Navigating the Security Dilemma in the South China Sea: Lessons from Israeli-Palestinian and Russo-Ukrainian Conflicts

Abstract

This chapter explores the security dynamics in the South China Sea, focusing on how the actions of the Philippines and China contribute to an escalating security dilemma. By examining the historical basis for territorial claims, such as the Philippines’ establishment of the Kalayaan municipality and China’s reliance on the Nine-Dash Line, the chapter highlights the strategic measures both nations have taken to assert their claims. Key developments, including the South China Sea Arbitration and the forced transfer of Thomas Cloma’s claims, provide insight into the legal and historical contexts
of the dispute. The chapter also draws parallels with the Russo-Ukrainian War and the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, illustrating how regional disputes can lead to arms races and increased military spending. Recommendations from Latin American case studies, such as the Beagle Channel and Chile-Peru disputes, offer a framework for peaceful resolution through international mediation and adherence to legal processes, providing alternatives to militarization in the region.

Full text

61Dynamics in the Indo-Pacic: From Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Perspectives
Chapter 6
Navigating the Security Dilemma in the South China Sea: Lessons
from Israeli-Palestinian and Russo-Ukrainian Conicts
Brice Tseen Fu Lee, Juan Pablo Sims, and Yun-Tso Lee
Introduction
TheSouthChinaSea,astrategicallysignicantandresource-richregion,haslongbeenafocalpoint
of territorial disputes among multiple claimant states, including the Philippines, China, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and Brunei (Thao, 2023). These disputes involve not only sovereignty over land features
but also access to vast maritime resources and critical sea lanes. The Philippines and China, two key
claimants, have both adopted strategic stances based on their respective claims and rights, leading
to heightened tensions in the region.
The Philippines has recently taken several strategic actions, such as pursuing legal avenues like the
2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which invalidated many of China’s expansive
claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Zimmermann
& Bäumler, 2013). Additionally, the Philippines has increased military patrols and engaged in
diplomatic efforts to garner international support (Gordon, 2024; Wong, 2024). In contrast, China
bases its claims on historical rights and the “Nine-Dash Line,” which encompasses most of the
South China Sea and predates the current international maritime law framework (Gao & Jia, 2013).
Chinahasintensieditsactionsbyengaginginextensivelandreclamation,constructingartificial
islands with military facilities, conducting regular naval exercises, and deploying its coast guard
and maritime militia.
TheescalatingstrategicactionsofboththePhilippinesandChinahavesignicantimplications
for regional stability and security dynamics. This chapter argues that the actions of both countries
contribute to a security dilemma in the South China Sea. The security dilemma framework suggests
that measures taken by one state to enhance its security can be perceived as threats by others,
leadingtoacycleofactionsandreactionsthatexacerbatetensionsandpotentiallyleadtoconict
(Herz, 1950, 2003).
This chapter examines how the strategic actions of both the Philippines and China provoke direct
responses from each other, escalating the broader security dilemma in the South China Sea. The
analysis highlights how China’s actions provoke reactions from the Philippines and vice versa, with
bothnationsinuencingtheregionalsecurityenvironment.Thechapteralsoassesseshowthese
growing tensions impact the security strategies of other claimant states, such as Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Brunei. These nations, in turn, may feel compelled to bolster their military defenses and adjust
their diplomatic stances, potentially fueling an arms race and further destabilizing the region.
Employing the security dilemma framework, this chapter underscores the unintended
consequences of the strategic measures taken by both the Philippines and China on the security
environment of the South China Sea. What both countries perceive as necessary defensive
measures might paradoxically undermine the collective security of all claimant states. To enhance
this understanding, the chapter draws parallels with the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Israeli-
Palestinianconict,illustratinghowsimilarregionaldisputeshaveescalatedintoarmsracesand
heightened instability. These comparisons help illuminate the potential risks in the South China

62 Chapter 6
Sea, highlighting the critical need for cooperative security mechanisms among Southeast Asian
nations and their extra-regional allies.
In the following sections, this chapter will look into the historical context of the South China Sea
disputes,analyzethespecicactionstakenbythePhilippinesandChina,andexplorethebroader
regional and global implications of this escalating security dilemma. Through this comprehensive
examination, the chapter aims to offer valuable insights into the delicate balance of power and the
prospects for peace and stability in one of the world’s most contentious maritime regions.
It is important to acknowledge that both the Philippines and China have legitimate reasons to claim
their respective territories based on historical, legal, and strategic grounds. This chapter does not
seek to adjudicate the legitimacy of these claims but rather to analyze the implications of their
strategic actions and the resulting escalation.
Historical Context
The Philippines had existed as an independent country since 1946, when it gained independence
from the US. Prior to this, the region comprised a diverse collection of independent barangays,
rajahnates, sultanates, and other polities. The establishment of the independent Republic of the
Philippines was formalized by the Treaty of Manila on July 4, 1946. Crucially, the Treaty of Manila
denedFilipinoterritorybasedontheearlierTreatyofParis,whichendedtheSpanish-American
Warin1898.TheTreatyofParishasacleardenitionofFilipinoterritory,excludingthecontentious
areas under dispute today, such as the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal (Treaty of Peace
Between the United States and Spain, 1898).
The Philippines began to claim these disputed features in 1972 when the government established
a new municipality called “Kalayaan,” encompassing the Spratly Islands and incorporating it into
Palawan Province (Granados, 2009). This claim was based on the assertion that Tomas Cloma, a
Philippineshingvesselcompanyowner,had“discovered”theislands.Itisalsoworthnotingthat
while Thomas Cloma did “discover” the island, he also declared independence and established
the Free Territory of Freedomland, a micronation that covered the Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea from 1956 to 1974 (Granados, 2009). In December 1974, Tomás Cloma Sr. was arrested
and forced to sign a document transferring any rights he might have had in the territory to the
Philippines for one peso (Womack, 2006). The Philippines claim that this document legitimized
their acquisition of the territory. This claim was further formalized in a 1978 presidential decree by
Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. This expansionism was met with resistance from other regional claimants,
including China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia, which also have historical and strategic claims to
the Spratly Islands (Fan, 2024; Severino, 2014).
China’s claims to the South China Sea are based on historical rights, illustrated by the “Nine-Dash
Line,” which dates back to 1947 and was inherited from the Republic of China’s “Eleven-Dash
Line.” China’s assertion is supported by historical documents and maps predating the current
international maritime law framework, such as the 1947 map published by the Republic of China
andvariousrecordsofChinesenavalexpeditionsandshingactivitiesintheregiondatingback
centuries (Gao & Jia, 2013).
The 1970s saw increased activity from Vietnam and the Philippines, with both countries
establishing a presence on several features in the Spratly Islands (Park, 1978). In the 1980s, China
and Malaysia began to assert their claims more forcefully. China occupied Fiery Cross Reef, Subi
Reef, and Mischief Reef, while Malaysia occupied Swallow Reef and several others (Fox, 2021;

63Dynamics in the Indo-Pacic: From Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Perspectives
Kuiketal.,2021).Duringthe1990s,Vietnamsolidieditscontroloverseveralfeatures,while
the Philippines grounded the Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal (Misalucha-Willoughby,
2024; Womack, 2006). China continued to fortify its positions, especially in the northern part
oftheSpratlyIslands.Fromthe2000stothepresent,Chinahassignicantlyexpandedits
presencethroughlandreclamationandconstructiononvariousreefs,turningthemintoarticial
islands with military capabilities (Chen, 2015). This period has seen heightened tensions and
confrontations, especially between China and the Philippines, as well as China and Vietnam.
Today, the control in the South China Sea is as follows: The Philippines occupies ten reefs and
islands, including the Second Thomas Shoal. China occupies seven reefs, including Fiery Cross
Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. Taiwan occupies one island, Itu Aba (Taiping Island). Vietnam
occupies 21 islets and reefs. Malaysia occupies seven reefs, including Swallow Reef (Layang Layang).
TheevolutionofcontrolintheSouthChinaSeareectsacomplexinterplayofhistoricalclaims,
strategic interests, and military capabilities, leading to the current multifaceted and volatile
situation.
Current Dynamics
The historical context provided illustrates the complexity of the South China Sea disputes and the
varied basis for claims by the Philippines and China. The strategic actions taken by both countries,
based on their perceived rights and historical claims, have led to heightened tensions and an
intricate security dilemma.
AsignicantdevelopmentinthedisputedterritoriesistheSouthChinaSeaArbitration(Philippines
v. China, PCA case number 2013–19) (De Castro, 2017). This arbitration case was brought by the
Republic of the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China under Annex VII (subject to
Part XV) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The case concerned
issues in the South China Sea, including the Nine-Dash Line introduced by the Republic of China
as early as 1947. A tribunal of arbitrators appointed the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as
the registry for the proceedings (De Castro, 2017). The Philippines sought to gain legitimacy for its
claims through UNCLOS, which both the Philippines and China are part of. This framework gave the
Philippines a legal basis under modern international law to claim certain areas in the South China
Sea. On the other hand, China relies on its historical claims supported by the Nine-Dash Line, which
dates back to 1947, to legitimize its territorial assertions. These historical claims provide China with
a different form of legitimacy based on its long-standing presence and sovereignty (Gao & Jia, 2013).
It is also worth noting that at the June 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, China’s Defense Minister Dong
Jun emphasized that freedom of navigation for civilian ships has never been compromised despite
theregion’sheavyshippingtrafc.HequestionedthemotivesbehindtheincreasedUSmilitary
presence, suggesting it may provoke instability rather than ensure peace. China views US “freedom
of navigation” exercises as unnecessary provocations (Rising, 2024; Shidore, 2024).
The strategic actions of both nations have broader implications for regional stability. The
occupation and militarization of disputed areas by multiple countries, including Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Taiwan, contribute to a complex and potentially volatile security environment (Kuik et al.,
2021; Womack, 2006). The involvement of external powers, particularly the United States, further
complicates the situation. Freedom of navigation exercises and increased military presence by
the US are viewed with suspicion by China, which sees these actions as attempts to stir up trouble
rather than ensure peace.

64 Chapter 6
On the issue of the Second Thomas Shoal, China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun, in the Shangri-La
Dialogue, has accused the Philippines of reneging on an agreement that allowed only the supply of
food and water to the grounded Sierra Madre ship, not construction materials. The water cannon
incidentwasjustiedbyChinaas a measuretopreventthesupplyofconstructionmaterials,
whichtheyclaimviolatesthisagreement.FormerPhilippinePresidentDuterteconrmedin a
TV interview that such an agreement existed during his administration, accusing the current
administration of dishonesty and duplicity on this matter (Baroña, 2024).
Former Philippine President Duterte’s approach was markedly different. He sought to establish an
independentforeignpolicy,distancingthePhilippinesfromAmericaninuenceandattempting
to maintain neutrality in the South China Sea disputes (Hu et al., 2024). Duterte emphasized that
most ASEAN countries have followed neutral and independent foreign policies, hedging between
the US and China, and he aimed to foster a similar stance for the Philippines. He criticized the US
forpushingthePhilippinestowardsconictwithChinaandadvocatedfortheremovalofAmerican
militarybasesfromthePhilippinestoavoidbeingusedasalaunchingpadforpotentialconicts.
Duterte’s policy aimed to reduce tensions and avoid being drawn into a larger geopolitical struggle
between the US and China. His administration reached agreements with China to manage the
situation in the South China Sea peacefully. Duterte’s successor, President Marcos, however,
has taken a different approach, which has led to increased tensions and accusations of violating
previous agreements.
The historical context and current strategic actions of both the Philippines and China highlight
the deep-rooted and multifaceted nature of the South China Sea disputes. While both sides have
legitimate reasons for their claims, the resulting strategic measures have led to an escalating
security dilemma. By understanding this historical backdrop, we can better appreciate the current
dynamics and the need for cooperative approaches to ensure regional peace and stability.
Understanding the Security Dilemma
The security dilemma is a concept in international relations theory that describes a situation
where actions taken by a state to increase its security inadvertently lead to greater insecurity for
other states. This dynamic results in a cycle of actions and reactions, where each state’s attempts
to bolster its security provoke countermeasures, escalating tensions across the region. Originally
articulated by John Herz in the 1950s, the security dilemma has become a cornerstone of realist
thought in international relations (Herz, 1950, p. 2003).
In practice, the security dilemma arises because measures—such as military buildups or forming
alliances—that one state takes to feel more secure tend to make others feel threatened. These states,
in turn, respond by increasing their own security measures, creating a spiral of militarization and
arms races. Despite the original intention of maintaining peace and stability, these reactions often
leadtoheightenedtensionsand,attimes,conict.Thesecuritydilemmaisparticularlyrelevant
in the South China Sea, where strategic actions by both China and the Philippines trigger similar
reactions, raising the stakes for regional security.
Selection of Case Studies
To further understand the implications of escalating tensions in Southeast Asia, particularly in
the South China Sea, this chapter draws parallels with the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Israeli-
Palestinianconict.Bothconflictsareexamplesofregionaldisputeswhereheightenedinsecurities
have led to increased military spending, strategic posturing, and broader security dilemmas. The

65Dynamics in the Indo-Pacic: From Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Perspectives
Russo-Ukrainianconict,drivenbyterritorialdisputesandgreatpowercompetition,mirrors
elementsoftheSouthChinaSeatensions,whereexternalactorsalsoplayinuentialroles.
Similarly,theIsraeli-Palestinianconictillustrateshowprotracteddisputesoverterritoryand
identity can fuel continuous cycles of violence and military responses.
By comparing these cases, the analysis provides valuable insights into how similar patterns
could unfold in Southeast Asia. Understanding these dynamics can highlight the importance of
diplomatic and cooperative security mechanisms in preventing an arms race and maintaining
regional stability in the South China Sea.
The Russo-Ukrainian War
TheRusso-UkrainianWar,whichbeganin2014andescalatedsignicantlyin2022,servesas a
starkexampleofhowterritorialdisputescanleadtoprolongedconictandregionalinstability
(Johannesson, 2017; Knott, 2023). Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatist
movements in Eastern Ukraine provoked a series of defensive measures by Ukraine and its Western
allies. These actions included increased military aid to Ukraine, heightened NATO presence in
Eastern Europe, and substantial arms purchases by both Ukraine and neighboring countries
concerned about Russian aggression.
Table 6.1 Military Expenditure by Country, in Millions of USD at
Current Prices and Exchange Rates, 2019-2023
Source: SIPRI, 2024
TheconicthasledtoasignificantsecuritydilemmainEasternEurope.Countriesintheregion
have responded to the perceived threat from Russia by substantially increasing their defense
budgetsoverthepastveyears(Herz,1950,p.2003;Waslekar,2023).Thedataonmilitary
expenditures from 2019 to 2023 for several key countries illustrate this trend. Estonia’s military
expenditurerosefrom637millionUSDin2019to1.189billionUSDin2023,reecting a near
doubling of its defense budget. Similarly, Latvia increased its defense spending from 692 million
USD in 2019 to 1.045 billion USD in 2023, with steady increases each year. Lithuania saw a
signicantriseinmilitaryexpenditure,from1.094billionUSDin2019to2.161billionUSDin2023,
nearlydoublingovertheve-yearperiod.
Poland’s defense budget increased sharply from 11.786 billion USD in 2019 to 31.650 billion USD in
2023, more than doubling in just one year from 2022 to 2023. This dramatic increase underscores
Poland’s heightened security concerns and commitment to strengthening its military capabilities
inresponsetothethreatfromRussia.Russia’sownmilitaryexpenditureuctuatedbutshoweda
Country 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Estonia 637.0 718.1 748.6 818.3 1189.5
Latvia 691.9 742.0 823.1 856.1 1045.3
Lithuania 1093.8 1174.1 1306.8 1734.4 2160.8
Poland 11786.2 13718.3 15295.5 15341.3 31649.9
Russia 65201.3 61712.5 65907.7 102366.6 109454.4
Ukraine 6262.4 6838.8 6898.1 41183.9 64753.2
Finland 3635.2 3868.7 3831.6 4446.4 7348.0
Germany 49079.4 53318.7 56513.1 56153.1 66826.6
Sweden 5839.6 6271.3 7582.6 7722.5 8754.9

66 Chapter 6
notable increase from 65.201 billion USD in 2019 to 109.454 billion USD in 2023, with a substantial
jumpbetween2021and2022,highlightingtheintensicationoftheconflict.Ukraine’sdefense
spendingsurgedfrom6.262billionUSDin2019to64.753billionUSDin2023,reectingtheintense
conictandtheurgentneedformilitaryresources.Thisdramaticincreaseisindicativeofthe
country’s efforts to defend itself against Russian aggression.
Finland and Sweden, responding to the heightened security environment and their recent accession
toNATO,havealsosignicantlyincreasedtheirdefenseexpenditures(Gricius&Fakhoury,2024;
Thorhallsson & Stude Vidal, 2024). Finland’s military expenditure grew from 3.635 billion USD in
2019 to 7.348 billion USD in 2023, while Sweden’s defense spending increased from 5.840 billion
USD in 2019 to 8.755 billion USD in 2023. Germany, as one of the largest economies in Europe and
a leading NATO member, increased its defense budget from 49.079 billion USD in 2019 to 66.827
billionUSDin2023,reectingaconsistentupwardtrend.
These increases in military spending are indicative of the security dilemma faced by these
countries. As Russia’s actions in Ukraine have escalated, neighboring countries have responded by
signicantlyincreasingtheirdefensebudgetstoenhancetheirmilitarycapabilitiesandreadiness.
This cycle of action and reaction has led to heightened tensions and a more militarized regional
environment.
TheconictintheRusso-Ukrainianregionshowcaseshow a localizeddisputecanescalateinto
broaderregionalinstability,compellingneighboringcountriestosignicantlyboosttheirdefense
spendingandheightentheirsecuritymeasures.Astheconictintensifies,neighboringstates
perceive an increased threat to their own security. This perception is not just about immediate
military threats but also about the potential for regional destabilization.
In response to the perceived threat, countries start to allocate more resources to their defense
budgets. This can be seen in the dramatic increases in defense spending by Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania,Poland,Finland,Sweden,andGermanyoverthepastveyears.Increasedmilitary
expenditure allows these countries to invest in modernizing their military capabilities, purchasing
advanced weaponry, upgrading existing equipment, and enhancing technological capabilities.
Countries may also seek to form or strengthen military alliances to counterbalance the threat. For
example, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO was a direct response to the heightened
securityenvironmentcreatedbytheRusso-Ukrainianconict(Gricius & Fakhoury,2024;
Thorhallsson & Stude Vidal, 2024). There is a noticeable increase in military presence and joint
exercises within the region. NATO’s heightened presence in Eastern Europe and the frequent
military drills conducted by member states are examples of this trend.
The cycle of action and reaction between the states leads to an arms race, where each country
feels compelled to continuously enhance its military capabilities in response to the actions of its
neighbors. These arms races further escalate regional tensions and unease. The increased military
spending can strain national economies, diverting resources from other critical areas such as
healthcare, education, and infrastructure. This economic strain can lead to internal discontent and
instability.
Military Expenditure Analysis for the Israeli-Palestinian Conict
ToillustratetheimpactoftheIsraeli-Palestinianconictonregionalmilitaryspending,itishelpful
toanalyzedatafromkeycountriesoverthepastveyears.Thisanalysisrevealstrendsindefense

67Dynamics in the Indo-Pacic: From Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Perspectives
budgets and provides insights into the broader security dilemma in the Middle East.
Israel’smilitaryexpenditurehasconsistentlybeenamongthehighestintheregion,reectingits
strategic need to maintain a technological and qualitative edge over its adversaries. Over the past
veyears,Israel’sdefensebudgethasgrownfrom20.3billionUSDin2019to27.5billionUSDin
2023. This increase is driven by the need to address security threats from groups like Hamas
andHezbollah,aswellasregionaladversaries(Nilsson,2020).Thesignicantriseinspending
highlights Israel’s emphasis on enhancing its military capabilities in response to ongoing and
emergingsecuritychallenges,includingtheconstantthreatofrocketattacks,borderinltrations,
and regional instability.
Table 6.2 Military Expenditure by Country, in Millions of USD at
Current Prices and Exchange Rates, 2019-2023
Source: SIPRI, 2024
Egypt’smilitaryexpenditurehasshownuctuationsoverthepastfiveyears.In2019,Egypt’s
defense budget was 3.7 billion USD, which increased to 5.2 billion USD in 2021 before declining
to 3.2 billion USD in 2023. The initial increase in spending was likely due to Egypt’s efforts to
modernize its military capabilities, address internal security threats in the Sinai Peninsula, and
maintainitsstrategicinuenceintheregion(Joya,2020).Thesubsequentdecreasecouldbe
attributed to economic pressures, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which strained
national budgets and necessitated the reallocation of resources to public health and economic
recovery efforts (Rezk et al., 2020).
Iran’smilitaryexpenditurehasseenanotableincreaseoverthepastveyears,growingfrom4.8
billionUSDin2019to10.3billionUSDin2023.ThissignicantriseisdrivenbyIran’sstrategic
priorities, including its support for proxy groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and its broader regional
ambitions (Nilsson, 2020). Despite economic challenges and international sanctions, Iran has
continuedtoallocatesubstantialresourcestoitsmilitaryandsecurityapparatus.Thisreectsits
commitmenttomaintainingandexpandingitsinuenceintheregion,especiallyinresponseto
perceived threats from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States (Bahgat, 2008).
Jordan’s military expenditure has been relatively stable, with a gradual increase from 2.0 billion
USD in 2019 to 2.5 billion USD in 2023. Jordan’s defense spending focuses on border security and
internal stability, given its strategic location and role as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian
conict.ThesteadyincreaseinspendingindicatesJordan’songoingeffortstoenhanceitsmilitary
capabilities to address security threats and maintain regional stability, especially considering the
inuxofrefugeesandthepotentialforspilloverfromconflictsinneighboringSyriaandIraq.
Country 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Egypt 3743.7 4505.4 5165.4 4645.9 3164.6
Iran 4837.9 3335.7 5680.0 7334.0 10283.1
Israel 20339.2 21816.6 24341.0 23406.1 27498.5
Jordan 2032.1 2055.9 2176.8 2323.3 2450.2
Lebanon 2326.1 432.0 171.6 218.7 241.3
Saudi Arabia 65362.7 64558.4 63194.7 70920.0 75813.3

68 Chapter 6
Lebanon’smilitaryexpenditurehasexperiencedsignicantfluctuations,primarilyduetoits
ongoing economic crisis and political instability. In 2019, Lebanon’s defense budget was 2.3 billion
USD, which dropped dramatically to 171.6 million USD in 2021 before slightly recovering to 241.3
millionUSDin2023(Ben‐Meir,2022;Sharnoff,2022).Theseuctuationshighlightthechallenges
Lebanon faces in maintaining its military capabilities amid severe economic and political turmoil.
Thedrasticreductionindefensespendingreectsthecountry’seconomiccollapseandthe
prioritization of scarce resources for basic needs and public services, but the increase from 2022 to
2023 is still evident due to regional instability.
SaudiArabia’smilitaryexpenditureremainsamongthehighestintheworld,reectingitsstrategic
rivalrywithIranandinvolvementinregionalconictssuchasthewarinYemen.Overthepastfive
years, Saudi Arabia’s defense budget has ranged from 65.4 billion USD in 2019 to 75.8 billion USD
in 2023. This substantial and consistent level of spending underscores Saudi Arabia’s commitment
to maintaining a robust military presence and addressing its security concerns in the region (Gul et
al., 2021). The increase in 2023 could be attributed to heightened regional tensions and the need to
counteractIranianinuenceandsupportforproxygroups.
Heightened military activities and increased defense spending contribute to diplomatic tensions
betweenstates.Thetrustdecitwidens,makingdiplomaticresolutionsandnegotiationsmore
challenging. The measures taken by each country to ensure its security have, paradoxically, resulted
in greater insecurity for all, illustrating the core dynamic of the security dilemma. In summary,
thedataonmilitaryexpendituresfromkeycountriesinvolvedintheIsraeli-Palestinianconict
highlight how regional tensions and perceived threats lead to increased defense spending and a
broader security dilemma. This cycle of action and reaction not only escalates regional tensions but
also creates broader geopolitical instability, mirroring the core dynamics of the security dilemma
theory.
Implications for Southeast Asia
TodrawparallelsbetweentheRusso-UkrainianWar,theIsraeli-Palestinianconict,andpotential
developments in Southeast Asia, it is essential to consider how escalating tensions, particularly in
the South China Sea, might evolve. The data on military expenditures from key Southeast Asian
countries provide a baseline for understanding regional defense dynamics.
Table 6.3 Military Expenditure by Country, in Millions of USD at
Current Prices and Exchange Rates, 2019-2023
Source: SIPRI, 2024
Country 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Brunei 414.7 436.5 453.3 435.9 448.9
Cambodia 595.4 621.3 630.4 618.7 668.0
Indonesia 8154.2 9387.0 8802.5 10133.9 9480.8
Laos ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia 3265.3 3374.6 3675.5 3673.8 3899.1
Myanmar 1532.1 2498.2 2642.7 2489.9 2493.5
Philippines 4268.1 4693.1 5546.1 5321.9 5451.7
Singapore 10402.6 9801.6 11017.6 12034.0 13200.7
Thailand 7091.2 7295.7 7123.1 6031.0 5765.8
Viet Nam ... ... ... ... ...

69Dynamics in the Indo-Pacic: From Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Perspectives
Overthepastveyears,militaryexpendituresinSoutheastAsiahaveshownvariedtrends.Brunei’s
defense budget has remained relatively stable, increasing slightly from 414.7 million USD in 2019
to 448.9 million USD in 2023. Cambodia’s defense spending has seen a modest increase from 595.4
million USD in 2019 to 668.0 million USD in 2023. Indonesia, the largest country in the region,
hasshownsignicantfluctuations,withitsbudgetrisingfrom8.2billionUSDin2019toapeak
of 10.1 billion USD in 2022 before slightly decreasing to 9.5 billion USD in 2023. Malaysia’s defense
spending has steadily increased from 3.3 billion USD in 2019 to 3.9 billion USD in 2023.
Myanmar’s military expenditure saw a sharp increase from 1.5 billion USD in 2019 to 2.5 billion USD
in 2020, maintaining a similar level through 2023. The Philippines has also increased its defense
budgetsignicantly,from4.3billionUSDin2019to5.5billionUSDin2023,reflectingitsstrategic
focus on modernizing its military capabilities. Singapore, with the highest defense budget in the
region, increased its spending from 10.4 billion USD in 2019 to 13.2 billion USD in 2023, emphasizing
its commitment to maintaining a strong defense posture. Thailand’s defense budget, however,
has decreased from 7.1 billion USD in 2019 to 5.8 billion USD in 2023, potentially due to economic
constraints and shifting priorities.
Despite these increases in defense spending, there is no apparent security dilemma in Southeast
Asia comparable to what has been observed in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. However, the
potential for such a dilemma exists, particularly with the ongoing territorial disputes in the South
China Sea.
Drawing Parallels with the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Israeli-Palestinian Conict
TheRusso-UkrainianWarandtheIsraeli-Palestinianconictofferinstructiveparallelsfor
understanding how regional disputes in Southeast Asia might lead to a security dilemma. In the
Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatist movements
in Eastern Ukraine provoked a series of defensive measures by Ukraine and its Western allies
(Johannesson,2017;Knott,2023;Waslekar,2023).Thishasledtoasignicantincreaseinmilitary
spending and heightened tensions in Eastern Europe, creating a security dilemma where actions
taken by one state to enhance its security lead to greater insecurity for others.
Similarly,intheIsraeli-Palestinianconict,Israel’sassertiveactionstoaddresssecuritythreats
from groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, along with regional adversaries, have resulted in
substantial increases in military expenditure (Nilsson, 2020). This, in turn, has led to heightened
military activities and increased tensions with neighboring states, contributing to a broader
regional security dilemma.
In Southeast Asia, the South China Sea is a crucial maritime region for trade and natural resources,
with multiple Southeast Asian countries having overlapping territorial claims with China. These
include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. The strategic importance of the region and
the assertive actions by China to reinforce its claims have led to increased military activities and
naval confrontations.
IfthesituationintheSouthChinaSeaweretoescalatesignicantly,itcouldtrigger a security
dilemma similar to those seen in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Countries involved might
perceive an increased threat to their sovereignty and economic interests, prompting them to boost
their defense spending and military capabilities. This could lead to a cycle of action and reaction,
where each state’s efforts to enhance its security provoke countermeasures from others, increasing
regional tensions and instability.

70 Chapter 6
Forexample,thePhilippineshasalreadybeenincreasingitsdefensebudget,reectingitsconcerns
over Chinese activities in the South China Sea. If other countries, such as Vietnam and Malaysia,
follow suit, this could result in a regional arms race. External powers like the US might also intensify
their military presence and support for regional allies, further complicating the security landscape.
This involvement could mirror NATO’s response to Russian actions in Ukraine, with increased
militaryaidandstrategicpartnershipsaimedatcounterbalancingChina’sinuence.
In such a scenario, ASEAN would need to play a crucial role in managing regional security dynamics.
ASEAN has historically aimed to promote regional stability through dialogue and cooperation, but
the intensifying security dilemma would test its effectiveness. Strengthening cooperative security
mechanisms and diplomatic engagement among member states would be vital to preventing an
arms race and ensuring stability in the region.
Lessons from Latin America for Peaceful Conict Resolution
Latin America’s experience in resolving territorial and maritime disputes offers crucial lessons for
Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea. The region has long been a neighbor to the US, a
globalpowerwithsignicantinfluence,muchlikeSoutheastAsia’sproximitytoChinaandtheUS.
Despite this geopolitical pressure, Latin American nations have largely avoided militarization by
using diplomacy, mediation, and international legal frameworks, making their approach a valuable
recommendation for claimant states in the South China Sea.
One notable example is the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile (de la Fuente &
Kirchner, 2023; Siniver, 2024). Despite the escalation of tensions in the 1970s, both nations turned
to international mediation, with the Vatican playing a neutral role in brokering peace. The 1984
TreatyofPeaceandFriendshipnotonlyresolvedtheconictbutalsoestablishedjointcommissions
to manage future disputes. This long-term cooperation is an essential lesson for Southeast Asian
nations, as it demonstrates the value of peaceful resolution mechanisms.
Similarly, the Chile-Peru and Chile-Bolivia maritime disputes were settled through the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Gangopadhyay, 2014; Mitchell, 2023). Although not all rulings
were fully satisfactory to both parties, adherence to international law prevented escalation, leading
to stable, long-term solutions. This is particularly relevant for the South China Sea, where claimants
couldbenetfromsimilarlegalresolutionsundertheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawofthe
Sea (UNCLOS).
Importantly, these Latin American cases emphasize the effectiveness of non-military strategies in
managing disputes, even in the presence of a great power like the US For Southeast Asia, adopting
a similarfocusondiplomacyandinternationallawcouldreducetheriskofconict,foster
cooperation, and prevent an arms race in the region. By following these examples, the South China
Sea claimants can ensure long-term stability and avoid the pitfalls of militarization.

71Dynamics in the Indo-Pacic: From Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Perspectives
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