ArticlePDF Available

Abstract and Figures

Darknet forums dedicated to child sexual abuse material (CSAM) attract thousands of users interacting with each other through online communications. Given finite resources, law enforcement agencies seek ways to effectively prioritise their investigative efforts by identifying key-players that are central to the forum community. For the identification of such users, law enforcement agencies typically rely on the communication network that can be derived from messages posted on the public part of the forum. Many forums, however, also allow for private communications between members, raising the question to what extent relying on only a single mode of communication biases key-player identification. Using data on both public and private communications on two large-scale darknet CSAM forums, two communication networks are derived and their structures analysed. Measures of centrality robustness are applied to ascertain the level of bias introduced when determining key-players on only one of the available networks. Findings show only a minority of members to participate in forum communication, and limited overlap between participants active in public and private communications. Key-players emerging from combining the public and private communications resemble those from the public network only, suggesting that police prioritisation based on public postings only is still ‘on mark’. Members who are central to the private communications network may nevertheless be of special law enforcement interest.
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
ARTICLE
Missing the mark? Identifying child sexual abuse
material forum structure and key-players based on
public replies and private messaging networks
Frederic M. Gnielka 1, Rebecca Reichel 1, Arjan Blokland2, Anton Daser3, Meike de Boer4, Colm Gannon5,
Alexander F. Schmidt 3, Thomas Schäfer 1, Salla Huikuri6, Katarzyna Staciwa 7& Robert J. B. Lehmann1
Darknet forums dedicated to child sexual abuse material (CSAM) attract thousands of users
interacting with each other through online communications. Given nite resources, law
enforcement agencies seek ways to effectively prioritise their investigative efforts by iden-
tifying key-players that are central to the forum community. For the identication of such
users, law enforcement agencies typically rely on the communication network that can be
derived from messages posted on the public part of the forum. Many forums, however, also
allow for private communications between members, raising the question to what extent
relying on only a single mode of communication biases key-player identication. Using data
on both public and private communications on two large-scale darknet CSAM forums, two
communication networks are derived and their structures analysed. Measures of centrality
robustness are applied to ascertain the level of bias introduced when determining key-players
on only one of the available networks. Findings show only a minority of members to parti-
cipate in forum communication, and limited overlap between participants active in public and
private communications. Key-players emerging from combining the public and private
communications resemble those from the public network only, suggesting that police
prioritisation based on public postings only is still on mark. Members who are central to the
private communications network may nevertheless be of special law enforcement interest.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x OPEN
1Medical School Berlin, Berlin, Germany. 2Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement & Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands.
3Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Mainz, Germany. 4Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
5La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. 6Save the Children Finland, Helsinki, Finland. 7Polish Platform for Homeland Security, Poznań, Poland.
email: alexander.schmidt@uni-mainz.de
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COM MUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 1
1234567890():,;
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Introduction
Cloaking users from publicity by random paths of encrypted
servers, the darknet currently hosts hundreds of hidden
services that function as so-called virtual offender con-
vergence settings, i.e. online forums where offenders congregate
to exchange illegal goods and services, share information, and
socialise with like-minded others (Soudijn and Zegers, 2012).
These darknet forums may be dedicated to different crimes like
the trade in controlled substances, rearms, stolen credit card
details, or malicious software (e.g. Goonetilleke et al., 2023; Jiang
et al., 2021; Kigerl, 2022). A sizable subset of these forums orbits
around the exchange of child sexual abuse material (CSAM;
Gannon et al., 2023; IWF, 2023). Unaffected by physical and
geographical constraints, the number of users interacting in these
virtual offender convergence settings can reach thousands, if not
tens of thousands. This greatly challenges the resources available
to law enforcement to combat these types of cyber-enabled crimes
(Europol, 2023), and forces agencies to prioritise and focus their
investigative efforts on those they deem key to the criminal
exchange patterns (e.g. da Cunha et al., 2020).
Identifying key targets for prioritisation by law enforcement.
Following research on ofine criminal groups and, more recently,
Clearnet social media, law enforcement agencies have turned to
social network analysis to help identify key-players as targets for
their investigative efforts (Burcher and Whelan, 2018; Duijn and
Klerks, 2014; for a comprehensive introduction to and overview
of social network analysis, see McLevey et al., 2023). Key-players
are typically dened as those taking up central positions in a
network (Fonhof et al., 2019). Network centrality is seen as an
important proxy for social capital (Ganley and Lampe, 2009) and
is taken to be indicative of the individuals level of activity,
connectedness, inuence, prestige, and popularity in a commu-
nity. In addition, centrality may signal individualsaccess to
information, resources, and criminal opportunities (Morselli,
2010).
In the context of darknet criminal marketplaces, key-players
are typically dened based on their position in the forumspublic
communications network (Huang et al., 2021; Pete et al., 2020).
On darknet forums where illegal goods and services are sold,
bought, or bartered, online exchanges take place between parties
oblivious to each others true identity. In the absence of ofine
ties between forum members, public forum communication is an
important vehicle to establish trust and build a reputation in the
community (Duxbury and Haynie, 2021; Yip et al., 2013). Still,
prior research typically nds that only a small subset of forum
members takes part in public forum communication and that
even among those publicly communicating on the forum the
extent of contributions is heavily skewed, with a small number of
highly communicative members responsible for a dispropor-
tionate share of all public forum communication (e.g. Sun et al.,
2014; Zamani et al., 2019). Prioritising investigative efforts on
key-players appears to have some merit, as centrality based on
public communications in darknet criminal marketplaces has
been linked to risk indicators such as, for example, higher
involvement in discussions of cybercriminal activities and identity
security management (Pete et al., 2020) or vendor success
(Boekhout et al., 2024).
In prior research on key-players in the context of online
CSAM, two streams of research can be distinguished. A number
of studies have focused on darknet CSAM forum websites as their
unit of measurement. These studies have identied structural
properties of darknet CSAM forums and the relationships
between them, e.g. through the number of times different
websites referred to one another, or the amount of CSAM
available on these sites (e.g. Westlake and Bouchard, 2015;
Westlake and Bouchard, 2016; Westlake and Frank, 2017). This
approach might be benecial for prioritising forums for law
enforcement take-downs in an effort to distort the online
infrastructure facilitating the exchange of CSAM. A second
stream of research is focussed on analysing relationship between
users within a particular darknet CSAM forum. Like studies on
darknet criminal marketplaces, these studies identied key forum
members based on their position in the public communications
network (Fonhof et al., 2019; Fortin et al., 2021). This way of
identifying key-players is especially relevant for prioritisation of
investigative efforts aimed at the apprehension and prosecution of
high-risk individuals. Prior research showed that the most central
individuals in the public communication network were found to
provide the CSAM that resulted in the most views by far (da
Cunha et al., 2020). It is this second stream of research that is of
particular relevance to the current study.
Private messaging as an underdeveloped research focus.
Although for reasons of practicality, public forum communica-
tion has been the focus of research on darknet CSAM use so far,
many darknet forums also offer members the possibility to
communicate with other forum members privately. Public forum
communications are visible to the entire forum membership, and
all forum members can contribute to a particular thread. In
contrast, private messaging occurs member-to-member, or in ad
hoc groups of forum members, and is concealed from other
forum members. Typically, only forum administrators have an
overview of all private conversations taking place in the forum
community. Data on private messages is therefore not available in
forum scrapes (as, for example, described by Bergman and Popov
2023), as crawlers are only able to scrape the public part of
darknet forums. The same is true for (covertly operating) law
enforcement ofcers conducting live investigations on active
forums who only have access to the public parts of other mem-
berscommunication (e.g. da Cunha et al., 2020). Only forum
take-downs are sometimes able to secure both public and private
forum communications (e.g. Afroz et al., 2013; Motoyama et al.,
2011; Smirnova et al., 2024). Depending on its volume and
structure, neglecting private communications in determining
individualsnetwork centrality may lead key-player assignment,
and law enforcement prioritisations resulting from this, to be
misjudged. To assess the extent to which key-player assignment is
biased, data on both public and private forum communications
are pivotal to understand the precision of law enforcement target
identication (Smirnova et al., 2024).
More formally, due to the presence of different modes of
communicationi.e. public and private , darknet forum
communications can be constructed within the framework of a
multiplex network (Contractor et al., 2011; Halu et al., 2013;
Magnani and Rossi, 2011); a network in which individuals
(nodes) are connected through multiple types of ties (edges). One
way to think of multiplex networks is to distinguish different
layers, in which each layer represents edges of a different nature
(Magnani et al., 2021). By starting a public thread, forum users
address all other forum users simultaneously, exposing them-
selves to their potential replies and giving up control over the
entailing discussion. Contrarily, private messages are directed at
designated fellow forum users the sender chooses to communicate
with and who are the only ones who will be able to read and reply
to these messages. In other words, as users can send messages
directly to one another and at the same time participate in
discussion groups within a forum, they can be regarded as
embedded in two related online social networks(Halu et al.,
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
2HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
2013, p. 2). While multiplex networks are often used to model
different types of relationships between individuals (e.g. public
gures and friends; Magnani and Rossi, 2011), they have also
successfully been used to represent different modes of commu-
nication, such as private and public communication on online
forums (Halu et al., 2013) or even phone calls and text messages
(Gaito et al., 2017).
Figure 1depicts a (ctitious) darknet forum communication
network consisting of two layers representing public replies and
private messages respectively. The attened network combines
information from both layers in a single network representation.
Figure 1reports the order, size, and network density for both
layers and for the attened layer. The most central vertex in each
of these networks is coloured black. What becomes evident from
Fig. 1is that for determining node centrality, the layer(s) taken
into account could indeed matter; neither of the most central
nodes in layer 1 and layer 2 is the key player in the exemplary
attened network combining public and private ties presented
here.
To the best of our knowledge, prior research on darknet CSAM
forums identied key-players based on memberspublic activity
only (e.g. da Cunha et al., 2020; Fonhof et al., 2019; Fortin et al.,
2021). Yet, there are a few studies on online criminal markets that
were able to examine both public and private forum commu-
nications (Afroz et al., 2013; Motoyama et al., 2011; Overdorf
et al., 2018; Smirnova et al., 2024). Those have identied
discrepancies both in the number of members involved in each
type of communicative behaviour, as well as in memberslevel of
activity across layers (Motoyama et al., 2011; Overdorf et al.,
2018; Smirnova et al., 2024). It has even been suggested that
public and private communications might serve different
purposes (Afroz et al., 2013; Smirnova et al., 2024) and that
private messaging may represent relations between users most
accurately (Yip et al., 2013). Due to the sensitive and criminal
nature of the communications in a darknet CSAM forum, it is
likely that, similar to other darknet forums, some individuals will
choose to only communicate privately even within this hidden
community of like-minded individuals (Smirnova et al., 2024).
Disregarding the different forms of forum communications may
therefore result in missing the mark when determining who key-
players in the forum community are (see also Sun et al., 2019).
While access to all private messages from darknet forums is not
impossible, it remains rare in research (Overdorf et al., 2018).
Accordingly, authors of previous studies have called for
replication of their results, especially on criminal forums in the
darknet (Smirnova et al., 2024), and the development of measures
that can reliably operate on subsets of data (e.g. only public posts
without private messages) has been formulated as an explicit
research goal in the eld (Afroz et al., 2013). In other words, as
the effective allocation of law enforcement resources depends
heavily on the accuracy with which key-players can be identied,
estimates of the level of bias introduced by only considering
public forum communication are necessary. The current research
aims to provide further insight in the accuracy of key-player
assignment on darknet CSAM forums based on public commu-
nications data only by addressing the following research
questions:
How do the size and structure of communication networks
underlying public and private parts of darknet CSAM forums
compare?
To what extent is key-player assessment on darknet CSAM
forums biased by its reliance on public communication
data only?
Methods
Data. To answer our research questions, we use data from two
darknet CSAM forums made available to us by law enforcement
agencies. While the main language on both forums was English,
there were also posts and private messages in several other
languages.
Forum A was online for approximately one and a half years,
from April 2016 until the forum was seized by law enforcement in
September 2017. It can be described as a general CSAM forum
with the self-proclaimed goal to provide a simple free access
forum to the community, while simultaneously allowing a safe
and secure place to talk and just be ourselves(statement taken
from one of the forums introductory posts), offering a variety of
topical subforums, such as softcore, hardcore, and fetishes, as well
as the opportunity to engage in private conversations, which were
also available in the seized data. The forum was run by two
administrators, had 11 (sub-)forum moderators, and 60 members
that were designated as either VIP (very important person;
n=53) or MVP (most valuable player; n=10). Note that some
users had several roles at the same time.
Forum B described itself as a Boyloveronly [sic]forum
(statement taken from one of the forums introductory posts) and
was active for approximately one year from November 2021 to
Fig. 1 Schematic of a ctitious multiplex network with two layers. A
ctitious multiplex network with two layers and a attened layer onto which
the two layers are collapsed. Order, size, density, and the most central node
per layer/network are displayed.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 3
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
November 2022. Even though it was smaller in terms of number
of users than forum A, it had much more public posts and a
higher median of messages posted per day. There were two (co-)
administrators, 17 moderators, and ve so-called re-up doctors,
a role that was described on the forum as an employee who takes
care of dead left. And makes backup copies of new les. Table 1
shows descriptive statistics for both forums.
When the forums were seized, law enforcement agencies
secured data on the forumshistories in SQL (Structured Query
Language) data dumps. As a result, we can no longer ascertain the
reasons for any missing data (e.g. data might have been missing
due to deleted posts, users who left the forum, or data loss during
the take-down of the forum). The current analysis uses digital
trace data on both the public replies and private messaging on
these forums.
1
Dening the networks. From the digital trace data available, we
dened the forumscommunication networks as multiplex, in the
sense that each rst layer pertained to public communications,
each second layer to private messaging, and each attened net-
work represented the combination of the two layers (see also Halu
et al. 2013 for a similar multiplex network). Public communica-
tions are organised in threads that consist of an initial post, which
can be followed by one or more replies. While most replies are
direct answers to the thread starter, users can also reply directly to
another users reply. From these posts and replies, we constructed
the public replies networks; directed networks in which nodes
represent forum members, in-coming edges represent replies
received, and out-going edges represent replies sent. This meant
that n=728 users who only posted one or more original posts yet
received no replies and also never replied to public contributions
of others were excluded from the network of forum A, and
n=268 from forum B. With this denition of the network
architecture, we captured all directed public communications on
the forums, while purposefully ignoring undirected communica-
tions (i.e. thread starters). For a similar reason, all loops were
removed for the social network analyses. Even though it seems
intuitive that users can reply to their own posts, the goal of the
analyses was to quantify usersinteractions with others, and
therefore loops would have biased the results insofar as the
degrees would not have exclusively reected social interactions
with others.
In the private messaging networks, nodes again represent forum
members and directed edges represent private messages sent.
Again, loops (i.e. users replying to themselves) were removed
from the private messaging network. Edges in both the public and
private messaging network are weighted so that their weight
reects the respective number of replies and private messages
exchanged between members. Note that nodes and edges between
nodes may be present in both layers or in one layer only.
Formally, the forums communication networks are therefore
modelled as multiplex networks in this study.
For the attened networks, the two layers were collapsed into
one, so that each node and each edge from each layer was present,
respectively. The weights of the edges in the attened network
represent the summed number of all interactions between each
two users in both layers.
Analytic strategy. All analyses were carried out in R (R Core
Team, 2021). To analyse similarity between the different layers in
the CSAM forum communication networks, we followed the
approach taken by Bródka et al. (2018), where a multiplex net-
work is represented as a property matrix that allows for simple
comparisons across layers, e.g. by comparing the average degree
across layers and the degree distribution across nodes in each
layer, or by correlating node degree centralities between layers.
Bródka et al. (2018) list a number of metrics that can be used to
compare network structures across layers. Networks were con-
structed and analysed in R (R Core Team) with the igraph
package (version 2.0.3; Csárdi et al., 2024).
Descriptive measures were calculated separately for all network
layers. For the global transitivity index (see below), the network
layers had to be transformed into undirected networks without
multi-edges or weight attributes. Degrees were compared between
layers via Spearman rank correlations, as recommended by
Bródka et al. (2018) in the presence of severely skewed
distributions (see below). In addition, we follow previous work
by Borgatti et al. (2006) on the robustness of centrality measures
in the face of random error to assess the comparability of node
centrality rankings across layers. Several measures of centrality
robustness, as recommended by Borgatti et al. (2006), were
assessed. These measures are summarised in Table 4.
Results
Network layers. Table 2gives an overview over a number of
network-based measures for the different layers. Of the 936,110
members registered on forum A, 23,120 (2.47%) forum users were
present in the public replies network, generating 106,779 unique
edges. On forum B, 2.69% (N=15,491) of the 592,345 registered
users were in the public replies network, creating 174,192 edges.
The private messaging networks were smaller for both forums,
with only 12,279 (1.31%) forum users sending at least one private
message on forum A, and 3752 (0.63%) users on forum B.
Together, users who were active on the private part of the forums
generated 29,732 edges on forum A, and 19,089 edges on forum
B.
Combining the public and the private messaging networks
resulted in attened networks with 28,364 nodes (3.03% of all
forum members) for forum A, and 15,721 (2.65% of all forum
members) on forum B. This indicates that, while many
communicating forum members actively contribute to both
public and private forum communication, part of the forum
membership is active in one type of communication only. Because
of the relatively small order of the private messaging network of
forum B, the public replies network and the attened network
resembled each other more than on forum A.
In directed graphs, strong-connected components represent
sets of nodes that are connected by reciprocal paths, while weak-
connected components represent sets of nodes connected when
ignoring edge direction. The high numbers of users in the main
weak components of both the public replies and the private
messaging layers in both forums indicated general high
Table 1 Forum descriptions.
Descriptions Forum A Forum B
Total registered usersa936,110 592,345
Public postsb
Total 194,551 656,824
Thread starters
(percentage)
25,235 (13.0%) 29,995 (4.6%)
Md per day (MAD) 369 (78.5) 1715 (343)
Private messages
Total 58,484 61,992
Md per day (MAD) 112.5 (30.5) 163 (40)
MAD median absolute deviation.
aExcluding n=39 users with faulty user IDs from forum A and n=1 users with faulty user IDs
from forum B.
bExcluding n=431 posts from or replies to faulty user IDs and n=1236 posts that replied to
non-existing threads in forum A and n=4503 posts from or to faulty user IDs and n=1026
posts that were replies to non-existent threads on forum B.
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
4HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
connectivity between all active forum members, meaning that
some sort of path existed between almost any two nodes. Adding
the private messaging network to the public replies network
increased the number of components, while the percentage of
members in the main component was relatively unchanged. This
suggests that the small disconnected subsets observed in the
private messaging network remained unconnected even when
considering public communications between members.
The density of the public replies network, which can be
interpreted as the probability that a pair of randomly chosen
nodes are connected, on the other hand, was low for the public
replies, the private messaging, and the attened network, which is
to be expected given the limited number of members engaging in
communications. On average, each active member was connected
to approximately two to three other members in all layers on
forum A, and to two to ve on forum B. The low centralisation
for both in- and out-degrees on all layers indicates that these
networks were not dominated by a single node, even though
centralisation was higher for forum B, where each of the ten most
active users had disproportionately higher numbers of posts than
the most active user on forum A (see below). The diameter on all
layers was relatively large compared to the respective average path
length, suggesting the presence of hubs or highly connected
nodes. This is a rst indication that the distribution of degree
centralities across nodes in the network was skewed. In the light
of that, the high connectivity for the public replies network
reported above could also be attributed to some highly inuential
hubs, rather than a balanced communication between all forum
members. The average path length in both private messaging
layers was even higher than that of the public replies layers,
indicating lower cohesion.
Finally, global transitivity represents the proportion of triangles
in the network and can be interpreted as the likelihood that two
nodes have a common contact. In the public replies networks,
transitivity was rather low, and even lower on the private
messaging network, which again reects its lower cohesion.
However, the transitivity on forum B was generally higher than
on forum A.
Layer comparison. Table 3shows the number of nodes and edges
that were present in the different layers respectively. Additionally,
the Kulczynski distances in the network layers are displayed, i.e.
the intersection of nodes and edges between each two of the layers
in the multiplex network in relation to their symmetric difference.
For the forums under scrutiny, we found that on forum A 30.43%
(n=7035) of all members present in the public replies network
were also active in the private messaging part of the forum. On
forum B, this number was slightly lower with 22.74% (n=3522).
Table 3 Node and edge presence across layers.
Forum A Forum B
Public replies Public replies
Private messaging Yes No Yes No
Nodes
(Kulczynski =0.67)
Nodes
(Kulczynski =0.71)
Yes 7035 5244 3522 230
No 16,085 0 11,969 0
Edges
(Kulczynski =0.96)
Edges
(Kulczynski =0.95)
Yes 5572 24,160 8269 10,820
No 101,207 0 165,923 0
Kulczynski =1p1\p2
p1p2þp2p1

.
Table 2 Descriptive measures per network.
Network Order Size No. components Users in main (weak) component Total degree Centralisation Avg. path length Diameter Global transitivity
Strong Weak Total Percentage Density Geometric mean (SD) Median (MAD) In-degree Out-degree
Forum A
Public replies 23,120 106,779 14,728 29 23,060 99.7 0.0002 2.72 (3.21) 2.00 (1.00) 0.05 0.05 4.06 67 0.04
Private messaging 12,279 29,732 6,877 233 11,778 95.9 0.0002 2.07 (2.57) 2.00 (1.00) 0.05 0.04 5.70 86 0.02
Flattened 28,364 130,939 16,543 62 28,234 99.5 0.0002 2.67 (3.18) 2.00 (1.00) 0.05 0.04 4.25 98 0.04
Forum B
Public replies 15,491 174,192 7120 16 15,459 99.8 0.0007 4.57 (4.44) 3.00 (2.00) 0.11 0.06 3.73 49 0.11
Private messaging 3752 19,089 1349 40 3650 97.3 0.0014 3.67 (3.44) 3.00 (2.00) 0.13 0.12 5.58 142 0.06
Flattened 15,721 185,012 7074 15 15,691 99.8 0.0008 4.65 (4.54) 2.00 (2.00) 0.12 0.07 3.75 59 0.11
Order =number of nodes; Size =number of edges; No. components =number of components; MAD =median absolute deviation; Avg. path length =average path length; Diameter =longest distance between any two nodes. The global transitivity index was calculated with
undirected networks for all networks and layers.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 5
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
The majority (69.57% on forum A; 77.26% on forum B) of
members sending or receiving public replies thus did not engage
in private communications, suggesting that engaging in public
conversation may represent a lower threshold for communicat-
ing. Still, we also found that 42.71% (n=5244) of members active
on the private part of the forum did not contribute any public
replies on forum A. Again, this number was lower on forum B,
with only 6.13% (n=230) of members engaging in private
communications while not engaging in public replies.
Also shown in Table 3is the number of edges that were present
in either network. Only 5.22% (n=5572) of edges present in the
public replies network were also present in the private messaging
network on forum A, and 4.75% (n=8269) on forum B. More
interestingly, 81.26% (n=24,160) of edges in the private
messaging network of forum A, and 56.68% (n=10,820) of
forum B, were not mirrored by a similar edge in the public replies
network. This indicates that forum members were connected by
private messaging in ways that do not become apparent when
only considering the public part of the forum, even though this
difference was much more pronounced on forum A than on
forum B. This was also reected in the higher values of the
Kulczynski distances corroborating higher dissimilarities for
edges than for nodes on both forums.
The comparison of the network diameter to the average path
length (Table 2) suggested the presence of hubs in both the public
and private communication network. To provide a more detailed
comparison of both networks, the degree distributions across
layers were compared next. First, for the public replies network
we found that of the 23,120 users posting at least one reply on the
public part of forum A, 53.30% (n=12,322) had an in-degree of
0, indicating that these members replied at least once on the
public part of the forum but never elicited any reaction from the
community (Fig. 2). This number was lower on forum B, with
38.91% (n=6028) of the 15,491 members in the public replies
network exhibiting an in-degree of 0. Only 7.86% (n=1817) of
members active in the public replies network on forum A, and
6.06% (n=938) on forum B, showed an out-degree of 0,
indicating that while they never replied to the public commu-
nications of others, others replied to theirs. On forum A, the
highest number of replies a user sent was 3659 (Md
zeroes+
=
MAD
zeroes+
=1.00; Md
zeroes
=2.00; MAD
zeroes
=1.00), while
the highest number of replies received was 4735 (Md
zeroes+
=
MAD
zeroes+
=0.00; Md
zeroes
=2.00; MAD
zeroes
=1.00).
2
The
average number of replies each user sent per day ranged from 0 to
46 and from 0 to 129 for received replies per day. Note, however,
that some of the high maximum values of daily sent or received
replies (and, respectively, private messages) were partly caused by
users who were highly active within only short periods of time.
On forum B, the most active user sent with 14,115 replies almost
four times as many as the most active user on forum A (Md
zeroes+
=Md
zeroes
=2.00; MAD
zeroes+
=MAD
zeroes
=1.00), while the
highest number of received replies was with 62,700 more than 13
times as high as forum A (Md
zeroes+
=MAD
zeroes+
=1.00;
Md
zeroes
=3.00; MAD
zeroes
=2.00). On average, each user sent
between 0 and 101 replies per day and received between 0 and
365.
The degree distributions for the private messaging layer are
depicted in Fig. 3. We found that 39.32% (n=4828) of members
active on the private part of forum A did not receive a single
private message from others. Given their presence in the private
messaging network, this indicates that these members sent a
private message to at least one other member but did not receive
an answer. Again, this number was much lower on forum B, with
6.26% of users in the private messaging network having an out-
degree of 0. Similarly, we found that 14.95% (n=1836) of
members involved in private messaging on forum A received at
least one private message but never replied. This number was
higher on forum B (28.68%; n=1076). The highest number of
Fig. 2 Degree distributions of the public replies layer. Lorenz plots of in- (a,c) and out-degrees (b,d) of nodes in the public replies layer on forum A (a,b)
and forum B (c,d). Square roots of the normalised in- and out-degrees were used due to the skewness of the distributions and high number of zeroes.
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
6HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
private messages sent by one user on forum A was 2429 (Md
zeroes
+
=MAD
zeroes+
=0.00; Md
zeroes
=1.00; MAD
zeroes
=0.00),
while the highest number of private messages received was 3170
(Md
zeroes+
=MAD
zeroes+
=0.00; Md
zeroes
=MAD
zeroes
=1.00).
On average, each user sent between 0 and 23 private messages per
day and received between 0 and 31 private replies per day. On
forum B, the user sending the most private messages sent with
2926 approximately as many as the one on forum A (Md
zeroes+
=
MAD
zeroes+
=0.00; Md
zeroes
=4.00; MAD
zeroes
=3.00), which
was with 3646 also true for most private messages received
(Md
zeroes+
=MAD
zeroes+
=0.00; Md
zeroes
=3.00;
MAD
zeroes
=2.00). The average number of private messages a
user sent per day ranged from 0 to 17, and from 0 to 15 for
private messages received.
Comparing Figs. 2and 3, we found that both in- and out-
degree distributions in the public networks were more unequally
distributed than in the private messaging networks. This
indicated that on the public part of the forum, a small number
of highly active members were generating a disproportionate
number of communications, more so than on the private part of
the forum. For example, the Lorenz plot in panel c of Fig. 2shows
that roughly the top ve percent of users on forum B were
responsible for about three quarters of all in-degrees on the public
replies network. Figure 4depicts the distribution of local
transitivity across nodes in each network, describing the tendency
for a nodes neighbours to be connected to each other. The
presence of nodes with high local transitivity was indicative of
densely linked subgroups within the overall network, which, in
turn, may represent forum members interested in similar topics.
Comparing the public and private communication networks, we
found these clusters of densely interconnected nodes to be more
prevalent in the public replies networks on both forums. These
comparisons pertained to the overall distribution of degrees and
local transitivity in the networks considered, irrespective of the
position particular members take in these distributions. To
examine the extent to which the same members took central
positions across different layers, we turned to assessing the
robustness of centrality measures across network layers.
Measures of centrality robustness. To assess centrality robust-
ness across layers, several measures recommended by Borgatti et
al. (2006) were assessed. The results are displayed in Table 4. For
both the Top 1 and the Top 3 measure, the most central node/s in
the public replies layer of forum A was/were not the same as the
most central node/s in the private messaging layer (regarding
both in- and outdegree) but was/were the same for the public
replies layer and the attened network. The Top 10% measure, on
the other hand, showed that the most central node in the public
replies layer of forum A was among the 10% most central nodes
in both the private messaging layer and the attened network.
This was even more pronounced on forum B, where the Top 1,
Top 3, and Top 10% measures all showed the same central nodes
across layers. In addition to the Szymkiewicz-Simpson coefcient,
we calculated the Jaccards coefcient (jA\Bj
jABj), which was 0.34 for
in- and 0.26 for out-degrees (against a maximum of 0.53) on
forum A, and even closer to its respective maximum on forum B
(0.22 for in-, and 0.21 for out-degrees against a maximum of
0.24). For the public replies layer and the attened network,
Jaccards coefcients equalled the maximum of 0.82 for both in-
and out-degrees on forum A, while being a bit lower on forum B
(0.94 for in- and 0.93 for out-degrees against a maximum of 0.99).
Rank correlations for the weighted degrees (as recommended by
Bródka et al. 2018, due to the high skewedness of the data) closely
resembled those of the unweighted degrees for both forums and,
similar to the other measures, showed that there was substantial
overlap between the public replies and the attened network,
while this was less pronounced between the public replies and the
Fig. 3 Degree distributions of the private messaging layer. Lorenz plots of in- (a,c) and out-degrees (b,d) of nodes in the private messaging layer on
forum A (a,b) and forum B (c,d). Square roots of the normalised in- and out-degrees were used due to the skewness of the distributions and high number
of zeroes.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 7
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
private messaging network.
3
In addition, Table 5A, B shows the
top ve most central nodes for both in-degree and out-degree for
each of the network layers. Across all layers, and considering in-
as well as out-degree centrality, there were 10 distinct users
among the ve most central members of forum A, and 11 for
forum B. In Table 5, these users are rank-ordered based on the
total number of networks in which they were positioned among
the ve most central nodes.
On forum A, user 19406 was among the most central in all six
networks considered, while user 32890 was central in four out of
six networks. When it came to receiving messages, user 32890 was
central only in the private messaging network, yet concerning
sent messages this user was central in the public, private, and
combined network. Table 5A shows that when considering in-
degree, only two among the ve most central users in the public
replies network were also central to the private communications
network, whereas for out-degree centrality this applied to three
out of ve users. While one of the administrators of the forum
was among the topmost central across all networks (user 19406),
the other administrator (user 1) was central in the private
messaging network only. Of the 10 distinct users identied as
most central, only one had no special role on the forum. These
Fig. 4 Transitivity distributions of the multiplex network layers. Histograms of the transitivity index distributions for the public replies (a,c) and the
private messaging (b,d) layer on forum A (a,b) and forum B (c,d). There are 9815 nodes with exactly one neighbour and therefore missing transitivity in
the replies layer, and 7907 in the private messaging layer.
Table 4 Measures of centrality robustness.
Forum A Forum B
Measure Description Comparison
network
In-
degree
Out-
degree
In-
degree
Out-
degree
Top 1 Is the most central node in the public replies layer the same as the most
central node in the private messaging layer/the attened network?
Private
messaging
No No Yes Yes
Flattened Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 3 Is the most central node in the public replies layer in the top 3 of the
most central nodes in the private messaging layer/the attened network?
Private
messaging
No No Yes Yes
Flattened Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 10% Is the most central node in the public replies layer among the 10% most
central nodes in the private messaging layer/the attened network?
Private
messaging
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Flattened Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overlap
(SzymkiewiczSimpson
coefcient)
What is the overlap between the 10% most central nodes in the public
replies layer and the private messaging layer/the attened network?
Private
messaging
0.74 0.60 0.93 0.88
Flattened 1 1 0.98 0.97
R What is the correlation of the centralities between the public replies layer
and the private messaging layer/attened network (limited to actors who
are in both layers)?
Private
messaging
0.54 0.39 0.63 0.63
Flattened 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.998
Table adapted from Borgatti et al. (2006). SzymkiewiczSimpson coefcient =jA\Bj
minðA
jj
;B
jjÞ
.
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
8HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Table 5 A Characteristics of the ve most central actors across layers on forum A. B Characteristics of the ve most central actors across layers on forum B.
ID No.
networks
most
central
In-degrees Out-degrees Roles No.
public
posts
No.
public
posts
with
link
No.
private
messages
No.
private
messages
with link
Public
replies
Private
messaging
Flat-tened Public
replies
Private
messaging
Flat-tened Adminis-
trator
Mode-rator VIP MVP
A
19406 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4041 910 1646 232
32890 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 2181 935 1327 695
11615 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 312 146 274 31
6500 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 955 567 575 45
50229 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 2561 376 609 252
23406 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3492 2835 283 117
13502 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 758 514 240 37
93933 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1445 366 111 22
1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1118 161 2433 240
6306 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3814 397 1776 223
Geometric mean (SD)
2.31
(3.01)
2.13
(3.13)
1.91
(2.69)
1.76 (2.51)
Median (MAD)
2.00
(1.00)
1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
ID No.
networks
most
central
In-degrees Out-degrees Roles No.
public
posts
No.
public
posts
with
links
No.
private
messages
No. private
messages
with link
Public
replies
Private
messaging
Flat-tened Public
replies
Private
messaging
Flat-tened Adminis-
trator
Mode-rator Reup
doctor
B
2 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 12,266 1844 2926 356
62260 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 230 27 757 96
85 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6451 2625 1845 500
118502 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1652 604 858 355
192 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4459 2368 624 172
488 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1870 442 179 37
54754 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1243 787 39 10
678 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 816 343 86 35
8700 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2640 794 214 47
72462 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1567 241 56 12
19025 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5746 1332 50 1
103 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1423 89 108 11
3622 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1778 1115 162 78
5222 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2846 879 835 131
Geometric mean (SD)
3.98
(4.92)
4.31
(6.14)
5.53
(4.30)
3.02
(3.40)
Median (MAD)
2.00
(1.00)
2.00
(1.00)
4.00
(3.00)
2.00 (1.00)
Due to the skewed distributions, the last four rows show the geometric mean (excluding zeroes) and the median across all forum members who were active on the respective part of the forum, i.e. contributed at least one public post/reply (with link) or sent at least one private
message (with link) for each particular column.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 9
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
roles attribute certain special rights and/or responsibilities to
selected members of the forum, and only roles that were
explained on the forum are included here.
On forum B, only user 2 was central in more than two of the
network layers, and this user was also the only one who was
central in both the public replies and the private messaging layer
when it came to both sending and receiving messages. The four
users who are among the 11 most central users because of their
centrality in the private messaging network were central for both
sending and receiving private messages, while all users central in
the public replies layer were central only for either their in- or
their out-degree. Only six of the 11 most central users had a
special user role, with only one of the two administrators being
present among them. The two re-up doctorswere both most
central for the public replies they received, while the three
moderators were only most central in the private messaging
network.
The nal four columns of Table 5A, B refer to the frequency
and nature of membersforum communications. The most
central users can be considered proliferate communicators, with
posting frequencies high above the active usersaverage (shown in
the last four rows of Table 5A, B). Still, posting frequency was not
all-important, as was illustrated by users 6306 and 11615 on
forum A. In terms of public communications, user 6306 trumped
user 11615 by over factor ten. Yet, user 6306 was not among the
most central when considering public replies received, whereas
user 11615 was. This is because users were selected based on their
unweighted (as opposed to weighted) degrees and therefore the
numbers of sent replies and private messages might seem
unintuitive at times. User 85 in Table 5B, for example, had
contributed a high number of public posts, yet was not among the
top 5 users with respect to in- or out-degree in the public replies
network because these replies were distributed between fewer
users than those of the users among the top 5.
Regarding the nature of the forum communications, Table
5A, B also show the number of public posts and private messages
which contained a hyperlink. Previous research found that these
hyperlinks are a good proxy for sharing CSAM (Blokland et al.,
2024). User 23406 on forum A appeared to be sharing a
disproportionately large amount of CSAM on the public part of
the forum, potentially causing this users high in-degree
centrality, yet, judging by their out-degree centrality, this user
did not seem very communicative towards others.
To better understand the relationship between communication
and sharing of CSAM in the forums under scrutiny we computed
Spearman rank correlations between in- and out-degrees and the
number of hyperlinks posted in the communication networks.
For forum A, the correlations on the replies network were of
medium size (forum A: r
in, html
=0.51, r
out, html
=0.29). For
forum B, the correlation value for in-degrees was similar, but
higher for the correlation with out-degrees (forum B: r
in,
html
=0.56, r
out, html
=0.66). Comparable values were obtained
for the number of links shared in the private messaging network
(forum A: r
in, html
=0.25, r
out,html
=0.41; forum B: r
in,html
=0.56,
r
out, html
=0.41). Accordingly, the users identied to have the
highest degrees in either the public or private part of the
respective forum (Table 5A, B) only showed a moderate overlap
with the users that shared the most links on each respective part
of the forum. In forum A, three users of the ones with the highest
degrees were also among the users who posted the most
hyperlinks in their posts, and four of the most central users in
the private part of the forum were among the ones that shared the
most hyperlinks in their private messages. In forum B, on the
other hand, none of the most central users on the public part of
the forum were among the users who post the highest number of
hyperlinks, while three of the most central users were among the
ve users who shared the most private messages with hyperlinks.
Figure 5A, B shows network plots of the 100 users with the
highest total degrees in the respective attened networks. The 100
users with the highest degrees were chosen because showing all
users on the forums would have resulted in uninterpretable plots.
All users were present in both respective public and the private
messaging layers. Colours indicate whether users had special roles
in the forum. Since some users had multiple roles, we interpreted
the roles and their descriptions and ranked them from highest
(administrator) to lowest (MVP on forum A; reup doctoron
forum B). Accordingly, only each users highest role is displayed in
the plot. The 10 distinct users from forum A and the 11 from
forum B that were present in the respective Top 5 lists across all
layers are annotated with labels. It is noticeable from the plot that
a large number of the displayed users had a special role in the
forum, which was rare on both forums (only 0.3% of all users
active on at least one of either the public replies or private
messaging layer on forum A and 0.2% on forum B had one or
more of these roles). Connections in the network plot show the
summed number of all interactions between the users in the plot,
i.e. replies in the public replies layer as well as private messages in
the private messaging layer, with darker shades indicating more
interactions. Because there were much more interactions between
these users on forum B than on forum A, the shades indicate
different numbers in the two plots. Again, for visibility reasons the
interactions are shown as undirected edges. The plot for forum A
shows that communication between users with the selected special
roles appeared to be more interconnected and intense than that of
the communication with users without special roles. For forum B,
on the other hand, this was less pronounced.
Discussion
Using digital trace data from two large-scale darknet CSAM
forums, the current study constructed distinct communication
networks between forum members in which one layer represented
memberspublic communications, and the other layer repre-
sented membersprivate messaging to assess the extent to which
key-player identication is misjudged when only using public
communication data. As in previous studies, ndings showed that
only a small minority of registered members were actively com-
municating on the forums (e.g. van der Bruggen and Blokland,
2022). Furthermore, the number of contacts per member was
heavily skewed, indicating the presence of hubs or key-players.
This again aligns with ndings of prior studies describing darknet
CSAM forum communications and identifying central users
(Blokland et al., 2024; da Cunha et al., 2020; Fonhof et al., 2019).
Comparisons of the public and private messaging networks,
however, showed that not all communicating members were
active in both layers, although the degree to which this was true
varied across the forums. In forum B, only few users were active
in the private messaging network and not in the public replies
network. However, central players in the public network in either
forum were not necessarily also hubs in the private messaging
network. Likewise, key-players in the private messaging network
were not always central to the public network. This is in line with
previous research on comparing private and public messages,
which has shown that, while there are similarities between both
modes of communication, they are not the same (Afroz et al.,
2013; Motoyama et al., 2011; Overdorf et al., 2018; Smirnova
et al., 2024). As the private messaging network in both forums
contained fewer members and fewer connections between
members, combining both layers into a attened network yielded
results more similar to that of the public network alone.
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
10 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Fig. 5 Roles and interactions of the 100 users with the highest total degrees. a Roles and interactions of the 100 users with the highest total degrees on
forum A. Network plot showing the 100 users with the highest total degrees in the attened network of forum A, with colours representing their roles and
opacity of their connections showing the number of interactions. bRoles and interactions of the 100 users with the highest total degrees on forum B.
Network plot showing the 100 users with the highest total degrees in the attened network of forum B, with colours representing their roles and opacity of
their connections showing the number of interactions.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 11
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
How do these results reect on the main research question of
to what extent key-player assessment on darknet CSAM forums is
biased when relying on public communication data only? It seems
that there are two possible answers to this question. One could
argue that, given the number of members involved and the extent
of their interactions, public communications are more important
to the online community than private messages. Given that
combining the public and private messaging layers into a at-
tened network yielded highly similar results when it comes to
identifying key-players, the amount of bias introduced by relying
solely on the public part of the forum seems limited. Targeting
key-players in a forums public replies network has been shown to
signicantly reduce the ow of CSAM through that forum (da
Cunha et al., 2020), which is in accordance with Smirnova et al.s
(2024) assumption that the ow of information was similar
within the private and the public part of the hacker forum they
analysed. Additionally, publicly available user roles appeared to
be a viable proxy for identifying central players in the attened
network on forum A, insofar that the overlap between users with
high degrees and users with special roles was substantial. Even
though this was less pronounced in forum B, it revealed another
interesting dynamic, as all users with a special role, except the
global administrator of the forum, were most central only in the
private messaging network. That means that although user roles
in forum B less reliably indicated a central position in the at-
tened network, they did so in that part of the forum that is usually
not accessible to law enforcement agencies (i.e. the private mes-
saging network) and could therefore provide additional valuable
information for case prioritisation. In that sense, darknet CSAM
forum users who have a special role can be said to reliably identify
themselves as key-players in at least one communication layer in
both researched forums. Preliminarily, law enforcement agencies
can therefore be argued to be on the markwhen prioritising
users central to public forum activity.
Contrarily, one could also argue that members who commu-
nicate privately might constitute a user subtype on their own,
with their own dynamics and central guresgiven that mem-
bers active on the private part of forum A only partly overlapped
with those active on the public part. Focussing only on the public
part of the forum obscures the activities of this subgroup enga-
ging in private interactions and would fail to identify a substantial
part of those key to that particular subgroup. In prior analyses of
underground forums, it has been similarly found that there was
only partial overlap of users actively participating in the different
modes of communication (Motoyama et al., 2011; Overdorf et al.,
2018; Smirnova et al., 2024), leading to the assumption that
private messages might be used for other operations than public
ones (Afroz et al., 2013; Smirnova et al., 2024). This is less true for
forum B, where only 230 users were active on the private part of
the forum who were not also part of the public part of the forum.
This shows that specic means of communications might not
only serve different purposes (Afroz et al., 2013; Smirnova et al.,
2024) but also develop differently across CSAM darknet forums;
an assumption that may also be supported by the fact that one of
the other forums considered for analysis used a special chat room
instead of private messaging on the forum. Data on other aspects
of member interactions, like the nature and novelty of the
material shared, is needed to determine whether a separate focus
on key-players in the private communication network is war-
ranted (Westlake et al., 2011). To this end, future research should
compare the content of material shared in public posts and in
private messages.
The current analyses were based on directed networks derived
from forum communications. On forum A we found that the
distribution of degree centrality, i.e. the number of other mem-
bers a user is connected to, is more skewed when considering in-
degree than out-degree on both the public and private messaging
network. In forum B, this pattern was reversed for private mes-
sages. For the public network this means that the original post-
ings of some members are generating a disproportionate number
of replies. While the distributions of replies sent were also skewed,
they were yet more equally spread than those of replies received.
It seems reasonable to assume that posts containing links to new,
rare, and/or high-quality material elicit most reactions from the
community, although this has yet to be studied empirically. High
in-degree members, therefore, appear to be the most suitable
targets for law enforcement prioritisation, while high out-degree
members may play a more indirect role in the continuation of the
community, creating a forum environment to which members are
willing to contribute (Blokland et al., 2024). Thus, these members
might play an instrumental role in sustaining the larger com-
munity of users across specic darknet CSAM forums. Future
research will have to show if these users as well as members
central to the private parts of the forums might be considered
promising targets for law enforcement agencies. For forum A, the
same pattern of less equally distributed out-degrees was found in
the private communications network. For forum B, this pattern
was again reversed, i.e. although both in- and out-degree dis-
tributions were very skewed (with more unique users trying to
contact others than being contacted by private messages), in-
degrees were more equally distributed than out-degrees. That
might have been due to active users and users with administrative
roles from the public replies layer of forum B using private
messaging more often to reach out to other users they knew from
the public part than on forum A.
In sum, the comparison of forums A and B speaks to the
overall importance of relatively few key-players in the networks.
While the skewed degree distributions of the two forums do not
only resemble properties of generic internet forums but also each
other, the current analysis also reveals a number of important
differences between forums. The different styles of communica-
tion developing in different forums with otherwise similar forum
architectures, for example, reveal a substantial amount of
uniqueness.
The highly skewed distributions of the in- and out-degrees in
the public and the private messaging networks might hint at
network formation mechanisms at work on these forums. In the
presence of skewed distributions, so-called preferential attach-
ment is often proposed, stating that new users on the forum
would tend to direct their communication disproportionately
towards members that are already central (Albert and Barabási,
2002). Given that, to our experience, a lot of the communication
in the network evolves around the praise of or requests for
CSAM, this proposition makes intuitive sense and has already
been suggested for other darknet forums (Me and Pesticcio,
2018). However, the analysis of longitudinal dynamics in the
formation of the forumscommunication networks would have
been beyond the scope of this study and should be subject to
future research.
Moreover, other sources of information besides userspositions in
the social network structure might be considered important in the
identication of key-players. For example, the content of the com-
munication on the forum (publicly or privately) might highlight users
with important social roles (LHuillier et al., 2011). Basu and Sen
(2021) even deem the monitoring of key-players solely based on their
network measures an uneconomical practice. In fact, our results
support that prioritisation utilising network degrees should be
combined with other information to enable the identication of the
most promising suspects, given that the overlap between top com-
municators and top sharers of CSAM was only moderate. Other
authors have, for example, explored the combination of network
measures with the severity of the material shared and nd that it
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
12 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
might enhance key-player detection (Westlake et al., 2011). Future
researchintothecontentofthepublicandprivatemessagesandthe
CSAM exchanged, as well as identication strategies from other
research areas, may provide more insights into nding users who are
important for the structure of darknet CSAM forums. Still, social
network measures are relatively easy to use as heuristics on large and
diverse data sets, especially in comparison to more labour-intensive
methods such as the manual annotation of post contents.
Given the size of the forums, and the breadth of genres and
interests covered by its subforums for instance in terms of victims
age and gender , it also seems likely that some members will limit
their interactions with other members to one or only a few sub-
forums. While these members may not be among the most central
when the total forum is considered, they might be key-players in
subcommunities orbiting around specicsetsofsexualorcrime
preferences. In the context of mainstream news forums, Forestier
et al. (2012) refer to such forum members as contextual celebrities.
Indeed, our current results on transitivity in both the public and the
private messaging networks suggest the existence of densely con-
nected subcommunities within the forum community as a whole. To
the extent that these subcommunities focus on specictypesof
CSAM that can be considered especially harmful, despite not being
most central to the overall community, contextual celebrities may
also warrant law enforcement vigilance.
Limitations
Some limitations to the current study must be noted when con-
sidering its implications for law enforcement practice. First, given
the context of the darknet, the information available on individual
forum members is limited to their user handle. Hence, in the
communication networks under scrutiny here, each user handle is
considered a separate node. From law enforcement practice, we
know that some individuals may at some point in time simulta-
neously operate under multiple user handles on the same forum.
To the extent that this may have been the case on the forums
analysed, we overestimate the number of nodes, and, to the extent
that members interacted differently with other users depending
on the user handle they had operated under, we underestimate
membersnetwork centrality.
Second, our analyses are limited to conversations taking place
within single forums. As at any given moment multiple darknet
CSAM forums are online, members who are not central in any
particular forum may be key-players when activities across mul-
tiple forums are combined. Additionally, members may be in
contact with each other outside of the forum environment, and
continue their interactions on, for example, darknet chat sites or
communication services such as Telegram. This too could lead to
underestimating the centrality of individual members.
Third, although digital trace data provide a unique window at
membership activity, we noticed that at least some posts had been
deleted. Given that the reasons why and the exact number of
posts deleted remain unknown, this introduces an unspecied
level of inaccuracy to our analyses. Based on the information we
do have, e.g. the number of replies to posts not in the data, we
assume this level of inaccuracy to be low, however.
Lastly, but probably most importantly, our study describes only
two large darknet CSAM forums. Despite these forums having
thousands of members, since our units of analysis are forums, our
sample size remains to be two. This sample size does not allow for
any statistical tests and the generalisability of our ndings to other
CSAM darknet forums remains uncertain. However, this is a lim-
itation that all current research studies dealing with (private) mes-
sages on CSAM darknet forums must acknowledge, as the number of
seized forums a research team can gain access to is still limited.
Conclusion
The current study set out to assess the extent to which law
enforcement agencies identifying key-players based on darknet
CSAM forum memberspublic communications are missing the
mark in terms of detecting those most central to the forum
community. Given the rarity of full access to private commu-
nication, the results of this study offer the rst analysis of dif-
ferent modes of communication between members of two
darknet CSAM forums. Comparing the public and the private
messaging networks from two large-scale darknet CSAM forums,
we nd notable differences in the size and structure of the public
and private forum communication networks. The robustness of
key-player identication across network layers can be considered
moderate. As adding private communication data to those based
on public posts and replies does not substantially alter users
designated as central to the network, however, law enforcement
practice of using public communications only to identify key-
players does not seem to signicantly suffer from intolerable bias.
Yet, to the extent in which private messaging might include the
exchange of new or extremely harmful CSAM, those central to
the private messaging network only may still warrant (limited)
law enforcement attention.
Received: 28 March 2024; Accepted: 15 October 2024;
Notes
1 During our analyses, we also considered the inclusion of data from two other seized
darknet forums we had access to. However, an inspection of the private messages
showed that we could not use these data because one of the forums had a separate chat
room, completely replacing the function of the private messages, and the network
created from the other forum was too small.
2 Median and median absolute deviation (MAD) values reported for all active users, i.e.
those who sent/received at least one public message or sent/received at least one
private message, respectively, once including users with zero values (Md
zeroes+
and
MAD
zeroes+
), and once excluding users with zero values (Md
zeroes
and MAD
zeroes
).
3 Note, however, that only users present in both layers of the network were analysed via
correlations. Including users present in only one layer and assigning them a degree
value of zero would have resulted in lower correlation coefcients. The correlations
reported here should therefore rather be considered an upper bound of this
association.
References
Albert R, Barabási AL (2002) Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Rev Mod
Phys 74(1):4797. https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.74.47
Afroz S, Garg V, McCoy D, Greenstadt R (2013) Honor among thieves: a com-
mons analysis of cybercrime economies. In: 2013 APWG eCrime Researchers
Summit, San Francisco, USA, 111. https://doi.org/10.1109/eCRS.2013.
6805778
Basu K, Sen A (2021) Identifying individuals associated with organized criminal
networks: a social network analysis. Soc Netw 64:4254. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.socnet.2020.07.009
Bergman J, Popov OB (2023) Exploring dark web crawlers: a systematic literature
review of dark web crawlers and their implementation. IEEE Access
11:3591435933. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3255165
Boekhout HD, Blokland AAJ, Takes FW (2024) Early warning signals for pre-
dicting cryptomarket vendor success using dark net forum networks. Sci Rep
14(1):16336. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-67115-5
Blokland A, Daser A, de Boer M, Gannon C, Gnielka F, Huikuri S, Reichel R,
Schäfer T, Schmidt AF, Staciwa K, Lehmann R (2024) Why do users continue
to contribute to darknet CSAM forums? Examining social exchange, social
capital, and social learning explanations using digital forensic artifacts. Child
Abuse Negl 153(106815). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2024.106815
Borgatti SP, Carley KM, Krackhardt D (2006) On the robustness of centrality
measures under conditions of imperfect data. Soc Netw 28(2):124136.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2005.05.001
Bródka P, Chmiel A, Magnani M, Ragozini G (2018) Quantifying layer similarity in
multiplex networks: a systematic study. R Soc Open Sci 5(8):116. https://doi.
org/10.1098/rsos.171747
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 13
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Burcher M, Whelan C (2018) Social network analysis as a tool for criminal
intelligence: understanding its potential from the perspectives of intelligence
analysts. Trends Organ Crime. 21:278294. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-
017-9313-8
Contractor N, Monge P, Leonardi P (2011) Multidimensional networks and the
dynamics of sociomateriality: bringing technology inside the network. Int J
Commun 5:682720
Csárdi G, Nepusz T, Traag V, Horvát S, Zanini F, Noom D, Müller K (2024)
igraph: network analysis and visualization in R. https://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.7682609
da Cunha BR, MacCarron P, Passold JF, dos Santos LW Jr, Oliveira KA, Gleeson JP
(2020) Assessing police topological efciency in a major sting operation on
the dark web. Sci Rep 10(73). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-56704-4
Duijn PA, Klerks PP (2014) Social network analysis applied to criminal networks:
recent developments in Dutch law enforcement. In: Masys AJ (ed) Networks
and network analysis for defence and security. Springer International Pub-
lishing, p 121159
Duxbury SW, Haynie DL (2021) Shining a light on the shadows: endogenous trade
structure and the growth of an online illegal market. Am J Sociol
127(3):787827. https://doi.org/10.1086/718197
Europol (2023) Internet organised crime threat assessment (IOCTA) 2023. https://
www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/les/documents/IOCTA%202023%
20-%20EN_0.pdf. Accessed 27 Mar 2023
Fonhof AM, van der Bruggen M, Takes FW (2019) Characterizing key-players in
child exploitation networks on the dark net. In: Aiello LM, CheriC, Cheri
H, Lambiotte R, Lió P, Rocha LM (eds) Complex networks and their appli-
cations VII: volume 2 proceedings the 7th international conference on
complex networks and their applications COMPLEX NETWORKS 2018.
Springer International Publishing, p 412423
Forestier M, Velcin J, Zighed DA (2012) Analyzing social roles using enriched
social network on on-line sub-communities. In: ICDS 2012: The sixth
international conference on digital society, 1722
Fortin F, Paquette S, Gagné S (2021) Challenges and opportunities in investigations
of online sexual exploitation of children: old networks, dark web, and
proactive response. In: Deslauriers-Varin N, Bennell C (eds) Criminal
investigations of sexual offenses: techniques and challenges. Springer Inter-
national Publishing, p. 217233. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79968-7
Gaito S, Quadri C, Rossi GP, Zignani M (2017) Urban communications and social
interactions through the lens of mobile phone data. Online Soc Netw Media,
1:7081. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.osnem.2017.04.003
Ganley D, Lampe C (2009) The ties that bind: social network principles in online
communities. Decis Support Syst 47(3):266274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
dss.2009.02.013
Gannon C, Blokland AA, Huikuri S, Babchishin KM, Lehmann RJ (2023) Child
sexual abuse material on the darknet. Forens Psychiatr Psychol Kriminologie
17:353365. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11757-023-00790-8
Goonetilleke P, Knorre A, Kuriksha A (2023) Hydra: lessons from the worlds
largest darknet market. Criminol Public Policy 22(4):735777. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1745-9133.12647
Halu A, Mondragón RJ, Panzarasa P, Bianconi G (2013) Multiplex PageRank. PLoS
ONE 8(10):110. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0078293
Huang C, Guo Y, Guo W, Li Y (2021) HackerRank: identifying key hackers in
underground forums. Int J Distrib Sens Netw 17(5):15501477211015145.
https://doi.org/10.1177/15501477211015145
IWF (2023) #BehindTheScreens. A deep dive into the digital and social emergency
happening #BehindTheScreens, in childrens bedrooms. The annual report
2022. https://annualreport2022.iwf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/
IWF-Annual-Report-2022_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 10 Dec 2023
Jiang C, Foye J, Broadhurst R, Ball M (2021) Illicit rearms and other weapons on
darknet markets. Trends Issues Crime Crim Justice 622:120
Kigerl A (2022) Behind the scenes of the underworld: hierarchical clustering of two
leaked carding forum databases. Soc Sci Comput Rev 40(3):618640. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0894439320924735
LHuillier G, Alvarez H, Ríos S, Aguilera F (2011) Topic-based social network
analysis for virtual communities of interests in the dark web. ACM SIGKDD
Explor Newsl 12:6673. https://doi.org/10.1145/1964897.1964917
McLevey J, Scott J, Carrington PJ (eds) (2023) The Sage handbook of social net-
work analysis. SAGE Publications Limited
Magnani M, Rossi L (2011) The ML-Model for multi-layer social networks. In:
2011 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and
Mining, 512. https://doi.org/10.1109/ASONAM.2011.114
Magnani M, Rossi L, Vega D (2021) Analysis of multiplex social networks with R. J
Stat Softw 98:130. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v098.i08
Me G, Pesticcio L (2018) Tor black markets: economics, characterization and
investigation technique. In: Jahankhani H (ed) Cyber Criminology. Springer,
119140
Morselli C (2010) Assessing vulnerable and strategic positions in a criminal net-
work. J Contemp Crim Justice 26(4):382392. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1043986210377105
Motoyama M, McCoy D, Levchenko K, Savage S, Voelker GM (2011) An analysis
of underground forums. In: Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM
conference on Internet measurement conference, 7180. https://doi.org/10.
1145/2068816.2068824
Overdorf R, Troncoso C, Greenstadt R, McCoy D (2018) Under the underground:
Predicting private interactions in underground forums. https://doi.org/10.
48550/ARXIV.1805.04494
Pete I, Hughes J, Chua YT, Bada M (2020) A social network analysis and com-
parison of six dark web forums. 2020 IEEE European symposium on security
and privacy workshops, Genoa, Italy, 484493. https://doi.org/10.1109/
EuroSPW51379.2020.00071
R Core Team (2021) R: a language and environment for statistical computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria
Smirnova O, Hyslip TS, Holt TJ (2024) Are active users the most central to hacker
social networks? A comparative analysis of public and private online network
structures among hackers. Deviant Behav, 117. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01639625.2024.2373356
Soudijn MR, Zegers BCT (2012) Cybercrime and virtual offender convergence
settings. Trends Organ Crime. 15(2-3):111129. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12117-012-9159-z
Sun N, Rau PPL, Ma L (2014) Understanding lurkers in online communities: a
literature review. Comput Hum Behav 38:110117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
chb.2014.05.022
Sun Z, Rubio-Medrano CE, Zhao Z, Bao T, Doupé A, Ahn GJ (2019) Under-
standing and predicting private interactions in underground forums. In:
Proceedings of the ninth ACM conference on data and application security
and privacy, 303314. https://doi.org/10.1145/3292006.3300036
van der Bruggen M, Blokland A (2022) Proling darkweb child sexual
exploitation material forum members using longitudinal posting history
data. Soc Sci Comput Rev 40(4):865891. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0894439321994894
Westlake BG, Bouchard M (2015) Criminal careers in cyberspace: examining
website failure within child exploitation networks. Justice Q 33(7):11541181.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2015.1046393
Westlake BG, Bouchard M (2016) Liking and hyperlinking: community detection
in online child sexual exploitation networks. Soc Sci Res 59:2336. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.04.010
Westlake BG, Bouchard M, Frank R (2011) Finding the key-players in online child
exploitation networks. Policy Internet 3(2):104135. https://doi.org/10.2202/
1944-2866.1126
Westlake BG, Frank R (2017) Seeing the forest through the trees: identifying
key players in online child sexual exploitation distribution networks. In:
Holt T (ed) Cybercrime through an interdisciplinary lens. Routledge,
189209
Yip M, Shadbolt N, Webber C (2013) Why forums? An empirical analysis into the
facilitating factors of carding forums. In: Proceedings of the 5th annual ACM
web science conference, Paris, France, 453462. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2464464.2464524
Yip M, Webber C, Shadbolt N (2013) Trust among cybercriminals? Carding for-
ums, uncertainty and implications for policing. Policy Soc 23(4):516539.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2013.780227
Zamani M, Rabbani F, Horicsányi A, Zafeiris A, Vicsek T (2019) Differences in
structure and dynamics of networks retrieved from dark and public web
forums. Phys A 525:326336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.03.048
Author contributions
Frederic M. Gnielka, Rebecca Reichel: These authors contributed equally to this work.
Alexander F. Schmidt, Thomas Schäfer, Salla Huikuri, Katarzyna Staciwa, Robert Leh-
mann: These authors jointly supervised this work.
Funding
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Competing interests
This research was funded by the European Union under Grant ISF-2021-TF1-AG-CYBER.
Ethical approval
This study was conducted retrospectively on pre-anonymised data. Therefore, ethical
approval was not required. All research was performed in accordance with the ethical
standards as laid down by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
14 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Informed consent
This study was conducted retrospectively on pre-anonymised data. Therefore, informed
consent was not required.
Additional information
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to
Alexander F. Schmidt.
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
Publishers note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional afliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
material in this article are included in the articles Creative Commons licence, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
articles Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
© The Author(s) 2024
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024) 11:1459 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03954-x 15
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Terms and Conditions
Springer Nature journal content, brought to you courtesy of Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH (“Springer Nature”).
Springer Nature supports a reasonable amount of sharing of research papers by authors, subscribers and authorised users (“Users”), for small-
scale personal, non-commercial use provided that all copyright, trade and service marks and other proprietary notices are maintained. By
accessing, sharing, receiving or otherwise using the Springer Nature journal content you agree to these terms of use (“Terms”). For these
purposes, Springer Nature considers academic use (by researchers and students) to be non-commercial.
These Terms are supplementary and will apply in addition to any applicable website terms and conditions, a relevant site licence or a personal
subscription. These Terms will prevail over any conflict or ambiguity with regards to the relevant terms, a site licence or a personal subscription
(to the extent of the conflict or ambiguity only). For Creative Commons-licensed articles, the terms of the Creative Commons license used will
apply.
We collect and use personal data to provide access to the Springer Nature journal content. We may also use these personal data internally within
ResearchGate and Springer Nature and as agreed share it, in an anonymised way, for purposes of tracking, analysis and reporting. We will not
otherwise disclose your personal data outside the ResearchGate or the Springer Nature group of companies unless we have your permission as
detailed in the Privacy Policy.
While Users may use the Springer Nature journal content for small scale, personal non-commercial use, it is important to note that Users may
not:
use such content for the purpose of providing other users with access on a regular or large scale basis or as a means to circumvent access
control;
use such content where to do so would be considered a criminal or statutory offence in any jurisdiction, or gives rise to civil liability, or is
otherwise unlawful;
falsely or misleadingly imply or suggest endorsement, approval , sponsorship, or association unless explicitly agreed to by Springer Nature in
writing;
use bots or other automated methods to access the content or redirect messages
override any security feature or exclusionary protocol; or
share the content in order to create substitute for Springer Nature products or services or a systematic database of Springer Nature journal
content.
In line with the restriction against commercial use, Springer Nature does not permit the creation of a product or service that creates revenue,
royalties, rent or income from our content or its inclusion as part of a paid for service or for other commercial gain. Springer Nature journal
content cannot be used for inter-library loans and librarians may not upload Springer Nature journal content on a large scale into their, or any
other, institutional repository.
These terms of use are reviewed regularly and may be amended at any time. Springer Nature is not obligated to publish any information or
content on this website and may remove it or features or functionality at our sole discretion, at any time with or without notice. Springer Nature
may revoke this licence to you at any time and remove access to any copies of the Springer Nature journal content which have been saved.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, Springer Nature makes no warranties, representations or guarantees to Users, either express or implied
with respect to the Springer nature journal content and all parties disclaim and waive any implied warranties or warranties imposed by law,
including merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose.
Please note that these rights do not automatically extend to content, data or other material published by Springer Nature that may be licensed
from third parties.
If you would like to use or distribute our Springer Nature journal content to a wider audience or on a regular basis or in any other manner not
expressly permitted by these Terms, please contact Springer Nature at
onlineservice@springernature.com
... Social network analysis, as shown by Blokland et al. (2024), can map these relationships, revealing how poll creators and responders influence new members' behavior, shape community focus and sustain harmful behaviors via differential association. These "key players," as for example identified by Gnielka et al. (2024), may encourage certain preferences or endorse specific practices through their poll questions and commentary. From a preventive perspective, disrupting the influence of central figures and the polls they promote could destabilize key elements of these networks, making them less effective at reinforcing deviant norms. ...
Article
Full-text available
With societal attitudes toward adult-child sexual interactions shifting in the late 20th century, resulting in stricter legal frameworks and heightened public concern, individuals with a sexual interest in children increasingly turned to the darknet to maintain anonymity. This study examines a "boy-lover" darknet forum, home to nearly 100,000 members, by analyzing responses to 12 user-generated polls. These polls, while not scientifically structured or motivated, offer a rare, non-reactive glimpse into the psychosexual and psychosocial dynamics within this hidden community. The analysis highlights how preferences, behaviors, and social interactions are communicated, reinforced, and normalized in an environment shielded from societal scrutiny. By focusing on user-generated topics such as age preferences, child sexual abuse material consumption, and child sex cues, this study contextualizes these behaviors within existing research and underscores the critical role these digital ecosystems play in perpetuating sexual exploitation. The findings emphasize the need for a deeper understanding of these online communities to inform strategies for disrupting harmful activities and protecting vulnerable populations.
Article
Full-text available
In this work we focus on identifying key players in dark net cryptomarkets that facilitate online trade of illegal goods. Law enforcement aims to disrupt criminal activity conducted through these markets by targeting key players vital to the market’s existence and success. We particularly focus on detecting successful vendors responsible for the majority of illegal trade. Our methodology aims to uncover whether the task of key player identification should center around plainly measuring user and forum activity, or that it requires leveraging specific patterns of user communication. We focus on a large-scale dataset from the Evolution cryptomarket, which we model as an evolving communication network. Results indicate that user and forum activity, measured through topic engagement, is best able to identify successful vendors. Interestingly, considering users with higher betweenness centrality in the communication network further improves performance, also identifying successful vendors with moderate activity on the forum. But more importantly, analyzing the forum data over time, we find evidence that attaining a high betweenness score comes before vendor success. This suggests that the proposed network-driven approach of modelling user communication might prove useful as an early warning signal for key player identification.
Article
Full-text available
Background: The darknet hosts an increasing number of hidden services dedicated to the distribution of child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Given that by contributing CSAM to the forum members subject themselves to criminal prosecution, questions regarding the motivation for members contributing to darknet CSAM forums arise. Objective: Building on insights gained from research into clearnet communities, here we examine the extent to which social incentives generated by the online CSAM community may explain members' posting behavior on darknet CSAM forums. Participants and setting: We analyze digital forensic artifacts on the online behavior of members of a darknet CSAM forum that was shut down by law enforcement agencies in July 2015. Methods: We apply group-based trajectory modelling (GBTM), social network analysis, and mixed-effect survival models. Results: Applying GBTM three posting trajectories can be distinguished. Social network analyses finds the reply network to be more centralized than predicted by chance. Mixed-effect survival models show positive associations between the length of members' first post and the time since members' first registration on the forum and subsequent posting. Contrarily, the number of replies received appears to mitigate subsequent posting. Conclusions: Findings show posting activity on the forum to be concentrated in a minority of forum members who show posting trajectories that are both frequent and persistent. Results further suggest persistence in posting is motivated by social identity and, to a lesser extent, differential association processes.
Article
Full-text available
Research Summary We present a comprehensive description of Hydra, the largest darknet marketplace in the world until its shutdown in April 2022. We document the main features of Hydra such as dead‐drop delivery, feedback and reputation system, escrow, and dispute resolution. Using data scraped from the platform, we quantitatively examine the scale and the structure of the marketplace. We find that it has been highly competitive, geographically covering at least 69% of the Russian population and trading a wide variety of drugs, while also allowing the wholesale trade of drugs and precursors. The dead‐drop delivery system used on Hydra was expensive, as the courier costs comprised a substantial proportion of the sale price of drugs on Hydra. We contribute to the research on drug cryptomarkets by studying an unprecedentedly large non‐Western marketplace that existed substantially longer than any other known darknet market. Policy Implications The phenomenon of Hydra shows that shut‐down policies applied to darknet marketplaces have a large effect and implicitly shape the whole drug market. Without these policies, a pervasive digitalization of the drug trade can occur. The major cost of allowing marketplaces to grow is the probable increase in the consumption of illegal drugs due to convenience for consumers and facilitated cooperation between suppliers. This cost must be weighed against the potential benefits, including a higher quality of drugs, a decrease in potential violence, and the incentives for a large marketplace to self‐regulate. The case of Hydra also suggests the relevance of financial regulation to limit the growth of darknet marketplaces.
Article
Full-text available
By routing traffic through a random combination of servers worldwide, the darknet obfuscates the identity of its users, making it an attractive medium for journalists, dissidents, and individuals committing crimes. Since 2008, access to the darknet has been facilitated by the The Onion Router (TOR) browser, bringing the darknet within reach of an increasingly wider audience. Tens of thousands of darknet forums serve the criminal needs of millions of users each day and hundreds of these darknet forums are especially dedicated to the exchange of child sexual abuse materials (CSAM). Practitioners who work with men with sexual offences may therefore face individuals whose sexual offences occurred partly or wholly in the darknet. In the current review article, we summarize both the scientific literature and evidence obtained from CSAM forum “take-downs,” to describe the organization of darknet CSAM forums and the activities of their members. These forums report large and international memberships of individuals who, much like mainstream social media, interact online on a regular basis, creating large, online communities in which like-minded individuals can socialize and barter CSAM with minimal risk of discovery. Not all forum members contribute equally to the community, and especially administrators appear indispensable for the proper functioning of the CSAM forum. Implications for future research and law enforcement are discussed.
Article
Full-text available
Strong encryption algorithms and reliable anonymity routing have made cybercrime investigation more challenging. Hence, one option for law enforcement agencies (LEAs) is to search through unencrypted content on the Internet or anonymous communication networks (ACNs). The capability of automatically harvesting web content from web servers enables LEAs to collect and preserve data prone to serve as potential leads, clues, or evidence in an investigation. Although scientific studies have explored the field of web crawling soon after the inception of the web, few research studies have thoroughly scrutinised web crawling on the "dark web" or via ACNs such as I2P, IPFS, Freenet, and Tor. The current paper presents a systematic literature review (SLR) that examines the prevalence and characteristics of dark web crawlers. From a selection of 58 peer-reviewed articles mentioning crawling and the dark web, 34 remained after excluding irrelevant articles. The literature review showed that most dark web crawlers were programmed in Python, using either Selenium or Scrapy as the web scraping library. The knowledge gathered from the systematic literature review was used to develop a Tor-based web crawling model into an already existing software toolset customised for ACN-based investigations. Finally, the performance of the model was examined through a set of experiments. The results indicate that the developed crawler was successful in scraping web content from both clear and dark web pages, and scraping dark marketplaces on the Tor network. The scientific contribution of this paper entails novel knowledge concerning ACN-based web crawlers. Furthermore, it presents a model for crawling and scraping clear and dark websites for the purpose of digital investigations. The conclusions include practical implications of dark web content retrieval and archival, such as investigation clues and evidence, and the related future research topics.
Article
Full-text available
How do illegal markets grow and develop? Using unique transaction-level data on 7,205 market actors and 16,847 illegal drug exchanges on a "darknet" drug market, the authors evaluate the network processes that shape online illegal drug trade and promote the growth of online illegal drug markets. Contrary to past research on online markets, the authors argue that the high-risk context of illegal trade enhances market actors' reliance on social relationships that emerge endogenously from transaction networks. The findings reveal a highly structured trade network characterized by dense clustering and frequent recurrent drug exchange. Dynamic network models reveal that both embeddedness and closure in exchange structure increase the hazard rate of illegal drug trade, with effect sizes comparable to formal reputations. These effects are pronounced in the early stages of market development but wane once the market reaches maturity. These findings demonstrate the powerful, temporally contingent, influence of transaction networks on illegal trade in online markets and reveal how endogenous networks of economic relations can promote risky exchange under conditions of relative anonymity and illegality. Governments play a key role in market development. States define the type of products for sale as well as the rules governing exchange. Markets also rely on 1 We are indebted to Srinivasan Parthasarathy and Mohit Jangid for coding assistance.
Article
Full-text available
Multiplex social networks are characterized by a common set of actors connected through multiple types of relations. The multinet package provides a set of R functions to analyze multiplex social networks within the more general framework of multilayer networks, where each type of relation is represented as a layer in the network. The package contains functions to import/export, create and manipulate multilayer networks, implementations of several state-of-the-art multiplex network analysis algorithms, e.g., for centrality measures, layer comparison, community detection and visualization. Internally, the package is mainly written in native C++ and integrated with R using the Rcpp package.
Article
Full-text available
With the rapid development of the Internet, cybersecurity situation is becoming more and more complex. At present, surface web and dark web contain numerous underground forums or markets, which play an important role in cybercrime ecosystem. Therefore, cybersecurity researchers usually focus on hacker-centered research on cybercrime, trying to find key hackers and extract credible cyber threat intelligence from them. The data scale of underground forums is tremendous and key hackers only represent a small fraction of underground forum users. It takes a lot of time as well as expertise to manually analyze key hackers. Therefore, it is necessary to propose a method or tool to automatically analyze underground forums and identify key hackers involved. In this work, we present HackerRank, an automatic method for identifying key hackers. HackerRank combines the advantages of content analysis and social network analysis. First, comprehensive evaluations and topic preferences are extracted separately using content analysis. Then, it uses an improved Topic-specific PageRank to combine the results of content analysis with social network analysis. Finally, HackerRank obtains users’ ranking, with higher-ranked users being considered as key hackers. To demonstrate the validity of proposed method, we applied HackerRank to five different underground forums separately. Compared to using social network analysis and content analysis alone, HackerRank increases the coverage rate of five underground forums by 3.14% and 16.19% on average. In addition, we performed a manual analysis of identified key hackers. The results prove that the method is effective in identifying key hackers in underground forums.
Article
Full-text available
This study provides a snapshot of the availability of weapons across eight omnibus or ‘High Street’ and 12 specialist darknet or illicit cryptomarkets between July and December 2019. Overall, 2,124 weapons were identified, of which 11 percent were found on niche markets. On all markets, weapons for sale included 1,497 handguns, 218 rifles, 41 submachine guns and 34 shotguns. Also available were ammunition (n=79), explosives (n=37) and accessories such as silencers (n=24). Omnibus markets also sold other weapons (n=70) such as tasers, pepper spray and knives, and digital products (n=112), mostly DIY weapon manuals, as well as chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons (n=12). The data allowed for estimates of the cost of weapons and some description of the 215 vendors identified, 18 (8.4%) of whom were active across more than one market.