-choice questions. In our analysis
we controlled for the time gap and other methodological differences between these datasets.
3Hereafter, we will refer to the result of the equation as Effective Number of Candidates (ENC), since in
our case we utilize candidates vote shares and not parties.
4We opted to include survey waves fixed effects instead for years since in many cases the surveys were
initiated in the last month of the year and completed in the next one. Also, we preferred survey wave
fixed effects as they can control for any methodological adjustments.
5There are five missing values. Three of them are due to the fact that the party released details only about
the number of candidates that took part in the internal elections but did not give the percentage of each
candidate and therefore it was impossible to calculate the ENC. In the other two cases COSPAL was not
able to record the type of selectorate.
6As robustness checks we tested alternative approaches for operationalizing intra-party competition, i.e. com-
paring the years in which the parties had no change in leadership and the percentage points of the first can-
didate in votes. The results are largely the same (see Appendix, Table 5, in the Supplementary Material).
7Wave 14 was conducted between 3 November and 17 November 2020 and wave 15 was conducted
between 25 February and 12 March 2021.
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