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Vietnam’s Bamboo Diplomacy: Between Beijing’s
Persistent Shadow and Growing Western Ties
This commentary was originally published via: https://www.egmontinstitute.be/vietnams-bamboo-diplomacy-
between-beijings-persistent-shadow-and-growing-western-ties/
If one were to look solely at their highly similar government systems and cordial foreign policy
statements, one might assume that China and Vietnam are the closest of allies. The fact that To
Lam, who succeeded long-time paramount leader Nguyen Phu Trong as “National Chairman”
(Chu tich nuoc, “president”) of Vietnam and General Secretary (Tong Bi thu) of the Communist
Party of Vietnam (CPV) following Trong’s passing in June 2024, chose China for his first state
visit, reinforces this perception. Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs further underscored this
by stating that the visit “was successful in all aspects and made important contributions to
promoting the building of a community with a shared future for Vietnam,” seemingly signaling
Hanoi’s full embrace of Beijing’s main foreign policy concept of “community with a shared
future for mankind” (renlei minyun gongtongti, formerly translated as “community of common
destiny for mankind”).
However, during my stay in various parts of Vietnam in September and October, observations
painted a starkly different picture. The centuries of “Northern domination” (Bac thuoc) were
prominently featured in nearly every historical museum in Vietnam, which particularly
highlight the revolts and battles that ended each phase of Chinese rule. Despite their extended
duration and significant influence on the country, the more nuanced (and sometimes objectively
positive) aspects of these periods are generally overlooked in favor for a stark contrast between
harsh Chinese occupation and benevolent Vietnamese governance following each successful
expulsion. Furthermore, as for example shown through this commentary’s cover image, maps
demonstrating Vietnamese sovereignty over the “East Sea” (Bien Dong), generally known in
China and beyond as the “South (China) Sea” (Nan [Zhongguo] Hai), were also a common
feature in public locations.
Popular nationalist sentiment was particularly palpable when speaking with locals about the
contested maritime region. Many Vietnamese expressed frustration over Beijing’s persistent
claim that it has not engaged in warfare since the PRC’s founding in 1949. After all, having
seized several islands from South Vietnam during the final moments of the Vietnam War
(1974–75), Beijing, enjoying tacit approval from Washington (the enemy of my enemy…),
launched a punitive surprise attack in early 1979. This was largely driven by frustration over
the then-deepening Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and primarily aimed at deterring Hanoi from
toppling the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, a close Chinese ally. Although
China failed to save Pol Pot from his downfall, the 1979 war was followed by a decade of
bloody Sino-Vietnamese border clashes which lasted until bilateral ties were finally normalized
in November 1991.
The consequences of this turbulent history were especially evident to me while traversing Ho
Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Prior to multiple anti-Chinese crackdowns following the fall
of Saigon in 1975 and (especially) the 1979 war, Vietnamese of Chinese descent (Nguoi Hoa)
had controlled up to 80 percent of the local economy. This once-dominant economic presence
has now been reduced to a bustling but rather decrepit bazaar district still known to many as the
“Big Market” (Cho Lon), while even contemporary Chinese tourists seemed to prefer the
glittering skyscrapers of District One (Quan Mot).
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The US-Vietnam détente
While Vietnam primarily sought Soviet backing during much of the first period of trouble with
the PRC – Moscow nowadays is still one of Hanoi’s closest friends – it gradually diversified
its diplomatic portfolio after the Doi Moi (literally, “renewal”) economic liberalizations that
started in 1986. Particularly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Vietnam recognized the need to
establish new alliances. It therefore strengthened its ties with other ASEAN members, South
Korea, Japan, as well as most European countries, and, in 1995, even normalized relations with
its former adversary the US. Despite opposition from vocal groups of anti-CPV Vietnamese
diaspora in the US still flying South Vietnam’s flag, relations have since progressed rapidly.
Polls show that in the eyes of most Vietnamese, the US – unlike China – poses no (more) threat
to their country’s sovereignty. Under the above historical context and escalating Sino-
Vietnamese tensions surrounding the South/East Sea, it also comes to little surprise that nearly
80 percent of Vietnamese nowadays favor alignment with the US over China. Especially
emblematic in this regard was the port call of the USS Ronald Reagan to Da Nang in June 2023
and Vietnam’s foreign ministry’s open invitation for further US engagement in the country’s
eastern waters: “Strong bilateral ties between the US and Vietnam are key for Washington if it
wants to remain the dominant power in the region.” In this light, To Lam’s visit to the US
shortly after his maiden trip to China appears a logical move.
Bamboo Diplomacy: Opportunities for the EU
This pragmatic geopolitical balancing act was formalized by To Lam’s predecessor, Nguyen
Phu Trong, during the 2010s, and later became known as “Bamboo Diplomacy” (Ngoai giao
cay tre). The term originated in a 2016 speech by Trong referencing the CPV’s founder, Ho Chi
Minh, who described the Vietnamese people as having bamboo-like qualities: “flexible yet
resilient, compassionate yet strong-willed, adaptable yet principled, understanding the times
and circumstances, knowing oneself and others.” The message was clear: Alike bamboo,
Vietnam should glide along with changing ‘winds’ and adapt pragmatically to shifting regional
and international ‘gusts.’ Equally alike bamboo’s resilience, Vietnam should ensure it is never
uprooted and maintain a non-aligned policy, a strategy that was also confirmed in a 2019 white
paper by its ministry of defense. Illustrative of this balancing approach was Vietnam’s signing
of a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US in September 2023, despite
simultaneously maintaining ‘neutrality with Russian sympathies’ regarding the war in Ukraine.
Vietnam also expressed its intention to elevate ties with former colonizer France to similar
levels in October 2024. If realized, France would join the ranks of China, Russia, India, South
Korea, the US, Japan, and Australia, thereby becoming the first member state of the EU to
achieve this level of bilateral relations with the country.
As economic ties between Brussels and Hanoi continue to expand, France, with its long
experience in the country and region, could act as a strategic gateway for Vietnam within the
EU and vice-versa. An EU-Vietnam free trade agreement that seeks to eliminate virtually all
trade barriers by 2030 has already entered force in August 2020 (a simultaneously negotiated
investment protection agreement still awaits the signature of several member states). As of 2023,
Vietnam is the EU’s largest trading partner in goods in ASEAN, with total trade flows
amounting to €64.2 billion. Adjusted for population size, these figures even slightly surpass the
EU’s trade with China, despite the latter’s higher level of economic development. Vietnam also
stands to gain significantly from the EU’s new EV tariffs that will be imposed on some Chinese
companies starting October 31, as its own brands, like VinFast which has partnered with Bosch
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to access European charging infrastructure, seek to enter and expand within the European
market.
Vietnam’s greatest advantage to the EU and its member states is its moderate size. The
Vietnamese market is large enough to absorb a significant portion of potential trade diversion
from China in the wake of the EU’s decision de-risk its economic relations with the country.
Furthermore, while trade tensions similar to present EU-China disputes could certainly emerge
in the future as EU-Vietnam economic ties increase, Vietnam is simply not large enough to ever
be perceived as a “systemic rival” in the same light as its northern neighbor. Additionally,
Vietnam has yet to encounter the demographic challenges faced by its East Asian neighbors,
with its demographic dividend set to continue to support rapid growth until at least the late
2030s. Finally, although Vietnam’s political system remains highly repressive and authoritarian
in a manner not dissimilar from China, unlike Brussels’ gripes with Beijing (i.e., those
concerning Xinjiang and Taiwan), human rights issues or geopolitical conflicts that could
impede deeper relations with Hanoi appear absent.
On the reverse, the fact that Vietnam, while falling short of a call for compliance alike the
Philippines, positively acknowledged the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration which rejects the
legitimacy of the PRC’s maritime claims under its nine-dash line, has presented a geopolitical
opportunity for further alignment. While outright alliances are off the table under Vietnam’s
Bamboo Diplomacy and Hanoi has so far limited its comprehensive strategic partnerships to
nation-states, Brussels seeks to benefit from further deepening its ties with the rapidly
developing country. Pursuing this would be wholly in line with the Union’s foreign policy
bedrock of Principled Pragmatism – an outlook that strongly resonates with Vietnam’s Bamboo
Diplomacy.
Jasper Roctus is an Associate Fellow at Egmont working on domestic Chinese politics and
cross-Strait Relations – and occasionally enjoys taking a detour in Vietnamese politics. He also
pursues a PhD in the “East Asian Culture in Perspective: Identity, Historical Consciousness,
Modernity” research group at Ghent University, where he works on evolutions in narratives
surrounding Sun Yat-sen. His “PhD Fellowship fundamental research” is funded by the
Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).