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The nature and development of cognitive offloading in children
Child Development Perspectives
Abstract
Humans routinely use external thinking tools, like pencil and paper, maps, and calculators, to solve cognitive problems that would have once been solved internally. As many youth face unprecedented exposure to increasingly capable technological aids, there is a growing pressure to understand children's cognitive offloading capacities and propensities, and what they stand to gain or lose as frequent offloaders in the modern world. In this article, we review emerging research on the development of cognitive offloading. Children as young as 4 years can engage in effective offloading strategies that follow principles similar to those used by adults—for example, greater recruitment of external support when tasks are more difficult. However, young children's strategies also show evidence of bias (sometimes inadequate and sometimes excessive offloading), lack of selectivity, and lack of self‐initiation. We also draw attention to important avenues for future research, working toward protecting and nurturing children's cognitive well‐being in the digital age.
... This suggests that 8-to 12-year-old children were aware of the potential benefit offered by the alarm and reallocated the freed cognitive resources to the ongoing task. It aligns with a recent finding indicating that school-age children are, for example, capable of using cognitive offloading strategy based on beliefs of task difficulty to compensate for cognitive challenges (Armitage & Gilbert, 2024). In our study, the experimenter provided salient PM cues to children, and future research should continue to explore children's ability to voluntarily set alarms or reminders for PM tasks. ...
... Furthermore, if freed cognitive resources are diverted to unrelated tasks, situation awareness can decrease [40]. There is also evidence of AI use fostering bias and a lack of self-initiation, potentially stemming from flawed metacognitive evaluations, raising concerns for developmental impacts, especially in children [3,56]. ...
Humans have always dreamed of possessing superpowers, and the rapid development of AI-based features promises to bring these dreams (closer) to reality. However, these advancements come with significant risks. This paper advocates for challenging existing methods and approaches in design and evaluation for more responsible AI. We stimulate reflection through a futuristic user journey illustrating the AI-driven life of Edmund in 2035. Subsequently, we discuss four AI-based superpowers: extended perception, cognitive offloading, externalized memory, and enhanced presence. We then discuss implications for HCI and AI, emphasizing the need for preserving intrinsic human superpowers, identifying meaningful use cases for AI, and evaluating AI's impact on human abilities. This paper advocates for responsible and reflective AI integration and proposes a pathway towards the idea of a Human Flourishing Benchmark.
... Dergaa et al. (2024) cautioned against AI-induced cognitive atrophy, where habitual AI use weakens problem-solving abilities. Similarly, Armitage and Gilbert (2024) observed that early exposure to AI-powered educational tools can impede independent reasoning and analytical skills, potentially hindering long-term intellectual development. The shift toward shallow cognitive processing is another key concern. ...
This chapter investigates the perceived erosion of critical academic skills among 745 university students due to dependency on AI tools. The survey measured six key constructs: AI Dependency (AID), Cognitive Offloading (CO), Motivational Decline (MD), Academic Skills Erosion (ASE), Academic Integrity Awareness (AIA), and External Pressures (EP), using a five-point Likert scale. Path Analysis was employed to examine the interrelationships among these constructs. The results revealed a strong positive relationship between AID and both CO and MD, which indicated that the increased reliance on AI leads to reduced cognitive engagement and diminished academic motivation. Additionally, CO and MD were positively associated with ASE, which means that students who offload cognitive tasks and experience MD are more likely to exhibit deteriorating academic skills. While AIA had a weak negative relationship with AID, EP showed a moderate positive association and highlighted the role of academic stress in driving AI reliance.
Australian children aged 6–9 years (N = 120, 71 females; data collected in 2021‐2022) were tasked with remembering the locations of 1, 3, 5, and 7 targets hidden under 25 cups on different trials. In the critical test phase, children were provided with a limited number of tokens to allocate across trials, which they could use to mark target locations and assist future memory performance. Following the search period, children were invited to adjust their previous token allocation. Although 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds prospectively allocated proportionately more tokens to more difficult trials, 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds did so only in retrospect. During middle childhood, humans become increasingly adept at weighing up when to rely on their unaided capacities and when to offload cognitive demand.
Reminders such as calendar entries and digital alerts are highly effective at helping people remember what they need to do. Recent work has explored the triggers of reminder setting, also known as intention offloading, finding that low confidence is associated with more offloading in laboratory tasks. This supports a metacognitive model of cognitive offloading. Here, we investigated whether this model generalizes to real-world intentions. We asked 112 participants about their upcoming plans and subsequent fulfillment of those plans in two online surveys conducted in 2022. Participants were more likely to set reminders for plans that (a) they were less confident they would remember and (b) they judged to be more important. Participants with lower confidence that they would remember to return for the second survey were more likely to set a reminder for this plan. This, in turn, predicted greater fulfillment. Therefore, ironically, lower confidence predicted greater success. These findings show that intention offloading predicts fulfillment of real-world intentions. They also point toward metacognition as a target for interventions to facilitate this.
Cognitive offloading is used to supplement internal processing demands through external actions such as writing down information. While metacognition plays a critical role in adults’ cognitive offloading decisions, less is known about the relation between metacognition and cognitive offloading in children. Here, we introduced an immediate memory task to 11- to 12-year-olds under two conditions: no choice to offload and choice to offload. Participants made metacognitive judgements about their memory capacity, and the task performance components such as accuracy and effort. Our results revealed that recall accuracy of the to-be-remembered items increased in the choice condition. Interestingly, while there was a consensus amongst participants that they chose to offload to maximise accuracy and reduce effort, there was no relation between offloading behaviour and metacognitions about accuracy and effort. On the other hand, metacognition for memory capacity was related to offloading behaviour. We discuss the implications for further understanding of the relation between cognitive offloading and metacognition in children.
A cardinal feature of adult cognition is the awareness of our own cognitive struggles and the capacity to draw upon this awareness to offload internal demand into the environment. In this preregistered study conducted in Australia, we investigated whether 3-8-year-olds (N = 72, 36 male, 36 female, mostly White) could self-initiate such an external metacognitive strategy and transfer it across contexts. Children watched as an experimenter demonstrated how to mark the location of a hidden prize, thus helping them successfully retrieve that prize in the future. Children were then given the opportunity to spontaneously adopt an external marking strategy across six test trials. Children who did so at least once were then introduced to a conceptually similar but structurally distinct transfer task. Although most 3-year-olds deployed the demonstrated strategy in the initial test phase, none of them modified that strategy to solve the transfer task. By contrast, many children aged 4 years and older spontaneously devised more than one previously unseen reminder-setting strategy across the six transfer trials, with this tendency increasing with age. From age 6, children deployed effective external strategies on most trials, with the number, combination, and order of unique strategies used varying widely both within and across the older age groups. These results demonstrate young children's remarkable flexibility in the transferral of external strategies across contexts and point to pronounced individual differences in the strategies children devise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as ‘intention offloading’. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals’ ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals’ adaptive use of cognitive tools.
The storage of information in external tools (e.g., notebook, cellphone) has become increasingly common. Some researchers have defined this behavior as cognitive offloading, which is a type of learning strategy. Studies have indicated that as age increases, children become increasingly capable of calibrating their learning strategies according to the difficulty of learning items. The value of items is also essential in people’s daily learning. However, how children apply both cues of item difficulty and item value for cognitive offloading to regulate their learning process remains unclear. In three studies, we investigated children’s offloading of learning items by manipulating these items’ difficulty and value (Study 1), value alone with difficulty being unvaried (Study 2), and difficulty and value with an emphasis on value (Study 3). The results indicate that children aged 11 years used difficulty cues alone for cognitive offloading when both difficulty and value cues were presented. However, when difficulty was controlled and value was emphasized, the 11-year-old children adopted cognitive offloading strategies based on value cues. The three studies revealed the conditions under which children in middle childhood apply cues of the item value, which are goal-driven cues, for cognitive offloading and provided methods for encouraging children to simultaneously apply item difficulty cues, which are data-driven cues, and item value cues.
Pronounced developmental progression during the transition to formal schooling can be found in executive functions (EF) and metacognition (MC). However, it is still unclear whether and how EF and MC influence each other during this transition. Previous research with young children suggests that inhibition may be a prerequisite for monitoring skills. Thus, the present longitudinal study investigated the association between the common subcomponents of EF (inhibition, working memory, and shifting) assessed in kindergarten (T1) and metacognitive monitoring assessed in 2nd grade (T2) in a sample of N = 84 children. In line with our hypothesis, the results revealed a significant link only between the EF subcomponent inhibition and later metacognitive monitoring. More precisely, children with better inhibition skills in kindergarten showed less overconfident monitoring in elementary school. Interestingly, the longitudinal relationship between inhibition and monitoring was not bidirectional. The findings indicate an essential role of early inhibition skills regarding emerging and developing elementary school children’s monitoring skills.
Metacognition plays an essential role in adults’ cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool‐aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions.
Ninety‐seven children aged 4–11 (49 males, 48 females, mostly White) were given the opportunity to improve their problem‐solving performance by devising and implementing a novel cognitive offloading strategy. Across two phases, they searched for hidden rewards using maps that were either aligned or misaligned with the search space. In the second phase, maps were presented on rotatable turntables, thus allowing children to manually align all maps and alleviate mental rotation demand. From age six onwards, children showed strong evidence of both mentally rotating misaligned maps in phase 1 and manually aligning them in phase 2. Older children used this form of cognitive offloading more frequently, which substantially improved performance and eliminated the individual differences observed in phase 1.
Modern technical tools such as tablets allow for the temporal externalization of working memory processes (i.e. cognitive offloading). Although such externalizations support immediate performance on different tasks, little is known about potential long-term consequences of offloading behavior. In the current set of experiments, we studied the relationship between cognitive offloading and subsequent memory for the offloaded information as well as the interplay of this relationship with the goal to acquire new memory representations. Our participants solved the Pattern Copy Task, in which we manipulated the costs of cognitive offloading and the awareness of a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 1 (N = 172), we showed that increasing the costs for offloading induces reduced offloading behavior. This reduction in offloading came along with lower immediate task performance but more accurate memory in an unexpected test. In Experiment 2 (N = 172), we confirmed these findings and observed that offloading behavior remained detrimental for subsequent memory performance when participants were aware of the upcoming memory test. Interestingly, Experiment 3 (N = 172) showed that cognitive offloading is not detrimental for long-term memory formation under all circumstances. Those participants who were forced to offload maximally but were aware of the memory test could almost completely counteract the negative impact of offloading on memory. Our experiments highlight the importance of the explicit goal to acquire new memory representations when relying on technical tools as offloading did have detrimental effects on memory without such a goal.
Individuals often choose between remembering information using their own memory ability versus using external resources to reduce cognitive demand (i.e. ‘cognitive offloading’). For example, to remember a future appointment an individual could choose to set a smartphone reminder or depend on their unaided memory ability. Previous studies investigating strategic reminder setting found that participants set more reminders than would be optimal, and this bias towards reminder-setting was predicted by metacognitive underconfidence in unaided memory ability. Due to the link between underconfidence in memory ability and excessive reminder setting, the aim of the current study was to investigate whether metacognitive training is an effective intervention to a) improve metacognitive judgment accuracy, and b) reduce bias in strategic offloading behaviour. Participants either received metacognitive training which involved making performance predictions and receiving feedback on judgment accuracy, or were part of a control group. As predicted, metacognitive training increased judgment accuracy: participants in the control group were significantly underconfident in their memory ability, whereas the experimental group showed no significant metacognitive bias. However, contrary to predictions, both experimental and control groups were significantly biased toward reminder-setting, and did not differ significantly. Therefore, reducing metacognitive bias was not sufficient to eliminate the bias towards reminders. We suggest that the reminder bias likely results in part from erroneous metacognitive evaluations, but that other factors such as a preference to avoid cognitive effort may also be relevant. Finding interventions to mitigate these factors could improve the adaptive use of external resources.
Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4–11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation––to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.
Background:
Cognitive offloading is the use of physical action to reduce the cognitive demands of a task. Everyday memory relies heavily on this practice; for example, when we write down to-be-remembered information or use diaries, alerts, and reminders to trigger delayed intentions. A key goal of recent research has been to investigate the processes that trigger cognitive offloading. This research has demonstrated that individuals decide whether or not to offload based on a potentially erroneous metacognitive evaluation of their mental abilities. Therefore, improving the accuracy of metacognitive evaluations may help to optimise offloading behaviour. However, previous studies typically measure participants' use of an explicitly instructed offloading strategy, in contrast to everyday life where offloading strategies must often be generated spontaneously.
Results:
We administered a computer-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions. One group of participants was explicitly instructed on a method for setting external reminders; another was not. The latter group spontaneously set reminders but did so less often than the instructed group. Offloading improved performance in both groups. Crucially, metacognition (confidence in unaided memory ability) guided both instructed and spontaneous offloading: Participants in both groups set more reminders when they were less confident (regardless of actual memory ability).
Conclusions:
These results show that the link between metacognition and cognitive offloading holds even when offloading strategies need to be spontaneously generated. Thus, metacognitive interventions are potentially able to alter offloading behaviour, without requiring offloading strategies to be explicitly instructed.
Cognitive offloading refers to our reliance on the external environment in order to reduce cognitive demand. For instance, people write notes on paper or smartphones in order not to forget shopping lists or upcoming appointments. A plausible hypothesis is that such offloading relies on metamemory - our confidence in our future memory performance. However, this hypothesis has not been directly tested, and it remains unclear when and how people use external sources to aid their encoding and retrieval of information. In four experiments, here we asked participants to learn word pairs and decide whether to offload some of the pairs by "saving" them on a computer. In the memory test, they had the opportunity to use this saved information on half of trials. Participants adaptively saved the most difficult items and used this offloaded information to boost their memory performance. Crucially, participants' confidence judgments about their memory predicted their decisions to use the saved information, indicating that cognitive offloading is associated with metacognitive evaluation about memory performance. These findings were accommodated by a Bayesian computational model in which beliefs about the performance boost gained from using offloaded information are negatively coupled to an evaluation of memory ability. Together our findings highlight a close link between metamemory and cognitive offloading.
Individuals frequently choose between accomplishing goals using unaided cognitive abilities or offloading cognitive demands onto external tools and resources. For example, in order to remember an upcoming appointment one might rely on unaided memory or create a reminder by setting a smartphone alert. Setting a reminder incurs both a cost (the time/effort to set it up) and a benefit (increased likelihood of remembering). Here we investigate whether individuals weigh such costs/benefits optimally or show systematic biases. In 3 experiments, participants performed a memory task where they could choose between (a) earning a maximum reward for each remembered item, using unaided memory; or (b) earning a lesser amount per item, using external reminders to increase the number remembered. Participants were significantly biased toward using external reminders, even when they had a financial incentive to choose optimally. Individual differences in this bias were stable over time, and predicted by participants' erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. Bias was eliminated, however, when participants received metacognitive advice about which strategy was likely to maximize performance. Furthermore, we found that metacognitive interventions (manipulation of feedback valence and practice-trial difficulty) yielded shifts in participants' reminder bias that were mediated by shifts in confidence. However, the bias could not be fully attributed to metacognitive error. We conclude that individuals have stable biases toward using external versus internal cognitive resources, which result at least in part from inaccurate metacognitive evaluations. Finding interventions to mitigate these biases can improve individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
Research has shown that adults can engage in cognitive offloading, whereby internal processes are offloaded onto the environment to help task performance. Here we investigate an application of this approach with children, in particular children with poor working memory. Participants were required to remember and recall sequences of colors by placing colored blocks in the correct serial order. In one condition the blocks were arranged to facilitate cognitive offloading (i.e., grouped by color), whereas in the other condition they were arranged randomly. Across two experiments (total N = 166) the ordered condition improved task performance for children with low working memory ability. In addition, participants in Experiment 2 rated the difficulty of the two arrangements, and performed a further condition in which they were given an opportunity to freely arrange the blocks before completing the task. Despite performing better in the ordered condition, children with low working memory ability did not rate the ordered arrangement as easier, nor did they chose an ordered arrangement when given the opportunity to do so. This research shows that cognitive offloading can also be a useful process in populations other than typical adults, and the implications of this work for supporting children with poor working memory are discussed.
Objective:
A distributed cognitive system is a system in which cognitive processes are distributed between brain-based internal and environment-based external resources. In the current experiment, we examined the influence of metacognitive processes on external resource use (i.e., cognitive offloading) in such systems.
Background:
High-tech working environments oftentimes represent distributed cognitive systems. Because cognitive offloading can both support and harm performance, depending on the specific circumstances, it is essential to understand when and why people offload their cognition.
Method:
We used an extension of the mental rotation paradigm. It allowed participants to rotate stimuli either internally as in the original paradigm or with a rotation knob that afforded rotating stimuli externally on a computer screen. Two parameters were manipulated: the knob's actual reliability (AR) and an instruction altering participants' beliefs about the knob's reliability (believed reliability; BR). We measured cognitive offloading proportion and perceived knob utility.
Results:
Participants were able to quickly and dynamically adjust their cognitive offloading proportion and subjective utility assessments in response to AR, suggesting a high level of offloading proficiency. However, when BR instructions were presented that falsely described the knob's reliability to be lower than it actually was, participants reduced cognitive offloading substantially.
Conclusion:
The extent to which people offload their cognition is not based solely on utility maximization; it is additionally affected by possibly erroneous preexisting beliefs.
Application:
To support users in efficiently operating in a distributed cognitive system, an external resource's utility should be made transparent, and preexisting beliefs should be adjusted prior to interaction.
The current study explored under what conditions young children would set reminders to aid their memory for delayed intentions. A computerized task requiring participants to carry out delayed intentions under varying levels of cognitive load was presented to 63 children (aged between 6.9 and 13.0 years old). Children of all ages demonstrated metacognitive predictions of their performance that were congruent with task difficulty. Only older children, however, set more reminders when they expected their future memory performance to be poorer. These results suggest that most primary school-aged children possess metacognitive knowledge about their prospective memory limits, but that only older children may be able to exercise the metacognitive control required to translate this knowledge into strategic reminder setting.
Psychology must confront the bias in its broad literature towards the study of participants
developing in environments unrepresentative of the vast majority of the world’s population. Here,
we focus on the implications of addressing this challenge, highlight the need to address over-reliance
on a narrow participant pool, and emphasize the value and necessity of conducting research with
diverse populations. We show that high impact-factor developmental journals are heavily skewed
towards publishing papers with data from WEIRD populations (Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich and Democratic). Most critically, despite calls for change and supposed widespread awareness
of this problem, there is a habitual dependence on convenience sampling and little evidence that the
discipline is making any meaningful movement towards drawing from diverse samples. Failure to
confront the possibility that culturally-specific findings are being misattributed as universal traits has
broad implications for the construction of scientifically defensible theories and for the reliable public
dissemination of study findings.
Individuals frequently make use of the body and environment when engaged in a cognitive task. For example, individuals will often spontaneously physically rotate when faced with rotated objects, such as an array of words, to putatively offload the performance costs associated with stimulus rotation. We looked to further examine this idea by independently manipulating the costs associated with both word rotation and array frame rotation. Surprisingly, we found that individuals' patterns of spontaneous physical rotations did not follow patterns of performance costs or benefits associated with being physically rotated, findings difficult to reconcile with existing theories of strategy selection involving external resources. Individuals' subjective ratings of perceived benefits, rather, provided an excellent match to the patterns of physical rotations, suggesting that the critical variable when deciding on-the-fly whether to incorporate an external resource is the participant's metacognitive beliefs regarding expected performance or the effort required for each approach (i.e., internal vs. internal + external). Implications for metacognition's future in theories of cognitive offloading are discussed.
© 2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Twenty children at each of grades K, 1, 3, and 5 were interviewed in order to sample their knowledge concerning various memory or memory-related phenomena (metamemory). In the present study, metamemory referred primarily to the child's verbalizable knowledge of how certain classes of variables act and interact with one another to affect the quality of an individual's performance on a retrieval problem. Examples of such variables include the relations among the items to be learned, how much study time is allotted, and how exactly they must be reproduced on the recall test. The results of this exploratory study tentatively suggest that children of grades K and 1 can often articulate the intuition that decay from shortterm memory (STM) can be very rapid; there are apt to be savings in the relearning of previously learned but subsequently forgotten information; retrieval performance is affected by amount of prior study time, by properties of individual items (e. g., familiarity), and especially by the number of items to be retrieved. Younger as well as older subjects also showed a striking tendency to think of external mnemonic resources, such as written records and other people, when proposing solutions to various preparation-for-retrieval and retrieval problems. Children of grades 3 and (especially) 5 appear considerably more planful and self-aware in their approach to both kinds of problems and also command a wider variety of solution procedures. Specific acquisitions include a more differentiated concept of self and others as mnemonic organisms and a better understanding of how relations among items (as contrasted with their individual properties) can variously facilitate or interfere with retrieval.
Over the last decade, the metacognitive abilities of nonhuman primates and the developmental emergence of metacognition in children have become topics of increasing research interest. In the current study, the performance of three adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Experiment 1) and forty-four 3.5- and 5.5-year-old human children (Experiment 2) was assessed on a behavioral search paradigm designed to assess metacognition. Subjects either directly observed the baiting of a large reward into one cup among an array of four, or had the baiting occluded from their view. In half of the trials, subjects were also presented with an additional distinctive cup that was always visibly baited with a small reward. This cup allowed subjects the opportunity to escape from making a guess about the location of the bigger reward. All three chimpanzees and both age groups of children selected the escape cup more often when the baiting of the large reward was concealed, compared to when it was visible. This demonstrates that both species can selectively choose a guaranteed smaller reward when they do not know the location of a larger reward and provides insight into the development of metacognition.
In everyday life, we often use external artifacts such as diaries to help us remember intended behaviors. In addition, we commonly manipulate our environment, for example by placing reminders in noticeable places. Yet strategic offloading of intentions to the external environment is not typically permitted in laboratory tasks examining memory for delayed intentions. What factors influence our use of such strategies, and what behavioral consequences do they have? This article describes four online experiments (N = 1196) examining a novel web-based task in which participants hold intentions for brief periods, with the option to strategically externalize these intentions by creating a reminder. This task significantly predicted participants’ fulfillment of a naturalistic intention embedded within their everyday activities up to one week later (with greater predictive ability than more traditional prospective memory tasks, albeit with weak effect size). Setting external reminders improved performance, and it was more prevalent in older adults. Furthermore, participants set reminders adaptively, based on a) memory load, b) the likelihood of distraction. These results suggest the importance of metacognitive processes in triggering intention offloading, which can increase the probability that intentions are eventually fulfilled.
The aim of the present study is to provide information and suggest ways to improve and evaluate metacognition in early childhood. Metacognition is important to learning and knowledge transfer and preparing students to become lifelong learners is a main aim of schooling. The engagement of young students in metacognitive thinking is considered necessary, as they seem capable of developing fundamental forms of metacognition after the age of three. The development of metacognitive skills helps young children to become thoughtful about their learning process. Specifically, the implementation of interesting activities in an enjoyable manner that develops young children's high-order thinking could help them to enhance metacognitive skills and become effective learners. Physical activities during reciprocal and self-check teaching styles are such activities that could guide young students to reflect on their own learning and realise what they are doing.
So far, research on children's allocation of study time has shown that, even though most young children can distinguish between easy and hard learning materials, they do not use this knowledge for further regulation of study time. To explore possible underlying mechanisms, we examined whether task characteristics can be created that facilitate children's appropriate use of study time. We investigated the effects of incentives and instructions (accuracy vs. speed emphasized) in 69 seven-year-old and 79 nine-year-old children's self-paced study times for easy (highly associated) and hard (unrelated) item pairs. Overall, the results confirm the findings obtained in previous studies, with older children differentiating more between easy and difficult learning materials in their study time. Regarding the effects of instructions, the study revealed that only 9-year-olds studied significantly longer when accuracy was emphasized. In contrast to our expectations, this increase in study time was not accompanied by an increase in subsequent recall. No differences in the study times were found as a function of presence/absence of incentives. The results are discussed both in terms of developmental progression taking place and in terms of the general theory of self-paced study time.
Kindergarten, first-, and third-grade children were given a multitrial sort-recall task with different items on each trial. Children were asked to predict how many items they would recall prior to each trial. We classified children into high- and low-overestimation groups based on their prediction accuracy on the first two trials and assessed changes in recall and strategy use over trials (trials 4/5 minus trials 1/2). Following predictions, at all grades, children in the high-overestimation group showed greater gains (or fewer losses) in recall than children in the low-overestimation group. Differences in strategy use over trials were generally nonsignificant. The results were interpreted as reflecting the adaptive nature of children's overestimation of their cognitive abilities.
Research and theorizing on executive function (EF) in childhood has been disproportionately focused on preschool age children. This review paper outlines the importance of examining EF throughout childhood, and even across the lifespan. First, examining EF in older children can address the question of whether EF is a unitary construct. The relations among the EF components, particularly as they are recruited for complex tasks, appear to change over the course of development. Second, much of the development of EF, especially working memory, shifting, and planning, occurs after age 5. Third, important applications of EF research concern the role of school-age children's EF in various aspects of school performance, as well as social functioning and emotional control. Future research needs to examine a more complete developmental span, from early childhood through late adulthood, in order to address developmental issues adequately.
Theories of self-regulated study assume that learners monitor item difficulty when making decisions about which items to select for study. To complement such theories, the authors propose an agenda-based regulation (ABR) model in which learners' study decisions are guided by an agenda that learners develop to prioritize items for study, given their goals and task constraints. Across 4 experiments, the authors orthogonally manipulated 1 task constraint-the reward structure of the task-with objective item difficulty, so that learners could use either item difficulty or potential reward in deciding how to allocate their study time. Learners studied items, were tested, and then selected half the items for restudy. As predicted by the ABR model, reward structure drove item selection more than did item difficulty, which demonstrates learners' agendas can override the effects of monitoring item difficulty in the allocation of study time.
Research suggests that individuals with lower working memory have difficulty remembering to fulfil delayed intentions. The current study examined whether the ability to offload intentions onto the environment mitigated these deficits. Participants (N = 268) completed three versions of a delayed intention task with and without the use of reminders, along with three measures of working memory capacity. Results showed that individuals with higher working memory fulfilled more intentions when having to rely on their own memory, but this difference was eliminated when offloading was permitted. Individuals with lower working memory chose to offload more often, suggesting that they were less willing to engage in effortful maintenance of internal representations when given the option. Working memory was not associated with metacognitive confidence or optimal offloading choices based on point value. These findings suggest offloading may help circumvent capacity limitations associated with maintaining and remembering delayed intentions.
The goal of this article is to review the empirical evidence of metacognition and its role in early childhood development and education. Metacognition is the ability to monitor and regulate one’s thinking, which supports meaningful, life-long learning. Metacognition is well studied in elementary and higher education; however, it is often overlooked in early childhood. This paper synthesizes research studies from the last few decades to provide readers with a conceptual understanding of the history, development, measurements, applications, and future directions of metacognition in the early years.
Remembering to carry out intended actions in the future, known as prospective memory (PM), is an important cognitive ability. In daily life, individuals remember to perform future tasks that might rely on effortful processes (monitoring) but also habitual tasks that might rely on more automatic processes. The development of PM across childhood in laboratory contexts is well understood, but little is known about the social context in which children develop their PM skills in everyday life. In the current study, three hundred and one parents reported on their 3-to 11-year-old child’s PM, child’s strategy use, and on their own scaffolding of their child’s PM using the Children’s Everyday Memory Questionnaire (CEMQ; adapted from the Prospective Memory Questionnaire). Preliminary analyses showed that the PM items on the CEMQ were reliable and composed of two components (a PM and a PM strategy use subscale). Our results showed that children’s PM and use of memory strategies, as reported by their parents, increased with age. Further, more frequent parent scaffolding was related to better PM in children. These relations were also explored separately for older and younger children. Notably, parents of younger, 3-to 6-year-olds reported scaffolding them more frequently with age, while parents of older, 7-to 11-year-olds reported scaffolding them less frequently with age. Open-ended responses revealed that parents used verbal reminders and children used external aids most frequently. Overall, parent scaffolding appears to impact children’s PM, but future research is needed to identify the causal direction of these relations.
People often use external reminders to help remember delayed intentions. This is a form of “cognitive offloading”. Individuals sometimes offload more often than would be optimal (Gilbert et al., 2020). This bias has been linked to participants’ erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. However, underconfidence is unlikely to fully explain the bias. An additional, previously-untested factor that may contribute to the offloading bias is a preference to avoid cognitive effort associated with remembering internally. The present Registered Report examined evidence for this hypothesis. One group of participants received payment contingent on their performance of the task (hypothesised to increase cognitive effort, and therefore reduce the bias towards offloading); another group received a flat payment for taking part, as in the earlier experiment. The offloading bias was significantly reduced (but not eliminated) in the rewarded group, suggesting that a preference to avoid cognitive effort influences cognitive offloading.
From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6, 7, 8, 9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.
A central feature of modern technologies such as smartphones or tablets is that they allow for the externalization of working memory processes (i.e. cognitive offloading). Such externalizations enable their users to perform beyond the limitations of internal cognitive processing. In this experimental study (N=172), we investigated two determinants of participants’ decision to offload working memory processes when using mobile devices. These determinants, interface design (i.e. responsivity in terms of temporal delay) and interaction design (touch-based vs. mouse-based control) of the involved mobile devices altered offloading behavior in a Pattern Copy Task. We observed that participants performing the task with a highly responsive device (i.e. no delay when accessing relevant information) offloaded more working memory processes than participants handling the same device at a lower responsivity (i.e. temporal delay). Further, participants using the device’s touch function also offloaded more working memory processes than participants using a computer mouse. These findings were further supported by subjective measures about the easiness, naturalness, and intuitivity when using the device. Thus, our study showed that both interface and interaction design influence metacognitive evaluations of the use of mobile devices and offloading behavior.
There is a vibrant debate about consequences of mobile devices on our cognitive capabilities. Use of technology guided navigation has been linked with poor spatial knowledge and wayfinding in both virtual and real world experiments. Our goal was to investigate how the attention people pay to the GPS aid influences their navigation performance. We developed navigation tasks in a virtual city environment and during the experiment, we measured participants’ eye movements. We also tested their cognitive traits and interviewed them about their navigation confidence and experience. Our results show that the more time participants spend with the GPS-like map, the less accurate spatial knowledge they manifest and the longer paths they travel without GPS guidance. This poor performance cannot be explained by individual differences in cognitive skills. We also show that the amount of time spent with the GPS is related to participant’s subjective evaluation of their own navigation skills, with less confident navigators using GPS more intensively. We therefore suggest that despite an extensive use of navigation aids may have a detrimental effect on person’s spatial learning, its general use is modulated by a perception of one’s own navigation abilities.
Previous studies have found that individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) can have difficulty remembering to execute delayed intentions. However, in these studies participants were prevented from setting external reminders, whereas the use of such reminders in everyday life is commonplace (e.g. calendars, to-do lists, smartphone alerts). In the present study, 28 participants with ASC and 24 matched neurotypicals performed a task requiring them to remember delayed intentions. In the first phase participants were required to use unaided memory, whereas in the second they had the option to offload their intentions by setting reminders if they wished. Performance of the ASC group was significantly poorer than the neurotypical group in phase 1, and metacognitive evaluations of memory abilities mirrored this. Nevertheless, in the second phase, the ASC group failed to compensate for impaired performance: if anything they set fewer reminders than the neurotypical group. These results indicate that intact explicit metacognitive judgements cannot be assumed to lead directly to the use of compensatory strategies.
If you have ever tilted your head to perceive a rotated image, or programmed a smartphone to remind you of an upcoming appointment, you have engaged in cognitive offloading: the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand. Despite the ubiquity of this type of behavior, it has only recently become the target of systematic investigation in and of itself. We review research from several domains that focuses on two main questions: (i) what mechanisms trigger cognitive offloading, and (ii) what are the cognitive consequences of this behavior? We offer a novel metacognitive framework that integrates results from diverse domains and suggests avenues for future research.
How do we decide whether to use external artifacts and reminders to remember delayed intentions, versus relying on unaided memory? Experiment 1 (N=400) showed that participants’ choice to forgo reminders in an experimental task was independently predicted by subjective confidence and objective ability, even when the two measures were themselves uncorrelated. Use of reminders improved performance, explaining significant variance in intention fulfilment even after controlling for unaided ability. Experiment 2 (N=303) additionally investigated a pair of unrelated perceptual discrimination tasks, where the confidence and sensitivity of metacognitive judgments was decorrelated from objective performance using a staircase procedure. Participants with lower confidence in their perceptual judgments set more reminders in the delayed-intention task, even though confidence was unrelated to objective accuracy. However, memory confidence was a better predictor of reminder setting. Thus, propensity to set reminders was independently influenced by a) domain-general metacognitive confidence; b) task-specific confidence; and c) objective ability.
With the continued integration of technology into people's lives, saving digital information has become an everyday facet of human behavior. In the present research, we examined the consequences of saving certain information on the ability to learn and remember other information. Results from three experiments showed that saving one file before studying a new file significantly improved memory for the contents of the new file. Notably, this effect was not observed when the saving process was deemed unreliable or when the contents of the to-be-saved file were not substantial enough to interfere with memory for the new file. These results suggest that saving provides a means to strategically off-load memory onto the environment in order to reduce the extent to which currently unneeded to-be-remembered information interferes with the learning and remembering of other information.
© The Author(s) 2014.
The goal of the current investigation was to compare two monitoring processes (judgments of learning [JOLs] and confidence judgments [CJs]) and their corresponding control processes (allocation of study time and selection of answers to maximize accuracy, respectively) in 5-, 6-, and 7-year-old children (N=101). Children learned the meanings of Japanese characters and provided JOLs after a study phase and CJs after a memory test. They were given the opportunity to control their learning in self-paced study phases and to control their accuracy by placing correct answers in a treasure chest and placing incorrect answers in a trash can. All three age groups gave significantly higher CJs for correct answers compared with incorrect answers, with no age-related differences in the magnitude of this difference, suggesting robust metacognitive monitoring skills in children as young as 5years. Furthermore, a link between JOLs and study time was found in 6- and 7-year-olds, such that children spent more time studying items with low JOLs compared with items with high JOLs. In addition, 6- and 7-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, spent more time studying difficult items compared with easier items. Moreover, age-related improvements were found in children's use of CJs to guide their selection of answers; although children as young as 5years placed their most confident answers in the treasure chest and placed their least confident answers in the trash can, this pattern was more robust in older children. Overall, results support the view that some metacognitive judgments may be acted on with greater ease than others among young children.
Determining how we use our body to support cognition represents an important part of understanding the embodied and embedded nature of cognition. In the present investigation, we pursue this question in the context of a common perceptual task. Specifically, we report a series of experiments investigating head tilt (i.e., external normalization) as a strategy in letter naming and reading stimuli that are upright or rotated. We demonstrate that the frequency of this natural behavior is modulated by the cost of stimulus rotation on performance. In addition, we demonstrate that external normalization can benefit performance. All of the results are consistent with the notion that external normalization represents a form of cognitive offloading and that effort is an important factor in the decision to adopt an internal or external strategy.
In a study of strategy use, 94 children aged 6, 8, and 10 years were given 3 tasks in a single session-Selective Recall (remembering the locations of a subset of the items), Remember All (remembering the locations of all items), and Same-Different (judging whether 2 rows of items are the same or different). On each task, during a study period on each trial the children chose which items to expose on an apparatus with doors concealing each item. 8- and 10-year-olds were more likely than the 6-year-olds to match their strategy to the particular task at hand. That is, older children tended primarily to open doors hiding relevant stimuli (items to be remembered) on the Selective Recall task, all of the items in a spatially organized way (row by row or column by column) on the Remember All task, and spatially corresponding doors (column by column) on the Same-Different task. 6-year-olds tended to use spatially organized strategies on all tasks, even when not appropriate. There also was evidence of transitional periods when an appropriate strategy is only partially used or when an appropriate strategy is produced but does not lead to improved performance as it does in older children. It was concluded that the development of strategies is a lengthy, gradual process involving several steps between their first emergence and their eventual refinement.
ABSTRACT— This article gives an overview of developmental trends in research on metacognition in children and adolescents. Whereas a first wave of studies focused on the assessment of declarative and procedural metacognitive knowledge in schoolchildren and adolescents, a second wave focused on very young children’s “theory of mind” (ToM). Findings from a recent longitudinal study are presented that demonstrate developmental links between early ToM and subsequent declarative metacognitive knowledge, mainly mediated by language competencies. The relevant literature further indicates that developmental trends in declarative and procedural metacognitive knowledge clearly differ. Whereas the findings for declarative metacognitive knowledge show steady improvement through childhood and adolescence, mainly due to increases in knowledge about strategies, the results are not similarly clear-cut for procedural metacognition. Age trends observed for this component of metacognition are significant for self-control activities but not pronounced for monitoring abilities. These findings have important implications for education, emphasizing the role of strategy training procedures in different instructional domains and illustrating teachers’ potential impact on the improvement of monitoring and control processes.
Two interrelated aspects of allocation of study time were examined in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 children: (a) distributing study time so that more difficult units were given more emphasis than others (differential allocation) and (b) determining how much time to spend for studying in order to meet the study goal (sufficient allocation). Children were asked to study a set of booklets (one “easy” or highly related and one “hard” or unrelated) of paired-associate items until they were sure they could remember all the pairs perfectly. While grades 1 and 3 children spent approximately the same amount of time on hard pairs as they spent on easy pairs, grades 5 and 7 children spent a greater amount of time on hard pairs than they did on easy pairs. Age-related improvement in allocation of sufficient time was evidenced by the significantly higher number of older children (grades 5 and 7) than younger children (grades 1 and 3) achieving perfect recall. Older students also exhibited a greater knowledge of and tendency to use self-testing strategies to monitor how well learned items were. It should be noted, however, that even many of the older children were not entirely successful at recalling the items perfectly.
This review article examines theoretical and methodological issues in the construction of a developmental perspective on executive function (EF) in childhood and adolescence. Unlike most reviews of EF, which focus on preschoolers, this review focuses on studies that include large age ranges. It outlines the development of the foundational components of EF-inhibition, working memory, and shifting. Cognitive and neurophysiological assessments show that although EF emerges during the first few years of life, it continues to strengthen significantly throughout childhood and adolescence. The components vary somewhat in their developmental trajectories. The article relates the findings to long-standing issues of development (e.g., developmental sequences, trajectories, and processes) and suggests research needed for constructing a developmental framework encompassing early childhood through adolescence.
Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers - often implicitly - assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these "standard subjects" are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species - frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior - hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.
In three experiments, preschoolers' ability to predict their picture recall was examined. Children studied 10 pictures, predicted how many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. This study-prediction-recall trial was repeated multiple times with new pictures on each trial. In Experiment 1, children were overconfident on the initial trial, and this overconfidence persisted across three trials. In Experiment 2, children predicted either their own performance or another child's performance. Their predictions were overconfident across all trials regardless of whether they made predictions for themselves or for another child, suggesting that wishful thinking cannot fully account for their overconfidence. In Experiment 3, some children postdicted their previous recall performance prior to making each prediction. Although their postdictions were quite accurate, their predictions were still overconfident across five trials. Preschoolers' overconfidence was remarkably resistant to the repeated experience of recalling fewer pictures than the children had predicted. Even asking them to report the number that they recalled on a previous trial, which they could do accurately, did not cause them to lower their predictions across trials.
Many models of learning rely on accessing internal knowledge states. Yet, although infants and young children are recognized to be proficient learners, the ability to act on metacognitive information is not thought to develop until early school years. In the experiments reported here, 3.5-year-olds demonstrated memory-monitoring skills by responding on a non-verbal task originally developed for non-human animals, in which they had to access their knowledge states. Children learned a set of paired associates, and were given the option to skip uncertain trials on a recognition memory test. Accuracy for accepted items was significantly higher than for skipped on a subsequent memory task that included all items. Additionally, children whose memory-monitoring assessments more closely matched actual memory performance showed superior overall learning, suggesting a correlation between memory-monitoring and memory itself. The results suggest that children may have implicit access to internal knowledge states at very young ages, providing an explanation for how they are able to guide learning, even as infants.
Children's change over time in frequency of finger use on number combinations was examined in relation to their change in accuracy. Performance was tracked longitudinally over 11 time points, from the beginning of kindergarten (mean age = 5.7 years) to the end of second grade (n= 217). Accuracy in number combinations increased steadily during the time period while frequency of finger use declined. Correlations between finger use and accuracy decreased gradually, ranging from 0.60 in kindergarten to -0.15 at the end of second grade. Low-income children showed linear growth in frequency of finger use while middle-income children slowed down by second grade and even started to decline. Although girls and boys showed similar growth patterns in frequency and accuracy, boys used their fingers less often than girls and were more accurate. The findings indicate that finger use is most adaptive when children are first learning number combinations, but this benefit lessens over time.
The time required to recognize that two perspective drawings portray objects of the same three-dimensional shape is found
to be (i) a linearly increasing function of the angular difference in the portrayed orientations of the two objects and (ii)
no shorter for differences corresponding simply to a rigid rotation of one of the two-dimensional drawings in its own picture
plane than for differences corresponding to a rotation of the three-dimensional object in depth.