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Post-war, past Russia: Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, regional unpeace and the imperatives of post-war European security (re)ordering

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Andriy Tyushka at College of Europe
Andriy Tyushka
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Abstract

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has radically undone peace and security in Europe, broken its post-Cold War order and triggered a seismic shift in European geopolitics. Moscow’s lasting and ever-widening multilayered conflict against Ukraine, the EU, the US and NATO/West at large bears no end in sight. With the coming age of hostile coexistence with Russia, European countries grapple with how best to ensure a more robust and aggression-proof system post-war. Amidst multiple uncertainties, there is a certainty that the future European security architecture will not be complete without Ukraine, as well as there seems to be a political will to devise a security system that protects from Russia and aggression in the foreseeable future. Considering the past dynamics and the current impasse in Russia’s relationality to the European security order, this forum contribution examines the imperatives and modalities of organizing post-war European security in opposition to Russia.
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Vol.:(0123456789)
International Politics
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00643-z
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Post‑war, pastRussia: Russian war ofaggression
againstUkraine, regional unpeace andtheimperatives
ofpost‑war European security (re)ordering
AndriyTyushka1
Accepted: 18 November 2024
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2024
Abstract
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has radically undone peace and security
in Europe, broken its post-Cold War order and triggered a seismic shift in Euro-
pean geopolitics. Moscow’s lasting and ever-widening multilayered conflict against
Ukraine, the EU, the US and NATO/West at large bears no end in sight. With the
coming age of hostile coexistence with Russia, European countries grapple with
how best to ensure a more robust and aggression-proof system post-war. Amidst
multiple uncertainties, there is a certainty that the future European security archi-
tecture will not be complete without Ukraine, as well as there seems to be a political
will to devise a security system that protects from Russia and aggression in the fore-
seeable future. Considering the past dynamics and the current impasse in Russia’s
relationality to the European security order, this forum contribution examines the
imperatives and modalities of organizing post-war European security in opposition
to Russia.
Keywords Russia–Ukraine war· Collective West· Hybrid war and peace·
Unpeace· Post-war European security architecture(s)
‘The dread is not that something will change – the dread is that everything
may stay the same’
(Lina Kostenko, ‘Notes of a Ukrainian Madman’, 2010, p.27)
* Andriy Tyushka
andriy.tyushka@coleurope.eu
1 European Neighbourhood Policy Chair, College ofEurope inNatolin, ul. Nowoursynowska 84,
02-797Warsaw, Poland
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
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