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Contemporary Security Policy
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fcsp20
Filling the weapons procurement gap in the Indo-
Pacific: South Korean arms exports to India and
Indonesia
Soul Park & Chirayu Thakkar
To cite this article: Soul Park & Chirayu Thakkar (17 Dec 2024): Filling the weapons
procurement gap in the Indo-Pacific: South Korean arms exports to India and Indonesia,
Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2024.2441065
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2441065
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Filling the weapons procurement gap in the Indo-
Pacific: South Korean arms exports to India and
Indonesia
Soul Park
a
and Chirayu Thakkar
b
a
School of Politics, Philosophy & Area Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK;
b
Faculty
of Arts & Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore,
Singapore, Singapore
ABSTRACT
How do second-tier suppliers adapt to defense-industrial globalization and
expand their weapons sales in dierent regions? We oer a demand-side
explanation of arms procurement. As the first-tier suppliers focus on
advanced power projection weapons, two types of qualitative structural gaps
emerge in the global arms market either due to excessive superiority or utter
neglect of certain platforms. Consequently, buyer states turn to weapon
systems produced by second-tier suppliers as they are proximate to their
qualitative needs in terms of strategic/technical and doctrinal requirements.
Through case studies of South Korea’s weapons sales to India and Indonesia,
we show how a second-tier supplier is able to outbid its first-tier
counterparts on qualitative grounds to fill the structural gap left by global
power disparity.
KEYWORDS Indo-Pacific; weapons procurement; South Korea; defense-industrial globalization
Defense-industrial globalization has majorly transformed the global arms
industry as it has become increasingly more sophisticated and transnational
in the post-Cold War era (Brooks, 2005; Mabee, 2009; Park, 2018). Scholars
and policymakers argue that the changing nature of arms procurement
would lead second-tier producers to either converge towards a liberal-
market model or continue to rely on military technonationalism and incur
the economic costs (Bitzinger, 2017; Hayward, 2001; Struys, 2004). Yet,
even in the face of economic challenges posed by defense-industrial globali-
zation and ensuing advances in weapons technology, many small and
medium states in the international system have managed to maintain
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the
Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
CONTACT Soul Park Soul.Park@uea.ac.uk School of Politics, Philosophy & Area Studies, Uni-
versity of East Anglia, 0.29 Arts and Humanities Building, Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ, UK
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2441065
defense autonomy and, in some cases, increased their market share (DeVore,
2015). How did these second-tier suppliers adapt to the globalization of arms
production and expand their weapons sales in dierent regions?
Much of the weapons procurement literature has focused on the domestic
policy shifts and adjustments made by the small and medium states in the
face of defense industrial globalization, what we broadly refer to as the
supply side explanation (e.g., Choi & Park, 2023; DeVore, 2015, 2016;
Ikegami, 2013; Mawdsley, 2008). While this literature oers valuable
insights, it remains a partial picture that lacks a systematic analysis of the
reasons for the buyer (or client) state’s motives for purchasing weapons
from these second-tier suppliers—the demand side explanation. As recent
works have noted, buyer states have shown a tendency to gravitate
towards second-tier suppliers for a variety of reasons, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific region: the rise of external threats (Groll & De Luce, 2016;
Loo, 2005; Naseem, 2023); the provision of attractive oset packages (Ani-
cetti, 2024; Mathews, 2019); the need to modernize outdated military
arsenals (Laksmana, 2018); or the push to diversify its weapons portfolio
and reduce their dependence on particular first-tier suppliers in an era of
growing strategic uncertainty (Boutin, 2009; Storey, 2021).
In this article, we focus on the demand-side of arms procurement and
analyze the factors that lead regional powers to purchase platform-based
weapons systems from second-tier states, at times distancing themselves
from first-tier suppliers in the process. Moreover, this demand side expla-
nation, as the rest of the article will demonstrate, increases our grasp on con-
temporary trends of weapons ow in the Indo-Pacific region as more and
more regional powers facing security challenges from China pursue military
modernization (Broad & Laksmana, 2023). In addition to explaining a key
pattern in the Indo-Pacific region, our research sheds additional light on
the actual procurement calculus of regional actors drawn into a crisis situ-
ation, as the current Ukraine conict has displayed (Herzinger, 2023).
In a nutshell, we argue that second-tier suppliers tap into the structural
gap that exists in many cases due to the dierence between the quality of
the weapons the first-tier suppliers have to oer and the baseline quality
requirements of the buyers. Specifically, two interrelated factors precipitate
this quality gap. First, as major defense manufacturers from first-tier states
focus on power projection capabilities, they either move too far ahead of
the technology curve producing the most advanced weapons or neglect
some platforms altogether. In such cases, their oerings are not relevant
for regional players, who do not harbor power projection capabilities,
leaving the defense needs of these states largely unmet. Second and sub-
sequently, the second-tier suppliers have been more adept at meeting such
defense needs, owing to either the similarity of threat environment or
certain path dependence as they enter the market by improvising existing
2 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
platforms that are licensed or co-produced (Bitzinger, 2003). Consequently,
we argue that regional powers, such as India and Indonesia, purchase arms
from second-tier states precisely because the weapons systems they procure
fit their baseline qualitative requirements. To operationalize “baseline
requirement”, we employ a broad set of strategic/technical and doctrinal
indicators.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we
analyze the structural gap in the weapons procurement process created by
the power disparity in the international system. We examine two interrelated
structural gaps, one positive and the other negative, that have come to exist
in the international system due to the first-tier suppliers’ pursuit of the most
advanced weapons system and power projection capabilities. In the following
section, we conduct in-depth case studies of South Korea’s (Republic of
Korea or ROK) weapons sales: the diesel-electric Jang Bogo/Nagapasa-class
submarines to Indonesia and the K9 Thunder/Vajra-T self-propelled howit-
zers to India. In particular, we assess the strategic and doctrinal reasons
behind the two countries’ decision to strike arms deals with South Korea
in recent years. We conclude with broad implications on the state of the
global arms market owing from our study.
Structural gaps in weapons procurement: Demand-side
explanation
In the contemporary era, the global arms market continues to be dominated by
a small group of first-tier supplier states, who possess “the largest [research and
development] R&D investments and domestic markets, [and] produce the
entire range of modern weapons systems at the technological frontier and
be the dominant arms producers” (Krause, 1992, pp. 31–32). When mapped
over trade numbers, the top six manufacturers—US, Russia, France, China,
Germany and the UK—who hold an average five percent global market
share or above meet these criteria (Wezeman et al., 2023). The US, in particu-
lar, has been at the forefront of cutting-edge weapons technology and has con-
tinuously outspent about two-thirds of all other countries in the world on
defense R&D (Beckley, 2012; Gholz & Sapolsky, 2021, pp. 856–859). More-
over, American defense firms dominate the global arms market overall, with
six companies ranking among the top ten in 2021 (Defense News, n.d.; Caver-
ley, 2018). Likewise, despite facing substantial challenges and declining sales
trends in recent times (Storey, 2022), Russia, which ranks a notch below the
US, has utilized its sizeable arms export as a key tool to advance its foreign
policy interests abroad (Bowen, 2021). Defense firms from the other four
major exporters—France, China, Germany and the UK—compete for the
same space with the US and Russia in selling indigenously developed sophis-
ticated platforms.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 3
In certain categories, these first-tier suppliers have focused on producing
long-distance power projection capabilities or exquisitely advanced plat-
forms (Mazarr, 2020), often at the expense of other low-end and inexpensive
options. For instance, the emphasis on high-end ships by the US Navy has
led to the neglect of “less expensive, smaller vessels that can perform impor-
tant combat missions on their own for sustained period on the high seas,
even in contested environments” (Talent, 2018). Barring Germany, all tier-
one manufacturers mentioned earlier have produced and possess a substan-
tial number of power projecting air and naval assets, commensurate to their
overall power (Lee & Thompson, 2017).
The focus on power projection capabilities and the pursuit of technical
superiority of tier-one suppliers, we contend, has created two types of inter-
related structural gaps in arms procurement in the international system. The
first variant is what we refer to as a positive structural gap (TYPE 1) between
the quality of the weapons first-tier suppliers have to oer and the qualitative
requirements of buyers. Much of tier-one manufacturers’ production and
research is aimed at developing the most advanced weapons, primarily to
serve their own militaries and their ability to deal with various threats and
crises across the globe. Yet, most arms-procuring countries neither require
such advanced weapons for their own security nor can they aord such
expensive platforms. As scholars note, “[m]ore often than not, lesser technol-
ogies are perfectly adequate” (Caverley & Kapstein, 2012, pp. 127–128;
Caverley & Kapstein, 2016, p. 173).
Compared to first-tier states, regional and middle powers need weapons
that can best deal with both the internal and external threats within their
regional strategic environment. For instance, diesel-electric attack submar-
ines, which the US has stopped producing since the 1950s, can be a
cheaper and more appropriate option for many of the US allies in the
Indo-Pacific region (Caverley & Kapstein, 2016; Holmes, 2018). Caverley
and Kapstein (2016) succinctly note that “while the US defence industry
excels at producing the type of arms that its principal client (the Pentagon)
wants, it does not produce cheaper variants of items well suited for the
mission that much of the world, particularly in Asia, currently demands”
(p. 174). Similarly, commenting on US exports to Southeast Asia, others
note that Washington’s lukewarm success in many cases can be attributed
to its eorts at selling advanced and expensive weapons, which are “not
quite needed in Southeast Asian countries” (Siow, 2023).
The qualitative inequality in arms production has simultaneously given
rise to what we refer to here as a negative structural gap (TYPE 2) in the
global arms market. As the other first-tier arms suppliers move ahead of
the technology curve, they exhibit neglect in the R&D of certain types of plat-
forms distancing them from the need of the export market. For instance, as
the US and its NATO partners employed unmanned aerial systems since the
4 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, their reliance on artilleries
declined, leading to a retreat from continuous investment and development
in artillery enhancement (Gordon et al., 2019a; McKenney, 2007, pp. 311–
324). Similar concerns were agged in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war
as analysts felt that the US artillery systems “have atrophied after nearly
two decades of focus on counterinsurgency warfare” (Peck, 2022). More
technical analysis find NATO’s major guns such as the M109A6 Paladin
have fallen behind its peers and currently lack “the more powerful gun
and automation of the current generation of modern howitzer systems”
(Gordon et al., 2019b, p. 19). Noting this as a prominent trend across
weapons systems, scholars suggest the requirements of developing countries
have been “largely ignored by major Western defence producers” (Siow,
2023).
In both these cases—of excessive superiority and utter neglect—the
second-tier suppliers find an opportunity as they continue to rely on and
enhance what has now become “legacy systems” for first-tier suppliers.
Although it is not central to our argument, fine readings of multiple cases
of second-tier suppliers suggest that these states initially started production
through license agreements (Bitzinger, 2003). Over time, they are able to
make technical changes that are better suited to local environments and
have much better qualitative revisions to oer. This gives the second-tier
producers a relative qualitative edge. Specialization, after all, has been one
way for defense industries of medium and small states to survive the whirl-
wind of post-Cold War era globalization (DeVore, 2013). Figure 1 below
depicts the thematic representation of both types of structural gaps in the
global arms market.
Figure 1. Thematic representation of positive and negative structural gaps.
Note: Figure by authors.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 5
Ironically, both types of gaps provide the structural conditions for select-
ing weapons produced by second-tier suppliers in the open market. As the
US and first-tier suppliers are qualitatively farther from the buyers’ require-
ments, which serves as the baseline in our figure, it advantages the smaller
suppliers for certain key weapons. This qualitative proximity to the buyer’s
requirements, we argue, is a demand side explanation that helps us under-
stand the survival, and in some cases ourishing, of the tier-two suppliers
under the onslaught of arms industry globalization. Put dierently, a produ-
cer’s market success depends on the qualitative proximity of its weapons to
the buyer’s demands. Indeed, it is surprising that the role of qualitative proxi-
mity has remained subdued in theorizing procurement choices, especially
because most conceptualizations of arms orders follow qualitative sophisti-
cation as the key marker of division (Bitzinger, 2003; Krause, 1992; Ross,
1989).
We operationalize a buyer’s qualitative requirements through two inter-
related factors: strategic and technical imperatives and doctrinal compatibil-
ity. First, purchasing states consider the strategic environment in which they
operate and procure weapons that best align with their security require-
ments. Today’s largest consumers in the arms market, such as India, Egypt
and Indonesia, have professional armies going back to the colonial period.
Consequently, their institutional memories, recent experiences, threat assess-
ments and ecological factors, such as terrain and weather conditions, trans-
late into technical specifications of weapons. Not only are weapons cheaper
procured by second-tier suppliers in most cases, but they can also have fea-
tures designed to meet similar threat environments of the client states,
making them operationally appealing.
Second, the weapons that states purchase should also fit with their long-
term doctrine. Doctrinal fit enables the armed forces to develop their oper-
ational capabilities to meet their defense requirements. Some buyer states
have already gained operational experience from regional conicts and
other military engagements, which has helped them establish war doctrines
of various levels of sophistication. Such doctrinal adherence can further
shape specific operation demands, which, in turn, inform technical specifica-
tions for the platform. This amalgam of strategic/technical and doctrinal
requirements produces a specific baseline of quality requirements. Anything
too inferior or superior will prompt buyers to explore alternative options in
the arms market.
At this stage, we want to caveat our argument with four points. First, we
see our demand-side explanation as complementing rather than competing
with the supply-side explanation focusing on domestic policy calibration for
the survival of second-tier suppliers’ defense industries. Domestic adjust-
ments are indeed critical for achieving the economies of scale demanded
by modern weapons systems (e.g., Choi & Park, 2023; DeVore, 2015, 2016;
6 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
Ikegami, 2013; Mawdsley, 2008). Second, we look at a narrow condition
where the platforms oered by first-tier suppliers are too superior or rela-
tively inferior. We do not strongly hypothesize about situations where
there is qualitative parity between first- and second-tier suppliers, but we
assume first-tier states might be the preferred choice for a number of
other reasons. Nonetheless, our theoretical framework of qualitative proxi-
mity can be used by others to examine such cases of head-on competition.
Third, to examine the role of qualitative proximity and study the success
of second-tier states, we work under strong ceteris paribus assumptions in
that our theoretical argument and research design deliberately exclude
instances that grant decisive weight to a single variable. We are aware that
procurement is a multi-causal decision, where states consider multiple
factors. As aforementioned, studies focusing on demand side explanations
cover an array of factors pertaining to the decision-making process of the
buyer state. These include costs, external threat, technology transfer, direct
and indirect osets and attached political strings, among others (e.g., Ani-
cetti, 2024; Harold et al., 2019; Kirkpatrick, 2004; Laksmana, 2018;
Mathews, 2019; Storey, 2021). A single variable can, at times, decisively
load the dice against one of the competitors. Despite noting these obvious
confounding variables, we still proceed to analyze the role of qualitative
proximity as it remains an under-researched and untheorized factor in the
study of global arms ow. Fourth, we remain agnostic about domestic acqui-
sition processes. Mistrust among civil–military elites, the lack of professional
consultations or other institutional deficits that disallow technical expertise
from translating into concrete acquisition decisions may pose challenges
to our argument. It still does not preclude us from studying major buyers
around the world that are predominantly stable polities with established
norms and processes for acquisitions.
To sum up, a structural gap exists in the global arms market due to power
disparities in the international system. As the US and other first-tier suppliers
stay ahead in the technology curve and focus on state-of-the-art weapons
systems while neglecting other platforms, they leave a vacuum around the
median baseline of qualitative requirements of regional players. From an
average buyer’s perspective, there remains a preference for operational
requirements against power projection, regional against global, cost-eective
against expensive, and robust against the avant-garde. Both the positive and
negative gaps, we argue, have provided opportunities for second-tier supplier
states to survive and, at times, thrive in the global arms bazaar.
South Korean arms export to Indonesia and India
To investigate our theoretical argument, we examine South Korean arms
sales in the Indo-Pacific region. As a second-tier supplier—defined as
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 7
having “a much lower overall R&D, domestic procurement and production
base [than first-tier states], and will depend more heavily on exports or state
subsidies” (Bitzinger, 2017, p. 4; Krause, 1992, pp. 31–32)—South Korea is a
crucial case for our study (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 120–121), for several
reasons. First, the ROK has successfully defied the odds of arms globalization
and become one of the leading exporters in its category. After initiating the
Yulgok Project and launching its indigenous arms production in the early
1970s, the Korean defense industry has certainly come a long way (Kim,
2011; Moon et al., 2015; Nolan, 1986). If we identify first-tier suppliers as
having a market share of five percent or above and second-tier suppliers
in the sub-five percent region, South Korea tops the chart along with
Spain, Italy, Israel and the Netherlands.
1
Even among its peers, ROK
stands out with exports to nearly 90 countries worldwide (Ahn & Kim,
2018, p. 80), an increasing portion of which are platform-based weapons.
This feat is even more notable given that South Korea lacked previous pol-
itical or diplomatic ties with many of the states whom it sells arms. Seoul’s
export momentum is likely to continue with recently completed deals in
dierent regions (Kang, 2021; Yoo, 2022). In some niche areas, ROK has
already become a dominant player; for instance, it now commands two-
thirds of the howitzer market globally (Lee & Smith, 2023). Second, unlike
some European manufacturers such as Spain and Italy, South Korea,
together with Israel, are situated in a perpetually hostile environment invol-
ving adversaries of similar strength that mirrors challenges of many other
regional buyers. This similarity of threat experiences leads to closer anity
in strategic and technical requirements of weapons, strengthening a vital
condition we wish to study. Lastly, Seoul has undertaken requisite domestic
adjustments to survive the onslaught of globalization and transform its
defense industry towards an export-oriented sector (Bitzinger, 2019; Choi
& Park, 2023). However, these shifts alone do not explain the South
Korean arms industry’s successes with certain regional players. As such,
our examination of South Korea’s exports allows us to control for endogen-
ous explanations while looking at global patterns and trendlines that leave
niche space for second-tier suppliers. That makes South Korea a crucial
and paradigmatic case for understanding the success of second-tier suppliers.
Since the center of economic and geopolitical gravity is shifting to the
Indo-Pacific, we chose this as region of interest. Anecdotally, one can see a
continuously expanding footprint of Korean defense exports in the Indo-
Pacific region—patrol corvettes to Malaysia, FA-50 light combat aircrafts
and T-50 Golden Eagle advanced trainers to the Philippines, Indonesia and
Thailand, AS21 Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Australia, diesel-elec-
tric submarines to Indonesia, and K9 Thunder howitzers to India (Broad &
Laksmana, 2023; International Trade Administration, 2020; Lim, 2023).
Korea’s export figures in the Indo-Pacific market are in line with the
8 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
region’s increasing arms appetite, outdoing all other regions around the
world (Bitzinger, 2015; SIPRI, 2022). On the buyer side, therefore, we
choose two regional players from the Indo-Pacific region: Indonesia and
India. Both countries represent top recipients of South Korean arms in
two sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific (Table 1): from Southeast Asia, Indone-
sia is the leading buyer, whereas India tops the table in South Asia. Many
states in the Indo-Pacific have already undertaken or are in the midst of mili-
tary modernization, replacing their outdated inventories, to attend to the
changing strategic landscape due to an increasingly assertive China (Sham-
baugh, 2018). These eorts at modernization largely exclude power projec-
tion as a factor. When we emphasize these exigent threat calculations, we
do not necessarily argue that regional powers lack interest in power projec-
tion. For instance, some states like India face dual calculus—addressing
imminent threats in the continental theater against China and Pakistan,
whereas joining its western allies in projecting power in the maritime
theater, for which it is already looking up to the US for the most advanced
platforms.
Given these export patterns to the region, we conduct in-depth analyses of
two recent transactions to assess the factors that inuenced the decision to
purchase from a second-tier supplier state: Jang Bogo-class submarines to
Indonesia and the K9 howitzers to India. Hence, our unit of analysis is a
specific deal from the buyer-seller dyad that is chosen based on important
theoretical and empirical considerations: availability of decision-making
details in the public domain, competition with a tier-one supplier, and no
other confounding variable such as price or geopolitics exerting a decisive
inuence in the decision-making process. In the next two sections, we
analyze both cases individually. Each case study proceeds in three parts:
the first part provides the overview of the deal, the second part analyzes
the structural gap in each case, and the last part outlines the causes of
success for the second-tier supplier, especially the strategic/technical and
doctrinal elements that inuenced the decision-making process. Following
Table 1. Top ROK weapons destinations 2001–2021 SIPRI
(2022) arms transfer database (million TIV)
5
.
Turkey 1412
Indonesia 1405
Philippines 702
United Kingdom 532
Thailand 434
India 432
Iraq 431
Peru 368
Norway 220
Bangladesh 183
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 9
both case studies, we also consider a number of alternative explanations per-
taining to our cases.
Indonesia and Jang Bogo-class submarines
The deal: Regional dynamics in Southeast Asia have become much tenser
since the mid-2000s, chiey due to China’s assertiveness, particularly in
the South China Sea (Wezeman, 2019). Most weapons acquisition patterns
reect the threat perception due to this shifting strategic landscape:
it is clear from the equipment acquired—combat aircraft, anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft, air defence systems, coastal defence systems, submar-
ines and major surface combat ships that perceptions of foreign threats are an
important driver of most military acquisitions by South East Asian states.
(Chang, 2014; also see O’Callaghan, 2012; Wezeman, 2019, p. 8)
While Southeast Asia is not in the midst of a traditional arms race as com-
mentators have pointed out (Bitzinger, 2010), the region collectively has cer-
tainly seen an increase in military spending, making it the second-largest
military market worldwide (Laksmana, 2018, p. 106).
As one of the parties to the South China Sea conicts, Indonesia, like other
regional players, slowly began to turn its attention towards naval military
modernization. Chang (2021) succinctly points out that.
[t]he degree to which those countries with maritime interests have modernized
their militaries appears to be increasingly linked to their strategic concerns
related to changes in the geopolitical environment, edging out domestic con-
siderations that have long dominated many of their military procurement
decisions.
As an archipelagic state, Indonesia’s defense strategy has placed maritime
defense at the top of its policies as emphasized in the 2015 Defense White
Paper (2015; Kembara, 2018, p. 8). Moreover, Indonesia has been vamping
up its security on the Natuna Islands and surrounding areas, where it has
faced conict with China in recent years (Meyer et al., 2019).
With maritime security one of the ocial priorities, along with Indone-
sia’s desire to be a regional player in Southeast Asia, Jakarta embarked on
military modernization to replace its aging and outdated weapons systems
and platforms (Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 8; Wezeman, 2019). A key
aspect of this military modernization program has been an emphasis on mar-
itime capabilities of which submarines serve as an integral component
(Andersson, 2015). As Indonesian Navy Chief of Sta Admiral Muhammad
Ali recently pointed out: “the development of the submarine force stands as a
game changer and ultimate weapon that will empower us, not only to resolve
but also dominate the challenges that lie ahead” (quoted in Isjchwansyah,
2024). The purchase of submarines aligned with Indonesia’s long-term
10 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
strategic goals of procuring 8–12 submarines by 2029 for its maritime secur-
ity requirements (Jikibi, 2021; Parameswaran, 2018; Permana, 2021). At the
time of the deal with South Korea, the navy’s chief spokesperson Commo-
dore Iskandar Sitompul outlined the importance of submarines for Indone-
sia in order to “safeguard its maritime territories … [and] to maintain a
regional balance of power to secure peace” (Santosao, 2009). After a competi-
tive bidding process, Indonesia and South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and
Marine Engineering (DSME) agreed to a $1.1 billion deal for three Type 209/
1400 Jang Bogo/Nagapasa-class diesel-electric submarines in 2011 (The
Jakarta Post, 2017).
Positive structural gap: Unlike Russia and France, who were in the fray to
win the Indonesian bid, the US was not even in the competition as it has
stopped manufacturing diesel-electric submarines, even for exports. While
nearly half of the Russian submarine eet and the entire French eet is
nuclear, both countries have a successful diesel-electric export variant,
which competed for the Indonesia order. However, according to Deputy
Minister of Defense Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, his government chose the South
Korean oer, which came with the transfer of technology as part of the
deal, “rather than from Russia and France upon consideration on technical
specifications, operational needs and budget” (Antara News, 2011, emphasis
added). In fact, Russia’s bid was disqualified because their submarines
were “too big and not suitable for an archipelagic country” (The Jakarta
Post, 2011). The Jang-bogo class submarines (1,400-ton) are much smaller
and lighter than the Russian Project 636 variant (2,450-ton) oered to Indo-
nesia (Rosoboronexport, n.d.), which makes the former more suitable for the
littoral environment surrounding Indonesia, especially for patrolling its mar-
itime territory against foreign incursions (Global Security, n.d.). In terms of
survivability, a larger hull size creates a bigger acoustic signature, compro-
mising stealth of the vehicle (Moore, 2019). Furthermore, the Jang-bogo
class submarines are much better aligned with Indonesia’s anti-access strat-
egy (Gady, 2016).
While the Russian Project 636 can be employed for most operations the
Indonesian Navy intends to execute, it is primarily designed for force projec-
tion as a part of Russia’s Pacific Fleet. For example, all three variants of
Project 636 were the backbone of a provocative exercise the Russian Navy
conducted much closer to the coast of Hawaii (Novosti, 2021). As others
have noted, Project 636’s broader role “relates to a limited force projection
and ability to operate as part of a coalition. This task calls for ships that
are capable of striking sea and land targets independently, and of supporting
and defending land forces” (Luzin, 2021). These features exceed Indonesia’s
defensive needs, which would be served better by a eet of smaller vehicles
swarming across the archipelago. As Benjamin Schreer notes, a “larger
number of smaller but modern submarines would make perfect sense … in
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 11
the Indonesian archipelago” (Schreer, 2013, p. 19). In short, a positive struc-
tural gap was created due to excessively superior platforms—nuclear-only in
the case of the US and conventionally-superior in the case of Russia and
France—which South Korea was able to fill in.
Strategic/technical and doctrinal compatibility: In the past, the Commander
of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) Admiral Agus Suhartono and then
Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro have pointed to the need for Indonesia
to be equipped with up to 12 submarines to police its naval territories and
protect its sea lanes (Rostiyani, 2012; Suhartono & Wong-Anan, 2010). As
others have noted, “this latest [ROK] submarine deal reveals Jakarta’s strategic
priorities—to develop the capability for a sea denial strategy” (Wu, 2019). The
idea of “anti-access” is deeply ingrained in Indonesia’s security lexicon and stra-
tegic thought. For instance, while planning for the new administrative capital in
Nusantara, the National Resilience Institute (or Lemhannas) suggested that the
“the government should adopt an anti-access or area denial strategy to safe-
guard the new capital” (Jakarta Globe, 2022). It is within this context that
one needs to view Indonesia’s investments in other naval assets, such as the
sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles or the Dutch Sigma-class frigates, that
play an oensive role operationally in anti-access strategy (Sambhi, 2017,
p. 86; Schreer, 2013, p. 20). Here too, South Korea’s own operational experi-
ences in developing anti-access capabilities for its own complex shorelines
has parallels with Indonesian defense needs (Bowers, 2019, pp. 6–7).
Once operational and fully equipped, the submarine eet is expected to be
a critical pillar of Indonesia’s maritime strategy, specifically “area denial
strategy”
2
against China’s expanding naval intelligence capabilities in the
South China Sea. This involves aggressive surveillance and reconnaissance
in the short term (Chang, 2021), as well as monitoring the archipelagic sea
lanes and preventing access for enemy forces in the long term. Moreover,
the submarine eet is envisioned as implementing Indonesia’s evolving mar-
itime strategy as a fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Parames-
waran, 2020). And even though the diesel-electric vehicles are not as silent as
their nuclear counterparts, the modern variants “are not only stealthy, but
also more lethal with the advent of underwater-launched anti-ship missiles”
(Chang, 2021). There are very specific upgrades to this eect; for instance,
the Torpedo Acoustic Counter Measure (TACM), which increases the survi-
vability in a “hider-finder competition” with enemy vessels by generating
deecting noise to deceive the SONAR of incoming torpedos (Rahmat,
2019). For its attack options, the submarine has torpedo tubes that can
carry mines as well as UGM-84 Harpoon missiles for surface targets (Mili-
tary Today, n.d.). In a way, attack submarines such as Jang-bogo class
serve as an “ideal alternative for surface vessels” for navies like Indonesia
as it provides “greater deterrence … and their long-range strike capability
provides a degree of force projection” (Honrada, 2022).
12 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
The Jang Bogo-class submarine is doctrinally compatible with Indonesia’s
Minimum Essential Force (MEF) plan for a minimum credible deterrence
against potential foreign encroachment. Introduced under president Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono in 2005 and upgraded by his successor, Joko
Widodo (Jokowi), under his Global Maritime Fulcrum vision (Morris &
Paoli, 2018, pp. 15–18; Parameswaran, 2020), the Indonesian government
adopted MEF as a “twenty-year plan (2005–2024) that sets forth a military
modernization agenda, with a special emphasis on the modernization of
the Indonesian navy and air force” (Koh, 2015, pp. 437–438; Shekhar &
Liow, 2014). Undergirding this modernization agenda was the “maritime
axis” vision, which recognizes the maritime domain as central to Indonesia’s
foreign and security policies (Agastia & Perwita, 2015, p. 36). Among other
things, it envisions an advanced Indonesian Navy that can form a defensive
firewall “to protect the country’s maritime assets, sea-lanes and territorial
waters from both non-traditional security threats and external incursions”
(Shekhar & Liow, 2014). In the future, Indonesia would develop a green-
water navy that would be well-positioned to conduct “eective EEZ [exclu-
sive economic zone] policing and limited regional, and occasionally even
international, force projection capabilities” (Koh, 2015, p. 435; Supriyanto,
2012). Evolving from this vision, the TNI’s joint Tridek (Tri Dharma Eka
Karma) doctrine “envisions the armed forces being able to destroy the
enemy at its base, en route, or upon entry into the country’s territory”
(Malufti & Sciascia, 2022). Moreover, Indonesia’s submarine bases are
located in the maritime “choke points” in the South China Sea and on
Makassar Strait (Isjchwansyah, 2024), thus enabling it to implement its mar-
itime strategy, of which submarines form an integral component. This sort of
doctrinal emphasis lays a certain combination of defensive and oensive
demands in terms of warfare that requires optimum fit and customization
for all vessels. The submarines that were built for Indonesia is a customized
variant that is slightly bigger than the Type 209 that South Korea currently
possesses and are “designed for a range of missions, including anti-surface
warfare (ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine laying, and special
forces operations” (Gady, 2016; Naval Technology, 2011). Moreover, the
upgraded Jang-bogo submarines with a new combat management system
and improved target detection and tracking capability are well-suited “to
carry out underwater warfare in a more eective manner” (Gady, 2019).
It is in this vein that the Jokowi government recently outlined intentions
to spend more than $120 billion over the next 20 years to continue upgrading
and modernizing its military capabilities as part of the MEF plan (Indo-
Pacific Defense Forum, 2021). It was reported that Jakarta aims to “get its
hand on bigger and more advanced submarines” in the coming years in
order to develop a navy that is capable of “operat[ing] far beyond its territor-
ial waters” (Malufti & Sciascia, 2022). Consequently, the Indonesian navy has
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 13
canceled the follow-on order for three more ROK submarines due to a
variety of factors (Arthur, 2024; Hynd & Broad, 2023). Instead, Indonesia
has agreed to procure France’s Naval Group Scorpène-class submarines in
Indonesia (Guild, 2024). The new Scorpène-class submarines will feature
lithium-ion batteries that will allow them to remain submerged for longer
periods, equipped with unmanned underwater vehicles which are well-
suited for supporting special forces “as well as intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR)” missions and armed with “SM39 B2 Mod 2, a sub-
marine-launched variant of the Exocet missile family” (Guild, 2024; Malufti,
2024). The submarine partnership with France, as Colin Koh notes, “will
allow it [the Indonesian indigenous defense industry] to absorb and grow”
other technologies (quote from Arthur, 2024), which is a comparative advan-
tage over the South Korean oer.
As noted in the previous section, client states will go with first-tier states
should they oer the best package and osets (Arthur, 2024). Yet, under the
old equilibrium with limited strategic goals, South Korean submarines were
indeed a natural fit for Indonesian needs. More broadly, South Korea moved
into Southeast Asia, where a structural gap existed, and “filled the gap in the
market for advanced, but aordable combat platforms and systems” and
emerged as a “top arms supplier to all four of Southeast Asia’s largest mar-
itime countries” over the past decade (Chang, 2021).
India and K9 Thunder/Vajra-T
The deal: Relations between India and South Korea were uneasy during the
Cold War (Brewster, 2010; Panda, 2019). The mutual visits by President Lee
Myung-bak and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the mid-2000s placed
India-ROK relations on an upward trajectory. The successful deal of K9
Thunder/Vajra-T self-propelled howitzers marked South Korea’s formal
entry into the Indian defense market. It was a significant deal for India,
too, as it was the first such large order placed under prime minister Narendra
Modi’s agship “Make in India” scheme that aimed to produce major plat-
forms locally. India had long fancied tracked self-propelled howitzers as
part of its artillery modernization program (Shukla, 2015), with the require-
ment of an estimated 252 new guns divided into 12 regiments (on the Indian
Army’s force structure, see Joshi, 2015). The first lot of 100 guns was placed
in May 2017 and fulfilled by February 2021, with an Indian company Larson
and Toubro (L&T) serving as the local partner (Unnithan, 2022). Though
initially acquired for the desert plains on India’s western ank, K9s were
deployed in the mountainous terrain against China during the 2021
conict, where it far exceeded the Indian Army’s expectations in that
terrain. New orders for an additional 200 guns were formally placed after-
wards (Unnithan, 2022).
14 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
Indian military modernization has been laggard, to say the least (Behera,
2021; Cohen & Dasgupta, 2018; Cowshish, 2016; Matthews & Lozano, 2014),
as the arms acquisition process remains marred by many bureaucratic and
institutional challenges.
3
The lethargy in acquiring howitzers and other plat-
forms reached a critical point when then Army chief, Gen. V. K. Singh, had
to write a letter to Prime Minister Singh urging him to address the dire situ-
ation (The Times of India, 2012). After sustained delays under successive
administrations, the acquisition process of artilleries was set into motion.
The, 2011 request for proposal (RFP) for tracked howitzers resulted in
four oers: Indian automaker Tata Power’s Strategic Electronics Division,
Indian government company Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML),
Russia’s state manufacturer Rostec (exported by Rosoboronexport), and
Samsung Techwin (later Hanwa Defense) (Singh, 2016). Tata and BEML
pulled out mid-way as they did not meet the Indian Army’s technical
requirements. This underscores the fact that professional armies with
long-standing military planning and experience are quite precise in their
requirements, be it mobility, range or fuze. Ultimately, Rostec’s 2S19
MSTA-S and Hanwha’s K9 Thunder, partnered with the Indian govern-
ment’s Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and L&T respectively, were left in
the race. Eventually, India acquired the K9 self-propelled howitzers over
the Russian 2S19 MSTA-S.
Negative structural gap: The better fit of K9s availed India the long-desired
opportunity to diversify its weapons portfolio, and move away from its
reliance on Russian arms, which accounts for anywhere between 60–86
percent of India’s inventory (Thakkar, 2024). In its diversification bid, India
has been looking up to its western partners such as the US, France, and
Israel (Wezeman et al., 2023). However, in the category of self-propelled
howitzers, the US did not have anything specific to oer to India as its
M109 (39 caliber) could not match the competing models in terms of range,
lethality, or mobility (Gordon et al., 2019b, p. 19). India’s military planners
were well aware of the US’ abject neglect of artillery. For instance, Lt Gen
Dushyant Singh (2021), former head of the Eastern Command, recently
noted that such neglect of artillery has “led to the US and Western artillery
forces becoming a laggard especially in comparison to Russia”. In the late
1990s, the US envisioned an 11 billion dollar program to design the next gen-
eration of 155 mm self-propelled howitzers but later dropped it entirely
(Shankar, 2002). The situation for the UK is not any dierent. As one observer
predicted, the continuous neglect of conventional deterrence through ground
forces, including artillery regiments, can lead to a situation where NATO and
British forces will be “comprehensively outgunned and outranged, leaving
enemy artillery free to prosecute fire missions with impunity” (Watling,
2019). Moreover, during the Russia-Ukraine war, it was brought to light
that the BAE Systems cannot manufacture gun barrels that get worn out
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 15
after certain rounds of firing (Hinton, 2023). Russia had a comparable alterna-
tive to oer but it paled operationally compared to the Korean howitzer as
highlighted in the following section. However, in the case of portable guns,
where the US had to oer ultralight yet advanced M777 howitzers that the
Indian Army can easily sling under choppers, India willingly bought it. In
sum, in the category of tracked self-propelled howitzers, India faced a negative
structural gap, which was filled in by South Korea.
Strategic/technical and doctrinal compatibility: For starters, K9’s technical
features met the Indian Army’s primary technical requirements. K9 Vajra,
the Indian variant, is a 47-ton tracked 155 mm/39 caliber howitzer with a
1,000 HP engine with an eective firing range of 40 km and traveling capacity
of 450 km on power, making it suitable for “shoot and scoot” operations deep
into adversary’s territory (Lt. Gen. Katoch, n.d.). To meet the Indian require-
ments, 14 “critical sub-systems” were replaced, including its automatic fire-
control, direct-fire, ammunition handling systems, auxiliary powerpacks, air
conditioning units, as well as nuclear, biological and chemical protection kits
(Bedi, 2021).
K9’s firing speed is similar to its Russian counterpart—six to eight rounds
per minute, and two to three rounds for a sustained firing of an hour (Army
Guide, n.d.). Nor is there a significant dierence between the two in terms of
range required by the Indian Army (Bedi, 2014). However, mobility played
the decisive role since India was buying howitzers for the Pakistan-bordering
deserts of Rajasthan with unusually rugged terrain.
4
MSTA’s engine failed to
match K9’s mobility in hill climbing exercises and in desert ranges under
plus 40°C temperature due to lower performance of its gas-turbine engine
(Lee, 2020). The K9 Vajra is propelled by an automatically controlled 1000
HP engine, whereas the Russian howitzer is an MSTA-S gun mounted on
a T-72 main battle tank chassis that is powered by an 840 HP engine. Loco-
motion is indeed a critical criterion for tracked guns proposed for desert
operations. Here, South Korea’s own hostile experience with over 6,000
North Korean artillery systems is reected in the technical/mobility features
required to fulfill operational demands of oensive and counter-batter firings
(Barnett et al., 2020).
K9 Vajra’s superior mobility suited India’s evolving war doctrine that
places a premium on swiftly moving tracked howitzers as a part of its inte-
grated battle formation. After the logistical aws of the previously subscribed
Sundarji doctrine were exposed during Operation Parakram in 2004 (Sood &
Sawhney, 2003), the Indian Army was forced to undertake a doctrinal revision
in the form of much-discussed Cold Start doctrine (Ladwig, 2007), which has
been openly acknowledged since 2017 (Unnithan, 2017). Under the new doc-
trine, the strike corps were to be divided into integrated battle groups (IBGs), a
formation of infantry, artillery and armored divisions with air support, that
can mount quick oense in multiple sectors, simultaneously introducing
16 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
elements of surprise, strength and stretch. With the acquisition of K9s, the
Indian armed forces would now be able to fully meet the performance
needs imposed by the doctrine, specifically the agile and swift-moving
tracked guns would allow it to perform “shoot and scoot” operations. As
defense analyst and veteran Ajai Shukla (2015) explains, “[t]he strike corps’
T-90S tanks currently outpace their artillery guns … [and] … With the K-9
Vajra mounted on a tracked vehicle that keeps up with tanks, the armour
spearheads would be assured of heavy fire support.” Another veteran, Maj.
Gen. Harsha Kakar makes a similar point:
The Vajra is destined for the plains and deserts and would form part of the
strike corps. Being self-propelled they would operate alongside armoured for-
mations and provide much needed firepower. For a long time, these for-
mations lacked requisite firepower with matching mobility. (Kakar, 2018,
emphasis added; also see Sengupta, 2017)
Amidst India’s acquisition of K9 Vajra, the Russia-Ukraine war broke out,
which turned out to be a major conventional war involving artillery (Peck,
2022). While Russia and Ukraine had initially similar artillery systems
based on legacy Soviet designs, Ukraine has been supplied with German,
American, British and Czech artilleries since February 2022 (Saw, 2023).
Interim performance assessments on both sides have found the “vulner-
ability of towed artillery systems” with alarming levels of loss, whereas
“self-propelled artillery emerges as the logical solution to artillery require-
ments” (Saw, 2023). Even Indian military planners have inferred that for
force preservation, more quantities of self-propelled guns with shoot and
scoot capabilities would be required (Dutta, 2023). This assessment
reinforced their prior technical and doctrinal assessment.
To conclude, K9’s optimum balance between mobility, range and lethality
made it an evident choice in a complex integrated environment. The recent
Sindhu Sudarshan military exercises involving battlegroups and the frequent
inclusion of IBGs in ocial pronouncements further evince the Indian
Army’s oensive intentions, for which K9 Vajra proved to be an ideal
match (Kulkarni, 2019; Ministry of Defence, 2020). This is not to say that
K9 Vajra is the only piece of artillery potent enough to meet the Indian
Army’s needs. However, we wish to emphasize that the K9 Vajra was selected
because of its strategic/technical and doctrinal suitability, which was much
closer to the Indian Army’s qualitative requirements.
Alternative explanations
This section discusses alternative explanations on why the buyer states
decided to strike arms procurement deals with second-tier suppliers. A
first plausible alternative argument is the expanding nature of the global
arms market which avails more opportunities to suppliers. Yet, contrary to
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 17
such arguments, the past decade has shown a certain equilibrium in the
volume of international arms transfer at around 30 billion trend-indicator
value (TIV) (SIPRI, 2022). More specifically, the regional market could be
argued to be expanding but commentators have noted that the arms
market has equally “become saturated with highly motivated sellers” (Bitzin-
ger, 2015). Consequently, second-tier suppliers seem to be competing within
the same market space against their first-tier counterparts in certain platform
categories. The reason for the recent success of the former, as we have argued
in this article, is due to their ability to provide buyer states with weapons that
meet the qualitative baseline requirements for specific types of weapons
systems.
Alternatively, some have noted that the global arms market has not only
grown in overall size but has also become a “buyers market” since the end of
the Cold War (e.g., Bitzinger, 2015; Mathews, 2019, p. 150). This applies
especially to the Indo-Pacific region with many states currently undergoing
a process of military modernization. It can be argued that the buyer states are
trying to diversify their weapons portfolio and minimize their vulnerability
with first-tier suppliers rather than continue with import dependence. This
aspect is perhaps more acutely felt in a today’s competitive buyer’s market.
Trends in weapons procurement in the region certainly indicate this to be
the case (Bitzinger, 2015; Laksmana, 2018; Wezeman, 2019) and this move
has provided more market opportunities for second-tier suppliers. Neverthe-
less, buyer states attempting to diversify their weapons portfolio is not
mutually exclusive to the argument developed here. Second-tier suppliers,
such as South Korea, still need to win out other motivated sellers in a com-
petitive arms market. In other words, the diversification argument leads to
certain indeterminacy in understanding probable alternatives, which can
be addressed by understanding the qualitative proximity between buyers
and suppliers. As our case study analysis has shown, even as buyer states
pursue diversification strategies, they will look for weapons that best meet
their qualitative needs in terms of strategic/technical and doctrinal require-
ments regardless of whether it is from a second—or a first-tier supplier.
Conclusion
Defense-industrial globalization has resulted in a widening technical gap
between the advancement by the US along with a small number of first-
tier suppliers and the defense requirements of the emerging regional
powers in the Indo-Pacific region. What is becoming evident is the fact
that many regional powers do not seek the most advanced and sophisticated
weapons to meet their security needs, nor do they want to settle with neg-
lected platforms that fall short of their qualitative expectations. It is this
gap where second-tier suppliers step in with platforms that they not only
18 S. PARK AND C. THAKKAR
operate but also continuously upgrade based on their own operational
experiences. Some of these weapons have been procured by second-tier
states due to their domestic defense industry’s continuous eorts to adjust
to the dictates of the globalized arms market. In addition to their domestic
transformation and adjustments—the supply-side explanation of their
success—is their qualitative proximity to buyer states, what we have ident-
ified as a demand-side explanation. More specifically, the platform-based
weapons produced by the second-tier suppliers are well-suited to meet the
strategic and doctrinal needs of the buyer states within their regional
context. This serves as one of the key reasons behind the success of their
weapons sales in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere, as our case study
analysis of two recent yet major South Korean sales in the region demon-
strated, the Jang Bogo-class submarines to Indonesia and the K9 Thunder
howitzers to India.
To be sure, our research does not imply that these are the only
reasons that states consider when procuring weapons costing billions. Pro-
curement decisions, as the literature points out, are often much more
complex and multi-layered. However, we emphasize that procurement
decisions cannot be separated from strategic concerns and—depending on
the regional context—could serve as an inuential factor in client states’
final decisions.
We conclude with two broad policy lessons stemming from our study.
First, much of the scholarly and policy attention has been focused on the
global network of production and the most up-to-date weapons systems,
such as the F35s stealth fighters, and these are rightfully important in their
own right. However, patterns of weapons sales by second-tier producers
can help us better understand regional security dynamics, especially perti-
nent to the Indo-Pacific region considering that it serves as the hotbed for
great power rivalry.
Second, we cautiously predict the continued success of second-tier suppli-
ers in arms sales as long as the power disparity in the international system
persists. As long as the US and other first-tier states focus on power projec-
tion capabilities and produce either too superior platforms or neglect them
altogether, second-tier suppliers will ourish with alternative oerings.
This pattern is observable in recently concluded transactions, such as
South Korea’s sale of the first indigenously manufactured mid-range
surface-to-air missiles (Cheolmae-2) to the United Arab Emirates and
Saudi Arabia, Japan’s Mogami-class frigates deal with Indonesia, as well as
India’s BrahMos missiles sales to the Philippines, among others (Arthur,
2024; ET Bureau, 2022; Navy Recognition, 2021). In other words, the struc-
tural gap existing in the global arms order will continue to provide avenues
to the second-tier suppliers, who remain proximate to the demands of
regional states and other emerging powers.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 19
Notes
1. We employ this heuristic to cluster peers and map Krause’s classic definition
(1992) on export figures.
2. We consider “anti-access” more as an operational rather than a grand strategic
concept. For multiple interpretations at various levels of analysis in the Indo-
nesian context, see Laksmana (2020).
3. Here we use procurement and acquisition interchangeably (see Mukherjee,
2020, p. 98).
4. K9s would be deployed against China during the 2020 conict due to the lack
of artillery regiments with necessary range (Chaturvedi, 2021).
5. Trend-indicator value (TIV) is the common unit in the SIPRI arms transfer
dataset that measures the volume of international transfer of conventional
weapons. TIV is based on the “known unit production costs of a core set of
weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources”
(SIPRI, n.d.).
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Hillary Bria, Chonghyun Choi, Matthew Gallagher,
Lt. Gen. Anjan Mukherjee, Kimberly Peh, Lt. Gen. Ravi Shankar, members of the
UEA Critical Global Politics working group, the CSP editors and the three anon-
ymous reviewers for their productive comments and constructive criticisms. Soul
Park would also like to thank Angela Lim, Nickson Quak and Matthew Giles for
their valuable research assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Soul Park http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6692-9080
Chirayu Thakkar http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7698-4283
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