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Colorblind Cops in Christian America: Christian Nationalism, Race, Politics, and Beliefs About Racist Policing

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Academic research on Christian nationalism has revealed a considerable amount about the scope of its relationships to public policy views in the US. However, work thus far has not addressed an essential question: why now? Research by the authors of this Element advances answers, showcasing how deeper engagement with 'the 3Ms' – measurement, mechanisms and mobilization – can help unpack how and why Christian nationalism has entered our politics as a partisan project. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the dynamics of Christian nationalism without reference to the parties, as it has been a worldview used to mobilize Republicans while simultaneously recruiting and demobilizing Democrats. The mechanisms of these efforts hinge on a deep desire for social dominance that is ordained by God – an order elites suggest is threatened by Democrats and 'the left.' These elite appeals can have sweeping consequences for opinion and action, including the public's support for democratic processes.
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Recent debates about whether educators should teach America's racist history have sparked activism and legislation to ensure students are taught American history in such a way that promotes “patriotism,” amplifying cherished national myths, emphasizing American exceptionalism, and erasing negative historical facts. Building on insights from both social dominance theory and Christian nationalism research, we propose Christian nationalism combines legitimizing myths that whitewash America's past with authoritarian impulses and thus seeks to enforce “patriotic” content in public school classrooms. We also theorize this connection varies across racial, partisan, and ideological identities. Data from a nationally‐representative survey of Americans affirm Christian nationalism is by far the leading predictor Americans believe “We should require public school teachers to teach history in a way that promotes patriotism.” This association is consistent across race (possibly due to divergent meanings of both “Christian nationalism” and “patriotism” across groups), but varies by partisanship and ideological identity for whites. Specifically, Christian nationalism brings whites who identify with the ideological and political left into complete alignment with their conservative counterparts who are already more likely to support mandatory patriotic education. Our findings provide critical context for ongoing battles over public‐school curricula and education's role in perpetuating social privilege.
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Previous research suggests an angry God image is a narrative schema predicting support for more punitive forms of criminal justice. However, this research has not explored the possibility that racialization may impact one's God image. We perform logistic regression on Wave V of the Baylor Religion Survey to examine the correlation between an angry God image and the belief that police shoot Blacks more often because Blacks are more violent than Whites (a context‐specific form of cultural racism). Engaging critical insights from intersectionality theory, we also interact angry God image with both racialized identity and racialized religious tradition. Results suggest that the angry God schema is associated with this form of cultural racism for White people generally as well as White Evangelicals, yet for Black Protestants, belief in an angry God is associated with resistance against this type of cultural racism.
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Asymmetric social alignments are transforming American partisan rhetoric, particularly how politicians leverage identity-based appeals. For example, asymmetric religious, racial, and ideological alignments within the Republican party now make reactionary religious rhetoric increasingly strategic. Focusing on that case, I propose a novel conceptual model to understand what such rhetoric aims to accomplish. Reactionary religious rhetoric advertises, appeals, and activates on a spectrum from overt to subconscious registers, which I explain using three metaphors: mating call, dog whistle, and trigger. Within a context of asymmetrical partisan “sorting,” Christian nationalist rhetoric overtly advertises partisanship (mating call). Rhetoric deploying encoded terms like “Christian” and “socialist” appeals to ethno-culture, connecting specific political opponents to abstract ethno-religious threats (dog whistle). Lastly, research on overlapping identities increasingly suggests rhetoric involving threats to “Christianity” may unconsciously activate White racial threat (trigger). I consider applications of this conceptual model to growing political appeals to nationalist and populist identities.
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A principal concern regarding nationalist sentiment is the tendency to sanctify “the nation” and support it as chosen and pure regardless of its complicity in injustice. Building on research showing the tendency to whitewash America’s past is primarily localized to white Americans, and particularly those who stress its Christian heritage, we theorize Christian nationalism amplifies Americans’ willingness to endorse “blind patriotism” (supporting the nation even in the wrong), but only for white Americans as opposed to Blacks or Hispanics. General Social Survey data affirm the more Americans conflate Christian and American identities, the more they agree citizens should support their country even if it is wrong. As anticipated, this association is pronounced for white Americans, but virtually non-existent among Blacks and Hispanics. Stemming from American religious and national identities being deeply racialized, conflating the two sanctifies “the nation” but only among whites, whose national membership and hegemony were historically assumed.
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A growing body of research connects Christian nationalism—a preference for a religiously conservative political regime—to social and political beliefs. This paper raises questions about the validity of a popular scale used to measure those attitudes. I begin by exploring the factor structure of the six-item Christian nationalism index. I then show how semi-supervised machine learning can be used to illustrate classification problems within that scale. Finally, I demonstrate that this index performs poorly at the interval level, a combination of measurement error and the sorting out of religious and political preferences. These attitudes have become so bound up in conventional politics that they often exhibit a threshold rather than a linear relationship to political preferences. I conclude with an appeal for care in matching theory to empirics: Christian nationalism is a prominent political theology, but research must grapple with the limitations of prevailing measurement tools when operationalizing it.
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Research examining how race and ethnic locations shape perceptions of the police is well-established. Yet there is little research examining how religion shapes individuals’ experiences with police. This study examines the influence of race and religion on U.S. adults’ reported experiences with police harassment due to their religion. We find that, independent of race and ethnicity, Muslim adults are significantly more likely to report police harassment due to their religion. Race and ethnicity moderate this effect, with Muslim adults identifying as Black or as Middle Eastern-Arab-North African (MENA) significantly more likely than White Muslim adults to report religion-based police harassment. We find that, independent of religion, adults identifying as Black or as MENA are significantly more likely to report religion-based police harassment when compared to White individuals, a finding that is explained by these individuals’ greater reports of race-based police harassment. That is, exposure to police harassment based on race is more likely to make an individual perceive harassment based on their religion as well. These findings highlight the intersectional nature of individuals’ social locations more broadly and the importance of addressing these multiple locations if we are to address the social problem of police harassment and victimization.
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Most Americans were shocked by the violence they witnessed at the nation’s capital on January 6, 2021. And bewildered by the images displayed by the insurrectionists: a wooden cross and wooden gallows; “Jesus Saves” and “Don’t Tread on Me”; Christian flags and Confederate Flags; even a prayer in Jesus’s name after storming the Senate chamber. Where some saw a confusing jumble, Gorski and Perry saw a familiar ideology: white Christian nationalism. In this short primer, Gorski and Perry explain what white Christian nationalism is and is not; when it first emerged and how it has changed; and where it’s headed and why it threatens democracy. They explain what makes white Christian nationalism “white.” They show how it took shape over three centuries ago. And how it has influenced American politics over the last three decades. Throughout American history, white Christian nationalism has animated the oppression, exclusion, and even extermination of minority groups while securing privilege for white Protestants. It enables white Christian Americans to demand “sacrifice” from others in the name of religion and nation, while defending their “rights” in the names of “liberty” and “property.” The future of American democracy, they argue, will depend on whether a broad spectrum of Americans—stretching from democratic socialists to classical liberals—can unite in a popular front to combat the threat to liberal democracy posed by white Christian nationalism.
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This paper examines race and police use of force using data on 1.6 million 911 calls in two cities, neither of which allows for discretion in officer dispatch. Results indicate White officers increase force much more than minority officers when dispatched to more minority neighborhoods. Estimates indicate Black (Hispanic) civilians are 55 (75) percent more likely to experience any force, and five times as likely to experience a police shooting, compared to if White officers scaled up force similarly to minority officers. Additionally, 14 percent of White officers use excess force in Black neighborhoods relative to our statistical benchmark. (JEL H76, J15, K42, R23)
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Sociologists have long identified a “perception gap” between Black and White Americans regarding racial injustice, often emphasizing either “epistemologies of ignorance” or “religio-cultural” mechanisms. Integrating and extending these insights, we theorize that conceptions of America’s religio-cultural heritage and identity are racially coded and grounded in White supremacy, but only for those atop the racial hierarchy. From this, we predict the perception gap is largely driven by Whites’ racialized idealization of their own religio-cultural preeminence in American civic life—what we call “White Christian nationalism.” Drawing on nationally representative data with currently relevant measures of Americans’ perceptions of racial injustice, we show the more Whites affirm seemingly race-neutral statements promoting Christianity’s preeminence in American life, the more they affirm White victimhood and deny anti-Black injustice. This association seems to drive the perception gap. Specifically, for Whites, Christian nationalism is powerfully associated with refusing to acknowledge anti-Black discrimination while affirming supposed anti-White discrimination; lower likelihood of attributing Ahmaud Arbery’s murder to racism or to even know about the incident; and greater likelihood of denying racial inequality in policing. For Black Americans, however, affirming the same measures of Christian nationalism produces no consistent change in their recognition of racial injustice. Thus, for Whites, appeals to America’s “Christian” heritage are racially coded and contribute to an ideological defense of White supremacy, including the denial of blatant anti-Black injustice and a commitment to White victimhood.
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Christian Americans are on track to become a minority of the U.S. population by mid-century. Research on racial demographic shifts shows majority-group members experience status threat when reminded of similar demographic changes. Public debate about religious freedom and the role of Christianity in America suggest that fast-changing religious demographics similarly elicit threat, and trigger defensive political stances, among Christian Americans. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 766 Christian Americans), reminders of religious demographic shifts evoked perceived threat to religious rights and freedoms, which in turn accounted for increases in Christian nationalism, conservative political ideology, and support for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election. Results illustrate how America's fast-changing religious landscape can evoke threat for Christians and how this threat may influence political reasoning.
Chapter
Historically, police have struggled to build trust and legitimacy in communities of color where the tumultuous relationship between the police and community have created contentious encounters, some ending in police use of force. Events in recent years, such as the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, among numerous other highly publicized incidents of police use of deadly force against unarmed Black men, have renewed the national conversation about disparate minority contact with police, policing practices, and policing culture. The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, we set out to explore how attitudes toward the police are formed and why people of color have historically low levels of trust in police. Second, we examine the effect of Ferguson and similar incidents of police use of deadly force, as well as the rise of activist groups, like Black Lives Matter, on public trust in the police and changes in policing practices and policies. Last, we explore how the rise in media attention and public outcry following police use of deadly force cases have changed police officer perceptions of policing and institutional policing practices. This chapter sheds light on the systemic issues contributing to racial disparities in attitudes toward the police and proposes several new areas of inquiry for future research.
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Introduction Violent encounters with police represent a significant cause of morbidity and mortality in the USA, especially among Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour (BIPOC). This study characterises trends in fatal police shootings overall and by armed status and quantifies inequities in mortality burden and years of life lost (YLL) across racial/ethnic groups. Methods Longitudinal study of Washington Post data on fatal police shootings in the USA using generalised linear-mixed models to capture trends with time and relative rates. Results This study shows that the rate of fatal police shootings for Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour (BIPOC) is constant from 2015 to 2020. Further, BIPOC have significantly higher death rates compared with Whites in the overall victim pool (Native American RR=3.06, Black RR=2.62, Hispanic RR=1.29) and among unarmed victims (Black RR=3.18, Hispanic RR=1.45). Native American (RR=3.95), Black (overall RR=3.29, unarmed RR=3.49) and Hispanic (RR=1.55, unarmed RR=1.55), victims had similarly high rates of YLL relative to Whites. Conclusion Fatal police shootings are a public health emergency that contribute to poor health for BIPOC. Urgent attention from health professionals is needed to help drive policy efforts that reduce this unjust burden and move us towards achieving health equity in the US.
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Recent studies demonstrate that white Americans who adhere to “Christian nationalism”―an ideology that idealizes and advocates a fusion of Christianity and American civic life―tend to hold authoritarian, exclusionary, and overtly prejudicial attitudes, particularly regarding ethno-racial minorities. We use data from the 1996 and 2014 General Social Surveys and consider relative political tolerance toward old-fashioned racists (i.e., persons who believe black Americans are genetically inferior) compared to other historically stigmatized groups, including anti-religionists, communists, militarists, and homosexuals. Viewing Christian identity as essential to American civic belonging is among the strongest predictors of whites’ being politically intolerant of all stigmatized groups, racists included. However, when we examine relative tolerance toward racists compared to other stigmatized groups, white Christian nationalists show greater tolerance than other whites. This effect is distinct from personal religiosity which is associated with lower relative tolerance toward racists. Additionally, we find both time and gender moderate the association between white Christian nationalism and relative tolerance toward racists. Findings ultimately demonstrate that white Americans who adhere to Christian nationalism exhibit authoritarian tendencies―expressing lower tolerance for all groups considered―while making greater relative allowance for old-fashioned racists, who may be allies in the task of social control and coercion.
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Racial disparities in police-community encounters are well documented, with people of color experiencing higher levels of police scrutiny. Far less is known about how police officers perceive the racial dynamics at play in their work. As part of a 2016 study of traffic stops in San Diego, we conducted in-depth interviews with 52 city police officers. Despite evidence of racial disparities in SDPD practices related to post-stop outcomes, officers denied, minimized, or even condemned racial profiling during traffic stops; officers described operating under a neutral policy of “colorblindness.” Our analysis identifies cognitive and discursive mechanisms which explain this complex and contradictory picture. We find that officers’ accounts excuse, justify, or otherwise negate the role of race in routine police work, yet officers’ thoughts and actions are based on racialized and, at times, dehumanizing narratives about people and communities of color. These morally neutral accounts form a pattern of micro-racialized discourse, constituting a layering of racialized processes and practices that cumulatively produce racially disparate outcomes. We argue that rejection of explicit racism alone is insufficient to address the progressive micro-racial aggression that emerges at key points during police-community encounters. We discuss the implications for law enforcement policy and practice.
Book
Taking America Back for God conclusively reveals that understanding the current cultural and political climate in the United States requires reckoning with Christian nationalism. Christian ideals and symbols have long played an important role in public life in the United States, but Christian nationalism demands far more than a recognition of religious heritage. At heart, Christian nationalism fights to preserve a particular kind of social order, an order in which everyone—Christians and non-Christians, native-born and immigrants, whites and minorities, men and women—recognizes their “proper” place in society. The first comprehensive empirical analysis of Christian nationalism in the United States, Taking America Back for God illustrates the scope and tremendous influence of Christian nationalism on debates surrounding the most contentious social issues dominating American public discourse. Drawing on multiple sources of national survey data collected over the past several decades and in-depth interviews, Whitehead and Perry document how Christian nationalism radically shapes what Americans think about who they are as a people, what their future should look like, and how they should get there. Regardless of Americans’ political or religious characteristics, whether they are Ambassadors, Accommodators, Resisters, or Rejecters of Christian nationalism provides powerful insight into what they think about immigration, Muslims, gun control, police shootings, atheists, gender roles, and many other political issues—even who they want in the White House. Taking America Back for God convincingly shows how Christian nationalists’ desire for political power, rigid social boundaries, and hierarchical order creates significant consequences for all Americans.
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Stop-and-frisk and other punitive policing practices disproportionately affect marginalized communities of color. In response to calls for reform, police departments have implemented community policing programs aimed at improving relations with racialized communities. This study examines how a police unit used courtesy and respect in its engagement with a criminalized population, gang-associated Latinos, while relying on the stop-and-frisk practice. Our study reveals contextual and situational contradictions between modern police departments’ attempts to establish legitimacy and the hegemonic practice of investigatory stops. Drawing on observations and interviews conducted during a ride-along study, we find that stop-and-frisk, simultaneously used with reform practices like courtesy policing, yield a paradoxical policing approach, “the legitimacy policing continuum.” Officers regularly articulate a goal of respectfully interacting with courtesy to build community and trust—what we term “the mano suave”—while practicing a dominant logic of crime prevention through punitive measures—what we term “the mano dura.” We argue that community and courtesy policing are drawn on strategically in interaction and ultimately intertwined with and constrained by the racial bias at the heart of punitive policing practices like stop-and-frisk.
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We use data on police-involved deaths to estimate how the risk of being killed by police use of force in the United States varies across social groups. We estimate the lifetime and age-specific risks of being killed by police by race and sex. We also provide estimates of the proportion of all deaths accounted for by police use of force. We find that African American men and women, American Indian/Alaska Native men and women, and Latino men face higher lifetime risk of being killed by police than do their white peers. We find that Latina women and Asian/Pacific Islander men and women face lower risk of being killed by police than do their white peers. Risk is highest for black men, who (at current levels of risk) face about a 1 in 1,000 chance of being killed by police over the life course. The average lifetime odds of being killed by police are about 1 in 2,000 for men and about 1 in 33,000 for women. Risk peaks between the ages of 20 y and 35 y for all groups. For young men of color, police use of force is among the leading causes of death.
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Black civilians are more likely to be stopped by police than white civilians net of relevant factors. Less is known about whether or not racial inequalities exist in police use of force during stops. Using data on over 2 million police stops in New York City from 2007 to 2014 and drawing on literatures on race, policing, and the Black Lives Matter movement, we test hypotheses regarding the associations between race, civilian behavior, age, and police use of force. We also investigate whether recent reforms reduced any observed inequality in police violence during stops. Findings show that Black and White civilians experience fundamentally different interactions with police. Black civilians are particularly more likely to experience potential lethal force when police uncover criminal activity and this disparity is greatest for black youth compared to white youth. Overall, if there were no racial disparities in police use of force, we estimate that approximately 61,000 fewer stops of black civilians would have included police use of force and 1,000 fewer stops would have included potential lethal force from 2007 to 2014. Furthermore, while reform efforts substantially reduced the number of stops annually, inequalities in police use of force persist.
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A large body of empirical research exists that attempts to determine whether or not police discriminate on the basis of race. We investigate whether the methods used typically produce valid inferences. We find that they often most likely do not and that results may diverge from reality in either direction, indicating discrimination when it is not present or alternatively indicating a lack of discrimination when it is in fact present. The reason for this is that tests make assumptions about police behavior that are often implausible. Because of this, the simplest forms of benchmark and outcome tests should not be used, although the problem is more general. We discuss several possible ways to improve inferences about the absence or presence of discrimination, such as employing matching or weighting techniques and using novel, computationally intensive methods. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Criminology Volume 2 is January 13, 2019. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
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Research shows that white Americans who subscribe to “Christian nationalism” – an ideology that fuses Christianity with civic life – tend to draw more rigid racial boundaries. Such research, however, has focused on overt forms of racial prejudices. None have considered how Christian nationalism may influence whites’ covert expressions of racism which are often more relevant for the reproduction of inequality. This study addresses this gap by examining Christian nationalism’s influence on whites’ relative support for government spending that is racially-coded, using data from a nationally random sample. Multivariate analyses demonstrate that whites who more strongly adhere to Christian nationalism are less supportive of welfare spending and more supportive of border spending and spending to reduce crime relative to more racially-neutral government expenses. Findings suggest that resurgent Christian nationalism associated with Trumpism not only reinforces overt expressions of racism, but also undergirds more covert, “colorblind” expressions shaping the policy opinions of white Americans.
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Numerous recent encounters between police officers and Black citizens have resulted in the deaths of African American men and have drawn renewed public scrutiny of police practices. We examine the public’s attributions about these encounters. Does the public perceive violent confrontations between police officers and Black citizens as a result of broader problems in police practices or simply as isolated incidents? We employ attribution theory and social identity theory to understand how social and political identities influence beliefs about police use of force against African Americans. We argue that racial and political identities predispose individuals to believe certain attributional perspectives over others. We test several hypotheses using individual level survey data from two national surveys. Our findings suggest that racial and political identities strongly shape attributions, and these patterns have implications for public trust in government institutions and the ability of police to operate effectively. We conclude with recommendations for police and policymakers. Link to here: http://rdcu.be/Aq54