A multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach to leader assessment at a distance: The case of Bashar al-Assad

Abstract

A Quick Look Assessment by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)

A multi-method assessment of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

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A multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach to leader
assessment at a distance: The case of Bashar al-Assad
A Quick Look Assessment by the Strategic Multilayer
Assessment (SMA)
1
Part I: Summary, comparison of results, and recommendations
February 2014
Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar (Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne, and NSI,
Inc.), Dr Peter Suedfeld (Univ. of British Columbia), Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (Univ. of
British Columbia), Mr. Ryan W. Cross (Univ. of British Columbia), and
Maj. Jason Spitaletta (Joint Staff/J-7 & Johns Hopkins Univ.),
Edited by: Dr. Hriar Cabayan (JS/J-38) and Dr. Nicholas Wright, MRCP PhD (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace)
1
SMA provides planning support to Combatant Commands (CCMD) with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency,
multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff,
J3, DDSAO and executed by OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO.

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ABSTRACT
This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter
Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on
multidisciplinary analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and
verbal messages from external sources.
The results are summarized in a two-part report. Part I (this document) provides a summary,
comparison of results, and recommendations. Part II describes each analytical approach in
detail.
2
Data: The speeches used in the study were delivered by al-Assad from Jan 2000 to Sept 2013;
the past six years was sampled most densely. Additional Twitter feeds were analyzed to gauge
his influence in the region.
Analytical Approaches: Five separate methods analyzed the speeches: (a) automated text
analytics that profile al-Assad’s decision making style and ability to appreciate alternative
viewpoints; (b) integrative complexity (IC) analysis that reveals al-Assad’s ability to appreciate
others’ viewpoints and integrate them into a larger framework; (c) thematic analysis of the
cultural and political themes al-Assad expresses before taking action or in reaction to events; (d)
qualitative interpretations of major themes in al-Assad’s rhetoric; and (e) analysis of the spread
of Twitter feeds. We highlight findings that reinforce each other as particularly robust for policy.
Major Findings: The major findings of these studies include:
 al-Assad is capable of recognizing other viewpoints and evaluates them in a nuanced
and context-dependent manner
 al-Assad values logical argumentation and empirical evidence
 al-Assad’s integrative complexity is relatively high, but might be lower before he takes
decisive action or when under intense threat
 al-Assad’s reasoning is consistent with his Arab nationalist Ba’athist political ideology,
and with a consistent opposition to Israel and Western domination; al-Assad sees Arab
resistance and his leadership, or at least that of the Ba’ath party, as essential
Key Recommendations: We used the doctrinal 7-Step MISO process to characterize al-
Assad as a target audience of one, and we absorbed the relevant components of our
multi-method analyses into the Target Audience Analysis format. The main practical
recommendations are:
 Avoid direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power;
 Appeal to al-Assad’s relatively high baseline level of Cognitive Complexity (ability to
see different sides to an issue, flexible decision-making, openness to information),
pragmatism, and respect for Arab nationalism to broker a negotiated settlement; and
 Identify and exploit al-Assad’s dynamic levels of Integrative Complexity to assess his
relative susceptibility, develop arguments and recommended psychological actions
and/or refine assessment criteria at a specific point in time.
2
Part II contains detailed analyses of each study that contributed to this effort, supporting appendices and summary chapters.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Main Findings
Basic findings from studies of al-Assad’s speeches, 2000 – 2013
1. Various Measures of Cognitive Complexity: Multiple measures converge to show that
Assad is capable of appreciating different viewpoints and the nuances between them.
al-Assad’s integrative complexity (his ability to differentiate different perspectives and
integrate them) is relatively high compared to other leaders in the region. al-Assad
furthermore demonstrates an ability to be logically consistent in how he evaluates
situations, and is responsive to credible (in his view) empirical evidence.
2. Deterrence: Traditional deterrence theory should apply to al-Assad generally, although
during periods of intense stress he may deviate more from such a model.
3. Integrative Complexity (IC): In general his IC has not changed over the course of the
conflict. But analysis of specific events suggests his IC tends to be lower when under
intense threat, or before taking decisive and violent action, compared to afterwards.
4. Arab Nationalism: al-Assad wants to lead Arab interests; he is a staunch Arab
nationalist.
5. Opposition to the West and Israel: al-Assad wishes to oppose Western and Israeli
influence in the Arab world; the history of Middle Eastern peace talks makes Assad
cynical about Israel-Palestine negotiations, despite his cognitive inclination for
negotiation. Assad’s narrative of opposing Israel decreases dramatically once Syrian
unrest begins (March 2011); return to this narrative may be an indicator of his baseline
rhetoric in times of relative peace within Syria.
6. Secular Ba’athist Political Ideology: al-Assad’s reasoning and values are consistent with
a more secular, Ba’athist, political ideology.
Key Recommendations
We used the doctrinal 7-Step MISO process to characterize al-Assad as a target audience of one,
and we absorbed the relevant components of our multi-method analyses into the Target
Audience Analysis format. Summary of Key Recommendations along with Supporting Analyses,
Part II Location, and Confidence Level are shown in table one. The main practical
recommendations are:
 Avoid direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power;
 Appeal to al-Assad’s relatively high baseline level of Cognitive Complexity (ability to
see different sides to an issue, flexible decision-making, openness to information),
pragmatism, and respect for Arab nationalism to broker a negotiated settlement; and
 Identify and exploit al-Assad’s dynamic levels of Integrative Complexity to assess his
relative susceptibility, develop arguments and recommended psychological actions
and/or refine assessment criteria at a specific point in time.

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Table 1: Summary of Key Recommendations, Supporting Analyses, Part II Location, and Confidence
Level.
Recommendation
Supporting Analyses
Part II
Location
Confid
ence
Avoid direct threats to Syrian
Ba’athist regime’s hold on power
Approach 2: al-Assad frequently appeals to conspiracies against
Syria and the Syrian Ba’athist regime; direct threats to this power
reinforce this narrative to his constituents.
al-Assad expresses a sense of duty to lead Syria and defend its
heritage against outside threats; his removal from power, if desired,
is a position to which one would have to build. Immediate demands
for his removal will fail, since they appear non-negotiable at this
point.
4.3.1, 4.3.3,
4.3.4, 4.3.6,
4.4.4,
High
Approach 3: al-Assad’s task orientation (or motivation for
seeking/retaining office) is 0.79 where 0.71 is considered high. He is
therefore likely to resist any notions of him relinquishing power,
particularly as he views his responsibility (much like that of his
father) as seeing Syria through the current crisis
5.3.2
High
Appeal to al-Assad’s relatively
high baseline level of Cognitive
Complexity (ability to see different
sides to an issue, flexible decision-
making, openness to information),
pragmatism, and respect for Arab
nationalism to broker a negotiated
settlement.
Approach 1: al-Assad’s baseline IC (from 2000-2007) was 2.4,
relatively high but within the range of Middle Eastern leaders during
politically calm periods: e.g., prior to the Gulf War, when the range
was from 1.1 for King Hussein of Jordan to 2.9 for Iranian President
A. Rafsanjani. al-Assad’s average IC from Jan 2008 – Sept 2013 was
1.9, and his yearly averages after the onset of the Arab Spring were
within 1.7 and 1.9. These scores are somewhat high relative to
other political leaders of the region, but within the range for Middle
Eastern leaders during a crisis, such as Saddam Hussein’s IC during
the Gulf Crisis, which ranged from 1.2 to 2.2.
3.1
High
Approach 2: al- al-Assad makes frequent appeals to Arab
nationalism and Syrian Heritage, which are key values, consistent
with his Ba’athist political ideology.
4.3.1, 4.3.3,
4.3.4, 4.3.6,
4.4.4
High
Approach 3: This used three measures of cognitive complexity:
Firstly, Conceptual Complexity (a component of ProfilerPlus
Leadership Trait Analysis). al-Assad’s PP_LTA_CC score was 0.66,
where above 0.62 is considered high. His high conceptual
complexity score coupled with his low self-confidence suggest
openness to contextual information. Secondly, ProfilerPlus Cognitive
Complexity (PPCC score, calculated separately by ProfilerPlus), al-
Assad’s mean PPCC Score of 5.8 (on a scale of 1-7) suggests a level
approaching the transition from moderate to high differentiation
and high differentiation. Thirdly, al-Assad’s use of “thinking” words
(Cognitive Mechanism score calculated by LIWC) in his speeches
showed relative stability over time (mean of 18.08 and a standard
deviation of 2.61). In summary, al-Assad exhibited moderate to high
cognitive complexity and did so throughout the period analyzed,
supporting the baseline findings of Approach 1.
5.3.1.1
5.3.1.2
5.3.1.3
Moder
ate
Approach 4: al-Assad has historically portrayed Syria as essential in
the region, and currently depicts the US as a malicious force.
6.2.1, 6.2.5
High
Identify and exploit al-Assad’s
dynamic levels of Integrative
Complexity to assess his relative
susceptibility, develop arguments
and recommended psychological
actions and/or refine assessment
criteria at a specific point in time.
Approach 1: The pattern of IC rising or remaining stable when a
problem first occurs and develops, and then declining with
continued stress, has been observed in previous studies. In this
particular case, the decline in al-Assad’s IC could be associated with
a high enough level of stress to have affected his problem solving
resources, or with al-Assad committing cognitively to a decision (i.e.
to use violent repression). In either case, al-Assad was able to
return to a more complex cognitive structure in some of the
following months.
3.3
High

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INTRODUCTION
We aim to provide guidelines useful for intelligence analysis, deterrence, information operations
and MISO. Five different teams
3
each employed one or more different methods for analyzing
language, and each of these five approaches provides distinct insight into al-Assad and the
Syrian regime’s goals, values and decision calculus. Each approach has its own value and its own
liabilities – and the extent to which similar conclusions are drawn from the different analytical
approaches is a measure of the assurance that the conclusions are sound. This chapter provides
a triangulation of results, indicating which findings are the most sound and therefore of the
most use in national security viz. the Assad regime.
The five basic approaches reported upon in this white paper are:
1. Integrative Complexity (IC) analysis as developed by Peter Suedfeld (University of
British Columbia)
2. Automated Leadership Trait Analysis using ProfilerPlus and the Language Inventory and
Word Count (LIWC) software (JHU-APL)
3. Thematic Analysis based on methodologies developed by National Security Innovations,
Inc. (NSI) and conducted by Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne (IPFW)
4. Geopolitical Discourse Development Analysis (CSIS, Center for Strategic and
International Studies)
5. Analysis of Influential Arab Twitter Feeds (Texas A&M)
In this document we first summarize the most basic findings from each approach, and then
compare the results from all five approaches.
Note on data sources: The speeches used in this study were delivered by al-Assad between Jan.
2000 and Sept. 2013, with the period of the past six years being sampled most. The analyzed
text was from open-source translations of 124 speeches, which comprise the totality of English
translations available for the (see study Table 2). Additional Twitter feeds were analyzed to
gauge his influence in the region.
Table 2: Number of Assad Speeches Included in the Analyses from 2000-2013.
Year
2000-
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total
No. of
speeches
23
17
22
28
8
12
14
124
3
The following individuals and institutions contributed to the research upon which this summary is based. Dr. Peter Suedfe ld
(University of Brit ish Columbia ), Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (Univ ersi ty of B ritish C olum bia ), Mr. Ryan W. Cross (University of
British Columbia), Dr. Larry Kuznar (Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne), Dr. Da na E yre (SoSA), Maj Jason
Spitalet ta (Johns H opki ns Universi ty) , Dr. Kathleen Eg an ( CTTSO), Mr. Sean Colbath (BBN ), Mr. Paul Brewer (SDL), Ms.
Martha L illi e (BBN), Mr. Dana Raft er (CSIS), Dr. Randy Kluver (Texas A&M), Ms. Jacquelyn Chinn (Texas A&M), Mr. Patrick Issa
(Texas A&M).

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FINDINGS FROM THE FIVE INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES
Approach 1: Integrative Complexity (IC) – University of British Columbia
Background: Integrative Complexity, as developed by Dr. Peter Suedfeld of University of British
Columbia, is a measure of the degree to which a source recognizes more than one aspect of an
issue or more than one legitimate viewpoint on it (differentiation), and recognizes relationships
among those aspects or viewpoints (integration). This method uses a 7-point scale that ranges
from 1 (no recognition of other points of view and no integration) to 7 (recognition of other
points of view and relationships among them). High IC is associated with nuanced judgments,
flexible and realistic planning and decision-making, openness to new information, tolerance of
uncertainty, and the ability to consider opposing positions. It is sometimes also connected with
slow and irresolute decision-making and a tendency to pay too much attention to unimportant
or irrelevant details.
Primary findings:
 al-Assad has exhibited a relatively high degree of IC during the period studied.
 al-Assad’s IC did not meaningfully change during the months before Bouazizi’s self-
immolation and the beginning of the Arab spring. This is consistent with Assad not
anticipating the Arab Spring prior to Bouazizi’s self-immolation.
 al-Assad’s IC increased following Bouazizi’s self-immolation, but before the first reports
of violence in the Syria conflict. This is consistent with applying greater cognitive
resources in response to a foreseen challenge. It may also suggest that, in the early
phases of the conflict, al-Assad did not plan the escalation of violence in advance.
 His IC declined during the escalation of violence early in the conflict (e.g., with the Syrian
Government’s sieges of Daraa, Homs, and Hama).
 Once a pattern of violence had been established, al-Assad’s IC declined during rebel
offensives and prior to Syrian government offensives, indicating stress in the first
instance and planning (or at least prior knowledge of plans) for violence in the second.
Conversely, his IC increased during and following Syrian Government offensives and
military successes (perhaps particularly in the Damascus region), implying reduced
stress associated with victories.
 al-Assad’s IC declined prior to the Ghouta chemical weapons attack. This may suggest
that al-Assad knew in advance about the attack, and perhaps played a role in planning it.
 al-Assad does not exhibit a trend of decreasing IC throughout the conflict. This suggests
that he is not suffering disruptive stress (IC dropping as cognitive resources are
depleted) in association with the conflict as a whole.
Approach 2: Thematic Analysis - (IPFW, Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne)
Thematic analysis can provide general predictions of which themes will precede conflict and
which will emerge as a reaction to conflict, an assessment of the major narratives al-Assad
draws on to persuade his audiences, and analyses of themes that emerge around specific
events.
Definitions:
Theme – A specific textual referent that conveys meaning; narratives will be composed of
different themes that give it impact

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Narrative – An account of connected events; a storyline.
Theme Association – An association of themes that reinforce one another, but are not
connected in a narrative.
Predictive Themes
Themes in al-Assad’s speeches that regularly occur in advance of material conflict and violent
events
• Domestic reform, Conspiracy, Figurative Language (symbolism, metaphor), Intensifiers
(hyperbole, superlatives), Russia
Reactive Themes
Themes that are most obviously salient to al-Assad regime and its Constituents after conflict
with rebels and/or United States, as judged by al-Assad’s’ reactions
• Domestic reform, Conspiracy, Figurative Language (symbolism, metaphor), Intensifiers
(hyperbole, superlatives), Hostile Media, Security
Major Narratives and Theme Associations
Factor analysis was conducted on a measure of theme frequency, identifying the themes
naturally associated in narratives.
• Syrian Arab Nationalism and Resistance
Syrian Arab Nationalism and Resistance is a cornerstone narrative in Ba’athist political
ideology. It is the notion that Syrian Arabs constitute a distinct nationality, and that they
have to struggle against foreign intervention in order to claim an identity, a homeland and
an economy and way of life. Themes that loaded highly on this factor include:
– Arab Identity, Courage, Duty, Honor, kinship, Sacrifice, Strength, Syrian
Nationalism, Victimization, Resistance, Syrian Military, Intimacy, Figurative
Language
• Logic and the Rebellion
Logic and Rebellion is an association of mutually reinforcing themes that al-Assad employs
to argue, on rational grounds, why the rebellion is unjustified politically and morally. He also
often mentions Russia as a key-supporting ally who supports his point of view.
 Resistance against Israel and Western Domination
Resistance against Israel and Western Domination is another important narrative of
Ba’athist political ideology. This narrative is an important baseline theme that all but
vanishes once the rebellion begins in 2011. Should the theme return to al-Assad’s rhetoric; it
may indicate al-Assad’s perception that the crisis is over.
 Heritage and Kinship
Heritage and Kinship are themes associated to stress the importance of one’s cultural
heritage and the need to protect it from foreign threats.
 Peace and Negotiation
The Peace and Negotiation narrative argues that peace between Israel, Palestine and Syria is
false because Arab lands are unfairly occupied and that formal negotiations are largely futile
with respect to this issue.
 Threat to Syrian Heritage
This narrative is also a core component of Ba’athist political ideology, and stresses that there
exist persistent threats to specifically Syrian cultural heritage.

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Analysis of Specific Events
The occurrence of themes three months before and three months after 11 specific events
relevant to the al-Assad regime was examined. This provided an opportunity to examine how
the particular context of events influenced al-Assad’s use of themes.
4
Some events al-Assad
planned (for example, the Siege of Daraa), and his use of themes before these events indicates
which ones may be predictive of his actions. Other events he could not have planned (for
example, Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the Arab Spring) and his use of themes after these
events indicates how he reacts to challenges.
Across these events, the following themes were predictive of , or at least regularly occurred
before conflict:
Figurative language, use of Intensifiers, Conspiracy
Across these events, the following themes were reactive to conflict:
Figurative language, use of Intensifiers, Conspiracy, Reform, Hostile Media
In both cases, al-Assad’s use of figurative language and intensifiers indicates a more emotive
frame of mind that may impact his decision calculus and/or a use of emotive rhetoric to
galvanize support from his constituents. al-Assad also consistently invokes the specter of a
regional and international conspiracy against Syria before his government takes violent action,
and in response to challenges to his hold on power.
Approach 3: Leadership Trait Analysis (JHU-APL)
A selection of English translations of Assad’s speeches (n=101) from 1 January 2000 to 13 September
2013, total of 256,240 words (mean number of words per speech=2537, SD=2224) were analyzed using
both ProfilerPlus
5
and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)
6
A more detailed description of Leadership Trait Analysis is included in Part II. A summary of
those results suggest Assad exhibits:
 High Conceptual complexity and Task orientation, which are greater than his self-
confidence that is in the low range; suggesting openness to contextual information.
 Low self-confidence, distrust and in-group bias
 Low need for power suggesting he has less of a need to be in charge and may be more
amenable to subordinates assuming more prominent roles.
 Slightly below average belief in control over events and thus he is unlikely to be overly
proactive or reactive in policy-making.
 Low in-group bias and distrust of others; therefore he does not perceive the world as
either inherently threatening or himself as persecuted.
 The findings suggest al-Assad is probably open to subordinates, not overly pro- or
reactive in policy, open to compromise, more tolerant of ambiguity, has a need for
information, and is more pragmatic on average and receptive to the interests, needs,
and desires of others.
4
These analyses were conducted on a monthly basis, and due to the fact that two months each contained two of the relevant
events, an analysis of the occurrence of themes in nine months was done in detail.
5
http://profilerplus.org/user/Request1.aspx
6
Pennebaker, J. W., Booth, R. J., & Francis, M. E. (2007). Operator’s Manual Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count: LIWC2007. LIWC. net.

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Approach 4: Geopolitical Discourse Development – Center for Strategic Analysis and
International Studies (CSIS)
CSIS analyzed the common corpus of 124 speeches by Bashir al-Assad from 2000 to present.
They provided qualitative interpretations of major themes that emerged in al-Assad’s discourse
over the course of the 13-year period studied. Their main findings include:
 Pre-rebellion: al-Assad advocated Syria as an essential integrator of Arab nations,
especially economically, basing his argument on pan-Arab nationalism. He spoke of
Turkey positively, and his speeches from 2001 until 2011 revealed a generally positive
tone towards Arab Gulf states.
 Once Syria plunged into civil war, al-Assad’s Pan-Arabic strategic geopolitical discourse
vanished from his public rhetoric. By August 2012 the president stated that Turkey had
some responsibility for the “bloodshed” that his country was experiencing; In March
2011, the Syrian leader started to hint at the dangerous influence of satellite channels
on the country’s domestic situation, most likely in reference to Gulf stations such as Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiya
 From the beginning of his rule until today, al-Assad has grown increasingly outspoken
about his ties with Russia, China, and Iran. In particular, al-Assad has remained most
consistent regarding how he portrays his relations with Russia.
 Starting in August 2006, al-Assad’s language towards the United States turned
progressively hostile. Throughout 2006 and 2007, al-Assad claimed that the United
States used the United Nations to destroy Middle Eastern stability. While he repeatedly
depicted Syria as the indirect victim of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, as well as of
“conspiracies” against Syria in Lebanon. In November 2012, he stated that the United
States was “against” him, and that it was supporting “terrorists” through its conduits in
Turkey.
Approach 5: Al Assad in the Arabic Twittersphere - Ms. Jacquelyn Chinn, Mr. Patrick Issa and
Dr. Randy Kluver (Texas A&M)
A team of analysts from Texas A&M University analyzed the twitter feeds of 195 influential
Arabic social media activists in the Middle East, in each 24 hour period before and after Assad
delivered a speech for the months of August and September, 2013.
Their primary finding is that influential Arabs tweet about Assad frequently, but do not pass on
his messages. There is little incidence of retweets of Assad, which is typically a measure of social
influence, or clout. Moreover, key regime figures and supporters do not have extensive social
media presence, and in this important arena, have therefore “abandoned the battle field” for
public opinion in social media. Therefore, Assad probably does not have much of an influence
through social media on the regional population.
However, themes of Assad’s speeches are largely replicated in the Arabic social media sphere,
so it is clear that Assad’s rhetorical strategies are not completely out of place in the region.
Thus, although Assad doesn’t seem to have a large impact upon this important monitor of public
opinion, it does allow us to see how Assad’s core convictions are shared around the region.
The network of influential Arabic language Twitter users is largely opposed to intervention in the
region, and decidedly anti-Assad.

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COMPARISON OF RESULTS
In this section, the main findings of each of the approaches are compared (Table 3). Those
findings that reinforce one another, despite very different theoretical and methodological
approaches, are taken as particularly sound, and should be seriously considered as the United
States considers how best to communicate with or interpret communications from the Assad
regime in the current crisis. This section is followed by suggestions for how the main findings of
this white paper may be best put to use.
The various analyses united in this study reinforce one another on several major points:
 al-Assad is no less cognitively complex, by several measures (IC, LIWC, Leadership Trait
Analysis), than other Middle Eastern leaders, and in many cases exhibits an ability to
consider various viewpoints and flexibly respond to outside input, employs rigorously
logical argumentation and seeks to lead a diverse Arab community.
 When the rebellion is most threatening to him, al-Assad’s integrative complexity is
lower. As the Syrian rebellion continues he sees his neighboring Arab states as
increasingly hostile, becomes increasingly suspicious of a regional and global conspiracy
against him, and employs more emotional language while also using logical
argumentation to defend his point of view. Evidence from the Twittersphere indicates
that his distrust of the broader Arab world may be justified.
 al-Assad asserts the necessity for Arab nationalist unity against a larger world. This is the
cornerstone element of Ba’athist political ideology and al-Assad is very consistent with
his professed Ba’athist ideology. Related to this is a cynicism about the possibility of
meaningful peace negotiations concerning Israel, Palestine and the Golan Heights.

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DETAILED IMPLICATIONS IN THE 7-STEP DOCTRINAL MISO FRAMEWORK
We used the doctrinal 7-Step MISO process to characterize al-Assad as a target audience of one,
and we absorbed the relevant components of our multi-method analyses into the Target
Audience Analysis format. Target audience analysis (TAA) is the systematic research and analysis
of relevant information within a selected population that may be exploited to achieve a desired
objective. Objectives can range from altering perceptions, to affecting objective reasoning, to
changing behaviors. While existing doctrine does not address the application of the TAA process
to the individual, the identification of conditions, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities lend
themselves to individual level analyses such as the ones presented here. What follows is the
integration of the multi-method analyses discussed early into the doctrinal TAA framework.
• Step 1: Identify and refine target audiences (TAs).
• Bashar al-Assad is the target audience.
• Step 2: Determine effectiveness.
• Measures of effectiveness of influence range from the absence of CBRNE
weapons employment (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High
Explosive), to achieving a negotiated settlement of the conflict.
• Additional measures of effectiveness could include the change in al-Assad’s IC in
response to unfolding circumstances as well as specific messages.
• Step 3: Identify conditions. Conditions are those existing elements that affect the TA,
but over which the TA has limited control.
• Analyses suggest the following conditions and their impact on influencing al-
Assad.
• Pre-rebellion: al-Assad advocated Syria as an essential integrator of
Arab nations, especially economically, basing his argument on pan-Arab
nationalism. He spoke of Turkey positively, and his speeches from 2001
until 2011 revealed a generally positive tone towards Arab Gulf states.
During this time he processed information in a relatively flexible,
nuanced, and realistic way.
• Once Syria plunged into civil war, al-Assad’s Pan-Arabic strategic
geopolitical discourse vanished from his public rhetoric. By August 2012
the president stated that Turkey had some responsibility for the
“bloodshed” that his country was experiencing; In March 2011, the
Syrian leader started to hint at the dangerous influence of satellite
channels on the country’s domestic situation, most likely in reference to
Gulf stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. Throughout this period
there was no overall trend in al-Assad’s IC, but were temporary
increases and decreases that might be associated with events.
• From the beginning of his rule until today, al-Assad has grown
increasingly outspoken about his ties with Russia, China, and Iran. In
particular, al-Assad has remained most consistent regarding how he
portrays his relations with Russia.
• Starting in August 2006, al-Assad’s language towards the United States
turned progressively hostile. At the same time, his IC declined from a
maximum in 2005, to below average (for him) in 2008. Throughout
2006 and 2007, al-Assad claimed that the United States used the United

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Nations to destroy Middle Eastern stability. While he repeatedly
depicted Syria as the indirect victim of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, as
well as of “conspiracies” against Syria in Lebanon. In November 2012, he
stated that the United States was “against” him, and that it was
supporting “terrorists” through its conduits in Turkey.
• al-Assad probably does not have much of an influence through Twitter on the
general Arab population.
• The network of influential Arabic language Twitter users is largely opposed to
intervention in the region, and decidedly anti-Assad.
• The major narratives relevant to influencing al-Assad include:
• Syrian Arab Nationalism and Resistance. Syrian Arab Nationalism and
Resistance is a cornerstone narrative in Ba’athist political ideology. It is
the notion that Syrian Arabs constitute a distinct nationality, and that
they have to struggle against foreign intervention in order to claim an
identity, a homeland and an economy and way of life. Themes that
loaded highly on this factor include:
• Arab Identity, Courage, Duty, Honor, kinship, Sacrifice, Strength,
Syrian Nationalism, Victimization, Resistance, Syrian Military,
Intimacy, Figurative Language
• Logic and the Rebellion. Logic and Rebellion is an association of
mutually reinforcing themes that al-Assad employs to argue, on rational
grounds, why the rebellion is unjustified on political and moral grounds.
He also often mentions Russia as a key-supporting ally who supports his
point of view.
• Resistance against Israel and Western Domination. Resistance against
Israel and Western Domination is another important narrative of
Ba’athist political ideology. This narrative is an important baseline
theme that all but vanishes once the rebellion begins in 2011. Should
the theme return to al-Assad’s rhetoric, it may indicate al-Assad’s
perception that the crisis is over.
• Heritage and Kinship. Heritage and Kinship are themes associated to
stress the importance of one’s cultural heritage and the need to protect
it from foreign threats.
• Peace and Negotiation. The Peace and Negotiation narrative argues
that peace in the Middle East is false because Arab lands are unfairly
occupied and that formal negotiations are largely futile.
• Threat to Syrian Heritage. This narrative is also a core component of
Ba’athist political ideology.
• Step 4: Identify vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are the needs, wants, or desires that
arise from the conditions of a TA. These idiosyncratic vulnerabilities may be addressed
through both the message content as well as through the dissemination mechanism.
• Themes that are most obviously salient to Assad regime after politically
challenging events include: Domestic reform, Conspiracy, Hostile Media, and
Security. These themes represent issues to which al-Assad may be particularly
responsive.
• al-Assad also is more likely to use emotive language such as Figurative
Language (symbolism, metaphor), and Intensifiers (hyperbole, superlatives)
providing a measure of how important these issues are to him and his regime.

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• al-Assad is intent on holding on to power and is sensitive to threats to that. Like
many leaders, he will equate his power with the role of the Syrian people and
thus the two may be confounded in his speeches.
• al-Assad’s belief in control over events is slightly below the mean and thus he is
unlikely to be overly proactive or reactive in policy-making. Also, his need for
power is in the low range and therefore he has less of a need to be in charge
and may be more amenable to subordinates assuming more prominent roles.
• Both al-Assad’s in-group bias and distrust of others are low and therefore he
does not perceive the world as either inherently threatening or himself as
persecuted. This may provide an opening for an objective third-party to
facilitate a negotiated settlement.
• Step 5: Determine susceptibility. Susceptibility is the likelihood of a particular line of
persuasion (LOP) having the desired impact on the TA.
• al-Assad’s leadership traits suggest he is probably open to subordinates, not
overly pro- or reactive in policy, open to compromise, more tolerant of
ambiguity, has a need for information, and is more pragmatic on average and
receptive to the interests, needs, and desires of others.
• Thematic analysis also indicated that al-Assad has a need for empirical data.
• Between 2000 and 2013, al-Assad’s speeches exhibit a relatively high level of IC.
He may therefore be considered able to comprehend relatively nuanced
arguments that incorporate the social and political complexity of the Middle
East.
• al-Assad’s IC tends to be below his baseline when the threat from violent
opposition to the regime is unusually high (e.g., when the conflict first became
violent, and when the rebels had the initiative in or around Damascus). Thus,
tactical success by a rebel group (or groups) and/or increased intensity of the
conflict may limit opportunities to engage with him. Rebel setbacks and/or
infighting amongst the groups may provide an opportunity for engaging with al-
Assad.
• Step 6: Determine accessibility.
• As a head of state, there are both official and unofficial methods of accessing al-
Assad. Understanding both formal and informal mechanisms and/or pathways
of conveying a message are essential, particularly when attempting an indirect
method of influence.
• Given al-Assad’s BACE (Belief in Control Over Events) and need for power,
identifying a trusted subordinate and/or extraterritorial ally who can help
facilitate a negotiated settlement should be a priority intelligence requirement.
• Step 7: Develop PSYOP arguments and recommend psychological actions (PSYACTs).
• For al-Assad, traditional rational actor deterrence theory should be generally
effective, although he may take some decision shortcuts (use heuristics) when in
a more emotive state before and after conflict.
• al-Assad exhibits a relatively high degree of IC through the period studied and
thus low IC arguments, often more clear and possibly viewed by him as
simplistic, may not be ideal. Rather, al-Assad seems to appreciate the
complexity of the conflict both within Syria and vis-à-vis the broader Middle
East. Thus, a nuanced argument that does not threaten his hold on power, and
especially that of the Ba’ath party, but suggests he cease the use of specific
tactics and/or weapons may be effective.

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• al-Assad’s high Task orientation indicates that he is not likely to relinquish
power, personally or for his party. This strategic option is probably the most
difficult for al-Assad to negotiate, given al-Assad’s dedication to his
constituents, his Syrian nationalism and Ba’athist ideology, his opposition to
extremist Islamists, and the difficulties in overcoming his perceived injustices
from Western powers and Israel.
• Cognitive Complexity: al-Assad’s ability to appreciate alternative
viewpoints and consider outside information indicates that he has a
high potential for a negotiated settlement, especially if he is presented
with what he accepts as evidence for why such an alternative would be
in his and his people’s interest. Approaches should emphasize his
openness to information, pragmatism (as opposed to dogmatism) and
willingness to adopt new policies and tactics (flexibility). Messages that
are themselves high in IC may induce him to raise his own, possibly
becoming more open to negotiations. There should be several
alternatives that may be flexibly related to each other and to ongoing
events, his and Syria's domestic and international relations, and his own
policies. Given al-Assad’s strong task orientation, combined with the
existential threat to him and his Alawite, Christian, Druze and some
moderate Sunni constituents, it is very unlikely that he would step down
from power and abandon his people.
• Arab Nationalism: Passing power to another leader within the Ba’athist
regime, or possibly another Arab nationalist regime, may be potentially
acceptable to al-Assad. Any negotiated settlement should retain power
in a pro-Arab nationalist regime of some sort, if only to allow al-Assad to
save face in not selling out to Western/Israeli interests, as he has
perceived other Arab leaders to have done.
• Decreasing Integrative Complexity Hardens His Position: If the
rebellion were to continue and become more threatening to al-Assad’s
regime, he would be expected to become less capable of appreciating
alternative solutions and would probably become more entrenched in
his desire to remain in power.
• Opposition to the West and Israel: Framing regime change as a victory
for the West and Israel would make it a less palatable, if not impossible,
option for al-Assad. Any negotiated settlement that would preserve a
sense that al-Assad and his constituents were still able to resist Western
and Israeli domination would be important.
• Secular Ba’athist Political Ideology: The possibility of more conservative
or violent Jihadist elements taking power will motivate al-Assad to hold
on to power more tenaciously. A negotiated settlement with more
moderate Syrian groups is more likely to succeed with al-Assad than
negotiations with more radical Jihadist elements.
• Identifying a regional (non-Syrian) influential Ba’ath party member to help
facilitate peace amongst regional Muslims, and not necessarily extremists with
the Sunni and/or Shia sects, to exert indirect influence on al-Assad without him
feeling threatened is recommended.
• al-Assad’s preference for logical argumentation over empirical evidence
suggests messages be crafted with sound (and consistent) logic and not

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necessarily laden with quantitative facts. Appealing to his rationality is likely
more effective than attempting to overwhelm him with information supporting
the US/UN position.
• Step 8: Refine assessment criteria.
• IC may provide an indicator of al-Assad’s susceptibility to tailored messages.
Analyzing Assad’s responses to US/UN messaging may provide indications of
effectiveness.
• Specifically: Increases in IC relative to US/UN overtures may signal more
openness to a negotiated settlement. Decreases in IC may indicate an
increasing rigidity in his opinions and therefore less openness. Given his
generalized ability and willingness to appreciate varying perspectives, a
stable (or increasing) IC may suggest a willingness to continue along a
particular route while a decrease in IC in response may suggest a
specific resistance to a particular theme. Furthermore, a decrease in IC
may suggest either an impending decision or an increase in perceived
threat.

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Table 3 Summarizes the relationships between the main findings from the various approaches
described in this white paper.
Table 3: Summary of al-Assad's Speeches, 2000 – 2013.
IC (UBC)
Leadership Trait
Analysis
(ProfilerPlus)
Thematic Analysis
(IPFW)
Syrian Geopolitical
Discourse
Development (CSIS)
Twittersphere
Analysis
IC comparable to other
Middle Eastern leaders in
peace and conflict; Capable
of flexible and nuanced
decision making
High Conceptual Complexity
and Task Orientation;
Correlation between LIWC
Cognitive Mechanisms and
UBC IC, r = .664
Overall, al-Assad exhibits
measured and rigorously
logical and empirical
argumentation in
comparison to other
regional leaders.
al-Assad speaks of Syria as a
major political and
economic integrator for the
region, speaks positively
about Turkey and the Gulf
States; stresses Pan-Arab
nationalism
IC increases at beginning of
Arab Spring, but declines
with the early escalations of
violence (first reported
violence, and the sieges of
Daraa, Hama, and Homs)
Logos, Intensifiers,
Conspiracy and Russia
themes increase through
time and with conflict;
themes associated with low
IC in previous studies
increase before conflict:
Honor/Shame,
Victimization, Enemy,
emotional language
(Figurative language and
intensifiers); puppet rulers
in Arab states and Turkey as
an enemy increase after
crisis begins
As crisis intensifies, he talks
more about conspiracies,
and US support of terrorists
through Turkey, and
rhetoric about Syria as an
economic and political
integrator vanishes;
mentions Russia
increasingly
During August and
September 2013, influential
Arab Twitter users in the
Middle East were largely
against the al-Assad regime
al-Assad’s most prevalent
narrative is of Syrian Arab
Nationalism and Resistance,
another important narrative
is Resistance against Israel
and Western Domination
and Threat to Syrian
Heritage
Stresses Pan-Arab
nationalism
IC declines from 2005 to
2008, possibly a decline
from high IC associated with
the withdrawal from
Lebanon and deepening of
relations with Russia, and
which then declines below
baseline in association with
the Israeli bombing of a
Syrian nuclear facility in late
2007. IC is steady
immediately before
Bouazizi’s self-immolation.
Key themes before Bouazizi
that indicate integration:
Logos, Turkey, Trade
Key themes before Bouazizi
that indicate low IC: Justice,
Peace (lack), Israel