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The Effect of the Rise of Populism in South Korea on Its
Government’s Diplomatic Relations with Japan
Yuqin Jin1,a,*
1BASIS International School Nanjing, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210000, China
a. jack.jin13909-binj@basischina.com
*corresponding author
Abstract: As a former colony of Japan, South Korea’s relationship with Japan has always
been ambivalent. South Korea did form an alliance with Japan through the alliance with the
United States and a geopolitical situation, but tension remained due to historical grievances
between the two countries. In recent years, populist South Koreans have demanded the
government take a harsher stance towards Japan when addressing historical problems as they
look for genuine apologies from Japan, challenging the government’s approach when
engaging with Japan. This paper, through case analysis, explores how populism shaped the
foreign policy of the Korean government. This paper finds that the public’s sensitivity
towards Japan’s historical issues, combined with the political structure of South Korea,
played a huge role in shaping their administrations’ interactions with Japan and verified
existing theories regarding populism’s role in foreign policies in the specific case of the
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.
Keywords: populism, foreign policy, Korea-Japan relations, territorial dispute.
1. Introduction
As an ideology, populism claims to represent the interest of the common people and reject any
mediation between people and governments, elites, and corporates. The exclusionary nature of the
populism results in nationalist sentimentsIn the field of diplomacy, populists often oppose any form
of diplomacy due to the belief that nationalist interest would be compromised through diplomatic
actions. In South Korea, the "386 generation", individuals who matured during the post-Korean War
and democracy era, adopted the concept of Minjung, a neo-Marxist perspective that highlighted the
populace's battle against the governing authority and colonial history and contemporary issues [1-2].
Regarding the Korean peninsula, the “386 generation” believed that they share an ethnic and national
identity with North Korea and advocated against intervention from external powers like the United
States and Japan. Additionally, the issue of Liancourt Islands (Dokdo or Takeshima) has heightened
the level of nationalism amongst Koreans, as they believe Dokdo is an inseparable part of South
Korea. These populist beliefs, accompanied by Korea’s democratic political system, have imposed a
serious challenge for the Korean government, especially when it came to improving relations with
Japan: their courses of action and negotiations are highly dependent on populists’ voices, and people
are likely to vote the incumbent government out of office if people viewed their negotiations as a
compromise of Korea’s national interests. This essay seeks to explore the populists’ influence on
foreign policy by comparing the approaches of Korean presidents (from liberal and conservative
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Global Politics and Socio-Humanities
DOI: 10.54254/2753-7048/73/20241116
© 2024 The Authors. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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campaigns) toward the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima Island) Dispute with South Korean
citizens’ perception of Japan. Seeing that theories about populism and foreign policy, especially
theories in the context of South Korea, exist, this article aims to verify and consolidate the theories
through the case analysis of the Dokdo Incident.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Populism and Diplomacy
Populism is considered a “thin ideology”: it is heavily reliant on ideas like anti-elitism and centrality
of the people, leaving a huge gap for interpretation. Johannes Plagemann and Sandra Destradi contend
that populists frequently amalgamate their rhetoric with other substantive ideologies, such as
socialism and nationalism. Thick ideology frequently influence a state's diplomatic decisions more
directly than populism does [3]. Angelos Chryssogelos, in “Populism in Foreign Policy,” elaborates
on this notion by asserting that populists frequently exhibit nationalist tendencies and skepticism
towards global institutions [4].
On the issue of alliances, Plagemann and Destradin argue that populists tend to disrupt
multilateralism by diversifying their alliances with countries of the Global South. Also, they observed
that populist rulers tend to centralize the decision-making process of foreign policies onto themselves
in Modi’s India, Erdogan’s Turkey, and Trump’s United States. They contend that the centralization
of decision-making processes results in foreign policies that are increasingly unstable and
unpredictable [3]. Chryssogelos supported this notion, observing that populists engage with
international organizations solely when they appear advantageous to their national interests [4].
Both authors concur that populism will differ across various regions. Chryssogelos has notably
identified that populists in European nations predominantly emphasize Euroscepticism and anti-
immigration sentiments, whilst populists in Global South countries concentrate on anti-Western
imperialism and neoliberal market critiques [4].
2.2. Populism in South Korea
In the case of South Korea, Yihei Zhao argues that populism has a significant influence on the
government's diplomatic actions. South Korean youth would urge that their government adopt a
stronger position when engaging with countries such as Japan because they are more sensitive to
controversial topics involving Japan, particularly those related to Japan's colonial period, and the
Dokdo Island dispute. In addition, a huge portion of Korean public mistrust the elites. This skepticism
would further constrain the government's foreign policy initiatives, as administrations struggle to
pursue realistic diplomatic solutions without incurring public reaction [5].
2.3. The dilemma of public opinion
The existing literature have analyzed responses from different South Korean presidents to people’s
nationalistic sentiments. Rozman and Lee contend that Roh Moo-hyun has leveraged South Korean
nationalist feelings by portraying himself as a formidable adversary to Japan. In doing so, he aimed
to galvanize South Koreans to endorse him [1].
Torkunov and Dyachkov found that although Lee Myung-bak, a conservative president, have been
actively engaging with Japan during his presidency, remaining historical disputes have still paralyzed
the relations between South Korea and Japan, especially when South Korea recalled its ambassador
from Japan in 2008 after Japan promoted textbooks that claim Dokdo/Takeshima as a part of theirs.
Torkunov and Dyachkov also argued that popular discontent with Japan has escalated this situation
as Lee Myung-Bak failed to reach an intelligence sharing agreement with Japan in 2012 and strained
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relationship between South Korea and Japan further by visiting a Dokdo. Lee's actions demonstrate
that public sentiment may significantly influence the government's foreign policy. In summary,
populism has influenced Lee's foreign policy [6].
However, Yoon Suk-Yeol’s foreign policy showed that he attempted to overcome populism’s
influence in foreign policies. Kim’s analysis into Yoon’s presidency shows that Yoon has rather
ignored the public discontent when engaging with Japan. He attempted to drastically improve Korea’s
relations with Japan through resolving historical issues and strengthening cooperation between South
Korea, Japan, and the United States. Certain Pro-Japan measures do not accurately represent public
resentment towards Japan. Kim proposed that Yoon's party could see a backlash in the 2024
parliamentary election due to the public perceiving him as uninformed of historical concerns [7].
2.4. Implication for Dokdo/Takeshima
The nationalistic behavior is more vividly illustrated by Chung-in Moon and Chun-fu Li’s explanation
about reactive nationalism— nationalistic sentiments that are stimulated by external actions. They
stated that South Koreans are more likely to have a stronger reaction towards external stimuli if the
stimuli strike at core nationalist sentiments like political and territorial integrity and the stimuli relate
to another incident that is more recent. This reactive nationalist sentiment could be stronger if
perceptions of the public and the leadership converge. Last, this sentiment could be further intensified
by an unsatisfactory response from the actor giving the stimuli. For instance, the designation of
“Takeshima Day” on February 22 by Shimane prefecture of Japan in 2005 triggered an emotional
response from South Korean public since Japan has annexed Dokdo and integrated it into Shimane
prefecture. Japan did not compromise on the exact day 100 years ago. Instead, its ministry of
Education and Science approved history textbooks which claimed Dokdo/Takeshima as a part of
Japan and downplayed Japan’s legacies in China and South Korea. President Roh's message to the
Japanese populace has intensified nationalist sentiments among Koreans, who were already
discontented with Japan's reactions [8]. Bukh added on to this narrative in his research on civic
activism. He observed that South Koreans would create organizations like Dokdo Headquarters,
which arranges public campaigns and monthly studies to raise awareness on Dokdo. Such
organization not only criticizes Japan’s obsession towards Dokdo, but also South Korean
governments’ inability to protect sovereignty. These organizations elevated the status of Dokdo from
a mere territorial dispute to a national crisis requiring resolution [1].
3. Case Analysis
To analyze the role which populism in Korea played in shaping the government’s diplomatic actions
with Japan, this paper will be specifically investigate how three presidents of South Korea, from
liberal or conservative parties, approach to Dokdo/Takeshima Island dispute. The study will analyze
the policies, actions, and legal measures that those presidents took, then comparing with South
Korean’s perception towards Japan during their presidency to decide whether their actions correspond
with public perception towards Japan.
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3.1. South Korean’s view and Roh Moo-hyun period (2003-2008 Liberal)
Figure 1: South Koreans’ view of Japan from 1991 to 2019 [9]
According to Figure 1, during Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency, South Koreans’ perception of Japan
reached a new low as 79% of people held a negative view towards Japan in 2005. The public has been
outraged by Japan’s decision in February 2005 to officially set Takeshima Day as February 22—the
day which Dokdo was annexed by Japan. 94% of the public urged Roh’s administration to take a
harsher stance on Japan.
Roh’s administration responded in a forceful manner. On March 1 the same year, Roh demanded
reparations from Japan. It is the first time since 1965 that a South Korean president did so. In an
official statement named “To the Citizens of South Korea,” Roh accused Japan of attempting to
rationalize its colonization in Korea and deny its independence. His statement has received an
approval rating of 89%.
Moreover, Roh’s administration had actively confronted their Japanese counterpart on Dokdo on
the international stage. Roh and Junichiro Koizumi, the Japanese president, have spent a great deal
of time during their own summit meeting in June 2005 and the APEC summit in December 2005. The
South Korean government had also protested Japan’s effort to claim Dokdo/Takeshima by postponing
the visit of foreign minister Ban Ki-Moon and canceling the “shuttle summit” with Japan after
Koizumi insisted on visiting the Yasukuni shrine. South Korea had even opposed Japan to secure its
UN Security Council membership for the first time that year [10].
3.2. Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013, Conservative)
As a conservative president, Lee Myung-bak has attempted to improve relations with Japan by
blaming Roh for harming relations with Japan and the US; normalizing the tension agglomerated
during Roh’s presidency; holding regular meetings with Japanese officials; and fostering economic
cooperation between China, South Korea, and Japan. However, his effort was limited because Japan
continued claiming that Dokdo/Takeshima belongs to Japan through amending history textbooks and
publishing such statements in the defense whitepapers. These activities incited popular sentiment in
Korea: the proportion of individuals perceiving Japan unfavorably increased from 69% in 2007 to 73%
in 2009 [8].
Lee's administration was thereby compelled to adopt a hardline position, particularly with Dokdo.
The government intends to lure additional residents to Dokdo by enhancing infrastructure, building a
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scientific base, and deploying authorities [11]. In 2010, Parliament enacted the Dokdo Protection Law
to safeguard the ecological environment of Dokdo [12]. Although this legislation is an environmental
protection statute, it nonetheless maintains the notion that Dokdo is an integral component of South
Korea. At the conclusion of 2012, the South Korean parliament increased the budget for promoting
Dokdo to 6.22 billion won (US$5.72 million) [13].
In August 2012, Lee Myung-bak independently visited Dokdo, becoming the inaugural South
Korean president to do so [12]. This action, which incited significant resentment in Japan leading to
the recall of their ambassadors, was mostly driven by public sentiment. In April 2012, Lee's approval
rating was approximately 30 percent, indicating a fairly low level of support [14]. Following the visit,
a government poll indicates that 80% of respondents endorsed Lee Myung-bak's trip to Dokdo [15].
Since the presidential election is approaching in December, Lee’s visit could possibly gain a higher
approval rating from the public and a higher possibility for his party’s candidate to win the upcoming
election.
3.3. Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-2027, Conservative)
Figure 2: South Koreans and Japanese’s perception to the other country, 2022 & 2023 [16]
During Yoon’s Presidency, the perception of Japan has relatively improved: in 2023, 28.9% of
Koreans held a favorable view to Japan. Still, a majority of 53.3% Koreans held an unfavorable view
towards Japan [16]. Yoon has also approached to controversial issues like comfort women in a more
moderate position by attempting to reconcile with Japan on historical issues.
Yoon’s approach to Dokdo showed similarities and differences with previous South Korean
presidents. Yoon’s administration has still considered Dokdo as a part of South Korea. When South
Korea’s Defense Ministry named Dokdo a “disputed territory,” Yoon’s sp okesperson has still called
for the Defense Ministry to rectify their stances [17]. However, Yoon’s administration has
downplayed the importance of Dokdo in his diplomatic actions. When Japan’s Foreign Minister
Hayashi Yoshimasa gave a speech about Dokdo/Takeshima and vice minister in the Cabinet Office
Nakano Hideyuki attended an annual ceremony for Dokdo/Takeshima, South Korean Foreign
Ministry's Director-General for Asia and Pacific Affairs Seo Min-jung had called in the ambassador
of Japan in Seoul for diplomatic protests. When Japan attempted to hold up the idea that
Dokdo/Takeshima belongs to Japan, the Office of the President responded that South Korea will not
resume importing seafood from Fukushima [18].
4. Discussion
From the cases above, it is conclusive that populism has played an important role in shaping the South
Korean government’s foreign policy with Japan, as many of the South Korean government’s
diplomatic actions, especially regarding Dokdo, aimed to address South Koreans’ anger and negative
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feelings towards Japan. This phenomenon was especially prevalent during Roh and Lee’s
presidencies, when they attempted to seek people’s approval by reprimanding Japan’s actions and
visiting Dokdo in person. These actions are generally more explicit and attention-grabbing. However,
by protesting to the Japanese Ambassador in person and suspending the import of seafood, Yoon’s
administration has more implicitly addressed controversies surrounding Dokdo and downplayed the
role of Dokdo in Japan’s diplomacy.
Roh and Lee’s diplomatic actions are highly restrained by South Korea’s populist ideology and
democratic system. As a democracy, South Korea’s political system allows people to elect those they
favor. And since the South Korean youth are more sensitive towards those historical controversies
with Japan, they would be prone to leaders who would take a harsher stance, boosting the place of
Korea-Japan relations in their consideration. Therefore, Presidents like Roh and Lee, who are
dedicated to remaining their government in power, have to take a harsher stance towards Japan even
if their party or themselves are relatively moderate. This is the dilemma which they have been placed
in. Yoon, however, attempts to change this dilemma. He has attempted to alleviate the effect of
populism by misaligning the government’s tone with the people’s voices, as it has been previously
stated that governments aligning the position of the people could result in a weaker nationalist
reaction. His implicit protests over Dokdo are ways in which the government “misaligns” people’s
voice through weakening the reaction towards Japan’s provocation. Beyond Dokdo, Yoon is trying
to downplay the significance of historical issues with Japan so that historical issues become weaker
stimuli for South Koreans’ rective nationalism. His attempt, however, might fail due to the South
Koreans’ unfavorable view of his foreign policy.
5. Conclusion
This paper has discovered that populism played a huge role in shaping their administrations’
interactions with Japan due to the public’s sensitivity towards Japan’s historical issues and political
structure in South Korea. Through case analysis that compares approaches to the Dokdo/Takeshima
Dispute between South Korea and Japan, the study has successfully applied and validated theories
regarding to the populism and foreign policy of South Korea and Japan on the specific issue. However,
it could be further developed by incorporating and investigating the mechanism of South Korea’s
foreign policy decision. Incorporating this investigation would improve our theory by investigating
how the South Korean government balances between national interest and public opinions, which
could at times conflict with each other. This investigation would also bring insights into the political
structure of the South Korean government, which could further explain how each branch of the South
Korean government would coordinate with each other in response to public opinion. Furthermore,
populism’s effect on South Korea’s policy could be more thoroughly reflected through further
investigation in other aspects of South Korea’s relations with Japan, like economic and regional
security factors, as well as investigating South Korea’s relationships with states like China, North
Korea, and the United States.
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