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Dates:
Submission: July 20, 2023
Revised: August 19, 2024
Accepted: August 28, 2024
Published(Online): Sept. 30, 2024
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Unpacking province creation in the philippines
To enhance service delivery and local democracy, legislators have tinkered with size or status of local
governments in the Philippines. is elasticity in local borders has been more evident at the province level,
the highest local government tier. Since 1987, a new province is birthed roughly every three years. As the
determinants and mechanisms of contemporary province fragmentation are under-examined, this article
investigates, at several policymaking levels and dimensions, attempts to redraw borders of Philippine
provinces. Framed by an institutional framework and a case-study approach, and employing a veto-player
analysis, heuristic cases of two provinces (Quezon and Zamboanga del Sur) were unpacked and compared.
Findings reveal that there is a large and fragmented veto-player group in the area of territorial rescaling
of provinces. Congruence of preferences among veto players was observed to be influenced by territorial
leveraging, pivot on networks and reciprocity norm, and mirroring of preferences. e tenacity and strategic
actions of reform agent or policy entrepreneur (usually the congressman), sometimes assisted by social
movement, is likewise found crucial in the pathways leading to reform outcomes. In a simple cross-case
analysis of recent reform attempts, findings also suggest that the provinces’ core-periphery location pattern,
and proposed type of spatio-jurisdictional partition are associated with reform outcomes.
How to cite this article:
Tumanut, Michael. “Unpacking Province
Creation in the Philippines.” Scientia - the
International Journal on the Liberal Arts 13,
no. 2 (September 30, 2024): 1–16. https://
doi.org/10.57106/scientia.v13i2.190.
Copyright:
Online: EBSCO, DOAJ. is work is
licensed under the Creative Common
Attribution License © 2024.
Print: Philippine Copyright © September
2024 San Beda University
Keywords: administrative-territorial reform, district creation, gerrymandering, province
fragmentation, state rescaling, and veto players
MICHAEL TUMANUT
University of the PhiliPPines Diliman
matumanut@up.edu.ph
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introDUction
Government authorities rescale local government
units at varying tempos and redraw local borders
primarily to respond to development needs
(see Baldersheim and Rose 2010), especially
when local governments are widely regarded
as creatures and apparatuses of the state (see
Dollery, Garcea, and LeSage 2008; Eaton, Kaiser,
and Smoke 2010). ese restructuring acts are
diversely exhibited as border expansion (through
merger or annexation), creation and abolition of
units, or creation of new tiers, special structures,
or configurations of subnational government.
Unpacking these reforms on local government
configuration, which this paper attempts to
contribute modestly, may provide insights into
structural and less orthodox ways to address
local issues and challenges. ese include but
are not limited to stimulating local or regional
development, resolving cross-border challenges,
and increasing efficiency in service delivery.
Whether or not it does improve local economy
and efficiency is, however, beyond the scope of
this study.
Structural reform of local authorities,
particularly of supra-municipal bodies, remains
an underexamined research area. According
to Tumanut (2020), the creation of new units,
whether municipal or supra-municipal, through
fragmentation has been a steady phenomenon
in many developing countries, and is uncommon
in developed countries. is phenomenon is
particularly pervasive in many countries in
the regions of Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe
(see Tumanut 2020). Against the backdrops of
decentralization and neoliberalism (see Aspinall
2013; Zhang and Wu 2006), scholars have
located triggers of subnational fragmentation:
First, ethnic heterogeneity or marginalization
(Fitrani, Hofman and Kaiser 2005; Grossman
and Lewis 2014; Refugee Law Project 2009;
Pierskalla 2016) and the ensuing accommodation
of identity aspiration (Bhattacharyya 2005;
Nordholt and van Klinken 2007); second,
rent-seeking and patronage (Aspinall 2013;
Fitrani, Hofman and Kaiser 2005; Green 2010);
third, shift in government system or political
institutions (Booth 2011; Kimura 2013); and,
fourth, geographic dispersion (Fitrani, Hofman
and Kaiser 2005). While Grossman and Lewis
(2014) posited economic marginalization as a
predictor, Pierskalla (2016) found weak evidence
on income inequality.
For causal mechanisms, the emerging literature
points to the role of local elites (see Eilenberg
2012; Pierskalla 2016), coalitions and networks
(see Eilenberg 2012; Grossman and Lewis 2014;
Kimura 2013), and opportunistic behavior and
gerrymandering tactic of politicians to preserve
power (see Firman 2009; Green 2010; Malesky
2010; Mawdsley 2002; Mohammed 2015).
Tactics of division of labor and resource pooling
were also specifically observed in Indonesia (see
Kimura 2013).
Province fragmentation in the Philippines is
one area of structural reform of subnational
government that has proliferated in number,
especially when a comprehensive reform of
the local government system is difficult to
set in motion. In a simple content analysis
of border restructuring-related bills recently
proposed in the Philippine Congress, border
rescaling is associated with three key desired
outcomes: improved service delivery, economic
development, and increased democratization.
is set of principles has continued to underpin
the rationale of continuing local spatio-
structural reforms in the country. At the level
of provinces alone, from 1987 to 2020, at least
82 bills (including those re-filed or resubmitted)
seeking to fragment and create new provinces
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were lodged in Congress. Only about 12 percent
of these bills were enacted as laws and ratified
by the voters. On average, since 1987, one new
province has been created every 3.3 years, while
2.7 new provinces are proposed every year.
Despite this recurring phenomenon, the nature,
politics, and administration of subnational
territorial reform in the Philippines remain
underexamined. Tumanut (2016b) demonstrated
the policy entrepreneur-driven dynamics in the
two cases of municipal merger, as well as the
role of opportunism, political bargaining, and
partisanship in the successful attempts. However,
the inclusion of national actors in the tracing of
this policymaking process is wanting. At the
level of intermediate level (i.e., province), there
is a scarcity of studies on structural reform. Cruz
(2012) showed that, while opportunism drives
local elites to propose reform, the cost-benefit
analysis of the probability of getting re-elected
against financial resources (lobbying cost) does
not adequately explain the success or failure of
province division. Similarly, opportunism by
the municipal mayors, whose terms are ending,
of recent jurisprudence on local government
creation also drives them to convert towns
into cities to be able to run anew, which to
Capuno (2013) was akin to gerrymandering,
and attributed such to the expected increase in
intergovernmental fiscal transfer.
Accordingly, the primary objective of this paper
is to attempt to fill this lacuna, in the context
of developing countries with direct democracy:
to investigate and draw descriptive inferences
on contemporary province fragmentation as a
downscaling reform choice by the Philippine
government since the early 1990s, including the
untangling of threads of nuanced mechanisms
at various levels of policymaking. Moreover,
it attempts to illuminate crucial dimensions
of policymaking on contemporary province
fragmentation and to describe and compare
mechanisms and determinants of partition using
Philippine cases.
In this paper, fragmentation, division, and
partition are used interchangeably.
methoDology anD framework
is study is an extension and replication of
Tumanut (2016a) on the mapping of different
actors and decision points in province division,
the varied roles actors perform, and the
strategies they employ, particularly unraveling
dimensions and mechanisms of such reform.
Whereas contemporary municipal merger, a rare
occurrence in the Philippines, was unpacked
in Tumanut (2016b), contemporary province
fragmentation is brought to a focus in this
paper. Case study is the principal approach
employed, complemented by process tracing and
within- and cross-case analyses. In building a
triangulated case description, assorted archival
records were parsed: newspaper articles; laws and
Supreme Court decisions; congressional records,
press releases, and briefing kits; explanatory
notes of bills, committee reports and minutes
of journal sessions; council resolutions; letters
addressed to legislators, and written comments to
documents; and websites. To further triangulate
data, key informant interviews were conducted
with various sectors of the policy community,
including several national and local legislators,
legislative staff, civil society leaders, bureaucrats,
media, and citizen-voters.
Several levels of cross-case comparison are made.
Two heuristic case studies (with embedded sub-
units, i.e., several attempts to fragment) of the
provinces of Quezon and Zamboanga del Sur are
documented and abridged to examine conditions
and mechanisms of province partition. ese
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two nearly identical cases (with differing reform
outcomes: success and failure) are selected using
population, land area, geography, number of
component units, and history of fragmentation
as criteria. In attempting to cursorily identify
antecedent events or triggers, ten recent cases of
province partition are further examined.
Besides employing a heuristic process, the cases
are partly configurative due to the framing of
Tsebelis’ (2002) veto player theory, simplified and
interpreted by Tumanut (2015) as the change in
status quo (i.e., province partition) is a function
of the interplay of three factors – the number
of veto players or VPs (i.e., those formally given
the authority to decide on this matter), cohesion
of VPs (i.e., collective decision of authorities),
and congruence of policy preferences (which,
in this paper, is argued as shaped by strategic
actions). e last element is comparable to
Kimura’s (2013) vertical coalition formation, as
the primary mechanism behind the successful
fragmentation of Indonesian provinces. is
paper also demonstrates, as earlier posited
by Tumanut (2016a), the interplay of causal
mechanisms of “territorial leveraging” of the
reform agent, and “mirroring of preferences”
among VPs.
institUtional context
A unitary system, the Philippines has a three-
tiered local government system: province
(intermediate), municipality and city (basic), and
barangay (sub-municipal). e complex hierarchy
of basic units renders this tier diversified, where
special cities (i.e., highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities) are on
par with provinces in status, fiscal authority,
and responsibilities. In 2023, there were 82
provinces, 148 cities (38 are special cities), 1486
municipalities, and 42027 barangays.
trends in province partition
Contemporary Philippine provinces trace their
official establishment to the American occupation
in the early 20th century. In the first two decades
of the 1900s, provincial governments had been
incrementally chartered and incorporated in
the Philippine government, with 40 of them
established in the first three years. As many as
21 in total were granted sub-province status but
were eventually either dissolved (by merging
with other units) or elevated to province status.
Fragmentation of large units, though first
observed in the mid-1910s, had gained ground in
the 1950s and 1960s, with eight large provinces
splintering into two or three units.
Between 1987 and 2020, nine new provinces were
created: two cases of elevation to province status,
and six cases of split that resulted in seven new
provinces and abolition of one province. ree
provinces also failed to be ratified: two were
rejected by voters, while one was declared void by
the Supreme Court. More recently, the creation
of two new provinces in Palawan province was
rejected in the March 2021 referendum, whereas
the split of Maguindanao province was recently
ratified in September 2022. Despite changes
in regimes and institutions, province partition
continuously pervades the legislative agenda.
Fragmentation is also occurring at the level of
municipality and village (barangay), which is
outside the scope of this study.
legal Framework and process
Power in the Philippines, a presidential form of
government, is divided among three co-equal
branches: executive, judiciary, and legislature.1
e 1987 Constitution ushered in a new ideology
1 Divided into two chambers: the 24-member Senate, and the
302-member House of Representatives.
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and political environment, where key political
and financial powers and functions were devolved
to local governments. Creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial boundary alteration
of local government is provided for in the
Constitution. Reforms on local government
territories usually originate from and manifest
through the bicameral congress, subject to
veto by the president and ratification by voters
through a plebiscite. Since 1987, the role of the
Supreme Court in territorial reform has been
invoked only a few times, while the president has
not actively vetoed any law creating provinces.2
While the Constitution generally stipulates
territorial reform at the subnational level, the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act
No. 7160) provides the conditions under which
alteration of boundary is possible: “verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services,” which are heavily premised on
financial capacity (i.e., locally generated income),
and either population or land area. In the
implementing rules and regulations of the Code,
the concurrence (through an official resolution)
of the local councils of all the affected units is
required.
e legislative process in Congress starts with
bill preparation at the House of Representatives
by the congressman representing the local
territories concerned, followed by first reading,
committee consideration/action, and second and
third readings. Bills on territorial reforms fall
under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Local
Government. When funding for the plebiscite is
appropriated by the national government, the bill
will be similarly deliberated in the Committee
2 Only on few occasions that the president did not affix signature
to laws creating provinces; this can be construed as a neutral position or
indirect rejection.
of Appropriations.3 e Committee on Local
Government of the House of Representatives
also requires various documents and instructions
that must be followed and completed before
a bill is calendared for deliberation. e bill is
then transmitted to and acted on by the Senate,
which has the same legislative process, and, to
the president for action (i.e., sign, no sign, or
veto). Voters in all the local units affected shall
ratify the law through a required plebiscite.
veto players
ere are at least three national veto players (i.e.,
the president and two chambers of Congress),
while the number of local players depends on
the number of local units involved: the local
councils and voters of each unit, all of which are
collective. Preferences are assumed to be dual
or mixed: individual (positional) and collective
(programmatic). Collective preferences are
assumed to be nonaligned, latent, or amorphous,
or indirectly influenced by an ideology or
collective discourse among legislators, which
during the period 1990-2020 is generally shaped
by the governing principles on and aspirations
for more decentralization, local autonomy, and
good governance.
As adopted in this paper, Eaton (2002) and
Kawanaka (2010) explained that the positional
preferences of the national VPs are assumed
to be a function of how they are elected, their
time horizon, and access to pork barrel. ey
further argue that due to a lack of incentive for
re-election and being directly elected at-large,
the president’s preference is more programmatic
rather than positional or particularistic, whereas
3 In recent territorial reform bills, the deliberation stage at
the Committee on Appropriations has been avoided by the policy
entrepreneurs (i.e., congressmen) by allocating plebiscite funds through
their own pork barrels. is Committee is a sub-veto point within
Congress that congressmen must overcome.
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members of the House of Representatives are
assumed to have more particularistic rather
than programmatic/outcome preferences due to
access to patronage. Moreover, the elected-at-
large senators (seeking re-election, or aspiring
for higher office), are more concerned about
image and are thus inclined to have outcome-
oriented preferences (Kawanaka 2010; Eaton
2002).
National politicians also indirectly affect the
local political dynamics. As the former are
elected at-large, they would need the support
of local politicians, but intra-party competition
also complicates this relationship (Hutchcroft
2008). Due to term limits, mode of entry to
office, and access to patronage, the provincial
and municipal VPs’ positional or selective
preferences are assumed to take precedence
over their collective, programmatic objectives.
Tumanut (2013) argued that the biggest form of
pork barrel at stake in this border restructuring
game in the Philippines is the access to bigger
fiscal transfer or the national tax allotment
(NTA), which, in the parlance of territorial
reform, is a demonstration of fiscal spoils (see
Simatupang 2009).
inFormal rUles
Other than the formal institutions that slightly
tilt the balance in favor of the executive,
historical legacies engendered informal rules
that affect executive-legislative and politician-
voter relations in the Philippines. ese informal
rules refer to social rules that are shared and tacit:
e political institutions nurture the patronage
culture via a control-support mechanism through
the elective office, which has become a lucrative
post in the decentralization era (Hutchcroft
2012); Patronage is fostered by the Filipino value
of utang na loob (interpreted as debt of gratitude,
solidarity, or reciprocity norm), and facilitated by
oligarchy or preservation of elite domination.
institUtional analysis anD DiscUssion
During the time of their respective structural
reform process, the two selected cases had nearly
identical population size, geographic attributes,
number of component units, and history of
spatial reform (see Table 1). Economic inequality
was also observed in both: the northern region
of Quezon province and the eastern section of
Zamboanga del Sur province (hereafter referred
to as ZamboSur) were more economically
developed than the rest of the provinces. is
contrast formed part of the partition logic
and narrative: e need to stimulate the local
economy and improve service delivery. In other
reform bills, similar economic and governance
motives were found. As part of the preliminary
findings of a pre-research for this study (where
13 bills on territorial reform were examined),
all bills identified slow economic development
as the primary reform impetus, while seven bills
added the promise of improved service delivery
and governance, and seven bills also alluded to
political development or conflict resolution.
Table 1. Key Attributes of the Provinces of Quezon
and Zamboanga del Sur
Zamboanga del Sur
(Pre-2001) Quezon
(Pre-2004)
Population
(estimate) 1,300,000 (in 2000) 1,500,000 (in 2003)
Geographic
attributes 7965.49 km2; elongated;
10th largest 8743.84 km2;
elongated; 9th largest
Number of
component
units
40 municipalities
1 city 39 municipalities
1 city
History of
territorial
fragmentation
Once part of Zamboanga
province until 1952;
Zamboanga was once a
district of Moro province
in 1903-14
Marinduque and
Aurora provinces were
carved out of Quezon
in 1920 and 1979,
respectively
Number of
congressional
districts
3 4
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Area under
reform Districts 1 & 2 – parent
unit
District 3 (16
municipalities) –
Zamboanga Sibugay
Districts 1 & 2 – parent
unit (Quezon del
Norte)
Districts 3 & 4 –
Quezon del Sur
Political
leaders Real; Yu (1st district)
Cerilles (2nd district)
Cainglet; Cabilao; Hofer
(3rd district)
Enverga; Nantes (1st
district)
Alcala; Punzalan (2nd
district)
Suarez (3rd district)
Tañada (4th district)
One key difference between the two provinces
lies in the number of congressional districts,
which, in turn, affected the dynamics between
local politicians and the proposed type of
partition (whether divided along congressional
district lines or quasi-gerrymandered).
Governorship in intact ZamboSur alternated
between two families from the first two districts,4
while in Quezon, the gubernatorial seat was
contested by many and rotated among three
leaders from Districts 1 and 3, but was held the
longest (nine years) by Enverga of District 1.
Equally important, ZamboSur’s partition was
disproportionate, as the parent province would
retain two districts, while only one district would
constitute the new province of Zamboanga
Sibugay. In Quezon, the province was proposed
to be divided almost equally: Quezon del Norte
(parent unit) comprising the first two districts
(18 municipalities and one city) and Quezon del
Sur (breakaway unit) comprising the other two
districts (22 municipalities).
conditions in seqUential policymaking
e two provinces are no strangers to structural-
spatial reform: both were subjected to several
attempts of division and have a history of
continuing territorial fissure (Quezon had lost
two sections in 1920 and 1979, while ZamboSur
was a product of the partition of Zamboanga
province). At least seven failed attempts since
4 e political leaders also alternated in Congress, representing
their respective districts
1968 were logged in ZamboSur, and six for
Quezon since 1996. Table 2 shows two common
conditions in the failed attempts: timetabling
of reform, and legal technicalities (including
bureaucratic requirements).
Table 2. Conditions Accompanying Failed Attempts
in Zamboanga del Sur and Quezon
Zamboanga Del Sur Quezon
Number of
previous attempts At least 7 At least 6
Timing (e.g.,
political crises) 1984(Lower Congress)
1971 (Senate) 1998 (Lower Congress)
Technicality
(e.g., lacking
requirements;
unresolved
boundary
dispute)
1996 (Lower Congress)
1992-1994 (Lower
Congress)
2002 (Lower Congress)
1996 (Lower Congress)
Others (e.g.,
weak bill
shepherding; no
data)
1987 (Lower Congress)
1980 (Executive decree)
1968 (No data)
2010 (Lower Congress)
2004 (Plebiscite)
1952 (Senate, no data)
Note: Author’s own construction based on
interviews and secondary sources
According to respondents, unfortunate
timing due to political crises contributed to
congressional inertia (i.e., failure) of several
bills to divide provinces. In ZamboSur’s case,
the imposition of Martial Law (that led to the
abolition of Congress) upset the bill in 1971; a
similar bill filed circa 1984 was also disrupted by
the 1986 revolt. Similarly, the impeachment of
then President Joseph Estrada in 2001 derailed
several bills lodged in Congress, including the
1998 bill to divide Quezon. Lack of requirements
(including unresolved border disputes) also
marred the attempts of ZamboSur in 1992-
1994 and 1996. Similarly, attempts for Quezon
partition also failed to move past the Committee
on Local Government due to documentary
deficiencies. According to a former secretary
general of the House of Representatives, while
rules are important, legislators must also have the
skill to use them to their advantage. Many bills
failed to clear the committee level due to non-
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compliance with basic technical requirements
of income, land area, or population. e other
reform attempts were attributed partly to a lack of
push from the reform agent (congressmen), such
as the 1987 and 1996 attempts of ZamboSur,
and the 2010 attempt of Quezon.
reForm agents and veto players
is section illustrates sequential policymaking
or veto of institutional VPs in two reform
attempts that led to the final and binding
stage of citizen ratification as mandated by law
through a referendum: the 1998-2001 attempt
in ZamboSur and the 2004-2008 attempt in
Quezon.
Split had long been desired by many political
leaders in both provinces, citing vast land area,
lack of infrastructure, and uneven economic
development or perceived inequality as rationale
for reform. Due to the local nature, scope, and
application of the territorial reform bills, the
congressmen who principally authored the bills
are labeled as reform agents and agenda-setters:
George Hofer in ZamboSur, and Lorenzo
Tanada III in Quezon.
Using the lens of rational choice theory, in their
bid for re-election or higher office, politicians
(local and national alike) could have exploited
the issue of province division. In the 1998-2001
ZamboSur attempt, several respondents cited
the electoral promise of a congressman, and the
formation of political turf as possible primary
reform motives. Several respondents in Quezon
also identified the latter as a key motive in the
2004-2008 division attempt.
In the attempts that reached the ratification
stage, there were as many as 21 VPs in the
successful attempt of ZamboSur and 28 VPs in
Quezon. ese VPs include collective players,
such as municipal and provincial councils of
directly affected units, bicameral Congress, and
the affected citizen-voters.5 ese VPs were also
influenced by non-VPs, such as governors and
social movements (see Table 3). In Quezon,
the agenda-setters included Wigberto Tanada,
Rafael Nantes, and Lorenzo Tanada on three
separate occasions. e other informal but
influential players included the governor, mayors,
as well as a social movement (led by the church
and media) in the 2004 attempt. In ZamboSur,
the agenda-setter and key reform agent was
George Hofer. e governor, mayors, and the
Zamboanga Occidental Movement comprised
the local players, who, despite their informal
veto, were influential at various stages of the
partition game.
Table 3. Summary of VP Constellation: Quezon and
Zamboanga del Sur
ZamboSur Quezon
Outcome Success in 1998-2001
attempt Failure in 2004-2008
attempt
Institutional
VPs
21 VPs: 16 municipal
councils, 1 provincial
council, 2 chambers of
Congress, 1 president,
1 set of voters
28 VPs: 22 municipal
councils, 1 provincial
council, 2 chambers of
Congress, 1 president, 1
set of voters, (Supreme
Court)
Other quasi-
VPs Governor, mayors,
social movement Governor, mayors, social
movements
At the national stage, politicians are presumed
to not gain much from creating a new province.
Creating a new province would introduce a new
player (i.e., new congressman) in the political
arena, as well as indirectly reorder or reinforce
political dynasties in general, decrease the fiscal
allotment of other provinces, and decrease the
pork barrel of congressmen. For congressmen
in the House of Representatives who are
elected through single-member districts,
their preferences are assumed to be more
programmatic (or even latent), which are evident
5 In Quezon, the role of the Supreme Court was invoked in the
2004 attempt when the constitutionality of the proposed division was
challenged.
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in their statements in committee meetings and
public hearings. Several respondents also noted
that the majority of congressmen were more
concerned about re-election, and would not
oppose bills of local significance or scope, from
which they would not be directly affected. For
senators that do not represent any congressional
district (as they are elected at-large), there are
two possible mechanisms in their preference
formation: first, by invoking the role of
networks, particularly through partisanship or
logrolling; and second, by acting on political
rationality in the interest of getting re-elected.
Based on documented statements from at least
two senators in legislative meetings, support for
the proposed new province would bring more
votes to senators seeking re-election. For some,
it was due to their affinity to depressed sections
of provinces under reform. Similarly, they would
also support programmatic reasons, such as
invoking the principles of decentralization and
good governance, as well as emphasizing the
legality and merit of the bill.
e Supreme Court, on the other hand, which is
not directly accountable to the voters, is expected
to be neutral, and would decide based on merits
of the case. As for the voters’ preferences, these
can be divided into two: those from the proposed
new province (i.e., breakaway area), and those
from the parent unit. Voters in the former are
assumed to support division if it would spur
economic development or transformation,
while voters from the parent province would
either be supportive or ambivalent, as it would
spell a smaller budget for the parent province,
but less competition for government services
and spending. ose on the fence would then
be blasted with propaganda and rhetoric to
swing them to either side. Interviews and
archival records support these propositions on
their voting behavior, as well as the influence
of patronage-driven political mobilization.
In the referendum stage, in the failed 2004-
2008 attempt to divide Quezon, voters from
the third and fourth districts (sectors that
would comprise the breakaway province) were
generally supportive of division. However, many
voters from the other districts opposed division.
Similarly, in ZamboSur, where 70 percent of the
voters ratified the division, most dissenting votes
came from the district that would constitute the
parent unit. In both cases, voter engagement was
lackluster: turnout of 36.5% in ZamboSur, and
38% in Quezon.
mechanisms oF congrUence oF vp preFerences
From an institutional-veto player analysis,
one pathway to successful reform is the observed
congruence among sequential VPs’ preferences.
e two cases vary in how the location of VP
preferences is aligned. As shown in Table 3,
ZamboSur had 21 institutional and sequential
VPs, whose preferences ultimately aligned with
those of the reform agent. Sequential congruence
among collective VPs was also observed in other
successful cases of province fragmentation (i.e.,
Surigao del Norte-Dinagat Islands, Davao del
Norte-Davao de Oro, Kalinga-Apayao, South
Cotabato-Sarangani, and Davao del Sur-Davao
Occidental).
e case of Quezon, on the other hand, with
28 VPs, attributes its failure to the final VP: the
voters. A similar fate befell another stillborn
case in 1995 (the failed partitioning of Isabela
province). e case of the Palawan partition in
2021 is a recent addition to this small group.
Other attempts failed at the penultimate VP
stage: the senate (e.g., Camarines Sur in 2013,
Bukidnon in 2006, and Oriental Mindoro in
2000). While successful and failed cases faced
opposition from various sectors (including
politicians), unity was achieved or nearly achieved
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(i.e., except among voters or senators) despite a
sizable assemblage of VP. It is puzzling therefore
how the preferences of as many as 21 veto players
in ZamboSur were rendered cohesive. is
section locates and untangles these successful
(or failed) mechanisms at various stages of the
reform process.
territorial leveraging
Opportunism and leveraging are hypothesized
to be at work, as province division creates
new spaces for political leaders and their
families to entrench themselves, consolidate,
or maintain power. Similar to the findings of
Tumanut (2016a) in Indonesian cases, anecdotal
statements were taken from various informants
on how the proposed provinces would benefit
local politicians in ZamboSur and Quezon:
while those who calculated potential losses (e.g.,
electoral base, and rent from breakaway areas)
would stage opposition, some were strong and
calculated, while some were insipid and even
backpedaled. Similar opportunistic tendencies
(e.g., gerrymandering, electioneering) animate
the institutional incentives exploited in Indonesia,
India, Pakistan, Uganda, and Vietnam to create
new turfs, strengthen power, or seek re-election.
Other forms of leveraging and opportunism
captured in the cases examined include strategic
actions to get re-elected in office. However, the
tenacity and political savviness of the agenda-
setter or reform agent had to complement such
strategic leveraging of space.
reciprocity norm and pivot on networks
Informants agree that, in the agenda-setting
stage, a cordial relationship with the committee
chairman6 and committee secretary is imperative.
A committee may adopt a first-come-first-
served policy due to the massive volume of bills
it receives.7 Another simple strategy disclosed
by informants is to regularly attend committee
meetings. Other than complying with legal
requirements, to expedite the process, a bill must
have a tandem proposal in the Senate. A good
track record of the political clan in Congress
sometimes would help, according to several
respondents. Whereas the use of personal
linkages (including family’s reputation) became
indispensable, the role of partisanship did not
appear as consequential at this stage.
Equally important, a tacit rule exists: legislators do
not oppose local bills outside their jurisdictions.8
Based on official statements and recorded
motions from transcripts of meetings, while
legality and merits were generally preferred by
lawmakers, a norm of legislative courtesy, which
can be reinterpreted as logrolling, particularly at
the lower chamber of Congress, explain internal
cohesion of this collective VP of 300+ members.
According to an anonymous congressman-
informant, what is reciprocated in Congress
is courtesy to each other being the “voice and
ear” of their respective jurisdictions. Other than
these shared norms, two other factors affected
the collective position of the lower chamber of
Congress: united stance of all congressmen from
the province, and downplaying the weight of the
provincial council’s decision (another collective
VP), as what transpired in the Quezon case.
is reciprocity norm is likewise manifested
at various levels: patronage at the local level;
policy votes in exchange for electoral votes at
6 According to respondents, chairmanship is not given to
neophytes, party affiliation is a factor, specific committees are reserved
for the administration party, but the Committee on Local Government
is not necessarily reserved for the administration party.
7 A typical committee may get around 200 bills at one time, and
schedules a meeting twice a month.
8 For example, one informant was asked by a politician to block a
bill dividing his province, but declined due to this unwritten rule.
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the senate; and delivery of electoral promises at
the president’s level. Given the small number of
senators, some senators also employed personal
lobbying and linkages, coupled with reelection-
seeking behaviors, as well as taking cues from
the united position of local elites (taken as an
absence of strong opposition). However, in some
cases, due to nonattendance, only half of the
members of the local government committee
on this collective VP would seal the fate of local
reforms.
At the referendum level, the mobilization of
political supporters was rendered possible by
invoking such a reciprocal norm. Consistent with
the literature, the chronic cycle of patronage is
observed. According to interviews with citizen-
voters and some local elected officials, debt of
gratitude and patronage (e.g., loyalty in exchange
for pork barrel access) proved to be prominent
in negotiations at the local council level and in
plebiscite campaigns.
ese unraveled mechanisms in the Philippines
draw similarities to Kimura’s (2013) observations
in Indonesia, as encapsulated in the coalition
model’s mechanisms of linkages, division of
labor, and resource pooling.
mirroring oF preFerences
While this mechanism is evident in all
successful cases—especially illustrating how
collective preferences (assumed to be latent or
amorphous) at bicameral Congress were also
influenced by the stance of local councils—,
the stillborn cases also demonstrate the
mirroring in collective preference of voters.
Due to imperfect or incomplete information,
some VPs would rely on strategic behaviors of
other players, particularly by the reform agent,
resulting in preference mirroring. Interviews
and archival records reveal that sponsorship or
policy-push was flexed in meetings, attendance
in deliberations, correspondence, legislative and
executive lobbying, and public campaigns.
e case of Quezon illustrates repeated
failure at various levels of policymaking. When
other VP preferences were distant from that of
the agenda-setter or reform agent, the latter had
difficulty making these preferences congruent,
leading to a lack of concurrence in reforming
territories. Tanada, the reform agent, failed to
obtain the support of three VPs: the provincial
council (that had been consistent since 1992 on
their no-division stance), the president (who
did not actively support the law by not signing
it), and the citizen-voters of Quezon province
(including the lackluster backing of the Senate).
e lack of provincial council concurrence
that Congress eventually overlooked, and the
ambiguous position of the president, were
instrumental in shaping the collective preference
of the local voters of Quezon. Despite the multi-
sectoral support it drew, Tanada’s pro-division
movement was countered by the provincial
government’s strong opposition (amplified by a
social movement), and failed to persuade the final
VP, the voters. Accordingly, the divided position
of the elites in the province was mirrored in the
plebiscite results.
is observation supports the earlier finding of
Tumanut (2016a) in Indonesia, where a similar
large network of VPs exists in subnational
fragmentation, and was hypothesized to have
taken cues from other players in the sequential
system of local government rescaling. A similar
finding was also reported in Philippine cases of
municipal mergers (see Tumanut, 2016b).
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social movement and division oF labor
Crucial to the role of the reform agent (i.e., policy
push) is the emergence of social movement,
which either bolstered the efforts of the former
or campaigned against territorial rescaling. In
this reform game, social movements operated
in different ways: emerged independently
from political elites, collaborated with the
reform agent, or mobilized by the local elites
themselves. Businessmen, media, and the
church, as well as those with political ambitions,
primarily spearheaded such movements. eir
mobilization is a mediating factor influencing
preference congruence (i.e., to bolster or counter
the reform agent’s efforts), as evident in the cases
of ZamboSur (success), and Quezon (failure).
In ZamboSur, success in making preferences
congruent was attributable to the strong advocacy
and tenacity of then-Congressman Hofer and
the Zamboanga Occidental Movement (ZOM),
which both expended resources and lobbied at
various levels. Consistent with the findings of
Kimura (2013) in Indonesia, division of labor was
employed in this Philippine case. e support of
ZOM was crucial in reshaping local preferences.
e movement was able to garner support
from various sectors of society particularly the
church-goers, teachers, and residents of the third
district. Moreover, local politicians, who were in
the same policy position as Hofer and ZOM,
mobilized support. eir united stance and
lobbying in the legislative process were equally
influential in reshaping the preferences of the
national VPs (based on the official statements
of a senator and congressman) and the voters.
At the national level, Hofer marshaled his bill
from the Committee on Local Government at
the House of Representatives to the President’s
Office. Hofer also gained the backing of the
senate president, who also arranged an ocular visit
to the district before the scheduled plebiscite.
e role of social movement may also explain
why, despite the aligned formal VP preferences,
citizen-voters rejected the proposed split of
Isabela province, following a series of information
campaigns and social mobilization by local radio
and the church. Conversely, a lack of such may
partly explain the low voter turnout in many
cases of structural reform. e rise of social
movements in relation to local border reform
is not peculiar to the Philippines, as it has also
been observed, at varying degrees, in Indonesia
and Japan, among others.
other possible mechanisms
For voters, other mechanisms are also
hypothesized to be at play. Because the final and
binding decision points are the local voters, the
strategic behaviors of reform agents and their
supporters logically took precedence. According
to some respondents, the campaign for or against
division was interspersed with money politics.
Policy learning through juridical interpretation
(based on statements made by a congressman
and senator), and auspicious timing (e.g., Hofer
and ZOM adeptly learned from Makati City’s
experience in addressing boundary issues) were
likewise instrumental in clearing the legal and
technical hurdles in Congress.
attribUtes and antecedent conditions oF province
division
Due to a limited number of cases, a probabilistic
approach to identifying factors affecting province
partition proved difficult to undertake. erefore,
the following possible determinants (drawn
heuristically and informed by the literature) are
analyzed using a simple cross-case comparison
of recent attempts in 10 provinces since 1992.
ese attempts were all made at least during the
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Senate deliberation, the penultimate stage before
the president’s veto and local referendum.
Population and land area are not strongly
associated with province partition success,
contrary to the findings of Fitrani et al. (2005)
and Gomez-Reino and Martinez-Vasquez
(2013). Two provinces (Surigao del Norte and
Oriental Mindoro) were able to reach Senate
deliberation despite their small land area and
population. Moreover, as many as eight large
provinces (i.e., >7,000 km2) remain intact.
Similarly, not all highly populated provinces
have been proposed to undergo reform: there
are as many as 12 highly populated provinces
(>1.7 million population) that remain intact,
and logged no rescaling attempt. When selected
bills on territorial reform were examined, only
eight of 13 cited vast or dispersed territory as a
contributory factor to economic disparity, which
usually served as a catalyst for and framed the
reform.
Geographic attributes (whether elongated,
peninsular, salient, archipelagic, landlocked, or
a combination) vary both in success and failure
cases, but the core-periphery location pattern
of the provinces is instructive. All five recent
successful cases of province division (excluding
those elevated from sub-province status) are from
Mindanao island; only one recent failed proposal
(proposed split of Bukidnon) is from Mindanao.
Many of the provinces in Mindanao are products
of continuing territorial fission, making it the
country’s most precarious area in terms of border
restructuring. Such volatility finds similarities
with the findings of Eilenberg (2012) in district
formation in the fringes of Indonesia, as well
as the marginalization hypothesis found in the
literature, but this marginality is not necessarily
based on ethnicity. Contrarily, almost all of the
proposed division of provinces located near
Manila or Luzon island failed.
Another emergent finding is the disparity in the
proposed type of partition: asymmetrical division
(i.e., unequal division of districts or number of
municipalities) and/or gerrymandered division
(i.e., new, breakaway province does not conform
to existing congressional district lines) is found
in all successful cases. Conversely, in failed
cases, symmetrical or near symmetrical division
of districts or number of municipalities was
proposed (see Table 4). is finding diverges
with the geographic or administrative dispersion
forwarded by Fitrani et al. (2005) that rely on
population and geography.
Table 4. Comparison of Recent Division Attempts
in the Philippines
Province under
Reform No. of
Districts Reform
Outcome Type of Partition
Davao del Sur 2 Success (Davao
Occidental) Gerrymandered;
asymmetrical
(5 of 8 towns in
2nd district)
Surigao del
Norte 2 Success
(Dinagat
Islands)
Gerrymandered;
asymmetrical
(7 of 16 in 1st
district)
Zamboanga
del Sur 3 Success
(Zamboanga
Sibugay)
District-based;
asymmetrical
(1 of 3 districts; 16
of 42 towns)
Davao del
Norte 3 Success (Davao
de Oro) Gerrymandered;
asymmetrical
(11 towns taken
from 1st and 2nd
Districts)
South
Cotabato 3 Success
(Sarangani) District-based,
asymmetrical
(1 of 3 districts; 7
of 18 towns)
Quezon 4 Failed (Quezon
del Sur) Symmetrical (2
districts)
Camarines Sur 5 Failed (Nueva
Camarines) Near symmetrical;
district-based
(2 of 5 districts; 17
or 36 units)
Oriental
Mindoro 2 Failed
(Mindoro del
Sur)
Symmetrical (1
district)
Bukidnon 3 Failed
(Bukidnon del
Sur)
Near symmetrical;
but not district-
based (10 of 22
units)
Isabela 4 Failed (Isabela
del Sur) Symmetrical (2
districts)
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conclUsion
is study unpacked several dimensions of
policymaking on contemporary province
creation: spatial, temporal, and logic (rationality).
e first aspect discussed the sequential process
in policymaking (in the area of subnational
territorial reform), identifying at least three
key stages: endorsement-confirmation (local
councils), legislation (congress and president),
and ratification (referendum). e second
included the timing of bill submission and
deliberation, including political stability, the
negative value of which is partly responsible for
the failure of territorial reform at various VPs
(or levels of policymaking). Put differently, time
and space are essential dimensions in framing
and analyzing how policies are shaped and
legitimized in this area of local government
reform.
Logic demonstrated the use of institutional
disequilibrium in justifying the proposed
reform. is included an imbalance in economic
performance, in allocating resources, in providing
services, or in the presence of extreme power
asymmetry. In the cases unpacked, perceived
socio-economic or political disequilibrium
was cited. Moreover, conformance to higher-
level institutions (or the technical dimension)
is crucial in nudging the collective committees
in Congress. e game of institutional change
must be played within the rules, i.e., complying
with the technical and legal requirements set by
higher-level rules, such as the Constitution, and
the Local Government Code. Additionally, in
the limited cases that were analyzed, two findings
emerged that require further examination:
core-periphery pattern and partition type are
found to be associated with reform outcomes.
is investigation of Philippine cases also
attempted to enhance and provide a nuanced
understanding of the earlier hypotheses on the
role of geographic diversity and marginalization
in territorial reform.
Whereas these conditions are necessary for
reform to occur, congruence among veto
players’ preferences was observed to be shaped
by mechanisms that played prominently in
the dynamics of territorial reform in the
Philippines: territorial leveraging led by the
reform agent (usually the congressman), norm
of reciprocity (coupled with pivot on networks,
and policy push), preference mirroring, and
prodding through social movement. Because
of the institutional and sequential setup in the
Philippines, and among the many other players
in the assemblage, at least one player (i.e., the
congressman) acted as the key reform agent that
set the structural reform in motion.
Moreover, when other VP’s ideal points or
preferences are ambiguous or are located far from
that of the reform agent, the latter will abate
possible veto through persuasion, bargaining,
or other strategic actions. While the Senate’s
collective preference was mainly affected by
the bill’s merits and united stance of local elites
(preference mirroring), pivot on networks and
norms of reciprocity, such as legislative courtesy
(as a form of tacit logrolling), proved paramount
at the House of Representatives.
In the area of subnational territorial reform, the
Philippines epitomizes a large and fragmented
VP constellation (i.e., multiple national VPs,
multiple local VPs, plus citizens via referendum).
Despite these many players, veto points, and
preferences, the mechanisms unpacked in this
study attempted to demystify how such policy
attempts sometimes succeed.
is study may provide practical knowledge to
policymakers and architects of local government
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structures (including borders, sizes, and tiers),
particularly in the context of Philippine provinces.
It also attempted to locate reform triggers,
some of which diverge from the literature,
while at least two are new hypotheses that may
require further investigation. In unbundling the
mechanisms and conditions at play, many are
found to support earlier findings, while some
are emergent. Hence, due to the limited number
of contemporary cases, a replication study of
similar cases in other similarly situated countries
is an area for future research. e framework and
methodology may also be replicated in other
subnational governments, such as municipalities
and sub-municipal units. Equally important,
whether or not these territorial restructuring
efforts have attained their intended objectives
(whether economic, social, or organizational)
remains to be seen, and is another area that
needs further research.
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