Terrorist attacks, major incidents and critical infrastructure. Observations from Berlin

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Terrorism–Studies,Analyses,Prevention,2024,no.6:541–551
CCBY-NC-SA4.0
https://doi.org/10.4467/27204383TER.24.036.20256
Varia
Terrorist attacks, major incidents
and critical infrastructure.
Observations from Berlin
Dramatic security incidents, such as terrorist attacks, generate
widespread public interest. ey arouse strong emotions, on the wave
of which there are appeals to the authorities to counter threats more
eectively, passionate demands for changes and declarations of their
introduction. is usually lasts for a few months and then the topic
goes quiet. In the interview, Paul Fröhlich from the Operations
Division of the Berlin Police, an expert in the EU Protective
Security Advisors programme, refers to a gurative term for this
phenomenon- disaster dementia. He suggests ways to counter it,
mentioning, among other things, the lessons learned and lessons
identied by the Berlin police after the terrorist attack on the Berlin
Christmas market. He emphasises the importance of being prepared
for crises not only at national but also at individual level and the role
of institutional and non-institutional cooperation.

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Damian Szlachter: In June 2024, various German politicians
told the media and the public that there were no indications
ofconcrete terror plans, but that there was a high “abstract threat
situation”. Who determines the terrorist threat level in Germany?
Are decisions made at central or regional level?
Paul Fröhlich: e Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany
establishes that the majority of police competences reside with
the 16 federal states. Additionally, there are federal police forces with
special jurisdictions. For example, the Federal Criminal Investigation
Department (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) carries out various
central tasks, including assessments of the threat situation related to
terrorism. e respective states may adapt the assessments formulated
at federal level, but in most cases the evaluations of the BKA are
followed. e system has generally proven eective, particularly
because the situation can vary signicantly from state to state. Unlike
some other EU member states, Germany does not use numerical
terrorism threat levels, but rather employs descriptive terms. It is
up to the individual states to respond to these threats. e actions
of the relevant authorities naturally correspond with the evolving
situation, whether it is becoming more or less tense. e federal
police may support these activities.
What does building social and business resilience to terrorist
attacks look like, what is the role of the German Police in this
matter?
I would like to respond with a memorable example. In the summer
of 2016, the German Federal Minister of the Interior held a press
conference where he presented a guide for emergency preparedness
and correct action in emergency situations. e focus was
primarily on personal preparedness and stockpiling, which makes
sense for various situations or crises. Contrary to all professional
expectations, this press event received a lot of criticism, and it was
accused of exaggerated scaremongering. It was absurd because this
guide had existed for many years and only an update was being
presented. A few years later, it would have certainly been benecial
in Germany if parts of the population (and parts of the media)
had reacted more appropriately, thus reducing panic buying at
the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Whether in the context

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Terrorism – Studies, Analyses, Prevention
of such crises or terrorist attacks, this shows how important it is to
communicate appropriate recommendations to the public in a timely,
understandable, calm, but also honest manner. In this context, I nd
the step taken in Sweden in 2018 quite impressive. At that time, all
households were made aware with the brochure “IFCRISIS OR WAR
COMES”. Also, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
now oers an interesting online course on terrorism preparedness in
public spaces.
But back to Germany, my personal opinion is that the events
of the recent years have led to only a slightly improved understanding
among the public that not only state preparedness but also personal
preparation for emergencies and crises is necessary. However, this
is undoubtedly insucient. In addition, something that Albrecht
Broemme, the renowned former Fire Chief of Berlin, likes to call
“disaster dementia” occurs. Broad interest, outrage, and the drive
to make a positive change typically last only a few months after
a severe incident and then fade in public (and political) awareness.
What can the police do in this regard? Generally, the police can
oer recommendations, advice and guidelines for the public in
this context. Of course, they also play an important role in crisis
communication, along with other actors.
And increasing the resilience of economic entities?
As for the economy and its resilience, one might need to dierentiate
a bit. While it is possible for (large) corporations to implement more
extensive measures, such as having a Chief Security Ocer with
appropriate sta, considering aspects of cybersecurity, and preparing
for Business Continuity Management, this is often not possible, or
at least not to a comparable extent, for medium-sized or smaller
companies.
Following the European CER Directive (Critical Entities
Resilience Directive – editor’s note), a corresponding law for critical
infrastructures is planned and already drafted in Germany. When it
comes into eect, it will particularly regulate their physical protection
and introduce mandatory minimum standards nationwide. Another
central element is to be the reporting system for signicant
disruptions, which will also serve to quickly respond to potential

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or actual threats. rough these and further coordinated eorts,
a robust defence against dierent types of risks - whether natural or
man-made- is to be ensured.
Photo: Paul Fröhlich from the Operations Division of the Berlin Police (le) and
Damian Szlachter from Counter-Terrorism Centre of the Internal Security Agen-
cy are experts in EU Protective Security Advisors programme.
Source: own materials.
What types of facilities can count on support in the eld
ofterrorist prevention from law enforcement agencies and special
services?
Depending on the specic occasion, there can be direct contact and
exchange between the requesting facilities and the police or other
authorities or services. is includes the provision of information,
assessing threats, recommendations for behaviour, and possibly
consultations on protection, especially physical protection.
Ifnecessary, temporary protective measures by the police can also
be implemented. Generally, there are facilities with which special
information exchange as well as advice and further measures take
place. Notably, these include diplomatic facilities (embassies,
consulates and the like), some places of worship, government
buildings, public transport as well as critical infrastructures. With

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the UEFA EURO 2024 taking place in Germany, stadiums and
some other accommodations are also involved. Additionally, there
is also an exchange with some organisations, associations, and other
forums through which relevant ocial information and assessments
are distributed to various stakeholders.
What is the biggest challenge for the Berlin Police in countering
terrorist threats?
e overall challenge is likely to be obtaining relevant and reliable
information about such threats in a timely manner, in order to then
take the appropriate measures. is is such a general answer that
it probably applies not only to Berlin. Berlin is a capital city and
the largest city in the European Union (although only since Brexit).
is naturally poses a special challenge for the Berlin Police – and also
for the Federal Police deployed in Berlin. However, there are certain
structures here that help: a really high police density, the largest
professional re brigade in Germany, 37 hospitals for emergency
hospitalisation, selected units with CBRN/HazMat capabilities, and
much more.
From my perspective, there is a challenge – and again this is
likely not unique to Berlin – that sometimes does not receive enough
attention. In addition to special units and special investigative units,
it is extremely important that the rst responders are well-prepared
for such operations. is of course includes training and protective
equipment, but it also involves designing coherent concepts to
enhance operational action. Moreover, there should ideally be no
discontinuities between the actions of rst responders, riot police,
and special units. In this context, the important work of paramedics
must also be recognised and made feasible. A lot of work has been
done on these points in Berlin in recent years and this is still ongoing.
Was the impetus for the intensication of work provided by the
2016 terrorist attack in Berlin? What preventive measures were
implemented after this tragic event?
e evening of 19 December 2016 caused a shock. A terrorist attack
on a Berlin Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz killed 13 people
and injured many. In December 2020, the European Commission

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presented an Agenda for Counter-Terrorism consisting of four
pillars - Anticipate, Prevent, Protect and Respond. In the same
month, the federal state of Berlin introduced an anti-terrorism plan
named “SAVE”, which includes preventive and reactive measures.
It also has four main pillars - Protection, Clearing up, Prevention
and Containment. Protection is understood as the implementation
of security measures, especially for the protection of public spaces
and critical infrastructure. is also includes security research
and additional technical equipment for police ocers and
investigators. Clearing up means early identication and clarication
of Islamist networks and activities. is encompasses improving
the early warning system as well as intensifying and networking law
enforcement. Prevention refers to eorts to counteract radicalisation
through educational, integration, and deradicalisation initiatives.
Containment, on the other hand, is understood as minimising
the impact of potential terrorist attacks. It includes preparation
for handling terrorist attacks, the swift and eective response
of operational units, and psychosocial emergency care for victims and
aected parties.
Was there also an organisational dimension to the solutions
introduced?
Training and exercises have been intensied in the Berlin Police,
including joint activities with the re department and emergency
medical service. Some units have been better equipped materially
and personnel-wise. Operations Division has established new
permanent command groups that can lead operations due to
exceptional situations. A new command and control structure for
certain major incidents has been developed, which can be used by
incident commanders like a template and has proven particularly
eective in both drills and real situations in Berlin. is has been
a real game-changer. It is popular among operational forces too,
maybe because the centrepiece is presented very concisely as
a one-pager. Additionally, several other concepts were developed and
existing training and operational concepts for countering oenders
were revised.

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Which initiatives of your institution are worthy of being
implemented at the EU level as universal, exemplary?
Although there are certainly some successful good or better practice
approaches at the Berlin Police, I would like to start by ipping
the perspective. In my view, it is fantastic what the Berlin Police has
already learned from other EU member states and I would like to
mention at least one example. e so-called Quick Identication
Teams (QIT) are used in the Netherlands during attacks to very
quickly collect crucial evidence at the scene and apply new methods.
Colleagues from the Netherlands have greatly supported and
trained the Berlin Police, enabling the Berlin Criminal Investigation
Department to implement this as well. Something from the Berlin
Police that could be somewhat exemplary are our revised designed
structure for command and control and essential measures, which
have proven very eective in the early phase of a major incident.
In both exercises and real situations, it has proven to be useful,
eective, and exible enough. However, these are procedures that
take into account signicant specics of Berlin and therefore cannot
be fully transferred to all major cities in Germany, nor to large parts
of the EU member states. Additionally, I would like to point out that
the Berlin Police was signicantly involved in a previous EU project.
As part of the SafeCi (Safer Space for Safer Cities) project, a manual
with six key topics and several good practices was created and made
available.
You have been active in national security structures as well as
those at EU level for many years. So in conclusion, I would like
to ask you what do you think has a real impact on increasing the
resilience of facilities to terrorist attacks?
Well, that also depends on the specic facility. reats or attacks can
occur across dierent dimensions or layers: on land, in the air, in
water, or via cyber. So, it really matters what the specic facility is,
as a port requires some dierent solutions or measures compared to
a ministry or a gas storage facility.
To answer the question, I can list some points that may sound
a bit “old-fashioned“, but these classics have proven themselves for
decades and will surely remain “in fashion“ for the next years. One
of them is unauthorised access that should be made impossible

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or at least very dicult. Another is using suitable means for early
detection of intruders or disturbances. e next point concerns
relevant information. ey should be quickly gathered, veried
and shared with relevant parties. Finally, the countermeasures to be
taken. ey can be technical in nature, which in many cases will
require the presence of (security) personnel. In my experience, this is
sometimes underestimated. And one has to ask oneself what good is
knowing about a situation to the second if there are simply no (or too
few) designated forces to deploy and to handle it?
I would like to emphasise two additional things that I notice
in my work. Firstly, it is very valuable that there are mechanisms
for concrete mutual support – both nationally and within the EU.
is includes the exchange of threat pictures and other relevant
information and the possibility to request special equipment, special
units, or other units as needed. Secondly, I am very pleased that
expertise, methods, and tools are being shared and jointly improved.
ere are several EU reports, guidelines, and other products that
can be directly applied or adapted to specic needs. One example is
the “EU quick guide to support the protection of places of worship.”
Additionally, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European
Commission is expanding the promising “Software as a Service”
approach and making tools available online. eir development was
and is made possible with taxpayers’ money, and if interested, these
tools can then be provided to member states at no additional cost.
I am only aware of the above points because they were shared
with me during training and workshops as part of the EU PSA
(Protective Security Advisor) programme. ese events also facilitate
direct and trusted exchange and sharing of specic experiences from
various experts from EU member states.
By the way, I learned about “TERRORISM – studies,
analyses, prevention” at such events, and I am pleased to now have
the opportunity to contribute to it.
So, nally, dziękuję (Paul says thank you in Polish - editor’s note).
I wish us all success in preventing as well as countering terrorism and
other challenges, and in 2024 of course, I also wish for successful
and peaceful major sports events in Germany, France, and all other
countries.
Interviewed by: Damian Szlachter

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Paul Fröhlich
He is a Protective Security Advisor (EU PSA) and part
of a corresponding pool of experts founded by the European
Commission (DG HOME). Since 2019, he has held a teaching
position at the Berlin School of Economics and Law.
He has 28 years of service with the Berlin Police (currently
in Operations Division), with responsibilities in relation to major
incident proceeding. is includes conceptualisation, command and
control, enabling exercises, projects and working groups, primarily
focusing on attacks, mass casualty incidents and related major
incidents.
TheopinionsexpressedbyPaulFröhlich arepurelypersonalanddonotrepresent
theocialpositionofauthoritiesmentionedabove.
Useful links
Counter terrorism and radicalisation | 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda
for the EU (English)
https://home-aairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-ter-
rorism-and-radicalisation_en
Berlin Anti-Terror-Plan „SAVE“ – Berlin Plan to counter Islamist Radi-
calisation and Terrorism 2020 (German) | Berlin Senate Department
for the Interior and Sport
https://www.berlin.de/sen/inneres/presse/weitere-informationen/ar-
tikel.1032697.php
Press conference „Berlin Anti-Terror Plan“ from December 18, 2020
(German) | Berlin Senate Department for the Interior and Sport
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zp002466ugM

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Guide for Emergency Prepardness and Correct Action in Emergency
Situations (English) | Federal Oce of Civil Protection and Disaster
Assistance (BBK)
https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Mediathek/
Publikationen/Buergerinformationen/Ratgeber/ratgeber-englisch-disas-
ters-alarm.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=12
e brochure If Crisis or War Comes (English) | Swedish Civil Contin-
gencies Agency (MSB)
https://www.msb.se/en/rad-till-privatpersoner/the-brochure-if-crisis-or-
war-comes/
Online Course on Terrorism Preparedness in Public Spaces (Swedish) |
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
https://webbutbildning.msb.se/utb/terrorberedskap-internt/
QIT – Quick Identication Team (Dutch) | Dutch Defence Press
https://www.dutchdefencepress.com/qit/
SafeCi – Safer Space for Safer Cities – Trailer, Information & Handbook
(English) | Polizei Berlin
https://www.berlin.de/polizei/aufgaben/praevention/safeci/ar-
tikel.786181.en.php
Data and Tools to Counter Terrorism & Newsletter (English) | European
Commission – Joint Research Center (JRC)
https://counterterrorism.ec.europa.eu/

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EU quick guide to support the protection of places of worship (available
in 23 languages) | European Commission
https://home-aairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/eu-quick-
guide-support-protection-places-worship_en
EU Protective Security Advisors (English) | European Commission
https://home-aairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/count-
er-terrorism-and-radicalisation/protection/eu-protective-security-advi-
sors-eu-psa_en