The heart can lie: a preliminary investigation of the role of interoception and theory of mind in deception

Abstract

While a large part of the deception literature focuses on lying detection, the factors contributing to one’s ability to lie remain unclear. The present study examined the contribution of Theory of Mind (ToM) and interoception on our ability to lie using a directed lie paradigm with two conditions (“Interrogation” and “Polygraph”), designed to enhance each of the two mechanisms. Given the relatively small sample size (n = 26 × 40 trials), special steps were taken to avoid false positives. Our results suggest that various facets of interoceptive abilities are positively related to the self-rated confidence in one’s own lies, especially when under the belief that bodily signals are being monitored (i.e., in the “Polygraph” condition). Beyond providing evidence for the role of the body in lying and raising interesting questions for deception science, these results carry practical implications for criminology and lie detection protocols.

Full text

Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-024-06890-w
socially malevolent prole known as the Dark Triad (Paul-
hus & Williams, 2002), such as narcissism (Zvi & Elaad,
2018) and psychopathy (Rassin et al., 2023). While often
conceptualized to be immoral and unconscionable, lying is
ubiquitous in everyday life, and being able to lie skillfully
can sometimes facilitate interpersonal relationships, help-
ing us avoid conict or causing emotional harm to others
(Levine & Lupoli, 2022). In fact, recent research shows that
certain forms of deception, such as prosocial lies (i.e., false
statements told to benet others, Levine & Lupoli, 2022),
can increase trust (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015). Moreover,
individuals who told altruistic lies were perceived as more
benevolent than those who were honest (Levine & Sch-
weitzer, 2014).
As deception requires the liar to intentionally manipulate
the beliefs of others (Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Sip et al.,
2012), a signicant line of research has been focused on the
role of theory of mind (ToM) in lying ability. ToM refers
to the ability to infer that others have mental states, such
as beliefs, emotions and intentions, distinct from ourselves
(Baron-Cohen, 1997; Lee & Imuta, 2021; Wellman et al.,
2001). The ability to tell lies, as well as their complexity,
have previously been found to be related to higher ToM
abilities (Evans & Lee, 2011; Talwar et al., 2007, 2017).
However, studies investigating the link between ToM and
Lying - the intentional attempt at instilling a false belief in
others (Sip et al., 2012) - is a prevalent phenomenon car-
rying potentially important consequences. Interestingly,
evidence suggests that the successful detection of a lying
attempt depends more on the ability of the liar, than on the
performance of the lie detector (Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2008;
Levine et al., 2011; Verigin et al., 2019). However, with
most of the deception literature focused on deception detec-
tion (Masip, 2017; Sternglanz et al., 2019; Viji et al., 2022),
the factors contributing to one’s ability to lie remain unclear.
Nevertheless, some ndings suggest a relationship between
the propensity to tell lies, and traits that characterize the
Dominique Makowski
D.Makowski@sussex.ac.uk
1 School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
2 School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore, Singapore
3 Centre for Research and Development in Learning, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
4 Lee Kong Chian School of Medicine, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
5 National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore, Singapore
Abstract
While a large part of the deception literature focuses on lying detection, the factors contributing to one’s ability to lie
remain unclear. The present study examined the contribution of Theory of Mind (ToM) and interoception on our ability
to lie using a directed lie paradigm with two conditions (“Interrogation” and “Polygraph”), designed to enhance each of
the two mechanisms. Given the relatively small sample size (n = 26 × 40 trials), special steps were taken to avoid false
positives. Our results suggest that various facets of interoceptive abilities are positively related to the self-rated condence
in one’s own lies, especially when under the belief that bodily signals are being monitored (i.e., in the “Polygraph” condi-
tion). Beyond providing evidence for the role of the body in lying and raising interesting questions for deception science,
these results carry practical implications for criminology and lie detection protocols.
Keywords Deception · Interoception · Theory of Mind · Polygraph · Lying Ability
Accepted: 16 October 2024 / Published online: 13 November 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
The heart can lie: a preliminary investigation of the role of
interoception and theory of mind in deception
DominiqueMakowski1· Zen J.Lau2· TamPham2· An ShuTe2· StephanieKirk2· ClaudiaLiauw2·
S. H. AnnabelChen2,3,4,5
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
deception have predominantly been focused on children
and neuroatypical individuals (Beaudoin et al., 2020; Bora
& Yener, 2017; Roheger et al., 2022), and its importance in
healthy adults remains to be claried.
Besides paying attention to the person we lie to, gaug-
ing whether they believe us, some attention is also directed
inwards: monitoring our own body and its reactions (e.g.,
cardiac activity and its related changes such as blushing),
which could be used as cues to infer our real intent. This
begs the question of the potential role of interoceptive abili-
ties in deception ability. Broadly dened as one’s sensitivity
to their own internal signals and bodily states (Chen et al.,
2021; Murphy et al., 2019; Weiss et al., 2014), Garnkel
et al., (2015) conceptualize interoception as a three-dimen-
sional construct comprising three distinct facets, namely,
interoceptive accuracy - the objective ability to monitor
internal bodily signals; interoceptive sensibility - the sub-
jective condence in one’s interoceptive accuracy; and
interoceptive awareness - the metacognitive ability to cor-
rectly evaluate one’s interoceptive ability. Interoception has
increasingly been tied to subjective perceptual experiences
(Connell et al., 2018; Seth et al., 2012), as well as individual
dierences in executive functions, emotional processing,
and decision-making (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Murphy et
al., 2019; Petzschner et al., 2021).
Although few studies exist that investigate the relation-
ship between interoception and deceptive ability per se,
previous decision-making studies have demonstrated a
negative correlation between interoceptive awareness and
one’s likelihood to make risky decisions (Dunn et al., 2010;
Furman et al., 2013). This is in line with the somatic marker
hypothesis, which posits that an accurate evaluation of one’s
bodily signals facilitates the use of such interoceptive feed-
back to guide rational decision making (Damasio, 1996).
Indeed, Sugawara et al. (2020) further reported that individ-
uals who received interoceptive training were more likely
to show higher interoceptive accuracy and make reasoned
decisions. Given that deciding to lie generally involves a
consideration of the potential costs of getting caught, and
hence could also be perceived as risky behavior (Kireev et
al., 2013), interoception could be construed to be negatively
related to lying ability. However, some studies have instead
found heightened interoceptive attention (one’s self-focus
towards internal bodily signals), to predict immoral behav-
iour, such as cheating (Ditto et al., 2006; Lenggenhager et
al., 2013; Williams et al., 2016). Extending these ndings to
social cognition, Vabba et al. (2022) further reports individu-
als with lower interoception told signicantly fewer egoistic
lies when the social reputational stakes were high, whereas
individuals with higher interoception did not exhibit a sig-
nicant dierence in the number of lies told. Given the
scarce research on interoception and deception, more stud-
ies are herein needed to clarify these mixed ndings.
The aim of the present study was to explore the contri-
bution of ToM and interoception abilities on individuals’
deception skills, as indicated by their lying condence,
physiological arousal and response time. To this end, we
designed a directed-lying paradigm with two conditions
diering in the nature of their feedback cues. The Inter-
rogation condition was designed to emphasize (and pref-
erentially mobilize) ToM-related mechanisms, whereas the
Polygraph condition was designed to emphasize interocep-
tive mechanisms. In particular, we expected lying ability
(i.e., higher lie condence, shorter response time and lower
physiological arousal), to be positively predicted by indi-
viduals’ interoceptive abilities in the Polygraph condition,
and by ToM skills in the Interrogation condition. Consistent
with the cognitive load approach outlined in several theories
of deception (such as the Four-Factor Theory (Riggio et al.,
1987) and Activation-Decision-Construction Model (Walc-
zyk et al., 2014), as well as previous ndings which suggest
response time as a reliable cue to deception (Gonzalez-
Billandon et al., 2019; Walczyk et al., 2009), we regarded
shorter response times as a proxy of better lying ability.
Methods
Participants
Thirty university students from Singapore were recruited
through posters, yers, and online social media platforms,
and rewarded with study credits for their time. Four par-
ticipants were excluded as their data was not recorded due
to technical issues. The nal sample consisted of 26 par-
ticipants (Mean age = 20.9, SD = 2.0, range: [18, 25], Sex:
65.4% women, 34.6% men). The heart rate of one partici-
pant and response time of one participant were excluded
from further analysis due to extreme outlying values. To
maximize statistical power, the problematic data from these
two participants were only excluded from analyses involv-
ing those measures; all other data were retained for analyses.
This study was approved by the NTU Institutional
Review Board (NTU-IRB-2020-09-007). All participants
provided their informed consent prior to participation and
were awarded with academic credits upon completion of the
study.
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
Measures
Theory of Mind (ToM)
Two measures of ToM and its related constructs were
administered. The Yoni Task (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-
Peretz, 2007) is a behavioral task which assesses rst and
second-order ToM abilities in both cognitive and aective
domains. Participants were presented with the face of a
character named “Yoni”, surrounded by four colored pic-
tures of objects or faces - one in each corner of the screen.
In total, each participant completed 101 trials − 49 trials
assessing their aective ToM abilities, 37 trials assessing
their cognitive ToM abilities and 15 control trials (physi-
cal TOM). During each trial, participants were given an
instruction (e.g., “Yoni is thinking of …” or “Yoni loves
…”) and a specic cue (e.g., the directions of Yoni’s eye
gaze or Yoni’s facial expressions) which they used to choose
the correct answer among the four options presented. Par-
ticipants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
using the corresponding keys on the given keyboard. In the
control trials (physical TOM), the instruction (e.g., “Yoni is
close to …”) and the cue (e.g., physical distance between
Yoni and the options) required participants to respond based
on Yoni’s physical context. Additionally, the instructions
were changed to assess the rst and second-order abilities
for cognitive and aective TOM. In rst-order TOM tri-
als, participants were instructed to make inferences about
Yoni’s mental state with regards to the objects surrounding
it (e.g., “Yoni is thinking of…” for cognitive ToM trials or
“Yoni likes…” for aective ToM trials). In more complex
second-order TOM trials, participants had to correctly infer
the interaction between Yoni and others’ mental states (e.g.,
“Yoni is thinking of the fruit that … wants” for cognitive
ToM trials or “Yoni likes the fruit that … likes” for aective
ToM trials).
The Basic Empathy Scale (BES, Jollie & Farrington,
2006), a 20-item self-report questionnaire measuring two
dimensions of empathy, namely Cognitive (
α=0.83
)
and Aective (
α=0.82
) using a 5-point Likert scale was
administered. Although ToM and empathy are regarded as
distinct psychological constructs, previous research nd-
ings point to them being closely related (Gallant et al.,
2020; Sebastian et al., 2012). Specically, empathy is often
thought to be an integral component in the aective dimen-
sion of ToM (i.e., the ability to infer what someone else is
feeling) (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).
Interoception
To assess participants’ interoceptive ability, participants
completed a Heartbeat Counting Task (HCT, Schandry,
1981) while having their actual heartbeats recorded. During
the HCT task, participants were instructed to count the num-
ber of heartbeats over 5 trials with varying time intervals
(20s, 25s, 30s, 35s, 40s), the order of which was random-
ized. Interoceptive accuracy was computed from the dier-
ence between the estimated number and the real number of
heart beats. Interoceptive sensibility was estimated as the
average of the condence ratings presented at the end of
each trial. Interoceptive awareness was indexed by the cor-
relation between the objective accuracy and the subjective
condence.
Given its multidimensional nature, the MAIA-2 (Meh-
ling et al., 2012), a 37-item questionnaire using 5-point Lik-
ert scales was also administered. It measures eight distinct
facets of interoception including Noticing (e.g., I notice
when I am uncomfortable in my body;
α=0.70
), Not-Dis-
tracting (e.g., I try to ignore pain;
α=0.87
), Not-Worrying
(e.g., I can stay calm and not worry when I have feelings of
discomfort or pain;
α=0.68
), Attention Regulation (e.g., I
can refocus my attention from thinking to sensing my body;
α=0.85
), Emotional Awareness (e.g., I notice how my
body changes when I am angry;
α=0.75
), Self-Regula-
tion (e.g., I can use my breath to reduce tension;
α=0.62
), Body Listening (e.g., I listen to information from my body
about my emotional state;
α=0.88
), and Trust (e.g., I trust
my body sensations;
α=0.89
).
Deception
Using PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019), we implemented a
directed-lying task in which participants were instructed
to briey answer 80 questions (taken from their previously
taken Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire - AMQ,
Rubin et al., 2003) pertaining to their personal preferences
and subjective experiences, by either lying or telling the truth
(depending on whether they see “lie” or “truth” written on
the screen). Their goal was to make convincing answers, so
that truths would be judged as truths by the receiver, and lies
as lies. The nature of the receiver was dierent depending
on the condition: participants were told that for half of the
trials, they would have to convince another participant who
would be observing them from a separate room (COVID
regulations were used as a justication) via a webcam con-
nection (Interrogation condition). For the remaining tri-
als, participants were tasked to convince a “lie detection
machine” that would be assessing their behaviour through
their physiological signals (Polygraph condition). In real-
ity, there was no real “receiver” and their answers were not
judged externally (the study focused on their subjective rat-
ings and reactions). The two conditions were presented in a
counter-balanced order, and each comprised of 40 trials (20
truth; 20 lies).
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
questionnaire that assesses four dispositional lying dimen-
sions - Ability (
α=0.92
), Frequency (
α=0.66
), Negativ-
ity (
α=0.66
), and Contextuality (
α=0.70
).
Procedure
A within-subjects design was used in the present study,
which is comprised of two sessions, to investigate the roles
interoception and ToM play in lying ability. During session
1, participants answered a brief demographic survey as well
as a questionnaire regarding their personal preferences and
subjective experiences (the AMQ), followed by a series
of psychological scales (i.e., BES, MAIA and Lie scale),
which were randomly displayed.
During session 2, performed about one week later, the
three cognitive-behavioural tasks (i.e., the deception task,
HCT and the Yoni task) were administered to participants
while their physiological signals (ECG, RSP, and EDA)
were being recorded. The physiological recording devices
were set up as follows: ECG was recorded with three elec-
trodes placed according to a modied Lead II conguration
(Takuma et al., 1995), and respiration was measured using a
respiration belt. All signals were recorded at 1000 Hz via the
BioPac MP160 system (BioPac Systems Inc., USA).
For all participants, session 2 began with the deception
task, followed by the Yoni task and the HCT, with the latter
two presented in a randomized order. In the directed-lying
task, items of the AMQ were presented as stimuli, with par-
ticipants’ recorded responses (in session 1) used to establish
the ground truth.
Data analysis
Aware of the low number of participants, we tried to take
every step to (1) maximize power by using all available data
(from individual trials) with appropriate statistical tools and
(2) ensure the robustness of results by cross-validating the
ndings across dierent measures and approaches.
Firstly, a manipulation check was carried out to ensure
that our outcome variables were sensitive to the experi-
mental manipulations, by testing the eect of the question
phrasing (direct vs. indirect) and condition (polygraph vs.
interrogation) on the outcome variables. This analysis was
performed using mixed models with the participants and
questions both entered as random factors. Marginal con-
trasts analysis (denoted by
∆
) was also performed to clar-
ify the dierences between conditions. To allow for a better
quantication of the uncertainty associated with the eects,
as well as to increase the robustness to outliers and artefac-
tual ndings, all statistics were undertaken under the Bayes-
ian framework (Makowski et al., 2019), using informative
The sequence of each trial was the same for both condi-
tions. Participants were rst instructed to respond to a ques-
tion shown on a computer screen by verbally lying or telling
the truth (for half of the trials in each condition, i.e., n = 20).
In addition, as past studies have found associations between
lying behaviour and type of question phrasing (Walczyk &
Cockrell, 2022), each question was phrased either directly
(e.g., “What is your favourite sport?”), or indirectly (e.g.,
“Is your favourite sport Hockey?”) to reduce possible con-
founding eects. Following a short interval (0.7–1.5 s) to
allow time for response preparation, during which “Con-
necting…” was shown on the screen, a social or bio-
feedback cue (for Interrogation and Polygraph conditions
respectively) was displayed for a maximum of 10s or until a
response was given. Specically, participants had to provide
their answers verbally, and pressed the space key to signify
the end of their response. After another short interval (1.5–
2.5 s), during which “Disconnecting…” was presented on
the screen, participants were asked to rate their condence
in how convincing (i.e., likely to get judged as truthful) they
perceived their response to be on a visual analog scale.
In the Interrogation condition, participants had to pro-
vide their answer while receiving social feedback in the
form of a video stream of an examiner, and were informed
that the examiner would be evaluating the truthfulness
of their responses after observing them through the live
video feed. In actuality, the displayed video feed were pre-
recorded video clips of a confederate’s face (staying still
with minimal reactions, and with a medical mask, as the
experiment was run during COVID restrictions), and the
same video-clips were used with all participants. All partici-
pants reported believing that the stream was real and that the
examiner was really there during the debrieng.
In the Polygraph condition, participants had to provide
their answer while receiving bio-feedback in the form of
physiological signals (including cardiac activity - ECG, res-
piration - RSP, and electrodermal activity - EDA), of which
they were informed was live feedback of their own physi-
ological activity. In actuality, we displayed pre-recorded
video clips of a confederate’s physiological signals. All
participants reported believing that their own signals were
shown during the debrieng.
Three outcome variables were recorded for each trial
of the deception task, namely the participants’ condence
ratings that their answers (lies or truths) were convincing,
the response time (RT) between the question onset and the
participant’s key press (indicating the end of their verbal
answer), and the change in heart rate associated with the
response (within a window of 3.5 s).
Finally, on top of the deception task, we also measured
participants’ self-reported tendency to lie in their everyday
life using the Lie Scale (Makowski et al., 2021b), a 16-item
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
leading to slower answers, regardless of whether they were
lies or truths. Given this absence of interaction with the type
of answers in any modality, this factor was not included in
subsequent analysis.
Feature reduction
The three Yoni-task dimensions and the two BES traits were
combined into a unique factor, labelled ToM (explaining
35.76% of variance). It was loaded by the cognitive (0.89),
aective (0.77), physical (0.45) Yoni dimensions, and the
aective (0.41) and cognitive (0.17) facets of the BES.
The eight MAIA dimensions and the three HCT com-
ponents were reduced to 4 factors (explaining 65.17% of
variance). The rst factor, labelled Interoception - Meta
(23.59%), was loaded primarily by Attention Regulation
(0.97), Self-regulation (0.63), Emotional awareness (0.60),
and Noticing (0.49) dimensions of the MAIA and the HCT
condence score (0.40). The second factor, labelled Intero-
ception - Listening (18.54%), was primarily loaded by the
Body Listening (0.92) and Trusting (0.53) MAIA dimen-
sions, and the Awareness (-0.60) and Condence (0.46)
HCT scores. The third factor, labelled Interoception - Focus
(12.07%), was primarily loaded by MAIA Not-Distracting
(0.87), Emotional Awareness (-0.40) and HCT Accuracy
(0.33). The fourth factor, labelled Interoception - Regula-
tion (10.97%), was primarily loaded by MAIA not-worrying
(0.71), HCT Accuracy (0.61) and MAIA Trusting (0.40).
Theory of mind
The higher composite To M score was signi-
cantly associated with a decreased condence in lies
(
β=−0.19,95%CI [−0.36,−0.02] ,pd=98.47%
), spe-
cically in the polygraph condition. Figure 1 illustrates the
interindividual correlates of lying condence. The higher
composite To M score was also associated with slower answers
for lies (
β=0.42,95%CI [0.01,0.83] ,pd=97.67%
), spe-
cically in the polygraph condition. No signicant eect
was found with regards to dispositional lying traits, heart
rate, and RT for truths in both polygraph and interrogation
conditions.
Interoception
The higher Meta interoception score was sig-
nicantly associated with an increased con-
dence in lies, specically in the polygraph
condition (
β=0.20,95%CI [0.03,0.35] ,pd=98.98%
). It was also associated with faster answers for both lies
(
β=−0.54,95%CI [−0.93,−0.15] ,pd=99.67%
) and
truths (
β=−0.29,95%CI [−0.63,0.03] ,pd=96.10%
),
priors centred around 0 (
tConfidence (1,0,1)
,
tRT (1,0,3)
,
tHeartrate(1,0,8)
).
To maximize the signal-to-noise ratio, we performed a
feature reduction on our two groups of predictor variables
(namely, ToM and interoception) using factor analysis over
PCA, as the goal was to extract meaningful and consis-
tent factors, rather than merely maximizing the variance
explained. Then, we modelled the relationship between
these inter-individual composite scores (note that the analy-
sis for all individual variables is nonetheless included in the
analysis report) and the three outcome variables in interac-
tion with the condition (polygraph vs. interrogation). Finally,
we investigated the relationship between the deception scale
traits, and the ToM and interoception scores using Bayesian
correlations. All analyses and data have been made publicly
available. Therefore, in this manuscript, we will focus on
discussing signicant ndings, which - in this context - are
statistically reliable and in our opinion theoretically relevant
results.
The data analysis was carried out using R 4.2 (R Core
Team, 2022), brms (Bürkner, 2017), and the easystats col-
lection of packages (Lüdecke et al., 2019, 2021; Makowski
et al., 2019, 2020), and the physiological signal processing
was done using the default routines available in NeuroKit2
(Makowski et al., 2021a). Note that EDA was not further
analyzed as most participants did not yield any skin conduc-
tance responses - which we believe was partly caused by the
low temperature (with dry air-con air) of the experimental
room.
The analysis was not pre-registered (stemming from an
undergraduate’s nal year project), but the full reproducible
analysis script, statistical results report, and data, are avail-
able at [masked for blinding].
Results
Manipulation check
Compared to truths, lies were rated with less con-
dence (
∆=−1.35,95%CI [−1.46,−1.23] ,pd=100%
), but no signicant dierence between the condi-
tions was found. On the other hand, the RT did not
dier between truths and lies, but was signicantly
slower in the polygraph condition for both conditions
(
∆=0.25,95%CI [0.62,0.41] ,pd=100%
). The heart rate
was signicantly more elevated during lies as compared
to truths (
∆=1.16,95%CI [0.57,1.73] ,pd=100%
), and
during interrogation as compared to the polygraph condi-
tion (
∆=4.84,95%CI [4.23,5.44] ,pd=100%
).
The indirect phrasing of the question only had a signicant
eect on RT (
β=0.36,95%CI [0.21,0.51] ,pd=100%
),
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
(
r=0.50,95%CI [0.04,0.64] ,BF10 =3.48%
). No sig-
nicant association was found with heart rate in both
conditions.
The higher Focus interoception score was signicantly
associated with an increased condence in truths in the
polygraph (
β=0.17,95%CI [−0.01,0.34] ,pd=97.16%
); a consistent pattern, although non-signicant, was
found for condence in truths in the interrogation con-
dition (
β=0.15,95%CI [−0.02,0.32] ,pd=95.76%
). The Focus interoception score was also positively
correlated with the dispositional lying Ability trait
(
r=0.50,95%CI [0.22,0.74] ,BF10 =34.37%
). No sig-
nicant association was found with RT for lies and heart
rate in both conditions.
specically in the polygraph condition. No signicant asso-
ciation was found with regards to dispositional lying traits
and heart rate in both conditions.
The higher Listening interoception score was signicantly
associated with an increased condence in lies, in both the
polygraph (
β=0.43,95%CI [0.27,0.59] ,pd=100%
) and interrogation conditions
(
β=0.16,95%CI [0.01,0.32] ,pd=98.04%
). It
was also associated with faster answers for both lies
(
β=−0.42,95%CI [−0.82,−0.03] ,pd=98.19%
) and
truths (
β=−0.36,95%CI [−0.76,0.03] ,pd=96.49%
), specically in the polygraph condition. The Lis-
tening interoception score was also positively corre-
lated with the dispositional lying Contextuality trait
Fig. 1 Interindividual corrrelates
of lying condence. The lines
shows the relationship (with 95%
CI), assessed via Bayesian mixed
models (*pd > 97%, **pd > 99%,
***pd > 99.9%), between the par-
ticipants’ interoceptive and ToM
composite scores and the con-
dence ratings of their responses.
Average lying condence (+/- 1
SD) for each participant within
the two experimental conditions
is displayed as points for descrip-
tive purposes as the models were
ran on individual trials
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
interoception and ToM (Chiou & Lee, 2013; Gendolla &
Wicklund, 2009; Scadi Abbate et al., 2016; Wundrack &
Specht, 2023), our results suggest the two are negatively
linked. One possible interpretation of our ndings is that
people with stronger ToM abilities by default rely more on
their social skills and altercentric inference when lying (i.e.,
they focus on - and try to read - the other person). When
that mechanism is unavailable or unsuited (e.g., when there
is no person to lie to - but a “machine” in our case), their
corresponding lying ability decreases. However, in light of
the current eld of mixed ndings relating interoception and
ToM (Canino et al., 2022; Gao et al., 2019; Miller, 2015;
Shah et al., 2017), future studies are necessary to investi-
gate the interaction of these mechanisms in dierent social
contexts.
We also found that interoceptive abilities (as indicated
by the composite interoception scores) are correlated with
a higher condence in one’s lies in the polygraph condi-
tion, a condition in which the attention towards internal
reactions is fostered. Indeed, this is in line with previous
studies that found individuals with low interoception were
more averse to risk when reputational stakes were high, tell-
ing fewer egoistical lies (Vabba et al., 2022). In fact, Vabba
et al. (2022) further reported that people with high intero-
ception abilities were less likely to dier in risk-taking ten-
dencies, telling the same number of lies regardless of the
social stakes. Consistent with our results, Mohr et al. (2023)
found that individuals with high interoceptive accuracy
were more likely to make egocentric decisions. However,
in contrast to previous studies (Füstös et al., 2013; Owens et
al., 2018; Pinna & Edwards, 2020; Pollatos et al., 2007), we
did not nd any signicant relationship between individu-
als’ interoception scores and their heart rate changes during
their answers. This points toward a predominantly meta-
cognitive eect without necessarily an actual bodily regula-
tion (i.e., participants with good interoception feel that their
lies are more convincing, but do not actively attenuate their
bodily reactions).
Another possibility that should be tested in the future is
that of a mediating role of executive functions, given their
association with lying (Abe et al., 2007; e.g., Battista et al.,
2021) and interoception (Molnar-Szakacs & Uddin, 2022).
For instance, neuroscientic ndings investigating the cor-
relates of interoception have underlined the potential role
of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula
(AI) (Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004; Khalsa et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2019), both of which are often thought to be
activated during deception (Abe, 2011; Baumgartner et al.,
2013; Sip et al., 2008), and have been implicated in cogni-
tive processes associated with deception (such as cognitive
control, Molnar-Szakacs & Uddin, 2022; or conict detec-
tion, Kerns et al., 2004). It is thus possible that the positive
The higher Regulation interoception score was signicantly
associated with an increased condence in lies in both the
polygraph (
β=0.32,95%CI [0.14,0.51] ,pd=99.99%
) and the interrogation conditions
(
β=0.18,95%CI [0.00,0.36] ,pd=97.42%
), and with a
decreased condence in truth only in the polygraph condi-
tion (
β=−0.1,95%CI [−0.36,0.01] ,pd=97.16%
). No
signicant association was found with RT and heart rate in
both conditions (Fig. 2).
Discussion
The present study examined the contribution of ToM and
interoception on our ability to lie using a directed lie para-
digm with two conditions (“Interrogation” and “Polygraph”)
designed to enhance each of the two mechanisms. Inter-
estingly, we found that when participants’ responses were
perceived to be evaluated by a person (the interrogation
condition), instead of the lie detection machine (the poly-
graph condition), their response time for both lies and truths
were faster, and their heart rate was elevated. Although the
condition did not impact the subjective condence that par-
ticipants had in their answers, the pattern of results suggests
that believing one’s response is being evaluated by a person,
instead of a machine, could induce more fear, consequently
speeding up the response and increasing the physiological
arousal (Aylward et al., 2017). Alternatively, the slower
response in the polygraph condition could be explained by
the established attentional switching hypothesis, which pos-
its that an increase in attention towards internal signals and
managing one’s emotional reaction would confer less cog-
nitive resources available, thereby resulting in individuals
taking a longer time to respond (Arnold et al., 2019; Hana-
nia & Smith, 2010). While the impacts of external settings
on individuals’ responses warrant further investigation, the
results highlight how physiological responses can be easily
confounded by other factors, independent of whether one
is lying or telling the truth. For instance, the presence or
absence of the “interrogator”, or the saliency of the moral
nature of the task (e.g. Peleg et al., 2019, argues that the
polygraph test alone also acts as a “moral reminder,” fram-
ing the possibility that physiological arousal in a polygraph
context might be partially a reection of individuals’ atten-
tion directed to their own moral standards). By extension,
our study concurs with the controversial discourse sur-
rounding the use of physiological measures in deception
research (Oviatt et al., 2018; Rosky, 2013).
Furthermore, our results suggest that higher ToM abilities
were related to slower and less condent lies, but only in the
polygraph condition. While previous bodies of work have
reported mixed ndings regarding the association between
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
with informative priors), future replication studies with
larger samples are warranted to conrm this rst investiga-
tion. Nonetheless, we believe our results to be credible as
we nd consistent patterns across various facets and mea-
sures (for instance, all interoceptive dimensions, although
distinct, share a similar trend) in line with theoretical
expectations. The statistical power could also explain the
relationship between interoceptive abilities and deception is
at least partially mediated by cognitive control abilities.
Although yielding promising results, the sample size of
this exploratory study is a source of concern. Although we
tried to mitigate it by (1) extracting more robust variables
(by combining multiple ones by means of feature reduction)
and (2) using a suited analysis approach (Bayesian statistics
Fig. 2 Summary of ndings showing the positive (green) and negative
(red) associations between interoception and theory of mind abilities
and deception skills, depending on the experimental condition. It high-
lights that ToM was related to less condent and slower lies in the
polygraph condition, and that specic interoceptive dimensions were
related to more condent lies
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
interoception, could emerge with sucient statistical power
and valid measures.
Finally, there has been some research in the extant lit-
erature linking individual dierences in ToM and intero-
ception, as well as their neurophysiological underpinnings
(Gao et al., 2019; Ondobaka et al., 2017; Shah et al., 2017).
As such, it remains a possibility that the two constructs
interact in inuencing lying ability. However, much of this
research seems focused on emotion processing, which only
constitutes one of the hosts of cognitive processes required
to engage in deceptive behaviour (e.g., Shah et al., 2017).
Furthermore, given the overlaps in the literature surround-
ing ToM and empathy, it remains unclear whether intero-
ception works with ToM or empathy (specically aectivce
empathy) in the processing of emotions. Considering the
current gaps in literature, the present study investigates the
inuence of individual dierences in ToM and interocep-
tion on lying ability separately; this could be a useful rst
approach to delineate potential “main eects” of these pro-
cesses. Nevertheless, future studies (with a dierent design
and a larger sample) could investigate the interaction (and
possible mediation eects) between interoception and ToM
by means of, for instance, structural equation modelling.
In conclusion, this study is a rst step towards assess-
ing the contribution of ToM and interoception abilities in
deception, particularly in one’s ability to lie convincingly.
To this end, we introduced a new paradigm to delineate the
contribution of these mechanisms while remaining relevant
to applied elds of lie detection and criminology (in which
the experimental conditions nd echoing practices). Nota-
bly, our results provide some evidence that interoception
could be an important - and overlooked - process involved
in deception. Furthermore, our ndings extend and oer an
alternate perspective to the debatable use of polygraphs,
suggesting that its utility for lie detection is not only ques-
tionable, but could potentially selectively modulate decep-
tive skills depending on the cognitive and interoceptive
prole of the participant.
Acknowledgements [masked for blinding]
Funding The authors did not receive support from any organization
for the submitted work.
Data availability The material (stimuli generation code, experiment
code, raw data, analysis script with complementary gures and analy-
ses, etc.) for this research is available at [masked for blinding].
Declarations
Conflict of interest The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or nancial relationships that
could be construed as a potential conict of interest.
overall lack of results found in relation to heart rate, which
has a higher signal-to-noise ratio as compared to subjective
reports (such as condence scales). Additionally, one has to
note that the participants did not have strong incentive for
lying (there was no risk of losing the “reward” - i.e., student
credits), which might have further decreased the potential
eect sizes.
Another aspect to note is the strong reliance on self-
reported measures as outcome variables of lie ability (in
particular, the measure of answer condence, but also the
auto-questionnaires). This might conate meta-cognitive
abilities as well as dishonest answers. Although we tried
to include more objective measures, such as RT (although
it too was tied to the participants’ conscious decision to
press a key) and heart rate, future studies should attempt at
measuring objectively the answer (lie or truth) quality, for
instance by means of external examiners. Note that this is
not a limitation per se, as it answers a slightly dierent ques-
tion - what are the correlates of objective lying skills - rather
than of deception self-condence.
Additionally to the limitations pertaining to the measure
of lying ability, some also concern the measure of the pre-
dictor constructs, namely ToM and interoception. While
we tried to include a behavioral task as well as a subjec-
tive questionnaire for each, it has to be underlined that they
are notoriously dicult concepts to measure. In particular,
objective interoceptive accuracy was assessed using the
Heartbeat Counting Task (HCT). While the HCT used to be
considered as a gold standard and remains one of the most
commonly used measures (Desmedt et al., 2022), concerns
regarding its validity have been increasingly highlighted in
several studies as more research eorts are invested into
developing novel interoception tasks (Brener & Ring, 2016;
Desmedt et al., 2018, 2022; Legrand et al., 2022; Plans et
al., 2021; Ponzo et al., 2021). Future works should further
examine the relationship between interoception and lying
ability using measures with better psychometric properties.
Moreover, although the cognitive and aective compo-
nents of ToM and empathy share overlaps in the current
literature, and there is no consensus regarding how the
two concepts should be delineated, recent evidence none-
theless suggests ToM and empathy are necessarily distinct
constructs with separable underlying mechanisms (Kanske
et al., 2015). As such, future studies are warranted to fur-
ther investigate the associations between ToM and lying
ability using validated instruments sensitive to measuring
ToM (such as the Theory of Mind Inventory, Hutchins et
al., 2021). Furthermore, our application of feature reduction
as a noise-elimination measure could have over-simplied
the data. A more complex pattern of relationships, with dif-
ferent contributions of various subdimensions of ToM and
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Current Psychology (2024) 43:34215–34226
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Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
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