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Understanding Path-Departing Changes in Childcare Policy: The Influence of Self-Undermining Policy Feedback

Social Policy & Administration

October 2024

DOI:10.1111/spol.13095

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Martin Gurín

University of Bremen

The debate surrounding policy feedback and policy developments has long revolved around self-reinforcing (positive) policy feedback. Recently, the literature has been enriched by a new research agenda that highlights the role of self-undermining (negative) policy feedback, which is also argued to significantly influence the evolution of policies. This study contributes to the existing literature by examining changes in childcare policy, a field that has thus far primarily analysed and emphasised positive policy feedback. By analysing the case of South Korea, we demonstrate that childcare policy is a good candidate for both positive and negative policy feedback. Furthermore, it is the combination of these pieces of feedback that determines the evolution of childcare policy. Additionally, this study illustrates that inadequately addressed negative feedback may lead to unforeseen policy shifts, as exemplified in the Korean case by the introduction of the cash-for-care policy.

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Social Policy & Administration, 2024; 0:1–13

https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.13095

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Social Policy & Administration

ORIGINAL ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS

Understanding Path- Departing Changes in Childcare

Policy: The Influence of Self- Undermining Policy Feedback

MartinGurín

Chair for Social Structure and Sociology of Aging Societies, Faculty of Social Sciences, TU Dortmund University, Dort mund, Germany

Correspondence: Martin Gurín (martin.gurin@tu-dortmund.de)

Received: 9 February 2024 | Revised: 25 September 2024 | Accepted: 28 September 2024

Funding: The author received no specific funding for this work.

ABSTRACT

The debate surrounding policy feedback and policy developments has long revolved around self- reinforcing (positive) policy

feedback. Recently, the literature has been enriched by a new research agenda that highlights the role of self- undermining

(negative) policy feedback, which is also argued to significantly influence the evolution of policies. This study contributes to the

existing literature by examining changes in childcare policy, a field that has thus far primarily analysed and emphasised positive

policy feedback. By analysing the case of South Korea, we demonstrate that childcare policy is a good candidate for both positive

and negative policy feedback. Furthermore, it is the combination of these pieces of feedback that determines the evolution of

childcare policy. Additionally, this study illustrates that inadequately addressed negative feedback may lead to unforeseen policy

shifts, as exemplified in the Korean case by the introduction of the cash- for- care policy.

1 | Introduction

The reciprocal relat ionship between policies and political in stitu-

tions is a fundamental tenet of historical institutionalist thought

(Béland2010). Policies are not passive responses to political con-

ditions; rather, they actively shape the political environment,

influencing the distribution of resources, power dynamics, and

the behaviour of political actors (Lowi 1964; Moynihan and

Soss2014; Pierson1993). In other words, policies emerge from

political processes, yet they, in turn, shape the course of future

political and policy development. Scholars, such as Weir, Orloff,

and Skocpol(1988), Skocpol (1992) and Weaver(2010), further

highlight how policies, once established, reshape the organisa-

tion of the state and inf luence the goals and alliances of social

groups engaged in ongoing political struggles. And they do so

through two types of policy feedback: positive and negative.

Positive, or self- reinforcing, policy feedback occurs when a pol-

icy creates conditions that strengthen its own support over time,

rendering significant changes or reversals difficult to achieve

(Brooks and Manza2006; Pierson1993, 2004). Advocates of this

concept emphasise path dependence, indicating that past policy

decisions and institutional structures constrain current choices

and shape the trajectory of future policies. Pierson(1994) argues

that existing policies create entrenched interests and constit-

uencies that benefit from the status quo, leading to resistance

against change and mobilisation to defend vested interests. This

entrenched path makes it difficult to deviate from established

policies or initiate large- scale reforms that contradict existing

structures and interests. Consequently, policymakers often opt

for limited reforms that build upon existing policy frameworks

rather than fundamentally altering them (Pierson1993).

Negative, or self- undermining, policy feedback, on the other

hand, happens when a policy creates conditions that weaken

its own support or effectiveness over time (Jacobs and

Weaver 2015; Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Weaver 2010).

For instance, a regulation might initially address a problem

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effectively, but over time, it could lead to unintended con-

sequences that reduce its efficacy or generate opposition

(Oberlander and Weaver2015). External shocks or changing

societal conditions may initiate processes that undermine the

viability and popularity of established policies (Weaver 1986)

and potentially lead to radical policy changes, either through

policy reorientation or rollback (Jacobs and Weaver 2015).

Weaver, along with others (e.g., Daugbjerg and Kay 2020;

Fernández and Jaime- Castillo2013; Jordan and Matt2014),

argues that self- reinforcing feedback effects represent only

one aspect of the story, with self- undermining forms of pol-

icy feedback being widespread. They contend, instead, that

it is the combination of positive and negative feedback that

determines the evolution of policy regimes. As the policy feed-

back literature tends to be biased toward positive feedback,

these scholars call for more attention to be given to negative

feedback.

While scholars across various policy fields have endeavoured

to investigate the impact of negative feedback in their respec-

tive areas (Fernández and Jaime- Castillo 2013; Jordan and

Matt2014; Millar et al.2021; Skogstad2017), those focusing on

childcare policies have yet to fully recognise the role of negative

feedback in facilitating institutional change.

The literature argues that childcare policy has undergone

profound, revolutionary changes (Bonoli2013; Ferragina and

Seeleib- Kaiser2015), with these changes being fundamental

even in countries previously considered frozen landscapes

(Ostner 2010). These changes align with Peter Hall's (1993)

concept of third- order change, which entails a paradigm shift

in policy goals and instruments. Originally, many European

countries adhered to a model of familialism by default or ex-

plicit familialism, where responsibility for childcare rested

predominantly with families, with either minimal state in-

tervention or transfer- intensive approaches (Leitner 2003;

Saraceno 2016). However, as societal values have evolved,

there has been increasing recognition of the importance of

state involvement in the provision and regulation of child-

care services (Orloff 2006; Ostner 2010). This shift toward

de- familialisation aims to support working parents, promote

gender equality, and ensure child development, marking a

fundamental reorientation in policy thinking and objectives

(Ferragina and Seeleib- Kaiser2015).

Conversely, there have also been remarkable alterations in

policy logic in the opposite direction, as shown by the dis-

mantling of childcare services in the Czech Republic after the

collapse of communism (Hašková and Saxonberg2016) and

the introduction of cash- for- care allowances in Scandinavian

countries (Eydal and Rostgaard 2011). Traditionally,

Scandinavian countries have been known for their extensive

state- supported childcare services, designed to promote gen-

der equality and enable high levels of female workforce partic-

ipation. However, the cash- for- care approach, which provides

parents with a direct subsidy to care for their children at home

instead of using public childcare services, introduces a differ-

ent dimension to childcare policy. As such, the introduction of

cash- for- care represents a complex and fundamental shift in

policy that challenges the balance between supporting paren-

tal choice and maintaining the progressive achievements in

gender equality that have characterised Scandinavian welfare

states (Hiilamo and Kangas2009).

Consistent with the general feedback literature, we should as-

sume that the effects of negative feedback determine the evolu-

tion of childcare policy reg imes and that positive feedback effect s

do not overwhelmingly govern the realm of childcare policy.

In fact, over the last two decades, negative feedback may have

been even more influential than positive feedback. However, it

is evident that academic scholars studying changes in childcare

policy have predominantly focused on and emphasised the role

of positive feedback (e.g., Morel2007; Oliver and Mätzke2 014).

In addition, fundamental shifts in the childcare policy regimes

have been attributed to various drivers of change, including so-

cioeconomic challenges (Seeleib- Kaiser2016), ideational change

(Himmelweit and Lee2024; Seeleib- Kaiser2016), electoral com-

petition (Fleckenstein and Lee2017; Seeleib- Kaiser2010), or new

cultural constellations (Ostner2010), though negative feedback

is seldom considered. This discrepancy prompts us to question

whether the concept of negative feedback is theoretically use-

ful for interpreting childcare policy change or if scholars in this

field are overly biased towards positive feedback, neglecting the

significance of negative feedback as a driver of policy change.

We assert that including both positive and negative feedback is

crucial for understanding policy change in this field. This ar-

gument is substantiated by an in- depth analysis of childcare

policy changes in South Korea, which has experienced signif-

icant shifts in childcare policy in both directions mentioned

earlier (Gurín 2023), making it an ideal case for studying pos-

itive and negative feedback. The first major shift in childcare

policy occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s when governments

transitioned from a male- breadwinner model to market- driven

de- familialisation. Nearly a decade later, the second shift hap-

pened with the introduction of a cash- for- care allowance,

(partially) re- familialising in part the childcare policy regime.

Empirical investigation reveals that the fundamental policy

shifts in both instances were driven by negative feedback. In the

first instance, the negative feedback was a result of the unsus-

tainability of past policy approaches, marked by the absence of

childcare services, influenced by changes in family dynamics,

ongoing industrialisation, and the desire for OECD member-

ship; while in the second, it was due to dissatisfaction with the

poor quality of newly- established private services, which the

government failed to improve because of resistance from early

winners opposing reforms. In other words, the very services that

were established in response to negative feedback eventually be-

came targets of negative feedback themselves.

This case illustrates that childcare policies can be suscepti-

ble to both positive and negative feedback. Childcare policies

may evolve in ways unintended by their designers, resulting

in highly noticeable policy failures. Given the significance

of childcare for the welfare of families and children, child-

care policy failures can catalyse the formation of counter-

coalitions, compelling policymakers to address negative

policy legacies. These issues may largely go unheard during

times when governments favour the status quo, but may be

addressed when partisan allies take over the executive branch

(Oberlander and Weaver 2015). Furthermore, our example

demonstrates that inadequately addressed negative feedback

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can contribute to unforeseen shifts in policy— exemplified in

our case by the introduction of cash- for- care. Our findings un-

derscore the significance and presence of negative forms of

policy feedback in this policy field, emphasising the need for

increased attention to negative policy feedback from childcare

policy scholars.

The article is structured as follows. The next section provides an

overview of the current knowledge of negative policy feedback

and presents an argument for why childcare policies are suscep-

tible to negative feedback. Next, it presents the research method-

ology employed in the study, followed by an investigation of the

childcare policy change in the period between 1990 and 2020 in

the light of positive and negative policy feedback. The last part

concludes.

2 | Childcare Policy as a Candidate for Negative

Policy Feedback

Self- undermining policy feedback is understood in the politi-

cal sense as a “backlash that threatens to destabilise a policy”

(Daugbjerg and Kay 2020, p. 259). They represent a complex

phenomenon in which the very policies that are implemented

to address societal problems inadvertently contribute to their

own erosion over time (Jacobs and Weaver 2015; Oberlander

and Weaver2015; Weaver 2010). According to Weaver (2010),

self- undermining or negative policy feedback (as he originally

termed them) operate over extended periods of time and serve

to create a political and policy- making environment that is con-

ducive to the emergence of interest groups that seek to undo or

significantly alter current policy instruments and paradigms.

Proponents of negative policy feedback criticise the policy feed-

back literature as bia sed toward positive feedback and thus offers

only one aspect of the story (Fernández and Jaime- Castillo2013;

Jacobs and Weaver2015; Jordan and Matt2 014; Oberlander and

Weaver 2015). They argue that negative forms of policy feed-

back merit greater scrutiny from researchers given their preva-

lence and significant potential for understanding policy change

(Jacobs and Weaver2015; Weaver2010). This is because negative

policy feedback helps illuminate the path- departing changes ob-

served across policy fields, with negative feedback gradually cre-

ating the conditions for such changes (Weaver2010). Therefore,

they believe that it is the combination of the effects of positive

and negative feedback that determines the evolution of policies

(Jacobs and Weaver2015).

One primary cause of negative policy feedback stems from un-

intended consequences (Jacobs and Weaver2015; Mettler2016).

Policies may be designed with noble intentions, but unforeseen

outcomes c an emerge durin g implementation. The se unintended

effects may include social disruptions, economic imbalances or

unintended burdens on specific groups. As these consequences

become apparent, they can generate dissatisfaction among the

public and policymakers, which in turn leads to a reassessment

of the policy's effectiveness (Fernández and Jaime- Castillo2013;

Oberlander and Weaver2015). Societal changes, evolving val-

ues, and shifts in public opinion can also contribute to negative

policy feedback (Weaver2010). Policies that were once aligned

with prevailing norms may become obsolete or face increased

scrutiny as societal attitudes evolve. The disconnect between

the policy and current social dynamics weakens its legitimacy

and support, which can lead to calls for reform or replacement.

In addition, the emergence and empowerment of interest groups

can play a pivotal role in undermining policies (Jordan and

Matt2014). Policies often create winners and losers, and those

adversely affected may organise themselves into interest groups

that advocate for policy reversal or adjustments. These groups

exert political pressure and create an environment in which

the original policy is challenged by factions seeking to protect

their interests. Finally, Daugbjerg and Kay(2020) argue that too

much positive feedback over extended periods of time, where

the policy is no longer consistent with its context, can lead to a

self- undermining policy trajectory, i.e., “policy pathway is un-

dermined by positive instrument feedbacks” (p. 254).

While negative policy feedback can create internal tensions

and pressures, the broader context and a combination of factors

determine whether it translates into policy change (Jacobs and

Weaver2015; Skogstad2017). As Oberlander and Weaver(2015,

p. 44) note, actors seeking policy change “may have to wait until

sympathetic politicians gain power in order to redress their

grievances.” Indeed, the willingness of political actors to re-

spond to negative feedback is crucial. If policymakers are com-

mitted to preserving the status quo or lack the political will to

address the feedback, the self- undermining dynamic alone may

not lead to policy change.

While social policies are often described as prime candidates

for positive policy feedback (Campbell 2012; Pierson 1993), it

has recently been emphasised that these policies can also be

good candidates for negative policy feedback (Weaver 2010

and Fernández and Jaime- Castillo2013, using the example of

pension reforms). It is our view that this could also pertain to

childcare policies, which could similarly result in unforeseen

costs and unintended grievances that could undermine their

persistence.

Negative feedback may arise when childcare services are un-

derdeveloped or unavailable. Historically based on a male-

breadwinner model, the lack of childcare services can generate

negative policy feedback as societal norms shift toward dual-

earner families and gender equality. Without adequate child-

care, working parents, especially women, struggle to balance

work and family, leading to lower workforce participation, ca-

reer stagnation, and income inequality, which reinforces tradi-

tional gender roles and hampers labour market equity (Lauri,

Põder, and Ciccia 2020). Moreover, the absence of childcare

limits the effectiveness of poverty reduction and family welfare

policies, forcing parents to choose between work and caregiv-

ing (Plantenga and Remery 2009). These ongoing challenges

are driving demand for policy changes, recognising that with-

out (comprehensive) childcare support, the broader objectives of

welfare states cannot be fully realised (Bonoli2013).

Even with childcare services in place, negative feedback can

occur. Childcare policies can be criticised by a variety of stake-

holders, each highlighting different issues and advocating for

specific policy changes. Parents and families may criticise the

high cost, limited availability, poor quality and inf lexibility

of childcare services. They may demand increased subsidies,

4 of 13 Social Policy & Administration, 2024

expansion of public facilities, greater regulation to improve

quality, and more flexible childcare options (Thévenon and

Luci 2012; Saraceno 2011). Parental trust in the childcare

system, both public and private, is crucial. Negative percep-

tions, whether due to real incidents or public discourse, can

undermine trust in childcare services and prompt parents to

seek and/or demand alternative arrangements (Roberts2011).

Feminists and gender equality advocates may (and often do)

point out that inadequate childcare services limit women's

workforce participation and reinforce traditional gender roles.

They may call for fundamental policy changes that promote

work– family balance, increase women's labour market par-

ticipation, and encourage shared caregiving responsibilities

(Oliver and Mätzke 2014; Orloff 2006). Opposition political

parties may criticise inequities in access to childcare, par-

ticularly for low- income or rural families, and criticise the

inefficiency of the existing system. They may demand compre-

hensive reforms, greater investment in public childcare infra-

structure, and family- friendly policies to boost fertility rates

(Ostner 2010; Seeleib- Kaiser 2010). Finally, businesses and

employers may also express concerns and demands, pointing

out that insufficient childcare options lead to higher employee

turnover, absenteeism and reduced productivity (Baek, Sung,

and Lee 2011). They can advocate for employer- sponsored

childcare programmes, tax incentives, and public- private

partnerships to increase childcare availability.

Childcare pol icies can lead to negati ve unintended consequences

due to various factors such as inadequate regulation and insuf-

ficient funding. For instance, when state oversight is minimal,

childcare providers may not meet essential quality standards.

This can result in overcrowded facilities, unqualified staff, and

unsafe environments, which can adversely impact children's

development and well- being (Burchinal et al.2000). Inadequate

regulation can also lead to financial mismanagement and fraud

within private childcare centres, as seen in numerous cases of

financial irregularities uncovered in South Korea (Hwang2021;

Jo2018).

Childcare policy systems include monitoring and review sys-

tems which, as Skogstad(2017, p. 25) argues, are “capable of

revealing lapses in a policy's performance.” Visible govern-

ment failures resulting from poor policy design and/or unin-

tended consequences then could push governments to change

inherent negative policy legacies. At the same time, given the

significance of childcare for the welfare of families and chil-

dren in particular, childcare policy failures may catalyse the

formation of strong counter- coalitions, comprising parents,

childcare policy experts, and the political opposition. This

may compel policymakers to address negative policy legacies

by making adjustments, adopting alternatives, or even termi-

nating the policy.

The literature contains several cases that exemplify negative

feedback in childcare policy. For instance, the poor design of

childcare services was a crucial issue during the communist pe-

riod in the Czech Republic, resulting in eventual dismantling

of these services after the collapse of the regime (Hašková and

Saxonberg 2016). The marketisation of childcare services has

been argued to bring several negative consequences, including

poor quality and inequalities in access, which policymakers

often do not foresee at the time of adoption. In competitive

markets, childcare service providers prioritise attracting cus-

tomers and maximising market share over ensuring quality

and addressing societal needs. This competitive pressure incen-

tivises cost- saving measures and corner- cutting practices that

compromise service quality and reliability (see, for example,

Galla gher 2018). Daly (2010) and Lewis (2013) document that

such a policy path prompts dissatisfaction and criticism from

parents, who demand a policy reorientation. However, these

pleas are only partially, if at all, addressed since they often col-

lide with strong self- reinforcing feedback from private childcare

providers.

Hence, it is understandable that childcare policy schol-

ars pay attention to positive feedback as they resist, block

or blunt new policy approaches (León 2007; Naldini and

Saraceno 2008; White 2002), often expanding the inherent

policy legacies instead (Daly 2010; Lewis 2013), or chang-

ing policies while maintaining their traits or imprints (e.g.,

Morel2007). However, how negative policy feedback contrib-

ute to the understanding of childcare policy change and how

these emerge in the first instance, remain largely unexplored.

The numerous policy changes in recent decades, marked by

significant shifts in childcare policies among welfare states,

suggest that self- reinforcing feedback effects are not univer-

sal, with negative feedback being more prevalent and inf luen-

tial than commonly assumed. This study therefore addresses

two main questions: What are the mechanisms by which self-

undermining policy feedback emerge in childcare policies? And

how these pieces of feedback shape the trajectory of childcare

policy regimes?

3 | Methodology

Policy change is influenced by a range of factors, includ-

ing socioeconomic and demographic pressures (Bonoli 2005;

Hantrais1999), policy dynamics, shifts in the actors responsi-

ble for collective decision- making (von Wahl 2008), electoral

competition (Seeleib- Kaiser2010) and evolving prevailing ideas

(Béland2016). These factors are exogenous to the policy itself—

they originate outside the policy and exert external pressure on

decision- makers to adapt or change course. While these factors

may set the stage for policy change, policy feedback specifically

refers to how existing policies loop back to influence the future

policy environment. As previously mentioned, feedback can ei-

ther reinforce a policy by creating stakeholders who benefit from

it (Pierson 2004), or they can undermine a policy if the unin-

tended consequences erode public or political support (Jacobs

and Weaver 2015). Therefore, recognising policy feedback

involves identifying how past policies have reshaped the po-

litical landscape, altering the incentives, constraints, and pref-

erences of actors in ways that impact future decision- making

(Weaver2010).

Determining whether self- undermining policy feedback is a suf-

ficient cause of policy change, as Oberlander and Weaver(2015)

suggest it rarely is, or a contributing factor, necessitates a thor-

ough and detailed analysis. A single- case study is an effective

strategy for investigating policy change and the influence of

policy feedback as it allows for in- depth analysis, captures

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context- specific insights, and enables detailed process tracing

(Yin2018). South Korea was chosen because it represents a no-

table example of a country that has undergone significant pol-

icy changes (toward de- familialisation and re- familialisation of

childcare), thus falling under the purview of negative feedback

theory.

To assess the presence or absence of positive and negative

feedback and their impact on policy stability and change,

document analysis and expert interviews were employed.

Throughout, the document analysis focused on the prefer-

ences and roles of actors, including target populations and

other politically significant actors such as pressure groups,

in the policy- making process. This involved gathering public

statements both in support of and in opposition to the policy.

This included examining strategic policy documents, govern-

ment reports and media coverage of reforms where policy-

makers explicitly reference the consequences of and feedback

towards previous policies as reasons for changing course. This

method provided a broader perspective on stakeholder percep-

tions and official narratives, revealing how policy feedback is

discussed and addressed. In addition, we gathered and used

academic studies (written in English and Korean) that assess

the impact of policy feedback on decision- making processes,

providing empirical evidence of the link.

Complementing the document analysis, semi- structured inter-

views and information inquiries were conducted with three re-

nowned Korean scholars in the field of childcare policy, who are

either well knowledgeable about or have collected testimonies

that influenced policymakers to change policies in response to

policy feedback. These interviews and information inquiries

shed light on how feedback mechanisms influenced decisions

and uncovered contextual factors not evident in written docu-

ments. To adhere to ethical principles, the identities of those in-

terviewed are kept confidential.

4 | Case Study: Self- Undermining Policy Feedback

in the Korean Childcare Policy

4.1 | Early Expansion of Childcare Services With

the ‘Help’ of the Market

To determine whether a radical policy change has occurred due

to negative feedback, it is essential to establish a reference point

(Seeleib- Kaiser2016). Here, the reference point denotes the ini-

tial childcare policy that was in place before radical discontinu-

ities in policy were introduced in the 1990s and 2000s.

Childcare services and facilities were first introduced in Korea

during the postwar period, under The Child Welfare Act of

1961. These services were targeted exclusively at children from

low- income families. The prevailing notion at the time was that

mothers are primar y providers of childcare, and government

intervention or support in childcare was considered a measure

of last resort (Lee2018). No direct child benefits were provided

and childcare services served only those whom the regime

understood as the most deserving: single parents and couple

families with the lowest income (Fleckenstein and Lee 2014).

Accordingly, the childcare policy regime could be characterised

as a classic example of implicit familialism (Leitner2003) or fa-

milialism by default (Saraceno2016).

The Infant Care Act of 1991 marked a major policy shift, as

it recognised the joint responsibility of central and local gov-

ernments in providing childcare, not just a familial one. This

change was driven by concerns about the sustainability of past

policy trajectories in the face of shifting policy dynamics and

rapid industrialisation (Jeong, Oh, and Ahn1995). The rising

demand for female labour and the shift to nuclear families un-

derscored the need to reconceptualise childcare (Baek, Sung,

and Lee 2011). An expert interview (expert I) revealed that

South Korea's aspiration to join the OECD also motivated this

policy change. Criticism from the OECD about low female em-

ployment and inadequate childcare pushed the government to

act. As the expert explained, South Korea faced criticism for

lacking sufficient childcare support, which was seen as a bar-

rier to its recognition as a developed nation during the OECD

accession process.

Consequently, childcare serv ices witnessed an expansion during

the 1990s (3- Year Plan for Expansion of Childcare Centres 1995–

1997), aided by subsidies for low- income families in 1992 and the

provision of free childcare for five- year- olds from low- income

families residing in rural regions, still retaining residual traits.

The productivist government (cf. Holliday2000), however, was

reluctant to directly provide these services and instead encour-

aged the private sector to take action— anticipating positive eco-

nomic outcomes and avoiding strain on state finances from the

need to build childcare infrastructure. As a result, the childcare

policy system underwent de- familialisation through market-

driven service provision, with the number of private childcare

providers steadily increasing, while the number of public pro-

viders remained consistently low (Won and Pascall2004).

The neglected status of childcare services, which hampered

women's labour force participation and gender equality, also

drew criticism from feminist groups. The continued neglect of

childcare services could not be sustained when the Asian finan-

cial crisis of 1997– 98 severely impacted the South Korean econ-

omy (Jeoung 2021). Feminist activists urged the government

to reform institutional structures to take into account women's

interests in social policies and considered the participation of

women in economic activity as an extremely important task.

To ensure equal opportunity for both men and women and to

encourage women's economic activities, multifaceted measures

conducive to work– family balance were required (Baek 2009).

The government of Kim Dae- jung (1998– 2002), primarily fo-

cused on economic recovery, recognised the need to reevaluate

the welfare state regarding childcare policy and proposed child-

care policy focused on promoting women's labour force par-

ticipation. The childcare subsidy programme was expanded to

include middle- class and dual- earner households, in addition to

low- income families, and active measures were taken to foster

the growth of the private childcare sector (An and Peng2 016).

Deregulation of the system led to a significant increase in the

number of commercial childcare providers (from 6538 centres

in 1997 to 11,046 centres in 2002; Fleckenstein and Lee2 017).

Government's own involvement, however, remained minimal,

at best consisting of passive administrative oversight and finan-

cial support.

6 of 13 Social Policy & Administration, 2024

4.2 | Negative (Self- Undermining) Policy Feedback

Facing Strong Positive (Self- Reinforcing) Feedback

From the Private Childcare Providers

The expansion of childcare policies took significant strides

under the centre- left government of Roh Moo- hyun (2003–

2007), at a time when South Korea faced its lowest- ever fertility

rate of 1.08. This demographic crisis fuelled a ‘national emer-

gency’ discourse, which gained traction with both the general

public and influential actors who had previously been hesitant

to fully endorse childcare reform and work– family balance ini-

tiatives (Kim2018; Lee2018). Roh's administration recognised

the urgency of the situation, making work– family balance and

social investment cornerstones of its policy agenda (Baek2009).

The government's focus on childcare was driven by Roh's be-

lief that investing in these services was key to addressing the

challenges of an aging population. As a result, several pivotal

reforms were introduced, including the revised Infant Care Act

(2004), the Sa- ssak Plan (2006– 2010), and the Saeromaji Plan

(First Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aging Society). Together,

these reforms sought to enhance the affordability, quality, and

diversity of childcare services (Baek and Seo2004). A notable de-

parture from previous administrations was Roh's commitment

to reducing the market's dominance in the childcare sector. This

was to be achieved by expanding public access to services and

aiming for 30% enrolment in public childcare facilities, a strate-

gic move toward ‘de- familialising’ care through state- supported

social services. These reforms were met with support from key

civil society organisations, such as the People's Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy and the Korean Women's Association

United, underscoring the broad- based coalition behind the gov-

ernment's efforts.

However, the drive for reform was not merely a proactive re-

sponse to demographic concerns but also a reaction to the

mounting dissatisfaction with the existing childcare system. By

the early 2000s, chronic issues within the private childcare mar-

ket had led to widespread parental grievances, particularly over

the high costs and subpar service quality. Private childcare facil-

ities were criticised for having high teacher- to- student ratios and

lacking sufficient regulatory oversight, resulting in inconsistent

and inadequate care (Baek2009; Choi2010). Furthermore, poor

wages for childcare workers, especially in private centres, con-

tributed to substandard service delivery, further eroding trust

in the system (Hwang2005; Na et al.2003). Consequently, the

First Mid- to Long- term Childcare Plan outlined five- year goals

focused on strengthening public involvement in childcare, im-

proving service quality, and reducing financial burdens on

families. It prioritised creating a child- centred environment

that better supported working families and addressed public

grievances.

Thus, the most pressing policy need at this time was to in-

crease the number of public childcare facilities, which parents

preferred in terms of both cost and service quality. As propo-

nents of self- reinforcing feedback would anticipate, however,

strong opposition arose against this policy reform (cf. Daly2010;

Lewis 2013, for comparison with the UK case). Local govern-

ments and private providers fiercely opposed the government's

plans to increase access to public childcare (Lee2017).

The expert interview (expert II) reveals the depth of this

opposition:

When the government attempted to undermine

private institutions and shift toward a public

childcare model, private entities made it clear they

would not stand idly by. From the perspective of

private providers, they had a valid point: when the

Korean government previously needed daycare

facilities, it encouraged them to establish businesses,

even providing loans to do so. Now, however, the

government's plan to expand public daycare by 30%

seemed unreasonable. (…) This led to significant

conflicts between the Ministry of Gender Equality

and Family and private associations at the time.

Private childcare organisations viewed the proposed reform as a

direct threat to their established interests and investments. They

argued that the abrupt policy shift was unfair, especially since

previous governments had actively encouraged their establish-

ment. The expert describes this conflict:

Private associations engaged in extensive lobbying,

and at the central level, they staged protests in front of

the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry

of Gender Equality and Family, as well as in front of

city halls.

Also local governments were particularly resistant due to the

substantial responsibilities imposed on them, such as managing

land acquisition and the operation of public childcare facilities.

They were also expected to contribute one- fourth of the budget

for the expansion. As the expert notes,

An important aspect to consider is that childcare

funding comes not only from the central government

but also from local governments. (…) At the local level,

there is a close relationship between local governing

councils and priv ate childcare associat ions. Therefore,

the government could not ignore these close ties.

Local politicians, often indebted to private childcare providers,

exhibited passive behaviour towards the expansion of public fa-

cilities due to their intertwined interests (Chang2011). The ob-

jections and threats from private childcare providers intensified,

and the government feared that closing private providers could

create significant gaps in childcare provision. Ultimately, the

plan was halted by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, which

refused to allocate additional funds for the expansion of public

childcare facilities. As Lee(2017) notes, this decision was heav-

ily influenced by lobbying from private childcare organisations.

The government sought, at the very least, to regulate and en-

hance the quality of private childcare providers. As previously

mentioned, earlier administrations had attempted to reduce bar-

riers to entry and lower regulatory standards to foster competi-

tion. However, this approach led to numerous for- profit services

failing to meet basic quality standards, resulting in widespread

7 of 13

dissatisfaction and distrust among users (Kim 2 017). A new

accreditation scheme was intended to address these issues.

However, in contrast to the original draft, the evaluation crite-

ria in the final proposal were not sufficiently robust. This was

largely due to successful lobbying by private childcare organi-

sations, which actively opposed the introduction of stricter ac-

creditation measures, primarily due to concerns over increased

costs. As a result, the government was compelled to compromise

with the demands of the private sector (Lee2017).

As it became increasingly difficult to challenge the position of

private childcare providers, the government was forced to re-

orient its policy towards utilising the existing, more expensive

private services (cf. Hacker2005; Pierson2004). To reduce the

financial burden on parents and thereby increase the take- up

of services and enable higher female labour force participation,

the government expanded differential childcare subsidies to

also cover middle- income families and provided free childcare

for children under 5 or children with disabilities (Baek 2009).

In addition, the Basic Subsidy Scheme, directly paid to private

childcare providers, for parents with children up to the age of

two in private institutions was introduced in 2005. The aim was

to reduce the cost difference between public and private provid-

ers and thus ensure greater fairness between users of childcare

facilities. In contrast to the government's initial intentions, this

“private- based publicness” (Kim2017) led to the further expan-

sion of the private sector— an outcome that many social actors

(e.g., the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) had

warned about (Baek2009; Lee2017).

Nevertheless, the commercialisation of childcare was consis-

tently criticised for numerous problems, including poor service

quality and public distrust (Choi2016). Despite these ongoing is-

sues, the new centre- right government of Lee Myung- bak (2008–

2013) continued to view care as a market commodity. In an effort

to enhance user satisfaction and improve policy efficiency, the

government introduced an electronic voucher system in 2009

(Korea Institute of Child Care and Education2009). This system

was designed to replace the previous subsidy system, with the

goal of improving the quality of private childcare providers and

reducing the need for public service supplementation (Ma, Kim,

and Lee 2016; Kim2017). The central premise of the voucher

system was that enabling “customers” to select and choose their

childcare providers would promote cost- effectiveness and drive

improvements in service quality (Kim and Nam 2011). Public

daycare services were overlooked by the government, despite

significant pressure from parents and civic organisations.

4.3 | Negative Feedback and the Unforeseen

Shift in Childcare Policy: The Introduction

of Cash- for- Care

As the historical accounts illustrate, the policy regime showed

a clear preference for in- kind benefits over cash benefits, result-

ing in a noticeable imbalance. However, the need to introduce

direct financial support in the form of child benefits has been

highlighted and demanded by academics, civil society and po-

litical parties since the early 2000s. For example, the People's

Solidarity for Participatory Democracy advocated for child ben-

efit as an important measure to combat poverty (Choi 2020). The

idea of child benefit subsequently appeared on the government's

agenda, first in 2004, when the Roh government examined the

introduction of means- tested child benefit as one of the fertility-

enhancing components, and later as a possible universal bene-

fit for families regardless of their income (Lee2 017). However,

implementation was considered a long- term task and was con-

stantly postponed due to a lack of substantial (financial) support

from businesses and the Ministry of Finance, which did not

view the child benefit system as an “effective” measure to pro-

mote fertility (Lee2017; Choi 2020). In other words, the idea of

introducing a child benefit scheme encountered resistance from

self- reinforcing policy feedback, which favoured maintaining

the status quo and minimal state responsibility. As a result, the

debate on child benefits was put on hold. This inertia in policy

development, driven by financial considerations, illustrates the

ways in which entrenched policy feedback can act as barriers to

reform, perpetuating limited state responsibility in addressing

fertility- related challenges.

Instead, discussions had begun about supporting families

not using childcare services. In 2006, the Ministry of Gender

Equality and Family announced a plan to review the introduc-

tion of a cash- for- care allowance as part of the 1st Basic Family

Policy Plan (2006– 2010). This was seen as a way to offer fi-

nancial support to families, given that child benefit proposals

faced positive feedback aiming to maintain the status quo. By

September 2008, the Ministry of Health and Welfare officially

proposed the introduction of a cash- for- care allowance, ref lect-

ing growing dissatisfaction among families who did not use

childcare services but received no financial support.

As governments expanded support for families using childcare

services that, however, lacked the trust of families, vocal de-

mands of social justice and equity arose among families, who

decided not to use (private) childcare services and, they ar-

gued, remained without support (Min and Jang 2015; P yo and

Kim2021). And the government sought to address concerns re-

garding the fairness of its support to families as illustrated by

a 2009 report from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (p. 17)

which legitimised the introduction of cash- for- care policy ac-

cordingly: “to address the fairness of early childhood care sup-

port policies and meet the needs of parents who prefer to care

for their children at home, it is necessary to establish govern-

ment support for children not enrolled in childcare facilities.

(…) Introducing a child- rearing allowance for children not using

childcare facilities can be justified in terms of ensuring equity

with childcare fee support.” The negative feedback thus played

a key role in the decision to introduce a cash- for- care allowance

(a flat- rate benefit of 100,000 KRW per month) for low- income

non- users of childcare services in 2009.

However, it is crucial to acknowledge that other factors also

contributed to the policy's introduction. The expert interview

(expert I) highlighted the role of family and child studies which

gained inf luence by aligning with power interests. These schol-

ars believed that “children should be raised by their mothers to

foster attachment” and opposed state- supported daycare, argu-

ing that it was “detrimental to the well- being of children” (see

also Song 2014). As this discourse gained traction, it was argued

that without financial support, parents reluctant to use daycare

would cause an “unnecessary concentration of children in these

8 of 13 Social Policy & Administration, 2024

facilities,” which led to the rapid approval of the cash- for- care

allowance. These positions were also firmly held by a large part

of the ruling conservative party in which “policymakers took

women support for children at home for granted”, making the

adoption of this policy a relatively easy process (Kim 2017, p.

69). Additionally, the expert (I) pointed out that the govern-

ment's reluctance to invest heavily in improving daycare quality

led to the decision to provide direct financial support to fami-

lies, which was seen as a “strategy to save money while gaining

electoral support.” The Blue House discovered through polling

that “women in their 30s” were largely opposed to President Lee

Myung- bak, leading advisors to propose a policy to distribute

cash to this demographic, as these parents were frustrated by

the lack of support for home care despite daycare being free for

enrolled children.

Criticism of the cash- for- care allowance was strong, partic-

ularly from civic groups and childcare organisations. Civic

groups, including the Korea Women's Associations United and

the National Childcare Center Association, opposed the policy,

arguing that it should not be implemented without first expand-

ing public childcare services. These groups, which advocated for

greater state responsibility in childcare, feared that the allow-

ance would weaken public investment in high- quality childcare

facilities (Lee2017). This self- reinforcing feedback from propo-

nents of public childcare services was, however, unsuccessful in

preventing the policy's adoption.

The cash- for- care allowance, representing an explicit form

of familialism, marks another significant policy change in

the Korean childcare policy regime. This time, the shift was

driven by dissatisfaction with existing services, which them-

selves emerged from negative feedback, as previously discussed.

Dissatisfaction with existing childcare services, exacerbated by

the government's failure to expand public options or improve the

quality of private ones, regardless of the introduced voucher sys-

tem, led to a substantial rise in families opting for the allowance

over formal childcare services. The number of families using the

cash- for- care allowance even surpassed those utilising childcare

facilities (Kim2017).

4.4 | A Window of Opportunity for Public

Childcare: Change in the Government

Concurrently, the problems with the private daycare provid-

ers persisted. For instance, many childcare providers have

circumvented centralised accounting monitoring systems

(Hwang2021). A sequence of special audits conducted between

2013 and 2017 uncovered 5951 instances of financial irregulari-

ties and accounting fraud in 1878 private kindergartens. In these

cases, fees were misappropriated for personal purposes rather

than being used for quality improvements (Jo2018). Moreover,

numerous instances of child abuse were reported in private day-

care centres (Cho2015), ultimately leading to the mandatory in-

stallation of surveillance cameras in daycare centres since 2015.

It is therefore not surprising that the demand for public daycare

services far exceeded the actual supply (Lee et al.2018).

After the centre- left government regained control of the pres-

idential office, the window of opportunity for public childcare

reopened. The Moon Jae- in administration (2017– 2022), which

identified “inclusive welfare” as the new main paradigm of wel-

fare policy, had a clear policy orientation in favour of socialising

care through the expansion of the public sector— a measure rated

as the ‘most desired’ by 35.9% of respondents in the Ministry of

Health and Welfare's nationwide survey (MHW2018). The Fourth

Strategy for an Aging Society and Population envisaged strength-

ening the responsibility of the state by setting the goal of increasing

the enrolment rate in public childcare institutions to 40% by 2022

and to 50% by 2025. However, due to the activities of private child-

care associations, again, the implementation of such a policy has

been quite limited. For example, the amendment to the Child Care

Act (2017), which would have allowed the construction of public

childcare facilities in abandoned primary school classrooms, was

put on hold due to vehement resistance from these associations.

At the same time, the government made great efforts to improve

the standards of all daycare centres. As of 2019, all childcare

providers are required to use the accreditation system, which

was previously optional. By mandating participation in the as-

sessment system, the government aimed to improve the qual-

ity of (private) facilities and close the blind spot where many of

them remained uncertified. Additionally, the Moon administra-

tion established the Public Agency for Social Service (PASS) in

2019, which is responsible for managing and supervising public

childcare facilities. This policy is groundbreaking in two ways:

first, it enhances the central government's role beyond merely

providing financial incentives and regulatory guidance, moving

towards directly providing high- quality childcare; and second,

it enables local governments to re- municipalise childcare they

previously entrusted to the market (Yang2020).

5 | Conclusion

The debate surrounding policy feedback and policy change has

long revolved around positive (self- reinforcing) policy feedback

(Pierson 1994). The literature has been significantly enriched

by a newfound emphasis on negative (self- undermining) policy

feedback, which occur when existing institutions and policies

yield adverse socioeconomic consequences (Weaver2010, p. 139).

Interestingly, scholars in the field of childcare policy have also con-

centrated primarily on analysing and emphasising positive policy

feedback and their impact on childcare policy evolution. However,

they have largely overlooked the potential significance of negative

policy feedback, which could have acted as a trigger and a catalyst

for the transformative changes observed in recent decades.

We argue that childcare policies may be a good candidate for

negative feedback. When childcare services are missing or se-

verely neglected, negative feedback can arise. This is because,

without formal childcare, parents, particularly mothers, may

struggle to maintain employment or advance in their careers,

leading to financial instability and hindering professional

growth (Thévenon and Luci 2012). The shortage of childcare

services may be a subject of criticism from the political oppo-

sition for various reasons, notably its detrimental effects on

fertility rates and gender equality (Oliver and Mätzke 2014).

Consequently, the absence of childcare services may gener-

ate widespread dissatisfaction and criticism, as it disrupts

family life and individual career paths and has far- reaching

9 of 13

implications for economic stability. However, negative feedback

can also occur in response to existing childcare services due to

various factors that affect their perceived quality and reliability

(Roberts2011; Saraceno2011). The cost of childcare, the quality

of care provided, the caregiver- to- child ratio, concerns about the

qualifications and training of childcare staf f, incidents of neglect

or abuse, and inf lexible working hours can all contribute to neg-

ative feedback as they impact overall trust, satisfaction, and the

perceived value of childcare services, prompting parents to voice

their concerns and demand better alternatives.

Dissatisfaction and criticism can lead to fundamental changes in

childcare policy, such as shifting from a male- breadwinner model

towards a de- familialised system, and vice versa. Historical ac-

counts of Korean childcare policy illustrate this dynamic. In the

1990s, the lack of childcare services faced heavy criticism from

feminist groups and businesses, leading to a shift from implicit

familialism to market- driven de- familialisation. The imprudent

expansion of childcare services through the market, without ad-

equate oversight and regulation by the state, however, resulted

in unaffordable, low- quality services. This failure to ensure qual-

ity and affordability undermined parental trust and satisfaction,

prompting demands for more credible alternative arrangements

and solutions. The Roh Moo- hyun government attempted to ad-

dress these negative legacies but faced strong reinforcing feedback

that ultimately prevented any proposed reforms. Appeals for de-

sired policy solutions went unheard, and, as Pierson(2004) and

Hacker(2005) would predict, the government reverted to support-

ing existing arrangements. Consequently, non- users— those who

chose not to use private childcare services— found themselves

without support from the welfare state, which had thus far solely

focused on (market- driven) services. This prompted vocal criti-

cism, resulting in an unexpected shift in childcare policy: the intro-

duction of cash- for- care in 2009. The absence of additional reforms

to align the policy with parental demands resulted in increased

take- up of cash- for- care following its expansion, further weaken-

ing the position of market- based childcare. When centre- left po-

litical forces regained executive power a decade later, a second,

more successful opportunity arose to address negative feedback

(cf. Oberlander and Weaver2015). This contradicts the claim by

proponents of positive policy feedback that policy change becomes

increasingly challenging in the later stages of policy development.

In the light of this evidence, we believe that both scholars and

policymakers should allocate greater attention to negative pol-

icy feedback and their causes. This is because inadequately ad-

dressed negat ive policy feedback may lead to a variet y of negative

consequences for both the govern ment and the society it governs .

Poorly or imprudently designed childcare policies, which fail to

address crucial aspects such as safety, quality of care and equal-

ity in access, may negatively impact children's development (e.g.,

Burchinal et al.2000). In addition, such policies may exacerbate

gender inequality by disproportionately affecting women's abil-

ity to participate in the workforce (Leitner2003; Saraceno2011).

Childcare policies that go awry can erode public trust in the gov-

ernment's ability to address pressing issues. If people perceive

that the government is unable or unwilling to correct its mis-

takes, trust in governmental institutions may decline. Finally,

as illustrated by the Czech case, widespread dissatisfaction with

poorly designed childcare services can lead to their dismantling

or termination, with subsequent restoration being a difficult

task (Gurín 2024). Ultimately, this study underscores the need

for careful policy design, continuous assessment, and adaptive

governance to achieve positive outcomes.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply thankful to Martina Brandt, Young Jun Choi and Sigrid

Leitner for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, as

well as to the anonymous reviewers for their rigorous and detailed feed-

back. I deeply appreciate the time and expertise offered by the experts

involved in the study.

Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the

corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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12 of 13 Social Policy & Administration, 2024

Appendix A

Policy Changes and Mechanisms

Period

Policy

change Substance T ype of change Feedback Actors Description Other factors

1991– 1997 Expansion

of Childcare

Centres

Recognition of

childcare as a

national issue,

expansion through

private sector

Market- driven

de- familialisation

(radical policy

change)

Self-

undermining

Businesses, families,

OECD

Dissatisfaction with past policy

trajectory (absence of childcare

services)

Changing family dynamics,

industrialisation, government

reluctance to increase public

spending

1998– 2002 Expansion

of subsidies

Inclusion of middle-

class and dual- earner

families, further

deregulation of

private providers

Expansion of

target group

(incremental

policy change)

Self- reinforcing Private childcare

providers

Outcome: continuous growth of

private sector

Economic recovery post-

Asian financial crisis,

feminist activism for gender

equality, government

reluctance to increase public

spending

Self-

undermining

Civic organisations,

childcare experts,

families

Unintended consequences: Subpar

quality of private childcare

services, public distrust

Feminist and civic groups

advocating for public childcare

2003– 2007

(Reform attempt)

Reforms

(Sa- ssak

Plan/

Saeromaji

Pla n)

Focus on reducing

private sector

dominance and

improving its quality,

increasing public

childcare

Public- driven

de- familialisation

(incremental

policy change)

Self- reinforcing Private childcare

providers, local

governments

Resistance to public childcare

expansion due to vested interests

For reforms: declining birth

rates, female labour force

participation, change in

political leadership

Against reforms: financial

constraints, local political ties

Self-

undermining

Civic organisations,

childcare experts,

families

Dissatisfaction with private

services due to subpar quality of

private childcare services, public

distrust, low take- up of ser vices

and inequalities in usage

2005– 2009 Basic

subsidy

scheme

Voucher

system

Direct subsidies to

childcare providers

(including private)

Introduction of

market- oriented

voucher system for

childcare serv ices

Incremental

policy change

Self- reinforcing Private childcare

providers

Outcome: Continuous growth of

private sector

Civic and feminist organisations

critique (negative feedback):

advocating for public childcare

Declining birth rates,

economic downturn (for

voucher) and financial

constraint, change in political

leadership, ideological push

(neoliberalism)

2009 Cash- for-

care

Financial support for

families not using

formal childcare

services

Re- familialisation

(radical policy

change)

Self- reinforcing Scholars and civic

organisations supporting

traditional family values,

ruling conservative party

Civic organisations and childcare

advocacy groups consistently

opposed this policy, fearing

that it undermined the state's

role in supporting institutional

childcare. This pushback, while

not successful in preventing its

adoption, represents negative

feedback that could be added as

a counterbalance to the positive

feedback from conservative actors

Budgetar y constraints,

electoral competition,

ideological push (traditional

family values), change in

political leadership, declining

birth rates, state negligence

toward financial benefits (sole

focus on services)

Self-

undermining

Parents not using

childcare services due to

lack of public childcare

and poor quality of

private childcare (issue of

inequity and injustice)

(Continues)

13 of 13

Period

Policy

change Substance T ype of change Feedback Actors Description Other factors

2017– 2022 Moon Jae-

in's public

childcare

expansion

Target of 40 – 50%

public childcare

enrolment;

mandator y

accreditation for all

providers

Return to

public- driven

de- familialisation

efforts

(incremental

policy change)

Self- reinforcing Private childcare

associations

Private institutions that had

gained a foothold earlier

continued to protect their interests

Ideological shift (inclusive

welfare), declining birth

rates, change in political

leadership

Self-

undermining

Civic organisations,

experts, parents

Continued dissatisfaction with

private services

Source: Author's own complication.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.

Ideas, Coalition Magnets and Policy Change: Comparing Variation in Early Childhood Education and Care Policy Expansion across Four Latecomer Countries

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2022

This article examines variation in early childhood education and care (ECEC) expansion in four ‘latecomer’ reformers: Germany, England, South Korea and Japan. Taking a comparative approach through an analysis of policy documents, it focuses on the role of ideas as coalition magnets in explaining the more extensive and sustained policy shifts in Germany and Korea, in contrast to the more limited and fragmented reforms in England and Japan. As the comparative literature struggles to explain variation in ECEC expansion, this focus on ideas provides a significant contribution, highlighting why ECEC reform became supported by a broad cross-class coalition in Germany and Korea but not in England or Japan. The theoretical contribution argues that coalition magnets are formed when the polysemic potential of a policy is drawn out by key actors strategically linking it to several problem definitions, which can appeal to diverse political actors and forge lasting consensus for reform.

Self-reinforcing and self-undermining feedbacks in subnational climate policy implementation

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2020

This study demonstrates how interpretive feedback functions as an intervening mechanism during policy implementation that helps explain variation in subnational climate policy entrenchment. We examine three interrelated climate policy processes in Ontario, Canada from 2001–2018: a coal phase-out (2001–2014), the feed-in-tarriff (FIT) program for renewable energy (2006–2013) and a cap-and-trade program (2008–2018). Successful framing of the coal phase-out in terms of gains for both public health and climate change helped generate a broad-based coalition of support during implementation. Conversely, we find that the FIT and the cap-and-trade programs were vulnerable to framing around losses, especially regarding electricity rates and household costs, which counter-coalitions used to weaken public support during implementation. Our analysis demonstrates that building supportive coalitions for climate policy goes beyond the material gains and losses generated by initial policy designs. Framing strategies interact with policy designs over time to support or undermine policy durability.

Exploring resistance in family policy transfer: a comparative analysis of the Czech Republic and South Korea

Article

Jun 2024
Int J Sociol Soc Pol

Martin Gurín

Purpose: Family policy is an area where policy transfer has garnered a lot of attention lately. A growing body of research demonstrates policymakers' interest in and willingness to adopt foreign family policies. However, previous studies have tended to neglect the second mechanism of policy transfer: resistance. This manuscript aims to address this research gap by exploring both the willingness and resistance to policy transfer in Czech and Korean childcare and leave policies. Design/methodology/approach: This study employs a qualitative research design, incorporating structured expert interviews instrumental in in-depth thematic analysis. Findings: The analysis shows that policymakers in both countries demonstrated interest and willingness to transfer family policies, albeit employing different strategies and to varying extents. Moreover, the two countries exhibited significant differences in resistance to family policy transfer, with resistance in the Czech Republic being more frequent and effective. Resistance is directed towards both forced and voluntary transfers, although it isn't always against transfers that require a paradigm change. Policy transfer and non-transfer can concurrently be perceived as threats. Originality/value: The study concludes that integrating both policy transfer and resistance in the analyses helps to shed light on cross-national differences in family policy change and contributes to a more nuanced portrayal of the world of policy transfer in this policy field.

Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of US Welfare State Retrenchment

Chapter

Mar 2005

Jacob S Hacker

Debates surrounding institutional change have become increasingly central to Political Science, Management Studies, and Sociology, opposing the role of globalization in bringing about a convergence of national economies and institutions on one model to theories about ‘Varieties of Capitalism’. This book brings together a distinguished set of contributors from a variety to examine current theories of institutional change. The chapters highlight the limitations of these theories, finding them lacking in the analytic tools necessary to identify the changes occurring at a national level, and therefore tend to explain many changes and innovations as simply another version of previous situations. Instead a model emerges of contemporary political economies developing in incremental but cumulatively transformative processes. The contributors shoe that a wide, but not infinite, variety of models of institutional change exist which can meaningfully distinguished and analytically compared. They offer an empirically grounded typology of modes of institutional change that offer important insights on mechanisms of social and political stability, and evolution generally. Beyond Continuity provides a more complex and fundamental understanding of institutional change, and will be important reading for academics, researchers, and advanced students of Political Science, Management Studies, Sociology and Economics.

Forgotten Concepts of Korea's Welfare State: Productivist Welfare Capitalism and Confucianism Revisited in Family Policy Change

Article

Dec 2023
SOC POLIT

Martin Gurín

Understanding the dominant principle(s) of a welfare regime has been the "higher-level" objective of welfare state analysis. East Asian welfare states are no exception, and thus many contributions have sought to understand the welfare state order of these countries. In this article, we consider the development and current architecture of family policies at the center of welfare regime debate for the case of South Korea. Through this analysis we aim to critically assess current assumptions that both original foundations-productivist welfare capitalism and Confucianism-are theoretically useless for understanding the current welfare state and its development. Instead, this article argues that productivism remains at the heart of family policy in South Korea. The repositioning of productivism, however , and the related focus on social reproduction in the welfare state project, have led to most of the changes introduced to the detriment of Confucianism.

Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States

Book

Dec 1992

Theda Skocpol

From Maternalism to “Employment for All”:: State Policies to Promote Women’s Employment across the Afﬂuent Democracies

Chapter

Oct 2006

ANN SHOLA ORLOFF

Problems and Improvement Measures of Childcare Allowance and Child Allowance Policy

Article

Aug 2021

INTRODUCTION:: Understanding American Social Politics

Chapter

Dec 2020

Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment

Book

Oct 1994

Paul Pierson

This book offers a careful examination of the politics of social policy in an era of austerity and conservative governance. Focusing on the administrations of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Pierson provides a compelling explanation for the welfare state's durability and for the few occasions where each government was able to achieve significant cutbacks. The programmes of the modern welfare state - the 'policy legacies' of previous governments - generally proved resistant to reform. Hemmed in by the political supports that have developed around mature social programmes, conservative opponents of the welfare state were successful only when they were able to divide the supporters of social programmes, compensate those negatively affected, or hide what they were doing from potential critics. The book will appeal to those interested in the politics of neo-conservatism as well as those concerned about the development of the modern welfare state. It will attract readers in the fields of comparative politics, public policy, and political economy.

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