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Frontiers in Sociology 01 frontiersin.org
Navigating resistance on digital
platforms: delivery and
transportation labor in Türkiye
BatuhanErsöz
1* and AltanBaşaran
2
1 Department of Social Work, Faculty of Health Sciences, Tokat Gaziosmanpaşa University, Tokat,
Türkiye, 2 Department of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, Faculty of Economics, Marmara
University, Istanbul, Türkiye
Digital platforms are transforming the world of work. However, platforms operating
in similar fields of activity encounter varying mechanisms of opposition, as a result
of dierent degrees of professional institutionalization and their relations with
the state. This study examines the diversified labor/capital struggle processes on
platforms operating at dierent points of urban mobility in Istanbul and makes an
evaluation between delivery and transportation platforms. Therefore, the actions of
workers against digital platforms, news reports and public statements of relevant
actors in both fields were systematically analyzed. As a result of the study, it is seen
that the labor struggle in delivery services includes demands for the regulation
of work in parallel with traditional working class reflexes. On the other hand, the
resistance in the urban transport platforms is formed in the center of the rent and
turns into an institutional struggle as a result of the public activity of the actors.
Thus, the inter-class struggle in delivery services operating on digital platforms
transforms into an intra-class rent-sharing struggle in urban transport.
KEYWORDS
platform work, labor struggle, informal resistance, platformization, digital platforms
1 Introduction: platform work through the lens of
labor process and property relations
Platform-based work has become a global phenomenon, covering a wide range of workers
due to its success in connecting supply and demand (OECD, 2019). e rapidly evolving new
economy has led to the swi development of the gig work market, increasing the number of
non-standard jobs. For example, the number of platform workers in the European Union,
estimated at 28 million, is expected to reach 43 million by 2025 (European Commission,
2021). Unlike the standard process in traditional workplaces, platform workers log on to the
platform systems and accept the job/task or project requested on the system to becompleted
within a specied time period. Moreover, platforms that can operate in a wide spectrum close
the trust gap that spatial dispersion would create in interpersonal relations. e intermediary
nature of platforms eliminates trust issues between service providers and consumers (Berg
etal., 2020). us, platforms oen act as a bridge between those who demand the service and
those who provide it, acting as an important intermediary between the parties.
e platform economy characterizes workers as “independent entrepreneurs / contractors”
and envisions a tripartite structure in which independent workers and customer demands
instantly intersect through applications (Florisson and Mandl, 2018). is process creates a
controversial status for the workers in the platform economy (De Stefano, 2016). e activities
of the platforms, which are shaped by big data and algorithms, make algorithmic management
an important mechanism of organizational management and labor control (Gandini, 2019;
Möhlmann etal., 2021; Jooss etal., 2022; Caza etal., 2022; Parent-Rocheleau and Parker, 2022;
OPEN ACCESS
EDITED BY
José Soeiro,
University of Porto, Portugal
REVIEWED BY
Alisa Petro,
Fundació per a la Universitat Oberta de
Catalunya, Spain
Kenzo Seto,
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
*CORRESPONDENCE
Batuhan Ersöz
batuhan.ersoz@gop.edu.tr
RECEIVED 28 June 2024
ACCEPTED 25 November 2024
PUBLISHED 11 December 2024
CITATION
Ersöz B and Başaran A (2024) Navigating
resistance on digital platforms: delivery and
transportation labor in Türkiye.
Front. Sociol. 9:1456617.
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2024.1456617
COPYRIGHT
© 2024 Ersöz and Başaran. This is an
open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the
copyright owner(s) are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in
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is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
TYPE Review
PUBLISHED 11 December 2024
DOI 10.3389/fsoc.2024.1456617
Ersöz and Başaran 10.3389/fsoc.2024.1456617
Frontiers in Sociology 02 frontiersin.org
Huang, 2023). is situation creates an important eld of discussion
for the labor process and oers major opportunities for understanding
the dynamics of working life, which is being reorganized depending
on digital platforms. Digital platforms weaken the power of workers
in employment relations, leading to the equalization of wages at the
lower end of the scale (Veen etal., 2020; Huang, 2023). In addition,
although traditional employment relations have protection
mechanisms for workers, working through platforms individualizes
the risks associated with working life (Webster, 2016; Duggan etal.,
2020; Shanahan and Smith, 2021; Shvetsova, 2022).
e platform ecosystem also prevents workers from accessing
their fundamental right to organize a union. e organizing practices
of trade unions are not eective for gig workers, who are a
heterogeneous and individual group of workers (Lee, 2023) in terms
of the political and legal dimensions of their conditions. e need to
regulate the political and legal aspects of this situation makes the
relations between gig workers and trade unions uncertain (Kresal,
2022). e fact that platforms bring gig workers together in a
centralized structure, even for a certain period of time, creates a
paradox in terms of organizing these workers (Naidu, 2022). However,
the digital possibilities that enable platforms to access global markets
are creating a communication network for platform workers. Workers’
eorts to nd solutions to their problems in dierent ways through
global/local networks support a movement towards new forms of
organization (Eurofound, 2018; Wood et al., 2018; Yenisey, 2022;
Schou and Bucher, 2023).
In this context, three dierent forms of organization are
encountered in platform struggles at the global level. Workers on
platforms can take part in dierent online communication processes
such as online activities. ey can form unions and organizations, or
existing unions can support labor struggles on platforms (Yenisey,
2022). Platform workers contribute to the development of new and
informal models by transforming organizational practices into a
structure suitable for the digital age (Roşioru, 2022; Però and Downey,
2024). Bonini and Treré (2024) point out that resistance practices on
platforms include individual practices such as operating on more than
one platform, having more than one account on a platform, acting
outside platform directives, and collective practices such as solidarity
log-outs and coordinated cancellation of orders, emphasizing that
resistance processes are not only directly against algorithms, but also
through algorithms.
is study aims to evaluate the digital platform relations located
in dierent sectors and to explain the dierentiated nature of the
resistances seen against digital platforms in terms of urban mobility.
e delivery and urban mobility platforms, which constitute the main
object of review in this study, provide a signicant example of dierent
labor struggles. Since 2015, there has been a wide repertoire of labor
actions on these platforms, ranging from mass log-os to public
protests and strikes on a global scale (Maccarrone and Tassinari,
2023). In fact, the Uber driver protests in the U.S., which spread across
dierent states, achieved dierent forms of action and gains, as well as
the support of traditional unions and dierentiated labor groups
(Collier etal., 2017). e global nature of platforms can enable global
actions in terms of labor movements. An important example of this is
the international strikes against urban mobility platforms Uber and
Ly in 2019, ranging from the UnitedKingdom and the UnitedStates
to Brazil and Australia, with various traditional unions supporting
these actions (Chesta, 2023). Moreover, as seen in the case of Spain,
the activities of platform workers organized through associations or
professional organizations can have similarities to the activities of
traditional trade unions (Fernandez and Barreiro, 2020). is
organizational model also indicates the dominant form of organization
for platform workers (Stuart etal., 2023). Traditional unions dier in
how they have approached supporting platform-based struggles.
Unions’ inuence in platform labor struggles can bepositioned in the
tension between responding to the needs of existing members and
reaching out to potential members (Castel-Branco etal., 2023). In
some instances, trade unions may adopt a strategy that prioritizes the
protection of their existing members’ rights (Atzeni, 2023).
Occupational organizations may have a similar approach to the
unions’ approach to labor struggles on platforms, and may have an
attitude of activism that aims to prevent the competition created by
platforms and protect the interests of their members (Collier
etal., 2017).
e eectiveness of digital platforms is not homogeneous across
countries and economies around the world. Many factors, such as the
structure of a country’s labor markets, its infrastructure,
institutionalization level and market mechanism, impact the eciency
of platforms and labor activities (Fairwork, 2021; OECD, 2023). ese
dierences are clearly seen in the Digital Platform Economy Index,
where digital platform eectiveness is evaluated on the country level.
With the data of 2020, the UnitedStates, the UnitedKingdom and the
Netherlands ranked in the rst three places among 116 countries,
while Madagascar, Burundi and Ethiopia ranked in the last three.
Meanwhile, Türkiye ranks 49th with a score of 32.3 (Szerb etal., 2022).
Furthermore, digital platforms have an impact not only on the labor
that works within them, but also on professional actors working in
similar professional elds. is situation leads to struggles against the
operations and activities of the platforms. e demands of the actors
may dier in a wide range from the level of institutionalization of the
professional elds to the political eectiveness of the actors. Likewise,
in Türkiye, there are platforms such as “Getir,” “Vigo,” “Yemeksepeti,”
“Trendyol Go” in delivery services, “Uber,” “Martı” in transportation
services, and “Armut,” which operates in a wide range of activities
from home renovation to maintenance services (Öz, 2023; Uysal,
2023). ese platforms can either internationalize aer their local
emergence or have a direct international character. is transitivity
creates a multi-organizational and multi-actor regulatory and
operational process related to the activities of the platforms.
is study evaluates the dierent dimensions of couriers’ and
urban transport actors’ struggles/resistances against spatially
organized digital platforms in Istanbul. is exploratory qualitative
study aims to analyze why actors in two dierent professional elds
develop dierent forms of struggle against digital platforms based on
their class positions. In this study, the structure of the struggles of
couriers working in delivery services and traditional taxis in urban
transport services against digital platforms in Istanbul are examined
in the context of the possibilities oered by labor process theory
and proletarianization.
In understanding the dierent forms of struggle against the
platforms, the conceptual framework oered by labor process theory
provides a signicant framework for the working conditions and
employment relations of couriers. On the other hand, the struggle of
traditional taxi actors, which represents a dierent class position, gains
ground on the basis of proletarianization and property relations. e
labor process mainly examines the transformation of labor and the
Ersöz and Başaran 10.3389/fsoc.2024.1456617
Frontiers in Sociology 03 frontiersin.org
workplace relations, dierentiated control and consent mechanisms
on the basis of the production process (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy,
1979, 1985; ompson, 1990). As Braverman (1974) emphasises, the
production process is constantly reorganised around capital
accumulation. As labor becomes increasingly detached from the
knowledge of production, the control and supervision shis directly
to the employers. is approach focuses on a dual control mechanism
and is therefore criticized for being a linear approach and not taking
into account the dierent stratications within labor (Littler, 1990;
ompson, 1990). On the other hand, Burawoy (1979, 1985) focuses
on dierentiated control mechanisms in terms of the labor process
and includes the mechanisms of consent generation through various
production organizations in the framework of the discussion. us, it
focuses on the reconstitution of the capitalist production process
within the scope of diversied control mechanisms. According to this
analysis, the capitalist labor process has three main dynamics: job
design and division of labor, control structure in a broad framework
from monitoring processes to rewarding strategies and employment
relations that includes market structure, property relations and the
state. erefore, the labor process refers to both property relations and
general control mechanisms (Littler, 1990). e development of
theories on the labor process demonstrates a dynamic structure.
Dierent areas of research are integrated into the development
processes depending on the changing relations of production. In this
context, ompson and Newsome (2004), who examine labor process
theories through four waves, note that the fourth wave in particular
emphasizes global production chains and new production relations in
which risks are individualized. is approach is especially important
regarding the characteristics of digital platforms that shape the
labor process.
However, the impact of digital platforms is not only observed
between labor and capital in the context of the reorganization of work.
Digital platforms also constitute an important eld of competition for
traditional actors and forms of work. is diversies the processes of
struggle within similar digital platforms and dierentiates the
struggles between “labor and capital” and the struggles between
“dierent layers of capital.” In this context, the relations of small-scale
producer forms with digital platforms are situated in a signicant
point, and the change of property relations and social positions should
beanalyzed on this context. is situation also leads to the discussion
of the occupational rent that small producers have owned based on
their property. Rent is decisive in terms of social class positions
formed within the framework of certain property relations (Marx,
1990). However, especially small producers are in danger of
dispossession and proletarianization on the basis of capitalist
competition (Savran, 2014). e fact that the position of small
producers in existing production relations is based on permanent
property rights linked to rent makes these class positions more fragile.
Small producers, on the other hand, organize themselves through
associations such as professional associations to protect their rent-
based advantages and intervene in competition processes by
institutionalizing (Parkin, 1979).
In regard to this subject, the existing literature is initially
examined, and then the news of actions, statements of policymakers,
professional actors, and unions are analyzed in reference to both
research areas. Finally, the reasons for the dierentiation of struggles
against platforms in traditional taxi services and delivery services are
discussed in terms of employment status, class positions and property
relations. is leads to the dierentiation of the forms of struggle
developed by dierent class positions against digital labor platforms.
erefore, the actions and struggles related to digital platforms, which
can be traced through two examples in Istanbul, constitute an
important example in terms of observing the struggles developed in
dierent property relations and class positions.
2 Method and limitations
is study descriptively examines two dierent cases of struggles
on digital platforms (“Yemeksepeti” and “Trendyol” platforms for
delivery services and Uber platform for urban transportation services)
in Istanbul. Exploratory qualitative research focuses on a group or
individual’s understanding of a social problem, providing meaning
and perspectives on actions and events (Creswell and Creswell, 2017;
Maxwell, 2012). us, new areas of inquiry are being developed
(Patton, 2014) that provide an understanding and exploration of the
unique dimensions of concepts as social phenomena (Maxwell, 2012;
Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). e study reviewed secondary data,
public and political statements, and news regarding the struggles. As
the analysis period of the study, the years 2018–2023 were taken into
consideration, as the years in which the struggles and regulations in
the relevant eld were widely observed.
For both cases, in addition to the relevant literature, the public
news and public statements made by the relevant actors are taken into
consideration. e electronic news archives of various public media
platforms were used to access the news and statements by actors and
institutions. During the search process, certain keywords such as
“courier protests,” “taxi resistance,” “Uber statements,” etc. were used
to retrieve news based on the analysis period of the study. However,
the news and the statements of actors and press releases used in the
study do not represent a quantitative categorization, but provide a
reference to the relevant facts within the scope of this review.
Moreover, a wide range of statements from dierent professional
organizations, especially from relevant public gures, as well as
company statements were examined. While evaluating the processes
of struggle in the delivery services, the approaches of the two major
trade unions in the relevant sector, Nakliyat-İş (Revolutionary Land,
Air and Rail Transport Workers Union of Türkiye) and TÜMTİS (All
Transport Workers’ Union), as well as the news portals of the couriers
in particular, were also included. However, since urban transportation
is also a public service, it exhibits a more complex and multi-actor
structure compared to delivery services. erefore, in addition to the
statements of the Istanbul Chamber of Taxi Drivers (İTEO) and
Istanbul Taxi Drivers’ Association, which are important professional
organizations regarding traditional taxi services, the evaluations of
local government actors were also taken into consideration. For this
reason, the study also includes the statements of the then Mayor and
the mayoral candidates of the two major political parties of the period.
In this direction, rst, the labor relations of couriers working on
dierent digital platforms are focused and class struggles in this eld
are addressed. Furthermore, to comprehend the organizational
processes, labor processes were analyzed with particular attention
focused on the union approaches within this framework. en, the
emerging competition in urban transportation due to digital platforms
and its eects on existing professional actors are emphasized. e
conicts between traditional taxis and Uber in Istanbul serve as the
Ersöz and Başaran 10.3389/fsoc.2024.1456617
Frontiers in Sociology 04 frontiersin.org
focus within this context. e evaluation concentrated on the
institutional and informal struggles of traditional actors in
competition with digital platforms. In addition, intervention strategies
against digital platforms were reviewed based on the statements of
professional actors and policy makers. It should benoted, however,
that the study is not without limitations. First, the study includes the
demands of relevant actors, as documented in the public sphere.
Secondly, the case of Istanbul constitutes a natural limitation due to
its population density and the economic eciency and intensity of the
platform activities. Finally, the platforms examined were chosen due
to the fact that they were the platforms where the most intense debates
and labor movements were observed in the relevant period.
3 Digital labor platforms and delivery/
transport workers in Istanbul:
dierentiating forms of resistance
e increasing mobility of people and goods on a global scale
brings new forms and methods of mobility into the agenda, based on
exibility and more intensive use of digital tools (Krastev, 2017). ese
developments are directly parallel to the growth in the platform
economy, and digitalization creates new possibilities in terms of
mobility. It is also observed that digital platforms have the ability to
combine and diversify services with dierent functions in the urban
space. For example, the rm “Uber” can provide both a service for
urban transportation and also oers business models for on demand
food delivery service. Discussions in this area usually focus on the
labor process on platforms (Gandini, 2019), labor relations (Kullmann,
2022; Howson etal., 2022) and new organization dimensions (Joyce
etal., 2023). However, platforms do not only change labor relations in
the production process, but they may also confront traditional actors
in some professional areas as well.
In order to gain insight into the processes of institutionalization
in the eld of delivery and transportation in Türkiye, it is useful to
provide a brief overview of these processes. In Türkiye, delivery
services are a relatively new eld on the line of late development of
capitalism. Especially since the 1980s, this service area has expanded
in parallel with the economic transformation Türkiye has experienced
(Kıdak, 2021; Kaya et al., 2022). is expansion process can also
betraced in terms of employee organizations, with 12 trade unions
operating within the relevant sector. It is stated that the existence of
dierent unions in the relevant eld also results in union competition
(Kıdak, 2021). Moreover, the gradual increase in the number of
couriers working independently through platforms, which is a
common phenomenon across platforms, brings about the
transformation of the organization of labor in this sector. Urban
transportation, on the other hand, is more complex in terms of both
institutional and organizational structure, and the late capitalist nature
of urban development in Türkiye leads to the predominance of
informal elements in the organization of urban services (Tekeli etal.,
1976). In examining the historical development of urban
transportation, it becomes evident that a multi-actor structure has
emerged, comprising both private and public actors. In the case of
Istanbul, taxis operate as independent operators depending on the
regulations of the local government. e structure of taxi operation
based on private ownership does not indicate a large-scale
corporatization, and urban transportation is provided through
individual license ownership. us, the urban transportation service
provided by taxis is under the control of the local government, but on
an individual basis. e local government controls the number of taxi
licenses. While the population is constantly increasing, the number of
taxi licenses does not increase at the same rate or remains xed,
leading to the renting of licenses. In addition, taxi license holders have
historically struggled to prevent competition by limiting new licenses
(Altınoklu, 2023; Tekeli, 2010). Moreover, taxi drivers can bedirect
license holders, employee-drivers working under the license holder,
or independent drivers who rent the license (Ergün etal., 2020). is
causes the emergence of a complex multi-actor structure in taxi
transportation, distinct from delivery services. erefore, the two
service areas must beelaborated separately.
3.1 Struggle within the digital platforms:
case of delivery workers in Istanbul
e employment structure of on-demand delivery services, which
have been growing in recent years, is similar to the self-employment
process described above, and actors in this eld generally work as
independent contractors. e logic of outsourcing, which is shaped by
costs and based on exibility in the capital accumulation process, also
becomes central to the organization of work in delivery services
oered by (Goods etal., 2019). Controlling labor supply at the spatial
level is particularly important for professions that require continuous
activity in urban space, such as delivery services, and through digital
platforms, idle labor at the spatial level can beoperationalized. In this
context, the issues raised regarding self-employment are also present
in the case of Türkiye.
Couriers operating within digital platforms have been
encountering a diversied repertoire of struggles and organizing
processes since the early 2020s to have their specic demands met by
the platforms (Abilio etal., 2021; Woodcock and Cant, 2022). For
example, Stuart etal. (2023), who examined labor unrest in 19 rms
and 95 countries between 2017 and 2020, found that the highest
number of incidents occurred in Europe with 51%, followed by Asia
with 25% and South Africa with 17%. ere are also signicant
dierences between the eectiveness of traditional unions and
informal groups in these struggles on a global level. e struggles seen
on the platforms are mostly through informal organizations and
include direct struggles of workers (Stuart etal., 2023). Within the
framework of the study, the actions of couriers operating in “Trendyol”
and “Yemeksepeti,” which are important examples of delivery services
among digital platforms in Türkiye, are analyzed. ere are similarities
to the global eld in both the beginning of the protests and the
workers’ demands. In this regard, it is important to elaborate the labor
struggles that have developed on the basis of both platforms.
ese platforms started their operations locally, but later acquired
a global character. “Yemeksepeti” was sold to Germany-based
“Delivery Hero” in 2015, while 86% of the “Trendyol” platform was
acquired by China-based “Alibaba Express” (Öz, 2023). Both platforms
have been confronted with labor protests that have been on the public
agenda since the beginning of 2022. A series of demands regarding the
organization of work, in particular the delivery payments, were made
to the platforms, while collective “ignition shutdowns” and slowdown
strikes were carried out (Evrensel, 2022; Serdaroğlu, 2022). During the
protests, which were also supported by trade unions, support
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Frontiers in Sociology 05 frontiersin.org
campaigns were organized on social media with various boycott calls
to raise awareness (Coşan, 2022). As a rst example the actions of the
self-employed couriers working with Trendyol company are evaluated.
At the beginning of 2022, an 11% increase was put on the agenda by
the platform, and in response, the couriers organized a three-day
protest called the “Legendary Resistance Days “, in reference to the
platform’s advertising slogan. As a result of these protests, a 38.8%
increase was accepted by the platform (Kurye Haber, 2022).
Furthermore, couriers working for Trendyol were involved in a
similar action process at the beginning of 2023, stopping work and
staging protests in front of the company’s headquarters, demanding
improvements in both income and working conditions (Birgün, 2023).
e demands of couriers in this area are particularly meaningful in
terms of the control that platforms have over the labor process. e
22-item list of demands created by couriers included improvements
in income, as well as limiting transportation distances, regulating peak
hours and limiting algorithmic control processes. ere were also
demands for social protection, including the extension of recruitment
and employment periods, the provision of health insurance coverage
by the platform, and the prevention of dismissals of couriers due to
the stated demands (Duvar, 2023). As a result of the actions, the
platform management made a statement and responded positively to
the increase in income demands and stated that demands regarding
administrative processes would also beevaluated (Cumhuriyet, 2023).
e action process of the couriers working on the “Yemeksepeti”
platform in 2022, which lasted for more than a month and included
statements and actions at dierent levels, is another example of the
actions of workers in delivery services connected to digital platforms.
It is noted that the fact that those working on this platform consist of
both paid employees and self-employed couriers has led to the
formation of a much more complex labor movement (Öz, 2023).
erefore, the most important demands in these actions were, in
addition to the improvement of income, the demands for the right to
organize and the end of the practice of “self-employed” couriers. As
a matter of fact, the rm also changed the “branch of activity” in
order to prevent unions from organizing, and the union membership
of 2000 union members was revoked (Öz, 2023). In the statements
made in front of the headquarters of the platform during the work
stoppage, there were active calls for support and boycott from
relevant unions such as Nakliyat-İş (Revolutionary Land, Air and Rail
Transport Workers Union of Türkiye) and TÜMTİS (All Transport
Workers Union), and demands for the right to organize were
expressed (Kurye Haber, 2022).
During this process, in addition to actions such as slowdown
strikes and press releases, a strong social media solidarity network was
created with the call of trade unions (Coşan, 2022). e calls for a
boycott of the platform also resonated with the public, with artists and
journalists sending messages of solidarity with Yemeksepeti couriers
through social media channels. At the same time, the Nakliyat-İş
stated that aer the boycott call, there was a 70% drop in orders from
the platform (Nakliyat-İş, 2022). However, it is observed that the labor
movements and boycott calls, which gained public visibility in the
early periods, were insucient in terms of sustainability in the
following periods and gradually faded away without any gains (Kurye
Haber, 2022). It is also stated that the platform transformed its
bureaucratic internal structure during the action process and tried to
prevent existing labor movements by changing the disciplinary
regulation (Serdaroğlu, 2022).
In this context, a dierentiated process of struggle emerges for
delivery workers operating on digital platforms. In Türkiye, as
evidenced by the examples in the global literature, the demands of
platform workers encompass a wide range of areas, from the
establishment of social protection mechanisms to the right to
unionize, particularly the elimination of income insecurity. eir
means of struggle include calls for work stoppages, slowdown strikes,
and boycotts. e couriers’ demands regarding their working lives
actually include a demand for the establishment of a norm parallel to
other examples in terms of industrial relations (Joyce etal., 2023). e
important area of discussion in both cases is the status of being an
“independent contractor,” which structurally points to the outsourcing
of capitalist development, and demands for recognition as “employee”
occupy a central place.
e structure of labor formation, which transforms into a grey
area in terms of delivery services through platforms in urban space,
can produce heterogeneous results in terms of dierent digital
platforms that constitute mobility in urban space. e eectiveness of
platforms can belimited, especially depending on the strength of local
actors. erefore, the next sub-heading will evaluate the nature of
competition between traditional taxi drivers and the Uber platform.
In order to understand the dierent forms of struggle, the focus will
be on the struggles in formal and informal relations and on the
consequences of the approaches of the dierent public actors.
3.2 Occupational segregation, rent and
platform work: traditional taxi resistance
against digital platforms in Istanbul
Urban transportation has also experienced signicant changes as
a result of the eectiveness of digital platforms. e changes in this
area have had a signicant impact in Istanbul, a city of approximately
16 million people, especially when it comes to taxis. In Istanbul, as in
many other parts of the world, taxi licenses are granted to individuals
and these licenses are embodied in the license plates of their vehicles
(Yıldızgöz, 2018). us, a structure is observed in where a public
service is provided by only private actors. However, in Istanbul, the
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) has the authority in urban
transport under the Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5215, and
since urban transport is also an important public service, all decisions
related to transport are implemented through the municipality’s
subdivisions related to transport. Taxi services, as a form of urban
transportation, demonstrate the provision of a public service by
private entities within a framework where individuals own the right
to operate. e responsibility to regulate this service lies with the local
government and its associated bodies. Although the number varies,
there are approximately 20,000 taxis in Istanbul (İBB, 2023) and over
50,000 taxi drivers according to information in 2020 (Ersöz, 2022).
e most important regulatory sub-governmental body in this
eld is the Transport Coordination Centre (Ulaşım Koordinasyon
Merkezi – UKOME), which is required to beestablished in Article 9
of the relevant law. e UKOME comprises representatives from local
and central government, as well as transport-related actors, and its
decisions are legally binding on all parties. However, with the
amendment published in the Ocial Gazette No. 31044 dated 19
February 2020, the membership structure of UKOME was
restructured to increase the weight of central government
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Frontiers in Sociology 06 frontiersin.org
representatives. is has resulted in the central government having
authority in some areas of regulation where the local government was
previously decisive.
1
In this context, as a digital platform providing
urban transport services, Uber is directly subject to the
relevant regulations.
e rm Uber, which began operations in 2009 and provides a
very important example of the relation between urban mobility and
digital platforms, has followed a rapid growth graph, reaching
8 million users and 160,000 drivers in 250 cities in 2014 (Wallsten,
2015). Uber’s activities directly raise debates on competition, taxation
and working conditions (Pepić, 2018). In the context of this study, this
has led to a central position in the debate about competition, given the
negative impact of Uber’s activities on the traditional taxi drivers’
earnings (Berger etal., 2018). Competition in existing taxi services can
also beseen in the restrictions imposed on taxi licenses in Istanbul.
e population in Istanbul has increased by 117% since 1990, while
the number of taxis has increased by only 5.7% (İBB, 2023).
In Türkiye, Uber’s eects have been observed since 2014. To the
extent that Uber has substituted for traditional taxi transport in urban
transport in Istanbul, it has caused a decline in both the potential
income and the exchange value of taxi licenses directly on the market.
us, the decline in potential income as a result of Uber’s activities
problematizes both the income of drivers who provide direct labor in
urban transportation and the rental income of small producers who
are license holders. In fact, this situation can beeasily observed in
terms of the market value of taxi licenses in Istanbul. In 2018, the
period when Uber’s activities and public visibility started to increase,
the price of taxi licenses decreased by about 30% (T24, 2018). During
this period, many dierent institutions and urban transport actors,
especially professional associations, made statements about Uber’s
activities in Istanbul. Taxi license holders, who are small-scale
producers, demanded the cessation of Uber’s activities on the grounds
that they were illegal.
e main problem with Uber’s transportation activities in Istanbul
is that it is providing a similar service within a legal regime where only
taxis are allowed to provide regular urban transportation. In Istanbul,
Uber came on the agenda with the “UberXL” service, which provides
service with luxury segment service vehicles. ese vehicles operate
in Istanbul with a D2 license. e D2 certicate for domestic
non-scheduled transportation, which is mostly used in the tourism
sector, allows for pre-invoiced and pre-contracted services. However,
as a digital platform, Uber is positioned in a grey area by combining
spatial mobilization with technological eciency (İnci, 2018). In fact,
it provides a pre-planned service similar to regular transportation
without a proper transportation license. is situation points to the
main problem with Uber and actually enables those who are not
authorized to operate in this eld to organize through platforms. As a
matter of fact, for a similar urban transportation platform, the
1 As a matter of fact, in a related issue to this study, the new taxi system
project of the local government has been rejected many times with the
opposing votes of the representatives of the profession and the central
government ocials. This situation constituted an important example of the
tripartite and tense structure between the central government, taxi drivers and
local government (Altınoklu, 2023).
“BiTaksi” platform does not face such a problem as it organizes
existing licensed taxis by mobilizing them into the digital space.
is situation has led the actors who work in the traditional taxi
industry to develop a strong opposition to Uber. As a result of the
increasing visibility of Uber’s activities in Istanbul, statements about
Uber from many actors in urban transport became part of the agenda.
In particular, various associations related to the taxi industry harshly
criticized Uber’s activities. e then-president of the Istanbul Taxi
Drivers’ Association even went further, declaring that Uber was
operating illegally in Istanbul and accusing those who drove for Uber
and used Uber of “treason” (Sputniknews Türkiye, 2018a).
e increasing level of strictness in the rhetoric of the opposition
to Uber had repercussions on the ground, with threats and various
acts of violence by taxi drivers targeting Uber drivers (Habertürk,
2018; Ulusal, 2018). is is an important example of informal
organization and income control in urban transportation activities
based on dierent levels of individual licensing. When individual
licensing in urban transport is shaped by weak levels of
institutionalization, potential income control is oen achieved
through informal actions and interpersonal relations, and informal
actions may include acts of violence depending on the level of struggle
(Fourie, 2005; Cervero and Golub, 2007; Spooner and Manga, 2019).
It is observed that a similar process took place in Istanbul during
Uber’s operations. It is noted that in the rst quarter of 2018, when the
controversy started, nearly 30 attacks were carried out against Uber
drivers, and even in some incidents, taxi drivers attacked Uber drivers
by demanding Uber service as customers (Sputniknews Türkiye,
2018b). However, these incidents have not only led to a public
backlash against the already questioned taxis, but also increased the
visibility of Uber. is was also mentioned by the former president of
the Istanbul Chamber of Taxi Drivers (İTEO), who emphasized the
need to improve the existing service through regulation (Eser, 2020).
Both the approaches of the formal professional actors of the sector
and the opposition of the drivers directly through informal relations
in the work process regarding Uber’s activities in Istanbul have been
responded to by policy makers. Various statements have been made
by local and central government authorities against Uber in the
political arena. e statements of political actors in this eld can
beexplained in terms of protecting local “voters “against Uber, an
“external” actor. e then-mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan
Municipality criticized the actions of taxis against Uber, stating that
Uber was a “convenience” (Hürriyet, 2018a), but at the same time,
during the local election process, statements such as “we are ready to
stand by taxi drivers” were made. Similarly, the two candidates who
received the highest number of votes inlocal elections during this
period also issued statements opposing Uber (TRT Haber, 2019;
Anadolu Agency, 2018; İBB, 2018). e President also made
statements in support of taxi drivers regarding Uber’s activities during
the same period (Hürriyet, 2018b).
In this process, the pressure of the professional actors yielded
results in parallel with the consecutive statements of the political
actors. First, Uber shut down its “UberXL” service, an alternative to
taxis, on May 31, 2019 (Habertürk, 2019). en, later in 2019, access
to Uber was completely blocked by court order (Sputniknews Türkiye,
2019). Aer the ban period, there was an increase in both taxi license
values (NTV, 2019) and taxi revenues directly related to urban
transport (Diken, 2020). is shows that restrictions on direct
competition had signicant eects. However, the ban on access to
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Uber was removed at the end of 2020, but Uber’s activities could only
be used for currently licensed taxis, in accordance with existing
regulations (NTV, 2023). us, Uber continued to operate in
compliance with existing regulations.
e struggle of taxis against new technologies is not only observed
in the Uber debates, but like the Uber debates, it is also seen that a
struggle is being developed against the applications of dierent
technology platforms based in Türkiye that provide dierent transport
services. Resistance in this area is not only focused on the urban use
of traditional vehicles, but also on new modes such as the use of
electric scooters or ride-sharing applications. Similarly, there have
been long-running disputes between taxi drivers and “Martı,” a
technology company / digital platform based in Türkiye which
provides urban mobility, and the manager of Martı even claimed that
hehad been threatened by the president of ITEO (Birgün, 2022). In
addition, a temporary injunction was issued following a request by the
Istanbul Chamber of Taxi Drivers, and access to the ride-sharing
applications of the relevant digital platform was blocked in connection
with ‘pirate’ transport (Diken, 2023). On the context of all these
developments, the functioning of digital platforms, which are space-
centered and create urban mobility in Türkiye, oers an important
area of discussion both in terms of labor and capital relations and as
an area of intra-class competition. For this reason, it is necessary to
evaluate these two dierent elds on the terms of their
own characteristics.
4 Discussion
e inuence of digital platforms on various occupations and
employment relations demonstrates a range of impacts across dierent
work domains, as well as the emergence of diverse divisions within the
same occupational sphere. Regarding urban mobility, there are notable
dierences between platforms that provide delivery services and those
that provide individual mobility, based on how labor is organized and
examples of conict in this area. e cause of this phenomenon is
rooted in a comprehensive framework encompassing the structural
features of labor organization to the institutionalization of specic
services. In societies marked by late institutionalization- urbanization,
the structural features lead to signicant dierences in the nature of
the responses to platforms (OECD, 2023; ILO, 2018). e intangible
nature of digital platforms is materialized on space, their activities at
the regional level cause them to have a geopolitical nature, and the
processes regarding the eectiveness of platforms are dierentiated
(Grohmann and Qiu, 2020). e position of platforms in capital
accumulation processes leads to a debate on the eectiveness of local
platforms in terms of becoming a regional power (Seto, 2024). When
these features are evaluated together, platforms are positioned at a
transitional point between the local, national and global spheres
(Steinberg and Li, 2017). For example, the fact that the Türkiye-based
“Armut” platform operates in more than one country under the name
“HomeRun” (Uysal, 2023) is meaningful in terms of observing this
transitivity. is can also beobserved in the government’s approach
to platform activities in Türkiye. e Investment Oce of the
Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye characterizes the acquisition of
platforms in delivery services by global actors as a success story (e
Investment Oce of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2023;
e Investment Oce of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye,
2024). us, the growth-oriented activities of delivery services have
found a legitimate ground. In contrast, public authorities have taken
a clear stance to protect local actors in the banning of Uber’s activities.
is has contributed to the emergence of dierences in the resistance
and its outcomes in the two study areas.
erefore, it is necessary to evaluate these two services in relation
to platforms, dierent class positions involved in the process of
institutionalization and capital accumulation. Moreover, while there
are similarities in terms of urban mobility and labor utilization
patterns of platforms providing delivery and transportation services,
there are also important dierences in the organization of platforms
(Schmitd, 2017). e eld of urban transportation does not only
dene a simple transportation service, but also points to an important
public service. e state aims to maintain these services in a
sustainable way through certain regulations (Çetin and Eryigit, 2011).
is situation causes platforms providing services in urban
transportation to operate in accordance with some existing regulations
(Haidinger etal., 2024). e fact that Uber is organized to include only
licensed taxis in line with existing regulations, as is the case with
similar platforms, eliminates competition with local actors and thus
the main problem area.
e mode of operation in delivery services, on the other hand,
points directly to a private, interpersonal service provision and
accordingly does not involve public service qualities or local
government regulations regarding mobility. Workers encounter
heightened risk during the hours designated as “rush hour” due to
intensied labor ramications in a structure where platforms control
the labor process. e pressure of work in instant-demand delivery
services is particularly challenging, creating signicant risks relating
to trac accidents (Vecchio etal., 2022; Sarkies etal., 2022). However,
many aspects such as income and social security are characterized by
precariousness (Florisson and Mandl, 2018; Vieira, 2020; Popan and
Anaya-Boig, 2021).
e developments emerging in working life on the basis of
technological developments have created a new emphasis on the labor
process (ompson and Smith, 2009). is approach also refers to the
dierentiated employment relations observed on digital platforms
(Omidi etal., 2023). Platforms have control over various elements,
including revenue, time, and productivity. It is emphasized that the
platforms’ control over labor and the labor process can betraced at
three points. First, workers are constantly monitored by applications
in the platform economy (Gandini, 2019; Veen etal., 2020). Second,
the platforms create information asymmetries. ird and nally, the
complex operational background of the applications makes it
impossible for labor to develop various resistance mechanisms. us,
the control of the labor process is shaped at the end of the labor
process rather than during (Galière, 2020; Lin etal., 2020). Moreover,
the deepening and diversifying possibilities of control make it possible
to continuously reorganize labor according to the interests of the
platforms (Van Doorn, 2020).
e problems surrounding employment status and working
conditions have led to the emergence of new organizing movements
and alternative models in this eld. A comprehensive array of organized
activities is witnessed, which extends from work slowdowns and
solidarity-building processes to strikes, facilitated through social media
and communication tools in tandem with state of the art technologies
(Marrone and Finotto, 2019; Cant and Woodcock, 2021; Cini and
Goldmann, 2021). It is also noted that for couriers, the physical
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connection they form with the urban environment plays a vital role in
creating solidarity and a common class identity (Cini, 2023).
Movements in this context are shaped outside the collective bargaining
power of traditional trade unionism and, similar to nineteenth-century
trade unionism (Joyce etal., 2023; Kresal, 2022) tend to focus on the
formulation of legal regulations and involve regional movements
spread across the city rather than workplace-based. is does not
exclude the role of trade unions and their interventions in this area. It
also shows that platform workers are in contact with existing trade
unions. However, unions’ impact in this area varies regionally,
historically and institutionally (Stuart etal., 2023). e couriers’ actions
in Istanbul, which are against the platform’s regulations, also draw
parallels with global literature. Demands to improve working
conditions and reduce precariousness play a signicant role. Moreover,
new mechanisms of solidarity have been formed. ere is a wide range
of resistance to platform regulations, from informal organizations to
joint struggles with formal unions. is situation bears resemblance to
the history of trade union activities in the relevant sector in Türkiye,
where there is a historically extensive repertoire of trade union
activities in the transport sector (Kıdak, 2021; Makal, 2018).
Nevertheless, in Istanbul, the conict between conventional taxi
services and platform actors indicates that the issue is not solely a
matter of labor relations. Rather, it points to a dierent eld of struggle
and to a set of structural problems and institutional arrangements that
extend beyond the mere labor process. To gain a better comprehension
of this phenomenon, it is important to outline briey the impacts of
rent relations in urban transport. e state imposes numerous
regulations, especially restrictions on the supply of taxis, in order to
maintain a balance between the quality of urban transport, which is a
public service, and the income of those who provide it (Cooper and
Mundy, 2016). Moreover, the free exchange of licenses in the market
leads to signicant rent potential, which depends on the class position,
level of institutionalization and political activity of the service
providers operating in this eld. erefore, depending on the
regulations, small-scale providers of urban transport become a
political pressure group that employs lobbying tactics to the extent of
their institutionalization (Çetin and Eryigit, 2011).
Signicant increases in potential license revenues are observed,
especially due to supply constraints. e unavoidable outcome is
occupational stratication in urban transportation through rent.
ose previously engaged in urban transportation as small producers
gradually evolve into employers or rentiers as a result of an increase in
potential income. As a result, they are no longer employed in urban
transportation, and a layered professional structure develops to the
point where the values of urban transportation licenses are sold and
rented (Khosa, 1994; Cervero and Golub, 2007; Seymour, 2009). In
this context, Wyman (2013) describes the private property nature of
urban transport licenses as “problematic private property,” pointing to
the tense process of revenue generation. A similar property relation
process is also visible in Istanbul. However, rst, the role of rent on
occupational stratication will bedetailed.
Analyzing the relation between the phenomenon of “rent” and
urban transport is crucial to understanding the struggle between
dierent actors. Although rent refers to a set of relations that develops
in relation to the creation of value on land (Marx, 1990), as Harvey
(2016) emphasizes, rent debates generally emerge in a eld where
political economy encounters spatial organization and constitutes a
means of claiming rights to potential income. Rentable property
provides advantages for its owners, but it also deepens inequalities at
the social level (Sørensen, 2005), thus contributes to the transformation
of class positions (Harvey, 1985). erefore, Katz (1986) draws
attention to the fact that rent is a much more abstract conceptual
phenomenon, as well as its capacity to deepen capitalist relations.
However, rent in urban transportation is highly fragile. Rent
primarily benets the rst owner economically, but subsequent owners
only receive the potential income. According to Sørensen (2005) and
Holcombe (2018), transport licenses are capitalized based on projected
revenue, thereby representing a direct investment opportunity.
erefore, license supplies can bereproduced by deregulation policies
signicantly faster than in the production of other commodities. e
decline in potential income can lead to the fragmentation of rent-based
stratication and class positions. e actors operating in this eld have
legitimized these restrictions through the discourse of investment
protection and have resisted change and regulation in this area
(Prentice etal., 2010; Wyman, 2013). e situation regarding the
restrictions is also the case for Istanbul, and calculations based on the
needs in Istanbul indicate that the number of taxis required in 2020
should bearound 41,000 (Ergün etal., 2020).
Professional stratication is also central to the organization of
traditional taxi services in Istanbul due to supply constraints.
Furthermore, labor relations and relations with transport authorities
are varied in Istanbul due to the absence of barriers to the circulation
of transport licenses (Ersöz, 2022). is is also observable in the
market value of licenses. In Istanbul, the price of taxi licenses has also
risen in recent years, reaching up to 2 million TL (Gündoğdu, 2020),
approx. $340,000 on the relevant date. In Istanbul, the market value of
taxi licenses is determined by the potential revenue they can generate,
with their rental value being as fragile as in other countries. As a
matter of fact, the value of taxi licenses in Istanbul fell sharply when
the local administration introduced a new taxi operating model for
urban transport under its own authority (Sputniknews Türkiye, 2020).
Although this implementation has not been put into practice, even the
regulation attempt alone has a signicant impact on license values in
terms of observing the rent-generation process. Regarding this study,
the change in the market value of taxi licenses as a result of Uber’s
activities and the struggle mechanisms developed by traditional taxi
license holders in this eld are central. However, it is necessary to
detail the dierences arising from property relations.
e resistance against Uber’s activities points to a struggle that
involves multiple layers. Although the struggle against Uber involves
small producers holding urban transport licenses at the formal level
and drivers at the informal level, it cannot bedescribed as a class
struggle. e resistance of traditional taxis against dierent platforms,
especially Uber, which create a potential alternative through digital
platforms, gains ground at two points. At rst, traditional professional
actors have aimed to prevent the impact of digital platforms in the
formal sphere, both through their involvement in policy-making
processes and through the support of policy makers. is is directly
linked to the institutionalization of small producers who possess urban
transport licenses. Indeed, as explained earlier, for small producers,
competition processes carry the danger of dispossession and
proletarianization. is is a signicant reality in cases where taxi
licenses dene commodities with exchange values in the market. For
example, in the case of NewYork, it is stated that the vast majority of
taxis are not used by their license holders (Wyman, 2013). is process
is also taking place in Istanbul, and a study in 2020 states that the vast
majority of taxis in Istanbul are not used by their owners (Ergün etal.,
2020). Moreover, Uber’s activities in Istanbul had a direct impact on
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Frontiers in Sociology 09 frontiersin.org
drivers, and taxi drivers who started to operate in Uber emerged on the
agenda. In particular, it is stated that Uber creates a bargaining space
for the working conditions of drivers working with license holders and
a regulatory eect in terms of labor relations (Ersöz, 2022). For urban
transport license holders, the existence of digital platforms implies a
signicant loss of the value of their property, resulting in the loss of
their current advantages and a shi in their social class position. In fact,
the continuation of Uber’s activities with only taxi-licensed vehicles is
an important example of the competitive axis of the current relation.
Furthermore, the conict in this area has not only advanced through
formal and bureaucratic means, but has also been encountered through
informal measures on the eld, occasionally involving violent actions.
Although the struggle here involves the interventions of those working
directly in the eld, it is not possible to characterize that as a class
struggle. As ompson (1990) emphasizes, even if the class struggle
does not involve a whole class, it should have a class character in terms
of its aims. However, in this case, the informal actions are focused on
preventing competition from the digital platforms, even if the actions
are carried out by the drivers. e events do not involve a direct conict
between labor and capital. Rather, they represent a reection of the
intra-capital struggle between the existing small producers and the
digital platform in the eld. e tense relation between drivers and
platforms is rooted in the complexity of the drivers’ class position.
Although traditional taxi drivers in the eld oppose digital platforms,
their main goal is to preserve their employment opportunities by
resisting the disappearance of small-scale production due to competition.
5 Conclusion
Evaluation of the platforms’ eectiveness in the context of Istanbul
reveals diverse forms of labor resistance that are constantly mobile in
the urban space. In terms of delivery services, the relations established
with platforms create the reections of a non-unionized laborization,
precarity and informal organization for the working class that indicates
emerging/developing class reexes. However, in cases such as taxi
services and Uber, where platform activity impacts the traditional
organized structures of the professional eld, the processes of struggle
are replaced by political activity. For taxi license holders, who are
already organized and demonstrate a petty bourgeois reex in a
profession stratied on the basis of rent, the relations and the networks
of inuence they have within the local and central government are the
main determinant. In addition to the formal organization that
interferes with public regulations, informal actions are also
encountered, and struggles to prevent the fragmentation of potential
income are organized in a way that may involve direct violence.
Resistance to platforms is visible in both occupational elds with
varying levels of mobility in urban areas. However, the results dier
according to their institutionalization. e struggle of the couriers
against the platforms, although generally directed against the
“independent contractor” organization of work, also reects a general
reex related to the labor process. During the strikes, couriers
achieved multiple benets but also encountered harsh opposition
from the platforms. us, demands for the legal regulation of labor
platforms follow a bottom-up path.
On the other hand, actors organized as small businesses and
operating directly within the local administration are able to take their
struggles regarding the platforms directly to the political arena through
their activities in political and bureaucratic eld. As political pressure
groups, actors within Istanbul’s traditional taxi services are eective in
preventing or restricting the activities of the digital platforms. us,
for these professions, the struggle within the platforms turns into a
struggle for existence in terms of the preservation of their class
positions. In this aspect, workers in urban transportation and delivery
services represent “individual contractors” through small-scale
production. However, when considered in terms of class positions, the
reexes of small producers against platforms in urban transport are at
one end of the debate on the competition-based shaping of capital
accumulation. e struggle of the actors in this eld aims to prevent
the decomposition of rent. us, their actions dene a resistance to
protect the current class positions. At other end of the debate labor in
delivery services organizing against platforms represent a repetition of
past experiences in a new digitalized playground as they ght to
berecognized as “workers” and secure their rights. Consequently, a
diverse spectrum of resistance is observed, encompassing both internal
labor struggles within platforms and external opposition to platforms.
Finally, the development of platform labor in Türkiye presents a
process shaped particularly in Istanbul. In this respect, the network of
relations formed within the framework of the economic, political and
therefore legal powers of the actors in the urban space is the
fundamental basis for the rules of platform working relations in other
cities. Comparative analyses of the examples in dierent urban spaces
in Türkiye can help to follow the development of the process and also
provide indicators for the future as well. e existence of new
platforms and their impact will also constitute one of the important
areas of research in the future. Considering the extent of working on
platforms on a global scale and their increasing activities over the
years, it is important to dene the employment status in Türkiye in a
way that includes new categories in accordance with the global eld
and to implement regulations to secure labor rights. Moreover, the
multidimensional characteristics of the platforms’ organization
require the consideration of dierent stakeholders in these regulations.
Author contributions
BE: Writing – original dra, Writing – review & editing. AB:
Writing – original dra, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
e author(s) declare that no nancial support was received for
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Acknowledgments
is paper is an updated and extended version of the work
presented as a brief abstract at the “7th International Social Sciences
and Innovation Congress” between 10.06.2023-11.06.2023.
Conflict of interest
e authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or nancial relationships that could
beconstrued as a potential conict of interest.
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Frontiers in Sociology 10 frontiersin.org
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All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent those of their aliated
organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the
reviewers. Any product that may beevaluated in this article, or
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endorsed by the publisher.
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