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Resilience in Times of Crisis: Empowering Refugees with Self-Sovereign Identity

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The Ukrainian refugee crisis, beginning in 2022, revealed challenges for both refugees and organizations in the Swiss asylum process. While refugees are faced with time-consuming and cumbersome administrative tasks, involved authorities and organizations are overwhelmed with slow paper-based processes, redundant work, and wrong data. We propose a digital identity (eID) to mitigate these issues. The challenges of implementing a centralized identity, particularly given Switzerland's decentralization, led us to choose a Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) concept. Following a design science research approach, we iteratively developed a prototype and evaluated it with refugees and different organizations. Based on the analysis of collected feedback, we formulated design principles for SSI-based eID for refugees and described how these principles impact feasibility, refugees' empowerment, and organizations' efficiency. We formulated the main principles for refugee empowerment through three lenses: SSI-comprehensive, early-access digital wallet; eID-gradual increase in identification; and GaaP-open identity platform.
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Resilience in Crisis: Empowering Refugees with SSI
Forty-Fifth International Conference on Information Systems, Bangkok, Thailand 2024
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Resilience in Times of Crisis: Empowering
Refugees with Self-Sovereign Identity
Completed Research Paper
Aleksandra Garazha
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
aleksandra.garazha@uzh.ch
Cedric Merz
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
cedric.merz@ergon.ch
Gerhard Schwabe
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
schwabe@ifi.uzh.ch
Liudmila Zavolokina
University of Lausanne,
University of Zurich
Lausanne / Zurich, Switzerland
liudmila.zavolokina@unil.ch
Abstract
The Ukrainian refugee crisis, beginning in 2022, revealed challenges for both refugees
and organizations in the Swiss asylum process. While refugees are faced with time-
consuming and cumbersome administrative tasks, involved authorities and
organizations are overwhelmed with slow paper-based processes, redundant work, and
wrong data. We propose a digital identity (eID) to mitigate these issues. The challenges
of implementing a centralized identity, particularly given Switzerland's decentralization,
led us to choose a Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) concept. Following a design science
research approach, we iteratively developed a prototype and evaluated it with refugees
and different organizations. Based on the analysis of collected feedback, we formulated
design principles for SSI-based eID for refugees and described how these principles
impact feasibility, refugees’ empowerment, and organizations’ efficiency. We formulated
the main principles for refugee empowerment through three lenses: SSI - comprehensive,
early-access digital wallet; eID - gradual increase in identification; and GaaP - open
identity platform.
Keywords: Self-Sovereign Identity, Digital Identity, Government as a Platform, Refugee Crisis
Introduction
Since 2022, almost 6 million Ukrainian refugees have come to Europe, making it the largest displacement
crisis in Europe since World War II (UNHCR 2024). The influx of Ukrainian refugees was also
unprecedented for Switzerland: in the first six weeks after the activation of protection status S, over 40,000
people from Ukraine registered in Switzerland (State Secretariat for Migration 2023). The Swiss
government provided considerable support to refugees, including accommodation, social support, and a
special “S statusthat allows the right to work. However, to obtain all this, refugees had to wait in queues,
register in person at multiple locations, and endure months of waiting for identification due to lost or
incorrect documents. The increased workload overwhelmed public organizations, highlighting how paper-
based processes, though effective in normal circumstances, lack scalability during a crisis because of tight
time constraints and uncertainty.
The most obvious solution to this problem is the digitalization of processes, and a crucial first step is the
implementation of a digital identification system. However, Switzerland's highly decentralized structure,
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with three federal layers (federal, cantonal, and municipal), poses a challenge. The subsidiarity principle
grants substantial autonomy to each municipality, hindering the implementation of a unified digital identity
system, especially during a crisis. Even with the prospective implementation of a national Swiss digital
identity in the coming years (Bundesamt für Justiz 2023), its application for refugees carries both potential
benefits and risks. On the one hand, identification is crucial for refugees, and digitalization can accelerate
processes, potentially easing their lives and empowering them (Pöhn et al. 2021). On the other hand, it
could generate surveillance risks and exclude already disadvantaged groups (Madon and Schoemaker
2021). From the perspective of public organizations, digital identities could increase efficiency and
interoperability but could also become a source of insecurity (Preukschat and Reed 2021).
Our study takes place in a unique context: Switzerland, a highly decentralized developed nation with
significant resources, is hosting Ukrainian refugees who have prior experience using eGovernment services,
such as “Diia” (Ukrainian Government 2019). Hence, we pose the following research question:
RQ: How can a digital system for refugees be designed in a federal state to support identification and
verification processes?
Our research is grounded in the Government as a Platform (GaaP) approach, which provides a framework
for the creation of an open platform for the public sector where people inside and outside government can
innovate and contribute to co-create better public services (O’Reilly 2011).
To answer RQ, we employed a Design Science Research (DSR) methodology (Peffers et al. 2007). Firstly, to
identify the problems and formulate the objectives for our solution, we conducted a literature review and
analyzed data from 50+ interviews conducted within the project Government as a Platform: Orchestrating
stakeholders in crisis situations through digital platforms in the Canton of Zurich(we will call it “GaaP for
refugees in Zurichproject, Zavolokina et al. 2023). This analysis revealed the need for digitalization and
highlighted federalism and high-security standards as the main barriers. Therefore, for the design, we
proposed using Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) as a potential solution. According to the SSI approach, not the
provider of a service but the users themselves manage their credentials (such as identity documents or
driver's licenses) in a digital wallet on their phone and have the option to share them with organizations
through a secure, decentralized network (Preukschat and Reed 2021). This design approach addresses both
core challenges: (a) mitigates the decentralization of a federalized system by placing refugees at the center,
and (b) incorporates security by designprinciples to meet high-security standards. To develop our SSI-
based identity system (we will call it “RefugeeID”), we went through three iterations of DSR that involved
three cycles of design, development, demonstration, and evaluation. After the first evaluation, we assessed
the system's feasibility and realized the wallet needed to hold more than just an identity document. The
second iteration highlighted the importance of refugees having early access to the digital wallet. To evaluate
our system, we conducted interviews with refugees (14) and organizational representatives (4) throughout
the three evaluations of our prototype.
Evaluation data indicate that the solution eased the lives of refugees, with nearly all participants expressing
a willingness to adopt it. While some gains in empowerment were observed due to time savings and secure
data storage, the solution had a limited impact on perceived control and self-sovereignty. Organizations
recognized the potential of SSI to improve efficiency but did not observe changes in inter-organizational
data exchange. Based on evaluation data, we described how specific SSI principles and our solution
objectives contribute to the feasibility of an identity system, refugee empowerment, and organizational
efficiency. For refugees’ empowerment, providing early access to the digital wallet and facilitating the
inclusion of diverse documents were particularly important. In terms of identification, these properties of
a wallet ensure a gradual increase in the degree of identification. Based on this analysis, we suggest that SSI
technology may be most suitable in situations involving decentralized stakeholders and stringent security
requirements. Generalizing our findings, we offer design principles for SSI-based digital identity for
refugees within the GaaP framework. Integrating these principles into the development of a digital identity
wallet can enhance its resilience during future crises.
This article is structured as follows: In the Background section, we introduce the GaaP language and explore
the concept of digital identities from both theoretical and practical perspectives. The Methodology section
outlines our research approach using the Design Science Research (DSR) framework, followed by the
Findings section, where we present the results of each phase. In the Discussion section, we offer insights on
when to use SSI technology, present our derived design principles, and explore the theoretical and practical
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implications of our findings. The Conclusion section summarizes our key takeaways, acknowledges
limitations, and proposes future research directions. Additional data is presented in the online Appendix
1
.
Background
Government as a Platform
The term platform initially referred to systems within the private sector, such as Uber or App Store,
characterized by a stable core and flexible periphery.” (Baldwin and Woodard 2008) The concept
subsequently evolved to encompass digital platforms for development,” exploring how such platforms can
facilitate the creation of public value (Bonina et al. 2021). When considering innovative platforms such as
the App Store, we can identify three key roles: (1) the platform owner, who is responsible for the platform's
development, maintenance, and governance; (2) complementors, those who develop and provide services
using the tools offered by the platform owner; and (3) users, the individuals who consume these services
(Hein et al. 2020).
From an architectural perspective, platforms can be deconstructed into three components: the central core,
boundary resources, and the surrounding ecosystem (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013). The core's
defining characteristic is its centrality, encompassing both technical and organizational aspects (Hein et al.
2020). Boundary resources act as a mediating layer, providing tools and rules that enable orchestration and
facilitation. These resources are characterized by their flexibility and the level of control maintained by the
platform owner. Finally, the main characteristic of an ecosystem is its openness (Hein et al. 2020; Madon
and Schoemaker 2021). The literature explores trade-offs between centralization and decentralization,
openness and control, flexibility, and standardization within platform architectures. In refugee contexts,
for instance, enhanced openness may improve access to services but simultaneously increase vulnerability
to exploitation (Madon and Schoemaker 2021). Conversely, centralization offers greater oversight but could
lead to the exclusion of complementors (Hein et al. 2020). Highly flexible platform tools necessitate well-
defined governance structures to maintain safety (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013).
The concept of GaaP envisions the government as the orchestrator of diverse stakeholders via a digital
platform. Existing GaaP implementations can be found in countries like Estonia, Italy, and the UK (Kuhn
et al. 2023). Considering GaaP in federal states, two examples emerge: Russia has some GaaP elements, but
its political system is not truly decentralized (Styrin et al. 2022). Conversely, Germany's decentralized
system lacks GaaP implementation yet, but they've found blockchain technology suitable for refugee
management (Roth, Stohr, et al. 2023).
Robust management of digital identification is critical to GaaP implementations since users must be
verifiably identified to get public services through the platform. Thus, digital identity is an important
building block of GaaP. However, there is another link between digital identity and GaaP: digital identity
systems can be conceptualized as platforms — with owners (identity providers), complementors (verifiers),
and users (Masiero 2021). Therefore, we can use this GaaP language even if we do not implement the whole
GaaP, but only the identity system.
Digital Identity and SSI in Theory
Identity is a multifaceted concept with philosophical, sociological, psychological, and technical dimensions
(Madon and Schoemaker 2021). An example of physical identity can be a passport or a driving license. For
the purposes of this article, we define digital identity (or electronic identity, eID) as a mechanism to show
that a person is who they claim to be within a digital environment (Mühle et al. 2018). While it can often
serve as a digital analog of legal identity, a digital identity is not limited to this function.
Three primary approaches govern the management of verified digital identity: centralized, federated, and
self-sovereign, see Figure 1 (Preukschat and Reed 2021). In a centralized model, users maintain separate
identities for each service, which leads to data redundancy and increased security risks for service providers.
Federated identity models introduce a central identity provider (such as Google accounts), streamlining
user experiences but consolidating information with the provider, potentially creating a single point of
1
https://seafile.ifi.uzh.ch/f/db26c13910eb43da8ada/
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failure and privacy concerns. To address these problems, a new approach called self-sovereign identity (SSI)
was proposed in 2015 (Preukschat and Reed 2021).
Figure 1. Three types of identity management
Figure 2. How Self-Sovereign Identity works
SSI is a relatively new and still evolving approach to digital identity management that emphasizes user
control and decentralization (Preukschat and Reed 2021). Users store verifiable credentials (VCs) issued by
trusted entities (issuers) within a digital wallet on their devices. These VCs can represent attributes like
identification, education, or residence. When interacting with a verifier (service provider or government
agency), users selectively disclose necessary information from their VCs (Figure 2). This minimizes data
exposure and reduces reliance on centralized authorities. SSI leverages cryptographic techniques to ensure
the authenticity and integrity of VCs.
Given the evolving nature of SSI and the lack of a universally accepted definition, we will use the described
principles of SSI to outline its key characteristics. In 2016, Allen proposed ten principles of SSI in his blog
post (Allen 2016). These principles were later consolidated with existing design knowledge, resulting in the
following nine design principles (Sedlmeir et al. 2022):
(1) Representation: SSI can represent any entity digitally.
(2) Control: Only the actual controller has decision-making power over their digital identity.
(3) Flexibility: No vendor lock-in, low switching costs, focus on interoperable standards, and open-source
projects.
(4) Security: State-of-the-art cryptographic tools and authenticated end-to-end encrypted interactions.
(5) Privacy: In each interaction, only the data that is essential for its purpose is revealed.
(6) Verifiability: The validity and timeliness of credentials can be checked efficiently.
(7) Authenticity: Credentials are bonded to their initial bearers.
(8) Reliability: There is guidance that helps verifiers decide which issuers they can trust in a highly
dependable infrastructure.
(9) Usability: Success and durability factors.
Since SSI wallets can store various types of documents, in this type of identity platform, both issuers and
verifiers become complementors, and the wallet provider becomes the owner, responsible for publishing a
governance framework that consists of rules for managing the ecosystem (Laatikainen et al. 2021). Thus,
trust among involved actors, as well as the security and privacy of the system, are assured by both the
technology and the governance framework (Laatikainen et al. 2021; Preukschat and Reed 2021). Sedlmeir
et al. (2021) suggested a research agenda for decentralized digital identities.
Digital Identity and SSI in Practice
Many governments worldwide recognize the potential of digital identities, utilizing them for various non-
crisis applications. Estonia, with its compulsory digital identity system for citizens, is often cited as a
pioneer (Pöhn et al. 2021). India's Aadhaar program represents the world's largest national digital identity
system (Pöhn et al. 2021). Ukraine also leverages digital identity to provide access to its eGovernment
platform, Diia (Kniazieva et al. 2023). While digital identities offer benefits like efficiency,
interoperability, and resource savings, potential drawbacks include user exclusion due to limited
infrastructure or data literacy, alongside concerns about surveillance (Pöhn et al. 2021).
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Several initiatives explore the use of eIDs for development purposes. For instance, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) utilizes digital identity platforms to empower refugees (Madon and
Schoemaker 2021). Similarly, other countries and organizations use eID's potential to streamline
registration and identification processes (UNHCR 2021). For refugees, access to identification is crucial as
it enables legal recognition, facilitates access to services, and protects against exploitation, human
trafficking, and unjust deportation or detention (Cheesman 2020). Digital identity solutions are seen as an
efficient and cost-effective method for providing individuals with identification. However, eIDs for refugees
might introduce even greater risks of exclusion that could potentially lead to policy redirection (Masiero
and Arvidsson 2021). Other concerns arise from the inherent duality of identity: social and institutional
identities differ, and this disparity can create friction between refugee groups (Madon and Schoemaker
2021).
Despite its relative novelty, SSI is already being piloted in various eID initiatives. Examples include
Germany's Security Digital Identities showcase program, a pilot SSI wallet in Busan (South Korea),
similar projects in US states (Pöhn et al. 2021), and Bhutan's National Digital Identity (Bhutan NDI 2023).
The European Union is also developing an eID wallet, with four large-scale pilot projects launched in 2023
and scheduled to continue until 2025 (European Commission 2024). Switzerland anticipates rolling out
state eIDs around 2026 (The Federal Council 2023). While these initiatives demonstrate promise,
challenges remain. These include existing eID hurdles, potential downsides of SSI principles (such as
concerns about data freshness), legal uncertainties, and the ongoing development of SSI technology itself,
which is still maturing and may require further refinement (Preukschat and Reed 2021).
SSI holds the potential to empower various marginalized groups. Examples include initiatives in the US
targeting homeless individuals, Sierra Leone for those lacking bank accounts, and cash assistance projects
in Jordan (Pöhn et al. 2021). SSI is also actively being explored to aid refugees, with projects like the
Rohingya initiative, medical identities within the Mae La camp (Cheesman 2020), and other projects such
as Taqanu, Banqu, TIKN, Gravity, and BitNation (Cheesman and Slavin 2021). However, SSI-based
solutions for refugees need careful consideration. Hünseler and Pöll (2023) analyzed the potential benefits
and risks of implementing SSI principles for three different types of consumers: vulnerable, confident, and
responsible. They concluded that exclusion risks are intensified, and the SSI principle of user data control
can lead to oversharing due to limited resources and competing priorities of refugees.
The adoption of SSI was studied by Laatikainen et al. (2021), who described the benefits and challenges
associated with it. To achieve this, the authors conducted field research, collecting the data from three
perspectives: open-source communities, organizations, and individuals. Their results suggest that adopting
SSI is highly rewarding for industries that require the management of sensitive or confidential data. On the
other hand, SSI necessitates high investment costs and fundamental changes; thus, in certain contexts, the
perceived sacrifices may outweigh the potential benefits.
Thus, existing studies on SSI-based identity systems for refugees show that refugee case is different from
normal-life case, but these studies primarily focus on analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of already
deployed systems. However, a research gap exists regarding design principles specifically tailored to the
creation of SSI-based identity systems for refugees. Our study addresses this research gap by deriving
design principles through a rigorous and established scientific methodology.
Methodology
This work follows a DSR approach for information systems research (Peffers et al. 2007). We opted for DSR
since this method structures a design and evaluation process to tackle real-world problems such as the one
we have in the crisis. DSR consists of six main activities: (1) problem identification and motivation, (2)
solution objectives, (3) design and development, (4) demonstration, (5) evaluation, and (6)
communication. DSR is applied iteratively, such that learnings from the evaluations influence and improve
the solution objectives and the developed artifact. Figure 3 offers an overview of how DSR was applied in
each step and iteration of this research.
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Figure 3. Application of DSR in this article and method overview.
Problem Identification and Solution Objectives
This study contributes to a larger project, “GaaP for refugees in Zurich” (Zavolokina et al. 2023), focused
on platform-based solutions for refugee crisis management. Within the scope of this project, we conducted
56 interviews: 20 with refugees, the remainder across the public sector, private sector, NGOs, volunteers,
and other stakeholders involved in managing the Ukrainian refugee crisis in Zurich. For more detailed
demographic data, see Appendix A. These interviews highlighted the unscalability of existing manual
processes and revealed the potential of digitalization as a suitable solution. We then investigated problems
associated with implementing digital identity in our specific case. This involved a literature review exploring
the pros and cons of different types of eID, alongside an analysis of interviews with IT experts and
government authorities. Additionally, we used interviews with refugees to outline a user scenario for
RefugeeID.
Design and Development
Self-Sovereign Identity was the type of eID that best aligned with our solution objectives. We used a Figma
prototype for the first evaluation to validate this technology choice and the processes that come with it.
Since the results were positive, we used a fully functional SSI-based eID system for the second and third
iterations (see the Design and Development Subsection in the Findings Section for technical details). We
added corresponding design features to our system as new solution objectives appeared.
Demonstration
For all three iterations, we conducted demonstrations with Ukrainian refugees recruited via a Telegram
group Zurich Helps Ukrainian Refugees.” Participants received a 30 Swiss franc voucher as compensation.
The first and second evaluations employed “think-aloud” sessions in a one-on-one format conducted by the
second author. Namely, after a short introduction, refugees used the prototype following a particular
scenario (described in the next paragraphs) and were asked to verbalize all their actions and thoughts. In
the third evaluation, we designed a more elaborate evaluation scenario that incorporated multiple locations
and different issuers/verifiers, allowing us to assess the applicability of RefugeeID in a simulated real-world
setting. The median age of the refugees was 31; four were male, and ten were female. The median education
level was a Master’s degree. More detailed information can be found in Appendix B.
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During the second and third iterations, we also showcased our prototype to domain experts (one expert, E1,
during the second evaluation and four experts, E1-E4, during the third evaluation). All these experts were
involved in the refugee management process. Two of them (E3 and E4) worked in the Migration Office of
the Canton of Zurich (head of the office and team leader of Asylum), one of them (E2) was the head of the
social integration department of the Asylum Organization of Zurich (AOZ), an organization that provides
services to refugees. One expert (E1) worked as an employee of a cantonal administration in IT.
In the first iteration, refugees received a letter with a QR code informing them that they could optionally
use a digital wallet. By scanning the attached QR code, they could add their eID (corresponding to their S
permit) to the wallet. To register at the residents' office, they scanned another QR code, checked the
requested information, and confirmed that they were sharing the data from their eID. During the
evaluation, participants suggested expanding the digital wallet to include other document types.
For the second iteration, we expanded the scenario. The refugee first obtained an eID and subsequently
used it for the residentsoffice registration, as before. Next, a confirmation of domicile was issued as a
second credential and added to their digital wallet. Finally, the refugee leveraged attributes from both
documents to apply for health insurance, which resulted in the issuance of a third document, a health
insurance card. Additionally, we demonstrated the functionality of this updated prototype to an expert.
In the third iteration, we maintained the same SSI-based eID system but adapted the scenario based on
issues identified in the second evaluation. Since it takes a long time to get an S permit, we made it possible
to use the digital wallet before getting an S permit. In this iteration, refugees received their eID upon arrival
at the border. This allowed them to register with the municipality, access social support services, and enroll
in language courses much earlier. We then demonstrated how this prototype works to four experts.
Evaluation
We formulated our evaluation goals based on the results of the problem identification and solution
objectives phase (see the corresponding subsection in Findings). For refugees, the objectives included
empowerment and ease of life; for organizations, they included efficiency and interoperability. After each
demonstration, we conducted semi-structured interviews. During the first and second iterations, interviews
were conducted by the second author; during the third iteration, they were conducted by the first author
and a researcher from the “GaaP for Refugees in Zurichproject.
Refugee interview questions were designed to measure artifact utility and user-friendliness using the
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis 1985; Venkatesh et al. 2002). Empowerment was evaluated
using structural (Spence Laschinger et al. 2001) and psychological (Spreitzer 1995) frameworks. Interview
guides were refined iteratively for clarity, with consistent measures. During the first two evaluations,
sessions lasted 45-75 minutes, were conducted in English, and included a think-aloud component and
interview. In the third evaluation, interviews were conducted after the experiment and took 30 minutes.
Expert interviews followed short prototype demonstrations, with experts assuming dual. As issuers and
verifiers, they were asked about usability and structural empowerment assessments. As experts, they were
asked about SSI technology feasibility, clarification of our design principles, and potential downsides of SSI.
We conducted one expert interview (52 min) during the second iteration and three interviews (20, 30, 37
min) during the third evaluation. Interview guides for both refugees and organizations can be found in
Appendix C.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The analysis of the interviews was conducted in two separate
ways. First, a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) was performed by the second author, employing
both inductive and deductive approaches. Categories of themes were predefined according to the evaluation
goals (ease of life, empowerment, efficiency, interoperability) and the iterative nature of DSR
(“flaws and features to add). Several themes were also predefined according to the structure of the
concepts (e.g., for the category structural empowerment, we predefined the themes opportunities,”
information,” “resources,” …). After familiarization with the data, the second author coded the interviews
using both predefined and open codes. After reviewing the codes, we excluded those used by less than half
of the participants and collated the remaining codes into new themes, which were then further reviewed.
The second round of analysis was conducted by the first author, following a deductive approach. This
analysis aimed to connect existing SSI principles and our solution objectives with the evaluation goals. The
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codes corresponded to pairs: “SSI principle evaluation goal” (54 pairs) and “solution objective
evaluation goal” (36 pairs). Further information about the codes can be found in Figure 8. For both rounds
of analysis, we used MAXQDA 2022 for coding.
Findings
Problem Identification and Solution Objectives
Problem identification relied on data from the project “GaaP for refugees in Zurich,” described in
Methodology. Analysis of the interviews highlighted numerous problems (we call them “primary problems”
since they were observed during the crisis), categorized for all parties. This study will focus solely on
identification-related problems. Refugees’ problems include filling out the same forms multiple times,
visiting different organizations in person, errors in documents, and lost documents, which could lead to
family separation. Organizations’ problems were divided into three categories: technical, organizational,
and cultural. Technical problems include inefficient manual processes, complexities in data exchange,
error-prone data, and high-security standards. Organizational problems include communication gaps
between federal levels. The main cultural problem was the language barrier.
Based on this analysis, we formulated the following evaluation goals: empowerment and ease of life for
refugees, efficiency within organizations, and interoperability between organizations. The refugees’
problems and the technical organizations’ problems led us to our main Solution Objective-00 (SO-00):
“Digitalization through eID.To address the cultural problem of the language barrier, we formulated SO-1:
Multi-language support.
While digitalization has the potential to address these problems faced by both refugees and organizations,
attempting to digitize the registration process may introduce further problems (we refer to these as
secondary problems, as they were not observed in real life but would arise if the solution were
implemented). The Central type of identity imitates the existing process and is not enough to solve refugees’
problems. While a federated type (like Estonia's state-issued eID) might seem promising, the Swiss context
presents obstacles. Because of the subsidiarity principle and high-security standards, it is hard to introduce
a central identity provider. Data exchange among and within different levels of the public sector becomes
inefficient during a crisis. Additionally, security concerns and a lack of public trust (evidenced by the
referendum in 2021 (Bundeskanzlei 2021)) make delegation of identity management to the private sector
or NGOs unfeasible.
Figure 4. Refugee manages their identity
Figure 5. Increase in degrees of identification
through three iterations of DSR
Therefore, as a solution objective to these “secondary” problems (SO-0), we propose using decentralized
infrastructure with provable security that could be achieved by using SSI-based eID. Indeed, SSI offers a
decentralized identity because it shifts data management away from the federal, cantonal, or municipal
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level or NGOs to the refugee's own device (see Figure 4). The security of SSI systems is assured by both the
technology and the governance framework. Furthermore, from the literature, we foresee two additional
problems related to the implementation of SSI. The first, exclusion, is relevant for any eID (Masiero and
Arvidsson 2021) and leads us to SO-2 Optionality of eID.” The second problem derived from the
literature is oversharing (Hünseler and Pöll 2023), which is relevant specifically to SSI and especially
during a crisis. To address this problem, we propose SO-3, Minimum data in requests,which means that
verifiers cannot request more data than necessary.
Solution objective
Primary problems
SO-00: Digitalization
through digital
identity
SO-1*: Multi-
language support
*was not implemented
Secondary problems
SO-0: Distributed
identity
SO-2: Using
RefugeeID is
optional
SO-3: Minimum data
in requests by
verifiers
1st
iteration
SO-4: Different
credentials can be
issued, stored, and
verified.
2nd
iteration
SO-5: Issue some
credentials only in
person
SO-6: Provide ID
with a low level of
assurance as soon as
possible
Table 1. Problems, solution objectives, and design features of the artefact.
Finally, during evaluations, several new problems were identified. After the first evaluation, we understood
that the ID contained too little information about refugees and did not fully address their primary
challenges with visiting offices or resolving document errors. For the second evaluation, we therefore
decided to use different documents in the wallet (SO-4). The second evaluation revealed that such an
approach solves problems that arise only after refugees receive their S status, but valuable parts of
communication happen earlier. Therefore, we decided to provide a first digital ID (with a low level of
assurance) onsite when refugees first speak to public authorities (SO-6). This aligned with another problem
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mentioned during the second evaluation, which was that some documents can only be issued in person (SO-
5).
By reformulating SO-4 and SO-6, we conclude that RefugeeID should provide a gradual increase in the
degree of identification, starting as soon as possible (see Figure 5). In Table 1, we present primary and
secondary problems derived from a literature analysis, interviews, and evaluations. For each identified
problem, we have formulated a corresponding solution objective.
Design and Development
A functional showcase was configured within Procivis SSI+ identity management solution, which is based
on the decentralized “IDunion” network, which makes the solution a full-fledged implementation adhering
to SSI principles. This solution was selected for its user-friendly smartphone app (“SSI+ Wallet”) and
configurable web application (“SSI+ Desk”). By reusing an existing setup from the blockchain project UZH
Wallet Pilot” (UZH 2023), the configuration process was simplified. This involved customizing VC visuals,
attributes, and proof requests. Thus, RefugeeID supports issuing real VCs that are verifiable through a
blockchain and has real proof requests to receive data from documents.
Figure 6. SSI+ Desk
Figure 7. SSI+ Wallet
Issuance process: Refugee’s data is entered into the SSI+ Desk (Figure 6), generating a QR code. Scanning
this code with the smartphone wallet app establishes a secure connection and transmits the document to
the device. VCs that do not require immediate oversight can be issued asynchronously.
Verification process: To utilize their digital documents, refugees scan a QR code provided by an
organization. The refugee is then shown which organization is requesting their data, whether the
organization is officially verified (indicated visually), and the specific attributes requested. Requests can
target whole documents, specific attributes, or a combination across multiple documents. If needed,
refugees can self-attest missing attributes directly within the smartphone app and then share the data with
the organization (Figure 7).
It is important to note that the setup from the UZH Wallet Pilot Project did not support the Ukrainian
language, so the SO-1 “multi-language support” was not achieved in our case. However, the participants
were able to use the application without any difficulty, as they were specifically selected as English speakers
to conduct the evaluation.
As mentioned in the background section, the system's security is assured by both the technology and the
governance framework. The technological aspect of security was addressed in the initial design stages when
we chose Self-Sovereign Identity as the appropriate type of identity platform (SO-00 eIDand SO-0 SSI).
The governance framework partially addressed security issues through SO-3 Minimum data requestsand
was adjusted based on new information that emerged during the evaluation (SO-5 Issuance only onsite).
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Demonstration and evaluation
Implications of Use of the Prototype
In this subsection, we describe the results of the evaluation from the refugees’ and organizations’ points of
view. We start with the results of the thematic analysis. The code tree can be found in Appendix D.
Refugee point of view: Nearly all participants (aside from one) indicated a willingness to use RefugeeID
due to reduced wait times (“It took much less time to share my data than to write these forms and then to
stand in a queue.” R3.6) and increased convenience in document access and storage (“I don’t want to lose
this Ausweis,” because I know that this is very very hard to get. (…) If I have all this in my phone, I think
it’ll be much more secure” R2.2). Regarding structural empowerment, refugees benefitted from the
potential to complete processes online, saving time and potentially facilitating faster access to work or
education due to streamlined identification processes. Information access also contributed to feelings of
empowerment. While increased autonomy and the time saved may have contributed to some psychological
empowerment, security and privacy concerns were a mitigating factor. Furthermore, refugees often felt
they lacked control over their data during registration as sharing information was mandatory ("If the city
of Zurich requires that [data], what option do we have?”R1.3).
Organization point of view. Experts indicated that RefugeeID could enhance organizational efficiency
through digitalization, standardized communication, and improved data quality (“I think that with this, the
data quality could really be improved.” E1). However, they expressed doubts about the solution's
potential impact on direct interoperability, as such processes would likely still require the refugee's
involvement (Between authorities, I somehow can’t imagine it yet. E3). Feasibility: Experts
emphasized the necessity for robust security measures and governance mechanisms within the system.
Figure 8. Impact of SSI Principles (left) and Solution Objectives (right) on efficiency/interoperability of
organizations, technology acceptance/ empowerment of refugees, and feasibility.
The results of the deductive analysis are presented in Figure 8, and the coding scheme can be found in
Appendix E. They highlight distinct priorities for refugees and organizations. Refugees emphasize the
importance of usability, flexibility, and privacy, while experts prioritize authenticity, reliability, security,
verifiability, and usability as complementors and security, reliability, privacy, authenticity, and
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verifiability for the feasibility of eID. Control does not impact refugees’ empowerment and interferes with
org-to-org data exchange. All stakeholders see clear value in multi-language support. For refugees, the
ability to obtain their digital wallet quickly and expand it with as many documents as possible is crucial.
Meanwhile, experts emphasize the importance of other solution objectives to ensure the system's overall
feasibility.
Flaws and Requested Features
Feedback from organizations highlighted known limitations of SSI-based systems: unchangeable attributes
(outdated data), lack of backups, potential exclusion of non-tech-savvy refugees, privacy concerns, and
limitations due to immature technology and legislation. These reflect inherent trade-offs with privacy
requirements (e.g., persistence and unchangeable attributes) or potential improvements expected over time
(with the development of the EUDI wallet and Swiss eID). To mitigate exclusion, it is important to consider
providing optional use of traditional identity channels.
Suggestions for further development primarily focused on enhancing interactions between organizations
and users. Refugees proposed features including tutorials, FAQs, and chatbots to provide support.
Additionally, they suggested implementing in-app communication to replace physical mails from
organizations and receiving notifications about document expiration dates. Organizations similarly
expressed interest in utilizing the RefugeeID for improved refugee communication, information sharing
(such as registration processes), and potential connection to a centralized database. Finally, there were
requests for the eID to be valid in other countries.
Discussion
When to Use SSI for Refugees
Our study revealed several potential drawbacks of using RefugeeID, including a lack of backups, outdated
data, and technological immaturity. While these disadvantages could impede the adoption of SSI-based eID
in normal circumstances, some of these challenges were already present during the crisis. Organizations
lacked real-time information, and refugees often could not provide backups of existing paper documents.
Therefore, SSI-related downsides did not significantly worsen the situation. This suggests that SSI adoption
is viable when the disadvantages of the current situation outweigh the potential disadvantages of a new SSI-
based system that aligns with the previous works on SSI adoption (Laatikainen et al. 2021).
In our case, both refugees and organizations were receptive to the SSI-based eID solution. Several factors
contributed to this: (1) Federalism and stringent privacy standards exacerbated the challenges of the crisis
as-issituation. (2) The IT literacy and technological trust exhibited by Ukrainian refugees made them
amenable to an SSI solution.
Our findings suggest that SSI solutions can be effective in highly decentralized systems, including not only
federal states but also those with diverse stakeholder groups. Furthermore, SSI can address the privacy
paradoxwhere overly stringent privacy standards lead to the adoption of insecure solutions. In such cases,
SSI can offer a viable and secure alternative. These recommendations align with results from blockchain-
based refugee management in Germany (Amend et al. 2021; Roth, Rieger, et al. 2023).
We suggested utilizing SSI as a stand-alone application, as we did not attempt to integrate it further with
the governmental platform. Although SSI has a significant impact, it may not fully resolve the challenges
associated with data exchange between all involved organizations.
How to Design SSI for Refugees
Leveraging GaaP concepts, we transform our solution objectives into general design principles (DPs), see
Table 2. In terms of GaaP, the research team played the role of the owner, issuers and verifiers (from both
the public and private sectors) were complementors, and refugees were the users.
The first principle originates from SO-2 and pertains not to the platform's design but to the conditions of
its use. According to DP0: Optionality of eID,” it is important to provide both digital and traditional
identity options to minimize refugee exclusion. Although setting up parallel systems could be a burden, the
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necessity for this principle arises from the findings of Masiero and Arvidsson (2021), who demonstrated
that the consequences of excluding vulnerable individuals could be severe, potentially leading to hunger
deaths or impacting existing policies.
The next two principles, derived from objectives SO-4 and SO-6, promote openness within the ecosystem.
DP1: Involve users as soon as possible emphasizes openness for refugees, while DP2: Invite
organizations as many as safe aligns with openness for complementors (issuers and verifiers). Our
findings on refugee empowerment underscore the necessity of these principles. This aligns with works
describing the potential of open identity platforms for refugees (Madon and Schoemaker 2021).
To facilitate interaction between diverse users and complementors, we propose DP3: Mimic Pre-Crisis
Life,” which generalizes objectives SO-1 and SO-5. This principle emphasizes the use of flexible and familiar
tools to accommodate a variety of complementors and mitigate the impact of the crisis. For refugees, this
means native language support and context-specific tutorials. For organizations, it means options for
online/onsite issuance, flexible data structures, and seamless integration with existing systems. This
principle emphasizes the importance of familiarity during the crisis and aligns with the principle “Prioritize
digital tools that are easy and familiar over tools that are newfor digital inclusivity (Yokoi et al. 2021).
Name
Aim
Mechanism
Rationale
DP0: Optionality of eID
Provide both digital and
traditional identity options
The usage of eID is
optional
Avoid exclusion
(Masiero and
Arvidsson 2021)
Ecosystem
Comple-
mentors
DP1: Invite
organizations as
many as safe
Provide access to different
trusted complementors to
provide secure services for
refugees.
Include as many
organizations as safe
Openness
(Madon and
Schoemaker
2021)
Users
DP2: Involve
users as soon as
possible
Provide the solution for
users as soon as possible to
ease their lives.
Install the app and
provide 1st ID on a
border
Boundary resources
Tech
DP3: Mimic pre-
crisis life
Provide flexible and familiar
tools for inclusion and crisis
impact reduction
Provide multi-language
support, onsite/online
issuance
Familiarity for
inclusivity
(Yokoi et al.
2021)
Org
DP4: Control
data
minimization in
requests
Control which data could be
requested, how and by
whom to protect users
Complementors prove
the necessity of
requested data
Rules for safety
(Schreieck et al.
2017)
Core
Org
DP5:
Centralization
Provide services and control
uniformly and rapidly
Centralize ownership,
not necessarily on the
federal level
Centrality
(Kuhn et al.
2023)
Tech
DP6:
Interoperability
Provide mature and
compatible technology
Comply with Swiss and
EU standards
Interoperability
(Allen 2016)
Table 2. Design Principles SSI-based eID for Refugees
However, ensuring the security of our open platform necessitates addressing the issue of oversharing.
Evaluation indicates that data privacy is not a major concern for users, and complementors are not
incentivized to request minimal data. To address this challenge, we reformulate SO-3 to DP4: Control Data
Minimization in Requests. This principle empowers the platform owner to control the amount of data
included in requests. It reinforces the SSI principle of minimization (Allen 2016), protecting refugees
from data misuse. Furthermore, DP4 acts as a counterbalance to DP3, preventing the return of unwanted
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pre-crisis data practices. Finally, this principle aligns with the need for increased control within more open
platforms (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Madon and Schoemaker 2021; Schreieck et al. 2017).
Therefore, we propose DP5: Organizational Centralization of the Core.” While the platform itself operates
on a decentralized technical architecture, a centralized governance structure will help to ensure strong and
rapid control over data requests. This centralization does not necessitate a federal-level authority as the
owner. However, the owner must possess the legal authority to regulate data requests from all participating
verifiers. In essence, DP5 reflects an optimal level of centralization within the core, balancing the benefits
of a decentralized technical system with the need for a centralized owner during a crisis.
Finally, DP6: Technical Interoperability emphasizes the importance of compatibility with other systems,
promoting interoperability between states and addressing challenges posed by immature technology.
These seven DPs on “how to use SSI for refugees” complement nine principles on “how to design SSI”
(Sedlmeir et al. 2022). We can now examine the interconnections and potential tensions between these two
sets of design principles. DP0 (Optionality), DP1 (Users Involvement), and DP2 (Complementors
involvement) focus on inclusivity and operate independently of SSI principles. DP3 (Mimic Pre-Crisis Life)
specifies how Usabilityshould be adapted during a crisis. DP4 (Control Data Minimization) exhibits
tension with the Controlprinciple, as it reduces userscontrol over data sharing. However, it enhances
Privacyand Reliability since now holders know which verifiers they can trust. DP5 (Organizational
Centralization) serves primarily to support DP4 (Control Data Minimization) and eases crisis
management. Finally, DP6 (Technical Interoperability) emphasizes the need to prioritize
Interoperabilityover Flexibilityduring a crisis.
Theoretical Implications
The primary theoretical contribution of this study is the development of design principles for SSI-based
eIDs for refugees. These design principles complement the existing nine SSI principles (Sedlmeir et al.
2022), prioritizing and strengthening some of them to better address the challenges of crisis.
Secondly, this research contributes to the field of Self-Sovereign Identity by exploring the impact of SSI
principles on participants, thereby bridging the gap between theory and practice. We analyzed the impact
of nine SSI principles from three perspectives: refugees (usability and empowerment), organizations
(efficiency and interoperability), and overall feasibility. These results align with the works of Cheesman
(2020) and Cheesman and Slavin (2021) while refining our understanding of how Allen's ten SSI principles
impact different types of wallet holders (Hünseler and Pöll 2023).
Thirdly, this study describes principles for refugees’ empowerment in terms of SSI, eID, and GaaP. From
experimental data, we derived two design principles, DP1 and DP2, crucial for refugees’ empowerment and
formulated them through three interrelated lenses: (SSI) To empower refugees, we need to start using their
digital wallets as early as possible and add as many documents as safely possible. (eID) Empowerment
requires a gradual increase in the degree of identification. (GaaP) Empowerment through an open identity
platform. Additionally, our evaluation data revealed the importance of owner control extending beyond
issuers and including verifiers as well. Thus, we empirically confirmed the empowering potential of open
identity platforms for refugees, emphasizing the need for increased owner control within such systems,
which aligns with Madon and Schoemaker (2021). Additionally, we outlined a mechanism for
empowerment within SSI-based identity platforms: open identity platforms empower refugees through
gradual identification, enabled by comprehensive, early-access digital wallets. That contributes to the
research avenues Governance of decentralized digital identity system and Design choices for
decentralized digital identity systems” suggested by Sedlmeir et al. (2021)
Fourthly, our findings contribute to the understanding of resilience in identity management across three
levels: SSI, eID, and GaaP. In terms of SSI resilience, we emphasize the importance of allowing control over
verifiers’ requests. For eID resilience, the identity system should enable gradual identification starting as
soon as possible. GaaP resilience requires the possibility of strong governance to achieve empowerment
through openness. Finally, we validated the suitability of the SSI approach for highly decentralized states,
particularly during crises. While decentralized technology addresses federalism by placing refugees at the
center and offers enhanced security, centralized ownership facilitates efficient governance and fast
decision-making during a crisis. That aligns with the results from the German refugee management system
(Roth, Rieger, et al. 2023).
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Practical Implications
Based on theoretical impact, our study has implications for stakeholders. These implications become even
more important as laws and technology for digital identities evolve (with the development of the EUDI
wallet and Swiss state eID).
Based on the three practitioners’ perspectives described in the Background (open-source communities,
organizations, and individuals), we identify three roles of practitioners involved in SSI adaptation:
members of SSI communities, decision makers, and implementors (which we divided into SSI, eID, and
GaaP developers). For the SSI Community, we present a use case of SSI-based eID that was developed
through continuous user feedback, employing fully functional SSI technology. For Government Authorities
and Decision Makers, we offer recommendations on when to use SSI-based eIDs, how to develop them
specifically for refugees, and strategies to enhance the resilience of SSI-based eIDs in general. For SSI
Implementors, we offer seven design principles for building SSI-based eIDs for refugees. Integrating these
principles into digital wallet development can enhance their resilience during future crises. For eID
Implementors, we emphasize the importance of a gradual increase in the degree of identification for
refugees' digital identities. This holds implications for creating resilient digital identity systems overall. For
GaaP Implementors, we reinforce the role of eID as a foundational step in GaaP implementation. Our study
demonstrates how eIDs can be designed specifically for crisis situations and how to increase overall
resilience.
Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work
In this study, we applied the Design Science Research (DSR) approach to design a digital identity system
“RefugeeID” for Ukrainian refugees in Switzerland. Based on our findings, we formulated design principles
of SSI-based eID for refugees and described their impact on refugees’ empowerment, organizations’
efficiency, and the system’s feasibility.
While our solution was well-received by the participants, several limitations of this study highlight potential
avenues for future research. Firstly, our refugee sample consisted of tech-savvy, English-speaking
individuals recruited via Telegram. To reduce this bias, future research should encompass elderly or
disabled populations along with refugees from diverse origins. Secondly, our collaboration was limited to a
single canton and focused on complementor and user perspectives. Engaging additional cantons and
exploring the owner perspective would enhance understanding and identify potential challenges faced by
platform owners. Thirdly, we implemented SSI exclusively; comparative studies involving alternative types
of identities could assess the relative importance of leveled identification and open platforms for achieving
empowerment. Lastly, while our research focused mainly on the technological aspects of digital identity,
future studies should investigate adjacent fields like institutional changes, legislation, political interests,
and other relevant areas. This would facilitate a more comprehensive interdisciplinary perspective.
Acknowledgements
This research was conducted with the support of the Digitization Initiative of the Zurich Universities (DIZH)
and the Digital Society Initiative of the University of Zurich. We thank all the interviewees for their time
and readiness to help. Thanks go to Ergon Informatik AG for their contribution to the research.
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