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Disclaimer
This report is an intellectual property work of the author, published by Corisk AS. The report and its content
represent the viewpoints and positions of the author. The report may have been produced in consultation with
others, but the responsibility for all content, facts and positions rests solely with the author.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is for free use by private media, individuals and academic
institutions, provided that any presentation, replication or re-use of data or text is to be thus credited:
Bollman Bjørtvedt, Erlend (2024): “Russia’s foreign trade and trade costs 2019-2024”, Corisk Report Series, No.
8, October 2024.
Media should credit all data and graphics in the following way:
Source: Corisk.
This report is non-commissioned, and no funding or financial support has been provided for its production.
This report was first released as a draft on September 6, 2024.
This second draft version released on September 16, 2024, with substantial changes to data estimates.
The third draft version released on September 27, with improvements to currency rates and data.
This final version released on October 12, with several improvements across the document.
The author has no commercial interest, or conflicts of interest, in the issues discussed in the report.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is not for free use, distribution, or commercial utilisation by
corporate or other commercial entities including their subdivisions and representatives. Such use must be
cleared with the author, and is otherwise limited by the right of citation regulated under Norwegian Law.
The author is an experienced economic scientist and analyst with 25 years of experience from international
business and research. He has published corporate R&D papers and peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals.
The author wants to thank Maria Perrotta Berlin and other colleagues at Stockholm School of Economics for
kind comments and ideas for improvements across the report. Thanks to Shayekh ibn Emdad (University
Canada West) for data research assistance and comments through the process. The author also thanks Jon
Samuelsen (Norwegian Confederation of Enterprises, NHO) for comments and ideas through the work process.
© 2024: Corisk AS.
Corisk AS is a country risk analysis and consulting company registered in Norway.
Website: www.corisk.no
E - mail: ebb@corisk.no
Phone: +47 – 9225 9227
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Contents
1. Background and summary ............................................................................................................... 4
2. Estimates of Russia’s total trade.................................................................................................... 6
3. Russian exports 2019-2024 ............................................................................................................. 7
3.1. Cost of trade in Russian exports ................................................................................................... 8
3.2. The geography of Russian exports ............................................................................................. 14
4. Russian imports 2019-2024 ........................................................................................................... 17
4.1. Cost of trade in Russian imports ................................................................................................. 18
4.2. The geography of Russian imports ............................................................................................. 22
4.3. Russian imports including circumvention .................................................................................... 24
5. Methodology and data selection .................................................................................................. 27
5.1. Validation of the data .................................................................................................................. 28
5.2. Trade between Russia and Belarus ............................................................................................ 29
5.3. Variations in national reporting ................................................................................................... 32
5.4. Selected countries ...................................................................................................................... 34
5.4. Data sources per country ............................................................................................................ 35
5.5. Specific risks of double counting ................................................................................................ 41
5.6. Discussion of trade costs ............................................................................................................ 42
5.7. Trade costs and inflation ............................................................................................................. 45
6. Raw data and assumptions ........................................................................................................... 46
7. Endnotes .......................................................................................................................................... 50
Abstract
This study aims to measure trade partners’ reporting of all trade with Russia, thus creating mirror trade
data to estimate Russia’s total per-country trade, validate the trustworthiness of the Bank of Russia
balance-of-payments commodity trade data, and estimate changes to Russia’s trade costs. We do this
by compiling monthly trade data for 170 countries, representing more than 99.5 % of Russia’s trade.
We collect credible third-party data for 92 % of the total trade. Our data reveal that China and the
Global South absorb more of Russia’s exports. China alone has gained substantial export market
shares in supplying Russia’s imports, while the Global South and ex-Soviet neighbours struggle to
gain market shares. Western countries have preserved more of their market share in Russia’s imports
than official data indicate. Ex-Soviet states have gained roles as intermediaries and facilitators for
circumvention exports of Western goods to Russia, without winning any substantial market share for
their own export products. Finally, we apply the total CIF/FOB margin as an indicator of Russia’s trade
costs, first of all Russia’s costs of imports and trade partners’ total costs of buying Russia’s exports.
Russia’s import costs add to Russia’s inflation, while trade costs of Russia’s exports hurt Russia’s
export competitiveness. The analysis captures trade costs such as shipping, insurance, customs
bribery and trade route risk premia, while trade cost analysis cannot capture all of the substantial
cross-the-supply-chain price increases on (sanctioned) goods in Russia’s imports. Our study shows
that sanctions correlate with an almost trebling of Russian import trade costs from 2021 to 2024,
contrary to global trends and far in excess of the trade cost increases by other countries. Russia’s
exports are totally dominated by oil and gas, and trade costs increased already in 2021 before
sanctions but accelerated from 2023. Export trade costs are probably heavily influenced by export
composition including the sharp fall in pipeline gas sales in 2021. Fully understanding Russia’s trade
costs requires access to more granular Russian trade reporting beyond present customs data. We
need better and more accessible data to detect Russia’s economic situation.
1
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1. Background and summary
In our endeavour to analyse the effects of sanctions of Russia, Corisk launch this estimation of the
total, country-by-country trade in commodities of the Russian Federation, and an analysis of the cost
of trade incurred on Russia by sanctions. We present Russia’s annual trade cost applying a CIF/FOB
margin methodology inspired by the OECD and CEPII, on macro data to indicate Russia’s comparable
trade costs during sanctions.
2
Developing a complete trade dataset, we assess the trustworthiness of
the Bank of Russia’s monthly aggregate commodity trade data, which include exports free-on-board
(FOB) and imports including insurance and freight costs (CIF).
3
We achieve this by measuring trade
partners’ monthly imports CIF and exports FOB.
4
Our report excludes trade in services and other parts of Russia’s external balance. But for goods, our
comprehensive database allows for comparative analyses across time, and will enable analysis of 170
nations’ monthly exports and import with Russia. The report brings a total estimation of Russia’s
external trade in commodities by combining and accumulating trade data from Russia’s trade
partners, in much the same manner as performed by the economic thinktank Bruegel. However,
while the Bruegel Russia Foreign Trade Tracker collects data on exports and imports between Russia
and 38 countries, we collect the same data on Russian exports and imports with 170 countries. By
utilizing numerous national trade statistics and expanding the scope to include a significantly higher
number of countries, we aggregate more than 99.5 % of Russia’s trade. By including our well
established estimates of Western circumvention trade with Russia via Russia’s neighbours and
partners, we can present a near-complete trade that is absent in other independent estimates which
especially lack data on the trade within the ex-Soviet sphere.
Russia’s global exports peaked at 172 billion dollars in Q1 2022, falling gradually to 118 billion in Q2
2024. Russia’s imports peaked at 74 billion dollars in Q4 2022, falling to 65 billion in Q2 2024. Our
study indicates that the Russian Central Bank publishes trustworthy data for FOB exports and CIF
imports. This means that the central bank’s data on external trade may provide credible data on
goods trade for production and growth analysis, but we have not explored the trustworthiness of the
bank’s data on trade in services. From 2022 to 2024, Russia’s export markets shifted as flows to
Western countries fell from 20 billion to 4 billion dollars per month, while Russian monthly sales to
non-Western markets jumped from 15 to 35 billion dollars. Indirect Russian circumvention exports of
goods to the West via third countries are marginal at only 200-500 million dollars per month.
5
Russia
has shifted exports from Europe to Asia, but at declining revenues and higher trade cost.
Contrarily, total flows of Western circumvention export goods to Russia are still up to 3 billion dollars
per month, mostly circumvented via ex-Soviet states, Turkey, or the UAE. But even when including
these indirect Western circumvention exports, total flows of Western goods to Russia have declined
by 40 %, from 11 to 6 billion dollars per month. China has won export market share in Russia, while
most other countries have lost market share for their products, with third-country export growth
mainly deriving from facilitation of trade in Western circumvention goods. Countries in the Global
South gained some export market share in 2023 but lost it again in 2024, and most gains were
nevertheless achieved by Turkey rather than countries in Latin America or Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa
has reduced their exports. Russia also buys less goods produced in nearby ex-Soviet countries, and
more from long-distance producers and traders in China, India, Turkey, and the UAE.
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The compilation of commodity trade data with complete estimation of Russia’s 2019-2024 exports at
CIF value and imports at FOB value, allows us to compare with Bank of Russia data and estimate the
total trade cost from the CIF/FOB margin.
6
This indicates trade costs including shipment payments,
insurance, port handling, briberies at borders, sanction risk premia, and trader profits - while largely
ignoring re-export price increases along the supply chain. The study contributes to explore the total
Russian losses incurred by sanctions. The OECD performs annual micro-level analysis of the CIF/FOB
margin for country-pairs at commodity trade level, while CEPII adds a calibration against volumes to
further improve estimates. But since Russian data are only available at the aggregate level, we can
only estimate and mirror Russia’s total trade flows. The lack of country-pair or commodity-level
Russian data makes it impossible at this time to establish or study bilateral (country-pair) trade costs.
While comparisons of export and import prices require considerable data on trade, quality parity and
trade representativeness, our analysis of total bilateral trade flows overcome such requirements. But
using total trade values to estimate relative trade costs has several pitfalls and requires that the level
of relative over- or under-reporting between the trading parties is constant (both measure all of the
trade flow, or at least a mutually constant share of it over time). Otherwise, the CIF/FOB margin
value may be partly caused by changes to the relative reach of Russian recording versus trade
partner recording over the period. It seems impossible to rule out this and other sources of error. But
applying consistent time series over the whole period we believe the observed changes to total trade
costs give a good indication of the actual dynamics, especially for Russia’s imports.
The CIF/FOB margin between Russian and partner trade recordings indicates the trade cost of getting
goods from producer to importer. In the wake of Covid-19 and sanctions, the cost of trade in Russia’s
oil-dominated exports increased from 10-15 billion dollars annually 2019-2020, to 37 billion in 2021
and 49 billion dollars in 2023, despite falling tanker freight rates. Export trade costs thereby hiked
from 3 % of partners’ CIF imports to eventually 10-11 % after 2022, a record high level globally.
Russian annual import trade costs were around 10 billion dollars (3-4 % of CIF imports) before 2022,
jumping to 27 billion dollars annually (9-10 %) thereafter, despite falling global cargo freight rates.
The jump in 2022 was considerably more severe than what was seen anywhere in the world, and
sent Russian trade costs from a level below, to a level double as high as, the global average.
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 sums up some independent studies exploring
Russia’s foreign trade, including the Central Bank of Russia. In Chapter 3, we present Russia’s exports
from 2019 to 2024, including their absolute value, geographic composition, and development of the
trade cost. Chapter 4 similarly presents Russia’s imports against three other sources, with breakdown
of geographic suppliers and an estimation of the import trade cost through the period. This chapter
also contains estimates of total Western indirect exports to Russia. We present an account of
methodology and data sources in Chapter 5, including applied accounting and estimation principles.
We present our selection of data sources and process of data validation, including assessments of
local under- and over-reporting and our management of the risks of double accounting. The chapter
finally presents the sources applied and data series selected for each country, and a discussion of
trade costs in Russia’s foreign trade. In the end, Chapter 6 provides raw trade data for Russia’s trade
with the several the 170 studied countries, global and country-group totals, and currency rates used.
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2. Estimates of Russia’s total trade
Russia’s second attack on Ukraine in February 2022 happened amid an already ongoing decline in
global trade and increases in commodity prices, which were partly attributable to post-Covid impacts
and partly to the outbreak of the war itself.
7
The combination of raising energy prices and the fallout
of imports from sanctioning countries, short-term induced a strong improvement in Russia’s trade
balance. Immediately after the February attack, Russia suspended publication of per-country trade
data and continued to release only aggregate data for all global partners combined, and for intra-CIS
trade, respectively.
8
Belarus followed suit and stopped publishing their trade data from July 2022.
Several independent institutes regularly release continuous estimates of Russia’s foreign trade. Some
of them utilise trade data from the balance-of-payment accounts of the Central Bank of Russia.
9
In
2022, the Bank of Russia stopped issuing country-by-country trade data, but continued sharing
aggregate data and time series. We apply this official Russian source and consult some other
institutes’ data in order to compare our own result to the Russian data:
National authorities are a key source to calibrate and verify trade data, including central banks
(Balance-of-Payment data, BOP), and customs or statistical offices who publish official trade data.
UN ComTrade is a trade data reporting and aggregation database releasing trade data down to 6-
digit HS (Harmonised System) commodity level.
10
There is a similar trade data repository available
from the OECD, which in this respect we regard as supplementary but un-utilised by this study.
11
TradeMap is a publicly funded institution collecting trade data from mainly national sources.
12
CEPII release the databases BACI, TradeProd, and TradePrice, with data on bilateral trade, trade
prices, and macroeconomic indicators for 160-200 countries and 9 sectors, up to 2020 or 2022.
13
The Bruegel economic think-tank compile trade data of Russia’s trading partners from UN ComTrade,
Eurostat, and national agencies.
14
They estimate Russia’s trade with 38 foreign countries, including
the 27 EU member states, the USA, UK, Japan, South Korea, India, China, Turkey, Brazil, Kazakhstan,
Switzerland, and Norway.
15
This is thought to encompass some 80 percent of Russia’s foreign trade.
The Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) in Finland compile a weekly Russia Fossil
Tracker that measures Russia’s continuous exports of oil, gas, coal and their derived products, by
utilising customs data and data from Kpler, Eurostat, and Equasis.
16
We do not utilise sources that are secondary, including CEIC Data who release monthly trade data
through 2022 based on Russian Customs, Trading Economics who release continuous monthly trade
data from Bank of Russia, or Statista who release trade data up to and including 2023.
17
Corisk has maintained a database of Western direct and indirect trade with Russia since July 2022,
including 18 EU member states, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, United Kingdom,
Japan, and South Korea. By applying Eurostat data, we are further able to construct data regarding
direct trade with Russia for all EU member states, bringing the Western countries in our sample to a
total of 41 countries: EU-27, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Faeroe Islands, Greenland,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan.
During 2024 we have extended this database to include Russia’s trade with another 129 countries,
beyond the 41 Western states. Thereby, our total estimates consist of Russia’s commodity trade with
all major economies of the world, and including all the major trading partners of Russia.
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3. Russian exports 2019-2024
The continuously aggregated Corisk Excessive Trade Model contains c. 110,000 data points including
a dataset on total direct trade with Russia of 41 Western and 129 other countries, apart from
estimating the indirect trade of 26 Western countries. The total model allows us to account Russia’s
monthly exports to 170 countries from January 2019, covering more than 99.5 % of total exports.
We cover 91,87 % of the exports with importer country CIF import data, while the other 8.13 % of
the trade is covered with Russian trade and customs data containing a mixture of CIF and FOB
accounted records. The result in Figure 1 is an estimate of Russia’s exports measured CIF at the
importers’ hands (blue), which is consistently higher than the total Russian FOB export value deriving
from banks’ transactions via the Bank of Russia (red). The distance between the two lines indicates
the gross cost of trade added to importer CIF prices including shipment, insurance, etc. The Bank of
Russia data matches well with exports as reported by Russia to UN ComTrade (orange, dotted). For
overview, we also include the Bruegel institute’s estimate of Russia’s CIF exports (black, dotted).
Figure 1: Four estimates of Russia’s global exports, 2019-2024
Figure 1 reveals the strong growth in Russian export revenues from 2020 to 2022, and subsequent
decline in revenues from 2022 to 2024 – closely following developments in oil and gas markets.
Russia’s export revenues by our estimates have declined from around USD 55 billion per month in
early 2022, to only USD 39 billion per month in early 2024, a decline by 29 percent. Total exports FOB
climbed from USD 494.2 billion in 2021, up to 592.1 billion in 2022, but fell to 424.5 billion in 2023.
Exports CIF were USD 529.9 billion in 2021 and 634.3 billion in 2022, but fell to 474.4 billion in 2023.
Figure 1 also reveals a consistent correlation between Russian official FOB export data, and our
global CIF data, where the difference between them (CIF - FOB) appears consistent and indicates the
cost of trade in global imports of Russian export products. Assuming that Russian export goods are
sold at world market prices, this cost of trade represents a Russian loss of net sales revenue.
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Based on our results, we tend to believe that the Bank of Russia BOP data for commodity trade are
correct, however not granularly reported per-country. If we compare the total Russian exports in
2023 to the average annual exports 2019-2021, total exports FOB as measured by the central bank
increased by 2.1 %. However, the world’s global imports CIF from Russia increased by 8.4 % in the
same period. This underscores how Russia’s export revenues were historically low in 2023, and the
Russian loss of revenue value as more revenues befell shippers, insurers and traders - of which
probably only a fraction has accrued to Russian shipping or insurance companies.
Figure 1b illustrates the strong interdependency between Russian exports (blue, right scale) and the
price of Ural grade crude oil from Trading Economics (green, left scale).
18
The later sanction price cap
of USD 60 is marked with a dotted green line. The interdependency between the oil price and
Russia’s export revenues makes them volatile and hard to predict.
19
While about 90 % of Russia’s oil
exports may exceed the price cap, the country has been forced to yield price rebates that have
fluctuated greatly towards the Brent Blend benchmark.
20
Our previous research indicates that it also
directly limits Russia’s scope for imports due to the country’s limited forex reserves.
21
Figure 1b: Russia’s global exports and the market price of Russian crude oil, 2019-2024
3.1. Cost of trade in Russian exports
Cost of trade is computed for imports, not exports. Though the same methodology can be used for
exports as in this chapter, this has limited usability as we actually end up estimating the bilateral cost
of trade of 170 different countries in their purchases from Russia. Still, we carry out the exercise in
this chapter to explore some characteristics and impacts on Russia’s exports to global markets. To
see Russia’s costs of trade as estimated according to standard methodology, confer Chapter 4.1.
Below, we record the monthly CIF/FOB margin for Russia’s exports over the period in Figure 2, and
apart from the high export trade costs in January-February 2022, we see a gradual increase in the
nominal trade cost in Russian exports, despite the total decline in exports from late 2022 onwards
(Figure 1). Russia’s exports are dominated by oil and gas products. From the start of 2023, Russian
pipeline gas exports almost disappeared, and since then largely depended on maritime shipping.
22
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Global oil tanker freight rates were low in 2021 but started to climb from early 2022, as fears
mounted that sanctions would soon hit global supplies.
23
Global oil tanker freight rates reached
record high levels in the second half of 2022, amid hoarding ahead of the upcoming Western import
bans, but freight rates fell again and remained relatively low during 2023. This was a year when the
“shadow fleet” of older tankers expanded in the market for Russian crude and refined oil shipping.
24
Figure 2: Monthly difference between Russian FOB export value and global CIF import value (CIF – FOB)
Despite Russian attempts to secure lower-cost oil exports through the “shadow fleet”, and amid
rather low global tanker freight rates, the monthly cost of trade in Russia’s oil-dominant exports took
off from 2023. The monthly difference (indicating the cost of export) was USD 2 billion out of a FOB
export worth on average USD 34 billion in early 2019. This CIF/FOB margin grew only modestly to
USD 4 billion in early 2022 out of a USD 52 billion FOB export. But by early 2024 when Russian
exports FOB fell to USD 35 billion, the margin widened to more than USD 6.4 billion.
The erratic pattern is largely due to diverging time of recording between partner CIF import data
versus the Russian FOB export data. Temporal lags in between exports and imports at month end
may cause the volatility. In Figure 3, we remove some of the volatility by recording the same export
CIF/FOB margin on a quarterly basis, summing the three-months exports and imports data while
assuming simultaneous exports and imports without making temporal adjustments in the time
series. Because the actual current value of the export fluctuates, we present in Figure 3b the same
trade cost measured in percent of the final trade partner CIF import value – indicating better how the
relative trade cost develops over time before and after Russia’s second attack on Ukraine.
As already underlined, this analysis is a pragmatic approximation to the original methodology and
what we measure here, is in fact the trade costs of all the 170 trade partners when they import from
Russia. But needles to say, it mirrors the dynamics surrounding Russia’s exports and its trends.
Observe that in Figure 3 and 3b, data are now quarterly with approximately 3 times higher values
than in Figure 2. Since monthly exports stabilized at USD 32-40 billion in the last year, quarterly trade
is USD 96-120 billion, with USD 1 billion of trade costs representing around 1 percent of CIF imports.
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Figure 3: Quarterly difference between Russian FOB export value and global CIF import value (CIF – FOB)
Figure 3b: Quarterly difference between Russian FOB export value and global CIF import value, as a
percentage of trade partners CIF import value
Figures 3 and 3b indicate the increase in trade costs in 2023 and 2024, occurring despite low tanker
freight rates. Russian trade costs diverge from the global pattern: while global oil tanker rates surged
in mid-late 2022, trade costs declined in Russia’s exports, perhaps reflecting the continued ability to
export oil and gas to nearby Europe amid European hoarding of oil products. From early 2023, when
the European market disappeared, Russian trade costs grew strongly despite rather low global tanker
rates, and stabilised in 2024 as the “shadow fleet” expanded.
25
While in first quarter 2024 the
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CIF/FOB margin of USD 15 billion implies a 5 billion monthly trade cost (13 % of exports), second
quarter data imply a 4 billion monthly trading cost (10 %). The data indicate a four-fold increase in
trading costs in Russian exports, from 1 billion dollars per month in 2019 and up to 4 billion in 2024.
Annual CIF/FOB margins are presented in Figure 3c, where trade costs climbed from 10-15 billion
dollars, up to 50 billion in 2023. To enable comparison with other countries we present in Figure 3d
the relative trade cost of Russia’s exports as a share of trade partner CIF import values. This yields a
better understanding of the relative effects of the 2021 Covid-19 bottlenecks and later sanctions.
Figure 3c: Annual difference between Russian FOB export value and global CIF import value (CIF – FOB)
Figure 3d: Annual difference between Russian FOB export value and global CIF import value, as a
percentage of trade partners CIF import value
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One intriguing feature of the trade cost in Russia’s exports, is the high trade costs in 2021. We do not
attempt to fully explain this “too early” effect where trade costs start hiking before the second attack
on Ukraine and connected sanctions. But some possible explanations may be worth exploring:
a. Russia’s exports were artificially low in 2020 due to Covid-19 impact on commodity trade.
There was a global rise in costs of trade in 2020, but global costs of importing from Russia
actually declined, on average. The share of total Russian exports to nearby ex-Soviet and
European markets actually fell, while the share of exports going to China and BRICS+
increased. But the contraction of total exports may still have made pipeline gas exports
relatively more important, with its low costs of transportation. If this is correct, the “normal”
non-crisis Russian export trade costs may actually be higher than we assume, closer to 4-6
percent rather than the observed 2019-2020 level which was well below 4 percent.
b. Trade partner recording of imports from Russia may have been deficient during the height of
the Covid-19 pandemic. In Figure 3b, we see that the export trade cost is negative both in Q2
and Q4 2020, and slightly positive in Q3. That makes for 9 months from April 2020 to
December 2020 with cumulatively negative trade costs, which makes little sense. This could
indicate recording deviations during the pandemic, maybe for exports to ex-Soviet republics.
c. When exports trade costs increased in 2021, this remains a puzzle. But again, and strictly, it
measures the import trade costs of the 170 partners, not of Russia. And, importantly, Russian
exports was the object of much fewer sanctions, and almost no outright trade bans, contrary
to Russia’s imports. This means that Russian exports and their trade costs may have been
considerably less impacted by sanctions, than imports. Oil exports increased a lot in 2021,
but so did pipeline gas with its assumed low export costs. There may be discrepancies in
recording as Russia delivered more gas to ex-Soviet neighbours under political, long-term
agreements with rebates, lock-in prices, or semi-barter conditions.
26
Pipeline fraud may also
have caused recording asymmetries. Reporting from the Bank of Russia in 2021 matched well
with the customs-based trade recording to UN ComTrade (Figure 1, red versus dotted orange
lines 2019-2021). But asymmetries against trade partner recording is, of course, possible.
d. The strong growth in export trade costs in 2023 corresponds with a strong decline in Russia’s
pipeline gas exports. Russia closed NorthStream 1 in September 2022, and pipeline exports
stabilized at low levels from March 2023.
27
From 2023 onwards, Russian exports started to
rely more on “normal” modes of transport, first of all sea-borne oil and LNG, which globally
have higher trade costs. These factors may explain the surge in trade costs in 2023.
Globally, OECD found that the average CIF-weighted cost was 4.3 % immediately before Covid-19,
but all regions experienced higher costs after 2020 and the global average increased to 4.9 %.
28
Generally, more trade cost was added to the longer trade routes and there were great variations
between countries and between commodity groups. Remote countries like Australia and Chile
experienced dramatic increases in trade costs after Covid-19, while the USA being more “centrally”
located experienced an only modest increase. Contrarily, Russia before and during Covid-19 mainly
conducted trade with Europe, an intra-continental nearby partner with low transport costs. For the
period up to 2004 CEPII measured the CIF/FOB margin at 9-14 % for crude oil and natural gas
products (range 3-21 %), and metal ores at 5-14 % (range 0-28 %), depending on distance.
29
Given
the Russian exports shift from Europe to Asia, trade costs going from 4 % to 10+ % seems plausible.
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In Figure 3e, we compare the trade cost of Russian exports over time against average trade costs of
some regional imports from global partners in the OECD study. It illustrates clearly how Russia’s
export trade costs jumped in 2021 after Covid-19, more than in other regions. Russian trade costs
again climbed in 2023 as oil and gas exports to nearby Europe almost disappeared, which must have
increased the country’s tanker freight costs despite the global decline in both tanker and cargo
freight rates. There is a further cost increase of Russian export costs in the first half of 2024.
Figure 3e: Annual CIF/FOB margins of Russian exports against average regional costs on imports
(OECD), percentage of CIF import value
The figure above suffers three limitations. First, the OECD data only includes 2022, though we have
no reasons to believe that other regions experienced a similar jump in trade costs as Russia did in
2023 and 2024, when global shipping costs fell markedly. Second, the OECD data measure the trade
cost of all countries’ exports to selected regions, whereas our data measure the trade cost of Russia’s
exports to all regions. This means that the regional values for export trade costs would be slightly
different than in Figure 3e, but they would make up the same global average. For an apple-to-apple
comparison avoiding these dissimilarities, see Figure 7e and Figure 7f.
The third limitation of our analysis is that it does not include the effects of transport ownership and
costs on Russian oil revenues. It is well known that the Western oil price cap has instigated price
rebates on Russian oil among Asian buyers, but KSE economists have found that the growth of the
“shadow fleet” of tankers has reduced these rebates, stimulating Russian relative revenues.
30
The
shadow fleet (if controlled by Russia) will tend to increase Russian profits on export at the same
selling price, and it will bring transport services revenues not captured by this study. Still, the growth
of the shadow fleet runs parallel with a considerable loss of export revenue from 2023 onwards, and
a substantial increase in the export cost of trade. Trade costs may erode the competitiveness of
Russian exports with importers either seeking rebates or reducing imports from Russia. We see such
tendencies of stagnation in Chinese imports, both in Corisk data and in CREA data on the fuel trade.
More research is needed to establish how much of this rapidly increasing CIF/FOB margin (trade cost)
represents miscalculations, increasing shipment costs for importers, currency risk premium, or other
sanction risk premium costs imposed by freighters, middlemen, insurers, or importers themselves.
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Larger distances of trade also play a part, given the fallout of gas markets in nearby Europe and the
need for Russia to seek oil and commodity export markets further away from 2023 onwards.
3.2. The geography of Russian exports
We will now investigate the foreign import markets where Russia sells its goods, by summarizing
monthly importer market trade data and lumping countries into geopolitical groups. A geopolitical
breakdown of Corisk data from Figure 1 are presented in Figure 4. We present ex-Soviet and CIS
states that have intimate trade relations with Russia, in red colour. BRICS+ states that support Russia
politically (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, UAE, Iran) are given in yellow colours, of
which China is singled out in orange. Western states that sanction Russia and condemn its warfare
are given in blue for Europe and in light blue for the Non-European West (see chapter 5.3). Finally, all
other states including most countries in the Global South are counted as brown. The imports from
Russia in Figure 4 include both imports for final use and imports for further re-export, including some
ex-Soviet and other facilitating countries that are reselling sanctioned Russian goods to the West.
In Figure 4b, we present the same data, but focusing on the Western reduction in imports from
Russia more clearly by switching the country groups so that Western imports are at the bottom.
We see clearly from Figure 4 and Figure 4b how Russia has abandoned most of its direct exports to
Western countries, which have reduced imports from Russia to a minimum. The Western market was
reduced gradually for more than ten years
31
but was strongly eroded in 2022, with a dramatic decline
after the February 2023 oil product ban. This decline was first of all offset by an acceleration of the
ongoing increase in exports to BRICS+ countries, partly to China but with an even stronger relative
growth in exports to India and other partners. The ex-Soviet market (red) saw only modest growth in
import from Russia. The rest of the world (brown) which includes Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, Mexico, and other medium-sized and small economies, has clearly increased purchases of
Russian goods. These were 7.1 billion dollars per month in the year preceding the attack (March 2021
- February 2022), and 8.1 billion per month during the last year (July 2023 - June 2024).
Figure 4: Total CIF imports from Russia by geopolitical groups, 2019-2024
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Figure 4b: Total CIF imports from Russia by geopolitical groups, 2019-2024
Certainly, the exports from Russia into the ex-Soviet sphere and to certain other countries such as
Turkey and the UAE, include Russian goods later re-exported to Western countries as a sanction
evasion strategy. But these Russian circumvention exports and indirect exports to the West are very
small, about 200-500 million dollars per month, only a tenth of the flows of Western export goods to
Russia circumvented via the intermediary countries (1,800 - 2,500 million dollars per month). This is
in line with a hypothesis that it is easier to limit imports, than exports.
32
Import control is more
developed, and export goods can reach Russia via many more logistic chains and alleys.
Countries with the largest relative increase in imports from Russia when we compare the monthly
average in 2023 to the monthly averages 2019-2021, are Jamaica (+ 5,654 %), the Faeroe Islands (+
1,820 %), India (+ 762 %), Hong Kong (+ 613 %), Libya (+ 618 %), Ghana (+ 421 %), Zimbabwe (+ 440
%), Djibouti (+ 381 %), Tunisia (+369 %), Afghanistan (+ 325 %), Oman (+ 314 %), Myanmar (+ 312 %),
Switzerland (+ 287 %), Tanzania (+ 212 %), Hungary (+ 225 %), Cote d’Ivoire (+ 200 %), Yemen (+ 188
%), Kenya (+ 167 %), United Arab Emirates (+ 165 %), Kyrgyzstan (+ 154 %), Brazil (+ 150 %), Uganda
(+ 150 %), Malaysia (+ 146 %), Armenia (+ 130 %), Algeria (+ 111 %), Indonesia (+ 108 %), Pakistan (+
101 %), Malawi (+ 101 %), China (+ 96 %), Turkey (+ 96 %), Sri Lanka (+ 96 %), Togo (+ 87 %),
Mozambique (+ 87 %), Eritrea (+ 80 %), Kenya (+ 73 %), Georgia (+ 76 %), Burkina Faso (+ 78 %),
Congo Republic (+ 73 %), Macedonia (+71 %), Zambia (+ 63 %), Bangladesh (+ 63 %), Rwanda (+ 56
%), Senegal (+ 55 %), Egypt (+ 52 %), Laos (+ 55 %), Uzbekistan (+ 46 %), Mexico (+ 46 %), Austria (42
%), Honduras (+ 39 %), South Africa (+ 31 %), Azerbaijan (+ 25 %), Nicaragua (+ 24 %), Kazakhstan (+
24 %), Israel (+ 17 %), Nigeria (+ 16 %), Singapore (+ 15 %), Belarus (+ 13 %), Taiwan (+ 13 %), Saudi
Arabia (+ 13 %), Nigeria (+ 10 %), Morocco (7 %), and Sudan (+ 10 %).
Taken as a whole, import from Russia grew by 158 % to the BRICS+ aera including China, and imports
of Russian goods to Africa grew by 76 % (Sub-Saharan Africa + 43 %), while the Russian exports
increased by only 12 % to the much nearer ex-Soviet aera (including Ukraine). Bear in mind that the
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Russian export growth to the ex-Soviet area also include a certain value of Russian circumvention
goods destined for Western countries, but these do not substantially alter the picture.
Contrary, imports from Russia declined between 2019-21 and 2023 in countries like Ukraine (- 100
%), Greenland (- 100 %), Liechtenstein (- 100 %), Botswana (- 100 %), Suriname (- 99 %), United
Kingdom (- 99 %), New Zealand (- 99 %), Sweden (- 99 %), Australia (- 97 %), Mauritania (- 97 %),
Canada (- 96 %), Mali (- 96 %), Kuwait (- 95 %), Lithuania (- 92 %), Iceland (- 91 %), Estonia (- 90 %),
Germany (- 88 %), Guyana (- 88 %), Cuba (- 88 %), Poland (- 84 %), Norway (- 83 %), Ethiopia (- 83 %),
Qatar (- 83 %), Finland (- 82 %), Cameroon (- 80 %), USA (- 80 %), Argentina (- 80 %), Denmark (- 79
%), Bahrain (- 76 %), Philippines (- 72 %), European Union (- 67 %), El Salvador (- 66 %), Thailand (-
63 %), Chile (- 56 %), Albania (- 54 %), France (- 58 %), Lebanon (- 57 %), Netherlands (- 57 %), Latvia
(- 55 %), Nepal (- 53 %), Turkmenistan (- 53 %), Brunei (- 52 %), Bolivia (- 52 %), Ecuador (- 51 %),
Paraguay (- 49 %), Moldova (- 49 %), Dominican Republic (- 47 %), Japan (- 43 %), Somalia (- 44 %),
Angola (- 43 %), Uruguay (- 43 %), Belgium (- 41 %), Montenegro (- 40 %), South Korea (- 37 %),
Tajikistan (- 35 %), Benin (- 23 %), Peru (- 21 %), Bosnia-Hercegovina (- 17 %), Panama (- 17 %),
Vietnam (- 9 %), Jordan (- 8 %), Guatemala (- 8 %), Costa Rica (- 7.5 %), Congo DR (- 7 %), Guinea (- 7
%), Namibia (- 5.9 %), Mongolia (- 3.4 %), Colombia (- 2.4 %), and Morocco (- 2 %).
Taken as a whole, imports from Russia declined by 61 % in the whole Western area including Europe,
North America, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Among Western and semi-Western powers increasing
imports from Russia in 2023 against baseline, are Hungary (+ 225 %), Switzerland (+ 287 %), Austria (+
42 %), Singapore (+ 15 %), and Taiwan (+ 13 %). Among traditional allies of Russia who have
substantially reduced their imports, we find Cuba (uncertain data), Angola, and Ethiopia.
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4. Russian imports 2019-2024
The national trade data continuously aggregated in the Corisk Excessive Trade Model allow us to
account the monthly direct exports to Russia from 170 exporting countries, since January 2019. For
the estimate we cover 92.56 % of the exports to Russia from exporter country trade data measured
as FOB exports, and the reminder7.44 % fully or partly with Russian customs data that contain a
mixture of FOB and CIF based data. This provides a FOB-based estimate of Russia’s global imports.
Total CIF imports according to Bank of Russia were USD 276.5 billion in 2022 and 302.9 billion in
2023. Total global FOB exports to Russia were USD 249.6 billion in 2022 and 275.5 billion in 2023.
In Figure 5, we reveal the total global FOB exports to Russia as measured by Corisk (blue), alongside
total Russian imports CIF as recorded from bank transactions by the Central Bank of Russia (red). We
see how Russian official import data compiled from customs and reported to UN ComTrade (orange,
dotted), match or are only slightly lower than the more complete balance-of-payment data of the
central bank. Again, Bruegel data are included for comparison (black, dotted). We see clearly how
Bruegel increasingly under-report exports after 2022, because they measure too few circumvention
enablers and thereby miss out the increase of circumvention trade in Western goods.
This time, it is the Russian CIF import data that are higher than the Corisk FOB data, reversing the
relationship from Figure 1. The distance between the Russian CIF imports data (red) and the Corisk
FOB exports data (blue) represents the CIF/FOB margin, i.e. the total cost of trade in Russia’s imports.
We see clearly how these trading costs increase substantially after February 2022.
Figure 5: Four estimates of Russia’s global imports, 2019-2024
If we compare total Russian imports in 2023 to average annual imports 2019-2021, imports CIF as
measured by the central bank increased by 7.3 %, while the world’s exports FOB to Russia increased
by only 4.0 %. The residual implies a relative increase in the cost of trade in Russian imports, equal to
a loss of value. We see this as the increasing distance between red and blue lines in Figure 5, above.
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4.1. Cost of trade in Russian imports
Whereas the cost of trade on Russian exports (Chapter 3.1) correlated less with the timing of
sanctions and maybe more with the composition of exports, we should expect the cost of trade on
Russia’s imports to behave differently because sanctions are more absolute, with more outright
trade bans, and no dominating commodities. To complement studies advanced by the OECD and
CEPII
33
we record the CIF/FOB margin over the 2019-2024 period in Figure 6. The margin seems to
gradually increase, despite the import’s decline from late 2022 onwards. Russia imports all kinds of
finished and semi-finished goods, vehicles, machinery and various technology. Sanctions target a
wide range of these products including aircraft and aircraft parts, digital components, etc. Russia
therefore needs to source these goods via third-country intermediaries, adding various risk premium
costs. In March and June 2022, Russia enacted various legislations to legalize parallel imports, but
middlemen find themselves under constant risk of secondary sanctions from Western powers. This,
alongside longer logistic lines, currency risk and other elements, may explain the rising trade costs.
Figure 6: Monthly difference between Russian CIF import value and global FOB export value
Despite the apparent continuous increase in trade costs along the linear correlation line, there is in
fact a clearer disruption between pre-2022 trading costs on the one hand, and post-2022 costs on
the other hand. We shall remove some of the erratic patterns by measuring quarterly CIF/FOB
margins, from monthly data compounded into three-month periods. This time, we believe there are
stronger temporal delays in trade and recording, due to more indirect and time-consuming logistic
lines, fractured and sanctioned supply chains, and probably an earlier customs recording on sellers’
hands compared to importers’ final clearance after long indirect routes or transit imports. Therefore,
we shall make a temporal adjustment by comparing exports against Russian imports skewed one
month forwards. Thus, for a second quarter, we compare March-May FOB export data from Corisk
against April-June CIF import data from Bank of Russia, and similar for other quarters.
In Figure 7 below, we see how this greatly improves trend coherence and readability:
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Figure 7: Quarterly difference between Russian CIF import value and global FOB export value
Similarly, in Figure 7b we present the trade cost as a percentage of the Russian import value of the
goods that were exported the month before by all the 170 studied trade partners of Russia:
Figure 7b: Quarterly difference between Russian CIF import value and global FOB export value, as a
percentage of the total Russian CIF import value
In Figure 7 and Figure 7b, we see only a modest increase in trade costs prior to the February 2022
attack on Ukraine, from roughly USD 1 billion per month (5.5 %) in early 2019 to above USD 1.5
billion in late 2021 (5.8 %). This runs parallel with a rather dramatic increase in sea-borne cargo rates,
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with a rise in the Baltic Dry Index from 1,500 to around 5,000 during the period. Other logistics costs
also increased in the wake of the Covid-19 bottleneck-related constraints on trade. Still, import trade
costs fluctuated and were not much higher during the whole of 2021, than in 2019 or 2020. From
early 2022 onwards, non-oil freight rates as expressed by various bulk and container freight indices,
started to decline continuously until the Baltic Dry Index reached around 1,000 points by early 2023.
Contrary to this global decline in freight prices, trade costs in Russia’s imports made a substantial
upwards shift after the second attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The monthly trade cost quickly
established around 3 billion dollars per month (6-15 %) and stabilized there. While global shipping
costs declined, Russian trade costs witnessed a considerable upward shift to a new and stable level.
Before the second attack on Ukraine in 2022, Russia imported largely European goods with low
transport costs, keeping trade costs at 4 % and well below the global average of 5-7 %.
34
After the
effects of sanctions became more felt, Russian import trade costs hiked to levels far above all
comparable nations, and equal to the average global trade costs that prevailed around 1940.
35
The annual costs of trade defined as the CIF/FOB margin, is illustrated in Figure 7c. We have now not
made any temporal adjustment in the FOB data, because the periods of study are full years where
temporal mismatch between Russian imports and foreign exports would only appear on the margins
in January and December, leaving this source of error more marginal. We see from Figure 7c how
Russia pays significantly higher cost to import after the second attack on Ukraine, than before. Trade
costs were USD 10 billion during Covid-19 in 2020 and 2021, but reached USD 27 billion in 2023.
Figure 7c: Annual difference between Russian CIF import value and global FOB export value
Again, to enable comparison with other countries and regional averages, we present in Figure 7d the
relative trade cost of Russia’s imports as a percentage of Russian CIF import values. This yields a
better understanding of the relative effects of the 2021 Covid-19 bottlenecks and later sanctions. For
Russian imports, trade costs remain around 4 % during post-Covid-19, but sees a dramatic rise to 10
% of CIF imports in 2022 - as many sanctions came into effect on typical Russian import goods from
Western countries. Trade costs almost trebled and remained high between 9% and 10 % since that.
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Figure 7d: Annual difference between Russian CIF import value and global FOB export value, as a
percentage of the total Russian CIF import value
In Figure 7e and Figure 7f, we compare the trade cost of Russian imports over time against average
trade cost of some regional and national imports in the OECD study. It illustrates how import costs
grew somewhat from 2021 after Covid-19, while Russia’s costs alone hiked in 2022 as key import
goods became sanctioned, inconsistent with the global decline in cargo freight rates. The high
Russian trade costs persisted in 2023 and further increased in the first half of 2024.
Figure 7e: Annual CIF/FOB margins of Russian imports against average regional trade costs on
imports (OECD), percentage of CIF import value
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Figure 7f: Annual CIF/FOB margins of Russian imports against other countries’ trade costs on imports
(OECD), percentage of CIF import value
The analysis above will miss key parts of the effect of cross-value-chain inflation on Russian imports.
In principle, measuring the difference between CIF import and FOB export values should capture the
effect of price increases and extra profits enjoyed by the seller. However, that will only be captured
for the value after formal bi-lateral exports, i.e., from the last exporting nation. Consider that
Germany exports a CNC machine to Turkey worth 1 million dollars, and Turkey re-exports it to Russia
for 2 million dollars. In case of re-exports and consignment accounting, the price difference will get
ignored by CIF/FOB margin analysis, which will only capture costs between Turkey and Russia and
miss the immense cost increase on the machine’s way from Germany to Turkey including the USD 1
million in profits to the Turkish re-seller. Economists at Kyiv School of Economics found such profits
to be substantial for many key sanctioned goods - on digital components the price inflation along the
trade and circumvention route may well be 150-250 % before the technology reaches Russia.
36
Such
effects will only be marginally reflected in trade cost analyses unless the goods were traded in
transit, or unless the analysis rests on origin accounting or single-commodity price comparison.
More research is needed to analyse the full topology of trade costs in Russia’s imports. For now, we
believe there are merit to some elements including circumvention and indirect export costs, the EU
entry ban for Russian trucks and ships, longer logistic lines and supply chains, sanction risk premium
costs by intermediaries, needs to bribe and circumvent border controls, and higher currency risks.
4.2. The geography of Russian imports
Turning to the foreign export markets where Russia sources its imported goods, we will summarize
monthly exporter market trade data and again lump exporter countries into geopolitical groups. A
geopolitical breakdown of Corisk data from Figure 5 are presented in Figure 8. Again, we distinguish
ex-Soviet states in red colour, China in orange colour, and the other seven BRICS+ states (India,
Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, UAE, Iran) in yellow. European exporters are marked as bright
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blue and other Western states as darker blue, while all other states including most countries in the
Global South are coloured as brown. The exports to Russia in Figure 8 include the exports from the
last country of commodity refinement or re-export, this boosting the exports of ex-Soviet and other
states if they act as intermediaries for sanctioned Western goods. Finally, we add the trade cost as
the residual CIF/FOB margin between Russian CIF and partner FOB reporting (grey). This means that
the top of the grey area marks the Russian Central Bank’s recording of total CIF imports. For
reference, we also illustrate the average CIF import of the baseline 2019-2021 period (dotted line).
We see from Figure 8 how Russian imports have shifted away from Europe and relies more on China,
ex-Soviet republics, Turkey (in the brown group) and the United Arab Emirates (in the yellow group).
The reduction in imports from Western countries is partly a longer trend, connected with established
(and later expanded) Russian post-2014 counter-measures against certain Western goods and food
producers.
37
Further, we see that total CIF imports as recorded by Russia was record high after late
2022, while the actual FOB value of imports dropped in 2024 below the 2019-2021 baseline average.
Figure 8: Total FOB exports to Russia by geopolitical groups, and total Russian trade cost, 2019-2024
If we compare exports to Russia in 2023 against the baseline average 2019-2021, countries with
noteworthy trade and large increases in their exports include Kyrgyzstan (+ 828 %), Tunisia (+ 711 %),
United Arab Emirates (+ 383 %), Armenia (+ 353 %), Jamaica (+ 288 %), Qatar (+ 165 %), Turkey (+
234 %), China (+ 99 %), Thailand (+ 85 %), Belarus (+ 72 %), Kazakhstan (+ 67 %), Egypt (+ 62 %),
Uzbekistan (+ 57 %), Ghana (+ 47 %), India (+ 37 %), Serbia (+ 32 %), and Vietnam (+ 9 %).
Taken as a whole, export to Russia grew by 88 % from the BRICS+ aera including China, but by 68 %
by the BRICS-7 excluding China. Exports grew by 65 % from the nearby ex-Soviet aera including
Ukraine. However, several of the additional exported goods from these countries are Western,
earning the countries revenues as traders but not as producers.
The largest declines in exports to Russia were seen in Ukraine (- 100 %), Australia (- 99 %), Cambodia
(- 94 %), Canada (- 92 %), Mexico (- 92 %), USA (- 90 %), Singapore (- 83 %), Finland (- 81 %), United
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Kingdom (- 70 %), Germany (- 67 %), France (- 67 %), Spain (- 61 %), Poland (- 55 %), Argentina (- 54
%), Japan (- 48 %), Italy (- 44 %), Pakistan (- 43 %), Philippines (- 41 %), Morocco (- 38 %), Sri Lanka (-
37 %), Taiwan (- 31 %), Bangladesh (- 30 %), Saudi Arabia (- 27 %), South Korea (- 25 %), Malaysia (-
25 %), Kenya (- 23 %), Brazil (- 22 %), Moldova (- 19 %), Indonesia (- 18 %), Switzerland (- 17 %), Israel
(- 14 %), Peru (- 13 %), Ecuador (- 11 %), Hong Kong (- 3 %), Nigeria (- 2 %), and Tanzania (- 1 %).
For the Western area including Europe, North America, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, direct exports to
Russia declined by 55 %. But as we see from the overview above, many large economies of the Global
South substantially reduced their exports to Russia, including Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
4.3. Russian imports including circumvention
The recorded exports to Russia from typical intermediary countries include sanctioned Western
goods that are re-exported to Russia as a sanction evasion and circumvention strategy. These flows
of Western circumvention exports amount to typically USD 1,800 - 2,500 million per month, and in
Figure 8b we add these circumvented Western goods to the total Western exports with blue colours,
against a corresponding deduction in the exports of circumvention facilitation intermediaries
grouped as ex-Soviet (red), the UAE (yellow), and Turkey (brown). Thus, from Figure 8, we increase
the blue areas and decrease the red, yellow and brown areas in accordance with the monthly
magnitude of Western indirect / circumvention exports to Russia via each of those third countries.
However, we are not able to isolate Western circumvention goods flowing to Russia via China and
Hong Kong, which are probably a considerable portion of these countries’ exports to Russia.
Figure 8b: Total FOB exports to Russia by geopolitical groups, and total Russian trade cost, with
estimated indirect (circumvention) exports allocated to Western exporters, 2019-2024
Again, we will similarly present the same global exports data, but focusing on Western total exports
by presenting the Western country groups at the bottom of Figure 8c.
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Figure 8c: Total FOB exports to Russia by geopolitical groups, and total Russian trade cost, with
estimated indirect (circumvention) exports allocated to Western exporters, 2019-2024
In Figure 8b and Figure 8c, Western circumvention goods are identified and deducted from the gross
total exports of the ex-Soviet area, the United Arab Emirates within the BRICS+ group, and from the
gross exports of Turkey in the “All other” groups. This leaves three key observations:
First, Western countries have reduced their total direct and indirect exports to Russia much less, than
when counting only the direct exports (Figure 8). After an initial strong decline after the second
attack in February 2022, Western total exports to Russia increased rapidly until reaching almost pre-
attack levels in December 2022, but thereafter sales gradually fell. On average, Western countries
exported goods worth 133 billion dollars to Russia annually in 2019-2021. Western total direct and
indirect exports in 2023 were 85.2 billion dollars, a reduction by 36 % from baseline. These Western
exports included direct sales of 59.5 billion dollars and indirect sales of 25.7 billion dollars, with
indirect exports (generally to be assumed sanctioned) thus making up 30 % of the total. In the first
half of 2024, the total Western exports to Russia were 46.7 billion dollars, distributed between direct
sales worth 24.5 billion, and indirect sales of 22.2 billion dollars. This brings the indirect share of total
Western exports up to 47.5 percent. For comparison, total Western exports was 69.3 billion dollars in
the first half of 2021, i.e., a reduction between 2021 and 2024 by only 33 %.
We do not know exactly how much of the indirect Western trade via third countries, that includes
goods that are sanctioned. But for this report, this does not really matter because we aim only to
account the full trade of Russia irrespectively if the good are sanctioned, or not. In a analysis of the
inflow of sanctioned goods to Russia, however, such a distinction would have been important and we
would have to analyse the flows of Western goods between third countries and Russia in more detail.
Second, we see that China (including Hong Kong and Macao) is still increasing their share of exports
to the Russian market. While their sales were 61 billion dollars on average during baseline 2019-
2021, exports rose to 116.4 billion in 2023. We are not able to estimate the total Western
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circumvention trade via China, and this indirect trade in Western goods must be assumed to make up
a noteworthy share of the increased Chinese exports. Still, we are convinced that the Chinese share
in Russia’s imports has grown considerably.
Third, we observe that “all other” countries have kept constant or lost export market share in Russia,
when confining values to domestic and other non-Western goods. Alas, while ex-Soviet (red), BRICS+
(yellow) and Global South countries (brown) have certainly increased overall market shares in Russia
including the re-export of Western circumvention goods (Figure 7), those countries have marginally
retained or even lost net exports of goods produced domestically. In other words, countries like
Turkey, the UAE and ex-Soviet states have utilised the sanctions window of opportunity to sell more
Western goods to Russia, but not by stepping up domestically production for exports.
Comparing 2023 to the average of the baseline years 2019-2021, the annual combined net exports of
ex-Soviet states excluding re-export of Western circumvention goods (red), have plummeted from 30
billion dollars in 2019-2021, down to only 29.4 billion dollars in 2023, though excluding Ukraine the
area has a meagre 12 % export growth. Measuring net exports in 2023 over baseline, excluding
Western circumvention goods, Belarus obtained a 54 % increase while Kazakhstan saw a 31 % decline
in exports to Russia. In the first half of 2024 net exports excluding Ukraine were 17.15 billion dollars,
or 18 % above the 14.5 billion exports in the first half of 2021. Altogether, therefore, the ex-Soviet
area, with the exception of Belarus, has not utilised the momentum of sanctions to enhance their
own export industries, but rather flourished in the role as facilitators of Western circumvention sales.
The seven non-China BRICS+ countries (yellow) India, Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, UAE, and
Iran, witnessed total annual exports of 8.4 billion dollars on average 2019-2021, against 12.2 billion
dollars in net exports in 2023, a growth of maximum 45 percent.
38
This masks a growth in net, non-
circumvention exports of 190 % for the Emirates and 37 % for India, against a decline of 15 % for
Brazil. Net exports were 6.2 billion dollars in the first half of 2024, equal to the 2019-2021 period.
The large Global South group of “All other” (brown) including Turkey exported goods worth 23.3
billion dollars annually in the period 2019-2021, while their net exports to Russia in 2023 climbed to
30.4 billion dollars - a growth by 30.6 percent. But this was largely enjoyed by Turkey (net + 119 %),
while exports declined from Malaysia (- 36 %), Indonesia (-18 %), and Sub-Saharan Africa (-7 %). And
in the first half of 2024 this net export was only 12.4 billion dollars, slightly below pre-attack levels
and also a clear decline from 2023. This attests that Turkey and a handful other countries managed
to gain some market share for their own products in 2023, but as a whole the Global South lost much
of that gain in the first half of 2024.
Altogether, given the high-tech nature of Russian imports, market shares have shifted from Western
countries to China, and little else. Further, the relative shift of market share away from the West is
less pronounced when we include the value of circumvention exports in the equation. The shift to
China masks a noteworthy volume of Western sanctioned goods in the Chinese exports. Importantly,
the countries of the BRICS+, the ex-Soviet area and the Global South have not managed to gain much
market share beyond their opportunities-seeking as intermediaries for sanctioned Western products.
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5. Methodology and data selection
This report estimates Russia’s trade in commodities with various global trading partners, including
trade in both domestically produced goods, and foreign origin goods via re-export, transshipment,
partial refinement, etc. All data in the report are in US Dollars, but several have been converted from
raw data in other currencies by monthly-average currency rates from XE.com.
39
We strive to apply
the non-Russian trade partners’ national data as far as possible, except when trade partners clearly
under-estimate their trade with Russia, as against verifiable Russian sources.
Our estimates include trading partners’ total trade with Russia by country of consignment. All export
data follow the (exporting) country of consignment principle, while China accounts import by country
of origin where “the country of the last substantial working or processing” of the commodity is being
recognized as the origin country.
40
We believe that for Russia this reflects consigned exports to China
with little or no risk of double counting, because these exports are dominated by raw materials that
are moved directly from Russia to China, with very little re-export of non-Russian goods.
Trade normally means that the commodity in question crosses the border and changes ownership.
Statistics organisations are encouraged to account exports by the value obtained at the point of
transfer to shipment from the exporting country (Free on board, FOB), and imports by the value at
arrival in the importing country (Cost, insurance, freight, CIF).
41
This means that import data will
include the cost of shipment and related services and be higher than the corresponding export data,
with the residual making up the trade cost (CIF). For Russia’s imports, when available, we apply
partner export data and record Russia’s imports FOB. For Russia’s exports, we apply partner import
data and thereby record Russia’s exports CIF. This allows us to identify the deviation against Russian
data where this deviation indicates the degree of Russian mis-reporting and/or the trade cost.
A substantial deviation between accounted exports and imports in the same bilateral trade, derives
from the level of control and comprehensiveness of recording by the responsible authorities:
A. Imports are usually more ardently inspected and recorded than exports, because incoming
goods are physically screened for illegal substances at customs, and because they form the
basis for import excise duty revenues. Export control is universally less developed, and
unrecorded exports are usually easier to conduct, for example ship-to-ship at sea.
42
B. Recording is more comprehensive in more developed countries, and in countries with less
corruption or financial crime. We observe that registration and clearance of exports seems to
be more common in countries with better export control enforcement, greater corporate
transparency, and more predictable tax regimes. For these and other reasons exports to
Russia from countries in Africa and Central America are often substantially under-recorded.
Trade statistics are normally recorded either from customs and the trading companies in the form of
official trade data, or from banks in the form of Balance of Payments (BOP) data. Customs data
derive directly from the customs authorities’ database, while official trade data will usually be
calibrated against surveys and accounting data from trading companies. BOP data from central banks
tend to be more comprehensive as they are able to retrieve information on the transactions behind
all trade, irrespectively of the trade’s clearing through customs. The better coverage of national bank
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data over customs data is evident for Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia, among others.
Whenever possible, we adjust final trade values closely against BOP data from central banks. Some
countries only release data quarterly, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the UAE. We then distribute
trade evenly over the three months unless we have single-month data from other sources.
In accordance with the above, the quality of data recorded by authorities varies a lot. We take effort
to verify, assess and adjust data across the three main sources: official trade statistics, Balance of
Payments statistics, and direct customs data. For countries with strong customs organisations and
enforcement, we apply official data directly, as for most Western countries, China and other East
Asian countries, Turkey, and the UAE. These countries record trade quite comprehensively, including
their FOB exports. As an example, and despite the substantial shipping distance, Australia records a
higher export FOB to Russia, than what Russia records as imported CIF from Australia. This shows
how Australia’s trade recording is clearly more comprehensive, than Russia’s.
Most ex-Soviet republics seem to have generally strong statistics services, but publication lags or fails
in Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Countries that are members of the Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU) release transaction-based data up until mid-2022. Ex-Soviet states account
total values including the re-export of Western circumvention goods, while in Western data these
circumvention goods appear as trade with the ex-Soviet intermediary country. Some intermediary
countries release deviating or deficient data across publication platforms. To assess their full gross
exports including re-exports of Western circumvention goods, we produce parallel estimation data
where we compute the value of circumvention trade, and then add to that any recorded trade in
domestic and non-Western goods from official trade data or customs data. This enables us to
validate data using three independent sources, to arrive at better trade estimates.
For all students of trade, official trade data will de-facto never capture all trade. There is always illicit
and unrecorded trade, even between the most democratic and advanced countries with the best
statistical capacities. For example, the habit of ship-to-ship re-loading of fish and oil products is
pervasive. Thus, the aim of any study will be to include as much of the actual ongoing trade as
possible, and try to apply coherent sources over time instead of switching between sources over the
estimation period. Our methodology rests on a three-stage collection and validation process. Finally,
the study probably under-estimates trade with Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela and a few
other countries who report little or no trade but in reality may have a substantial trade with Russia.
However, these countries’ trade with Russia is under-reported near zero not only at the partner end
by Venezuela, Iran and North Korea, but also by Russia itself because they are similarly absent in
Russian customs data (which are consistent with Russian BOP data, ref Figure 1). When the trade is
removed from reporting at both sides, it does not impact much on the trade cost analysis.
5.1. Validation of the data
Our tree-stage collection and validation process behind this study is performed in the following way:
First, trade data by consignment country are retrieved from UN ComTrade and TradeMap, if possible
both from the reporting exporter and the importer, to identify deviations and under-reporting.
Besides, we have cross-checked for further available data at OECD. As a general rule we choose
exporter FOB data for trade-partner exports and importer CIF data for trade-partner imports, but if
those are clearly under-reporting we use instead the Russian data and adjust for trade cost. Russia
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has reported trade data per country until 2022. If Russia as an importer records clearly more of the
imports than the exporting country does, we estimate the trade partner’s 2019-2021 average rate of
under-reporting as compared to Russian reporting, and apply that rate of under-reporting on the
monthly exports data reported by the exporter from 2022 onwards, deducting 2-10 % trade cost
according to shipping distance and logistics conditions. In this process we also confer Russian
customs data for imports to validate and identify real outputs in line with customs data reporting.
Similarly for Russian exports, if Russia reports clearly more and the foreign importer under-reports,
we apply Russian data and the trade partner data adjusted for the rate of under-reporting from
2022, adding on both 2-10 % trade cost according to shipping distance and logistics conditions.
Second, we look for official trade data from national statistics institutions and central banks, to
compare them to data reported to UN ComTrade and TradeMap. These data are usually consistent,
but some countries deviate or lack reporting to UN ComTrade over several periods while they have
trade data available nationally – such as Austria. Other countries report more detailed to the UN than
what they otherwise publish, like Italy. For EU member states, we confer trade data from Eurostat to
validate outputs and to validate the totals for EU members. We consult each country’s higher
reporting to identify gaps or inconsistencies. If we must shift from one time series to another, we
take account of the monthly time gaps between exports and imports by recording quarterly totals
and spreading these on the three connected months to fill the overlap and get the totals right.
Third, we further validate data for Turkey, the UAE, and ex-Soviet republics through an intricate
process. These countries are known enablers of circumvention, and Turkey also performs its own
circumvention exports to Russia via ex-Soviet states. This context may give the countries motivations
to under-report, and we want to validate whether they report trade values in full. Our database
continuously estimates Western circumvention trade with Russia via third-countries, and Turkish
circumvention trade with Russia via ex-Soviet third countries. This is done by applying the excessive
trade method were excessive or abnormal exports to third-countries are being recorded. As excessive
we identify all trade which in 2022 exceeds a baseline trade by more than 20 %, from January 2023
onwards increasing that threshold by another 1 %p every second month. The baseline period is
either 2019-2021 or only 2021 (whichever is higher) except for Belarus, where the baseline period is
alternatively the first quarter of 2022 (whichever is lower).
43
This excessive trade between Western
countries and third countries is assumed to directly indicate circumvention trade with Russia.
The Russian customs service records some trade with Ukraine that is not reflected in Ukrainian
import data, and seemingly include trade with the occupied territories Similarly, the Russian customs
service similarly records some trade with North Ossetia and Abkhazia which we do not recognize as
international trade. We exclude all these trades from the study, as we regard such trade as most
probably supplying battlefield troops in addition to civilian populations under Russian occupation.
5.2. Trade between Russia and Belarus
Belarus followed Russia’s example and totally stopped reporting country-by-country data for Russia
and the other ex-Soviet countries in April 2022. We find Belarusian trade data from three main
sources: monthly official trade data reported to UN ComTrade until April 2022; quarterly central bank
BOP data reported to the EAEU until October 2022; and annual official data for trade with the whole
ex-Soviet area and Russia from Belarus Statistical Agency (BelStat) in 2019 and 2020. From 2021
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onwards, we get monthly BelStat for the whole ex-Soviet area partly directly and partly from the
index data collected by economists at BEROC.
44
There is considerable fit between Belarusian BOP
data reported to the EAEU, trade data from BelStat, and trade data reported to UN ComTrade.
For Belarusian average annual exports to Russia 2019-2021, the EAEU report USD 14.07 billion,
BelStat reports 14.4 billion, and UN ComTrade 13.71 billion. BelStat presents total exports to the ex-
Soviet area at an annual average of USD 20.37 billion, and for 2019 and 2020 we apply the annual
exports to the ex-Soviet area and deduct Belarus’ reported FOB exports to Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan to get find the implied residual exports to
Russia. This implied export to Russia stands in 2019-2020 at an annual average of USD 13.70 billion,
compared to USD 13 billion reported BOP data, USD 13.42 billion by BelStat, and USD 13.26 billion at
UN ComTrade. Only UN ComTrade has monthly data 2019-2020, we apply those data for that period
and adjust them upwards to match with the total annual value of implied residual exports to Russia.
From 2021 onwards we have monthly BelStat trade data for exports to the whole ex-Soviet, and
deduct from those monthly data the monthly Belarusian reported FOB exports to the other ex-Soviet
states, to arrive at the implied residual exports to Russia. From April 2022 we apply their reported CIF
imports from Belarus and adjust it to their recent rate of under-reporting or over-reporting vis-à-vis
Belarus’ FOB export data. This means that BelStat export data for the ex-Soviet area minus Belarusian
exports to the non-Russian countries form the basis of our estimates through the 2019-2024 period.
However, during 2022 there is a tendency of BelStat under-reporting exports compared with BOP
data. The underreporting is 5 % in Q2, jumping to 11.8 % in Q3. In the third quarter, BelStat actually
report less exports to the whole ex-Soviet area, than the Bank of Belarus reports to Russia alone in
their last available BOP data. After Q3 we observe a rapid and strong increase in Belarus’ BOP data
for total global exports, which must imply a strong increase in the further BOP exports to Russia,
which cannot be fully absorbed in BelStat export data into the winter of 2022-2023. This is the period
when Belarus accelerates re-exports of Western circumvention goods to Russia, which we need to
capture in our estimates and find out if BelStat tries to hide from the monthly reported totals. To
check this hypothesis, we present an analysis of the various trade data in the following table.
Month, quarter
mio USD
01/22
02/22
03/22
04/22
05/22
06/22
07/22
08/22
09/22
Q4/22
(est.)
Monthly average of
BOP export to Russia
1,256
1,834
2,341
2,782
BelStat exports to the
whole ex-Soviet area
2,212
2,180
1,373
1,776
1,889
2,180
2,212
2,261
2,341
2,487
- export to non- Russia
168
186
107
133
136
143
162
163
218
161
= Residual net export
to Russia
2,044
1,994
1,266
1,643
1,753
2,037
2,050
2,098
2,123
2,325
BelStat over (+) or
under (-) reporting
512
- 23
-251
- 457
Monthly Corisk
circumvention
0
1
160
313
Mis-reporting vs
Corisk circumvention
..
- 22
- 91
- 144
Corisk estimate,
export to Russia
1,256
1,834
2,341
2,634
The table presents the monthly average values of the quarterly Belarussian BOP exports to Russia up
to and including Q3 2022, including our own estimates of the BOP export values for the fourth
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quarter based on Belarus’ global BOP exports (row 1). We then present BelStat official export data
for the ex-Soviet area (from the BEROC index) and the Belarusian exports to the non-Russian partners
in that area, which we then deduct to find the “Residual net export to Russia” (rows 2-4). These net
values are compared to the BOP data with the difference indicated as “BelStat over (+) under (-)
reporting” (row 5).
45
We then compare the over- or under-reporting to the value of re-exported
Western circumvention goods based on the Corisk Excessive Trade Model, to assess whether BelStat
under-reporting conceals re-exported Western goods (row 6, blue numerals). Finally, the Corisk
monthly estimate of Belarus’ FOB exports to Russia are presented (row 7, blue numerals).
We know that Western circumvention exports to Russia via third countries started shortly after
Russia’s second attack on Ukraine, and the shadow trade took off from April-May 2022.
46
Focusing on
three quarters following the attack, the BelStat under-reporting against BOP data ranges from USD
23 million to 457 million (standard deviation 217.1). When we add estimated re-exports of Western
circumvention goods, the under-reporting becomes much more modest and considerably less
volatile, ranging from USD 22 million to 144 million (standard deviation 61.2). But how to explain that
the BelStat under-reporting seems to grow faster than the estimated extent of circumvention (rows
5-6). First, BOP reporting and trade data reporting may be temporally skewed, indicated by the fact
that the BelStat under-reporting in Q2-Q4 offsets the over-reporting in Q1. We also saw for Russia’s
imports that the CIF/FOB margin went “wild” in Q1 2022, indicating severe issues with reporting or
goods clearance at the start of 2022 (Figure 7), which may help explain the massive over-reporting in
Q1.
47
The under-reporting may also have declined into 2023 when Russia’s total imports substantially
fell, by which the scope for under-reporting must have narrowed. As to the increasing trend in under-
reporting even after correction for circumvention trade, may indicate that the Corisk estimates of
shadow exports are two conservative, which has also deliberately been intended. The highly volatile
trade of Belarus 2021-2022 also makes it extra difficult to establish baseline and estimate excessive
trade, as Belarus itself came under sanctions and the country’s trade plummeted in early 2022.
Based on the improved coherency of BelStat under-reporting against BOP data after we introduce
Corisk estimates of re-export of Western circumvention goods into the equation, we estimate the
monthly exports to Russia from Q2 2022 by recording the implied residual net exports to Russia from
total exports to the ex-Soviet area (BelStat), and adding the Corisk estimated circumvention exports.
For Belarusian imports from Russia, we have the same sources as for exports: monthly official trade
data reported to UN ComTrade until 2Q 2022; quarterly central bank BOP data reported to EAEU
until Q4 2022; and monthly data for imports from the ex-Soviet area directly from BelStat. The
average monthly import value 2019-2021 from the three sources are presented in the table below.
Monthly average mUSD
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
BelStat CIF from ex-Soviet area
2,005
1,535
2,145
1,942
2,001
q1-q2 2,150
- UN ComTrade CIF from others
165
154
136
57
38
39
= Implied CIF import from Russia
1,841
1,381
1,989
1,885
1,963
q1-q2 2,111
BelStat CIF from Russia
1,835
1,376
1,972
UN ComTrade CIF from Russia
1,802
1,354
1,281
EAEU national BOP data
1,705
1,367
2,032
q1-q3 1,866
Corisk estimate, CIF import
1,841
1,381
1,989
1,885
1,963
q1-q2 2,111
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From the table we observe the considerable coherency between the data sources. Seen top-down,
we observe that BelStat publishes continuous data series for CIF imports from the ex-Soviet, and for
each of those countries 2019-2021 that we may deduct from the totals to get implied CIF imports
from Russia alone (rows 1-3). From 2022 onwards, we estimate the CIF import from ex-Soviet states
based the recent rate of underreporting in Belarus FOB reporting against each of the trade partners
(row 2). BelStat also publishes stand-alone import data for Russia, but only annual and only 2019-
2021 (row 4). The Belarusian reporting to UN ComTrade is consistent with other data except in 2021,
where for some reason they are considerably lower than the three other sources (row 5). The
quarterly BOP data released via EAEU are lower than official trade data except in 2021 (row 6). This is
a rare instance of under-reporting by central banks against official trade data.
Based on the fit between sources and the continuous release of official trade data via BelStat and UN
ComTrade, we consistently apply the implied CIF imports from Russia (row 3) as reference level of CIF
imports. For 2019-2020 we use monthly UN ComTrade data for volatility and adjust them up to 2
percent to match BelStat totals, while from 2021 onwards we apply the monthly implied data
directly. The implied data are construed from official CIF imports from the ex-Soviet area, by
deducting official Belarusian CIF imports from non-Russian trade partners 2019-2021, and by
estimate these values from trade partner FOB exports to Belarus 2022-2024.
5.3. Variations in national reporting
Some ex-Soviet states release updated and granular data are highly consistent with Western data,
including Armenia and Kazakhstan, while Georgia seems to clearly under-report trade with several
Western partners. Western countries with seemingly comprehensive and consistent reporting
include France, Germany, and the Nordic countries. Italy does not publish national data except more
granular data via Eurostat and UN ComTrade. The Netherlands seems to struggle with estimation,
they regularly revise past records more than a year back, and under-report trade with for example
Armenia. Other countries that frequently do back revisions to prior data include Egypt, France, and
the UK. We make informed judgements by inspecting several sources and apply the latest versions of
the same source of trade by consignment as far as possible across the whole timeframe of inquiry.
For the 170 studied providers of Russia’s imports there is generally good local data, matching or
ahead of Russian trade data, in all of the Western countries and Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Faeroe Islands, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. For these countries we apply local
data, and fill in any data gaps with Russian data deducted a 2-10 % shipping cost.
We find under-reporting from Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Costa
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Jordan, Macao, Madagascar, Malaysia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Qatar, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For these countries, we apply local data adjusted
for under-reporting against verifiable Russian data, or Russian data deducted a 2-10 % shipping cost.
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We find deficient reporting from Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Burkina, Burundi,
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, DR Congo, Congo Republic, Cuba, Djibouti, El Salvador,
Eritrea, Gabon, Greenland, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, North Korea, Kuwait,
Laos, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Myanmar, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Togo. Here we apply Russian data, deducted a 2-10 % shipping cost.
For countries with 10 million dollars or more in monthly exports to Russia, noteworthy uncertainties
pertain to the exports of Iran after 2021, Cote d’Ivoire after 2022, Belarus after June 2023;
Bangladesh, Ghana, Guinea, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Macao, Maldives, Morocco, Pakistan Singapore,
South Africa UAE and Uruguay in 2024; and to the exports of Hong Kong, Israel, Kazakhstan,
Moldova, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam after March 2024. For these countries, estimates are done
for the periods mentioned based on available local data, legacy under-reporting rates, and Russian
customs data. Uncertainties pertain to approximately 10 % of the exports to Russia in the second
half of 2023, and 15 % in the second quarter of 2024. Provided we regard all existing and verified
data as “correct”, the months with national data uncertainties should create a margin of error for the
total value of all the 170 exporting countries in the range of perhaps 2-4 percent.
For the 170 studied buyers of Russia’s exports, we find good local data, matching or ahead of Russian
data, for the Western countries and Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, DR
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands,
Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,
Macedonia, Macao, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. For these countries, we apply local data, and fill in any data gaps
with Russian data deducted a 2-10 % distance- and logistic-based shipping cost.
We find evidence of under-reporting or deficient reporting of imports from Russia in Afghanistan,
Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bonaire-St-Eusabius-Saba, British Virgin
Islands, Brunei, Burkina, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cook Island, Cuba,
Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica,
Jordan, North Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
PNG, St Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Trinidad &
Tobago, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yemen. For these countries, we apply
either Russian customs data, or Russian reporting to UN ComTrade plus a 2-10 % shipping cost.
For countries with USD 10 million or more monthly imports from Russia, key uncertainties pertain to
Iran after 2020, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova after June 2023; Myanmar and Sri Lanka in 2024; and
Algeria, Armenia, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa,
Taiwan, Tunisia and Vietnam after March or April 2024. For these countries, estimates are done for
the periods mentioned based on available local data, legacy mis-reporting rates, and the availability
of credible Russian customs data. The uncertainties pertain to approximately 4 % of the imports
from Russia in the second half of 2023, and 7 % in the second quarter of 2024. Provided we regard all
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existing and verified data as “correct”, the months with data uncertainties should create a margin of
error for the total value of all the 170 importing countries in the range of perhaps 2-4 percent.
The evidence sheds light on reporting resources. Compared to the situation for partner exports to
Russia (Russian imports), we see that partner imports from Russia are more comprehensively
reported and match or exceed Russian data for more countries, including many countries in Africa
and Latin America. While a total of 64 out of the 129 non-Western countries (50 %) provide good-
quality import data, only 39 out of 129 non-Western countries (30 %) provide good-quality export
data. This confirms the impression that countries more rigorously record imports, than exports.
5.4. Selected countries
Our estimates of Russia’s foreign commodity trade in this report include the following 170 countries:
41 Western states
27 EU member states
4 EFTA member states Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland
3 European states Faeroe Islands, Greenland, United Kingdom
2 North American states Canada, United States of America
5 Asian-Oceanic states Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand
129 Other states
11 ex-Soviet states Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
8 semi-Western states Albania, Bahamas, Bosnia-Hercegovina, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Macedonia, Mexico, Montenegro
39 Asian states Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Cook Island, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran (incomplete), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, North Korea
(incomplete), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall
Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Yemen
45 African states Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Republic of Congo,
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Morocco,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan,
Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
26 Latin America states Argentina, Aruba, Barbados, Bolivia, Bonaire-St-Eusabius-Saba, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (possibly incomplete), Curacao, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Lucia, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela (incomplete)
These countries include all the 150 largest trade partners and more than 99.5 % of Russia’s trade.
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5.4. Data sources per country
Applying the same data source and data type for each country throughout the period, is a vital
safeguard against double counting. We always confer UN ComTrade and TradeMap, and apply local
trading party data for the overwhelming majority of the trade with Russia, confining the use of
Russian data to countries that do not themselves report, and countries stat have very small trade
with Russia. Countries that are estimated via Russian trade data represent 7-8 % of Russia’s total
trade. These are included in order to estimate the total trade volume, and thus to be able to
compare totals with official Russian data and develop trade data for macro-economic analysis.
For each country we record data from the following sources, listed first for Russia’s exports and then
for Russia’s imports, with an indication of how we form our final data estimate and how much of
Russia’s total trade each region represents. In the tables, we include the following colour codes:
Green Country (left column) Data series are constructed from a single source across 2019-24.
Corisk estimate (right) The Corisk estimate is based solely on local (national) data.
Red Country (left column) Data series are constructed from two or more sources across 2019-24.
Corisk estimate (right) The Corisk estimate is based solely on Russian data
Table 1. Sources for each country’s imports from Russia (Russian exports):
Country
Source 1
Source 2
Source 3
Corisk estimate data basis
Western states 33 % of Russia’s exports
EU-27
Eurostat
Statistics agencies
Central Banks
Eurostat
USA
UN ComTrade
US Census
US Census
Canada
UN ComTrade
Statistics Canada
Statistics Canada
Japan
UN ComTrade
ESTAT
ESTAT
Korea
UN ComTrade
KOSIS
KOSIS
Taiwan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Trade Dept
Trade Department
Australia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT data
New Zealand
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT data
UK
UN ComTrade
ONS
ONS
Switzerland
UN ComTrade
Swiss Customs
Swiss Customs
Norway
UN ComTrade
Statistics Norway
Statistics Norway
Iceland
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT + 200 %
Faroe Islands
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Greenland
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Liechtenstein
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Albania
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Bosnia & Herc
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Macedonia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Montenegro
Un ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Serbia
UN ComTrade
Customs Serbia
RZS (statistics)
Local RZS
Ex-Soviet states 12 % of Russia’s exports
Armenia
UN ComTrade
Statistics agency
TradeMap
Statistics Armenia
Azerbaijan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Belarus
UN ComTrade
EAEU
BelStat, BEROC
Local EAEU / BEROC
Georgia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Rus customs +2%
Kazakhstan
UN ComTrade
EAEU
Statistics agency
Local UNCT / EAEU
Kyrgyzstan
UN ComTrade
Central Bank
Statistics agency
Central Bank / EAEU / Corisk
Moldova
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local customs / UNCT
Tajikistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Turkmenistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Ukraine
UN ComTrade
Statistics Ukraine
Local Statistics Ukraine
Uzbekistan
UN ComTrade
Statistics Uzbek
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Stat Uzb - 2 %
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(cont.)
Source 1
Source 2
Source 3
Corisk estimate data basis
Asian states 51 % of Russia’s exports
Afghanistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Bahrain
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Russian customs
Bangladesh
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local customs / UNCT
Brunei
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Cambodia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
China
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs China
Customs China
Hong Kong
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
India
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Min of Commerce
Local MOC
Indonesia
UN ComTrade
Customs Indonesia
BPS (statistics)
Local UNCT / customs
Iran
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / Corisk est.
Iraq
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Central Bank
Russian customs
Israel
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
CBS (statistics)
Local UNCT
Jordan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
North Korea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Kuwait
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Laos
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Lebanon
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Macao
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Malaysia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Min of Economy
Local MOC
Maldives
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Marshall Is
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Mongolia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Central Bank
Russian customs
Myanmar
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT + 5%
Nepal
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap / Rus customs
Oman
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Rus customs
Pakistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Papua N Guinea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Philippines
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
PSA / Customs
Local PSA / Rus customs
Qatar
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Russian customs
Saudi Arabia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Singapore
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Singapore
Local UNCT / customs
Sri Lanka
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT + 40 %
Syria
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Thailand
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Central Bank
Local central bank
Turkey
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
UAE
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
FCSC (statistics)
Local data / Rus customs -30%
Vietnam
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
GSO (statistics)
Local UNCT
Yemen
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
African states 2 % of Russia’s exports
Algeria
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Angola
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Angola
Local UNCT / customs
Benin
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Botswana
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Botswana
Russian customs
Burkina Faso
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Burundi
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap / Rus cust +10%
Cabo Verde
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap
Cameroon
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Cameroon
Local customs
Central Afr Rep
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Chad
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Congo DR
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Congo
Local customs
Congo Rep
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Cote d Ivoire
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Russian cust x 2
Djibouti
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Egypt
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
CAPMAS statistics
Local UNCT / CAPMAS
Eritrea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Ethiopia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Ethiopia
Local customs
Gabon
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Gambia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
37
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(cont.)
Source 1
Source 2
Source 3
Corisk estimate data basis
Ghana
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Russian customs
Guinea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Kenya
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Kenya
Local customs
Libya
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Madagascar
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Malawi
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap
Mali
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Mauritania
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Mauritius
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Mozambique
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Morocco
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Rus customs x 2
Namibia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Niger
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Nigeria
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Statistics Nigeria
Local stat / Rus cust / UNCT
Rwanda
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Senegal
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Senegal
Local customs / UNCT
Somalia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
South Africa
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
South Sudan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Sudan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Tanzania
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Tanzania
Local UNCT / customs
Togo
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Tunisia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
INS (statistics)
Local UNCT / INS
Uganda
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local customs
Zambia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Zimbabwe
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Latin American states 2 % of Russia’s exports
Argentina
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
INDEC (statistics)
Local UNCT / customs
Bahamas
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Bolivia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Brazil
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
MDIC (govt)
Local UNCT / MDIC
Brit Virgin Is
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Cayman Is
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Chile
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Chile
Local UNCT / customs
Colombia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Costa Rica
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT - 8%
Cuba
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Domin. Rep
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Russian cust
Ecuador
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / customs
El Salvador
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT - 8%
Guatemala
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Guyana
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Honduras
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Jamaica
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Mexico
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
INEGI (statistics)
Local INEGI
Neth Antilles
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
CSB (statistics)
Russian customs / UNCT
Nicaragua
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Panama
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Paraguay
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Peru
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Rus customs
St Lucia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Suriname
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Trinidad &Tob
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Uruguay
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Venezuela
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs.
Table 1 above illustrates how trade partner import data are much more often comprehensive; in that
we are more likely to be able to find local (national) CIF import data that capture Russian exports to
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
38
www.corisk.no NO 926 378 538
the partner countries. This enables us to apply one single data source across the whole time period
for more of the countries, and for most of the trade under study.
The same table can be similarly constructed for Russia’s imports from trade partners. Again, the
green coloured Country name in the left column means that we apply only one data source over the
time period, while green coloured Corisk estimate source in the right column means that we apply
only local (national) data. Conversely, red coloured country name means that we apply two or more
sources over the time period, and red coloured right column means that we apply only Russian data.
Table 2. Sources for each country’s exports to Russia (Russian imports):
Country
Source 1
Source 2
Source 3
Corisk estimate data basis
Shares of trade 2022-2023
Western and European states 27 % of Russia’s imports
EU-27
Eurostat
Statistics agencies
Central Banks
Eurostat
USA
UN ComTrade
US Census
US Census
Canada
UN ComTrade
Statistics Canada
Statistics Canada
Japan
UN ComTrade
ESTAT
ESTAT
Korea
UN ComTrade
KOSIS
KOSIS
Taiwan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Ministry of Trade
Russian customs
Australia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
New Zealand
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
UK
UN ComTrade
ONS
ONS
Switzerland
UN ComTrade
Swiss Customs
Swiss Customs
Norway
UN ComTrade
Statistics Norway
Statistics Norway
Iceland
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT + 200 %
Faroe Islands
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Greenland
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Liechtenstein
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Albania
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Bosnia & Herc
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Macedonia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT + 60 %Russian
customs / UNCT
Montenegro
Un ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT + 700 %
Russian customs / UNCT
Serbia
UN ComTrade
Customs Serbia
RZS (statistics)
Local RZS
Ex-Soviet states 19 % of Russia’s imports
Armenia
UN ComTrade
Statistics agency
Statistics Armenia
Azerbaijan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap / Russian customs
Belarus
UN ComTrade
EAEU
BelStat, BEROC
Local EAEU / BEROC
Georgia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT
Kazakhstan
UN ComTrade
EAEU
Statistics agency
Local UNCT / EAEU
Kyrgyzstan
UN ComTrade
Central Bank
Statistics agency
Central Bank / EAEU / Corisk
Moldova
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Moldova
Russian customs / UNCT - 2 %
Tajikistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Turkmenistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Ukraine
UN ComTrade
Statistics Ukraine
Local Statistics Ukraine
Uzbekistan
UN ComTrade
Statistics Uzbek
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Stat Uzb
Asian states 52 % of Russia’s imports
Afghanistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Bahrain
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs + 35 %
Bangladesh
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Banglad.
Rus customs +100 % / UNCT
Brunei
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Cambodia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
China
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs China
Customs China
Hong Kong
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Rus cust – 5 %
India
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Min of Commerce
Local UNCT
Indonesia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
BPS (statistics)
Local UNCT / BPS + 20%
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
39
www.corisk.no NO 926 378 538
(cont.)
Source 1
Source 2
Source 3
Corisk estimate data basis
Iran
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Iraq
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Central Bank
Russian customs
Israel
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
CBS (statistics)
Local CBS
Jordan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT + 450 %
Russian customs + 100 %
Kuwait
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Laos
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Lebanon
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Macao
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs – 5 %
Malaysia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Min of Economy
Local MOC / UNCT
Maldives
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Marshall Is
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Mongolia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Central Bank
Central Bank
Myanmar
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Nepal
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Oman
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Rus customs
Pakistan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Papua N Guinea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Philippines
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
PSA / Customs
Russian customs – 4 %
Qatar
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT + 400%
Russian customs + 800 %
Saudi Arabia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Singapore
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Singapore
Local UNCT + 30% / Rus cust
Sri Lanka
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Sri Lanka
Local UNCT + 40 %
Thailand
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Central Bank
Local UNCT
Turkey
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Turkey
Local UNCT
UAE
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
FCSC (statistics)
Local UNCT / FCSC
Vietnam
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
GSO (statistics)
GSO / Russian customs
African states 1 % of Russia’s imports
Algeria
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Angola
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Angola
Russian customs x 10
Benin
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Rus cust - 10 %
Botswana
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Botswana
Local customs
Burkina Faso
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Burundi
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap
Cabo Verde
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap
Cameroon
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Cameroon
Russian customs x 5 / UNCT
Central Afr Rep
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Congo DR
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Congo
Local customs
Congo Rep
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Cote d Ivoire
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs x 15 / UNCT
Djibouti
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Egypt
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
CAPMAS statistics
Local CAPMAS
Eritrea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Ethiopia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Ethiopia
Local customs
Gabon
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Ghana
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Ghana
Russian cust / UNCT - 10%
Guinea
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian cust + 15% / UNCT
Kenya
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Russian cust
Libya
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Madagascar
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs x 2 / UNCT
Malawi
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local TradeMap
Mali
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Mauritania
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT / Rus customs
Mozambique
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Morocco
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT - 5 %
Namibia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Rus cust x 2
Niger
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Nigeria
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Nigeria
Russian cust / UNCT - 10%
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
40
www.corisk.no NO 926 378 538
(cont.)
Source 1
Source 2
Source 3
Corisk estimate data basis
Rwanda
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Russian UNCT
Senegal
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Senegal
Russian customs / UNCT
Somalia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
South Africa
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian cust +50% / UNCT -10%
South Sudan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Sudan
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Tanzania
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Tanzania,
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Russian cust / UNCT - 10 %
Togo
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Rus cust - 10 %
Tunisia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
INS (statistics)
Local INS / Russian UNCT x2
Uganda
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs
Zambia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs x 15 / UNCT
Zimbabwe
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs x 3.5 / UNCT
Latin American states 1 % of Russia’s imports
Argentina
UN ComTrade
Customs Argentina
INDEC (statistics)
Local UNCT
Bahamas
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Bolivia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Bolivia
Local UNCT / Rus customs
Brazil
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Local UNCT + 20 %
Brit Virgin Is
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Cayman Is
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Chile
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Chile
Local customs
Colombia
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT
Costa Rica
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Costa Rica
Russian customs / UNCT - 8%
Domin. Rep
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Ecuador
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Ecuador
Local UNCT / customs
El Salvador
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT - 8%
Guatemala
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian cust +100 % / UNCT
Guyana
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Honduras
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Jamaica
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs / UNCT - 7%
Mexico
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
INEGI (statistics)
Local INEGI
Neth Antilles
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
CSB (statistics)
Russian customs / UNCT
Nicaragua
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT / Rus cust - 7 %
Panama
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs / UNCT
Paraguay
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Local UNCT
Peru
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Customs Peru
Local UNCT / Rus cust - 10%
Suriname
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian customs
Uruguay
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
TradeMap
Russian customs – 10 %
Venezuela
UN ComTrade
Russian customs
Russian UNCT / Corisk est.
Table 2 above illustrates how trade partner export data are often deficient - we often lack local
(national) export data and need to apply Russian recorded import data to capture comprehensive
values of trade. For countries with noteworthy export volumes, we must then apply Russian data
deducted a distance- and logistics-based trade cost. We deduct from 2 % to 10 % in trade cost
according to distance from Russia, land-locked positions, and the assessed availability of maritime or
land-based logistics routes between the trading partners.
The two tables above may give the impression that Russian trade and customs data have been widely
used to establish our total trade estimates, since many African and Latin American countries have
had their trade estimated in this way. But countries that are estimated by use of local (national)
trade data represent more than 90 % of the total trade volume, making sure that the inclusion of the
CIF/FOB margin covers a high proportion of trade, enabling analysis of the magnitude of Russian
trade and shipment costs, circumvention risk costs, and other potential deviations.
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
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5.5. Specific risks of double counting
For Russia’s imports, these mainly consist of finished goods and are imported directly from trading
partners, or indirectly from intermediary countries and neighbours in the case of sanctioned Western
goods. This situation does not create substantial risks of double accounting. Corisk regularly updates
a database of Western circumvention exports and indirect exports to Russia, and in Western trade
data this trade will appear as sales to the third countries including many of Russia’s neighbours. Thus,
it will not appear in the Western countries’ exports to Russia, but if the intermediaries re-export the
goods to Russia, it shall be included in the reported trade between them and Russia. Thus, we must
make sure to retrieve data that include all of Russia’s trade with neighbours, including with members
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). We apply BOP-based transaction data for all trade within the
EAEU, and we observe in these data a considerable increase in trade from mid-2022 onwards,
indicating inclusion of the Western goods from Western indirect exports. We further validate this by
estimating the total Western circumvention exports via each intermediary, and retrieve data on
trade in domestically produced goods where that is available, to ensure that the totals sum up to
comprehensive trade values for Russia and its neighbours including Turkey and UAE. We believe that
we have managed to include all intra-EAEU and intra-CIS trade, including that in foreign goods.
For Russia’s exports, Western direct imports of oil and gas and their derived products were gradually
abandoned in the trade with Russia during 2022 and early 2023 and switched to supplies from other
countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The European Union only allows a minor quota of oil to
be imported by Bulgaria, and somewhat more natural gas to Central Europe. Any illicit Western
circumvention or indirect imports of Russian oil products via neighbours such as Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan or Turkey, should ideally be visible either in Russia’s trade with these intermediaries, or
with the Western countries themselves, with low risk of double counting, but with a certain risk of
Russia earning non-captured revenues by secret trade via the intermediaries.
However, for sea-borne oil cargoes the risk of double counting is higher, especially when Russian oil
or oil products are shipped by vessels of the so-called “shadow fleet”. First and foremost, there will
be risk that Russia transfers oil ship-to-ship and conceals the trade and revenue transactions, thus
earning revenues that go unaccounted. Especially, this may be the case if the trade is intertwined
with transfers connected with Venezuela, Iran, or North Korea. Further, Russia customs record large
exports of oil and oil products to the Netherlands Antilles, and more modest volumes to Panama,
which we cannot validate in data from the importing countries. Sorting out duplications in the data,
we find that the states of the former Netherlands Antilles ceased importing oil products from Russia
in 2019 and 2020. These are not recorded double by the Netherlands.
48
But the exports recorded by
Russian customs include vast quantities of crude oil, nickel, chemicals and numerous semi-finished
and finished goods, always with buyer country stated as “unknown”, and the thousands of monthly
exports end abruptly on 1 August 2020. Nationally, there are no traces of the imports neither from
the statistics offices of Curacao nor Aruba.
49
The values also include Russian export totals that
mismatch grossly with the totals reported by the Central Bank of Russia for 2019 and 2020. We
conclude that Russian customs has systematically used “Netherlands Antilles” as a “residual post
account” for a high number of export shipments going elsewhere, and we expect to find these
Russian exports in the import data of other countries.
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
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Similarly, there are Russian exports of up to 277 million dollars per month to Panama, which are not
visible in Panama national trade data. The Canal Zone may involve transfer activities that allow for
recording confusion, and the Russian customs data contain a repetition of the exact same monthly
figures January-May 2023 and January-May 2024, leading us to suspect that the 2024 figures are
invalid. Therefore, we have chosen to rely on Panama imports data for the whole period 2019-2024
which are 2.34 billion dollars lower than the Russian data. Zimbabwe, Libya, Jamaica and Marshall
Islands are other smaller trade partners that reveal strongly increasing, though still modest, imports
from Russia. Hong Kong and Macao will retain a certain risk of double counting with imports to
China, but they absorb less than 1 % of Russia’s total exports.
In our accounting of the trade of Switzerland, we exclude the country’s extensive trade in gold both
in circumvention estimates, and for the direct trade with Russia. While for Russia and many other
countries gold is a normal trade commodity, we regard the Swiss trade in gold as a predominantly
financial transaction. However, we do not exclude gold from the trade between Russia and other
countries and intermediaries, and in the total values that gold will still be included in our totals if it is
being re-exported to Russia. This makes comparison with Russian BOP data more accurate.
Trade between Hong Kong and Russia is considerable, with exports amounting to 10.7 billion USD in
2022-2023, and imports amounting to 13.3 billion dollars. The methodology documentation from
Customs China does not explicitly state that goods from and to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao are
excluded, but the four entities conduct separate reporting to UN ComTrade which specifically states
that the four trading states are reported separately.
50
The Chinese and Hong Kong data reported to
UN ComTrade match with their other published data including those applied in this study.
Regarding the situation in Ukraine, trade to and from Crimea is explicitly accounted and reported by
Russia, and explicitly not reported by Ukraine.
51
We have not encountered methodological
documents regarding Donbas, but for the foreign exports of grain to Africa we widely apply Russian
customs data which explicitly include (stolen) Ukrainian grain from Donbas, which we do not assume
to be accounted by Statistics Ukraine. Altogether and given the military situation in the area, the
foreign trade of the Donbas must be assumed to be relatively marginal.
5.6. Discussion of trade costs
Trade costs are a complex term, but it is normally defined as all costs associated with delivering a
good or a service to a customer through (cross-border) trade.
52
In macroeconomic and policy
analysis, trade costs are often derived from regression of various logistic and regulatory variables
against the prevalence of trade, often within a gravity-model equation framework.
53
In this study, we shall define it as all costs connected with cross-border trade between two countries,
but excluding explicit taxes and tariffs. In line with the OECD, we identify trade costs in the difference
between Country A’s recorded import CIF, and Country B’s recording of the same trade as export
FOB.
54
The OECD study applies so-called explicitly reported CIF/FOB margin data at disaggregated
product and country-pair level and then aggregate these up using total CIF import value as weights.
The French institute CEPII perform similar analyses from UN ComTrade data, where they validate
both that country-pairs have recorded exports FOB and imports CIF, and that they have recorded the
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
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www.corisk.no NO 926 378 538
same volumes (tons, liters, pieces) for the trade in question.
55
However, since February 2022 Russia
has stopped issuing any needed micro-level data for such analyses – country-.pair trade, volumes or
values, be it at aggregate or commodity level. This means that trade cost analysis at the micro level,
where symmetric recording between exporter and importer can be validated, is impossible for
Russia. Alas, the OECD and CEPII databases do not contain recent trade cost information for Russia.
These costs include more elements than the classical CIF cost components of insurance, financial
transaction costs, commodity shipment, and other transportation or logistics costs. For example,
they may include middleman trader costs and commissions deriving from re-export, added customs
clearance, briberies to customs officials, or smuggling costs. Our estimates will not capture fiscal
taxes and tariffs administered by governments directly at each end of the trade but may capture such
costs of middlemen if added to the re-export commodity price to final importers.
In a best-effort application of the CEPII methodology, we apply analysis directly at the macro level for
all countries simultaneously. This means that we incur all the methodological weaknesses that CEPII
sums up, and we must see to it that we capture the trade of all of Russia’s trade partners, so that we
construct a country-pair consisting of Russia as one part, and all other countries as the other.
The basic equation regardless of applying a disaggregated or aggregated approach, is:
Relative CIF/FOB margin = ( CIF value – FOB value ) / CIF value
For that to bear fruit we must capture a maximum complete flow of trade, and measure that same,
complete flow through the period. The sources of error that micro analyses run into, include the
completeness of recording problem, the value/volume alignment, the gross/net unit of weight
measurement problem, the exchange rate measurement problem, the CIF/FOB recording issue, and
the country of consignment versus origin problem, among which the latter three are momentous.
56
When performing the estimates directly at the macro level, we run into all of these issues and we
only solve them in a few areas, first of all observing that the Russian measurement is collected from
the methodologically uniform BOP statistics throughout the period, and that we on the trade partner
side collect all data by country of consignment (to avoid double counting) and double-check all data
with one uniform source (UN ComTrade). What we cannot validate at the aggregate level is that all
imports are recorded CIF and all exports FOB (in line with UN recommendation), that the time of
currency conversion is uniform, and that no trade is recorded by country of origin. However, we feel
confident that the following considerations support our application of the macro approach:
- Most of the trade is recorded by well-established institutions that explicitly state their methodology
or recording and reporting, including the EU (Eurostat), US Census, the customs organisations of
China, Japan and Korea, and the trade statistics organisations of several ex-Soviet states.
- We have not recorded instances of countries changing their principles of recording or measurement
during the time period, so that sources of error will stay constant over time with limited impact on
changes to the cost of trade in Russian foreign commodity trade.
- Under the “law of big numbers” other sources of error such as changed composition of traded
goods, temporally skewed trade flow, or the value/volume alignment issue, may be more inclined to
even out over a sample of 170 countries and a temporal granularity spanning 66 months.
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In line with these considerations, we call upon caution in interpreting our estimates as accurate, and
believe our analysis can first of all shed valuable light on changes to the Russian costs of trade. We
also believe these changes are more pronounced and significant on imports, which display greater
shifts and changes than the costs of trade of importers on acquiring Russian exports. While Russia
has no scope for substation of imports from the World, the World can considerably substitute their
imports from Russia. In theory, the cost of trade equals the elasticity of substitution, all else being
equal. This leads to Russian exporters and foreign importers indulging in all kinds of trade-cost-
cutting including price rebates, shadow fleets, and alternative insurance schemes. We see this
difference in scope in the costs of trade on Russia’s exports which grew only gradually (Figure 3e),
while the trade costs on Russia’s imports almost trebled from one year to the next (Figure 7e). In this
perspective, the cost of trade measured at Russia’s imports appear somewhat more convincing.
The WTO Trade Cost Index finds that key components of trade costs include transport and travel
costs, information and transaction costs, ICT connectedness costs, governance deficiency cost, and
policy or regulatory costs including taxes, tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade, and “other”
costs.
57
They find trade costs to be highest for services and lowest for manufactured goods, with
agricultural goods falling in between.
58
Trade policy barriers such as tariffs and regulations on
average make up 14 % of trade costs, more for less developed countries than for developed.
Transportation is the highest cost component for trade between high-income countries, as these
have generally reduced or abolished tariffs and other technical or regulatory barriers to trade.
The gravity theory of trade places high emphasis on the trade cost of geographical distance, stating
empirically that larger economies, and neighbours and countries within shorter distance, tend to
trade more. Studies indicate that the cost of distance may have increased over time, favouring short-
distance trade over long-distance.
59
The gravity model also considers the size of the involved
economies, the quality of trade infrastructure, and the prevalence of landlocked trade.
60
Analysing the foreign trade of Russia, several factors come into play as determinants of trade costs:
1. Universal trends. Several studies have found trade costs to having generally declined over
the later decades.
61
The WTO finds trade costs to having fallen by 15 % from 2000 to 2018.
62
However, several studies have concluded in more long-term and general increases in trade
costs, though that may be attributed to longer supply chains and location of production in
more distant low-cost countries, and not necessarily increased costs of performing the same
trade or transport over time.
63
Trade costs are higher for less developed countries, having
fallen only for high-income and upper middle-income economies.
64
Global value chain
participation (GVCP) tends to reduce trade costs, and Russia may have shifted trade to
partners that are less likely to take part in global value chain. However, raw material bulk
exports may have a low GVCP in the first place, and thus be less vulnerable to such shifts.
65
Finally, so-called ‘deep’ trade agreements are a framework tending to reduce trade costs.
66
2. Transport costs are paramount to Russia’s exports, which consists of either special-transport
items (natural gas) or heavy, shipping-intensive bulk commodities (oil, metals, ores). Further,
changing away Western trade partners for new partners in Asia and Africa may shift trade to
partners with more red tape and less cost-efficient infrastructure, logistics, or trade services.
Increased trade with African countries may result in costs associated with the considerably
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higher costs of clearing goods there, than in Asian or OECD countries.
67
Transport costs for
liner shipping are relatively vulnerable to shipment providers’ market power, which is
stronger on less-served routes, and which we expect to be stronger for sanctioned goods and
for trade hit Western bans on Russian logistics.
68
Lastly, we observe the general trend of
falling global maritime shipment rates after 2022, but we find that these falling costs have
not translated into reduced trade costs for Russia. One study proposes that declining
transport costs are offset by higher adjacent, trade-facilitating costs as distances increase.
69
3. Geographical distance to trade has increased, as nearby legacy markets in Europe, Korea and
Japan have reduced their scope of trade and Russia needs to find markets further afield. Not
least, this is the case for oil and gas products that were until recently sold, predominantly, to
Europe and ex-Soviet neighbours including Ukraine. New dominating trade markets in China,
India and the Global South increase both shipment costs and time.
4. Sanctions on trade, introducing effects reminiscent of an indefinite tariff or similar regulatory
burden. Sanctions pose total barriers to trade, but just like an indefinite tariff the barrier can
be overcome by circumventing it via export and re-export through third countries, Such
circumvention has costs connected with transportation and logistics, alternative financial
transaction schemes, trader profits, bribery needs, currency risks, and secondary sanction
risks. In addition, sanctions will stimulate asymmetric market powers by empowering
Russia’s non-sanctioning trade partners, with consequences for Russia’s trade costs.
70
Finally,
sanctions have introduced a price cap on crude oil and oil products under regulated
shipment, inducing downward price pressure from foreign customers, partly mitigated
through the build-up of a shadow tanker fleet for oil but not for liquified natural gas.
Altogether, we find from the literature that the most relevant cost components to Russian trade
before and after the second attack, are sanction costs and barriers, changes to geographic distance,
shifts to less developed trade partners, and middleman costs that are unique to the context.
5.7. Trade costs and inflation
Increased trade costs spill directly over on import prices, accelerating import inflation with more
persistent and longer-term effects than many other price shocks have.
71
Studies reveal that shipping
costs spill less over on inflation in countries that practice monetary policies of credible inflation
targeting, and on countries with relatively lower imports to GDP.
72
Russia has an import level around
10 % to GDP which is far below the global average of 30-40 %, and the country officially practices the
4 % inflation targeting with floating exchange rate, using policy interest rates as the main monetary
instrument.
73
But since Russia has run out of most of its hard currency reserves, the Ruble has
depreciated, inflation and bank runs remain constant threats, monetary measures have become
more dramatic including solid interest rate hikes, occasional capital controls and forced conversions.
As discussed in Chapter 4.1, sanctions force high-priority and war-relevant goods to take longer and
more complex trade routes which severely add trade costs where gradually more of the across-
supply-chain inflation will be missed by our country of consignment analysis as more non-accounted
supply-chains are added with their trade cost margins. This calls for stronger real trade costs than our
estimates indicate, and a corresponding stronger effect on inflation in Russia.
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6. Raw data and assumptions
In the following tables, we present selected data on FOB export to Russia and CIF import from Russia,
as far as we can discern from the available statistical data sources. For presentation purposes we
combine three-month data into quarterly values, starting from April 2022. Chapter 5.4, above,
reveals the sources applied for each trading partner country to measure their exports and imports
with Russia. For quarterly imports from Russia (Table 3), we present official and direct trading data,
irrespectively of the origin of the commodities. This means that if Russia sells a sanctioned export
good to Belarus, which then sells it to Germany, the trade will only be recorded as exports from
Russia to Belarus. This means that Russian indirect (circumvention) exports will not be identified in
the table, but instead remain hidden as a non-quantified component to the total direct trade.
For quarterly exports to Russia (Table 4), we record first “direct” exports to Rusia as they appear in
official statistics (black). However, there are substantial indirect Western exports and circumvention
exports to Russia via third countries, of which we continuously estimate the value of circumvention
via Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Turkey, and the UAE (but not China, Hong Kong). Circumvention exports are estimated as
the ’abnormal’ Western export to a third country when this export after February 2022 exceeds a 20
% growth threshold over the 2019-2021 baseline, adding from January 2023 onwards another 1 %p
every second month to that threshold.
74
For Belarus, we apply January-April 2022 as baseline. Under
Western countries in Table 4, we add the value of these indirect “circumvention exports” (red) via
facilitating third countries. These indirect exports come in addition to the official direct exports to
Russia, and illustrate the magnitude of circumvention sales from each Western exporter state.
Under facilitating third countries, we also quantify the value of Western goods exported indirectly to
Russa via that country, calling this “of which circumvented” (red). Here, these circumvention values
are included in the country totals (black). As an example, if Germany sells abnormal amounts of
goods to Belarus which are then (assumed) re-exported to Russia, the goods will not appear in the
direct German exports value (black), but in the indirect German circumvention exports value (red).
For Belarus, they will appear both in the export totals (black), and in the part circumvented (red).
For facilitating third countries, the difference between total direct exports to Russia (black) and the
component of that which are circumvented goods (red), leaves a residual which in principle equals
normal legacy volumes of re-exported Western goods, plus domestically produced export goods, plus
re-exported non-Western goods. However, in reality this residual is not accurate for Turkey (and
probably not for the UAE). Since the entry into force of sanctions. Turkey has also itself performed
indirect exports to Russia via other third countries, perhaps to conceal their intermediary role or
avoid secondary sanctions. Compared to the 2019-2021 baseline, Turkey’s exports in 2023 increased
by 163 percent to Kazakhstan, by 116 percent to Belarus, and by 93 percent to Kyrgyzstan. This
indicates that some of the Western circumvention goods flowing to Russia via Turkey, do in fact flow
from Turkey to Russia via another third country, and is therefore absent in the total Turkish export
value to Russia. This gives volatility to the residual values without indicating domestic exports values.
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Table 3. Quarterly imports CIF from Russia (Russian exports) in million USD
Country
2019-
2021
2022
Q2
2022
Q3
2022
Q4
2023
Q1
2023
Q2
2023
Q3
2023
Q4
2024
Q1
2024
Q2
WORLD
109,197
160,704
152,523
146,656
126,052
116,654
113,062
118,616
115,324
118,249
Western
56,878
76,339
56,867
46,817
31,660
19,606
18,180
19,631
16,199
14,112
UK
3,007
667
264
69
20
18
14
19
19
21
Switzerland
288
529
426
758
2,084
873
592
931
7
5
USA
5,734
3,870
1,339
1,965
1,713
1,131
792
929
959
923
Canada
334
164
35
15
18
8
15
10
13
10
Japan
3,268
4,093
3,428
2,877
2,501
1,733
1,239
1,994
1,684
1,287
South Korea
3,456
3,554
2,723
3,159
2,576
2,372
2,052
1,892
1,690
1,601
Taiwan
949
1,498
1,212
853
715
1,073
1,177
1,307
988
1,173
Australia
71
133
8
2
6
1
1
1
1
1
EU-27
38,671
60,616
46,550
36,117
19,612
10,998
11,631
11,548
10,557
8,626
Germany
8,224
11,402
7,458
5,046
1,790
927
675
623
616
527
France
2,349
4,623
3,035
3,124
1,367
786
734
1,078
1,179
1,018
Italy
4,508
9,543
7,965
3,880
2,174
1,281
813
500
803
986
Spain
1,157
1,983
2,311
1,706
1,129
868
677
710
746
518
Netherlands
4,165
6,575
4,777
3,007
2,733
1,371
1,396
1,168
858
707
Belgium
1,607
3,770
2,261
1,943
1,558
1,233
410
584
785
788
Poland
3,991
4,446
2,825
2,321
1,140
457
369
418
444
427
Czechia
1,249
4,201
3,744
1,150
723
734
936
1,064
877
601
Slovakia
1,287
1,803
1,435
2,383
1,602
814
964
1,559
1,308
956
Finland
2,234
1,402
1,013
771
510
239
415
347
236
210
Lithuania
1,121
666
203
230
103
81
83
91
51
38
Hungary
945
2,260
2,202
3,316
7,203
1,179
1,442
1,740
1,481
1,044
Austria
700
2,335
1,344
2,265
1,563
804
720
882
618
602
Latvia
364
425
530
427
188
161
143
164
162
111
Sweden
707
47
47
31
13
5
12
8
16
23
Ex-Soviet
14,299
15,325
16,513
20,001
16,492
15,493
14,833
17,314
18,458
20,004
Belarus
5,211
5,314
5,324
6,005
5,654
5,543
6,012
6,345
6,068
6,595
Kazakhstan
3,846
4,959
5,517
6,696
5,644
5,002
4,147
4,332
4,000
4,630
Kyrgyzstan
406
678
933
932
893
972
873
1,124
984
1,563
Uzbekistan
1,118
1,407
1,504
1,791
1,626
1,513
1,548
1,820
2,038
1,901
Armenia
440
673
802
940
768
705
787
1,785
3,619
3,340
Azerbaijan
622
839
902
1,890
743
747
726
891
662
950
Georgia
247
432
537
592
490
437
437
380
459
399
BRICS-8
21,590
43,154
52,361
52,235
52,468
57,001
56,759
56,826
55,245
60,341
China + HK + Macao
16,599
29,083
32,645
30,638
30,869
34,008
35,433
35,575
32,987
33,595
India
1,901
9,267
13,511
13,987
15,641
15,341
15,070
13,855
15,798
19,398
Brazil
1,056
2,781
2,089
1,716
1,881
2,420
2,921
3,347
2,368
3,190
UAE
894
786
2,754
3,956
2,164
3,385
1,507
2,401
2,344
2,350
Iran (uncertain)
361
362
362
362
390
450
450
450
450
450
Egypt
815
770
849
1,403
1,471
1,311
1,119
1,056
1,208
1,225
South Africa
99
100
150
144
51
84
259
126
31
167
All Other
16,430
25,887
26,783
27,604
25,432
24,553
23,289
24,845
25,421
23,792
Turkey
5,825
15,019
16,898
13,212
13,076
11,507
10,120
10,899
11,983
10,057
Mongolia
566
636
692
1,039
507
565
425
691
681
682
Vietnam
517
475
338
467
361
436
524
569
601
585
Thailand
467
415
300
208
145
168
209
170
195
220
Philippines
220
110
162
107
42
74
77
57
11
69
Malaysia
250
618
621
460
381
683
472
922
621
487
Indonesia
293
408
454
690
558
658
595
623
516
546
Singapore
781
334
292
565
760
955
933
935
1,345
1,138
Bangladesh
319
203
184
542
344
326
644
759
483
649
Pakistan
115
107
92
219
370
141
117
298
446
300
Saudi Arabia
297
373
486
509
318
364
483
173
330
330
Algeria
812
756
695
1,531
1,341
1,377
1,950
2,184
1,700
1,800
Tunisia
119
233
317
254
368
593
689
591
494
451
Nigeria
347
180
225
290
758
395
222
228
592
365
Mexico
368
629
593
541
494
739
510
407
509
646
Argentina
224
101
65
44
25
58
63
33
16
38
Colombia
83
78
82
98
81
72
91
83
73
75
Peru
105
56
76
168
107
73
96
56
103
93
Ecuador
72
67
53
87
40
56
13
32
53
18
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Table 3. Quarterly direct and indirect exports FOB to Russia (Russian imports) in million USD
Country
Direct + indirect
2019-
2021
2022
Q2
2022
Q3
2022
Q4
2023
Q1
2023
Q2
2023
Q3
2023
Q4
2024
Q1
2024
Q2
WORLD
63,851
46,966
64,536
73,813
68,055
71,298
66,719
69,443
60,478
64,704
Western
33,160
16,268
17,077
19,340
17,354
15,362
13,346
13,454
12,613
11,920
+Circumvention export
0
1,069
4,025
7,678
6,887
6,642
5,377
6,769
6,588
7,150
UK
975
249
270
234
302
295
228
236
346
185
+Circumvention export
0
25
251
330
89
115
69
85
117
35
Switzerland
911
875
720
851
794
802
601
675
521
669
+Circumvention export
0
24
48
189
223
34
73
82
76
89
USA
1,422
224
240
256
172
156
106
163
110
124
+Circumvention export
0
42
342
1,102
1,131
800
608
1,084
1,081
834
Japan
1,747
710
1,039
1,228
900
876
637
437
432
564
+Circumvention export
0
130
175
461
439
475
517
645
666
854
South Korea
2,054
896
1,403
1,940
1,668
2,147
1,155
1,196
1,472
998
+Circumvention export
0
23
109
212
337
454
414
376
535
724
Taiwan
288
125
197
256
176
198
201
218
171
139
+Circumvention export
0
9
13
23
21
29
37
15
20
7
EU-27
24,521
12,108
12,361
13,517
12,348
9,884
9,622
9,668
8,858
8,396
EU-19
22,903
11,144
11,282
12,309
11,064
8,730
8,687
8,739
8,087
7,443
+Circumvention export
0
815
3,075
5,215
4,551
4,674
3,652
4,455
4,075
4,600
Germany
7,695
3,324
3,300
3,116
2,990
2,366
2,233
2,045
2,032
1,959
+Circumvention export
0
176
839
1,289
1,288
1,119
896
1,048
1,047
778
France
1,746
591
566
701
646
513
480
571
567
496
+Circumvention export
0
30
318
425
398
393
578
840
562
887
Italy
2,627
1,596
1,694
1,748
1,645
1,258
1,370
1,368
1,283
1,088
+Circumvention export
0
189
131
480
212
356
183
447
531
756
Poland
2,280
938
1,081
1,363
1,095
975
999
887
789
740
+Circumvention export
0
101
310
490
464
610
433
423
455
372
Lithuania
1,180
552
678
808
664
616
533
511
393
290
+Circumvention export
0
105
635
955
726
593
294
192
161
183
Ex-Soviet
7,506
9,223
12,460
14,281
12,079
12,996
11,769
12,755
11,488
12,863
of which circumvented
0
860
3,193
5,454
4,522
4,605
3,941
4,250
3,375
3,834
Belarus
3,974
5,436
6,751
7,914
6,920
7,094
6,399
6,907
6,860
7,283
of which circumvented
0
3
478
931
687
596
576
923
647
483
Armenia
189
364
876
1,033
798
901
892
827
743
665
of which circumvented
0
168
446
570
416
406
303
300
215
265
Georgia
129
147
207
178
177
167
168
145
161
179
of which circumvented
0
137
377
752
631
652
524
558