ArticlePDF Available

Relationships between personal human values and social value orientation

PLOS
PLOS One
Authors:

Abstract and Figures

The present study examined relationships between social value orientation and personal values. Participants, n = 1655, were university students (Mage = 18.9 years, 60% women) who completed the Triple Dominance Measure, a measure of social value orientation, and the PVQ-21, a measure of Schwartz’s personal values. Two items were added to the PVQ-21 to measure benevolence toward people in general. The analyses found that pro-socials had significantly higher scores than pro-selfs (Competitors and Individualists) for Benevolence, Universalism, and Conformity values, whereas pro-selfs had significantly higher scores than pro-socials on Hedonic, Achievement, and Power values. These differences reflected the fact that Benevolence, Universalism, and Conformity values concern the feelings and well-being of others, concerns that are consistent with a pro-social orientation. In contrast, Hedonic, Achievement, and Power values concern self-enhancement, concerns that are consistent with a self-focused orientation. There were no significant differences between individualists and competitors for any value, nor were there differences of any kind for Tradition, Security, Self-direction, and Stimulation values. These results complement and expand previous research by demonstrating how individual differences in social value orientation are related to individual differences in fundamental, personal human values.
This content is subject to copyright.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Relationships between personal human
values and social value orientation
John B. NezlekID
1,2
*
1Center for Climate Action and Social Transformations (4CAST), Institute of Psychology, SWPS University,
Warsaw, Poland, 2Department of Psychological Sciences, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia,
United States of America
*jbnezl@wm.edu
Abstract
The present study examined relationships between social value orientation and personal
values. Participants, n = 1655, were university students (M
age
= 18.9 years, 60% women)
who completed the Triple Dominance Measure, a measure of social value orientation, and
the PVQ-21, a measure of Schwartz’s personal values. Two items were added to the PVQ-
21 to measure benevolence toward people in general. The analyses found that pro-socials
had significantly higher scores than pro-selfs (Competitors and Individualists) for Benevo-
lence, Universalism, and Conformity values, whereas pro-selfs had significantly higher
scores than pro-socials on Hedonic, Achievement, and Power values. These differences
reflected the fact that Benevolence, Universalism, and Conformity values concern the feel-
ings and well-being of others, concerns that are consistent with a pro-social orientation. In
contrast, Hedonic, Achievement, and Power values concern self-enhancement, concerns
that are consistent with a self-focused orientation. There were no significant differences
between individualists and competitors for any value, nor were there differences of any kind
for Tradition, Security, Self-direction, and Stimulation values. These results complement
and expand previous research by demonstrating how individual differences in social value
orientation are related to individual differences in fundamental, personal human values.
Introduction
The present study was designed to add to existing research on relationships between social
value orientation (SVO) and values conceptualized more broadly. Although the word value is
part of SVO, there is little research on relationships between SVO and values understood more
broadly. The term “social value” refers to how much people value others versus how much
they value themselves, and it does not refer to personal values conceptualized in terms of peo-
ple’s beliefs about right and wrong, good and bad, and so forth. Nevertheless, there are good
reasons to believe that personal values and SVO should be related, and I discuss these reasons
below.
The present study was motivated by a desire to provide a better understanding of social
value orientation. As explained below, SVO is typically inferred from a series of behavioral
PLOS ONE
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 1 / 15
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Nezlek JB (2024) Relationships between
personal human values and social value
orientation. PLoS ONE 19(11): e0312795. https://
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795
Editor: Holger A. Rau, Georg-August-Universita¨t
Go¨ttingen: Georg-August-Universitat Gottingen,
GERMANY
Received: April 4, 2024
Accepted: October 13, 2024
Published: November 27, 2024
Copyright: ©2024 John B. Nezlek. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: As listed in thepaper:
All data and materials are available via the Open
Science Foundation: https://osf.io/c93mn/?view_
only=53adfe01d2044d308a217afe9334158b. The
files include a full annotated SPSS file, a
corresponding CSV file, and a codebook.
Funding: The author(s) received no specific
funding for this work.
Competing interests: The author has declared that
no competing interests exist.
choices. People receive scores or are classified into categories that represent the extent to
which and how they balance an emphasis on their own well-being with an emphasis on the
well-being of others.
As behavioral measures, measures of SVO do not provide direct information about the psy-
chological processes that underlie or are responsible for the behaviors that are used to measure
SVO. To understand such processes, researchers have examined relationships between SVO
and personality [1,2], between SVO and politics [3], between SVO and various prosocial behav-
iors such as donations [4], and other constructs. Although each of these bodies of research has
provided insights into the nature of SVO, I believe that our present understanding of SVO can
be increased by understanding the relationships between SVO and personal values.
Social value orientation
Social value orientation refers to how people balance the competing interests of rewarding the
self and rewarding others. An important impetus for research on SVO was the recognition
that people are motivated by more than narrow self-interest, what Ryan and Ackermann [5]
described as “Homo economicus.” People do not think only of themselves, although there is
considerable variability in the extent to which they take the benefits others receive into account
and exactly how this is done. These differences are the focus of measures of SVO.
Unlike many individual difference measures that rely on self-reports of attitudes, beliefs,
and self-evaluations, SVO is typically measured with some type of behavior. For example, over
a series of trials, individuals allocate rewards to themselves and to partners in what are usually
called economic games. The rewards are typically money or points, and the games vary in
terms of the specific type of choice, sometimes referred to as a social dilemma, that is mea-
sured. The games consist of a series of choices, and a person’s social value orientation is
inferred from the choices he or she makes in these games.
Although SVO can be described in various ways, the distinction that is emphasized in
much of the research on SVO is the distinction between pro-social and pro-self. Pro-social
refers to an orientation that reflects taking rewards to the self and to others into account when
making allocation decisions, whereas pro-self refers to an orientation that reflects taking only
rewards to the self into account when making allocation decisions. SVO is frequently operatio-
nalized in terms of categories, and individuals can be classified as pro-social or pro-self.
Although there have been concerns about measuring SVO as a category [5], category-based
measures of SVO such as the Triple Dominance Measure [TDM; 6] have been found to be
related to various individual differences outside of cooperation and resource allocation. For
example, Van Lange et al., [7] found that pro-selfs were more likely to vote for conservative
candidates than prosocials. Similarly, Chirumbolo et al. [3] found that pro-selfs were more
right-wing and were more authoritarian than prosocials. In their review of individual differ-
ences in prosocial behavior as measured by economic games, Thielmann et al. [2] found that
prosociality was positively related to Agreeableness, Openness, and the Honesty/Humility fac-
tor of the HEXACO model. In other words, although SVO is measured within the context of
economic games, the individual differences it measures are relevant to understanding a poten-
tially broad range of phenomena.
In the present study, SVO was measured using the TDM. The TDM provides a basis for
classifying people into one of three categories: pro-socials, individualists, and competitors. The
last two categories are frequently combined into a single category labeled pro-selfs, and in the
present study, differences among the three categories, differences between pro-selfs and pro-
socials, and differences between the two types of pro-self orientation (individualists and com-
petitors) were examined.
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 2 / 15
Personal values
In contrast to social value orientation, which focuses on the specifics of social exchange, per-
sonal values concern a much broader range of phenomena. As proposed by Schwartz [8]: (1)
Values are beliefs about the importance of desirable goals, (2) When activated, values elicit
emotion, (3) Values are basic goals that apply across specific situations, (4) Values consciously
or unconsciously motivate behavior, perception, and attitudes, (5) Value effects occur through
a process of trade-offs among the relevant values, (6) Values serve as standards for evaluating
actions, people, and events, and (7) Values are ordered by importance in a relatively enduring
hierarchical system. Schwartz’s model of personal values, like that of Rokeach [9] and other
theorists, concerns how people think of their relationships with world at large, their sense of
what is important to them, and ultimately, what motivates their behavior and provides a ratio-
nale for their beliefs.
Schwartz posited that there are ten basic personal values: Universalism, Benevolence, Con-
formity, Tradition, Security, Self-direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, and Power.
The validity of this model has been demonstrated numerous times, including large scale cross-
cultural studies [e.g., 10]. Brief descriptions of these 10 values, taken from Schwartz and Cie-
ciuch [10], are presented in Table 1.
The descriptions in Table 1 also include a new measure of Benevolence that was created for
this study. This new measure concerns benevolence towards people in general, as opposed to
benevolence to close others, which is the focus of Schwartz’s measure. Within Schwartz’s
model, benevolence is defined as “Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with
whom one is in frequent personal contact.” The focus of Benevolence on close others is evident
in the two items from Schwartz’s scale that measure Benevolence: “It is very important to him
to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well being,” and “It is important to
her to be loyal to her friends; She wants to devote herself to people close to her.”
The new items of benevolence refer to the same constructs, care and trustworthiness, but
they concern the care of and goodwill toward those beyond someone’s immediate contacts or
close others. I believed this new measure was needed because I believed it was necessary to
have a measure of benevolence that was not limited to people whom the respondent knew.
None of the measures of other values in Schwartz’s model specify close others (in any way). If
other people are mentioned, it is in general terms, e.g., an item measuring Power reads: “It is
important to her to get respect for others. She wants people to do what she says.”
Table 1. Definitions of Schwartz’s basic personal values with additional measure of Benevolence in general.
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent
personal contact
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and of
nature
Conformity The restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses that are likely to upset or harm others and
violate social expectations or norms
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or
religion provides
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of society, relationships, and self
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
Self-Direction Independent thought and action, choosing, creating, and exploring
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself
Power Control or dominance over people and resources
Benevolence-
General
Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people in general.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795.t001
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 3 / 15
Measuring benevolence in terms of the “generalized other” makes the measurement level of
benevolence the same as measurement level of the other values in Schwartz’s system. This new
construct was measured with two items that corresponded to the focus of the two original
items. One item concerned care: “It is important to him to be kind and caring to people,
whether he knows them or not,” and the other item concerned trust: “It is important to her
that other people trust and can rely upon her. She people to know that she is trustworthy.” As
explained in the Methods section, items in Schwartz’s measure are gender specific.
Measuring benevolence in terms of the generalized other also provided a level of measure-
ment that corresponded to the level of measurement of SVO. Unless specified otherwise, as in
the case of an experiment with a specific partner of some kind, measures of SVO concern the
allocation of rewards to an anonymous person. In terms of the present study, the TDM mea-
sure of SVO asks about reward allocation to a hypothetical person. This means that the focus
(or level of analysis) of Schwartz’s original measure of Benevolence and the focus of the TDM
were meaningfully different: close others for Benevolence vs. anonymous (presumably every-
one) for the TDM. Differences between the levels of analysis of the measures of SVO and
Benevolence could compromise the validity of analyses examining relationships between SVO
and Benevolence.
Regardless of the level of measurement of Benevolence, it is critical to distinguish the
Schwartz factors of Universalism and Benevolence. Although scores measuring these two basic
values are often combined to form a score on higher-order factor, typically labelled as Self-
transcendence, such a higher-order scale score can obscure differences between Universalism
and Benevolence. Universalism is defined as “Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of all people and of nature,” e.g., Schwartz et al. [11]. Universalism’s
emphasis on understanding and tolerance of others and an emphasis on nature, is qualitatively
different than the emphasis on caring and trust that underlies Benevolence, including the pro-
posed new measure of general benevolence.
The differences between Benevolence and Universalism were highlighted by analyses of the
2016–17 European Social Survey reported in Nezlek [12]. In this study I found that Universal-
ism was positively related to attitudes toward immigrants, refugees, and gays and lesbians, atti-
tudes about the environment and climate change, social benefits, and income equality. In
contrast, Benevolence was either unrelated or negatively related to these measures. The impor-
tance of this distinction was further confirmed by Nezlek [13]. In analyses of nine European
Social Surveys (2002 through 2018) I found that endorsing Universalist values was negatively
related to well-being, whereas endorsing Benevolent values was positively related to well-
being.
In terms of adding items that measure benevolence toward “not close others,” the results of
these two studies suggest that Universalism is not Benevolence directed toward a more general
group. Although Universalism concerns the welfare of others, this concern is qualitatively dif-
ferent than the concern inherent in Benevolence. For example, Benevolence includes a desire
for people to be seen as trustworthy by others. Such a desire is not part of Universalism. In
both Nezlek [12] and Nezlek [13], I suggested that Universalism and Benevolence could be
considered to be measures of Ideological and Interpersonal prosociality respectively, which are
distinct, albeit related, constructs.
Consistent with Schwartz’s conceptualization of personal values, I assumed that the per-
sonal values that Schwartz described constitute the foundation for more domain-specific con-
structs such as SVO. Some indications about this correspondence can be found in the
definitions presented in Table 1. For example, Benevolence, Universalism, and Conformity
concern the feelings of others, whereas Hedonism, Achievement, and Power concern self-
enhancement. The common focus of some of these basic values is indicated by the fact that
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 4 / 15
Hedonism, Achievement, and Power are sometimes combined to create a higher-order factor
named Self-enhancement, and Benevolence and Universalism are sometimes combined to cre-
ate a higher-order factor named Self-transcendence.
Note: There is some inconsistency in how Hedonism has been treated by Schwarz and col-
leagues. For the PVQ-21, the measure used in the present study, Hedonism is located at the
border of openness and self-enhancement but is scored as part of self-enhancement, e.g., Cie-
ciuch et al. [14] A little differently, Schwartz and Cieciuch [10] in a study of the PVQ-RR (not
the measure used in the present study), begin with the same assumption (Table 1, p. 1007), but
Schwartz and Cieciuch then present some factor analyses suggesting that Hedonism should be
modeled as part of openness to change. Regardless, whether Hedonism is part of Self-enhance-
ment is not relevant to the present study because the present study did not examine higher-
order factors.
Previous research on relationships between SVO and personal values
Previous research has found that SVO and personal values are related, although the number of
studies is limited. For example, Schwartz [15], a study of 90 university students who partici-
pated in a decomposed prisoner’s dilemma game, found that cooperation in the game was pos-
itively related to Universalism, Benevolence, and Conformity. In contrast, non-cooperation in
the game was positively related to the importance of Power, Achievement, and Hedonism
values.
Tao and Au [16] examined relationships between Schwartz’s Self-transcendence and Self-
enhancement higher-order values and reward allocation in a dictator game among 257 univer-
sity students. Similar to the results of Schwartz [15], they found that endorsing Benevolence
and Universalism values were positively related to the awards allocated to others, whereas
Achievement and Power values were negatively related to the awards allocated to others.
Hedonism was not significantly related to reward allocation. Tao and Au also found that these
relationships were stronger when either values or the self were primed.
A conceptually similar study to Tao and Au, Sagiv et al. [17], found similar, but not identi-
cal results to Schwartz [15] and Tao and Au [16]. The 46 students in Study 1 participated in a
paired charity game. Contributions to charity (prosociality) were negatively related to Power,
Achievement, and Hedonism, and were positively related to Universalism, Benevolence, and
Tradition, but not to Conformity. In Study 2 (81 undergraduates who played a charity game),
they found that Power was negatively related to cooperative behavior, whereas Benevolence
was positively related. More important, in Study 2, Sagiv et al. manipulated the salience of val-
ues, and they concluded that “individuals’ values influenced their behavior in the Group Char-
ity social-dilemma game” (p. 74), i.e., values were more of a cause of allocation of rewards than
the reverse.”
Although informative, the existing research on relationships between SVO and personal
values is limited in some ways. For example, the sample sizes have been small, which limits the
power to detect relationships, particularly relationships involving different types of pro-selfs,
who typically constitute a minority of participants. The sample in the present study was suffi-
ciently large to provide adequate power to detect such differences.
The present study
Participants in the present study completed the TDM and a measure of Schwartz’s personal
values. Assuming that Benevolence and Universalism reflect prosocial values leads to the
expectation that pro-socials will have higher scores than pro-selfs on these two measures. The
same can be said for Conformity, which concerns taking other’s feelings into account when
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 5 / 15
deciding how to behave. In contrast, for Hedonism, Achievement, and Power, which concern
benefits for the self, pro-selfs should have higher scores than prosocials. These predictions are
largely in line with the results of Schwartz [15], Sagiv et al. [17], and Tao and Au [16]. Guided
by these expectations, the analyses examined differences among pro-socials, individualists, and
competitors in the 10 basic values of Schwartz’s model of personal values plus the new measure
of Benevolence created for the present study.
Method
Participants
The initial sample consisted of 1903 students (M
age
= 18.9 years, SD = 1.02, range 18–28 years)
who took an introductory psychology course at the College of William & Mary. They partici-
pated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participation was voluntary; the course
requirement could be fulfilled in ways that did not include participating in research. Data col-
lection occurred over three semesters, the fall of 2002 (September through December of 2022),
the spring of 2023 (January through April of 2023), and the fall of 2023 (September through
December of 2023). Participants provided data using a secure website.
As explained below, the social value orientation of 226 of these 1903 participants could not
be determined. Moreover, of the 1677 participants whose social value orientation could be
determined, 22 did not answer any of the questions on the measure of personal values. Given
this, the analyses included only those 1655 participants whose social value orientation could be
determined and who answered some of the personal values questions. The number of partici-
pants included in each analysis is provided in the tables.
Ethical statement
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki regarding the rights
of research participants. Participants consented electronically by clicking on a link indicating
their agreement to participate after being told that their names would not be associated with
their answers and that they could terminate participation at any time without penalty. See sup-
plemental materials for a copy of the consent procedure. Consistent with these instructions,
responses were de-identified prior to analysis. The study was conducted over three semesters,
and a separate ethics approval was obtained from the William & Mary Protection of Human
Subjects Committee each semester. The protocol identifiers were: PHSC-2022-09-07-
15836-ajbravo (approved 9/23/2022), PHSC-2023-02-01-16086-ajbravo (approved 2/13/2022),
and PHSC-2023-09-13-16567-ajbravo (approved 9/18/2023).
Measures
Social value orientation (SVO). Social value orientation was measured using what is
called the Triple Dominance Measure [TDM, 6]. Participants made nine decisions, in which
they decided how many points to allocate to themselves and to a hypothetical other. Based on
the choices they made, participants were classified as either prosocial, individualistic, or com-
petitive. Consistent with past practice, participants were classified into a category if they made
six choices in the same category. Participants who did not make six consistent choices were
deleted from the analyses.
The instructions to participants were similar to those used in previous studies that have
used the TDM. Participants were told:
“In this task we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another per-
son, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This other person is someone you do not
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 6 / 15
know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and the "Other" person will
be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce points
for both yourself and the "Other" person. Likewise, the other’s choice will produce points for
him/her and for you. Every point has value: The more points you receive, the better for you,
and the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her. Here’s an example of how
this task works:
A You get 500 Other gets 100
B You get 500 Other gets 500
C You get 550 Other gets 300
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would receive
100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; and if you chose C,
you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both
the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives. Before you
begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers–choose
the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have
value: The more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the "other’s" point
of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. For each of the following
nine choice situations, choose A, B, or C, depending on which column you prefer most. Pro-
vide your response by clicking on the button at the bottom of the column containing your
answer.”
In this example, Choice A represents the competitive option, because it provides a larger
difference between one’s own and the other’s outcomes (500–100 = 400) than either Choice B
(500–500 = 0) or Choice C (550–300 = 250). Choice B represents the prosocial option because
it provides a larger joint outcome (480 + 480 = 960) than provided by either of the other
options, and Choice C represents the individualistic option because one’s own outcomes are
larger than are those in Choice A or Choice B. A copy of the TDM is in the supplemental mate-
rials on the OSF site.
Personal values. Personal values were measured using the PVQ-21, a measure developed
by Schwartz [18], with two additional items to measure Benevolence to people in general.
These two items were: “It is important to him to be kind and caring to people, whether he
knows them or not,” and “It is important to him that other people trust and can rely upon
him. He wants people to know that he is trustworthy.” Compare these to the original two
items, which focus on close others: “It is very important to him to help the people around him.
He wants to care for their well-being,” and “It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He
wants to devote himself to people close to him.”
Prior to the study, the two new items measuring benevolence toward others were reviewed
by a panel of three psychologists familiar with the measurement of individual differences
including personal values. The two new items that were administered were judged to be mea-
sures of the intended construct of benevolence towards others, generally defined.
Note that the items measuring values are gender specific. This is done to enhance respon-
dents’ involvement with the construct being measured. In the present study, participants indi-
cated which pronouns they wanted to be used to display the items: male, female, or neutral
(plural). A copy of the items used in the present study is available in the supplemental materials
on the OSF site.
For each of the resulting 23 statements, participants indicated the extent to which a state-
ment (e.g., to be rich, have money and expensive things; to be humble and modest, behave
properly) described them using a 5-point scale with endpoints labelled 1 = very much like me
and 5 = not like me at all. Before the analyses, responses to these items were reverse-scored so
that higher numbers indicated stronger endorsement of a statement. Moreover, as
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 7 / 15
recommended by Schwartz [18], responses were ipsatized, i.e., the mean response to the 23
items was subtracted from each response. This controlled for individual differences in the use
of the response scale.
Responses to these 23 statements were combined to produce 11 scores representing the 10
basic values defined by Schwartz’s model: universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition,
self-direction, stimulation seeking, hedonism, achievement, power, security, and a score repre-
senting the new measure of benevolence to people in general. Researchers sometimes calculate
what are referred to as higher-order factors which represent combinations of these basic val-
ues, e.g., Self-transcendence is a combination of Universalism and Benevolence. I chose not to
do this because previous research has found that the basic values that comprise higher-order
factors may be related to external criteria in different ways, e.g., Universalism and Benevolence
are (respectively) negatively and positively related to well-being [13].
Results
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations
Based on their responses, 1683 of 1906 participants could be classified as either prosocial, indi-
vidualistic, or competitive. The responses of 223 participants were not consistent enough to
classify them into one of the three categories, and these participants were dropped from the
analyses. Another 23 participants did not answer the values questions, and they were also
dropped from the analyses. This left 1655 participants in the analyses: 1151 (69.5%) were clas-
sified as prosocial, 381 (23.0%) were classified as individualistic, and 123 (7.4%) were classified
as competitive. For these participants, the mean number of prosocial choices for participants
classified as prosocial was 8.49 (SD = .92), the mean number of individualist choices for partic-
ipants classified as individualist was 8.28 (SD = 1.06), and the mean number of competitive
choices for participants classified as competitors was 8.37 (SD = 1.02).
Correlations between personal value scores and descriptive statistics for these scores are
presented in Table 2. Note that these are ipsatized scores, so the means are not the same as
means based on the original 5-point scale. The correlation between the existing and new mea-
sures of benevolence was .526. Given that both of these measures concerned benevolence, a
correlation of this size is not surprising. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that such
a correlation means that the two measures share only 28% of their variance, which leaves room
for divergent validity.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for, and correlations between, measures of personal values.
M SD n αBene Bene-G Conf Trad Sec SelfD Stim Hed Ach Pow
Universalism .469 .585 1653 .57 .272 .330 -.159 -.096 -.158 .048 -.102 -.206 -.276 -.432
Benevolence .700 .585 1649 .68 .528 -.120 -.028 -.145 -.040 -.105 -.175 -.236 -.345
Benevolence-General .805 .564 1647 .70 -.037 .030 -.085 -.074 -.155 -.231 -.181 -.368
Conformity -.567 .903 1649 .61 .246 .191 -.349 -.406 -.318 -.138 -.053
Tradition -.273 .814 1655 .30 -.021 -.182 -.171 -.290 -.323 -.172
Security -.150 .781 1651 .49 -.251 -.409 -.114 -.005 -.038
Self-direction -.012 .756 1653 .39 .146 -.058 -.074 -.142
Stimulation -.218 .891 1652 .75 .187 -.106 -.075
Hedonism -.203 .810 1652 .67 -.106 -.075
Achievement .170 .764 1651 .68 .298
Power .469 .585 1654 .41
Note: For n= 1655: |r|>.049 significant at p<.05; |r|>.064 significant at p.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795.t002
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 8 / 15
According to guidelines proposed by Shrout [19], six of these scales had moderate reliability
(.61 to .80), three had fair reliability (.41 to .60), and two had slight reliability (.11 to .40). It
must be kept in mind that with the exception of universalism, which consists of three items, all
of these scales consist of two items, the minimum number of items to estimate reliability.
Differences in values as a function of SVO
The primary analysis was a one-way ANOVA with SVO as the independent measure and the
11 basic value scores as the dependent measures. I also conducted two planned comparisons:
one compared pro-socials and pro-selfs (pro-selfs consisted of individualists and competitors
considered together) and a second compared individualists and competitors. According to
G*Power [20], assuming α= .05, for a one-way ANOVA with three groups, a sample of 1655
provides power of .96 to detect a small effect (f= .10). For a t-test comparing pro-socials
(n= 1151) with pro-selfs (n= 504), the power to detect a small effect (d= .2) was also .96. For a
t-test comparing individualists (n= 381) with competitors (n= 123), the power to detect a
medium effect (d= .5) was .99, the power to detect a small-medium effect (d= .35) was .92,
and the power to detect a small effect (d= .2) was .49.
These analyses found a significant main effect for SVO in the analyses of universalism, both
measures of benevolence, conformity, hedonism, achievement, and power. Moreover, for each
of these measures, the planned comparison of pro-socials vs pro-selfs was significant. In con-
trast, the planned comparison of individualists vs. competitors found no significant differences
in how strongly these two groups of participants endorsed any value, although the difference
in the strength of endorsing benevolence values as defined by Schwartz originally approached
the conventional level of .05 (p= .072).
The means for each group and the results of the main effects and the comparison of pro-
socials and pro-selfs are presented in Table 3. This table also contains an estimate of the pooled
SD based on the MS
error
for each variable. Note that all of the significant main effects and sig-
nificant differences between pro-socials and pro-selfs remained significant after controlling
for false discovery rate [21].
Generally speaking, as can be seen from the means presented in Table 3, individualists and
competitors (pro-selfs) tended to be more similar to each other than they were to pro-socials.
Compared to pro-selfs, pro-socials endorsed Universalism and the two types of Benevolence
Table 3. Results of analyses of variance and planned comparisons of basic values.
Social value orientation Main effect Pro-social vs. pro-self
n SD
pool
Prosocial Individual Compete F p η
2
F p η
2
Universalism 1653 .574 .543 .312 .262 31.71 .000 .037 55.76 .000 .033
Benevolence 1649 .581 .751 .558 .667 15.92 .000 .019 15.95 .000 .010
Bene-General 1647 .559 .854 .693 .692 14.62 .000 .017 23.48 .000 .014
Conformity 1649 .900 -.513 -.692 -.675 6.60 .001 .008 10.03 .002 .006
Tradition 1660 .814 -.260 -.314 -.264 <1<1
Security 1651 .780 -.176 -.080 -.120 2.27 .104 .003 2.67 .103 .002
Self-direction 1653 .756 -.011 -.018 .003 <1<1
Stimulation 1657 .891 -.243 -.171 -.134 1.54 .214 2.92 .088 .002
Hedonism 1652 .806 -.253 -.079 -.116 7.49 .001 .009 10.43 .001 .006
Achievement 1651 .760 .118 .316 .196 9.82 .000 .012 9.22 .002 .006
Power 1654 .806 -.633 -.287 -.243 34.43 .000 .040 58.40 .000 .034
Note: Bene-General refers to the new measure of benevolence. Column labeled SD
pool
contains the square root of the mean square error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795.t003
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 9 / 15
values more strongly. Compared to pro-selfs, pro-socials endorsed Conformity, Hedonism,
Achievement, and Power values less strongly.
Inspection of the means in Table 3 suggests that differences among the three TDM cate-
gories varied across the two measures of benevolence. Although a follow-up three (TDM
category) by two (measure of Benevolence) ANOVA did not produce a significant interac-
tion of category and measure, F(2,1643) = 2.36, p= .094, another analysis limited to individ-
ualists and competitors did find a near-significant interaction of category and measure, F
(1,500) = 3.77, p= .053. This interaction was due to the fact that for the new measure, the
difference between individualists and competitors was functionally 0 (.695 - .692 = .003),
whereas for the existing measure, scores for individualists were lower than scores for com-
petitors (.558 - .679 = -.121).
Discussion
The present results suggest that social value orientation is related to more fundamental, basic
personal values. Although the measure of SVO that was used, the TDM, produces three catego-
ries, prosocials, individualists, and competitors, the only distinction that mattered was between
pro-socials and pro-selfs (individualists and competitors grouped together). This distinction
has been found to be an important, perhaps the most important, distinction in previous
research [22]. We discuss the casual precedence of personal values and social value orientation
in a separate section below.
Consistent with the conceptualization of the pro-social orientation as reflecting a desire to
equalize or maximize joint outcomes, pro-socials were higher than pro-selfs on three other-
focused values, Universalism, which concerns treating people equally and fairly and includes
concern for the environment. They were higher on the two measures of Benevolence, which
concern more interpersonally focused values such as helping and supporting others and being
trustworthy. Pro-socials were also higher than pro-selfs in terms of Conformity, another value
focused on others. Pro-socials were lower than pro-selfs in terms of the self-focused values of
Hedonism, Achievement, and Power.
Levels of analysis of personal values and social value orientation
Schwartz’s various models all propose that personal values can be conceptualized at two levels
of analysis, typically referred to as basic values and higher-order factors. For example, across
these various models, Self-transcendence is defined as a higher-order factor consisting of the
basic values of Universalism and Benevolence [e.g., 10]. Nevertheless, some research questions
the validity of such higher-order factors because the basic values that comprise them are
related to external criteria in different, sometimes opposing ways. For example, as discussed
previously, Nezlek [13] found that Universalism and Benevolence were related to well-being in
different ways, and Nezlek [12] found that Universalism and Benevolence were related to vari-
ous social attitudes in different ways.
Regardless, the present results provide some support for the validity of these higher-order
factors, at least in terms of the correspondence between basic values and social value orienta-
tion. Differences among the three categories in the strength of the endorsement of Universal-
ism and of both the original and new measures of Benevolence were similar, suggesting that it
was appropriate to think of these basic values as manifestations of the higher-order factor of
Self-transcendence. Similarly, differences among the three categories in scores for Achieve-
ment and Power were similar, suggesting that it was appropriate to think of these basic values
as manifestations of the higher-order factor of Self-enhancement. Pro-socials had lower scores
on Hedonism than pro-selfs, which, as discussed in the introduction, is consistent with how
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 10 / 15
Hedonism has been treated in some discussions of personal values, i.e., as a manifestation of
Self-enhancement.
On the other hand, scores on Conformity, which is typically conceptualized as a manifesta-
tion of the higher-order factor of Conservation, varied across the three categories of SVO,
whereas Tradition and Security, which are also typically conceptualized as manifestations of
Conservation, did not. Moreover, although the main effect for SVO in the analysis of Security
was marginally significant (p= .10), the mean differences were in the opposite direction to the
mean differences in the analysis of Conformity. For security, pro-socials had lower (more neg-
ative) scores than pro-selfs, whereas for Conformity, pro-socials had higher (less negative)
scores than pro-selfs.
Expanding Benevolence to include people in general
Schwartz’s measure of Benevolence explicitly concerns benevolence toward close others,
friends, family, and possibly acquaintance, but certainly not strangers. There is nothing inher-
ently wrong in this. It was a choice, and the items reflect this choice. This focus of items mea-
suring benevolence on close others is also readily apparent in other versions of Schwartz’s
model such as the PVQ-RR, a 57 item scale [10].
The two items that were added to the PVQ-21 were similar to the original two items that
measured benevolence in terms of the benevolent values they measured but differed in terms
of the target of this benevolence. Although the results of the analyses of these two measures of
benevolence were similar, follow-up analyses that treated the two measures of benevolence as a
repeated measure found some support for the divergent validity of the new measure of benevo-
lence. Consistent with sharing a pro-self orientation, individualists and competitors had near
identical scores on the new measure, which focused on others in general. In contrast, individu-
alists had lower scores than competitors (p= .07) on the original measure of Benevolence,
which focused on close others.
At least in terms of the correspondence between personal values and social value orienta-
tion, the new measure appears to correspond more closely to SVO than the existing measure.
This makes sense given the “generalized other” focus of the new measure. Nevertheless, this
difference is not pronounced, and present results need to be considered as preliminary.
Causal precedence
An important question in the study of relationships between personal values and social value
orientation is the causal precedence of these constructs. Which is the cause, and which is the
effect? Many discussions of SVO are moot on causal relationships between SVO and other dis-
positions. For example, the word “causality” does not appear in reviews by Thielmann et al. [2]
and Murphy et al. [5]. Pletzer et al. [22] discuss causality, but their review is limited to relation-
ships between SVO and cooperative behavior. Authors sometimes discuss how dispositions
such as personality “predict” behavior in economic games [e.g., 23]. Although such language
avoids direct claims of causality, typically, one thinks of predictors as causes and outcomes as
effects.
Nevertheless, personal values as conceptualized by Schwartz and colleagues are meant to
represent “broad motivational constructs that express what is important to people” [8], and
the general logic of Schwartz’s model is that personal values serve as foundations for people’s
behaviors, attitudes, and so forth. Such logic suggests that values are causes and the people’s
choices in economic games are effects.
SVO as conceptualized in the present study (and many others) was inferred from the
choices people made, i.e., it is a behavioral measure, and research has found that values lead to
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 11 / 15
behaviors more regularly than behaviors lead to values. For example, in a series of six experi-
ments, Verplanken and Holland [24] found support for a value-behavior causal relationship
within the context of environmental values and environmentally-relevant behavior. Along the
same lines, Sagiv and Roccas [25] reviewed the research on value-behavior relationships and
proposed various mediators and moderators of such relationships. Nevertheless, the core of
their analysis was that values lead to behaviors, not the opposite.
Although previous research suggests a causal relationship from values to social value orien-
tation, the present study did not provide a basis to draw inferences about causality. The design
of the present study was cross-sectional and static. Changes across time, which can be used to
draw inferences about causality, were not examined.
It is possible that changes in SVO (a behavior) lead to changes in values, although I am
unaware of any research demonstrating this. Although many researchers appear to assume a
causal link from values to SVO rather than the reverse, often, the topic is not addressed explic-
itly. Clearly, resolving this issue requires collecting data that provides a basis for drawing infer-
ences about causal relationships between personal values and social value orientation.
The sample
The present study examined relationships between SVO and personal values among a sample
of students, who compromise a sample of what is frequently described as “emerging adults.”
The term was introduced by Arnett [26], and it refers to individuals who are between 18 years
old and the mid-late twenties. Emerging adulthood is conceptualized as a transitionary stage
between adolescence and adulthood. During emerging adulthood, individuals begin to formu-
late identities, which can include characteristics such as personal values and social value
orientations.
Although emerging adulthood can be a time of exploration, it appears that personal values
are relatively stable during emerging adulthood. For example, based on an eight-year study of
the stability of values among a sample of 270 young adults, Vecchione et al. [27] concluded
that: “The many transitions of young adulthood makes this a period with great potential for
naturally occurring, long-term value change. However, our findings, which examine four dif-
ferent aspects of change, reveal the presence of substantial stability in basic personal values
during this period” (p. 120). The stability of personal values during emerging adulthood may
extend into adulthood per se, but this has not been established.
It should be noted that much of the research on SVO has examined student samples or
young adults. For example, across the 770 studies Thielmann et al. [2] reviewed, the average
age of 152,077 participants was 26.3 years, Md = 23.0, and most studies (72.8%) were con-
ducted in the laboratory, suggesting the participants were university students. Although stu-
dent samples may limit the generalizability of results in ways that samples of community
members might not, in defense of this practice is the assumption that young adults do not dif-
fer from older adults in terms of what SVO represents. Nonetheless, this is an unexplored
question that will require further research to answer.
Strengths, limitations, and future directions
The present study had numerous strengths including the use of well-established measures of
personal values and SVO. The results were clear and consistent with expectations and were
consistent with how SVO and personal values have been conceptualized. The study also had a
large sample, something that was particularly important in terms of comparing individualists
and competitors. Competitors tend to be a relatively small minority of samples, typically 10–
15% [e.g., 6] and sometimes lower, which means that without large total samples, comparisons
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 12 / 15
of individualists and competitors can be underpowered. Competitors comprised 7.3% of the
present sample, but there were 123 of them, which provided adequate power to detect differ-
ences between them and individualists (n= 385).
In terms of divergent validity, there were no differences as a function of SVO for basic val-
ues reflecting constructs that did not concern prosociality (or the lack thereof). These were:
Tradition, Security, Self-direction, and Stimulation. Moreover, there was ample power to
detect differences for these measures. The lack of differences for these basic values is important
because like the other values, they are positively valent. The lack of differences in the analyses
of these basic values suggests that SVO is not a manifestation of positive values in general;
rather, it is a manifestation of values concerning the interpersonal domain in particular.
On the other hand, the study had shortcomings. For example, the study did not examine
how relationships between values and SVO might vary as a function of situational affordances
[2], nor did it examine how relationships might vary as a function of characteristics of the part-
ners with whom participants are playing an economic game [22]. As mentioned previously,
there is also the issue of the age of the sample. At this point, it would not be appropriate to
speculate about how the present results might differ if affordances, relationships, or age of
sample were considered. Examining such possibilities will require future research specifically
designed to do so.
There is also the issue of “third variables,” variables that might explain, mediate, or con-
found the relationships found in the present study. There is little research or theory that sug-
gests specific third variables, and the study was not designed to examine such possibilities, so it
is difficult to speculate about this. Possible variables could include personality (e.g., agreeable-
ness) and socio-political variables such as social dominance. Determining if such possibilities
exist will require future research specifically designed to do so.
The main effects for SVO accounted for between 1% and 4% of the variance in measures of
personal values. Such differences are fairly typical for research on SVO [2,28]. According to
guidelines discussed by Adams and Conway [29], an η
2
of .01 represents a small effect, and an
η
2
of .06 represents a medium effect. Although such differences may not appear to be meaning-
ful because they do not account for large amounts of variance, it is important to recognize that
small effects can be important when they concern a large number of outcomes [30]. People
probably make decisions about benefitting others vs benefitting themselves on an everyday
basis, and the cumulative effect of values on these decisions (or vice versa) has the potential to
be substantial.
Finally, there is the issue of the “disembodied” nature of the TDM. By design, the TDM
asks respondents to imagine that they are making decisions in terms of someone they do not
know and do not expect to meet. Moreover, in the TDM imaginary points are allocated. In
contrast, research using other measures of SVO may involve pairing participants with another
person (or persons) who is (are) identified and may involve the allocation of resources that
have some value, e.g., tokens that can be redeemed for cash or other rewards. Research that
has examined the correspondence of behavior in different economic games (including the
TDM) suggests that different games provide similar descriptions of people [e.g., 31], but this is
a relatively unexplored topic, and so it is not known if the use of the TDM limits the generaliz-
ability of the results of the preset study.
Conclusions
The present results complement and extend existing research on relationships between per-
sonal values and social value orientation. Importantly, based on their content, values that were
expected to vary as a function of SVO varied as expected, and values that were not expected to
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 13 / 15
vary did not vary. Individuals with a pro-social orientation had higher scores than individuals
with a pro-self orientation on Universalism, Benevolence, and Conformity values. In contrast,
individuals with a pro-self orientation had higher scores than individuals with a pro-social ori-
entation on Power, Achievement, and Hedonic values. Moreover, no differences were found
between individualists and competitors for these values, and no differences of any kind were
found for values that did not refer to the interpersonal domain, despite having adequate power
to find such differences.
In terms of how personal values map onto social value orientation, the present results sug-
gest that it may be more informative to conceptualize personal values in terms of basic values
rather than higher-order factors. Although some results were consistent with conceptualizing
values in terms of higher-order factors, there were enough results that did not, calling into
question the utility of the higher-order factors for understanding SVO. Given this, in future
research on relationships between personal values and SVO, it may be useful to conceptualize
values in terms of basic values rather than higher-order factors, at least initially.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: John B. Nezlek.
Data curation: John B. Nezlek.
Formal analysis: John B. Nezlek.
Investigation: John B. Nezlek.
Methodology: John B. Nezlek.
Project administration: John B. Nezlek.
Writing original draft: John B. Nezlek.
References
1. Parks-Leduc L, Feldman G, Bardi A. Personality traits and personal values: A Meta-analysis. Personal
Soc Psychol Rev. 2015; 19(1):3–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868314538548 PMID: 24963077
2. Thielmann I, Spadaro G, Balliet D. Personality and prosocial behavior: A theoretical framework and
meta-analysis. Psychol Bull. 2020 Jan; 146(1):30–90. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000217 PMID:
31841013
3. Chirumbolo A, Leone L, Desimoni M. The interpersonal roots of politics: Social value orientation, socio-
political attitudes and prejudice. Pers Individ Dif. 2016; 91:144–53.
4. Van Lange PAM, Bekkers R, Schuyt TNM, Van Vugt M. From games to giving: Social value orientation
predicts donations to noble causes. Basic Appl Soc Psych. 2007; 29(4):375–84.
5. Murphy RO, Ackermann KA. Social value orientation: Theoretical and measurement issues in the study
of social preferences. Personal Soc Psychol Rev. 2014; 18(1):13–41.
6. Van Lange PAM, De Bruin EMN, Otten W, Joireman JA. Development of prosocial, individualistic, and
competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1997; 73(4):733–46.
https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.73.4.733 PMID: 9325591
7. Van Lange PAM, Bekkers R, Chirumbolo A, Leone L. Are conservatives less likely to be prosocial than
liberals? From games to ideology, political preferences and voting. Eur J Pers. 2012; 26(5):461–73.
8. Schwartz SH. Basic individual values: Sources and consequences. In: Handbook of value: Perspectives
from economics, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology and sociology. New York, NY, US: Oxford Uni-
versity Press; 2016. p. 63–84.
9. Rokeach M. The nature of human values. New York: Free Press; 1973.
10. Schwartz SH, Cieciuch J. Measuring the refined theory of individual values in 49 cultural groups: Psy-
chometrics of the revised Portrait Value Questionnaire. Assessment. 2022; 29(5):1005–19. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1073191121998760 PMID: 33682477
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 14 / 15
11. Schwartz SH, Cieciuch J, Vecchione M, Davidov E, Fischer R, Beierlein C, et al. Refining the theory of
basic individual values. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2012; 103(4):663–88. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029393
PMID: 22823292
12. Nezlek JB. Distinguishing interpersonal and ideological prosociality: Introducing the construct of ideo-
logical prosociality. New Ideas Psychol. 2022; 65:100929.
13. Nezlek JB. The costs of ideological prosociality: Analyses of the European Social Survey from 2002 to
2018 find negative relationships between endorsing universalistic values and well-being and social capi-
tal. Appl Psychol Heal Well-Being. 2023; 15:390–408. https://doi.org/10.1111/aphw.12385 PMID:
35860853
14. Cieciuch J, Davidov E, Vecchione M, Schwartz SH. A hierarchical structure of basic human values in a
third-order confirmatory factor analysis. Swiss J Psychol. 2014; 73(3):177–82.
15. Schwartz SH. Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated value systems. In: Seligman
C, Olson JM, Zanna MP, editors. The psychology of values: The Ontario symposium. 1996. p. 119–44.
16. Tao L, tung Au W. Values, self and other-regarding behavior in the dictator game. Ration Soc. 2014; 26
(1):46–72.
17. Sagiv L, Sverdlik N, Schwarz N. To compete or to cooperate? Values’ impact on perception and action
in social dilemma games. Eur J Soc Psychol. 2011; 41(1):64–77.
18. Schwartz SH. European Social Survey Core Questionnaire Development–Chapter 7: A Proposal for
Measuring Value Orientations across Nations. London; 2001.
19. Shrout PE. Measurement reliability and agreement in psychiatry. Stat Methods Med Res. 1998; 7
(3):301–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/096228029800700306 PMID: 9803527
20. Faul F, Erdfelder E, Buchner A, Lang AG. Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: Tests for cor-
relation and regression analyses. Behav Res Methods. 2009; 41(4):1149–60. https://doi.org/10.3758/
BRM.41.4.1149 PMID: 19897823
21. Benjamini Y, Hochberg J. Controlling the false discovery rate—A practical and powerful approach to
multiple testing. J R Stat Soc Ser B Methodol. 1995; 57(1):289–300.
22. Pletzer JL, Balliet D, Joireman J, Kuhlman DM, Voelpel SC, Van Lange PAM. Social value orientation,
expectations, and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Eur J Pers. 2018; 32(1):62–83.
23. Hirsh JB, Peterson JB. Extraversion, neuroticism, and the prisoner’s dilemma. Pers Individ Dif. 2009;
46(2):254–6.
24. Verplanken B, Holland RW. Motivated decision making: Effects of activation and self-centrality of values
on choices and behavior. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2002; 82(3):434–47. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.
82.3.434 PMID: 11902626
25. Sagiv L, Roccas S. How do values affect behavior? Let me count the ways. Personal Soc Psychol Rev.
2021; 25(4):295–316. https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683211015975 PMID: 34047241
26. Arnett JJ. Emerging adulthood. A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. Am
Psychol. 2000; 55(5):469–80. PMID: 10842426
27. Vecchione M, Schwartz S, Alessandri G, Do
¨ring AK, Castellani V, Caprara MG. Stability and change of
basic personal values in early adulthood: An 8-year longitudinal study. J Res Pers. 2016; 63:111–22.
28. Balliet D, Parks C, Joireman J. Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-
analysis. Gr Process Intergr Relations. 2009; 12(4):533–47.
29. Adams MA, Conway TL. Eta squared. In: Michalos AC, editor. Encyclopedia of quality of life and well-
being research. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands; 2014. p. 1965–6.
30. Ellis PD. The Essential guide to effect sizes: Statistical power, meta-analysis, and the interpretation of
research results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010.
31. Yamagishi T, Mifune N, Li Y, Shinada M, Hashimoto H, Horita Y, et al. Is behavioral pro-sociality game-
specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process].
2013; 120(2):260–71.
PLOS ONE
Personal values and social value orientation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0312795 November 27, 2024 15 / 15
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
The authors adopt an interdependence analysis of social value orientation, proposing that prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations are (a) partially rooted in different patterns of social interaction as experienced during the periods spanning early childhood to young adulthood and (b) further shaped by different patterns of social interaction as experienced during early adulthood, middle adulthood, and old age. Congruent with this analysis, results revealed that relative to individualists and competitors, prosocial individuals exhibited greater levels of secure attachment (Studies 1 and 2) and reported having more siblings, especially sisters (Study 3). Finally, the prevalence of prosocials increased—and the prevalence of individualists and competitors decreased—from early adulthood to middle adulthood and old age (Study 4).
Article
Full-text available
Traditionally, prosociality has been conceptualized in terms of the interpersonal domain, for example, helping behavior. Nevertheless, people can be prosocial in terms of ideological domains, for example, social policies they support. The present study examined the utility of distinguishing interpersonal and ideological prosocial values as predictors of well‐being and social capital. Data from nine European Social Surveys were combined. The Universalism and Benevolence values of Schwartz's basic human values were treated as measures of ideological and interpersonal prosocial values. Relationships between Universalism and Benevolence and well‐being and social capital were examined with multilevel models, persons nested with rounds, rounds nested within countries. Respondent sex, age, and education were included as covariates. These analyses found that Benevolence was positively related to satisfaction with life and happiness, whereas Universalism was negatively related to satisfaction with life and happiness. Although endorsing both values was positively related to attitudinal measures of social capital (e.g., people can be trusted), Universalism was negatively related to self‐reports of social activity, whereas Benevolence was either positively related or unrelated to self‐reports of social activity. Being ideologically prosocial appears to be associated with reduced well‐being. Future research is needed to explain the mechanisms responsible for this relationship.
Article
Full-text available
Prosociality refers to dispositions and behaviors intended to benefit others, and the present study assumed that these dispositions reflect people's values. Much of the research on prosociality has examined prosociality in what can be called the interpersonal domain, e.g., helping others. I propose that prosociality also exists in the ideological domain. People hold prosocial values that concern collectives, not specific individuals. Multilevel analyses of data collected in Wave 8 of the European Social Survey (44,000 respondents in 23 countries) found positive relationships between ideological prosocial values and attitudes toward immigrants, refugees, and gays and lesbians, attitudes about the environment and climate change, social benefits, and income equality. Moreover, these relationships remained significant after controlling for participants' sex, age, income, education, political orientation, and happiness. In contrast, relationships between these attitudes and interpersonal prosocial values were either negative or not significant.
Article
Full-text available
Researchers around the world are applying the recently revised Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ-RR) to measure the 19 values in Schwartz’s (2017) refined values theory. We assessed the internal reliability, circular structure, measurement model, and measurement invariance of values measured by this questionnaire across 49 cultural groups (N = 53,472) and 32 language versions. The PVQ-RR reliably measured 15 of the 19 values in the vast majority of groups and two others in most groups. The fit of the theory-based measurement models supported the differentiation of almost all values in every cultural group. Almost all values were measured invariantly across groups at the configural and metric level. A two-dimensional multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) revealed that the PVQ-RR perfectly reproduced the theorized order of the 19 values around the circle across groups. The current study established the PVQ-RR as a sound instrument to measure and to compare the hierarchies and correlates of values across cultures.
Article
Full-text available
Decades of research document individual differences in prosocial behavior using controlled experiments that model social interactions in situations of interdependence. However, theoretical and empirical integration of the vast literature on the predictive validity of personality traits to account for these individual differences is missing. Here, we present a theoretical framework that identifies four broad situational affordances across interdependent situations (i.e., exploitation, reciprocity, temporal conflict, and dependence under uncertainty) and more specific sub-affordances within certain types of interdependent situations (e.g., possibility to increase equality in outcomes) that can determine when, which, and how personality traits should be expressed in prosocial behavior. To test this framework, we meta-analyzed 770 studies reporting on 3,523 effects of 8 broad and 43 narrow personality traits on prosocial behavior in interdependent situations modelled in six commonly studied economic games (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods Game, and Commons Dilemma). Overall, meta-analytic correlations ranged between -.18 ≤ r ≤ .26 and most traits yielding a significant relation to prosocial behavior had conceptual links to the affordances provided in interdependent situations, most prominently the possibility for exploitation. Moreover, for several traits, correlations within games followed the predicted pattern derived from a theoretical analysis of affordances. On the level of traits, we found that narrow and broad traits alike can account for prosocial behavior, informing the bandwidth-fidelity problem. In sum, the meta-analysis provides a theoretical foundation that can guide future research on prosocial behavior and advance our understanding of individual differences in human prosociality.
Article
Full-text available
Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta-analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well-established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology
Article
The impact of personal values on preferences, choices, and behaviors has evoked much interest. Relatively little is known, however, about the processes through which values impact behavior. In this conceptual article, we consider both the content and the structural aspects of the relationships between values and behavior. We point to unique features of values that have implications to their relationships with behavior and build on these features to review past research. We then propose a conceptual model that presents three organizing principles: accessibility, interpretation, and control. For each principle, we identify mechanisms through which values and behavior are connected. Some of these mechanisms have been exemplified in past research and are reviewed; others call for future research. Integrating the knowledge on the multiple ways in which values impact behavior deepens our understanding of the complex ways through which cognition is translated into action.
Article
Psychiatric research has benefited from attention to measurement theories of reliability, and reliability/agreement statistics for psychopathology ratings and diagnoses are regularly reported in empirical reports. Nevertheless, there are still controversies regarding how reliability should be measured, and the amount of resources that should be spent on studying measurement quality in research programs. These issues are discussed in the context of recent theoretical and technical contributions to the statistical analysis of reliability. Special attention is paid to statistical studies published since Kraemer's 1992 review of reliability methods in this journal.
Article
The common approach to the multiplicity problem calls for controlling the familywise error rate (FWER). This approach, though, has faults, and we point out a few. A different approach to problems of multiple significance testing is presented. It calls for controlling the expected proportion of falsely rejected hypotheses — the false discovery rate. This error rate is equivalent to the FWER when all hypotheses are true but is smaller otherwise. Therefore, in problems where the control of the false discovery rate rather than that of the FWER is desired, there is potential for a gain in power. A simple sequential Bonferronitype procedure is proved to control the false discovery rate for independent test statistics, and a simulation study shows that the gain in power is substantial. The use of the new procedure and the appropriateness of the criterion are illustrated with examples.