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Merleau-Ponty's phenomenal body and the study of religion
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This essay provides an anthropological account of a neuroepistemological account of mystical experience. We commence by outlining the various qualities of mystical experience (e.g. time-consciousness and space-consciousness distortion). Subsequently, we analyse the epistemology of mystical experience with special reference to the constructivist versus decontextualist debate. Next, we formulate a neuroepistemology of mystical experience and demonstrate how this account might contribute to the ongoing discourse between constructivists and decontextualists. Finally, from an anthropological point of view we discuss various methodological problems that may hinder a neuroepistemological account of mystical experience (e.g. phenomenological naiveté). We conclude by outlining the attributes of neuroepistemology of mystical experience researchers required to resolve the aforementioned methodological problems.
Keywords: Consciousness; constructivist; decontextualist; epistemology; mystical experience; neuroepistemology.
Russell McCutcheon is one of the foremost proponents of what he calls “the critical study of religion,” that is, the shift to reflect critically on the concepts used in the academic study of religion, who invented them, and why. The critical study of religion leads to the realization that the concepts with which we think were invented by particular people, at a particular historical location, for a particular purpose. What are the philosophical implications of this? McCutcheon defends a debunking or non-realist answer and contrasts this with my realist approach, and he is right to do so. This paper argues that those involved in the critical study of religion therefore face a choice between a non-realist and a realist metaphysics, that McCutcheon’s arguments against realism fail, and that those who wish to offer any kind of materialist account in which religious social structures shape human agency and subjectivity should adopt a critical study of religion that is also realist.
In this interview, Michael Winkelman and Martin Fortier discuss the extent to which consciousness is grounded in deep evolutionary mechanisms and can be enculturated. First, the main tenets of two neuroanthropological approaches to consciousness and culture are outlined. Next, the upsides and downsides of evolutionary psychology are examined; the fruitfulness of this approach in the study of cultural phenomena such as shamanism is debated. The authors then discuss the promises of the "big data" approach to the study of religion as well as evolutionary puzzles about religion. Turning to issues bearing on the taxonomy of consciousness, the interview explores how consciousness should be individuated and especially how many "modes" of consciousness should be identified based on what we know of the biology and phenomenology of altered consciousness. Winkelman's concepts of the "integrative mode of consciousness" and "psychointegrators" are subsequently examined. Next, the interview addresses both how alterations of consciousness are universally similar (the perennialist view) and can also be enculturated (the constructivist view). Finally, the authors discuss issues around the cultural use of hallucinogens (a.k.a. visionary plants): what is the best method to study them? And for how long have humans used them? keywords: altered states of consciousness, enculturation, evolutionary neuroanthropology, hallucinogens, shamanism. Your work is very multidisciplinary and spans several fields (at least the following: cultural anthropology, neuroanthropology, neurotheology, cognitive science of religion, evolutionary anthropology, medical anthropology and evolutionary psychology). What was your training like? Who were the most important inspirational figures in your intellectual development? I wandered from psychology to anthropology to cross-cultural psychology and cross-cultural studies (ethnology, holocultural studies) to Buddhist psychology, then the neurosciences and neurophenomenology and evolutionary psychology in the search
Aims and Scope The revised essays collected here, four of which are published for the first time, continue a longstanding argument made by McCutcheon and others: that the study of religion would benefit from self-conscious scrutiny of its tools, the interests that may drive them, and the effects that might follow their use. The chapters examine a variety of contemporary sites in the modern field where this thesis can be argued, whether involving the anachronistic use of of the category religion when studying the ancient world to current interest in so-called critical religion or critical realist approaches. Moreover - contrary to some past characterizations of such critiques - a constructive way forward for the field is once again recommended and, at several sites, exemplified in detail: redescribing not only religion as something ordinary but also our tendency to create the impression of exceptional and thus set-apart things, places, and people. Aimed at scholars and students alike, the book is an invitation to examine our own scholarly practices and thereby take a more active role in shaping the field in which we carry out our work as scholars of this thing we call religion.
Shamanism and possession are central concepts in the religious practices of many “premodern” societies, with substantial similarities manifested across cultures and time that reflect their basis in human nature. Shamans and possession both involve ritual alteration of consciousness but differences between them are illustrated by cross‐cultural studies and the distinctive experiential features associated with their respective activities. Shamans' characteristic alterations of consciousness involve soul flight, what modern psychology recognizes as out‐of‐body experiences that involve a separation of one's visual perspectives from self and body. Possession episodes differ in the experience of control by spirits and amnesia of the event, reflecting psychosocial features that produce dissociation. Shamanism and possession nonetheless share biological features in their elicitation of ancient brain systems to modify the consciousness in relation to healing and spiritual experiences.
Chapter uses cross-cultural research to identify the universal aspects of shamanism and biogenetic structural and neurophenomenological perspectives to examine the bases of shamanic universals.
Present day neuroscience places the brain at the center of study. But what if researchers viewed the brain not as the foundation of life, rather as a mediating organ?
Ecology of the Brain addresses this very question. It considers the human body as a collective, a living being which uses the brain to mediate interactions. Those interactions may be both within the human body and between the human body and its environment.
Within this framework, the mind is seen not as a product of the brain but as an activity of the living being; an activity which integrates the brain within the everyday functions of the human body. Going further, Fuchs reformulates the traditional mind-brain problem, presenting it as a dual aspect of the living being: the lived body and the subjective body-the living body and the objective body. The processes of living and experiencing life, Fuchs argues, are in fact inextricably linked; it is not the brain, but the human being who feels, thinks and acts.
For students and academics, Ecology of the Brain will be of interest to those studying or researching theory of mind, social and cultural interaction, psychiatry, and psychotherapy.
Recent studies of the evolution of religion have revealed the cognitive underpinnings of belief in supernatural agents, the role of ritual in promoting cooperation, and the contribution of morally punishing high gods to the growth and stabilization of human society. The universality of religion across human society points to a deep evolutionary past. However, specific traits of nascent religiosity, and the sequence in which they emerged, have remained unknown. Here we reconstruct the evolution of religious beliefs and behaviors in early modern humans using a global sample of hunter-gatherers and seven traits describing hunter-gatherer religiosity: animism, belief in an afterlife, shamanism, ancestor worship, high gods, and worship of ancestors or high gods who are active in human affairs. We reconstruct ancestral character states using a time-calibrated supertree based on published phylogenetic trees and linguistic classification and then test for correlated evolution between the characters and for the direction of cultural change. Results indicate that the oldest trait of religion, present in the most recent common ancestor of present-day hunter-gatherers, was animism, in agreement with long-standing beliefs about the fundamental role of this trait. Belief in an afterlife emerged, followed by shamanism and ancestor worship. Ancestor spirits or high gods who are active in human affairs were absent in early humans, suggesting a deep history for the egalitarian nature of hunter-gatherer societies. There is a significant positive relationship between most characters investigated, but the trait "high gods" stands apart, suggesting that belief in a single creator deity can emerge in a society regardless of other aspects of its religion.
Some contemporary philosophers defend the claim that it is rational to believe that God exists even if that belief is not
based on evidence. Many such defenses are developed from a religious epistemology inspired by the work of Thomas Reid's “common
sense” epistemology that posits the existence of numerous cognitive faculties that nonreflectively deliver beliefs. Reid argued
that one is justified in believing the automatic deliverances of these faculties unless evidence mounts to contradict them.
Reformed Epistemologists have suggested that, likewise, one should give the benefit of the doubt to beliefs that are produced
by a god-faculty or sensus divinitatis. Recent research in the cognitive science of religion provides new reasons to believe that humans are naturally endowed with
cognitive faculties that stimulate belief in the divine. We discuss these scientific findings in relation to the arguments
of Reformed Epistemologists and also with regard to arguments against the rational justification of religious beliefs.
Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability. Merleau-Ponty, who was greatly influenced by his study of developmental psychology, and whose phenomenology of perception was closely tied to the concept of the body schema, accepted these traditional assumptions. They also informed his philosophical conclusions concerning the experience of self and others. We re-examine issues involved in understanding self and others in light of the more recent research in developmental psychology. More specifically our re-examination challenges a number of Merleau-Ponty's conclusions and suggests, in contrast, that the newborn infant is capable of a rudimentary differentiation between self and non-self.
This book challenges the traditional idea that religions can be understood primarily as texts to be interpreted, decoded, or translated. In More Than Belief, Manuel A. Vásquez argues for a new way of studying religions, one that sees them as dynamic material and historical expressions of the practices of embodied individuals who are embedded in social fields and ecological networks. He sketches the outlines of this approach through a focus on body, practices, and space. In order to highlight the centrality of these dimensions of religious experience and performance, Vásquez recovers materialist currents within religious studies that have been consistently ignored or denigrated. Drawing on state-of-the-art work in fields as diverse as anthropology, sociology, philosophy, critical theory, environmental studies, cognitive psychology, and the neurosciences, Vásquez offers a groundbreaking new way of looking at religion.
The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in Science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.
An explanation, in terms of evolutionary ecology and neuroscience, of why and how religions evolved during human evolution
This study, based on the author's fieldwork among rural Tamil villagers in South India, focuses on the ways in which people in this society interact with the supernatural beings who play such a large role in their personal and corporate lives. Isabelle Navokov looks at a spectrum of ritualized contexts in which the boundaries between the natural and spiritual worls are penetrated and communication takes place. Throughout, Nabokov's meticulous analysis sheds new light on this hiterto almost unkown domain - and entire range of fascinating phenomena basic to South Indian religion as it is really lived.
Religion is one of the most universal and most studied human phenomena, yet there exists no widely shared definition of religion. This ambitious study attempts to provide and defend such a definition. Stewart Guthrie argues that religion is best understood as systematic anthropomorphism: the attribution of human characteristics to non-human things or events. Many writers have seen anthropomorphism as a superficial characteristic of religion. For Guthrie, however, it is central; religion consists in seeing the world as human-like. Guthrie begins by demonstrating that we find plausible, in varying degrees, a continuum of human-like beings including gods, spirits, demons, gremlins, abominable snowmen, Hal the Computer, and Chiquita Banana. We find messages from such beings in phenomena such as weather, earthquakes, plagues, traffic accidents, and the flight of birds. Guthrie argues that this represents an adaptive strategy; we “bet” on the most important possible interpretation of our perceptions of our world – it is better to mistake a boulder for a bear than the other way around. Because of the extreme importance for us of other human beings and their actions, we project human characteristics onto what we see. Guthrie then shows how this explanation can be applied to virtually every belief and experience classified as religious. The result is a provocative and disturbing book that should be both influential and controversial.
The academic study of religion in the past century has increasingly shifted from the study of religious texts to a broader vision that includes social practices, and this chapter argues that the discipline of philosophy of religion ought to expand its traditional object of study to follow suit. Illustrate how this shift has played out in three anthropological approaches: the Ricoeur-inspired hermeneutic approach of Clifford Geertz, the Foucault-inspired disciplinary approach of Talal Asad, and the Merleau-Ponty-inspired embodiment approach of Thomas Csordas. These approaches are often understood to conflict with each other on questions concerning subjectivity and in particular on the claim that social practices form the subjectivities of the participants. I argue that this disagreement is a philosophical one and that it provides an opportunity for philosophers of religion interested in religious practices to contribute to their theorizing. Properly understood, moreover, the three approaches can be understood to complement each other in a way that leads to an integrated approach so that despite the formation of subjectivity, the body in a religious practice is not only a text that one can read and not only the product of social power but also a perceiving, problem-solving person.
Within intellectual paradigms that privilege mind over matter, dance has long appeared as a marginal, derivative, or primitive art. Drawing support from theorists and artists who embrace matter as dynamic and agential, this book offers a visionary definition of dance that illuminates its constitutive work in the ongoing evolution of human persons. It introduces a philosophy of bodily becoming that posits bodily movement as the source and telos of human life. Within this philosophy, dance appears as an activity that humans evolved to do as the enabling condition of their best bodily becoming. Weaving theoretical reflection with accounts of lived experience, the book positions dance as a catalyst in the development of human consciousness, compassion, ritual proclivity, and ecological adaptability. Aligning with trends in new materialism, affect theory, and feminist philosophy, as well as advances in dance and religious studies, this work reveals the vital role dance can play in reversing the trajectory of ecological self-destruction along which human civilization is racing.
Outline of a Theory of Practice is recognized as a major theoretical text on the foundations of anthropology and sociology. Pierre Bourdieu, a distinguished French anthropologist, develops a theory of practice which is simultaneously a critique of the methods and postures of social science and a general account of how human action should be understood. With his central concept of the habitus, the principle which negotiates between objective structures and practices, Bourdieu is able to transcend the dichotomies which have shaped theoretical thinking about the social world. The author draws on his fieldwork in Kabylia (Algeria) to illustrate his theoretical propositions. With detailed study of matrimonial strategies and the role of rite and myth, he analyses the dialectical process of the 'incorporation of structures' and the objectification of habitus, whereby social formations tend to reproduce themselves. A rigorous consistent materialist approach lays the foundations for a theory of symbolic capital and, through analysis of the different modes of domination, a theory of symbolic power.
“This book closes an obvious gap between Native American epistemology and philosophy of dance performance, and Shay Welch is very careful and sensitive in situating herself and her own reflections on knowledge and dance in relation to the worldviews and cultures of Indigenous peoples.”
–Brian Burkhart, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, USA
“With rich description, methodological sophistication, and analytical acuity, this book brings dance to life philosophically as a way of knowing. Welch explores the connections between Native American epistemology, embodied cognition, and social meaning to expand the resources for thinking both about what it is to know, and also how engagement with marginalized traditions can enrich our understanding of our own lives. This is a book that anyone seeking to explore outside of the narrow paradigms of mainstream epistemology should read.”
–Sally Haslanger, Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
“In her distinctively iconoclastic and creative voice, Shay Welch makes a crucial contribution to social epistemology, embodiment studies, Native American philosophy, and performance studies. This bold work is a sparkling example of the philosophical value of broadening our vision to include the contributions of Native American and Indigenous thinkers and performers. Understanding dance performance as epistemic practice gives us an eye-opening new window into both.”
–Rebecca Kukla, Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University, USA
This book investigates the phenomenological ways that dance choreographing and dance performance exemplify both Truth and meaning-making within Native American epistemology, from an analytic philosophical perspective. Given that within Native American communities dance is regarded both as an integral cultural conduit and “a doorway to a powerful wisdom,” Shay Welch argues that dance and dancing can both create and communicate knowledge. She explains that dance—as a form of oral, narrative storytelling—has the power to communicate knowledge of beliefs and histories, and that dance is a form of embodied narrative storytelling. Welch provides analytic clarity on how this happens, what conditions are required for it to succeed, and how dance can satisfy the relational and ethical facets of Native epistemology.
In the history of dance and Christian theology, the United Society of Believers in the Second Coming of Christ, otherwise known as the Shakers, prove a unique case. Not only did the Shakers practice dancing for over 140 years as the central, constitutive ritual of a successful separatist religious socialism ; and not only did the Shakers mount a biblically informed theological defense of their dancing practice. The Shakers also elevated dancing alongside the Bible as a privileged medium of divine revelation. This paper mobilizes an ecokinetic approach in relation to the first two arcs of Shaker history to argue that the Shakers’ dancing serves as an authorizing source for their theological innovations. Dance is theopraxis.
Religion: Material Dynamics is a lively resource for thinking about religious materiality and the material study of religion. Deconstructing and reconstructing religion as material categories, social formations, and mobile circulations, the book explores the making, ordering, and circulating of religious things. The book is divided into three sections: Part One revitalizes basic categories-animism and sacred, space and time-by situating them in their material production and testing their analytical viability. Part Two examines religious formations as configurations of power that operate in material cultures and cultural economies and are most clearly shown in the power relations of colonialism and imperialism. Part Three explores the material dynamics of circulation through case studies of religious mobility, change, and diffusion as intimate as the body and as vast as the oceans. Each chapter offers insightful orientations and surprising possibilities for studying material religion. Exploring the material dynamics of religion from poetics to politics, David Chidester provides an entry into the study of material religion that will be welcomed by students and specialists in religious studies, anthropology, and history.
This book is an ethnographic account of three Roman Catholic women in contemporary Tamil Nadu, south India, who claim to be possessed by Mary, the mother of Jesus. It follows their lives over more than a decade, describing their own, the researcher's own, and devotees' understandings of the women's healing and possession practices along with questions about agency, gender roles, authenticity, and social power. It asks, how is it that some experiences of “possession” (a word introduced to India by Christian missionaries, which the book complicates through Tamil renditions) are recognized as authentic, yet others are not? What are the local conditions that enable their very possibility? Discussions of local and widespread “Hindu” practices and discourses shed light on how these women and their followers navigate their bodily experience, socioeconomic status, caste, and gender roles in a modern world of technological change and global economy—and how Church officials navigate these women. Part travelogue, part academic analysis, the book addresses a wide audience, including academics interested in the study of religion, spirit possession, anthropology, women's and gender studies, postcolonialism, Global Christianity, Tamil culture, Mariology, fluid boundaries across “traditions,” and the relationship between the ethnographer-“Self” and “Other.”.
The essence of religion was once widely thought to be a unique form of experience that could not be explained in neurological, psychological, or sociological terms. In recent decades scholars have questioned the privileging of the idea of religious experience in the study of religion, an approach that effectively isolated the study of religion from the social and natural sciences. Religious Experience Reconsidered lays out a framework for research into religious phenomena that reclaims experience as a central concept while bridging the divide between religious studies and the sciences. Ann Taves shifts the focus from "religious experience," conceived as a fixed and stable thing, to an examination of the processes by which people attribute meaning to their experiences. She proposes a new approach that unites the study of religion with fields as diverse as neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, and psychology to better understand how these processes are incorporated into the broader cultural formations we think of as religious or spiritual. Taves addresses a series of key questions: how can we set up studies without obscuring contestations over meaning and value? What is the relationship between experience and consciousness? How can research into consciousness help us access and interpret the experiences of others? Why do people individually or collectively explain their experiences in religious terms? How can we set up studies that allow us to compare experiences across times and cultures? Religious Experience Reconsidered demonstrates how methods from the sciences can be combined with those from the humanities to advance a naturalistic understanding of the experiences that people deem religious.
What Science Offers the Humanities examines some of the deep problems facing current approaches to the study of culture. It focuses on the excesses of postmodernism, but also acknowledges serious problems with postmodernism's harshest critics. In short, Edward Slingerland argues that in order for the humanities to progress, its scholars need to take seriously contributions from the natural sciences - and particular research on human cognition - which demonstrate that any separation of the mind and the body is entirely untenable. The author provides suggestions for how humanists might begin to utilize these scientific discoveries without conceding that science has the last word on morality, religion, art, and literature. Calling into question such deeply entrenched dogmas as the ‘blank slate’ theory of nature, strong social constructivism, and the ideal of disembodied reason, What Science Offers the Humanities replaces the human-sciences divide with a more integrated approach to the study of culture.
'I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than we can tell', writes Michael Polanyi, whose work paved the way for the likes of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. "The Tacit Dimension", originally published in 1967, argues that such tacit knowledge - tradition, inherited practices, implied values, and prejudgments - is a crucial part of scientific knowledge. Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart of scientific discovery.
This article is available for free download at www.gregoryshushan.com/articles. To support Dr. Shushan's work, please visit https://www.patreon.com/gregoryshushan.
Many contemporary scholars believe that all experience is dependent upon language and culture, meaning that it is unintelligible to speak of some cross-cultural event which can be called “mystical” or “religious”; and that the notion of the origins of religious beliefs lying in such experiences is thus methodologically and theoretically unsound. Challenges to these perspectives leave one open to charges of naivety, or of having crossed a boundary from the (ostensibly) objective Study of Religions into a kind of universalist crypto-theology. In defense of the study of such experiences, this article attempts to demonstrate the weaknesses in these arguments by showing that they are based upon a number of mutually-reliant but unproven culturally-situated philosophical axioms. With particular reference to near-death and out-of-body experiences, a reflexive, theoretically eclectic approach to this area of study is suggested.
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Deleuze and Guattari in One Thousand Plateaus, Jane Bennett in Vibrant Matter and David Abram in his Becoming Animal all set out to dismantle the mind over body logics common in the modern western world that continue to justify the pursuit of spiritual values at the expense of the earth
and its inhabitants. They each coin a non-dualistic concept of materiality with the intention of changing how we think about bodies and how we experience bodies. To their concepts of materiality this article poses a question borrowed from Friedrich Nietzsche: Can they dance? In the process
of investigating each, LaMothe fleshes out how and why a local, lived philosophy of bodily becoming can move us farther along the path these writers tread towards an appreciation of dance as a practice and resource for earth-friendly ways of thinking and believing.
In Vibrant Matter the political theorist Jane Bennett, renowned for her work on nature, ethics, and affect, shifts her focus from the human experience of things to things themselves. Bennett argues that political theory needs to do a better job of recognizing the active participation of nonhuman forces in events. Toward that end, she theorizes a “vital materiality” that runs through and across bodies, both human and nonhuman. Bennett explores how political analyses of public events might change were we to acknowledge that agency always emerges as theeffect of ad hoc configurations of human and nonhuman forces. She suggests that recognizing that agency is distributed this way, and is not solely the province of humans, might spur the cultivation of a more responsible, ecologically sound politics: a politics less devoted to blaming and condemning individuals than to discerning the web of forces affecting situations and events.
Bennett examines the political and theoretical implications of vital materialism through extended discussions of commonplace things and physical phenomena including stem cells, fish oils, electricity, metal, and trash. She reflects on the vital power of material formations such as landfills, which generate lively streams of chemicals, and omega-3 fatty acids, which can transform brain chemistry and mood. Along the way, she engages with the concepts and claims of Spinoza, Nietzsche, Thoreau, Darwin, Adorno, and Deleuze, disclosing a long history of thinking about vibrant matter in Western philosophy, including attempts by Kant, Bergson, and the embryologist Hans Driesch to name the “vital force” inherent in material forms. Bennett concludes by sketching the contours of a “green materialist” ecophilosophy.
The Primacy of Perception brings together a number of important studies by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961. The title essay, which is in essence a presentation of the underlying thesis of his Phenomenology of Perception, is followed by two courses given by Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne on phenomenological psychology. "Eye and Mind" and the concluding chapters present applications of Merleau-Ponty's ideas to the realms of art, philosophy of history, and politics. Taken together, the studies in this volume provide a systematic introduction to the major themes of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson take on the daunting task of rebuilding Western philosophy in alignment with three fundamental lessons from cognitive science: The mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Why so daunting? "Cognitive science--the empirical study of the mind--calls upon us to create a new, empirically responsible philosophy, a philosophy consistent with empirical discoveries about the nature of mind," they write. "A serious appreciation of cognitive science requires us to rethink philosophy from the beginning, in a way that would put it more in touch with the reality of how we think." In other words, no Platonic forms, no Cartesian mind-body duality, no Kantian pure logic. Even Noam Chomsky's generative linguistics is revealed under scrutiny to have substantial problems.
Parts of Philosophy in the Flesh retrace the ground covered in the authors' earlier Metaphors We Live By , which revealed how we deal with abstract concepts through metaphor. (The previous sentence, for example, relies on the metaphors "Knowledge is a place" and "Knowing is seeing" to make its point.) Here they reveal the metaphorical underpinnings of basic philosophical concepts like time, causality--even morality--demonstrating how these metaphors are rooted in our embodied experiences. They repropose philosophy as an attempt to perfect such conceptual metaphors so that we can understand how our thought processes shape our experience; they even make a tentative effort toward rescuing spirituality from the heavy blows dealt by the disproving of the disembodied mind or "soul" by reimagining "transcendence" as "imaginative empathetic projection." Their source list is helpfully arranged by subject matter, making it easier to follow up on their citations. If you enjoyed the mental workout from Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works , Lakoff and Johnson will, to pursue the "Learning is exercise" metaphor, take you to the next level of training. --Ron Hogan Two leading thinkers offer a blueprint for a new philosophy.
"Their ambition is massive, their argument important.…The authors engage in a sort of metaphorical genome project, attempting to delineate the genetic code of human thought." -The New York Times Book Review
"This book will be an instant academic best-seller." -Mark Turner, University of Maryland
This is philosophy as it has never been seen before. Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosophy responsible to the science of the mind offers a radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self; then they rethink a host of philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern analytical philosophy.
Where did we come from? What should we do here? Where are we going? As long as human beings ask these questions, we will need metanarratives—accounts of cosmological and biological evolution that place the human species in the context of what we know about the universe as a whole.
In my book Religion in Human Evolution and its sequel, a work-in-progress titled The Modern Project in the Light of Human Evolution, I have been exploring a new metanarrative by means of an extended hypothesis about religion and equality in human evolution—a hypothesis that is open to correction at every point and raises far more questions than it can answer.
I have come to view the Marxism of Marx and Engels (not of Lenin, nor certainly of Stalin, nor Mao) as a version of the biblical metanarrative about the history of salvation. Terry Eagleton's Why Marx Was Right has further awakened me to the Marxist quality of this biblical metanarrative. (Eagleton is a radical Irish Catholic with a deep conviction of the truth and current relevance of Marx's teaching.)
Marx's version of the biblical history of salvation begins with what he calls "primitive communism," when all things were held in common—a kind of Garden of Eden. Then comes the "fall" into class society that occurred when several forms of the domination of the poor and vulnerable by the rich and powerful succeeded each other—slave society, feudal society, and capitalism. Marx also foresees a version of "that Day" when the Lord will set all things straight, reward the faithful, punish the wicked, and create a reign of peace and justice on earth: socialism and communism.
Eagleton points out that Marx was quite aware of how much he owed to the biblical tradition. Moreover, when Marx's wife wanted to join a women's "secular society," he told her it would do her more good to read the Hebrew prophets.
The earliest humans, hunter-gatherers, were often remarkably egalitarian. But our history as a species did not begin with this "Eden" (we will see how we need to qualify that analogy in a minute), but with primate ancestors who were anything but egalitarian:
Our nearest primate relatives, the chimpanzees, live in hierarchal bands dominated by alpha males. What can explain the comparative egalitarianism of early hunter-gatherer societies?
Where did we come from? What should we do here? Where are we going? As long as humans ask these questions, the author writes, we will need accounts of our cosmological and biological evolution—accounts of how we went from painting cave walls to forming transnational corporations.
our nearest primate relatives, the chimpanzees, live in strongly hierarchal bands dominated by alpha males who attempt to maintain sole sexual access to the females of the group and keep both other males and females in subservience to them.
What accounts for the difference between primate bands and hunter-gatherer egalitarians? The absence of a disposition for dominance? Not likely. In Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior, anthropologist Christopher Boehm argues that we share with chimpanzees and bonobos a tendency toward despotism. Yet nomadic hunter-gatherers have nevertheless been uniformly egalitarian, seemingly for thousands if not millions of years. Boehm explains this seeming contradiction with the claim that hunter-gatherers have "reverse dominance hierarchies": the adult males in the society form a general coalition to prevent any one of their number, alone or with a few allies, from dominating the others. Male egalitarianism is not necessarily extended to females—the degree to which females are subject to male despotism varies, even among hunter-gatherers. But the reverse dominance hierarchy prevents the monopolization of females by dominant males. This makes possible the heterosexual nuclear family as we know it, based on (relatively) stable cross-gender pair bonding and mutual nurturance of children by parents, precisely what is missing in our closest primate relatives.
Egalitarianism is thus itself a form of dominance, the dominance of what Rousseau would have called the general will over the will of each. The hunter-gatherer band is not, then, the family...
