Can Science do without a Theory? The main questions that are discussed are as follows:1)
Do we have — as a matter of fact — a general philosophy of science which is comprehensive and powerful enough to present a solution to all the relevant methodological and metatheoretical problems arising within the sciences?
2)
Do scientists feel a need for such a general metatheoretical tool?
3)
In the
... [Show full abstract] probable case of a negative answer to both questions posed above: what, if any, is the legitimate status of the philosophy of science?
It is argued in some detail that at least three types of models have failed, at least as far as their advisory function for scientific action in realistic situational settings is concerned: the ideal language model (Wittgenstein, Carnap), methodological falsificationism (Popper), and behavioral theories of scientific action. From the standpoint of the history of science it is plainly obvious that science has always been ahead of its purported metatheory and that important advances within the latter had been implicit in real scientific action at least for centuries.