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An Analysis of Illiberal Democracies. Towards the End of Law?
Abstract
Democracy as a concept has often been confronted to a plethora of adjectives that at the same time determine and alter its meaning. The adjectives direct, representative, liberal designate contemporary forms of democracy without being exclusive, cumulative, or accessory the one to another. If it is widely accepted—at least from a legal point of view—that representative democracy is the dominant form of exercising power, we can still find expressions of direct and liberal democracy within national constitutions, namely through mechanisms such as the referendum for the former and the protection of the rule of law for the latter. Nonetheless, a new tendency seeks to affix adjectives to the term “democracy” that would not only alter its meaning but even go beneath the essence of democracy as a political regime, based on the electoral moment and ensuring fundamental rights and the rule of law. Therefore, the terms illiberal democracy, defective democracy, electoral democracy, hybrid democracy indicate a rather not exhaustive list of a regime that obeys formally to the democratic criteria but fails to fulfil the essence of democracy. Whereas legal scholars and political scientists have suggested that we are heading towards the transformation of Law as we know it, others have rather addressed the “end of Law”. Is the phenomenon of illiberal democracies a new constitutional phenomenon or is only part of a more profound process of the transformation of Law?
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This Article argues that, as far as Hungary and Poland are concerned, the use of term “illiberal constitutionalism” is justified. It also claims that, without denying that other states could also be considered illiberal democracies, Hungary and Poland display unique and distinctive features. These features include populist politics, which lead to the relativization of the rule of law and democracy principles, and human rights protection, which captured the constitution and constitutionalism by constitutionalizing populist nationalism, constitutional identity, and created new patrionalism and clientelism. All these features are supported by the ideological indoctrination of political constitutionalism. In the course of this process, formal and informal constitutional amendments are used, and a formal sense of constitutional democracy is maintained. Overturning these illiberal democracies by constitutional and legal means, at this time, seems doubtful, if not impossible.
The engagement of conservative, populist governments with constitutional reform and constitution-making is perceived as a significant threat to the rule of law and democracy within the European Union. Constitutionalists often assume a relation of mutual exclusion between populism and constitutionalism. In contrast, I argue that while populism ought to be understood as a rejection of liberal constitutionalism, it equally constitutes a competing political force regarding the definition of constitutional democracy. The article first discusses populist constitutionalism in the context of the two, main modern constitutional traditions: the modernist and the revolutionary ones. Second, I discuss the populist critique of liberal constitutionalism, with a central focus on the recent cases of right-wing populism in power in East-Central Europe. Four dimensions are prominent: 1) popular sovereignty as the key justificatory claim of populism; 2) majority rule as the main populist mode of government; 3) instrumentalism as the legal-practical approach of populists; and 4) legal resentment as the populists’ main attitude towards public law. In conclusion, I argue that while the populist critique of liberal constitutionalism provides significant insights into structural problems of liberal democracy, populist constitutionalism ultimately fails to live up to its own democratic promise.
Thomas Franck's “ emerging ” right to democracy seems to be entering turbulent times, as the current global democratic recession has undermined the optimism of the 1990s. The greatest paradox of the current populist wave is that democracy is being subverted by leaders promising more, not less, democracy—but it is a democracy of a different kind. Populists embrace the “form” of democracy and claim to speak for the people themselves. At the same time, however, by undermining its liberal constitutional foundations, they erode the substance of democracy, and gradually transform it into various forms of illiberal and authoritarian regimes.
The EU will not become something like a traditional nation-state anytime soon, and no supranational public sphere is likely to ever replace national public spheres.
Un moyen de comprendre l’expansion du phénomène des « démocraties illibérales », en Europe et ailleurs, est de l’envisager comme une réaction au passage d’une conception formelle à une conception substantielle du droit. Face à ce double phénomène de transformation de la démocratie et du droit, une alternative se dessine : revenir à une approche procédurale du droit qui ne correspond plus à ce qu’est la réalité moderne de l’État de droit démocratique, ou tenter de s’aventurer plus avant dans une approche morale du droit au risque de perdre la guerre des valeurs face aux conceptions illibérales.
Self-described populist leaders around the world are dismantling their nation’s constitutions. This has led to a widespread view that populism as such is inconsistent with constitutionalism. We disagree. Some forms of populism are inconsistent with constitutionalism, others aren’t. Context and detail matter. We begin with a thin definition of constitutionalism that people from the progressive left to the conservative right should be able to agree on even if they would supplement the thin definition with other more partisan ideas. We follow with a similarly thin definition of populism. Comparing the two, we argue that one facet of populism—its suspicion of institutions that are strongly entrenched against change by political majorities—is sometimes inconsistent with constitutionalism thinly understood. We then provide a series of case studies, some organized by nation, others by topic, to identify more precisely when and how populist programs are inconsistent with constitutionalism—and, importantly, when and how they are not. The book concludes with a discussion of the possibilities for a deeper and, we insist, populist democracy. After examining some recent challenges to the idea that democracy is a good form of government, we explore some possibilities for new, albeit revisable institutions that can determine and implement a majority’s views without always threatening constitutionalism.
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented an important case study, on a global scale, of how democracy works - and fails to work - today. From leadership to citizenship, from due process to checks and balances, from globalization to misinformation, from solidarity within and across borders to the role of expertise, key democratic concepts both old and new are now being put to the test. The future of democracy around the world is at issue as today's governments manage their responses to the pandemic. Bringing together some of today's most creative thinkers, these essays offer a variety of inquiries into democracy during the global pandemic with a view to imagining post-crisis political conditions. Representing different regions and disciplines, including law, politics, philosophy, religion, and sociology, eighteen voices offer different outlooks - optimistic and pessimistic - on the future.
Les démocratures désignent des régimes fort différents les uns des autres, qui ont pour point commun de réunir des éléments dictatoriaux et démocratiques. Plusieurs critères permettent d’opérer quelques distinctions au sein de ce vaste domaine : ils touchent à la démocratie électorale (degré de compétitivité des élections, pouvoir effectif des représentants élus) et au libéralisme (garantie des libertés, séparation des pouvoirs, respect du droit).
La multiplication des démocratures amène à s’interroger sur leur légitimation constitutionnelle. Non seulement les constitutions des États démocratiques se révèlent incapables de défendre les principes et valeurs qu’elles protègent, mais elles facilitent de surcroît la légitimation des démocratures, qui endossent le cadre constitutionnel en vigueur pour mieux asseoir leur autoritarisme. Essentiellement formelle, la légitimation constitutionnelle des démocratures se fonde sur les faiblesses de la protection constitutionnelle existante et la transforme en instrument de propagande pour renforcer son pouvoir.
Des démocrates athéniens à Montesquieu, d'Aristote à Rousseau, personne ne songeait à faire de l'élection l'instrument démocratique par excellence. Démocratie n'équivalait alors pas à gouvernement représentatif, et c'est le tirage au sort qui paraissait le mieux apte à respecter l'égalité stricte des candidats. Que s'est-il donc passé au tournant du XVIIIe siècle, en Europe et aux États-Unis, pour que se renverse cette conception multiséculaire, et pour qu'advienne l'idée qu'une démocratie est, par essence, un gouvernement représentatif ? Ce livre, devenu un classique et augmenté d'une postface inédite de l'auteur, présente une théorie du gouvernement représentatif en s'attachant aussi bien à la tradition européenne qu'aux débats américains.
The Future of Representative Democracy poses important questions about representation, representative democracy and their future. Inspired by the last major investigation of the subject by Hanna Pitkin over four decades ago, this ambitious volume fills a major gap in the literature by examining the future of representative forms of democracy in terms of present-day trends and past theories of representative democracy. Aware of the pressing need for clarifying key concepts and institutional trends, the volume aims to break down barriers among disciplines and to establish an interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars. The contributors emphasise that representative democracy and its future is a subject of pressing scholarly concern and public importance. Paying close attention to the unfinished, two-centuries-old relationship between democracy and representation, this book offers a fresh perspective on current problems and dilemmas of representative democracy and the possible future development of new forms of democratic representation.
Introduction the wave of democratic electoral revolutions in Eastern Europe and postcommunist Eurasia revived one of the most disputable but nonetheless appealing arguments in the theory of democratization: that is, successful democratic breakthroughs in one or several places help to shape the timing and dynamic of transformation in others. This interconnectivity of transitions in time (and space) is described in terms such as “contagion,” “diffusion,” or a “demonstration effect.” Indeed, although hardly a decisive factor, the evidence that contagion played an important role in transmitting the spirit of democracy and techniques for achieving it from Serbia in 2000 to Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 is evident. There is more than enough evidence that a large community of activists, policy advisors, local and international NGOs, and media were purposefully involved in translating the experience, strategy, and tactics of successful revolutions to new territories. This likely led to a repeated feeling of déjà vu among the international community, as the world read and watched television scenes replayed over and over of yet another autocrat being ousted and a new democratic leader being installed by “people power.” Why is contagion so important and vivid in this wave of democratic revolutions? First, as Valerie Bunce asserts, there is a unique fellowship of democratic activists in the entire postcommunist world (that is, spreading from Prague to the far east in Russia) who share a common experience of the past and on this basis have developed a sense of responsibility for helping their thus far less fortunate neighbors and comrades to achieve their dreams and goals of democracy and freedom.
The fusion of representation and democracy The invention of representative democracy is often said to be among the distinctive achievements of modern politics. It came as no easy victory. In its European homeland, it took seven centuries (and quite a few rebellions and revolutionary upheavals) to consolidate representative institutions. Church hierarchies had to be resisted in the name of true religion. Monarchs had to be brought under the control of assemblies. Legislatures then had to be subjected to democratic election, and in turn these democratic elements had to be grafted onto pre-democratic institutions of representation. The model of representative democracy that resulted is today familiar – within the European region, the United States, Chile, Japan, India and other countries – as a cluster of territorially bound governing institutions that include written constitutions, independent judiciaries and laws. These institutions guarantee such procedures as periodic election of candidates to legislatures, limited-term holding of political offices, voting by secret ballot, competitive political parties, the right to assemble in public and liberty of the press. Compared with the previous assembly-based forms of democracy associated with the classical Greek world, representative democracy was different. The ancient world knew nothing of representation; it did not even have a word for it. The citizens of Athens, for instance, thought of their democracy as direct and participatory.
Around the world, democratically elected regimes are routinely ignoring limits on their power and depriving citizens of basic freedoms. From Peru to the Philippines, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon: illiberal democracy. It has been difficult to recognize because for the last century in the West, democracy--free and fair elections--has gone hand in hand with constitutional liberalism--the rule of law and basic human rights. But in the rest of the world, these two concepts are coming apart. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is producing centralized regimes, the erosion of liberty, ethnic competition, conflict, and war. The international community and the United States must end their obsession with balloting and promote the gradual liberalization of societies.
Many countries have adopted the form of democracy with little of its substance.This makes the task of classifying regimes more difficult,but also more important.
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