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Polarization in multidisciplinary perspective
Abstract
This article provides an introduction to and overview of the articles in the PNAS Nexus Special Feature on Polarization and Trust.
... The area of intersection of all the P i -SOS reveals the topography of the shared Common Safe Operating Space, noting that when perspectives are exceptionally polarized in their values and objectives, there may be no part of the multidimensional space that considered "safe" by all perspectives. (Dimant and Kimbrough 2024) • A dynamic version of Fig. 2 ...
... To the extent the differences are irreconcilable, the RE aspect of RE-SOS then at least identifies a pathway to a situation where the risk of disappointment faced by each perspective is at least equitable. This alone may avoid the worst aspects of having unstable policy decisions that can be reversed each time a contrasting perspective wins 51% of the votes (or other ways that power in decision-making can be exercised) (Dimant and Kimbrough 2024), or resisted when some external policy gives one or more perspectives in the governance processes a priority that other perspectives consider unfair to their own interests (Hernes et al. 2005;Parsons et al. 2021). ...
Governance processes for management of living resources are increasingly inclusive and participatory, with more use of integrated risk-based approaches. Progress has been challenged by diverse participants holding different values, evidence rooted in different knowledge systems, and participants placed in adversarial roles. Drawing together developments in risk equivalence, the concept of safe operating space, and viability theory, Risk Equivalent Safe Operating Spaces address these challenges. Within the framework diverse perspectives can express their desired ecological, economic, and social outcomes using their own values and indicators. The aggregate suite of all indicators delineates a multidimensional space within which each perspective can describe their relative risk tolerances along each axis, using evidence from all relevant knowledge systems. The “present state” of the socio-ecological system is identified within this space, along with zones of equivalent risk for each perspective, and (if it exists) a zone of Safe Operating Space (SOS) within some acceptable risk tolerance for all perspectives. Pathways can be developed that first seek equivalent risk for all perspectives, then lead towards the center of the common, shared SOS. Where certain perspectives or dimensions of the multidimensional space have explicit priority, the pathways can prioritize minimizing these risks.
... Interest in the process of polarization, started by Durkheim (1), has experienced a recent boost, fuelled by the availability of extensive data and rapid theoretical developments (2). In classical consensus models, such as DeGroot's model (3), Abelson's model (4), and the voter model (5), polarization arises when subgroups become disconnected, preventing the formation of a unified consensus (6). ...
... Continuous lines are stochastic trajectories generated by the Gillespie algorithm for N = 100, and then averaged over 100 independent runs. The shaded grey area depicts the standard deviation derived from the mean-field approximation of the full dynamics as given in Eq. (2). Here ϵ = 0.1, p = 0.7 and λ = 0; the initial fractions of leftists and rightists are equal 0.45. ...
Explanations of polarization often rely on one of the three mechanisms: homophily, bounded confidence, and community-based interactions. Models based on these mechanisms consider the lack of interactions as the main cause of polarization. Given the increasing connectivity in modern society, this explanation of polarization may be insufficient. We aim to show that in involvement-based models, society becomes more polarized as its connectedness increases. To this end, we propose a minimal voter-type model (called I-voter) that incorporates involvement as a key mechanism in opinion formation and study its dependence on network connectivity. We describe the steady-state behaviour of the model analytically, at the mean-field and the moment-hierarchy levels.
In polarized societies, divided subgroups of people have different perspectives on a range of topics. Aiming to reduce polarization, authorities may use debunking to lend support to one perspective over another. Debunking by authorities gives all observers shared information, which could reduce disagreement. In practice, however, debunking may have no effect or could even contribute to further polarization of beliefs. We developed a cognitively inspired model of observers’ rational inferences from an authority’s debunking. After observing each debunking attempt, simulated observers simultaneously update their beliefs about the perspective underlying the debunked claims and about the authority’s motives, using an intuitive causal model of the authority’s decision-making process. We varied the observers’ prior beliefs and uncertainty systematically. Simulations generated a range of outcomes, from belief convergence (less common) to persistent divergence (more common). In many simulations, observers who initially held shared beliefs about the authority later acquired polarized beliefs about the authority’s biases and commitment to truth. These polarized beliefs constrained the authority’s influence on new topics, making it possible for belief polarization to spread. We discuss the implications of the model with respect to beliefs about elections.
Polarization poses a critical threat to the stability of nations around the world, as it impacts climate change, populism, democracy, and global health. This perspective examines the conceptual understanding, measurement challenges, and potential interventions for polarization. Our analysis highlights the distinction and interactions between the individual and collective levels of polarization, conceptually, methodologically, and in terms of interventions. We conclude by pointing out future directions for understanding polarization and highlighting the interrelations between polarization and other social phenomena.
Political segregation is a pressing issue, particularly on social media platforms. Recent research suggests that one driver of segregation is political acrophily—people's preference for others in their political group who have more extreme (rather than more moderate) political views. However, acrophily has been found in lab experiments, where people choose to interact with others based on little information. Furthermore, these studies have not examined whether acrophily is associated with animosity toward one's political out-group. Using a combination of a survey experiment (N = 388) and an analysis of the retweet network on Twitter (3,898,327 unique ties), we find evidence for users' tendency for acrophily in the context of social media. We observe that this tendency is more pronounced among conservatives on Twitter and that acrophily is associated with higher levels of out-group animosity. These findings provide important in- and out-of-the-lab evidence for understanding acrophily on social media.
Undemocratic practices, such as voter suppression and election interference, threaten democracies worldwide. Across four studies (N = 4,350), we find that informational and motivational factors drive Americans’ support for such practices. Partisans drastically overestimate how much opponents support undemocratic practices, which decreases people's willingness to defend democracy themselves (S1–S2). One remedy for this dynamic is to inform people about the extent to which their rivals actually support democracy, but in polarized contexts, people are incurious about the true beliefs of outpartisans. To address this, we test a new method for improving democratic attitudes—changing beliefs about cross-party empathy. Empathizing across disagreements can improve connections and boost persuasion. When people learn about these valued consequences of empathic engagement, their curiosity about outpartisans increases (S3), and they choose to learn about opponents’ support for democracy, which reduces their own support for undemocratic practices and politicians (S4). Our findings suggest that fostering support for democracy requires not just informational strategies but also motivational ones. The power of our combined approach comes in that—instead of presenting people with information about outpartisans—it induces them to seek out that information themselves. Together, these results highlight how cross-party empathy beliefs can increase people's curiosity about those they disagree with and disrupt processes of political escalation.
Political disagreement is increasingly moral, rather than economic, in nature, raising the question how the fields of political economy and moral psychology relate to each other. While these disciplines were initially deeply intertwined, cross-disciplinary exchange became rare throughout the 20th century. More recently, the tide has shifted again—social scientists of different backgrounds recognized that morality and politico-economic outcomes influence each other in rich bidirectional ways. Because psychologists and economists possess distinct and complementary skill sets, part of this movement consists of productive “economic imperialism”—economists leveraging their empirical toolkit to test and substantiate theories from moral psychology at scale or in the wild. To illustrate this, I present two case studies of recent economics research on prominent ideas in moral psychology. First is the theory that morality is ultimately functional—that it evolved as a form of “psychological and biological police” to enforce cooperation, such as in economic production and exchange. Second is that the structure of morality shapes political views and polarization, including on economic issues such as taxation and redistribution. I conclude from these case studies that economists have much to gain from integrating more ideas from moral psychology, and that moral psychologists will be able to make an even more compelling case if they engage with research in economics.
Affective polarization, or animosity toward opposing political groups, is a fundamentally intergroup phenomenon. Yet, prevailing explanations of it and interventions against it have overlooked the power of ingroup norm perception. To illustrate this power, we begin with evidence from 3 studies which reveal that partisans' perception of their ingroup's norm of negative attitudes toward the outgroup is exaggerated and uniquely predicts their own polarization-related attitudes. Specifically, our original data show that in predicting affective polarization (i.e. how one feels about one's partisan outgroup), the variance explained by ingroup norm perception is 8.4 times the variance explained by outgroup meta-perception. Our reanalysis of existing data shows that in predicting support for partisan violence (i.e. how strongly one endorses and is willing to engage in partisan violence), ingroup norm perception explains 52% of the variance, whereas outgroup meta-perception explains 0%. Our pilot experiment shows that correcting ingroup norm perception can reduce affective polarization. We elucidate the theoretical underpinnings of the unique psychological power of ingroup norm perception and related ingroup processes. Building on these empirical and theoretical analyses, we propose approaches to designing and evaluating interventions that leverage ingroup norm perception to curb affective polarization. We specify critical boundary conditions that deserve prioritized attention in future intervention research. In sum, scientists and practitioners cannot afford to ignore the power of ingroup norm perception in explaining and curbing affective polarization.
Recent research has shown how norms shape political and economic decision-making. Much of this work assumes that a single norm influences the behavior of all people, but in fact, many situations are characterized by the existence of competing normative viewpoints. We apply a method for measuring belief in the simultaneous existence of multiple norms. Such multiplicity arises naturally when norms are associated with distinctive groups, and thus political polarization can be characterized, in part, as a product of diverging norms between groups. We thus assess the validity of our measurement technique by testing whether it can recover polarization on seven salient political issues on which US Democrats and Republicans tend to hold different views. We then compare the norms elicited by our method to the norms of Democrats and Republicans elicited in a separate sample using an established and validated—but methodologically less rich—measurement approach. Our study uncovers a wide range of co-existing views between and within political groups. Partisans understand their group’s norms and hold personal views that align with them. They can also recognize the diversity and polarization in US public opinion by identifying norms specific to political parties and acknowledging the variety of views within their own parties, which may indicate internal divisions. This research underscores the importance of nuanced approaches to political norms that go beyond party lines. By acknowledging a plurality of views, we can encourage productive discussions and bridge ideological divides.
In our polarized societies, more companies are taking a stand on divisive sociopolitical issues. However, given the mixed findings from previous studies, it remains unclear whether Corporate Activism (CA) is more likely to hurt or help a company's performance and reputation, or shape the public's attitudes toward the sociopolitical issue involved. To better understand the impact of CA in polarized societies, it is valuable to study moderating factors, especially those linked to polarization. A meta-analysis of 72 scholarly works is conducted to examine the impact of CA on various outcomes (e.g. ads and social media engagement, cognitive and attitudinal reactions, public's intentions and actions, emotional reactions, social and ethical engagement, workplace, and employee perceptions) and the role of moderators (a sociopolitical issue's political leaning and controversy level, political orientation of the target audience, key demographics). The analysis reveals a positive, albeit small, effect size (0.085 [95% CI (0.0542, 0.1158)]) with the most impact on two outcomes: cognitive and attitudinal reactions, and emotional reactions. It further reveals that companies adopting liberal-leaning CAs elicit more favorable responses than those adopting conservative CAs and that liberals respond positively to CA, while conservatives are more neutral. However, when there is alignment between the CA's political leaning and the audience's political orientation, conservatives have a stronger positive response than liberals. Also, younger audiences view CA more positively. Finally, per national culture, while power distance and individualism positively moderate the reaction to CA, uncertainty avoidance has a negative effect.
Empathy is considered one of the most critical components for bridging political divides and reducing animosity between political groups. Yet, empathy between political opponents is rare. There is a growing concern that partisans do not empathize with out-partisans because they feel social pressure from fellow in-partisans not to do so. This article examines this social pressure hypothesis and draws two conclusions. First, on the surface, the hypothesis seems plausible: citizens perceive fellow in-partisans as comparatively disapproving of and reluctant to engage in out-party empathy, and naïve cross-sectional analyses suggest that this perception translates into lower empathy towards out-partisans. Second, however, experimental data suggest that this relationship is not causal. Expecting disapproval from fellow in-party members for empathizing with out-partisans does not lead to a significant reduction in intentions to empathize with out-partisans. Rather, exploratory analyses suggest that social pressure by the in-party increases empathy toward out-partisans and triggers disappointment toward in-partisans. This implies that partisans can resist social pressure from the in-party and might even compensate for in-partisans’ lack of out-party empathy. The results are supported by original cross-sectional and experimental survey data (N=2,535) collected in the United States, an arguably most likely case for in-party social pressure to shape partisans’ intentions. The results have important implications for understanding the causes of and viable strategies for building empathy across political divides.
Exhibiting altruism toward and cooperativeness with others is a key ingredient for successful work relationships and managerial decision making. Rising political polarization creates a hazard because it ruptures this fabric and impedes the interaction of employees, especially across political isles. This paper’s focus is to examine various behavioral-, belief-, and norm-based layers of (non)strategic decision making that are plausibly affected by polarization. I quantify this phenomenon via five preregistered studies in the context of Donald J. Trump, comprising 15 well-powered behavioral experiments and a diverse set of over 8,600 participants. To capture the pervasiveness of polarization, I contrast the findings with various political and nonpolitical identities. Overall, I consistently document strong heterogeneous effects: ingroup-love occurs in the perceptional domain (how close one feels toward others), whereas outgroup-hate occurs in the behavioral domain (how one helps/harms/cooperates with others). The rich setting also enables me to examine the mechanisms of observed intergroup conflict, which can be attributed to one’s grim expectations regarding cooperativeness of the opposing faction, rather than one’s actual unwillingness to cooperate. For the first time, the paper also tests whether popular behavioral interventions (defaults and norm-nudges) can reduce the detrimental impact of polarization in the contexts studied here. The tested interventions improve prosociality but are ineffective in closing the polarization gap.
This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
Funding: This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grant EXC 2126/1–390838866].
Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4701 .
How should ideology be understood, and should we be concerned if Americans lack it? Combining widely used survey questions with an incentivized coordination game, we separately measure individuals’ own policy preferences and their knowledge of what other ideological group members expect them to believe. This allows us to distinguish knowledge of ideological norms—what liberals and conservatives believe ought to go with what—from adherence to those norms. We find that a nontrivial portion of those reporting ideologically inconsistent preferences do so knowingly, suggesting their lack of ideological constraint can be attributed to pragmatism rather than innocence. Additionally, a question order experiment reveals that priming ideological norms before measuring policy preferences promotes ideological adherence, suggesting ideological constraint is at least partially attributable to norm‐conformity pressure. Together, these findings raise the question whether ideology is actually desirable or if it instead allows elites to reverse the direction of accountability.
Partisans hold inaccurate perceptions of the other side. What drives these inaccuracies? We address this question with a focus on partisan animosity meta-perceptions (i.e. how much a partisan believes opposing partisans hate them). We argue that predictors can relate to meta-perceptions statically (e.g. at a specific point in time, do partisans who post more about politics on social media differ in their meta-perceptions relative to partisans who post less?) or dynamically (e.g. does a partisan who increases their social media political posting between two defined time points change their meta-perceptions accordingly?). Using panel data from the 2020 US presidential election, we find variables display distinct static and dynamic relationships with meta-perceptions. Notably, between individuals, posting online exhibits no (static) relationship with meta-perceptions, while within individuals, those who increased their postings over time (dynamically) became more accurate. The results make clear that overly general statements about meta-perceptions and their predictors, including social media activity, are bound to be wrong. How meta-perceptions relate to other factors often depends on contextual circumstances at a given time.
How does the availability of excuses for self-interested behavior impact group favoritism? We report the results of a preregistered experiment, conducted on the eve of the 2022 midterm elections, in which American political partisans made payoff distribution choices for themselves and a partner who was known to be a co-partisan or opposing partisan. Under full information, participants exhibit significant group favoritism. However, when the payoff consequences for one's partner are initially hidden, participants exploit this excuse to act selfishly regardless of who their partner is and ignorance rates are identical for in-group and out-group members. As a result, moral wiggle room has a significantly larger impact on selfish behavior for those interacting with co-partisans than opposing partisans, leading to a reduction in group favoritism.
Evidence-based and human-centric design of digital media platforms could reduce many of the problems of misinformation, polarization, and misaligned incentives that plague both society and individual organizations. With these sorts of design changes, it may become possible to build deliberative digital media that are useful both for discussions of contentious issues and for achieving successful collective action. In this Perspective paper, we discuss several issues in which current-day social science indicates the origin of these problems and suggests methods for improvement. Finally, we analyze a popular deliberative democracy platform to illustrate how social science might enable design of next-generation digital media suitable for democratic deliberation, and in which generative artificial intelligence might be useful.
US partisans view each other with increasing negativity. While many attribute the growth of such affective polarization to nationally cross-cutting forces, such as ideological partisan sorting or access to partisan media, others emphasize the effects of contextual and institutional forces. For the first time, we introduce and explore data sufficiently granular to fully map the extent of partisan animosity across the US states. With a massive, nationally representative survey we find that, counter to expectations, variation in affective polarization across states is relatively small, and is instead largely a function of individual-level attitudinal (but not demographic) characteristics. While elections pit regions of the country against others, our results suggest affective polarization is a national, not regional, problem, requiring national interventions.
Descriptive social norms interventions, where a behavior is promoted by learning that others engage in that behavior, are a cornerstone of behavior change research and practice. Here, we examine the effect of learning about the behavior of outgroup members in a hyper-polarized context: mask-wearing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Contrary to prior findings, we find a descriptive social norm “backfire”: Across three experiments, Biden supporters increased their mask-wearing intentions after being informed that most Trump supporters never wore masks. We also provide evidence consistent with a mechanism whereby this effect was driven by changes in perceptions about how negatively ingroup members view nonmask wearing. Finally, in a fourth study, Biden supporters show the traditional descriptive norms effect (rather than a backfire) from the same treatment when in a nonpolarized context: dishonesty in a coin-flipping task. These findings help to clarify why descriptive social norm interventions promote behavior change, and underscore the importance of social norms in motivating prosocial behaviors. They also suggest an update to current best practices in the design of descriptive norm interventions: in polarized contexts, it can be beneficial to publicize antisocial behavior of outgroup members.
While many believe that affective polarisation poses a significant threat to democratic stability, the definition and operationalisation of the concept varies greatly. This leads to conceptual slippage as well as imprecise tests of the causes and consequences of affective polarisation. In order to clearly identify and target its micro-foundations, we must understand the degree to which political divides are, in fact, affective. In this paper, we do so. We begin by delineating affective polarisation, a social divide that is purportedly distinct from policy-based disagreements. Subsequently, we explore the influence of emotions in politics, including how affect is conceptualised within the framework of polarisation. Where possible, our literature review is supplemented with analyses of existing datasets to support our points. The paper concludes by proposing a series of questions emotion researchers could address in the study of polarisation.
While previously polarization was primarily seen only in issue-based terms, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party’s members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines. This phenomenon of animosity between the parties is known as affective polarization. We trace its origins to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify partisan animus. We also explore the consequences of affective polarization, highlighting how partisan affect influences attitudes and behaviors well outside the political sphere. Finally, we discuss strategies that might mitigate partisan discord and conclude with suggestions for future work. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science Volume 22 is May 11, 2019. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Critical thinking and misinformation vulnerability: experimental evidence from colombia
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