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The Meloni-Casellati Institutional Reform: Towards a New Government System?
Abstract
This study examines the Meloni-Casellati institutional reform in Italy. This reform constitutes a relevant political fact that could potentially affect the functioning of political institutions and the behavior of political actors in the country. The reform aims to strengthen the link between voter preferences and government formation and enhance government stability. The proposal, consisting of four substantive articles, abolishes life senators, modifies the Head of State's dissolution powers, introduces the direct election of the prime minister and a peculiar confidence mechanism. This study explores the historical context and motivations behind the reform proposal, examining its potential impact on the country's politics. Then, it describes the various steps of the reform drafting. Finally, it compares the Meloni-Casellati proposal with Israel's 1992-2001 experiment concerning the direct election of the prime minister, scrutinizing similarities and differences. If approved, the reform will introduce a new, unprecedented government system in Italy, that has never been adopted elsewhere. As such, this topic poses relevant theoretical challenges for political science research, eliciting scholarly attention about Italian politics, government forms, institutional design, and ruling and opposition parties behavior.
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Blog entry in 'PEX - Executives, Presidents and Cabinet Politics'.
This new post on the PEX Blog analyzes the constitutional reform approved by the Italian Senate on June 18, 2024, which seeks to establish the direct election of the prime minister. The proposal aims to strengthen the executive, ensure greater government stability, and better align the government with voters' preferences. The reform would result in a mixed system between parliamentarism and presidentialism, described as a "premierato." However, it requires an unlikely majority of two-thirds, which means a referendum would be necessary, and if approved, the outcomes could differ significantly from the initial goals.
In this article, we add to the existing literature on the political consequences of Covid-19 by studying executive power in Italy during the 2020-22 emergency. Given the direct, inverse link between executive centrality and accountability intended as the formal and informal institutions that limit unilateral action, we examine the behavior and practices of Italian executives in the context of the government-parliament relationship, the dynamics between the central state and the regional authorities (horizontal accountability), and the media (diagonal accountability). We focus on the choices made by the government during the Covid crisis. We present descriptive evidence indicating that executive centrality and standards of accountability fluctuated with an intensity proportional to the threat levels of the various stages of the pandemic.
Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theo-rise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium. Keyword Semi-parliamentary government · Presidentialism · Parliamentary government · Separation of powers · Legislatures · Executives · Parliamentary democracy This quote is drawn from the abstract of the book. The abstract and open-access to the book may be viewed on the Oxford University Press website-https:// acade mic. oup. com/ book/ 38917.
In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.
Governments in countries with the constructive vote of no-confidence (CVNC) tend to be more durable than governments in countries with a regular vote of no-confidence (RVNC). Although this is the common claim in the limited literature that exists about the CVNC, no comprehensive study and no empirical tests have been conducted to date. We begin to fill this lacuna. Using a two-stage analysis including a Multivariate Cox proportional Hazard Model, we find that the type of no-confidence vote affects the government’s term of office, so that in countries with a CVNC, governments in general, and post-election governments in particular, last longer in office than governments in RVNC countries.
This paper analyses the institutions associated with government termination in parliamentary systems: no-confidence and confidence motions, and the early dissolution of the parliament. We consider constitutional texts for all European countries between 1800 and 2019 and identify two broad trends: (1) the constitutionalisation of practices that have first emerged as the result of strategic interactions between the government and the parliament; (2) the tendency towards protecting both the executive and the parliament from mutual interference. While the first tendency has culminated with an almost universal constitutionalisation of the principle of parliamentarism in European constitutions, the second led to the protection of executives and the extension of effective legislative terms. We suggest that these constitutional developments are associated with the stabilisation of parliamentarism after World War II and conclude that although parliamentarism remains a flexible system, contemporary regimes do not function like their forebears did in the 19th century.
Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system, which mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: It establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the “majoritarian” and “proportional” visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. The article analyzes bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratizing the European Union.
Despite considerable progress in the study of party switching, scholarly interest in institutional constraints explicitly designed to limit or penalise inter-party mobility remains limited in the literature. This paper contributes to the emerging scholarship on party switching and legal institutional constrains by assessing the effectiveness of the new anti-defection regulations introduced in the Italian Senate starting from 2018. To evaluate the impact of this intervention, we develop two quasi-experimental research approaches that take advantage of the bicameral structure of the Italian Parliament and the fact that the anti-defection regulations were only implemented in the Senate and not in the Chamber of Deputies. Our results indicate that anti-defection regulations failed both to limit inter-party mobility and the formation of new legislative parties. However, they results effective in influencing the timing of party switching, concentrating it in the phases of government formation and dissolution.
A constructive vote of no-confidence is more restrictive than a regular vote of no-confidence as it limits the ability of the legislative branch to challenge the government. Belgium and Israel are the only two countries to adopt the constructive vote of no-confidence while being established democracies. This paper focuses on these two highly interesting cases and asks two questions: 1) What were the circumstances and intentions that brought about the adoption of the cvnc in Belgium and in Israel? 2) What were the implications of the adoption of the cvnc on the Belgian and the Israeli political systems? The findings suggest that both Belgium and Israel adopted the cvnc out of a desire to stabilize their governments; however only Belgium has experienced a clear improvement in government stability after its adoption. In Israel the findings are mixed, depending on the measurement used to define government turnover.
Introduzione
La dizione «premierato» indica un sistema parlamentare nel quale il potere esecutivo sovrasta il potere legislativo e nel quale il primo ministro comanda i suoi ministri. L'idea è di un governo sopra l'assemblea che ribalta il governo della assemblea (l'assemblearismo). Va da sé, pertanto, che il premierato sta per «governo forte» nel senso di governo efficiente, di governo in grado di governare. Dire «premierato forte» è pleonastico: se è premierato, è per definizione forte (strutturalmente parlando).
In multiparty parliamentary democracies, government stability is key for effective governance. A considerable body of literature investigated this issue emphasising structure- and crises-related explanations. Recently, a flourishing scholarship has been focussing on institutional determinants of government stability. Among the institutional provisions examined, the constructive vote of no confidence (CVNC) is prompting remarkable scholarly interest. This article sheds light on the relationship between constructive vote of no confidence and government stability. Drawing on Lento and Hazan (2021) framework, it is hypothesised that the CVNC decreases the risk of cabinet dissolution. The research hypotheses are tested through a survival analysis based on an original multilevel dataset. The analysis confirms the impact of the CVNC in boosting government survival, yet this effect is limited to discretionary dissolutions.
The core feature of parliamentary democracy is government responsibility to the legislature. The most important instrument by which parliament can express its lack of support for the government is the vote of no confidence. This mechanism remains significantly under-studied, and research on votes of no confidence calls out for systematic attention. It is also timely because parliamentary democracies are making it procedurally harder for parliament to terminate the government. Through developing and conceptualising a series of indicators that affect the relative ease with which parliament can challenge and terminate government, this study proposes the first ever framework for analysing votes of no confidence. It then empirically locates countries in the framework and discusses those that have shifted over time. The goal of this study is to begin to fill an academic lacuna concerning, arguably, the defining feature of parliamentary democracy.
Scholars are unable to rationalise the number of elected representatives in legislative assemblies. This study offers some insights into the political arithmetic by examining the rare event of reducing seats in a legislature. It is hypothesised that a policy of cutting electoral districts occurs during a search for cost efficiencies and a burst of populism. Interviews with party elites involved with seven seat reduction events in Canadian provinces establishes that the primary reason for the policy is its symbolic value. The message of fewer politicians sets an example for belt-tightening across government that will assist the executive branch with its austerity agenda. In these situations, the final number of members of a legislature matters little to a cabinet and most legislators compared with the broader symbolism of a smaller legislative branch.
This paper first examines the frequency of direct presidential elections among the 170 countries of the world with a working, directly elected parliament. We find that there is a directly elected president in more than half of the countries and in about two-thirds of the republics. Former British colonies are less likely to hold direct presidential elections, which are otherwise very popular in North and South America and Africa. We then examine the kind of electoral formula that is used for the election of presidents. Most elections are held under the majority rule, most of the time under the majority runoff procedure. The majority rule is clearly predominant in Europe and Africa, and is unpopular in North America. Finally, no relationship is observed between the level of economic development or of democracy and the use of direct presidential elections or the choice of an electoral formula.
The constitutional debate in Italy from the Risorgimento until today, with special emphasis on the Constituent Assembly (1946-1948) and the following developments
En las postrimerías de la República de Weimar, la inestabilidad política causada por la incapacidad parlamentaria de otorgar a los gobiernos una confianza sólida condujo al replanteamiento de una institución clásica del Parlamentarismo: la moción de censura. A partir de aquellas primeras reflexiones, el artículo 67 de la Ley Fundamental de Bonn estableció la llamada moción de censura «constructiva», figura que fue posteriormente recogida en el artículo 113 de nuestra Constitución. Desde entonces, esta forma de entender el instituto — excepcional en el Derecho comparado — ha sido defendida alegando los graves problemas políticos que puede evitar. No obstante, también ha sido criticada debido a los graves obstáculos que interpone en el intento de derribar gobiernos débiles. Las páginas que siguen constituyen un estudio sobre las razones a favor y en contra de la moción de censura constructiva, así como un juicio sobre la oportunidad de mantenerla.
English Abstract: At the end of the Weimar Republic, the political instability caused by the parliamentary inefficiency to grant a solid confidence upon the different governments led to the reconsideration of a classical parliamentary institution: the vote of no confidence. Departing from those first reflections, Article 67 of the Bonn Basic Law established the so-called "constructive" vote of no confidence, a figure that was later adopted by Art. 113 of the Spanish Constitution. Since then, this way of understanding the institution — an exception among the different Constitutional systems — has been defended alleging the serious problems that may be avoided. Nevertheless, it has also been criticized for the serious burdens that puts before the task of overthrowing weak governments. The following pages seek to examine the reasons for and against the constructive vote of no confidence and to reach a judgement upon the convenience of maintaining it.
I seek to explain the disappointing performance of the field of comparative politics addressing the three basic questions: Why compare? What is comparable? and How? I also challenge the view that the methodology of comparison is pretty well known and established. Hosts of unsettled issues remain, while a growing cause of frustration and failure is the undetected proliferation of `cat-dogs' (or worse), that is, nonexistent aggregates which are bound to defy, on account of their non-comparable characteristics, any and all attempts at law-like generalizations. The bottom line is that the comparative endeavor suffers from loss of purpose.
In 1992, the Israeli parliament enacted the new Basic Law: The Government, which provides Israel with the distinction of being the only country to have direct popular election of its Prime Minister (beginning with the next election, scheduled for mid-1996). This new law not only effectively alters the electoral system, but also changes the entire political system in Israel, replacing its pure parliamentary system with a new, hybrid and unique regime type. This article describes the circumstances that brought about the recent reforms in Israel, delineates the electoral changes which were adopted, and analyzes whether Israel has switched from a parliamentary to a presidential political system.
In this updated and expanded edition of his classic text, Arend Lijphart offers a broader and deeper analysis of worldwide democratic institutions than ever before. Examining thirty-six democracies during the period from 1945 to 2010, Lijphart arrives at important-and unexpected-conclusions about what type of democracy works best. Praise for the previous edition: "Magnificent.... The best-researched book on democracy in the world today."-Malcolm Mackerras, American Review of Politics "I can't think of another scholar as well qualified as Lijphart to write a book of this kind. He has an amazing grasp of the relevant literature, and he's compiled an unmatched collection of data."-Robert A. Dahl, Yale University "This sound comparative research ... will continue to be a standard in graduate and undergraduate courses in comparative politics."-Choice.
Advocates of the 1993 reform of the Italian parliamentary electoral system intended it profoundly to alter the structure of the party system and the relationships among parties, interests and voters. The content of the reform is summarized and the expectations raised by its advocates are reviewed and tested against the outcome of the 1994 parliamentary election. While Italian politics has changed dramatically on the surface, analysis of events before and since the election raises questions about the degree to which these developments can be attributed to the electoral reform, and about whether they really signal a fundamental change in the nature of Italian party politics.
The conventional wisdom concerning the choice between majoritarian electoral systems and proportional representation (PR) – and, more broadly, between majoritarian and consensus forms of democracy – is that there is a trade-off: PR and consensus democracy provide more accurate representation and better minority representation, but majoritarianism provides more effective government. A comparative analysis of 18 older and well-established democracies, most of which are European democracies, shows that PR and consensus democracy indeed give superior political representation, but that majoritarian systems do not perform better in maintaining public order and managing the economy, and hence that the over-all performance of consensus democracy is superior. This conclusion should also be tested among the growing number of slightly newer non-European democracies, which are already old enough to have proved their viability and can be studied over an extended period of time. If its validity is confirmed – and the evidence so far is very promising – it can have great practical significance for the future of democracy in the world.
The role of the president is presumed to vary amongst presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. However, there are a variety of subtypes within semi-presidential systems. Debate often hinges on the prime minister and government, and to whom they are more accountable. However, the accountability of prime ministers and governments to presidents can be rather ‘fuzzy’. This article looks through the prism of the president rather than that of the government. After examining definitions of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, several dispositional categories of political regimes will be established. Then presidential power will be assessed through a series of dichotomous measures, and for all electoral democracies with a president. Finally, the character of each category will be assessed. The concept of ‘semi-presidentialism’ is rejected in favour of more meaningful labels: presidential systems, parliamentary systems with presidential dominance, parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective and parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents.
There are good prima facie reasons to believe that directly electing a prime minister may provide the holder of that office with a tremendous power resource. Indeed some countries with weak prime ministers have debated this possible change, and one, Israel, carried it through. Using a theoretical argument based on the number of veto points in a political system, this article proposes that a directly elected prime minister will not increase the power of a prime minister. It studies what actually happened in Israel, and offers alternative explanations for the weakness of and lack of cohesion in its executive. Similarly, other factors are identified as causes of prime ministerial weakness in Italy and Japan.
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