Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger or Happiness: On the Importance of Morality, Sociability, and Competence

Abstract

Research has shown that negotiators sometimes misrepresent their emotions, and communicate a different emotion to opponents than they actually experience. Less is known about how people evaluate such negotiation tactics. Building on person perception literature, we investigated in three preregistered studies (N = 853) how participants evaluate negotiators who deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicate anger or happiness, on the dimensions of morality, sociability, and competence. Study 1 employed a buyer/seller setting, Studies 2 and 3 employed an Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG). In all studies, participants learned a negotiator’s (the target’s) experienced and communicated emotions (anger or happiness), before evaluating the target. Across studies, targets were evaluated lower on morality if they deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicated anger or happiness. Notably, negotiators deceptively communicating anger were evaluated lower on morality and sociability but higher on competence than those deceptively communicating happiness. Studies 2 and 3 investigated behavioral consequences by examining whether in a future negotiation participants chose the target to be their opponent or representative. Results showed that for opponents, participants preferred targets who genuinely communicated happiness (vs. anger), which was associated with their perceived morality or sociability. For representatives, participants not only preferred targets who had genuinely communicated happiness (vs. anger), but also targets who had deceptively communicated anger (vs. happiness), which was associated with their perceived competence. These findings show that when evaluating deceptive (vs. genuine) communication strategies, people distinguish between morality, sociability, and competence. The importance they attach to these dimensions is also contingent on the behavioral decisions they face.

Full text

Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal of Business Ethics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05824-7
ORIGINAL PAPER
Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger
orHappiness: On theImportance ofMorality, Sociability,
andCompetence
ZiYe1 · Gert‑JanLelieveld1 · EricvanDijk1
Received: 17 March 2024 / Accepted: 18 September 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Abstract
Research has shown that negotiators sometimes misrepresent their emotions, and communicate a different emotion to oppo‑
nents than they actually experience. Less is known about how people evaluate such negotiation tactics. Building on person
perception literature, we investigated in three preregistered studies (N = 853) how participants evaluate negotiators who
deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicate anger or happiness, on the dimensions of morality, sociability, and competence.
Study 1 employed a buyer/seller setting, Studies 2 and 3 employed an Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG). In all studies,
participants learned a negotiator’s (the target’s) experienced and communicated emotions (anger or happiness), before evalu‑
ating the target. Across studies, targets were evaluated lower on morality if they deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicated
anger or happiness. Notably, negotiators deceptively communicating anger were evaluated lower on morality and sociability
but higher on competence than those deceptively communicating happiness. Studies 2 and 3 investigated behavioral conse‑
quences by examining whether in a future negotiation participants chose the target to be their opponent or representative.
Results showed that for opponents, participants preferred targets who genuinely communicated happiness (vs. anger), which
was associated with their perceived morality or sociability. For representatives, participants not only preferred targets who had
genuinely communicated happiness (vs. anger), but also targets who had deceptively communicated anger (vs. happiness),
which was associated with their perceived competence. These findings show that when evaluating deceptive (vs. genuine)
communication strategies, people distinguish between morality, sociability, and competence. The importance they attach to
these dimensions is also contingent on the behavioral decisions they face.
Keywords Emotion deception· Social evaluation· Negotiation· Opponent· Representative
Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively
Communicate Anger orHappiness:
ontheImportance ofMorality, Sociability,
andCompetence
Negotiating is often a heated and emotional process. Dur‑
ing this process, emotions may affect behaviors of nego‑
tiators experiencing the emotions (i.e., the intrapersonal
effect of emotions), but when emotions are communicated
they may also affect behaviors of counterparts in the nego‑
tiation (i.e., the interpersonal effects of emotions). Hap‑
piness and anger are among the most commonly experi‑
enced and communicated emotions in negotiations, which
may explain why negotiation researchers focused mostly
on the social functions of these two emotions (e.g., Van
Kleef etal., 2004a, 2004b). For example, literature docu‑
mented that negotiators experience happiness when they
* Zi Ye
z.ye@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Gert‑Jan Lelieveld
lelieveldgj@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Eric van Dijk
dijk@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
1 Institute ofPsychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box9555,
Leiden2300RB, TheNetherlands
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Z.Ye et al.
feel they are getting towards an agreement, and they expe‑
rience anger when their goal is thwarted by someone else
(for a review see Van Kleef & Côté, 2022). Negotiators
express happiness and anger by multiple channels, mainly
involving verbal communications (Van Kleef etal., 2004a,
2004b) and facial expressions (De Melo etal., 2011; Sina‑
ceur & Tiedens, 2006). Negotiators who express happiness
are perceived as lenient negotiators who are expected to
give in, while negotiators who express anger are perceived
as tough negotiators with high limits (Van Kleef etal.,
2004a, 2004b). The expression of happiness often elicits
high demands or low concessions (Van Kleef etal., 2004a,
2004b). The expression of anger in general induces gener‑
ous offers (Ye etal., 2023), but may also backfire when it
elicits anger in the opponent (Van Dijk etal., 2008; Van
Kleef etal., 2008).
Negotiators may realize that the emotions they commu‑
nicate may influence behavior of others. With this in mind,
they may have an incentive to communicate a different emo‑
tion than what they experience if this may yield them higher
outcomes (Barry, 1999; Thompson etal., 1999). Andrade
and Ho (2009) revealed that negotiators deliberately exag‑
gerate anger to induce opponents to make higher offers
(see also Van Dijk etal., 2018). This strategy connects to
insights indicating that negotiators generally give in to angry
opponents (Van Kleef etal., 2004a, 2004b). Because of the
mixed‑motive nature of negotiations, negotiators also have
an incentive to reach an agreement (Van Kleef etal., 2004a,
2004b). Negotiators could hence deceive opponents by com‑
municating happiness while actually being unhappy or even
angry about offers they received when they feel that express‑
ing anger may backfire (Van Dijk etal., 2008; Van Kleef &
Côté, 2007) or result in an impasse (Yip & Schweinsberg,
2017), while expressing happiness might get their opponent
to like them (Pietroni etal., 2009) or lead to more coopera‑
tive behaviors from the opponent such as reaching an agree‑
ment (Carnevale, 2008).
These insights suggest that negotiators may strategically
choose which emotion they display, and communicate a dif‑
ferent emotion from what they actually experienced. In fact,
emotion deception is sometimes even advised as negotiation
strategy (Brooks, 2015). A relevant question, however, is
how such strategies are evaluated. Do people evaluate decep‑
tive emotion communications less positively and maybe as
less moral than genuine communications? Or maybe as a
sign of competence? Does it matter which emotion people
deceptively communicate? It is only recently that researchers
have started addressing these questions. Connecting to this
emerging line of research, we investigate how people evalu‑
ate negotiators who communicate anger while actually being
happy, which we refer to as deceptive anger, and negotia‑
tors who communicate happiness while actually being angry,
which we refer to as deceptive happiness.
As a starting point, we connect to the “Emotion as Social
Information” (EASI) model that emphasizes that evaluations
of emotional expressions are affected by their perceived
authenticity. Van Kleef and Côté (2018, 2022) reasoned
that deceptive emotion communications, where the com‑
municated emotion does not align with internal feelings,
are viewed negatively and considered inappropriate (Van
Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef etal., 2012). This would imply that
negotiators evaluate opponents more negatively if they think
these opponents deceptively communicated anger or hap‑
piness than if they think these opponents genuinely com‑
municated anger or happiness. Research by Kang and Sch‑
weitzer (2022) partly supports this view: Negotiators who
exaggerated anger compared to what they truly experienced
were perceived to be less ethical than those who genuinely
communicated anger.
While these insights might suggest that emotion decep‑
tion is evaluated negatively, there are also indications that
not all types of deceptive emotion communications may
be evaluated negatively. Kang and Schweitzer (2022), for
instance, showed that downplaying anger, sadness, or happi‑
ness, was perceived as more ethical than exaggerating these
emotions. More relevant for the current research, Ye etal.
(2023) indicated in a salary‑negotiation setting that negotia‑
tors evaluated opponents deceptively communicating anger
more negatively than opponents deceptively communicating
happiness. They suggested that deceptive happiness may be
seen as a positive signal to promote the relationship between
parties.
The findings discussed above have advanced the field by
clarifying that it is important to distinguish between differ‑
ent types of deception and different types of emotions (e.g.,
anger vs. happiness). To these insights, we would like to add
another qualification, namely that it is also important to be
specific on the type of evaluation. Negotiation researchers
have used a variety of measures to tap how people evalu‑
ate emotion deception. Evaluations have been measured as
positive versus negative impressions (e.g., Van Kleef etal.,
2004a). Other studies included more specific evaluations, for
example, in terms of ethicality/morality (e.g., Kang & Sch‑
weitzer, 2022), or prosociality (e.g., the intention to benefit
the relationship with others; Ye etal., 2023). We agree that
research may benefit from assessing specific evaluations.
For this purpose, we propose that the literature on the evalu‑
ation of emotion deception may benefit from distinguish‑
ing between the three main dimensions of social evaluation
that have been shown to be crucial in person perception:
morality, sociability, and competence (see e.g., Abele etal.,
2021; Brambilla etal., 2011; Brambilla & Leach, 2014;
Fiske etal., 2007; Heflick etal., 2011). Assessing these three
dimensions may especially be conducive because emotion
deception could be evaluated differently on these dimen‑
sions; for example, a specific deceptive strategy could be
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
considered immoral but at the same time also as a sign of
competence.
Social Evaluations ofDeceptive Emotion Expressions
In social psychology, considerable attention has been dedi‑
cated to identifying the fundamental dimensions that indi‑
viduals use to evaluate others in social interactions. This
literature has shown the benefits of distinguishing between
different dimensions of social evaluation rather than merely
assessing overall negativity or positivity (Abele etal., 2021).
Initially, research distinguished between the two fundamen‑
tal dimensions of warmth and competence. Later work sug‑
gested that the warmth dimension was actually comprised
of two distinct aspects: morality and sociability (Brambilla
etal., 2011; Landy etal., 2016). The research (see for over‑
views e.g., Brambilla & Leach, 2014) has now converged
on three fundamental dimensions: morality, sociability, and
competence. Morality evaluations include qualities like
trustworthiness, honesty, and sincerity. Sociability encom‑
passes traits like warmth, friendliness, and agreeableness.
Finally, competence refers to attributes such as skillfulness,
intelligence, and overall capability. These three dimensions
have not only been shown to be essential in person percep‑
tion (e.g., Fiske etal., 2007; Leach etal., 2007, 2015), an
expanding body of research has shown that these evaluation
dimensions also have behavioral implications in contexts
like information gathering (e.g., Brambilla etal., 2011),
presidential elections (Long etal., 2024), and negotiations
(Jeong etal., 2019).
For the current purposes, it is important to note the rel‑
evance of the morality‑sociability‑competence distinction
for the study on how people evaluate emotion displays. Li
etal. (2021), for instance, showed that people evaluated
high‑ (vs. low‑) intensity happy faces as higher on sociability
but lower on competence. Tiedens (2001) found that across
different contexts (e.g., in job interviews and presidential
elections) people who express anger (via facial expressions)
are evaluated as higher on competence (compared to those
who express sadness). Finally, Belkin and Rothman (2017)
showed that (both verbal and facial) expressions of happi‑
ness signal higher levels of morality, sociability, and com‑
petence than expressions of anger.
Importantly, these studies did not assess whether the
communicated emotions were genuine or deceptive. Thus,
research has not yet studied evaluations of morality, sociabil‑
ity, and competence for deceptive emotion communication,
and pitted these against genuine emotion communication.
However, it does not mean that prior research did not touch
upon some of these dimensions. One negotiation study, for
example, instructed participants to deceptively (vs. genu‑
inely) communicate happiness (or anger) via facial expres‑
sions (Campagna etal., 2016). The results showed that
negotiators who had deceptively expressed emotions were
evaluated as less trustworthy than those who had genuinely
expressed emotions. Moreover, as noted above, Kang and
Schweitzer (2022) showed that negotiators who downplayed
their anger were evaluated as more moral and ethical than
those genuinely communicating their anger. These studies
suggested that deceptive emotion communications may be
evaluated as lower on the dimension of morality than genu‑
ine emotion communications.
Some indirect evidence for an impact on evaluations of
sociability comes from the study by Ye etal. (2023), who
observed that negotiators who verbally communicated
deceptive happiness (vs. deceptive anger) via statements
were evaluated as more prosocial. Past research on emo‑
tional labor also suggested that deceptive happiness, com‑
municated in the form of fake smiles, could signal the ser‑
vice’s friendliness and enhance the costumer’s satisfaction
(Diefendorff etal., 2011; for a meta‑analysis see Grandey &
Sayre, 2019). Conversely, deceptive anger that is used as a
negotiation tactic has been found to harm the relationship
between parties (e.g., Côté etal., 2013). While these studies
did not directly compare between deceptive happiness and
deceptive anger, they suggested that deceptive happiness
may be evaluated as higher on sociability than deceptive
anger.
Previous research provided some evidence on how emo‑
tion deception may link to competence. Côté etal. (2013),
for example, uncovered that deceptive anger signals the
expresser’s toughness and competence in a negotiation.
Although researchers have not studied how deceptive hap‑
piness is perceived in terms of competence, the expression
of happiness has been perceived as lenient (Van Kleef etal.,
2004a) and naïve (Barasch etal., 2016) in a negotiation sce‑
nario. Deceptive anger might then be evaluated as higher in
competence than deceptive happiness.
The above findings did provide us with preliminary
insights on how emotion deception might impact the social
evaluations for the dimensions of morality, sociability, and
competence. Nevertheless, we also considered that the con‑
clusions drawn from this literature were often indirect or
incomplete. Based on these considerations, we therefore
decided to first start with a study in which we refrained
from formulating specific hypotheses, but would explore the
effects of deceptive (vs. genuine) emotion communications
on the dimensions of morality, sociability, and competence
(Study 1). After that, we conducted two more studies (Stud‑
ies 2 and 3) that used these explorations to formulate and
test specific hypotheses regarding these social evaluations,
and also investigated potential behavioral consequences. All
studies were preregistered.
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Z.Ye et al.
The Current Research
To study the effects of deceptive and genuine emotion com‑
munication in negotiations, Study 1 employed a buyer/
seller paradigm. Participants were presented with a setting
where they learned the buyer’s experienced and communi‑
cated emotions (anger or happiness) during the process of
bargaining. Studies 2 and 3 employed an Ultimatum Bar‑
gaining Game (UBG) paradigm in which an allocator had
made an offer to a recipient. Participants were presented
the recipient’s experienced and communicated emotions
(anger or happiness). As noted above, the literature on per‑
son perception not only revealed which evaluative dimen‑
sions are crucial, but also showed that distinct evaluations
may be connected to distinct behavioral reactions. In addi‑
tion to evaluations of morality, sociability, and competence,
we therefore also investigated potential behavioral conse‑
quences of such evaluations, i.e. whether or not participants
would prefer to negotiate with the target in an upcoming
negotiation task (Study 2 and 3) and whether or not they
would prefer the target to represent them in an upcoming
negotiation (Study 3).
Study 1
The first study (see preregistration https:// osf. io/ 4hnqs on
Open Science Framework) investigated how participants
evaluated targets who deceptively or genuinely communi‑
cated anger or happiness in terms of morality, sociability,
and competence.
Method
Participants andDesign
We employed a 2 (communication type: deceptive vs. genu‑
ine) × 2 (emotion type: happiness vs. anger) between‑par‑
ticipants design1. Participants were randomly assigned to
conditions.
An a priori power analysis indicated that to detect a
medium effect (f = 0.25) of the interaction between com‑
munication type and emotion type with an alpha of 0.05
and a power of 0.90, G*power (Faul etal., 2009) suggested
a sample size of N = 171. We recruited 180 participants
from prolific.com who were between 18 and 65, British, and
native English. Following the preregistration, we excluded
three participants who failed to pass manipulation checks.
One hundred and seventy‑seven participants (Mage = 40.00,
SDage = 12.00) remained; 44 men and 132 women, one pre‑
ferred not to report their gender.
Procedure andMaterials
After signing the informed consent form, participants read a
scenario in which two persons (a car salesperson and buyer)
negotiated about a second‑hand car. First, participants read:
“From next month on, Eric will need to commute
from Guildford to Westminster every day because of
his work. He does not have a car yet, so he decides to
look for a second‑hand car. Eric goes to a car dealer
and finds some options, such as a two‑seat sports car,
a Sedan, and an SUV. Then, Eric starts negotiating
with the salesperson about buying one of the (second‑
hand) cars. Some issues of the contract still need to
be settled, including the price, warranty, and service.”
Next, participants learned how the two persons
negotiated:
“After comparing the three different types of cars, Eric
decides that he prefers to buy the Sedan. The salesper‑
son states: ‘I can offer youa price of £11,630. Based
on the price,the warranty for any malfunctions is for 6
months.Car service, such as a yearly check and clean‑
ing,is covered for 10 months.’”
After that, participants learned Eric’s experienced happi‑
ness (or anger) about this offer by reading “After the sales‑
person makes the offer, Eric truly feels happy (or angry) with
it”. In the deceptive conditions, participants learned Eric’s
communicated anger (or happiness) by reading “Eric com-
municates to the salesperson that he is angry (or happy) with
this offer”. In the genuine conditions, participants learned
Eric’s communicated happiness (or anger) by reading “Eric
also communicates to the salesperson that he is happy (or
angry) with this offer”.
1 In our preregistration, this design was described as a 2 (experienced
emotion: happiness vs. anger) × 2 (communicated emotion: happi‑
ness vs. anger) between‑participants design. The 2 (communication
type: deceptive vs. genuine) × 2 (emotion type: happiness vs. anger)
design reported in the current studies is comprised of the same four
cells, only ordered differently (e.g., the genuine/anger cell is the expe‑
rienced anger/communicated anger cell in the preregistration; the
deceptive/anger cell refers to the experienced happiness/communi‑
cated anger cell).
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
After reading the negotiation scenario, participants
answered two manipulation check items: “What emotion did
Eric truly feel?” and “What emotion did Eric communicate
to the salesperson?”. Participants could choose between the
answers happiness and anger.
Then, participants evaluated Eric in terms of morality,
sociability, and competence on the items “To what extent
do you think Eric is …” from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much.
Morality (α = 0.94) was measured by the traits: sincere, hon-
est, trustworthy, moral, and reliable. Sociability (α = 0.96)
was measured by the traits: warm, friendly, sociable, nice,
and agreeable. Competence (α = 0.95) was measured by the
traits: capable, skilled, competent, intelligent, and smart.
Above measures and traits were adapted from past stud‑
ies about measurements of social evaluations (Abele etal.,
2021; Koch etal., 2021).
Finally, participants answered questions about their gen‑
der and age. Participants were fully debriefed and thanked.
They received £0.90 as reward.
Results
We employed two‑way ANOVAs in the General Linear
Model in R (1.1.463). In addition to the main and interac‑
tion effects of communication type and emotion type, we
conducted simple effect tests to examine differences between
deceptive happiness and deceptive anger and between genu‑
ine happiness and genuine anger. For means and standard
deviations of the dependent variables see Table1.
Morality
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on morality yielded significant main
effects of communication type, F(1, 173) = 164.83,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.49, and emotion type, F(1, 173) = 27.75,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.14. The main effect of communication type
indicated that participants evaluated targets who deceptively
communicated emotions (M = 2.91, SD = 1.03) as lower on
morality than those who genuinely communicated emotions
(M = 4.89, SD = 1.23). The main effect of emotion type indi‑
cated that participants evaluated targets who communicated
anger (M = 3.49, SD = 1.34) as lower on morality than those
who communicated happiness (M = 4.33, SD = 1.56).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
significant, F(1, 173) = 15.47, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.08. Simple
effects showed that participants evaluated targets who genu‑
inely communicated anger as lower on morality than those
who genuinely communicated happiness, t(173) = ‑6.53,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.20. Participants did not significantly differ
in their morality evaluation of targets who deceptively com‑
municated anger and targets who deceptively communicated
happiness, t(173) = ‑0.94, p = 0.348, ηp
2 = 0.01.
Sociability
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on sociability also yielded main effects of
communication type, F(1, 173) = 7.47, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.04,
and emotion type F(1, 173) = 178.35, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.51.
These effects resembled the effects observed for morality.
The main effect of communication type showed that par‑
ticipants evaluated targets who deceptively communicated
emotions (M = 3.97, SD = 1.27) as lower on sociability than
targets who genuinely communicated emotions (M = 4.43,
SD = 1.79). The main effect of emotion type indicated that
participants evaluated targets who communicated anger
(M = 3.15, SD = 1.13) as lower on sociability than those who
communicated happiness (M = 5.26, SD = 1.17).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
also significant, F(1, 173) = 31.31, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.15.
Simple effects showed that while overall participants
evaluated targets who communicated anger as lower on
sociability than those who communicated happiness, this
effect appeared weaker when these emotions were com‑
municated deceptively t(173) = 5.47, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.15,
than when these emotions were communicated genuinely,
t(173) = 13.44, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.51.
Competence
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on competence yielded a main effect of
communication type, F(1, 173) = 6.84, p = 0.010, ηp
2 = 0.04,
indicating that participants evaluated targets who deceptively
Table 1 Means and Standard
Deviations of Social
Evaluations as a Function of
Communication Type and
Emotion Type, Study 1
Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .05
Communication type
Deceptive Genuine
Emotion type
Anger M(SD) Happiness M(SD) Anger M(SD) Happiness M(SD)
Morality 2.81c(1.17) 3.01c(0.86) 4.18b(1.13) 5.59a(0.89)
Sociability 3.37c(1.14) 4.59b(1.09) 2.92d(1.08) 5.90a(0.85)
Competence 4.51a(1.13) 3.29c(1.00) 3.99b(1.31) 4.69a(1.00)
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Z.Ye et al.
communicated emotions (M = 3.91, SD = 1.23) as lower on
competence than those who genuinely communicated emo‑
tions (M = 4.34, SD = 1.21). The main effect of emotion type
was not significant, F(1, 173) = 2.35, p = 0.127, ηp
2 = 0.01.
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
significant, F(1, 173) = 32.57, p < 0.001, η p
2 = 0.16. Sim‑
ple effects showed that participants evaluated targets who
deceptively communicated anger as higher on competence
than those who deceptively communicated happiness,
t(173) = 5.10, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.13, whereas they evaluated
targets who genuinely communicated anger as lower on
competence than those who genuinely communicated hap‑
piness, t(173) = −2.96, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.05.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed that overall participants eval‑
uated targets who deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicated
their emotion to be less moral, less sociable, and less com‑
petent. Moreover, participants evaluated targets who genu‑
inely communicated anger (vs. happiness) as less moral, less
sociable, and less competent. The differences between the
dimensions of social evaluations appear when we look at the
different emotions in deceptive communications. Interest‑
ingly, participants evaluated targets who deceptively com‑
municated anger (vs. happiness) as less sociable but more
competent.
It should also be noted that these findings were the result
of exploratory analyses. It is therefore important to test
whether these effects replicate. In Study 2, we therefore
again employed a negotiation setting, but now tested with
confirmatory analyses—and with preregistered hypoth‑
eses—whether effects indeed replicate.
Moreover, we also followed up on the notion that social
perceptions may have behavioral consequences. We explored
the behavioral consequences by examining whether partici‑
pants would prefer to negotiate with the target or rather with
somebody else in an upcoming negotiation task. This meth‑
odological approach connects to previous studies (e.g., Van
Kleef etal., 2004b) that investigated whether communicated
emotions during a negotiation may influence negotiators’
intention to engage in future negotiations with the same
party. Hence, we investigated in Study 2 whether partici‑
pants’ preference to negotiate with the target would be con‑
tingent on whether the target had deceptively (vs. genuinely)
communicated anger or happiness, and to what extent this
preference would be associated with the perceptions of the
target being moral, sociable, or competent.
Study 2
In Study 2 (see preregistration https:// osf. io/ v9sgd), we
examined the effects of deceptive and genuine emotion
communications in the context of an Ultimatum Bargain‑
ing Game (UBG; Güth etal., 1982). This game depicts a
negotiation between two persons; an allocator who makes
an offer, and a recipient who can either accept or reject the
offer. Research by Andrade and Ho (2009) and Van Dijk
etal. (2018) already showed that in such a setting, recipients
may strategically misrepresent their communicated emotions
to the allocator if they believe the allocator still has to decide
on the final offer. Here, we used this setup to present par‑
ticipants with emotions the recipient experienced and sub‑
sequently communicated to the allocator.
In addition to evaluations of morality, sociability, and
competence, we also collected a behavioral measure. For
this purpose, we presented participants with the opportunity
to participate in a negotiation task in which they could select
whom they wanted to negotiate with—the target that they
just evaluated, or a random other participant.
Being informed by the exploratory results of Study 1,
we were now able to proceed to preregistered confirma‑
tory analyses. With regard to the contrast between decep‑
tive versus genuine emotion communications, based on
the findings of Study 1, we predicted (H1) that targets who
deceptively communicated emotions (i.e., who experienced
anger but communicated happiness or experienced happi‑
ness but communicated anger) would be evaluated as less
moral, sociable, and competent than those who genuinely
communicated emotions (i.e., who experienced and also
communicated anger or happiness). With regard to decep‑
tive emotion communications, we predicted that participants
would evaluate targets who deceptively communicated anger
to be less sociable (H2) and more competent (H3) than those
who deceptively communicated happiness. We also explored
the contrast between genuine anger versus genuine happi‑
ness. We preregistered that we would explore the associa‑
tions between participants’ evaluations of targets and their
preferences for the targets when choosing an opponent.
Method
Participants andDesign
We employed a 2 (communication type: deceptive vs. genu‑
ine) × 2 (emotion type: happiness vs. anger) between‑par‑
ticipants design.
An a priori power analysis indicated that to detect a
medium effect (f = 0.25) of the interaction between com‑
munication type and emotion type with an alpha of 0.05
and a power of 0.95, G*power (Faul etal., 2009) suggested
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
a sample size of N = 210. We recruited 222 participants
from prolific.com who were between 18 and 65, Brit‑
ish, and native English. Following the preregistration, we
excluded seven participants who failed to pass manipulation
checks. Two hundred and fifteen participants (Mage = 40.00,
SDage = 12.00) remained; 107 men and 107 women, one pre‑
ferred not to report their gender. A sensitivity power analy‑
sis indicated that this sample size could detect a medium
effect size, Odds Ratio (OR) of 0.40 (Cohen’s d = 0.50), of
the communication type × emotion type interaction with an
alpha of 0.05 and a power of 0.95.
Procedure andMaterials
After signing the informed consent, participants learned the
rules of the UBG by reading:
“In the negotiation setting we use in our study, a pair of
negotiators needs to negotiate the allocation of 100 val‑
uable chips.Each chip is worth £0.01. Before starting
the negotiation, these two negotiators are assigned the
role ofallocatorandrecipient, based on a chance pro‑
cedure. When dividing chips,the allocator first makes
an offer to the recipient. In this offer, the allocator pro‑
poses how many chipsthe allocator will receive (e.g.,
45, 50, or 55)and how many chipsthe recipient will
receive (e.g., 55, 50, or 45). Then, the recipient has an
opportunity tocommunicate their emotions about this
offer to the allocator. After that, the allocatormakes
the final offerby either adjusting the offer made before
or not. After the allocator makes the final offer, the
recipient decides whether toacceptorrejectthis final
offer. If the recipient accepts the final offer, both nego‑
tiatorsreceive chips in accordance with the offer.If
the recipientrejectsthe final offer, the negotiatorsboth
receive nothing.”
Then, participants learned one negotiator’s (the target’s)
past bargaining experience by reading:
“Y was assigned the role of therecipientand negoti‑
ated with the opponent, who was assigned the role of
theallocator.The opponent (the allocator) firstmade
an offerabout the distribution of 100 chips to Y(the
recipient). Y was then given the possibility to respond
to this offer.”
Subsequently, participants learned the target’s experi‑
enced emotions (anger or happiness, depending on condi‑
tion) by reading:
“We first asked the recipient Y to indicate how they
felt about the offer. Y knew that what he or she typed
wouldnotbe shown to the allocator. The negotiator
Y then typed feelingtruly happy (or angry) about the
offer.”
Participants then learned the targets’ communicated emo‑
tions. In the deceptive emotion conditions, participants read
“Then we asked the recipient Y to inform the allocator how
he or she felt. Then Y communicated a different message to
the allocator. Y communicated being angry (or happy) about
the allocator’s offer.” In the genuine emotion conditions, par‑
ticipants read “Then we asked the recipient Y to inform the
allocator how he or she felt.Then Y communicated the same
message to the allocator.Y communicated being happy (or
angry) about the allocator’s offer.”
After learning the target’s experienced and communi‑
cated emotions, participants completed manipulation checks
regarding “What emotion did Y truly feel” and “What emo‑
tion did Y communicate to the allocator”. Participants could
choose between the answers happiness and anger.
Then, participants evaluated the target in terms of moral‑
ity, sociability, and competence on the question “To what
extent do you think Y is …” from 1 = not at all to 7 = very
much. The traits we used to measure morality (α = 0.95),
sociability (α = 0.94), and competence (α = 0.95) were the
same as we used in the previous study. We additionally
measured participants’ overall impressions of the target (see
Supplementary Materials).
After that, participants were informed that they could
participate in a similar bargaining game. They could choose
to participate in the game with negotiator Y that had been
described to them, or with somebody else (about whom they
did not receive further information). Participants then were
asked to decide which negotiator they would choose to bar‑
gain with by answering “I would like to negotiate with …”
Participants could choose between the answers this negotia-
tor Y and somebody else.
Finally, participants answered questions about their gen‑
der and age. Participants were fully debriefed and informed
that we were mainly interested in their perceptions of and
decisions about the negotiator, and they would not partici‑
pate in a bargaining game. Participants were thanked and
were paid £1.00 as reward.
Results
To test our predictions, we employed two‑way ANOVAs and
a logistic regression, in the Generalized Linear Model. For
means and standard deviations of the dependent variables
see Table2 (social evaluations) and Table3 (negotiation
choices).
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Z.Ye et al.
Morality
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on morality yielded significant main
effects of communication type, F(1, 211) = 368.26,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.64, and emotion type F(1, 211) = 27.41,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.14. These results replicated the findings
of Study 1, and supported H1. The main effect of commu‑
nication type again showed that participants evaluated tar‑
gets who deceptively communicated emotions (M = 2.45,
SD = 0.96) as lower on morality than those who genuinely
communicated emotions (M = 5.04, SD = 1.13). The main
effect of emotion type again indicated that participants
evaluated targets who communicated anger (M = 3.42,
SD = 1.54) as lower on morality than those who communi‑
cated happiness (M = 4.16, SD = 1.72).
The communication type × emotion type interaction
was not significant, F(1, 211) = 2.10, p = 0.149, ηp
2 = 0.01.
Participants evaluated targets who communicated anger
as lower on morality than those who communicated hap‑
piness regardless of whether these communications were
deceptive, t(211) = ‑2.63, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.03, or genuine,
t(211) = ‑4.81, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.10. The contrast between
genuine anger and genuine happiness was also found in
Study 1. The significant contrast between deceptive anger
and deceptive happiness was not significant in Study 1.
Sociability
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on sociability yielded significant main
effects of communication type, F(1, 211) = 58.49, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.22, and emotion type, F(1, 211) = 466.55, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.44. These results replicated the findings of Study
1, and supported H1. The main effect of communication
type again showed that participants evaluated targets who
deceptively communicated emotions (M = 3.48, SD = 1.36)
as lower on sociability than those who genuinely commu‑
nicated emotions (M = 4.57, SD = 1.38). The main effect
of emotion type again revealed that participants evaluated
targets who communicated anger (M = 3.14, SD = 1.05) as
lower on sociability than those who communicated happi‑
ness (M = 4.96, SD = 1.25).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
not significant, F(1, 211) = 2.10, p = 0.149, ηp
2 = 0.01. Simi‑
lar to Study 1 and in agreement with H2, participants evalu‑
ated targets who deceptively communicated anger as lower
on sociability than those who deceptively communicated
happiness, t(211) = −7.97, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.23. Similar to
Study 1 this effect of emotion type appeared less pronounced
than when communications were genuine, t(211) = −10.32,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.34, but this now did not lead to a signifi‑
cant interaction.
Competence
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on competence yielded a significant main
effect of communication type, F(1, 211) = 17.57, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.08, and a non‑significant effect of emotion type, F(1,
211) = 3.01, p = 0.084, ηp
2 = 0.01, again replicating the find‑
ings of Study 1. The main effect of communication type sup‑
ported H1, indicating that participants evaluated targets who
deceptively communicated emotions (M = 4.01, SD = 1.42)
as lower on competence than those who genuinely commu‑
nicated emotions (M = 4.68, SD = 1.03).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
also significant, F(1, 211) = 19.72, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.09.
Similar to Study 1, and in agreement with H3, simple effects
showed that participants evaluated targets who deceptively
communicated anger as higher on competence than those
who deceptively communicated happiness, t(211) = 4.30,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.08. And again, participants evaluated tar‑
gets who genuinely communicated anger as lower on com‑
petence than those who genuinely communicated happiness,
t(211) = ‑1.95, p = 0.053, ηp
2 = 0.02.
Choosing anopponent
Participants could choose their opponent in a future negotia‑
tion – the target (of whom they knew the experienced and
communicated emotion), or an unknown other opponent.
The logistic regression showed significant effects of commu‑
nication type, χ2 = 20.74, B = 3.89, Z = 4.37, p < 0.001, and
emotion type, χ2 = 15.49, B = 3.27, Z = 3.81, p < 0.001. The
Table 2 Means and standard
deviations of social evaluations
as a function of communication
type and emotion type, study 2
Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .05
Communication type
Deceptive Genuine
Emotion type
Anger M(SD) Happiness M(SD) Anger M(SD) Happiness M(SD)
Morality 2.20d(0.89) 2.71c(0.97) 4.59b(1.03) 5.49a(1.04)
Sociability 2.69d(0.97) 4.29b(1.23) 3.56c(0.94) 5.56a(0.94)
Competence 4.50a(1.32) 3.50b(1.34) 4.46a(1.05) 4.89a(0.97)
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
communication type effect indicated that fewer participants
chose to negotiate with the target rather than someone else
if the target had deceptively communicated an emotion (38
out of 104 participants; 36.54%) than if the target had genu‑
inely communicated the emotion (73 out of 111 participants;
65.77%). The effect of emotion type showed that fewer par‑
ticipants chose to negotiate with the target rather than with
someone else if the target had communicated anger (42 out
of 108 participants; 38.89%) than if the target had communi‑
cated happiness (69 out of 107 participants; 64.49%).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
also significant, χ2 = 6.70, B = 4.86, Z = 2.54, p = 0.011.
Simple effects showed that participants’ choice did not dif‑
fer between targets who deceptively communicated anger
and who deceptively communicated happiness, χ2 = 0.93,
B = 1.48, Z = −0.96, p = 0.336. In both cases, most partici‑
pants chose to negotiate with someone else rather than the
target, see Table3. When the target had genuinely commu‑
nicated the emotion, we did observe an effect. As Table3
shows, participants less often chose to negotiate with the tar‑
get rather than someone else if the target had genuinely com‑
municated being angry than if the target had genuinely com‑
municated being happy, χ2 = 17.78, B = 7.20, Z = −4.22,
p < 0.001.
Mediation Effects
To explore whether communication type and emotion type
influenced the choice of opponent via morality, sociability,
and competence, we employed the GLM Mediation Model.
We included communication type, emotion type, and their
interaction as independent variables, morality, sociability,
and competence as mediators, and the choice of an opponent
(target vs. someone else) as the dependent variable. With
10,000 bootstrap resamples, we employed the mediation
analysis to estimate the confidence intervals (CIs) of the
indirect effects at the 95% level (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
The indirect effects (Fig.1) are summarized in the following
paragraphs. Total and direct effects can be found in Sup‑
plementary Materials.
The indirect effect of communication type on the choice
of opponent via sociability was significant, β = 0.15, 95%
CI [0.06, 0.25], p = 0.001; however, the indirect effect via
morality, β = −0.04, 95%CI [−0.29, 0.21], p = 0.771, or
competence was not significant, β = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.02,
0.07], p = 0.357. The indirect effect of emotion type on
the choice of opponent via sociability was significant,
β = 0.26, 95% CI [0.10, 0.41], p = 0.001; however, the indi‑
rect effect via morality, β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.08, 0.06],
p = 0.775, or competence was not significant, β = −0.01,
95%CI [−0.03, 0.01], p = 0.211. The indirect effect of the
interaction between emotion type and communication type
via morality, β = 0.00, 95%CI = [‑0.05, 0.04], p = 0.808,
Table 3 Percentages of participants choosing the target vs. somebody
else as opponent as a function of communication type and emotion
type, study 2
Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .05
Communication type
Deceptive Genuine
Emotion type
Anger Happiness Anger Happiness
Choice for target 32.08%b41.18%b45.45%b85.71%a
Choice for somebody
else
67.92%b58.82%b54.55%b14.29%a
Fig. 1 The Indirect Effects of Communication Type, Emotion Type,
and Their Interaction on the Choice of an Opponent via Morality,
Sociability, and Competence. Note. Standardized coefficients β are
reported. Dotted lines indicate non‑significant effects (p > .05). Solid
lines indicate significant effects; bolded lines indicate significant indi‑
rect effects (***p < .001)
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Z.Ye et al.
sociability, β = 0.03, 95%CI [− 0.03, 0.14], p = 0.179, or
competence was not significant, β = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.05,
0.14], p = 0.363. These findings suggested that there were
indirect effects of our manipulations on the choice of an
opponent via sociability only.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated most of the findings of Study 1 on the
evaluations of morality, sociability, and competence, and
provided support for our hypotheses. We again observed
that participants evaluated targets who had deceptively
(vs. genuinely) communicated emotions to be less moral,
less sociable, and less competent, which supported our H1.
Supporting H2 and H3, participants again evaluated targets
who had deceptively communicated anger (vs. happiness) as
less sociable but more competent. And we again found that
participants evaluated targets who genuinely communicated
anger (vs. happiness) as less moral, less sociable, and less
competent.
Regarding our behavioral measure, we observed that par‑
ticipants less often chose to negotiate with targets who had
deceptively, rather than genuinely, communicated emotions,
and less often chose to negotiate with targets who had com‑
municated anger, rather than happiness. Targets who genu‑
inely communicated happiness were clearly mostly preferred
as a negotiation opponent. The mediation analysis showed
that the stronger preference for targets who genuinely com‑
municated happiness resulted from the higher levels of
sociability that participants ascribed to these targets. This
might reflect that people rather negotiate with an opponent
who is sociable.
The decision of choosing the target (rather than some‑
one else) as an opponent in an upcoming negotiation was
not statistically associated with the ascribed competence or
morality. This might reflect that it may be less clear whether
it is in one’s best interest to negotiate with a moral and/or
competent opponent, as we mentioned in the introduction of
this study. To further explore this topic, we conducted Study
3, and investigated how evaluations related to choosing an
opponent or choosing a representative. As we argue below,
we anticipated that choices might differ when choosing an
opponent than when choosing someone to represent you in
a negotiation.
Study 3
In Study 2, we assessed behavioral consequences by present‑
ing participants with a negotiation task in which they could
choose their opponent—being either the target or somebody
else. In Study 3, we also added another condition, in which
participants could participate in an upcoming negotiation
task where they could choose a representative—the target
or somebody else. The representative would negotiate with
another person for their own outcomes and also for the out‑
comes of the participant.
This setup (see preregistration https:// osf. io/ jxnkc) ena‑
bled us to examine whether the behavioral consequences of
deceptive anger and deceptive happiness would differ for
both types of decisions. We reasoned that these might differ,
because people may seek different qualities when choosing
an opponent than when choosing someone to represent them.
In a negotiation setting, an opponent refers to someone with
conflicting interests, goals, or priorities. A representative is
on the same side as oneself, sharing common goals, inter‑
ests, or objectives (e.g., Mnookin & Susskind, 1999; Rubin
& Sander, 1988). It could then be that the person you prefer
as an opponent is not the same person that you would like
to see as your representative. You might search for different
qualities when considering someone as your opponent than
when considering someone as your representative.
Study 2 showed that the choice for the target as one’s
opponent was associated with the ascribed sociability. The
current setup allowed us to investigate whether this would
also be observed when choosing one’s representative. We
reasoned that sociability might not be the most important
feature that people look for when choosing someone as
their representative. In particular, we anticipated that peo‑
ple might prefer their representative to be competent, as a
competent representative may be more effective in enhanc‑
ing one’s outcomes (García etal., 2017; Phalet & Poppe,
1997). For a representative, participants might then prior‑
itize competence over sociability (Sears & Kinder, 1985).
We had less pronounced expectations on whether morality
would be more or less important when choosing an opponent
than when choosing a representative. Negotiators may seek
a moral opponent to prevent being cheated or manipulated
by the opponent, but those who value morality might also
seek this quality in those who represent them (Cohen etal.,
2014; Morse & Cohen, 2019).
Thus, we expected that when deciding on whether or not
to choose the target as an opponent, participants would base
their decision on the target’s sociability‑relevant traits (H4).
However, when deciding whether or not to choose the target
as their negotiation representative, we expected participants
to base their decision on the target’s competence‑relevant
traits (H5). This is because participants may feel that it is in
their best interest to be represented by a competent negotia‑
tor. For morality, we did not formulate a directional hypoth‑
esis. Traits related to morality may be important in both
decisions to some extent as participants may want to avoid
engaging in unethical actions exhibited by an immoral oppo‑
nent and safeguard their own party’s reputation, recognizing
the potential harm that could arise from an immoral repre‑
sentative. Hypotheses 1–3 for the effects of communication
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
type and emotion type on the social evaluations of sociabil‑
ity, morality, competence were similar to those in Study 2.
Method
Participants andDesign
We employed a 2 (communication type: deceptive vs. genu‑
ine) × 2 (emotion type: happiness vs. anger) × 2 (negotia‑
tor role: opponent vs. representative) between‑participants
design.
Compared to Study 2, we doubled the sample size for the
current study because we added the between‑participants
factor negotiator role. We thus recruited 480 participants
from prolific.com who were between 18 and 65years old,
British, and native English, ensuring sufficient statistical
power to separately analyze the data of choosing an oppo‑
nent and choosing a representative. An additional benefit
was that it increased the power for the evaluation measure‑
ments that were collected before participants chose an oppo‑
nent or representative.
Following the preregistration, we excluded 19 partici‑
pants who failed to pass manipulation checks. Four hun‑
dred and sixty‑one participants (Mage = 41.54, SDage = 12.29)
remained; 226 men and 231 women, two indicated “other”
and two preferred not to report their gender. A sensitivity
power analysis suggested that the sample size of N = 461
allowed us to detect a small to medium effect (f = 0.17; in
two‑ways ANOVAs) of the interaction between commu‑
nication type and emotion type on social evaluations with
an alpha of 0.05 and a power of 0.95. Also, this sample
size could detect a small to medium effect size, Odds Ratio
(OR) of 0.51 (Cohen’s d = 0.37), of the communication
type × emotion type interaction on negotiation choice with
an alpha of 0.05 and a power of 0.95.
Procedure andMaterials
The procedure of the UBG task was similar to Study 2
regarding the manipulations of communication type and
emotion type. The main difference was in the behavioral
option that participants were provided after these induc‑
tions and associated measurements. In the opponent con‑
dition, participants learned that they would negotiate with
an opponent about the distribution of chips in an UBG. As
their opponent they could choose the negotiator introduced
before, or someone else about whom they had no additional
information. In the representative condition, participants
learned that they would participate in a negotiation where
they would be represented by a representative who would for
them negotiate with an opponent. Participants would receive
the same number of chips as their representative would earn
in the UBG. As their representative they could choose the
negotiator introduced before, or someone else about whom
they had no additional information.
After having chosen their opponent or representative
(depending on condition), participants were further asked
to indicate how strong their preference for the chosen nego‑
tiator was (see Supplementary Materials). Finally, partici‑
pants answered questions about their gender and age. Par‑
ticipants were fully debriefed, thanked, and were paid £1.00
as rewards.
Results
To test our predictions, we employed two‑way ANOVAs in
the General Linear Model and logistic regressions in the
Generalized Linear Model. For means and standard devia‑
tions of the dependent variables see Table4 (social evalua‑
tions) and Table5 (negotiation choices).
Table 4 Means and standard
deviations of social evaluations
as a function of communication
type and emotion type, study 3
Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .05
Communication type
Deceptive Genuine
Emotion type
Anger M(SD) Happiness M(SD) Anger M(SD) Happiness M(SD)
Morality 2.28d(1.04) 2.92c(0.96) 4.48b(1.20) 5.58a(0.92)
Sociability 2.75d(1.00) 4.26b(1.02) 3.39c(1.09) 5.57a(0.79)
Competence 4.39b(1.24) 3.77c(1.12) 4.28b(1.14) 4.97a(0.90)
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Z.Ye et al.
Morality
The 2 × 2 × 2 2ANOVA on morality yielded significant
main effects of communication type, F(1, 453) = 630.61,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.58, and emotion type, F(1, 453) = 81.31,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.15. These results replicated the findings of
Studies 1 and 2, and supported H1. The main effect of com‑
munication type again showed that participants evaluated
targets who deceptively communicated emotions (M = 2.61,
SD = 1.05) as lower on morality than those who genuinely
communicated emotions (M = 5.03, SD = 1.20). The main
effect of emotion type again showed that participants evalu‑
ated targets who communicated anger (M = 3.43, SD = 1.58)
as lower on morality than those who communicated happi‑
ness (M = 4.27, SD = 1.63).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
also significant, F(1, 453) = 5.40, p = 0.021, ηp
2 = 0.01. Simi‑
lar to Studies 1 and 2, simple effects showed that overall
participants evaluated targets who communicated anger as
lower on morality than those who communicated happiness;
the difference was smaller in the contrast between deceptive
anger and deceptive happiness, t(453) = −4.67, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.05, than in the contrast between genuine anger and
genuine happiness, t(453) = −8.14, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.13.
Sociability
Again replicating the results of Studies 1 and 2, and sup‑
porting H1, the 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on sociability yielded
significant main effects of communication type, F(1,
453) = 123.44, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.21, and emotion type,
F(1, 453) = 429.00, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.49. The main effect
of communication type showed that participants evaluated
targets who deceptively communicated emotions (M = 3.53,
SD = 1.26) as lower on sociability than those who genuinely
communicated emotions (M = 4.52, SD = 1.49). The main
effect of emotion type revealed that participants evaluated
targets who communicated anger (M = 3.08, SD = 1.19) as
lower on sociability than those who communicated happi‑
ness (M = 4.98, SD = 1.15).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
also significant, F(1, 453) = 17.30, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.04.
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, and supporting H2, simple
effects showed that overall participants evaluated targets
who communicated anger as lower on sociability than those
who communicated happiness; the difference was smaller
in the contrast between deceptive anger and deceptive
happiness, t(453) = −11.54, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.23, than in
the contrast between genuine anger and genuine happiness,
t(453) = ‑17.85, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.41.
Competence
In line with the results of Studies 1 and 2, the 2 × 2 × 2
ANOVA on competence yielded a main effect of commu‑
nication type, F(1, 453) = 27.75, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.06, and
a non‑significant effect of emotion type, F(1, 453) = 0.13,
p = 0.714, ηp
2 < 0.01. The main effect of communication type
supported H2, and indicated that participants evaluated tar‑
gets who deceptively communicated emotions (M = 4.07,
SD = 1.22) as lower on competence than those who genu‑
inely communicated emotions (M = 4.63, SD = 1.08).
The communication type × emotion type interaction was
significant, F(1, 453) = 40.47, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.08. As in
Studies 1 and 2, and in agreement with H3, simple effects
showed that participants evaluated targets who deceptively
communicated anger as higher on competence than those
who deceptively communicated happiness, t(453) = 4.18,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.04. And again, participants evaluated tar‑
gets who genuinely communicated anger as lower on com‑
petence than those who genuinely communicated happiness,
t(453) = −4.83, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.05.
Choosing anOpponent/a Representative
In line with the results of Studies 1 and 2, the 2 (commu‑
nication type: deceptive vs. genuine) × 2 (emotion type:
happiness vs. anger) × 2 (negotiator role: opponent vs. rep‑
resentative) logistic regression showed significant effects
of communication type, χ2 = 38.19, B = 3.74, Z = 5.89,
p < 0.001, emotion type, χ2 = 19.86, B = 2.64, Z = 4.33,
p < 0.001, and a significant communication type × emotion
type interaction, χ2 = 53.64, B = 22.12, Z = 6.91, p < 0.001.
Although the three‑way interaction was not significant,
χ2 = 0.32, B = 1.66, Z = 0.57, p = 0.571, we looked into
whether participants’ choice for the target who used emo‑
tion communication strategies would differ when consider‑
ing choosing an opponent vs. a representative by running
two separate logistic regressions for the opponent dataset
and the representative dataset.
Opponent The 2 × 2 logistic regression on choosing an
opponent replicated the results of Study 2, and showed
significant effects of communication type, χ2 = 16.39,
B = 3.46, Z = 3.85, p < 0.001, emotion type, χ2 = 26.22,
B = 4.69, Z = 4.80, p < 0.001, and a significant communica‑
tion type × emotion type interaction, χ2 = 21.87, B = 17.17,
Z = 4.42, p < 0.001. As Table5 shows, participants did not
want a deceptive target as their opponent. Simple effects
showed that participants’ choice did not differ between tar‑
2 We included negotiator role into the ANOVA although this factor
was only manipulated after collection of the evaluation data. We did
not observe a main effect of negotiation choice, nor any interaction
effects with it. Thus, we only reported the main and interaction effects
of communication type and emotion type on the dependent variables.
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
gets who deceptively communicated anger and happiness,
χ2 = 0.10, B = 1.13, Z = − 0.32, p = 0.751. As Table5 also
shows, participants less often chose the target as their oppo‑
nent if the target had genuinely communicated being angry
than if the target had genuinely communicated being happy,
χ2 = 33.56, B = 19.42, Z = − 5.79, p < 0.001. This finding
replicated what we found in Study 2.
Representative The 2 × 2 logistic regression on choosing
a representative showed a significant main effect of com‑
munication type, χ2 = 22.10, B = 4.05, Z = 4.49, p < 0.001.
The main effect of emotion type was not significant,
χ2 = 1.64, B = 1.49, Z = 1.27, p = 0.204. The communication
type × emotion type interaction was significant, χ2 = 32.49,
B = 28.52, Z = 5.38, p < 0.001. Interestingly, the pattern of
the interaction differed from what we observed for choosing
an opponent. Simple effects showed that now participants
more often chose the target if the target had deceptively
communicated being angry than if the target had deceptively
communicated being happy, χ2 = 9.37, B = 0.28, Z = 3.06,
p = 0.002. For the targets who had genuinely communicated
their emotion we observed a similar pattern as for the oppo‑
nent choice. Participants less often chose the target if the
target had genuinely communicated being angry than if the
target had genuinely communicated being happy, χ2 = 9.37,
B = 0.28, Z = −3.06, p = 0.002. See Table5.
Mediation Effects ofMorality, Sociability, andCompetence
To explore how choices of negotiator role were related to
the morality, sociability, and competence evaluations, we
employed separate mediation models – for the choice of an
opponent and for the choice of a representative. Similar to
Study 2, we included in each model communication type,
emotion type, and their interaction as independent variables,
morality, sociability, and competence as mediators, and
choice as the dependent variable. The indirect effects (Fig.2)
are summarized in the following paragraphs. Total and direct
effects can be found in Supplementary Materials.
Opponent The indirect effect of communication type on
the choice of an opponent via morality was significant,
β = 0.26, 95% CI [0.04, 0.46], p < 0.001; however, the indi‑
rect effect via sociability, β = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.08, 0.12],
p = 0.741, or competence was not significant, β = 0.01, 95%
CI [−0.02, 0.04], p = 0.450. The indirect effect of emotion
type on the choice of an opponent via morality was sig‑
nificant, β = 0.09, 95% CI [0.01, 0.16], p = 0.024; however,
the indirect effect via sociability, β = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.15,
0.22], p = 0.741, or competence was not significant, β = 0.00,
95% CI [−0.01, 0.01], p = 0.736. The indirect effect of the
interaction between communication type and emotion type
on the choice of an opponent via morality, β = 0.03, 95%
CI [− 0.02, 0.13], p = 0.165, sociability, β = 0.01, 95% CI
[− 0.08, 0.11], p = 0.749, or competence was not signifi‑
cant, β = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.04, 0.09], p = 0.442. These find‑
ings differed from H4 and from what we found in Study 2
and H4, and showed that there were indirect effects of our
manipulations on the choice of an opponent via morality,
instead of sociability.
Representative The indirect effect of communication type
on the choice of a representative via competence was signif‑
icant, β = 0.08, 95% CI [0.03, 0.13], p = 0.003; however, the
indirect effect via morality, β = 0.14, 95% CI [−0.05, 0.33],
p = 0.141, or sociability was not significant, β = −0.03, 95%
CI [−0.10, 0.03], p = 0.347. The indirect effect of emotion
type on the choice of a representative via morality, β = 0.05,
95% CI [− 0.02, 0.13], p = 0.138, sociability, β = − 0.06,
95% CI [−0.18, 0.06], p = 0.331, or competence, β = 0.00,
95% CI [−0.04, 0.04], p = 0.909, was not significant. The
indirect effect of the interaction between communication
type and emotion type on the choice of a representative via
competence was significant, β = 0.11, 95% CI [0.10, 0.33],
p < 0.001; however, the indirect effect via morality, β = 0.01,
95% CI [−0.03, 0.07], p = 0.358, or sociability, β = −0.01,
95% CI [−0.06, 0.03], p = 0.421, was not significant. These
findings suggested that there were indirect effects of our
manipulations on the choice of a representative only via
competence, which supported H5.
Discussion
Above findings replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2
on the evaluations of morality, sociability, and competence.
In line with H1, participants evaluated targets who had
deceptively (vs. genuinely) communicated emotions to be
less moral, less sociable, and less competent. Findings also
Table 5 Percentages of participants choosing the target vs. somebody
else as an opponent/a representative as a function of communication
type and emotion type, study 3
Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .05
Communication type
Deceptive Genuine
Emotion type
Anger Happiness Anger Happiness
Opponent
Choice for target 35.71%b38.60%b31.67%b90.00%a
Choice for somebody
else
64.29%b61.40%b68.33%b10.00%a
Representative
Choice for target 50.94%b22.41%c44.07%b86.21%a
Choice for somebody
else
49.06%b77.59%c55.93%b13.79%a
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

Z.Ye et al.
supported H2 and H3, showing that participants evaluated
targets who deceptively communicated anger (vs. happiness)
as less sociable but more competent. Furthermore, partici‑
pants evaluated targets who genuinely communicated anger
(vs. happiness) as less moral, less sociable, and less compe‑
tent, which was also observed in Studies 1 and 2.
With regard to the behavioral measures of choosing one’s
opponent, results showed that, as in Study 2, participants
less often chose targets who had genuinely communicated
anger (vs. happiness) as an opponent; such a difference was
not observed between targets who deceptively communi‑
cated anger or happiness. The mediation analysis indicated
that choosing targets as one’s opponent was related to higher
levels of morality that participants ascribed to these targets.
This is different from Study 2 which showed that the above
relationship was related to sociability.
The addition to Study 2 was that we also investigated the
behavioral implications for choosing a representative. Inter‑
estingly, these data revealed a different pattern that suggests
a potential role for competence for choosing representatives.
When choosing one’s representative, participants less often
chose targets who had genuinely communicated anger (vs.
happiness) and more often chose targets who had decep‑
tively communicated anger (vs. happiness). The mediation
analysis suggested that this might be related to higher levels
of competence that participants ascribed to these targets,
which supported H5. Combined, these findings tentatively
suggest that negotiators may choose targets who are moral
A
B
Fig. 2 The Indirect Effects of Communication Type, Emotion Type,
and Their Interaction on the Choice of an Opponent (A)/a Represent‑
ative (B) via Morality, Sociability, and Competence. Note. Standard‑
ized coefficients β are reported. Dotted lines indicate non‑significant
effects (p > .05). Solid lines indicate significant effects; bolded lines
indicate significant indirect effects (*p < .05, ***p < .001)
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
or sociable as their opponent but choose targets who are
competent as their representative for future negotiations. We
will elaborate on this in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
The main goal of the current studies was to investigate how
people evaluate negotiators who deceptively communicate
anger or happiness. To advance the field we distinguished
between evaluations of morality, sociability, and compe‑
tence—dimensions that have been identified as essential in
the domain of person perception (e.g., Abele etal., 2021;
Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Leach etal., 2007). The current
findings indeed showed that distinguishing between these
dimensions may also advance the understanding of how peo‑
ple evaluate emotion deception, and in particular how they
evaluate different forms of emotion deception.
First of all, the studies consistently showed that—in gen‑
eral—communicating a different emotion than one truly
feels when negotiating is considered as less moral, less
sociable, and less competent than genuinely communicat‑
ing one’s emotion. As for the morality dimension, these
findings may connect to studies showing that negotiators
evaluate their counterparts who deceptively communicate
emotions as untrustworthy (Campagna etal., 2016); but note
that morality is a broader concept than trustworthiness (e.g.,
Brambilla & Leach, 2014). That emotion deception may also
negatively affect evaluations of sociability and competence
has to our knowledge not been shown previously.
In addition to comparing deceptive and genuine commu‑
nications of emotions, we also showed that people evalu‑
ate different types of emotion deception along the dimen‑
sions of morality, sociability, and competence. We found
that negotiators who deceptively communicated anger were
evaluated as less moral and less sociable but also as more
competent than those who deceptively communicated hap‑
piness. That deceptive anger is evaluated as less moral and
as less sociable matches with insights suggesting that decep‑
tive anger is seen as an attempt to increase one’s outcomes
at the expense of others. It may thus signal a lower concern
about the counterparts’ welfare (Campagna etal., 2016) and
a higher concern about increasing one’s own outcomes (Ye
etal., 2023). That deceptive anger may signal higher compe‑
tence, more so than deceptive happiness, is interesting. First
of all, because it shows that evaluations do not necessarily
converge. But importantly, the insights suggest that using
a tactic that is considered immoral (and less sociable) may
in the context of negotiations to some extent be seen as a
signal of competence. This may resonate with the advice
that is sometimes given to negotiators—i.e., to show, or
even fake anger and thereby become a competent negotiator
(see e.g., Hutson, 2015). The connection with competence
may also result from a potential connection with traits like
assertiveness and dominance, which are both relevant to the
competence dimension (see Abele etal., 2021). As for the
finding that deceptive anger is seen as more competent but
less sociable, the findings would also fit with Cohen etal.’s
(2014) suggestion that negotiators who communicate with
a “tough and firm” style are perceived as more dominant
and assertive than those who communicate with a “warm
and friendly” style. Note that their insights did not explicitly
refer to deceptive emotion communications but to commu‑
nication style.
Our primary interest was in how negotiators evaluate
emotion deception. Our findings, however, are also informa‑
tive on how negotiators’ evaluate genuine communications
of anger and happiness. We consistently found that negotia‑
tors who genuinely communicated anger were evaluated as
less moral, less sociable, and less competent than those who
genuinely communicated happiness. These results were in
line with Belkin and Rothman’s (2017) study showing that
facial expressions of anger (vs. happiness) signals lower
levels of morality, sociability, and competence. It also cor‑
roborates research that showed that expressions of happiness
increase interpersonal trust (e.g., Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005)
and signal high levels of affiliation and liking (e.g., Harker
& Keltner, 2001), and confidence and power (e.g., Belkin
etal., 2013).
Negotiation Choices
We were not only interested in how people evaluate nego‑
tiators who use emotion deception. We also explored their
relation with specific behavioral consequences by offering
participants the opportunity to choose an opponent (Study 2
and 3) or a representative (Study 3) in an upcoming negotia‑
tion. We observed different relations for these two types of
choices. Most striking, in our opinion, was that when choos‑
ing a representative, participants had a clear preference for
a negotiator who had deceptively shown anger. Participants
not only preferred this negotiator to one who had deceptively
communicated happiness, but even to negotiators who had
genuinely communicated their emotions. Apparently, having
deceptively communicated anger can qualify rather than dis‑
qualify oneself as a representative. The mediation analyses
suggest a possible explanation by indicating that the choice
of a representative was best explained by the competence
ratings. Apparently, when choosing a representative, dimen‑
sions like morality and sociability carry less weight than
competence. This interpretation would fit with research that
showed that negotiators may emphasize competence‑related
traits of their teammates or representatives to enhance nego‑
tiation outcomes (García etal., 2017; Jeong etal., 2019;
Phalet & Poppe, 1997).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

Z.Ye et al.
Competence appeared less essential when choosing an
opponent. The most preferred opponent was clearly the tar‑
get who had genuinely communicated happiness. Both in
Studies 2 and 3, this choice did not appear to be related to
evaluations of competence. Note, however, that while Study
2 suggested that the choice of an opponent was related to
sociability, Study 3 suggested a role for morality. It makes
sense that both sociability and morality are important when
choosing an opponent, as these favorable may traits lead
to successful and cooperative negotiations, which is further
discussed in the following section.
Limitations andFuture Directions
Despite the advantages mentioned earlier, the present
research has certain limitations. One issue concerns the
mediation analyses. Apart from the fact that the mediation
findings were not conclusive regarding the role of morality
and sociability for the choice of opponent, we are aware
of the general limitations of mediation analyses, especially
when measuring potential mediators concurrently with the
dependent variables, (see e.g., Spencer etal., 2005; Tate,
2015). To improve the reliability, validity, and causality of
the relationship between social evaluations and negotiation
choices, future studies could delve deeper by both measur‑
ing and manipulating these dimensions (see e.g., Pirlott &
MacKinnon, 2016; Stone‑Romero & Rosopa, 2011). This
approach may provide a more comprehensive understanding
of the intricacies involved in negotiators’ decision‑making
processes.
Second, the current research only focused on the two
emotions happiness and anger. Even though these two emo‑
tions are most often communicated in negotiations and stud‑
ied by negotiation researchers (Van Kleef & Côté, 2022),
evaluations of deceptive (vs. genuine) communications of
other emotions can also be investigated. For instance, nego‑
tiators may also experience and express disappointment or
sadness (when the outcomes of the negotiation fall below
expectations; e.g., Clark & Taraban, 1991; Lelieveld etal.,
2013), or shame or guilt (when negotiators believe they have
taken too much; e.g., Baumeister etal., 1994; Keltner, 1996;
for a review see Van Kleef & Côté, 2022). Negotiators may
also deceptively communicate these emotions to induce
concessions from counterparts or relieve conflicts between
parties. Future studies can investigate how people evalu‑
ate negotiators who deceptively or genuinely communicate
these emotions in terms of morality, sociability, and compe‑
tence. Investigations such as these may further advance the
field (see Kang & Schweitzer, 2022).
Finally, the current research considered both deceptive
strategies—deceptive anger and deceptive happiness—as
potentially effective and valid tactics that may be used by
negotiators. As discussed, expressing deceptive anger may
induce higher offers from counterparts (Van Dijk etal.,
2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), while expressing decep‑
tive happiness may facilitate an agreement in the negotiation
(Carnevale, 2008). Nevertheless, the one‑shot negotiation
setting used in the current studies may limit the potential
effectiveness or benefits of communicating deceptive hap‑
piness, which may also explain why this strategy was evalu‑
ated as the least competent of all strategies. For instance,
negotiators may benefit more from (deceptively) commu‑
nicating happiness if there are future interactions between
both parties or the agreement reached in the negotiation
needs to be fulfilled over a long period of time (Hart & Sch‑
weitzer, 2020; O’Connor & Arnold, 2011). Future studies
can examine the effectiveness of deceptively communicat‑
ing happiness in a negotiation setting with multiple rounds,
and investigate whether communicating deceptive happiness
would then signal similar levels of morality, sociability, and
competence, and whether it may trigger cooperation of coun‑
terparts in subsequent rounds of the negotiation.
Conclusion
Our findings thus suggest that deceptive communications
of anger and happiness elicit low evaluations on morality,
but differ in their evaluations on sociability and compe‑
tence. In addition, we examined behavioral consequences
for choosing people with the ascribed evaluations, and
showed that the importance negotiators attach to these
dimensions is situationally dependent and different when
choosing one’s opponent/representative for an upcoming
negotiation. Taken together, these findings show the ben‑
efits of applying insights from the person perception litera‑
ture to the domain of emotion deception. It is our hope that
the current approach will instigate more research on the
effects of emotion deception, and thereby will contribute
to a more nuanced approach of the ethics of deception.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen‑
tary material available at https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10551‑ 024‑ 05824‑7.
Acknowledgements This research was funded by China Scholarship
Council (No. 202007720021).
Author contribution All authors contributed to the study conception
and design. Material preparation, data collection, and analysis were
performed by Zi Ye. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Zi
Ye and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript.
All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Data Availability The preregistrations, data, materials, and analyses
code described in this article are openly available in the Open Science
Framework (https:// osf. io/ jc7mu/).
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Evaluating Negotiators Who Deceptively Communicate Anger orHappiness: On theImportance…
Declarations
Conflict of Interests No potential conflict of interest was reported by
the authors.
Ethical Approval This research involves human participants. This
researchadheres to the ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code
of Conduct as well as the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research
Integrity, and was reviewed and approved by the Psychology Research
Ethics Committee of Leiden University.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri‑
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta‑
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes
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