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Small Wars & Insurgencies
ISSN: 0959-2318 (Print) 1743-9558 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fswi20
Do mercenaries perform better than states?
Evaluating the Wagner group’s impact on Central
African Republic
Ori Swed & Alessandro Arduino
To cite this article: Ori Swed & Alessandro Arduino (2025) Do mercenaries perform better
than states? Evaluating the Wagner group’s impact on Central African Republic, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, 36:1, 59-86, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2024.2418675
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Do mercenaries perform better than states?
Evaluating the Wagner group’s impact on Central
African Republic
Ori Swed
a
and Alessandro Arduino
b
a
Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work Department, Texas Tech University, Lubbock,
Texas, USA;
b
Lau China Institute, King’s College London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Do mercenaries perform better than democratic state armies? This study exam-
ines the ecacy of mercenary groups compared to state military interventions,
using the Wagner Group’s operations in the Central African Republic as a case
study. By comparing the French Operation Sangaris (2013–2016) with Wagner’s
involvement (2021–2023), the research evaluates their relative eectiveness
across counterinsurgency measures, military success, and popular responses.
Utilizing data from the Armed Conict Location & Event Data Project, the
analysis reveals that the Wagner Group outperformed the French intervention
in most metrics, including territorial gains, geographical spread of operations,
and reduction of civil unrest. These ndings challenge prevailing assumptions
about mercenaries’ ineectiveness. The study suggests that the Wagner
Group’s perceived eectiveness, despite its controversial reputation and asso-
ciation to human rights violations, explains its appeal to African governments
seeking security solutions. This research contributes to ongoing debates about
the role of private military companies in conict zones and has implications for
understanding the changing dynamics of security provision in Africa and
beyond.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 August 2024; Accepted 15 October 2024
KEYWORDS Wagner group; Mercenaries; private military companies PMC; Central African Republic;
French operation sangaris; Counterinsurgency
Introduction
This study addresses the paradox of the Wagner Group’s success in Africa.
Studies consistently show the ineptitude and instability that mercenaries
introduce into conict areas.
1
Research suggests that rather than solving
security problems, mercenaries exacerbate violence and human insecurity,
2
marking them unreliable and risky partners. Yet, in a short period several
African countries, which entertained a longstanding French military
CONTACT Alessandro Arduino alessandro.1.arduino@kcl.ac.uk Lau China Institute, King’s
College London, London, UK
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES
2025, VOL. 36, NO. 1, 59–86
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2024.2418675
© 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
partnership and collaboration, decided to substitute their longstanding
French support with the Russian mercenary group – the Wagner Group.
This study is situated within a broader conversation on mercenaries’ and
private military and security companies’ (PMSCs) ecacy and the human
rights implications of their participation in an armed conict. Statist and
neoliberal scholars are conicted over non-state actors’ ecacy in security
operations and as agents of the state in armed conict in comparison to the
state and its armed and security forces.
3
Statist scholars raise concerns over
the challenge these groups pose to sovereignty and the legitimate monopoly
of the means of violence while neoliberal scholars emphasize the reality of
privatization and its outcomes. Utilizing the Wagner Group intervention in
the Central African Republic (CAR) as a case study, this research presents an
empirical analysis of those approaches, adding to those discussions. Our
ndings suggest that higher ecacy by those actors can lead to clients and
popular support, regardless of human rights reputation.
The case study examines two counterinsurgency operations that took
place in CAR: the French Operation Sangaris (2013–2016) and the Wagner
Group’s involvement in CAR (2021–2023).
4
We compare these two operations
across a variety of parameters with the goal of assessing the ecacy of the
mercenaries’ involvement. Focusing on the Wagner Group allows us to
engage well with the current body of work on mercenaries and PMSCs.
Despite disagreements over the proper denition for those entities the
Wagner Group is repeatedly considered as tting both categories. This is
due to its broad array of operations, which include full military capabilities as
well as more mundane security and support functions. The focus on CAR as
a case study allows us to compare two counterinsurgency campaigns con-
ducted by dierent actors against similar types of rivals in the same territory.
We hypothesize that the Wagner Group’s popularity and success in Africa
stem from its perceived eectiveness in dealing with insurgents. In compar-
ison to the French operation, the Wagner operation was more aggressive,
repatriated more territory from the rebels, and yielded better results for the
military junta in charge.
Outsourcing military operations, issues of ecacy and human
rights concerns
Discussions on the on-the-ground eects of outsourcing military operations
to private actors have focused on two streams of scholarship. The rst high-
lights the relative eciency of the private sector compared to government
operations, while the second focuses on concerns about human rights viola-
tions resulting from privatizing security functions, which could harm both
local populations and mission success.
5
The rst stream of studies was largely
driven by states’ adoption of neoliberal ideology for security and military
60 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
challenges. This trend initially focused on weak African governments’ reliance
on mercenaries in civil wars,
6
and later on the dierent iterations of out-
sourcing during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
7
It emphasized the benet of
specialization those actors oer and their ability to address the capabilities
gap.
8
In Africa, ‘o-the-shelf’ armies provided the security that local states
could not.
9
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the focus moved to specialized skills and
functions, such as VIP protection, logistics, training, and others.
10
It also
addressed the incorporation of public management logic into the eld of
security through this practice.
11
This invited a string of studies that explored
operational issues and assessed the eectiveness of those actors. The princi-
pal operational issues examined this dimension of military- ‘civilian’
interaction,
12
looking at unit cohesion and unintended consequences of
this collaboration. Studies on operational aspects quickly developed into an
assessment of eectiveness, essentially asking if the incorporation of contrac-
tors assists or harms units achieving their mission. Dunigan
13
examined the
contribution of private military and security companies to the U.S. military
eectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan, identifying the main challenges for
military collaboration with PMSC units and integration of contractors within
military units. She points out that PMSC improves the skills and quality of the
ghting force, oering an advantage that improves eectiveness.
Petersohn
14
shows that when deployed with armies along with institutiona-
lized oversight, private military contractors are indeed eective. Akcinaroglu
et al.
15
show similar results, suggesting that within a competitive market, for-
prot military professionals decrease the duration of civil wars. In another
study, Radziszewski and Akcinaroglu
16
denote that PMSC training interven-
tion decreases ghters’ readiness to ght and is associated with prolonging
the duration of peace. Modeling the moral hazard optimal employment of
PMSCs by states, Fahn and Hadjer
17
argue that it is preferable for states to use
PMSCs, even if they expect worse performance than state intervention.
While demonstrating a positive contribution to operational success
according to some dimensions, a second string of studies stress the more
problematic nature of this industry: its negative eect on human security and
human rights. This body of work focused on these actors’ problematic and
often criminal behavior, suggesting that this ecacy may come with a price
tag.
18
Studying mercenaries’ participation in African civil-wars, Kinsey
19
stres-
ses the moral and legal challenges those actors introduce. This debate was
received broader attention by the Nisour Square incident, involving the PMC
(Private Military Company) Blackwater’s contractors,
20
and the body of work
that raised concerns on the poorly regulated market for force.
21
This event
highlighted PMCs’ participation in the war eort and provoked a discussion
on mercenarism and accountability. The gaps in accountability and eective
regulation received vast coverage, with scholars and legal experts pointing
out these actors’ de facto impunity.
22
Examining US Army eld reports from
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 61
the Iraq War, Petersohn
23
shows that, on average, PMSCs are associated with
higher rates of civilian casualties than soldiers. Comparing two prominent
PMSCs in the Iraq War, Blackwater and DynCorp, Fitzsimmons
24
adds nuance
to this trend. He suggests that organizational culture can create more aggres-
sive companies, which may result in a higher civilian casualty count.
Following that dierentiative line of reasoning, Tkach
25
and Radziszweski
26
argue that contract structure or CEOs’ eld experience may have similar
impacts.
The discussion on the unintended consequences was not limited to civilian
casualties and human rights concerns. It translated these actors’ unruly
behavior with a decrease in ecacy, indicating that it may have serious
implications on operational outcomes. Pointing out how private contractors’
fraud and misconduct endangered American soldiers and operational goals,
Rasor and Bauman
27
suggest that outsourcing damages eectiveness.
Reckless organizational culture and cowboy mentality have the potential to
translate into operational problems and reduced ecacy. This was underlined
in Fitzsimmons’
28
work on Blackwater and Higate
29
examining contractors’
hazing practices. Moreover, several studies stress that the rise in civilian
casualties undermines counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations,
as it raises grievances and is used for insurgents and terrorists’ recruitment.
30
This body of theory suggests that mercenaries and PMSCs association with
increased body count in armed conict may lead to counterproductive out-
comes and damage ecacy.
The two streams of research come in contradiction regarding mercenaries
and contractors’ contribution to the mission’s ecacy. Are those actors
eective in achieving mission outcomes, shortening civil wars, and prolong-
ing peace, or are they associated with an increase in civilian casualties, human
rights abuses, and undermining conict ecacy?
The Wagner group
To explore this question, we will focus on a controversial organization, the
Wagner Group. The Wagner Group was spearheaded by retired Russian GRU
colonel Dmitri Utkin, the former commander of the Hong Kong-incorporated
PMC Slavonic Corps in Syria. Despite unclear origins, the group gained inter-
national attention in 2014 during Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern
Ukraine. The Wagner Group quickly rose to prominence, surpassing other
Russian PMCs, due to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s nancial backing and his ability to
combine military operations with his propaganda and disinformation appa-
ratus, the Internet Research Agency (IRA). Prigozhin, a catering magnate
turned aspiring warlord, met his end in a ery plane crash in Russian airspace
in August 2023, along with Utkin and other Wagner members.
31
Most of the
group’s activities have taken place in a legal gray zone, allowing the Russian
62 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
government a degree of deniability and distance from the group. In 2014, it
emerged in the East Ukraine conict and the takeover of the Crimea penin-
sula and a year later as an instrumental participant in the Syrian Civil War.
32
Since then, it’s been deployed as one of the main Russian proxies in Libya,
Sudan, and numerous African countries.
33
Following the Russian invasion of
Ukraine in 2022, the Wagner Group has played a major role, particularly in the
Battle of Bakhmut where it achieved territorial gains in a hard battle and with
heavy losses.
34
A signicant portion of the group’s funding is linked to own-
ership of and access to local natural resources and assets in the areas where
they operate. Those came through exploitative deals and concessions in
exchange for their security and military services.
35
The Wagner Group is an
outlier in the universe of commercial security actors due to its size, success,
and its direct involvement in combat. Nonetheless, it is the leading and most
discussed group in the category of mercenaries and PMSCs today.
Along with its battleeld successes in Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and other
places, Wagner gained serious notoriety. It’s been linked to severe human
rights abuse, among them extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity,
torture, and massacres.
36
A review of pundits’ and scholars’ assessments of
the Wagner Group indicates the organization is dangerous, placing civilians
and locals at risk.
37
It does not adhere to human rights norms and is asso-
ciated with massacres.
38
It is greedy, conditioning collaboration with eco-
nomic concessions that allow the group to take over natural resources.
39
Its
personnel comprised unprofessional operatives, including prisoners who
were ‘convinced’ to join in exchange for reduced sentences and expunged
criminal records.
40
And above all, they are just not good at what they do.
41
This would suggest that the organization’s bad reputation will make it harder
for them to secure clients or maintain their contracts. Surprisingly, this is not
the case. The Wagner Group expanded its operations, involvement, and
contracts across Africa and the Middle East, and has been associated with
over twenty countries. The Group capitalizes on instability to reap prots
without fostering sustainable development. Nevertheless, from the early
steps of Wagner in Mali in December 2021, the footprint has expanded in
Sub-Saharan Africa to include Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic,
Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan, and other countries in the Sahel.
Governments invite the group to assist them with security problems
42
and
the local urban population seems to be supportive of the Wagner operators’
arrival.
43
While the Wagner Group keeps expanding its footprint in natural
resources-rich African states, even after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demise, western
researchers are still adamant about the exploitative relation that the Group
has with the region. Wagner’s exploitative ties with numerous African gov-
ernments, leveraging military and security services to secure mining rights
and political favor, lack genuine intent for supporting local sustainable
development.
44
The negative ripple eects stemming from the Wagner
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 63
Group’s ‘’manageable chaos’’
45
—maintaining insecurity and proting from
the ongoing instability – involve widespread atrocities, such as extrajudicial
killings and forced disappearances.
46
Central African Republic Civil Wars and external intervention
The Central African Republic has been plagued with political instability since
its inception, experiencing multiple uprisings and military coups.
47
In 2013,
CAR’s President François Bozizé was overthrown by the Muslim rebel alliance,
Séléka, sending the country into a spiral of instability. Séléka has been
described by the International Crisis Group as ‘a heterogeneous consortium
of malcontents’
48
; many were rebels from the northeast part of CAR, some of
whom participated in past insurgencies against the Bozizé regime since his
takeover in 200249. Stamping through the country and taking several key
cities, the Séléka rebels’ military campaign ended in the takeover of Bangui,
the capital city, and the toppling of the regime.
50
They placed one of the
leaders, Michel Djotodia, as the new President. Emboldened by their success,
the rebels ran wild in the countryside, pillaging and killing Christian
communities.
51
Djotodia lost his control over the rebel groups, leading to
the collapse of the government and the continuation of the civil war. Waves
of massive sectarian warfare, conducted mostly by Séléka ghters and
Christian militias known as the anti-Balaka, engulfed the country. Concerns
over a potential genocide brought the U.N. to pass Resolution 2127, sanction-
ing the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
(MISCA) (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduit
africaine), which in 2014 was incorporated into the U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sion United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the
Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Those missions involved multiple nations
and raised a force of 3,5000 soldiers that grew to 12,109 personnel at the end
of 2016 under MINUSCA.
52
The mission was spearheaded by a French expedi-
tionary force of about 2,000 soldiers.
53
The French named this intervention Operation Sangaris. The operation was
the continuation of a long French interventionist tradition on behalf of its
regional allies and interests .
54
It was the seventh French military intervention
in the country since its independence in 1960. The French held a regular
contingent in the country, which secured the Bangui airport during the civil
war, and a second force that was part of the peacekeeping mission in the
country, Operation Boali. Those units established the core component of
Sangaris at its inception. The operation included three phases. The rst,
from December 2013 until January 2014 focused on the deployment of
troops and building condence among the local population. It concentrated
on securing Bangui, the largest concentration of population in the country.
The second phase, from January to March 2014, expanded the mission to
64 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
secure the logistic routes from Cameroon to Bangui. Those included the cities
Bouar, Carnot, and Berberati in the western part of the country. The third
phase, from March to June 2014, attempted to reestablish the government’s
authority and sovereignty on the eastern parts of the country.
55
During the
operation, the French forces actively participated in the ghting, working
closely with the African and international contingents. Yet, the number of
troops was not sucient to complete the mission. Thus, the last part of the
operation focused on transitioning MISUA into the larger mission, MINUSCA.
Under its limited mandate, the mission could be considered as a success,
given that it secured the pacication of Bangui, the logistic routes to Bangui,
demobilizedmilitia groups, and supported the transition to MINUSCA.
Furthermore, at the end of Sangaris the CAR government regained control
over the capital and parts of the country.
However, these outcomes were still limited. The government was far from
controlling most of the country. Estimates suggest that the government
assumed control over about 20% of the country, mostly in the western part
of the country, with pockets in the southeast part. The Séléka territorial losses
were attributed more to rival factions’ territorial gains, the formal dismantling
of Séléka, and the Ugandan operation in southeast CAR to capture Josef
Cony.
56
Furthermore, even the pacication of Bangui was not complete,
with militias controlling parts of the city and sectarian ghting still erupting
in the streets. Operations after Sangaris were led by the CAR armed forces and
MINUSCA. In 2016 and 2018, the combined forces were able to push some
factions outside of cities in the western part of the country. Yet, by 2021 those
gains diminished with the rise of new factions that exhausted the CAR armed
forces and MINUSCA. At that point, the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC),
a coalition of rebel and militia groups that controlled most of the country,
almost eliminated all government presence in the southeastern regions and
headed to Bangui.
The years following Sangaris signaled a decline in French inuence in the
country and the rise of Russian intervention. Between 2017 and 2021, Russia
and CAR increased their partnership. Russia promoted itself as a substitute for
France, oering political support, security and military assistance, and eco-
nomic collaboration with an emphasis on mining operations.
57
It was part of
a broader trend of Russian investment in African countries as part of a wider
attempt to expand its geopolitical reach and, later, o circumvent international
sanctions due to the annexation of Crimea and the Russian role in the Donbas
War. Russian support began with sending Wagner operatives under the
umbrella of instructors, who quickly became the Russians’ main agents in
the country.
58
In 2018, the Wagner Group trained the Presidential Guard and
even delivered VIP protection to President Touadéra. A few days before the
2020–21 CAR General Elections, rebels captured the city of Bambari and
pushed towards Bangui. This led to the deployment of additional Wagner
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 65
operatives and the preparation for a counteroensive. In 2021, Wagner led
CAR’s counteroensive against the rebels. It was accompanied by the crea-
tion of a ‘parallel army’, trained by Wagner, that sidestepped the state’s legal
recruitment and procedures. The army was comprised of 5,000 new recruits,
many of them from members of Touadéra’s ethnic group, twelve military
units that were trained by the Russian instructors, and some pro-government
militias.
59
The counteroensive was very successful, resulting in about 60% of
the country falling into governmental control. It included incursions into the
rebels’ stronghold in the east and the takeover of Birao which has been
eectively under rebels’ control since 2014. It is important to mention that
the Wagner operation has been also marred with multiple allegations of mass
atrocities.
60
Those included the targeting of rival ethnic groups, extrajudicial
killings, and the mass killings of civilians in rebel-controlled territory. Some of
the atrocities were associated with the cleansing of Touadera’s political rivals.
Others were linked to Wagner’s assertion of control within territories around
their gold mines.
61
Comparing the two operations across several parameters, in the following
section we examine the eect of each operation on the country.
Data and methods
To assess the ecacy of the French versus the Wagner-led intervention, we
use the Armed Conict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The ACLED
dataset is an event-base dataset that oers a variety of parameters, including
the actors involved in each event, their actions, the time and location of the
event, as well as additional characteristics.
62
The dataset is commonly used in
conict research.
63
In this study, we focus on data from the Central African
Republic between 2012–2023. We utilize the sub-event variables (such as
Armed Clashes, Government Regains Territory, Peaceful Protest, Arrests, and
many others)
64
in conjunction with the period of the French and the Wagner-
led operations in the country in our analysis.
Measuring success or ecacy is challenging and complicated. Those terms
can be explained dierently, operationalized dierently, and refer to dierent
phenomena. In the context of mercenaries and PMSCs, several studies
explored dierent dimensions of ecacy. Those can be broadly divided into
two approaches. The rst focuses on the services provided and assumes an
organizational outlook. These studies examine elements of cost-ecacy,
namely, the market oers specic solutions that cost less yet deliver similar
output. For instance, comparing private armies with military intervention,
Shearer
65
focused on the eectiveness of service delivery and cost-ecacy
calculations. The second approach examines the contribution of the PMSCs
and similar actors to military eectiveness. This approach focuses on the
military and not the management of business objectives. Namely to what
66 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
degree do these actors help the militaries achieve their goals? For example,
Petersohn
66
studiedPMSCs’ military eectiveness by focusing on ‘the ability
of the client’s forces to inict damage upon the enemy and expand military
operations’. Thus, his study assesses the military eectiveness of those actors
by focusing on the severity of the conict as a proxy. Dunigan
67
combines the
two approaches. In her book, she stresses that contractors’ successful inte-
gration into military operations is essential to achieving any level of success.
At the same time, her study measures eectiveness by looking at winning
wars. Comporting with the second approach, this study focuses on military
eectiveness, assessing military success.
To assess ecacy, our analysis compares the two operations across several
parameters. The rst set of parameters examines the operations through
counterinsurgency measures. The second set of measures examines the
operations through the lens of military success. The third set of parameters
examines popular responses.
Counterinsurgency measures. The counterinsurgency approach stresses
the importance of reducing civilian casualties in operations.
68
Given that the
state ghts with an elusive enemy that hides amongst the local population
and builds its logistics, intelligence, and recruitment within those commu-
nities, the ability to win hearts and minds and to separate communities from
insurgents is a key factor in achieving success. In this process, a high casualty
rate can alienate the local population and assist with the terrorists’ and
insurgents’ recruitment.
69
With mercenaries those are harder to achieve
given that they are associated with the increase in the severity of the conict
and its duration.
70
Thus, to assess ecacy in that domain, we focus on two
variables: fatalities rates and attacks against civilians. We assert that higher
ecacy will be associated with lower fatalities and instances of attacks
against civilians. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H1: The lower the fatalities rate in relation to an operation the more
eective the operation is.
H2: The lower the number of attacks against civilians in relation to an
operation the more eective the operation is
Military success. The CAR Civil War included the diminishing of the state’s
sovereignty and ability to control its own territory. Rebels and militias took
over towns, villages, and regions in the country, leaving the state
helpless.
71
ACLED identied 28 incidents of violent nonstate actors’ terri-
torial gains before the French intervention. Consequently, to assess military
success, we examine two variables. The rst focuses on areas of operation,
examining the geolocation of armed clashes. The second is the govern-
ment’s territorial gains. We suggest that the broader and deeper the
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 67
engagement, the more aggressive the operation aiming to take back
territory. We also assert that higher rates of the government’s territorial
gains are a clear indication of success. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
H3: The higher the number of government territorial gains in relation to an
operation the more eective the operation is.
H4: The lower the number of insurgents’ territorial gains in relation to an
operation the more eective the operation is.
H5: The further the geographical distribution of the armed clashes in rela-
tion to an operation the more eective the operation is.
Popular responses. Lastly, we suggest that the success of military opera-
tions is associated with the reduction of civil unrest and an increase in
sovereignty. At the inception of the civil war, the government lost control
of many parts of the country. This was followed by a rise in mob violence,
violent demonstrations, and looting.
72
We assert that a decrease in
popular violence is an indication of an increase in sovereignty and as
such the success of the operation. Thus, we introduce the following
hypothesis:
H6: A decrease in looting, mob violence, and violent demonstrations in
relation to an operation are indications of the success of the operation in
reestablishing sovereignty.
To compare and assess the ecacy across operations, the analysis uses
descriptive statistics (H1, H2, H3, H4, H6), logistic regression (H1), and
spatial analysis (H5). The descriptive statistics compare the variables
Fatalities, Armed Clashes, Government Territorial Gains, Nonstate
Territorial Gains, Looting, Mob Violence, and Violent Demonstration,
all taken from ACLED. The regression model uses logistic regression in
line with the structure of the independent variable (dummy). The
model focuses on the association between the period of time of the
French versus the Wagner operation and the number of conict-related
fatalities. The model includes control variables and alternative explana-
tions for the fatality rate (number of armed clashes, number of attacks
against civilians, grenade attacks, IED attacks, violent demonstrations,
territorial gains by one of the actors involved in the conict, and sexual
violence). Lastly, the analysis compares maps of the two operations that
geocode armed clashes, assessing the spatial boundaries of the
operation.
68 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
Results
Comparing the fatalities and attacks against civilians across the two opera-
tions shows the following. The ACLED data reported 1,747 fatalities and 661
attacks against civilians in the French operation, Sangaris. At the same time,
the Wagner-led operation has been associated with 1,817 fatalities and 557
attacks against civilians. Showing that the gap between the two operations is
not meaningful. While Sangaris showed fewer fatalities (more eective), its
rate of attacks against civilians was higher (less eective).
Fatalities can be associated with a variety of factors. First, the rate of
fatalities per attack or battle matters. Moreover, fatalities can be attributed
to civil unrest, such as violent demonstrations, and not directly to the opera-
tion. Table 1 presents two regression models that assess the association
between the time period of each operation to the fatalities rate, while con-
trolling for alternative explanations. Model 1 examines the French operation
association with fatalities. It shows that the operation is associated with a 0.40
increase in the log-odds of the fatalities, holding all other independent
variables constant (p < 0.000). Namely, the number of fatalities during
Sangaris was about 40% higher than any other period in the dataset.
Similarly, model 2 shows that the Wagner operation is associated with
about a 0.75 increase in the log-odds of the fatalities, holding all other
independent variables constant (p < 0.000). Meaning, the number of fatalities
during the Wagner operation was about 25% lower than any other period in
the dataset.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of a host of parameters taken
from the ACLED data. The parameters are divided into four periods: 1) the
Civil War Inception between 2012–2013, when the local government lost
control to the rebels 2) Operation Sangaris between 2013–2016, with the
Table 1. Logistic regression analysis of fatalities per operation.
Model I Model II
French Operation (Sangaris) 0.40***
Wagner Operation −0.25**
Armed Clashes 5.08*** 5.10***
Attacks Against Civilians 5.46*** 5.49***
Government Territorial Gain 3.27*** 3.32***
Grenade Attacks 4.81*** 4.95***
Mob Violence 4.53*** 4.59***
Nonstate Actors Territorial Gain 4.85*** 4.75***
IED Attacks 5.23*** 5.28***
Sexual Violence 3.78*** 3.77***
Violent Demonstrations 2.65*** 2.73***
ACLED Interactions Code 0.00*** 0.00**
Coff. −4.98 −4.48
N 5978 5978
R
2
0.33 0.33
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. +p < 0.1.
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 69
French intervention 3) The post-Sangaris period between 2016–2020, with
the retreat of France and the entry of Russia into the CAR 4) The Wagner
operation between 2020–2023.73 The data shows that the rst stages of the
conict between 2012–2013 have been characterized by the government loss
of territory (28 events reporting) and its inability to eectively engage in
armed conict with the rebels (low levels of armed clashes).
The French intervention (2013–2016) increased armed clashes (jumping
from 75 to 440) yet resulted in high casualty rates and minimum gains. The
French operation included merely 3 events involving the government regain-
ing its territory from the rebels while having 5 events of the rebels taking over
territory. The operation also led to 5 agreements and 16 non-violent transfers
of territory. In contrast, the Wagner operation was about equally lethal and
aggressive as the French one with 537 clashes and 1817 fatalities. Yet, it was
translated into signicantly higher numbers of governmental territorial gains
(36), despite the fact that 9 rebel territorial gains were also recorded. The
Wagner intervention was also associated with 15 agreements and 58 non-
violent territorial transfers. To sum up, the French intervention yielded a total
of 14 territorial gains, while the Wagner intervention won 85.
The gures in Table 2 oer us a glimpse into both operations, yet they do not
capture the scope of each operation. Specically, how geographically spread was
each operation. At the rst stages of the civil war, rebels and militia groups drove
the government out of many parts of the country, establishing their control and
diminishing the state’s sovereignty. Thus, regaining territorial control and dislod-
ging the rebels from their strongholds was essential for the government. Using
the armed clashes variable as a proxy for the military activities, Figure 1 shows
that the French operation has been concentrated mostly in the western part of
the country. At the same time, the Wagner operation was more widespread,
covering the eastern parts of the country as well.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by period.
Civil War inception
2012–2013
Sangaris
2013–2016
Post- Sangaris
2016–2020
Wagner operation
2020–2023
Fatalities 436 1,747 1,978 1,817
Attacks Against
Civilians
165 661 502 537
Armed Clash 75 440 578 428
Government regains
territory
1 3 8 36
Non-state actor
overtakes territory
28 5 20 9
Non-violent transfer of
territory
6 16 26 58
Agreements 0 5 31 15
Looting/property
destruction
30 54 211 195
Mob violence 17 95 45 33
Sexual violence 19 31 44 45
Violent demonstration 12 88 45 12
70 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
Discussion
What do these results suggest about the ecacy of each operation?
Following our parameters of counterinsurgency, military success, and popular
response, we see the Wagner operation was more successful. Except for the
measure of fatalities rate, on every other parameter, the mercenaries out-
performed the French military intervention. They targeted fewer civilians, and
their campaign went further into rebel territory. Wagner were able to retake
more territory from the insurgents or to force diplomatic solutions that
resulted in territorial gains. Lastly, their presence reduced popular violence
(looting, sexual violence, riots, etc.), signaling an increase in sovereignty. In
sum, the Wagner intervention can be considered more eective.
Those ndings might come as a surprise given the tendency of scholars to
critique and question the ecacy and contribution of guns for hire. It is even
more surprising given the multiple reports on the Wagner Group’s record of
human rights abuses in the region and specically in CAR.
74
In this respect in
a policy comment that reviews trends in terrorism, Clark
75
explains that the
Wagner Group’s heavy-handed tactics in the Sahel are ineective, feeding
terrorism instead of stopping it. A US State Department Global Engagement
Center statement
76
points out that Wagner’s heavy-handed approach in Mali
is not only extremely deadly for non-combatants but it also brought a surge
of 278% of terrorist violence against civilians since 2021 in the country.
Yet, the nding of this case study supports the discussions on mercenaries’
ecacy. Studies recurrently demonstrate the ability of PMSCs and mercen-
aries to win conicts and produce positive outcomes for their clients.
77
This is
a strong trend in research, regardless of caveats and unintended conse-
quences. The contribution of this case study is in showing that those actors
can overperform a democratic state power. In her assessment of PMSCs’
eectiveness, Dunigan
78
establishes that when PMSCs replace armies in
armed conict they reach good outcomes. Yet, their intervention is less likely
Sangaris Armed Clashes Wagner Intervenon Armed Clashes
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of armed clashes across operations.
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 71
to follow the laws of war. She also stipulated that PMSC intervention is less
eective than the intervention of democratic states regular forces.
Nonetheless, Dunigan adds a caveat to this assessment, noting that in certain
types of conict, PMSCs’ proclivity to aunt international law may increase
their military eectiveness in comparison to democratic states’ armies.
79
The
CAR case study may represent this type of situation.
At the same time, the Wagner Group in general, and specically in the CAR
intervention, has been associated with extensive human rights violations.
80
Scholars persistently point out and warn that a lack of oversight and regula-
tion of outsourced military and security functions will lead to human rights
violations. Penel and Petersohn
81
show that PMSCs and mercenaries’ victimi-
zation of noncombatants is linked to the country’s headquarters. Countries
headquartered in nondemocratic countries are more likely not to follow
international law and to generate more victims. Those studies show their
relevancy in the examined. Carving an extrajudicial efdom in areas around
gold mines in CAR and enjoying unique status in the country,
82
the Wagner
Group has demonstrated alarming impunity for its violations. Regarding the
damaging eect of mercenaries’ human rights violations on eectiveness,
83
the paper could not nd support for that argument or negate it. This could be
attributed to issues with data, to the unique conditions of the conict where
civilians have been severely brutalized by numerous actors prior to Wagner,
or to the weakness of this body of scholarship.
It is important to note the limitations of this study. First and foremost, while
the literature discusses various types and forms of mercenaries, the case at
hand focuses on a state-sponsored mercenary group. The Wagner Group has
acted as a state proxy working in concert with the Russian state. It has been
used as a complementing foreign policy instrument.
84
This has provided the
group with political coverage, diplomatic access, military support, and eco-
nomic funding. Those are not standard when examining that industry. As such,
we may want to place our ndings in this context. Moreover, the data in this
study is taken from ACLED. While a renowned and proven dataset, it does not
cover all incidents and all events on the ground. The Sentry report
85
argues for
a Wagner pattern of behavior of mass killings and murder in the rural part of the
country. Those incidents are hard to verify and are most likely omitted from the
ACLED dataset. Better data might counter those ndings. Lastly, while we
compare two operations against similar enemies in the same territory we do
have a problem with the temporal context. The French intervention assisted
the government with stopping the rebels’ advance and stabilizing the country
while the Wagner operation was used to push the rebels further. One might
raise a critique that the Sangaris created the foundation for Wagner’s success.
A future study may decide to address this.
72 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
Conclusion
In this paper we engage with the literature about mercenaries’ ecacy, using
the CAR conict as a case study. Comparing the French operation Sangaris
with the mercenary group Wagner’s intervention. The analysis illustrates that
the mercenary group outstripped the French force sent to support the CAR
government. These ndings complement existing studies that mercenaries
emphasize high ecacy. Yet, the contribution here is in showing that they
can even outperform forces of a democratic nation. Dunigan explained that
mercenaries’ performance is good yet less eective than democratic national
armies. She also posited that in some types of conicts mercenaries’ tendency
to aunt international law to make themselves more eective. Our case study
presents that type of conict.
This study’s ndings stress the distorting power of political branding. In
the West and among Russia’s adversaries, the Wagner Group’s name has been
synonymous with evil. It has been linked to crimes against humanity and
horrible actions, including against its own people.
86
Its activities branded it as
a criminal organization and even a designation as a terrorist organization.
87
Spearin
88
titled his work on the group “Wagner Group: Comparing and
contextualizing the Russian monster”. This critique of the group is very well-
earned. It has been associated with unimaginable atrocities. Yet, those des-
ignations and brandings induce contempt, anger, and hate that cloak the
group’s high military eectiveness and popularity among the regimes that
depend on Wagner’s praetorians for their survival and the urban population
that is aected by Russia’s disinformation. A review of the French intervention
in Mali (2013–2021) and the Wagner intervention (2022–2024), yield similar
trends to our analysis. Comparatively, Wagner gained more ground, and their
campaign was more aggressive. This eectiveness is the source of the Wagner
Group’s appeal for authoritarian rulers in Africa. Lees and Petersohn
89
show
that there is a negative association between democracy and PMSCs presence.
Namely, nondemocratic states are more likely to hire these actors. Among
leaders in the Sahel and neighboring regions, Wagner is perceived as
a pragmatic partner that comes with no strings attached. Also, it’s crucial to
remember that African states have agency, and they routinely use mercen-
aries as a bargaining chip. A striking example is the Central African Republic
junta’s call for an American company Bancroft Global Development to inter-
vene in the conict.
90
Wagner’s human rights reputation is overlooked by
sovereigns with tainted track records (see human rights and rule of law index)
that wish to gain agency in conicts that they cannot win alone. Their
exchange, which is perceived in the West as exploitative,
91
involved assets
that the client country does not hold and cannot hope to hold under existing
conditions of loss of sovereignty. At the same time, Wagner’s capture and
operation of those assets ensure both security in the region and economic
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 73
benets. Wagner is invested in the success of this operation, unlike peace-
keeper forces, and they have something palpable to gain. They take risks to
achieve it. The Sentry
92
report shows how Wagner’s capturing of gold mines
and other assets drives a signicant percent of their military operations. While
critiquing this approach, it also distinguishes Wagner from the French inter-
vention. First, it pushed Wagner to operate in rural areas or parts of the
country where peacekeepers did not consider liberating. Second, it denies
income sources to violent nonstate actors that hold those assets, improving
the state’s position in the conict. This harms the rebels’ ability to fund their
operations, personnel, and solidify their achievements. Those come with
a price. Wagner’s predatory exploitation of local natural resources severely
undermines CAR’s eorts to use its limited resources for sustainable
development.
Scholarship on mercenaries’ human rights violations suggests that mer-
cenaries’ lawless actions counteract their battleeld achievements by
decreasing popular support in the state and inviting support from the
opposition.
93
Yet, here, the group’s popularity extends beyond the leader-
ship. Russia and Wagner have been running massive inuence campaigns,
targeting CAR citizens’ public opinion through multiple venues.
94
Those
eorts included the nancing of local press and radio (the most popular
media mediums in the country), sponsoring local nongovernmental actors,
erecting statues for Wagner ghters in cities, and funding educational pro-
grams and beauty pageants.
95
The group even produced in CAR a Hollywood-
style movie (The Tourist) about a Wagner member who ghts for justice
against CAR rebels.
96
Traveling the country, Lechner
97
suggests that there
are positive popular sentiments towards the group. Those sentiments are
associated with increased security and the return of commerce, conditions
that were not prevalent under the rebels. At the same time, other sources and
testimonies report on displacement out of fear of the mercenaries, especially
their horric sexual violence and other brutal crimes.
98
An assessment of the
Wager Group’s weight on Russian public opinion in Africa shows mixed
results. Their military activities have a negative eect while their economic
activities provide positive eects.
99
Those suggest that the security package and solutions oered by Wagner
and Russia are considered superior to many countries, clients, and commu-
nities in the Sahel and the region. This is part of a broader trend where African
countries prefer Chinese economic partnerships over Western
100
and are now
looking towards Russia for regime survival. Nevertheless, the presence of the
Wagner Group and its new iteration labeled Africa Corps present a challenge
to Beijing’s interest in the region. Chinese investments under the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) require stability, while the Wagner Group thrives on
chaos. The worsening U.S.-China relations are driving Beijing and Moscow
into a closer strategic alliance. However, the challenges of controlling
74 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
mercenaries, especially in Africa, could lead to unintended and dangerous
outcomes despite the Sino-Russian ‘’no limits friendship’.’ A future study may
require assessing the increasing impact of Russian hybrid methods in the
region of China’s interests.
In essence, mercenaries’ participation in African conict, and beyond, is
a persistent phenomenon, one that is not going away. Simply branding
groups like Wagner as evil won’t solve the problem; it obscures the reasons
why local governments favor deploying these heavily armed, unaccountable
forces. Additionally, narrow-casted propaganda and disinformation have
highly ecient impacts on urban populations that may view Wagner’s
show of force as the way to long-lasting peace, while at the same time,
rural villagers near mining areas suer displacement or face the horror of
unmarked mass graves. Looking beyond the branding and negative associa-
tion of the Wagner Group and its predecessors, we identify a serious chal-
lenge to the liberal order that requires a dierent model and approach, one
that can provide better solutions and prosperity to African communities.
Notes
1. Del Prado, “Impact on Human Rights of a New Non-State Actor,” 151–169;
Petersohn, “The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security
Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002,” 191–215;
Petersohn, “Reframing the Anti-Mercenary Norm,” 475–493; and Petersohn,
“Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Eectiveness, and
Conict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007,” 1046–1072.
2. Baker, “Of ‘Mercenaries’ and Prostitutes: Can Private Warriors Be Ethical?,”
30–42; Baker & Gumedze, “Private Military/Security Companies and Human
Security in Africa,” 1–5; Petersohn, “The Impact of Mercenaries and Private
Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and
2002,” 191–215; and Petersohn, “Reframing the Anti-Mercenary Norm: Private
Military and Security Companies and Mercenarism,” 475–493.
3. Carmola, “Private Security Contractors and New Wars”; Krahmann, “States,
Citizens and the Privatisation of Security”; and Petersohn, “The Eectiveness
of Contracted Coalitions,” 467–488.
4. The Wagner intervention is still ongoing in 2024, yet the last entry used from
the ACLED dataset is for 2023-11-24.
5. Avant, “From Mercenaries to Citizen Armies,” 41–72; Singer, “Corporate
Warriors”; and McFate 2014.
6. Howe, 1998; and Musah & Fayemi, “Africa in Search of Security,” 13–43.
7. Kinsey, 2009; and Petersohn, “The Eectiveness of Contracted Coalitions,”
467–488.
8. Mini, “An Analysis of Private Military and Security Companies.”
9. Cilliers & Cornwell, Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in Africa, 31–42.
10. Simons, “Occupation for Hire,” 68–71; and Singer, 2017.
11. Ortiz, “The New Public Management of Security,” 35–41.
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 75
12. Cotton et al., 2010; Kelty, “The US Navy’s Maiden Voyage,” 536–564; and Kelty,
“Citizen Soldiers and Civilian Contractors: Soldiers’ Unit Cohesion and Retention
Attitudes in the ‘Total Force’,” 133–159.
13. Dunigan, “Victory for Hire.”
14. Petersohn, “The Eectiveness of Contracted Coalitions,” 467–488.
15. Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, “Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and
Termination of Civil Wars in Africa,” 795–821.
16. Radziszewski & Akcinaroglu, “Private Military & Security Companies, Conict
Complexity, and Peace Duration,” 1415–1440.
17. Fahn and Hadjer, 2015.
18. Davitti, “The Rise of Private Military and Security Companies in European Union
Migration Policies,” 33–53; Hoppe, 2008; Liu, “Law’s Impunity”; and White,
“Regulation of the Private Military and Security Sector,” 585.
19. Kinsey, 2007.
20. Tiefer, “No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private Security
Contractors in Iraq and After,” 745; Williams, “The Case for Overseas
Article III Courts,” 45.
21. Hoppe, 2008; Lehnardt, “Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under
International Criminal Law,” 1015–1034; and Milliard, “Overcoming Post-
Colonial Myopia,” 1.
22. Leander, “The Paradoxical Impunity of Private Military Companies,”
467–490.
23. Petersohn, “The Eectiveness of Contracted Coalitions,” 467–488.
24. Fitzsimmons, 2015.
25. Tkach, “Private Military and Security Companies, Contract Structure, Market
Competition, and Violence in Iraq,” 291–311.
26. Radziszewski, “Private Military and Security Companies and Human Rights
Abuses,” 554–574.
27. Rasor & Bauman, “Betraying Our Troops.”
28. Fitzsimmons, 2015.
29. Fitzsimmons, 2015.
30. Felter and Shapiro, 2017; Kaempf, “Saving Soldiers or Civilians?”; and Lyall,
“Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of
Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars.”
31. Stanovaya, “Why Yevgeny Prigozhin Had to Die.”
32. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 181–204.
33. Pokalova, “The Wagner Group in Africa,” 1–23.
34. Ivshina & Prosvirova, 2024.
35. Faulkner & Parnes, “Russia’s Mercenary-Industrial Complex in Africa.”
36. Doxsee & Thompson, “The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of
Counterterrorism in Mali”; Faulconbridge, “Video Shows Sledgehammer
Execution of Russian Mercenary”; and Obaji, “Survivors Say Russian
Mercenaries Slaughtered 70 Civilians in Gold Mine Massacre.”
37. Doxsee & Thompson, “The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of
Counterterrorism in Mali”; Faulconbridge, “Video Shows Sledgehammer
Execution of Russian Mercenary”; and Serwat et al., “Wagner Group
Operations in Africa.”
38. Burke, “Russian Mercenaries behind Slaughter of 500 in Mali Village, UN Report
Finds”; Clark, “Russian Mercenaries Are Destabilizing Africa”; and The Sentry,
“Architects of Terror.”
76 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
39. Pokalova, “The Wagner Group in Africa,” 1-23; and Rampe, “What Is Russia’s
Wagner Group Doing in Africa?.”
40. Andersons, “Russia’s Convict-Soldiers Have Their Own Brutal Rules.”
41. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa.”
42. Melly, “Boost for Wagner as Mali Shuns UN Troops, but at What Cost?”; and
Paquette, “Russian Mercenaries Have Landed in West Africa, Pushing Putin’s
Goals as Kremlin Is Increasingly Isolated.”
43. Posthumus, “Analysis: The Curious Case of Russia in Central African
Republic.”
44. Faulkner, “Undermining Democracy and Exploiting Clients,” 31.
45. Arduino, “Money for Mayhem.”
46. The Sentry, “Architects of Terror.”
47. Welz, “Brieng: Crisis in the Central African Republic and the International
Response,” 601–610.
48. Crisis Group, “Central African Republic.”
49. Hilleary, 2014.
50. Nossiter, “President Is Said to Flee as Rebels Seize Capital of the Central African
Republic.”
51. Tylor, “Christians, Muslims Clash in Central African Republic.”
52. United Nations Peacekeeping, “UN Mission Summary Detailed by Country.”
53. The number of French troops oscillated throughout the period of the operation,
ranging from 350 soldiers to 2,000.
54. Vallin, “France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–2014,” 79–101.
55. Hémez, 2016.
56. Burke & Mwesigwa, “Central Africa Fears Return of LRA after Hunt for Joseph
Kony Ends.”
57. Editorial Sta of Mondafrique, “Central Africa/Russia, Mondafrique’s Revelations
on the Sochi Meeting.”
58. Pokalova, “The Wagner Group in Africa,” 1–23.
59. The Sentry, “Architects of Terror.”
60. Ibid; Global Engagement Center, 2024.
61. Patta & Carter, “Russia’s Wagner Group Accused of Using Rape and Mass-Murder
to Control an African Gold Mining Town.”
62. Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED,” 651–660.
63. Chojnacki et al., “Event Data on Armed Conict and Security,” 382–401;
Demarest & Langer, “The Study of Violence and Social Unrest in Africa,”
310–325; and Eck, “In Data We Trust? A Comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED
Conict Events Datasets,” 124–141.
64. A review of the variables and their descriptive statistics is available at Appendix.
65. Shearer, “Private Armies and Military Intervention.”
66. Petersohn, “Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military
Eectiveness, and Conict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007,” 1046–1072.
67. Dunigan, “Victory for Hire.”
68. Lewis, “Reducing and Mitigating Civilian Casualties”; and Petraeus, “Learning
Counterinsurgency.”
69. Lyall, “Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of
Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars.”
70. Petersohn, “The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security
Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002,” 191–215;
Petersohn, “Reframing the Anti-Mercenary Norm,” 475–493; and Petersohn,
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 77
“Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Eectiveness, and
Conict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007,” 1046–1072.
71. Marima, “CAR Peace Deal Yet to Translate into Reality.”
72. Aboa, “Looters, Gunmen Roam Central African Republic Capital after Coup.”
73. See Appendix to rst and last entry date for each period.
74. Barbelet et al., “Community Engagement with Armed Actors in the Central
African Republic”; Obaji, “Putin’s Private Army Accused of Massacring Dozens
to Seize Gold Mine; The Sentry.” Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s
Blueprint for State Capture in the Central African Republic; and Obaji, “They
Turn Our Farms into Rape Centres.”
75. Clark, “Trends in Terrorism.”
76. Global Engagement Center, 2024.
77. Dunigan, “Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military
Eectiveness”; Tkach, “Private Military and Security Companies, Contract
Structure, Market Competition, and Violence in Iraq,” 291–311; and
Radziszewski, “Private Military and Security Companies and Human Rights
Abuses,” 554–574.
78. Dunigan, “Victory for Hire.”
79. Ibid., 155.
80. Gallagher, 2024; Obaji, “Putin’s Private Army Accused of Massacring Dozens to
Seize Gold Mine”; Obaji, “They Turn Our Farms into Rape Centres”; and The
Sentry. Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture in
the Central African Republic.
81. Penel and Petersohn, 2022.
82. The Sentry. Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture
in the Central African Republic.
83. Felter and Shapiro, 2017; Kaempf, “Saving Soldiers or Civilians?”; and Lyall,
“Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of
Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars.”
84. Pokalova, “The Wagner Group in Africa,” 1–23.
85. The Sentry. Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture
in the Central African Republic.
86. Legkauskas, “Feet of Clay,” 263.
87. Fabian, “US Labels Russia’s Wagner Group a Criminal Organization in New Bid to
Blunt Its Power”; and Reuters, “UK Ocially Proscribes Russia’s Wagner as
Terrorist Organization.”
88. Spearin, “Wagner Group: Comparing and Contextualizing the Russian Monster,”
153–163.
89. Lees & Petersohn, “To Escalate, or Not to Escalate? Private Military and Security
Companies and Conict Severity,” 2622–2645.
90. Cole, US Turns Tables on Putin in Africa PMC Powerplay.
91. Faulkner, “Undermining Democracy and Exploiting Clients,” 31.
92. The Sentry. Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture
in the Central African Republic, 26.
93. Felter and Shapiro, 2017; Kaempf, “Saving Soldiers or Civilians?”; and Lyall,
“Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of
Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars.”
94. Cliord & Gruzd, “Russian and African Media.”
95. El-Badawy et al., “Security, Soft Power and Regime Support.”
96. Jacobsen & Larsen, 2024.
78 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
97. Lechner, “Are Russian Mercenaries Bad for the Central African Republic?”
98. Barbelet et al., “Community Engagement with Armed Actors in the
Central African Republic”; Gallagher, 2024; and The Sentry. Architects of
Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture in the Central
African Republic.
99. Ishiyama, 2024.
100. SAIS-CARI (China Africa Research Initiative), “Chinese FDI in Africa Data
Overview.”
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Ori Swed is an Associate Professor in the Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work
Department and the Director of the Peace, War, and Social Conict Laboratory at Texas
Tech University. His scholarship on nonstate actors in conict settings and technology
and society has been featured in multiple peer-reviewed journals and his own edited
volume.
Alessandro Arduino, is an Aliate Lecturer at the Lau China Institute at King’s College
London and a Visiting Professor at the Geneva Graduate Institute. His latest book,
Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of
War (Rowman & Littleeld, 2023), explores the future of warfare in a world dominated
by private armies. His research has been published in peer-reviewed journals, edited
volumes, and renowned media outlets. His reputation as a Belt and Road Initiative
security expert has led him to work with international organizations including NATO,
OSCE, UNDP, and EBRD).
ORCID
Ori Swed http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9555-0985
Alessandro Arduino http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6721-9678
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SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 85
Appendix
Period First date entry Last date entry
Civil War Inception 2012-2013 2012-12-10 2013-11-29
Sangaris 2013-2016 2013-12-01 2016-10-30
Post- Sangaris 2016-2020 2016-11-02 2020-12-22
Wagner Operation 2020-2023 2020-12-23 2023-11-24
86 O. SWED AND A. ARDUINO
