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Voting like a human

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Abstract

The work of Vernon Smith and his collaborators that has come to be associated with the label “humanomics” offers both substantive and methodological amendments to economic theory. On the substantive level, humanomics offers a theory of human agency that is distinct from both neoclassical and behavioral economics. On the methodological level, humanomics cautions against blindly importing assumptions useful to economic theorists into the minds of the individuals whose behavior we seek to explain. Substantively, we argue that expressive voting is best understood as what political scientists call identity voting. Most voters do not have underlying policy preferences to which politicians cater. Rather, they have social identities that are constituted by synchronized moral sentiments. We apply both amendments to the public choice theory of voting, synthesizing empirical evidence showing that identity trumps issues. We argue that the public choice attachment to issue voting illustrates some of the methodological pitfalls that Smith identifies.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Public Choice
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01220-x
Voting likeahuman
AdamMartin1 · AdamSwisher1
Received: 13 October 2024 / Accepted: 14 October 2024
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2024
Abstract
The work of Vernon Smith and his collaborators that has come to be associated with the
label “humanomics” offers both substantive and methodological amendments to economic
theory. On the substantive level, humanomics offers a theory of human agency that is
distinct from both neoclassical and behavioral economics. On the methodological level,
humanomics cautions against blindly importing assumptions useful to economic theorists
into the minds of the individuals whose behavior we seek to explain. Substantively, we
argue that expressive voting is best understood as what political scientists call identity
voting. Most voters do not have underlying policy preferences to which politicians cater.
Rather, they have social identities that are constituted by synchronized moral sentiments.
We apply both amendments to the public choice theory of voting, synthesizing empirical
evidence showing that identity trumps issues. We argue that the public choice attachment
to issue voting illustrates some of the methodological pitfalls that Smith identifies.
Keywords Expressive voting· Issue voting· Humanomics· Public choice· D72· B41
JEL Codes D72· B41
1 Humanomics andpublic choice
When one of us (the older and rounder one) was a graduate student, someone at George
Mason University’s Arlington campus put an “I Voted” sticker on the door to Gordon Tull-
ock’s office. While Tullock had not invented the paradox of voting, he was fond of impishly
teasing out its implications. As in so many other domains, he relentlessly and masterfully
applied the economic way of thinking to study voting. And he found the voters wanting.
* Adam Martin
adam.martin@ttu.edu
Adam Swisher
adaswish@ttu.edu
1 Texas Tech University, Lubbock, USA
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
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