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ARTIGOS | 1 of 22
“The Million-Euro Answer”: Party Youth Wings’ Views
on the Opportunities and Challenges of Political
Communication on Social Media
“A Resposta de um Milhão de Euros”: A Visão das
Juventudes Partidárias sobre as Oportunidades e
Desafios da Comunicação Política nas Redes Sociais
https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-5462_45_13
Sara Machado
CITCEM - Transdisciplinary Research Centre «Culture, Space and Memory» / Faculty of Arts
and Humanities of the University of Porto, Portugal
up201202018@up.pt
Vasco Ribeiro
CITCEM - Transdisciplinary Research Centre «Culture, Space and Memory» / Faculty of Arts
and Humanities of the University of Porto, Portugal
vribeiro@letras.up.pt
Raquel Meneses
School of Economics and Management of the University of Porto, Portugal
raquelm@fep.up.pt
Submitted: 2024-03-15 | Accepted: 2024-06-26
Submetido: 2024-03-15 | Aceite: 2024-06-26
Abstract
Research on the relationship between youth, politics, and social media in Europe
often overlooks the role and views of party youth wings. In this study, we seek to ll
this gap by understanding (1) the objectives guiding the political communication of
party youth wings on social media and (2) the opportunities and challenges they
identify in the process. We do so by conducting semi-structured interviews with
representatives of youth wings and informal youth groups from Portuguese political
parties. Information emerges as the primary communicational objective of youth
wings, who do not consider social media an ideal space for political dialogue. Although
social media is the main communication channel with young people, offering more
reach, exibility, and feedback opportunities, several challenges limit the effectiveness
of communication: resources, algorithms, audience fragmentation, selection effects,
simplication of the complex, and the irreplaceability of face-to-face contact. The
implications of these results are discussed.
2 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
Keywords
party youth wings, social media, political communication, dissonant public sphe-
res, democracy
Resumo
A investigação sobre a relação entre jovens, política e redes sociais na Europa não
tem incluído o papel e a visão das juventudes partidárias. Neste estudo, procuramos
colmatar essa lacuna, explorando (1) os objetivos que norteiam a comunicação polí-
tica das juventudes partidárias nas redes sociais e (2) que oportunidades e desaos
elas identicam no processo. Para tal, recorremos a entrevistas semiestruturadas com
representantes das juventudes partidárias e grupos informais de jovens de partidos
portugueses. A informação destaca-se como o principal objetivo comunicacional das
juventudes partidárias, que não consideram as redes sociais o espaço ideal para o diá-
logo político. Embora as redes sociais sejam o principal canal de comunicação com
os jovens, trazendo mais alcance, exibilidade e possibilidade de feedback, vários de-
saos limitam a ecácia da comunicação: os recursos, o algoritmo, a fragmentação
da audiência, os efeitos de seleção, a simplicação do complexo e a centralidade do
contacto cara-a-cara. As implicações destes resultados são discutidas.
Palavras-chave
juventudes partidárias, redes sociais, comunicação política, esferas públicas dis-
sonantes, democracia
1. Introduction
While youth was described as apathetic or alienated from the political system in
the past, it is now agreed that younger generations have forged a new denition of
citizenship (Holbein & Hillygus, 2020). Yet, it seems consensual that young people
have a sense of distrust and cynicism toward political institutions, which they see as
incapable of addressing their issues (Ellison et al., 2020). This lack of condence leads
to low youth voter turnout, affecting their representation on the political agenda and
the inuence of public policies (Siegel-Stechler, 2019; Wattenberg, 2020).
Since institutional participation cannot be replaced by new engagement repertoi-
res (Holbein & Hillygus, 2020; Matos et al., 2023), it is essential to keep seeking new
ways to reconnect young people to formal politics. The solution has been widely sou-
ght in social media. The theory of a positive relationship between digital media use
and political participation is supported by several meta-analyses, which nd a parti-
cularly strong effect in the case of young people (Boulianne, 2009, 2015; Boulianne
& Belland, 2022; Boulianne & Theocharis, 2020).
However, one dimension is usually not studied: party youth wings. Despite nearly
80% of parties in Europe having a youth wing (Allern & Verge, 2017) and these structu-
res assuming a privileged mediating role (Forbrig, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2004; Malafaia
et al., 2018), European research on these organizations remains scarce (European
Consortium for Political Research, 2021; Heinze, 2024). Even rarer are studies on
youth wings’ communication strategies, especially on social media. Existing literatu-
ARTIGOS | 3 of 22
re points to underwhelming communication (Pickard, 2019) and a politics-as-usual
logic (Machado et al., 2023). Still, although these studies provide a state-of-the-art
analysis, they do not fully explore the role that party youth wings seek to assume on
social media or contextualize their communication strategies.
This study aims to understand party youth wings’ objectives while using social media
and the opportunities and challenges they identify in this type of political communication.
2. Youth and institutional politics: an unlove affair
Historically, young people have faced underrepresentation and exclusion from
the public sphere (Siegel-Stechler, 2019), and they now constitute a minority in aging
contemporary societies (Dassonneville, 2017). If, in addition, they do not vote and do
not form a signicant lobbying group, political actors do not take into account their
voices (Schlozman et al., 2020).
Indeed, while aging is a dominant theme in the political agenda in many coun-
tries, the challenges of young people’s emancipation are often sidelined (Wattenberg,
2020). This low prioritization of causes and issues important to youth can signicantly
affect their living conditions and, in turn, make young people feel even less motivated
to participate, creating a potentially vicious circle (Sloam, 2014).
Portugal is one of the countries where the participation inequality based on age
is most pronounced (Dassonneville, 2017; Holbein & Hillygus, 2020). An analysis
of data from the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2019 reinforces that
young Portuguese people (18-24 years old) vote much less than other age groups
(Magalhães, 2022). More recently, in an unexpected turn, the turnout rose conside-
rably in the 2024 Legislative Election, also in the 18 to 34-year-old group (Cancela &
Magalhães, 2024). Specically, the popularity of the far-right party Enough among
the younger population (Sampaio, 2024) has been associated with the party’s pene-
tration on social media platforms such as Instagram and especially TikTok (Anjos,
2024; Coelho & Valente, 2024). It is to be seen if these results are contextual or re-
present a rst step in a sustained growth trend.
Considering that young people are avid social media users, the mobilizing poten-
tial of these platforms for participation has been a prominent theme (Matthes, 2022).
In a meta-analysis of over 300 studies and 2.000 coefcients, Boulianne and Belland
(2022) conrm the existence of a positive and signicant relationship between inter-
net use and political participation, occurring at three levels: (1) access to potentially
mobilizing resources (e.g., information, people’s networks); (2) access to participation
platforms (e.g., petitions, contact with politicians); and (3) access to forms of docu-
menting participation (e.g., sele at the voting booth, protest).
In Portugal, although there are some indications of a positive relationship be-
tween social media use and political and civic engagement (Soares et al., 2021), the
impact of using these platforms on electoral participation is still an understudied
topic (Cancela, 2023). Returning to the framework of Boulianne and Belland (2022),
it is clear that party youth wings provide at least two types of interaction: access
to information and contact with politicians. For this reason, studying the activities
of these organizations on social media is deemed relevant. Firstly, however, it is
4 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
important to describe some of the characteristics of the environment in which digi-
tal political communication takes place.
3. Social media and democracy in the dissonant public sphere
In the digital era, understanding the public sphere as a cohesive social domain pro-
ves challenging (Aagaard, 2016). In that sense, Habermas (2022) recently revisited his
seminal work from the 1960s – “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”
– to reect on how digitalization created fragmented public spheres. Answering the
need for a reconceptualization, Pfetsch (2018) and Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) popu-
larized the term “dissonant public spheres”. This concept diverges from the traditional
view of the public sphere as a realm of consensus, instead portraying it as “a multi-
tude of sounds and voices, fragmented actor constellations, parallel issue agendas,
diverting or contradictory opinions, and conicting interests” (Pfetsch, 2023, p. 346).
The dissonant public sphere creates multiple challenges for political communication.
First, the strong audience fragmentation – reinforced by personalization lters
and algorithms (Geschke et al., 2019) – contributes to polarization and leads resear-
chers to question whether the internet provides the “social glue” that democracy nee-
ds (Sunstein, 2020, p. 260).
Second, there is an erosion of condence in the media and the political institutions,
once considered reliable sources of information (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018), which is only
exacerbated by phenomena like misinformation and fake news (Habermas, 2022). Indeed,
it is becoming progressively harder to differentiate between truth and fabrication (Koc-
Michalska et al., 2023) amid the “post-truth democracy” era (Habermas, 2022, p. 162).
Third, the political discourse on social media is often based on uncivil exchanges
and controversial content, which might arouse negative feelings toward politics and
have a demobilizing effect (Goyanes et al., 2021; Goyanes et al., 2023). Contact with
uncivil content on social media may also promote self-censorship and lead to more
passive uses of information (Newman et al., 2023).
Also, the users’ attention spans are waning (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018), along with
their ability to process relevant data (Habermas, 2022). The internet provides us with
an overwhelming amount of information that we struggle to absorb (Coleman, 2017).
As a consequence, in their quest to enhance user engagement (Pfetsch, 2020), insti-
tutions increasingly resort to emotionalization, sensationalism, personalization, and
politainment (Gómez‐García et al., 2023; Klinger et al., 2023; Koc-Michalska et al.,
2023; Sunstein, 2020). These trends contribute to society’s depoliticization (Habermas,
2022) and might pose serious threats to democracy (Gómez‐García et al., 2023). In
this environment, political communication on social media seems like a challenging
endeavor, both for parties and youth wings.
4. The (im)perfect mediator: The role of party youth wings
Given the difculty of youth in establishing themselves as priorities on the political agen-
da, it is essential to recognize the role of party youth wings in youth emancipation (Forbrig,
ARTIGOS | 5 of 22
2005). Party youth wings can be dened as “political organizations led by young people
and open to membership of young people within a limited age range, in order for political
parties to establish a connection with young people” (de Roon, 2020, p. 630). These groups
are important political socialization agents, playing a pedagogical and educational role for
youth and serving as a recruitment and rejuvenation function for the political party sphere
(Hooghe et al., 2004). Youth wings can assume a fundamental role in mobilizing youth for
political participation, and there is much potential to be explored in this area (Pickard, 2019).
In Portugal, although the contribution of youth party organizations to the rela-
tionship between youth and politics is practically unexplored (Silva & Costa, 2022),
the value of these organizations is recognized. In the words of Cruz (1990):
Party youth organizations are the main instruments for mobilizing and channe-
ling youth political participation. If they do not absorb all the existence and demand for
youth intervention in political life, they at least occupy that political space in a very ex-
tensive way, constituting the great visible expression of formal and organized participa-
tion. (p. 248) (Authors’ translation)
More recently, Malafaia et al. (2018) concluded that party youth wings in Portugal
offer quality political experiences, being “especially useful” in connecting young people
to formal politics, an “urgent and challenging task” (p. 52). Regardless, the authors recall
that these structures have been subjected to harsh criticism and viewed with some preju-
dice. Young people seem to be youth wings’ harshest critics, considering them obsolete
and identifying factors such as an excessive orientation toward careerism, dependen-
ce on the parent party, limited available information, and hindrance to the actual inte-
gration of young people into politics (Coutinho, 2023; Cunha, 2024; Matos et al., 2023).
Regarding their digital performances, the evidence is not more encouraging.
Internationally, party youth wings’ social media campaigns have been described as “un-
coordinated and unable to communicate efciently with different audiences” (Pickard,
2019, p. 224). Also, in the Portuguese context, despite youth wings considering political
communication through social media essential (Silva & Costa, 2022), their inadequacy to
young people has been noted, similar to parties’ (Costa et al., 2022; Machado et al., 2023).
To better understand this scenario, it is necessary to bring party youth wings into
the conversation, understanding the purposes that guide their activity on social me-
dia and the opportunities and challenges they face. In this regard, we formulate the
following questions:
RQ1: What are the main objectives of party youth wings’ communication throu-
gh social media?
RQ2: What opportunities and challenges do party youth wings’ members identify
in engaging young people through social media?
5. Method and data
To address the research questions, we adopted a qualitative method based on
semi-structured interviews with representatives of youth wings of political parties,
6 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
whom we consider experts. Experts are individuals who possess a specic type of
knowledge that, while not necessarily exclusive, is not readily available to everyone;
they are active participants who have acquired this specic knowledge through their
professional or voluntary involvement (Meuser & Nagel, 2009).
In recent research, interviews with members of party youth wings have been
considered elite interviews (Silva & Costa, 2022). However, we align ourselves with
authors who argue that the position of an expert is not necessarily accompanied by
the power and status characteristic of elite interviews (Audenhove & Donders, 2019).
Additionally, with this distinction in mind, we did not necessarily seek to interview the
top hierarchy of the youth wings, allowing them the freedom to indicate the most sui-
table representative to speak on the topic under study.
Regarding sampling, we employed the purposive technique, where each indivi-
dual is selected with a specic intention, usually due to their unique position in re-
lation to the phenomenon (Babbie, 2020). In this case, the selection criterion was
membership in party youth wings or informal youth groups within parties with (1)
parliamentary representation in the last ve years and (2) presence on social me-
dia. Seven youth political organizations met these criteria: within the realm of formal
party youth wings, the Portuguese Communist Youth (Portuguese Communist Party
/ Partido Comunista Português / PCP), the People’s Youth (People’s Party / Centro
Democrático Social – Partido Popular / CDS-PP), the Socialist Youth (Socialist Party
/ Partido Socialista / PS), and the Social Democratic Youth (Social Democratic Party
/ Partido Social Democrata / PSD); and within informal youth groups of parties, the
Bloc Youth (Left Bloc / Bloco de Esquerda / BE), the Liberal Youth (Liberal Initiative
/ Iniciativa Liberal / IL), and the Enough Youth (Enough / Chega / CH). Interview re-
quests were sent via email to each of these youth wings and youth groups, except
for Enough Youth, for which we had to resort to the party’s general address in the ab-
sence of a specic one for the youth wing.
As explained above, all interviewees were suggested by their respective party
youth organization as the most suitable spokespeople, except for the interviewee
from Enough Youth. After not receiving any response from the party, we were able to
reach an Enough member from the Vila Nova de Gaia committee, who recommen-
ded a youth member. Since not including the perspective of Enough Youth in this
research would impoverish the quality of the data, we proceeded with the interview.
However, as the party’s youth structure did not ofcially nominate the interviewee,
we caution that greater care should be taken when interpreting the participant’s
views as representative of his organization. The interviews took place via video call
between February 13 and May 24, 2023. The role of video conferencing tools in qua-
litative research has been growing due to their accessible, convenient, time-saving,
and sustainable character (Gray et al., 2020). It is also a particularly adequate tech-
nique for young people, who are generally comfortable with these new technologies.
Considering the expert status of the interviewees, anonymity and condentia-
lity were not assured. The collection, analysis, and publication of data thus depen-
ded on the interviewees’ formal and written authorization to use their personal data
via informed consent. The research plan was validated by the Ethics Committee
of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Porto (opinion no. 18/
CEFLUP/2022).
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Since we aimed to acquire specialized and interpretative knowledge from the inter-
views, the script was shared in advance with the interviewees, allowing them to reect
on the themes. Given the non-anonymous character of the interviews, we considered
it to be the most ethical approach. The script begins with warm-up questions about
party youth wings and youth political participation more generally, gradually moving
toward the topic of political communication on social media. Table 1 presents the
sample characterization. The diversity of ages, backgrounds, and birthplaces adds
to the richness of the data collected.
Table 1
Sample characterization
Party Youth wing Name Area of study Age* Birthplace
BE Bloc Youth Beatriz Vieira Education / Commu-
nication 25 Porto
CH Enough Youth Francisco
Pereira Araújo International Relations 19 Vila Nova de Gaia
IL Liberal Youth Pedro Pereira Medicine 26 Viseu
CDS-
PP People’s Youth Francisco
Camacho Law / Management 30 Lisbon
PCP
Portuguese
Communist
Youth
Francisco Jesus Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering 24 Vila Nova de Gaia
PSD Social Demo-
cratic Youth Alexandre Poço Communication /
Management 30 Lisbon
PS Socialist Youth
Francisco
Themudo de
Oliveira
Political science 29 Lisbon
Note*. Participants’ age at the time of the interview.
Interviews were transcribed and analyzed using NVivo, a software for qualita-
tive data analysis. The data analysis involved inductive coding of the data, aiming
for proximity to social reality, and using two sequential and complementary ap-
proaches: the In Vivo method and the focused coding method. In Vivo coding relies
on using the interviewees’ own language as codes, and it is particularly helpful in
studies aiming to honor and prioritize the voices of marginalized groups, such as
young people (Saldaña, 2021). Thus, in this rst step, we analyzed the interviewees’
answers as a whole and coded the words and expressions that stood out, using
quotation marks. Then, through focused coding, we analyzed the existing list of
codes to identify thematic similarities and to nd and develop the most prominent
categories or themes (Saldaña, 2021) in a process similar to a thematic analysis.
The dimensions that emerged are presented in Figure 1, and are further explored
in the results section.
8 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
Figure 1
Objectives, opportunities and challenges of party youth wings’ political communication on social media
6. Results
The results are presented in three sections: (1) objectives, (2) opportunities, and
(3) challenges. To maximize the voices of young people – in a social context where
they are seldom heard (Ferreira, 2017) – we heavily rely on direct quotations.
6.1 Objectives
Firstly, interviewees were asked about the main objectives of their respective youth
wing activity on social media. Mobilization (both electoral and party-related) and, above
all, the dissemination of information emerged as the primary functions of digital chan-
nels. On the contrary, interaction is not pointed out as a goal by any of the youth wings.
6.1.1. Mobilization
Most of the interviewees identied mobilization as a goal. This mobilization can
occur at two levels: on the one hand, in terms of voter turnout, and on the other hand,
in terms of party membership.
ARTIGOS | 9 of 22
Pedro Pereira (Liberal Youth) points out both types of mobilization as objectives.
The other interviewees are more clearly divided between mobilizing for participation
and mobilization for membership. On the left of the political spectrum, Beatriz Vieira
(Bloc Youth) and Francisco Jesus (Portuguese Communist Youth) agree on social
media’s mobilizing power for participation. Beatriz explains that the Bloc Youth tries
to reach young people without a political connection and convince them to vote, whi-
le Francisco refers to the mobilization for unconventional participation: “a kid from
one school sees that another school was closed because of the bar, he thinks ‘wow,
maybe we can do the same thing here’”.
On the right, the potential to attract members is identied more clearly. Alexandre Poço
(Social Democratic Youth) has no doubts that social media platforms are a “great gate-
way” for young people to join the youth wing, and Francisco Camacho (People’s Youth)
also sees these platforms as a way to transmit a certain message and recruit members.
6.1.2 Information
Despite the importance of mobilization, most participants identify information
dissemination as the main communication objective. The types of information are
varied and include details about youth wings and their events, political messages and
positions, and historical context about signicant dates. Nevertheless, even when
adopting a 1.0 communication approach, the interviewees remain concerned about
factors such as reach and virality. Francisco Themudo de Oliveira, for example, ex-
plains that the Socialist Youth’s nuclear goal is to “be viral while informing”, which is
difcult because “going viral involves a bit of bait and we don’t want to bait, we want
to be serious, but we also want to be seen”.
6.1.3 Interaction
Notably, the promotion of interaction and political expression is not mentioned
as an objective by any of the interviewees. All the young people admit that the orga-
nizations they belong to practice predominantly unidirectional communication, but
the reasons differ.
For a few youth wings’ representatives, this is not a strategy. Pedro Pereira (Liberal
Youth) explains that the number of comments in posts is usually very low, which makes
no room for dialogue. Additionally, Francisco Pereira Araújo considers that Enough
Youth’s unidirectional communication is due, to some extent, to the absence of so-
meone professional and paid to be fully dedicated to the communication department.
However, most interviewees believe that social media is not an appropriate place
for bidirectional communication in the political sphere. For the Socialist Youth, in di-
rect contrast to the Liberal Youth, it is strategic. Francisco Themudo de Oliveira ack-
nowledges that, although bidirectional communication is a recommended practice,
“given the political situation and the way the internet works” – in which “the comment
sections are much more directed at hateful comments, in general, than at positive
and constructive comments” – the Socialist Youth chooses not to engage. The young
10 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
socialist concludes that “it is not ideal because it is not elevated politics”. Alexandre
Poço also describes the Social Democratic Youth’s comment sections as a battle-
ground, in which “some defend and others attack”. He further explains that reactions
to their posts are almost always bifold: while the party’s supporters approve and ap-
plaud their initiatives, their political opponents criticize them.
Beatriz Vieira and Francisco Jesus share this perspective. Beatriz Vieira considers
that “social media is not the best place for debates”, which the Bloc Youth prefers to have
elsewhere. However, the Left Bloc member admits that this lack of dialogue can bring
mobilization difculties since, in her opinion, it is complex to convert and engage with
people without listening to them. Along the same lines, when asked about the fact that
the Portuguese Communist Youth has the comments section disabled on Instagram,
Francisco Jesus argues that the social media political discussions are “very fruitless”
and that “ends up being just people rambling and talking about things that don’t matter”.
6.2 Opportunities
The interviews allowed us to identify four main youth engagement opportunities
social media provides: direct communication, reach, exibility, and feedback.
6.2.1. Direct communication
The rst opportunity is the fact that social media networks are “immediate con-
tact channels with the new generations” (Francisco Camacho, People’s Youth) and
constitute the primary way party youth wings can communicate with young people,
replacing the traditional rallies or pamphlets (Pedro Pereira, Liberal Youth). Francisco
Themudo de Oliveira (Socialist Youth) describes the centripetal power of social me-
dia as a means of communication:
Social media networks already have total power over our public space and public
debate. The press still maintains some preponderance, but I think it’s cultural because
people consume even the press on social media. Morning radio programs are among
the most viral videos on Instagram, the most viewed reels on Instagram. Where peo-
ple read the news is on Facebook. In other words, social media is the center of public
space, meaning the mobilization power is total. (F.T. Oliveira, interview, April 18, 2023)
The Portuguese Communist Youth spokesperson agrees. Francisco Jesus argues
that social media networks facilitate contact and help overcome the “bit of shame”
that young people may feel, for example, in the party afliation process.
6.2.2. Reach
The majority of the interviewees mentioned reach as an advantage. Alexandre Poço
states that social media networks constitute 90% of the reach of Social Democratic
ARTIGOS | 11 of 22
Youth. Pedro Pereira explains that the electorate of Liberal Initiative is “younger, more
educated, more urban, virtually all of them will be on social media”, which means that,
theoretically, they can reach their whole target audience. “The reach capacity is innite”,
concludes the representative of the Liberal Youth. Francisco Themudo de Oliveira also
emphasizes the importance of reach, suggesting that the inuence of Socialist Youth
is directly linked to how widely their content is disseminated. Lastly, Francisco Jesus
(Portuguese Communist Youth) lists as an opportunity the ability to connect to a broa-
der audience, describing the “massication” nature of social media, although he points
out that it is not “the same level of conversation” nor has “the same level of impact”.
Beatriz Vieira presents a slightly different view from the other interviewees, more
focused onwhothan on how many. The Bloc Youth spokesperson argues that in a cen-
tralized country like Portugal – very focused on urban centers like Lisbon and Porto –,
social media networks can “bring people from the interior closer”. However, the Left Bloc
member acknowledges that the decrease in these inequalities was more evident during
the Covid-19 pandemic, when digital communication was the only available channel.
6.2.3. Flexibility
A third opportunity is exibility. Social media offers many opportunities to be bol-
der and take a chance: “if it goes wrong, it can go viral for the worst reasons, but if it
goes well, it can also have a huge echo for the best reasons” (Francisco Camacho,
Popular Youth). This exibility also translates into a more moldable communication,
according to Pedro Pereira from the Liberal Youth:
We can react very quickly on a social media network to a certain theme, to a
certain urgent reality than we can with parliamentary activity. And so the mode of com-
munication on social media networks becomes important not only in terms of reach but
also in the ability to react, to correct. (P. Pereira, interview, February 27, 2023)
6.2.4. Feedback
Finally, two interviewees mention – albeit in different ways – the opportunity to lis-
ten. Francisco Jesus explains that the activity of the Portuguese Communist Youth on
social media also involves giving visibility to organized youth movements that do not nd
space in the traditional media. Pedro Pereira highlights the advantage of having positi-
ve or negative “automatic feedback” on the Liberal Initiative’s ideas, which he considers
very benecial. The young liberal also displays a strategic communication perspective,
emphasizing the opportunity to analyze metrics and assess the content’s effectiveness.
6.3. Challenges
Regardless of ideological orientation, party youth wings face similar challenges
while trying to engage young people on social media: resources, algorithm, audience
12 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
fragmentation, selection effects, simplication of the complex, and the irreplaceabi-
lity of face-to-face contact.
6.3.1. Resources
A challenge identied by most interviewees, regardless of the size of the party they
represent, is related to resources. It is almost consensual that quality digital commu-
nication depends on material, nancial, and human resources.
“We know that we don’t have all the resources in the world”, says Beatriz Vieira,
acknowledging the limited resources for audiovisual productions on social media. The
Bloc Youth representative explains that communication depends on the limited time
of militants, who often accumulate other jobs. Similarly, Francisco Jesus (Portuguese
Communist Youth) identies the lack of resources and the difculty in achieving a hi-
gher production level. In Beatriz Vieira’s (Bloc Youth) words, “sometimes, membership
in small parties is done like this, everyone helps in the areas they can”.
This perspective is corroborated by Francisco Pereira Araújo from Enough Youth,
who considers that this is a challenge felt by all youth wings:
Sometimes we think – those inside the Youth – ‘communication could be di-
fferent’ or ‘communication could do this or that’, but it is true that when there is no
paid work, things become effectively more complicated in terms of availability, and
we always have that perception. Parties are positions that are paid. The Youths are
not. (F. P. Araújo, interview, April 24, 2023)
Although the Social Democratic Youth representative (Alexandre Poço) does not
mention resource-related difculties, Francisco Themudo de Oliveira notes that even
in the Socialist Youth – the incumbent party’s youth wing at the time of the interview
– material and production obstacles are always “great challenges”.
Pedro Pereira identies a correlation between resources and communication
quality, considering that the Liberal Initiative’s growth – also nancially – empowe-
red them to act. However, it is worth noting that even in the Liberal Youth, the strong
dependency on the militants’ voluntary work is evident.
6.3.2 Algorithm
The algorithm is a challenge for the youth wings of parties closer to ideological
extremes. Both the Enough Youth and the Portuguese Communist Youth representa-
tives report difculties with the posts’ reach on social media. Francisco Pereira Araújo
mentions the possibility that certain social media platforms are “a bit more hostile”
to the Enough party’s ideals, although he considers this trend has been decreasing.
More signicantly, he points out that the main obstacle is the party’s image as the
“black sheep”. In his opinion, some people have positive perceptions of Enough but
do not follow the party on social media because “they do not want to be associated”,
which negatively impacts the algorithm.
ARTIGOS | 13 of 22
Francisco Jesus also reports difculties with the moderating role of social media,
claiming that the Portuguese Communist Party’s symbols lead to “shadow ban or to
articially boycott the reach” of their posts. He also disputes the comparison between
ideological extremes and the idea that “a hammer and a sickle are equal to a swastika”.
6.3.3. Audience fragmentation
The third challenge is handling fragmented audiences. Alexandre Poço explains the
two main types of communication practiced by Social Democratic Youth on social media:
I think there are two types of communication that party youth wings do a lot,
and the Social Democratic Youth as well. It is communication for the masses, to try
to go beyond the connes of our natural space, our militants, our sympathizers, where
we can generate more reach. And then there is the communication, I would say, that
is for the tifosi, communication for those who are already in the cause. (A. Poço, inter-
view, March 6, 2023)
Describing the current proportion as 50-50, the social democrat explains that – al-
though, ideally, the communication for the masses would be dominant – it is crucial
to maintain a more internal communication for the “support base”.
According to its spokesperson, the Socialist Youth also seeks to balance the
two types of communication “with a little magic dust”. On the one hand, Francisco
Themudo de Oliveira considers that the former communication model used by the
Socialist Youth – heavily based on the promotion and coverage of events – had “lit-
tle interest for the average Portuguese citizen”. On the other hand, he argues that it is
“important to communicate to those who make the day-to-day of an institution”, even
if it delays the algorithm. Also, in Enough Youth, it is possible to identify the two types
of content – “toward the inside”, especially in the case of events, and for “an electoral
right-wing audience” when it comes to information sharing – but this coordination is
not pointed out as a difculty by Francisco Pereira Araújo.
In addition to content, the tension associated with communicating with different au-
diences can exist at the level of form or, in other words, language. Francisco Camacho
suggests that politicians often use a language that is not accessible to many citizens.
Comparing formal language to a “crutch” and arguing that “a good speech has to be a
simple speech”, the People’s Youth spokesperson acknowledges he tried to simplify
his approach and presentation over time. Beatriz Vieira recognizes that in Bloc Youth,
although they try to adapt their communication to a younger audience, the language
ends up being “quite technical”, “very specic”, and “more for the converted”. The Left
Bloc representative reects that, sometimes, “it’s difcult to get out of our bubble”.
6.3.4. Selection effects
The fourth challenge of political communication on social media is precisely the
“bubble”, a concept recurrently by interviewees while describing selection effects.
14 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
“It’s the bubble that participates. The bubble participates both online and ofine”,
summarizes Alexandre Poço (Social Democratic Youth), who has no doubt that the
“overwhelming majority” of those who use social media networks politically are “the
convinced, the converted, and the afliated.” Francisco Themudo de Oliveira agrees,
stating that the Socialist Youth cannot convince those uninterested in politics to go
to the ballots through social media.
Francisco Camacho also identies a bubble context. On one hand, those who
follow the People’s Youth page are users with a previous level of interest. On the other
hand, even when they try to appeal to the participation and militancy of new young
individuals, it is in contexts where youth with a previous level of interest tends to con-
centrate (e.g., Youth Parliament).
“It’s very easy to make that connection”, says Pedro Pereira (Liberal Youth), explai-
ning that those who use social media networks for political activities are “mostly those
who already have a political persona”. Beatriz Vieira (Bloc Youth) agrees that the young
people who consume Bloc Youth’s content on social media are either sympathizers or
at least have some political interest. “Even those who go there to insult”, she laughs.
6.3.5 Simplification of the complex
The fth challenge is what Francisco Themudo de Oliveira (Socialist Youth) jokingly
calls “the million-euro answer”. It is the balance between simplicity and complexity: “it’s
difcult to convert very complex issues that require a lot of analysis and study into small
pieces”, explains Francisco Jesus. Referring to José Saramago’s idea that people will start
roaring instead of speaking, the Portuguese Communist Party representative reprobates the
need to condense, for example, on Twitter (X), “highly complex issues into 280 characters.”
The Bloc Youth also feels this challenge. Beatriz Vieira believes that social media
networks like Twitter (X), whose principle is “be simple, go straight to the point”, are so-
mewhat incompatible with ideology. The problem is that, paradoxically, being simple is
complicated, as explained by the representative of the Popular Youth, Francisco Camacho:
Having simple language is difcult, it takes a lot of work. There are topics that
are not so simple, even for us who may have a more structured thinking on certain mat-
ters, are difcult for us to explain, so simplifying the complicated is a complex domain,
it’s a domain that requires effort. (F. Camacho, interview, May 24, 2023)
Although he considers this balance to be the “golden key” and a complex task,
Francisco Themudo de Oliveira acknowledges that it is becoming easier as the
Socialist Youth learns “the rules of the game” and perfects “the formula”.
6.3.6. Irreplaceability of face-to-face contact
The nal challenge of digital political communication is the importance of face-
-to-face contact, which digital channels cannot replace. In the words of Beatriz Vieira
from the Bloc Youth:
ARTIGOS | 15 of 22
How can I put it? I think some parties are more about Twitter and they thrive
there. But I think we, despite having a presence and, as our motion stated, living in a
very digital world, and obviously we have to be a part of it, but our place is the streets.
It always has been. (B. Vieira, interview, February 14, 2023)
One of the “Twitter parties” is the Liberal Initiative, alluding to the party’s suc-
cess on social media, acknowledged by most interviewees. Interestingly, even the
spokesperson of Liberal Youth (Pedro Pereira) agrees with the superiority of face-
-to-face contact, which “is and will always be the most important way to engage in
political participation”.
In the same vein, Francisco Jesus (Portuguese Communist Youth) considers that
the fact that social media is not as effective at mobilizing people as personal contact
is related to their individualistic-oriented structure:
I am not trying to demonize social media, mind you, they have their purpose –
but they end up being a symptom of a much larger thing, which is a society very orien-
ted toward the atomization of the individual. In other words, even Margaret Thatcher
said this – I totally disagree with this lady, mind you (laughs) – but what she says is
very symptomatic of the thinking that exists today, which is ‘there is no society, there
is only a series of individuals.’ And I think social media, in the way they are constructed,
often triggers this kind of thinking. And that makes political participation not so strong.
(F. Jesus, interview, March 7, 2023)
7. Discussion and conclusion
This study aims to gain more knowledge about party youth wings’ political communi-
cation on social media, by identifying its main objectives, opportunities, and challenges.
Information is identied as the primary objective of activity on social media. On
the one hand, this purpose aligns with the fact that, in Portugal, social media is a cen-
tral source of information for young people (Newman et al., 2023), including political
information (Costa, 2022). On the other hand, the assumed predominance of infor-
mation dissemination (unidirectional) over dialogue (bidirectional) corroborates the
use of Web 2.0 platforms with a 1.0 approach, previously identied in political com-
munication by Portuguese parties and youth wings (García-Orosa, 2022; Machado
et al., 2023; Santos & Bicho, 2016; Serra-Silva et al., 2018).
Although considering social media as an essential tool for direct contact with
young people, allowing widespread communication, exibility, and audience liste-
ning, the interviewees identify challenges that limit communication effectiveness.
Unsurprisingly, some of them are linked to the characteristics of dissonant public
spheres discussed in the literature review.
Firstly, in line with previous research, both international (Pickard, 2019) and na-
tional (Malafaia et al., 2018; Silva & Costa, 2022), we nd underinvestment by parent
parties reected in limited nancial resources, and heavy reliance on volunteers’ work.
The diverse areas of study of the interviewees hint that even the most involved mem-
bers in the youth organizations’ communication often maintain a “real-world job”.
16 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
Communicating with fragmented audiences is a further challenge, as reported by
Pickard (2019). The frequent need to include an inward-looking approach – also to
reward the members’ volunteer work – reects a somewhat “preaching to the con-
verted” logic (Norris, 2003). Unfortunately, this does not help alleviate the perception
of elitism associated with Portuguese youth political structures recently identied
by Matos et al. (2023).
Furthermore, despite not being explicitly verbalized by the interviewees, assem-
bling the puzzle reveals a certain level of incompatibility between politics and social
media: highly polarized spaces marked by high levels of incivility and dissonance
(Goyanes et al., 2021) resulting in unfruitful political debates (Goyanes et al., 2023);
platforms that require excessive simplication of highly complex issues, posing the
threat of “trivialization and ‘dumbing down’ of political issues” (Penney, 2017, p. 168);
and the ongoing tension between individualization and politicization (Reuter & Frick,
2024), with the individualization logic of social media potentially discouraging more
effective collective action (Maniates, 2001).
If studies keep nding a positive relationship between digital media use and po-
litical participation (Boulianne & Belland, 2022; Boulianne & Theocharis, 2020) des-
pite the challenges described above, it is necessary to understand who uses social
media for political purposes (Matthes, 2022). The interviewees provide the answer:
“the bubble”, that is, young people with prior political interest. What they describe is a
selection effect: as control over media consumption increases, individual media use
motivations become more relevant (Hopmann et al., 2016). This future line of resear-
ch is crucial. If it is already interested and involved youth who politically use social
media, these platforms may increase (rather than decrease) existing participation
gaps (Heiss & Matthes, 2019).
The results of the 2024 Legislative Election in Portugal, showing a decrease in
youth electoral abstention (Cancela & Magalhães, 2024), add new layers of comple-
xity. It is too early to determine if this scenario represents a paradigm shift or an ex-
ception, but it raises many questions. If negativity and populism are rewarded with
user engagement on social media (Klinger et al., 2023), could dissonance act as an
attraction rather than a deterrent for young people? If so, what is the best of two evils?
This theme calls for further research.
On a nal note, we should highlight that – in an era where political parties have big
incentives to adopt populist and sensationalist strategies to gain popularity (Pfetsch,
2023) – it is encouraging to see the next generation of politicians being aware and re-
ective about the dissonant public sphere and the role that political communication
plays in it. However, if party youth wings withdraw from the conversation, the resul-
ting void is likely to be lled by extremist and populist voices, whose appeal grows.
As Coleman (2017) reminds us, paradoxically, in the social media era, “the missing
element of contemporary political democracy is deliberation: the opportunity to sha-
re, compare, argue and resolve views with others” (p. 33). Thus, as difcult as it may
be, party youth wings must not give up on the promotion of political dialogue.
This study has limitations. First, the non-anonymous interviews may increase the
social desirability bias (Fielding & Thomas, 2016). However, the multiple points of con-
vergence found between interviews and recent research increase condence in the
data’s internal and external validity. Also, although we tried to spotlight youth’s ideas,
ARTIGOS | 17 of 22
we are still reporting the views of young people inserted in political elites. Giving voice
to the subjective contexts and realities of young people, especially the most margi-
nalized, remains urgent. With youth audience engagement expected to be an increa-
singly tricky task (Newman et al., 2023), the formula for reaching those who are not
interested is, also for scientic research, the million-euro answer.
Lastly, our research only begins to uncover the political communication of party
youth wings on social media and should not be taken as a comprehensive overview.
Future research avenues about the topic may include (1) the members’ level of pro-
fessionalization regarding digital communication tools; (2) multi-platform studies
on how youth wings leverage the different social media affordances to reach their
communication goals, and (3) the impact of politainment and negativity on young
users’ engagement.
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Acknowledgments
This work is funded by National Funds through the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT),
through a PhD grant (2020.05202.BD), with the support of CITCEM - Transdisciplinary Resear-
ch Centre «Culture, Space and Memory», within the scope of the project UIDB/04059/2020,
DOI 10.54499/UIDB/04059/2020.
Conflict of interest | Conflito de interesses
The authors have no conicts of interest to declare.
Os autores não têm conitos de interesses a declarar.
Biographical notes | Notas biográficas
Sara Machado is a Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University
of Porto. She is a member of the international scientic collaboration networks DigiWorld – Di-
gital Election Campaigning Worldwide and CamforS – Campaigning for Strasbourg.
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8153-7747
Ciência ID: A510-6C2D-9B98
Address: Via Panorâmica, s/n, 4150-564, Porto, Portugal
Vasco Ribeiro is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the Uni-
versity of Porto. He holds a Ph.D. in Communication Sciences. Currently, he combines his aca-
demic career with the position of Chief of Staff of the Mayor of Porto.
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8182-9395
Ciência ID: E816-962F-6FD0
Scopus Author ID:56668458200
Address: Via Panorâmica, s/n, 4150-564, Porto, Portugal
Raquel Meneses is an Associate Professor at the School of Economics and Management
of the University of Porto, where she is the director of the Master in Marketing and chairman of
its Scientic Committee. She holds a Ph.D. in Management.
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5829-9402
Address: Rua Dr Roberto Frias s/n 4200-464 Porto, Portugal
22 | MEDIA&JORNALISMO
How to cite | Como Citar [APA 7ª edition]
Machado, S., Ribeiro, V., & Meneses, R. (2024). “The Million-Euro Answer”: Party Youth Wings’
views on the Opportunities and Challenges of Political Communication on Social Media.
Media & Jornalismo, 24(45), Article e4513. https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-5462_45_13
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
License
Este trabalho está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons - Atribuição-Não Comercial
4.0 Internacional.