No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
The Dynamics of Misinformation Sharing: The Mediated Role of News-Finds-Me Perception and the Moderated Role of Partisan Social Identity
Mass Communication and Society
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
The widespread dissemination of misinformation on social media is a serious threat to global health. To a large extent, it is still unclear who actually shares health-related misinformation deliberately and accidentally. We conducted a large-scale online survey among 5,307 Facebook users in six sub-Saharan African countries, in which we collected information on sharing of fake news and truth discernment. We estimate the magnitude and determinants of deliberate and accidental sharing of misinformation related to three vaccines (HPV, polio, and COVID-19). In an OLS framework we relate the actual sharing of fake news to several socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, employment status, education), social media consumption, personality factors and vaccine-related characteristics while controlling for country and vaccine-specific effects. We first show that actual sharing rates of fake news articles are substantially higher than those reported from developed countries and that most of the sharing occurs accidentally. Second, we reveal that the determinants of deliberate vs. accidental sharing differ. While deliberate sharing is related to being older and risk-loving, accidental sharing is associated with being older, male, and high levels of trust in institutions. Lastly, we demonstrate that the determinants of sharing differ by the adopted measure (intentions vs. actual sharing) which underscores the limitations of commonly used intention-based measures to derive insights about actual fake news sharing behaviour.
With the rise of social media, everyone has the potential to be both a consumer and producer of online content. Although one might assume that people share news because they believe it to be true, worldwide concerns about the spread of misinformation suggest that truthfulness may not be a dominant driver of sharing online. Across three studies (total N=4,786), we investigate what content dimensions are associated with social media sharing intentions for a wide range of news headlines. When we examine the relationships between content dimensions using factor analysis, we consistently find separate factors capturing perceived accuracy and evocativeness. The perceived accuracy factor was positively correlated with both sharing intentions and the headline’s objective veracity. However, while the evocativeness factor was also positively correlated with sharing intentions, it was consistently negatively correlated with the headline’s objective veracity.
Scholarship has now recognized the potentially detrimental effects of social media on political knowledge. At the same time, a separate but similar line of work has raised concerns that these platforms are the primary vector of political misinformation. Despite the renewed focus on misinformation studies, the question as to whether political knowledge and susceptibility to misinformation are related remains open. If they are indeed related, we still know little about the underlying cognitive mechanisms that drive political learning when people rely on social media for news. Based on a two-wave panel survey collected during the 2020 U.S. presidential election, we found that social media news use fosters the news-finds-me perception (particularly among those who feel overwhelmed with the volume of information available on social media). This, in turn, leads people to be both uninformed and misinformed about politics and current affairs. Implications for democracy are discussed.
Online fake news can have noxious consequences. Social media platforms are experimenting with different interventions to curb fake news' spread, often employing them simultaneously. However, research investigating the interaction of these interventions is limited. Here, we use the heuristic‐systematic model of information processing (HSM) as a theoretical framework to jointly test two interventions against fake news that are implemented at scale by social media platforms: (1) adding warning labels from fact checkers to initiate systematic processing and (2) removing social endorsement cues (e.g., engagement counts) to reduce the influence of this heuristic cue. Moreover, we accounted for dispositions previously found to affect a person's response to fake news through motivated reasoning or cognitive style. An online experiment in Germany (N = 571) confirmed that warning labels reduced the perceived credibility of a fake news post exaggerating the consequences of climate change. Warning labels also lowered the (self‐reported) likelihood to amplify fake news. Removing social endorsement cues did not have an effect. In line with research on motivated reasoning, left‐leaning individuals perceived the climate fake news to be more credible and reported a higher likelihood to amplify it. Supporting research on cognitive style, participants with lower educational levels and a less analytic thinking style also reported a higher likelihood of amplification. Elaboration likelihood was associated only with age, involvement, and political leaning, but not affected by warning labels. Our findings contribute to the mounting evidence for the effectiveness of warning labels while questioning their relevance for systematic processing.
Misinformation has been existed for centuries, though emerge as a severe concern in the age of social media, and particularly during COVID-19 global pandemic. As the pandemic approached, a massive influx of mixed quality data appeared on social media, which had adverse effects on society. This study highlights the possible factors contributing to the sharing and spreading misinformation through social media during the crisis. Preferred Reporting Items and Meta-Analysis guidelines were used for systematic review. Anxiety or risk perception associated with COVID-19 was one of the significant motivators for misinformation sharing, followed by entertainment, information seeking, sociability, social tie strength, self-promotion, trust in science, self-efficacy, and altruism. WhatsApp and Facebook were the most used platforms for spreading rumors and misinformation. The results indicated five significant factors associated with COVID-19 misinformation sharing on social media, including socio-demographic characteristics, financial considerations, political affiliation or interest, conspiracy ideation, and religious factors. Misinformation sharing could have profound consequences for individual and society and impeding the efforts of government and health institutions to manage the crisis. This SLR focuses solely on quantitative studies, hence, studies are overlooked from a qualitative standpoint. Furthermore, this study only looked at the predictors of misinformation sharing behavior during COVID-19. It did not look into the factors that could curb the sharing of misinformation on social media platforms as a whole. The study’s findings will help the public, in general, to be cautious about sharing misinformation, and the health care workers, and institutions, in particular, for devising strategies and measures to reduce the flow of misinformation by releasing credible information through concerned official social media accounts. The findings will be valuable for health professionals and government agencies to devise strategies for handling misinformation during public health emergencies.
Research suggests that the temporal order in which people receive information about costs and benefits whilst making decisions can influence their choices. But, do people have a preference for seeking information about costs or benefits when making effort-based decisions, and does this impact motivation? Here, participants made choices about whether to exert different levels of physical effort to obtain different magnitudes of reward, or rest for low reward. Prior to each effort-based choice, they also had to decide which information they wanted to see first: how much physical effort would be required, or how large the reward would be. We found no overall preference for seeking reward or effort information first, but motivation did change when people saw reward or effort information first. Seeking effort information first, both someone’s average tendency to do so and their choice to see effort first on a given trial, was associated with reductions in the willingness to exert higher effort. Moreover, the tendency to prefer effort information first was associated with reduced vigorous exercise and higher levels of fatigue in everyday life. These findings highlight that preferences for seeking effort information may be a bias that reduces people’s willingness to exert effort in the lab and in everyday life.
(1) Background: Misinformation is prevalent on social media in the age of COVID-19, exacerbating the threat of the pandemic. Uncovering the processes underlying people’s misinformation sharing using social media assists people to cope with misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study extends the stimulus-organism-response framework to examine how individuals’ social media dependency relates to their misinformation sharing behavior, with a focus on the underlying processes. (2) Methods: A total of 393 valid questionnaires were collected using a survey method to test the proposed research model. (3) Results: The results demonstrate that informational dependency and social dependency engender both positive and negative cognitive states, namely perceived information timeliness, perceived socialization and social overload, which then invoke positive as well as negative affect. What is more, the results show that both positive affect and negative affect can engender misinformation sharing. (4) Conclusions: Theoretically, this study uncovers the processes that lead to misinformation sharing on social media during the COVID-19 pandemic. Practically, this study provides actionable guidelines on how to manage social media usage and social media content to cope with misinformation sharing during the pandemic.
Online misinformation is believed to have contributed to vaccine hesitancy during the Covid-19 pandemic, highlighting concerns about social media’s destabilizing role in public life. Previous research identified a link between political conservatism and sharing misinformation; however, it is not clear how partisanship affects how much misinformation people see online. As a result, we do not know whether partisanship drives exposure to misinformation or people selectively share misinformation despite being exposed to factual content. To address this question, we study Twitter discussions about the Covid-19 pandemic, classifying users along the political and factual spectrum based on the information sources they share. In addition, we quantify exposure through retweet interactions. We uncover partisan asymmetries in the exposure to misinformation: conservatives are more likely to see and share misinformation, and while users’ connections expose them to ideologically congruent content, the interactions between political and factual dimensions create conditions for the highly polarized users—hardline conservatives and liberals—to amplify misinformation. Overall, however, misinformation receives less attention than factual content and political moderates, the bulk of users in our sample, help filter out misinformation. Identifying the extent of polarization and how political ideology exacerbates misinformation can help public health experts and policy makers improve their messaging.
Background:
Social media is widely used as a source of news and information regarding COVID-19. However, the abundance of misinformation on social media platforms has raised concerns regarding the spreading infodemic. Accordingly, many have questioned the utility and impact of social media news use on users' engagement with (mis) information.
Objective:
This study offers a conceptual framework for how social media news use influences COVID-19 misinformation engagement. More specifically, we examine how news consumption on social media leads to COVID-19 misinformation sharing by inducing belief in such misinformation. We further explore if the effects of social media news use on COVID-19 misinformation engagement depend on individual differences in cognition and personality traits.
Methods:
We use data from an online survey panel administered by a survey agency (Qualtrics) in Singapore. The survey was conducted in March 2022, and 500 respondents answered the survey. All participants were above 21 years of age and provided consent before taking part in the study. We use linear regression, mediation, and moderated mediation analyses to explore the proposed relationships between social media news use, cognitive ability, personality traits, and COVID-19 misinformation belief and sharing intentions.
Results:
The results suggest that those who frequently use social media for news consumption are more likely to believe COVID-19 misinformation and share it on social media. Further probing the mechanism suggests that social media news use translates into sharing intent via the perceived accuracy of misinformation. Simply put, social media news users share COVID-19 misinformation because they believe it to be accurate. We also find those with high levels of extraversion than those with low levels are more likely to perceive the misinformation to be accurate and share them. Those with high levels of neuroticism and openness (than lower levels) are also likely to perceive the misinformation to be accurate. Finally, it is observed that personality traits do not significantly influence misinformation sharing at higher levels of cognitive ability but low cognitive users largely drive misinformation sharing across personality traits.
Conclusions:
The reliance on social media platforms for news consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic has amplified, with dire consequences for misinformation sharing. This study shows that increased social media news consumption is associated with believing and sharing COVID-19 misinformation with low cognitive users being the most vulnerable. We offer recommendations to newsmakers, social media moderators, and policymakers towards efforts in limiting COVID-19 misinformation propagation and safeguard citizens.
The increasing dissemination of online misinformation in recent years has raised the question which individuals interact with this kind of information and what role attitudinal congruence plays in this context. To answer these questions, we conduct surveys in six countries (BE, CH, DE, FR, UK, and US) and investigate the drivers of the dissemination of misinformation on three noncountry specific topics (immigration, climate change, and COVID-19). Our results show that besides issue attitudes and issue salience, political orientation, personality traits, and heavy social media use increase the willingness to disseminate misinformation online. We conclude that future research should not only consider individual’s beliefs but also focus on specific user groups that are particularly susceptible to misinformation and possibly caught in social media “fringe bubbles.”
As the primary arena for viral misinformation shifts toward transnational threats, the search continues for scalable countermeasures compatible with principles of transparency and free expression. We conducted a randomized field experiment evaluating the impact of source credibility labels embedded in users’ social feeds and search results pages. By combining representative surveys ( n = 3337) and digital trace data ( n = 968) from a subset of respondents, we provide a rare ecologically valid test of such an intervention on both attitudes and behavior. On average across the sample, we are unable to detect changes in real-world consumption of news from low-quality sources after 3 weeks. We can also rule out small effects on perceived accuracy of popular misinformation spread about the Black Lives Matter movement and coronavirus disease 2019. However, we present suggestive evidence of a substantively meaningful increase in news diet quality among the heaviest consumers of misinformation. We discuss the implications of our findings for scholars and practitioners.
Research on news exposure has shown that while political knowledge and interest largely determine the degree of active engagement with online news, some people are generally less willing to invest into actively staying informed. Instead, these people report to pursue a passive mode of relying on specific sources, such as social media, based on the belief that “news finds me” (NFM). Notably, the three dimensions of NFM—feeling informed, relying on peers, and not actively seeking news—combine intentions and perceptions related to news use. Understanding NFM perceptions, hence, requires an analytical distinction between active and passive modes of news use as well as reliable measures of (different types of) news exposure. We contribute to this field by combining a survey, tracked web-browsing data, and tracked Facebook data to investigate the relationship between NFM perceptions and exposure to online news, also taking into account political knowledge and interest as traditional predictors of active news use. Our results show that both political knowledge and interest are associated with more news exposure via web browsers and that political knowledge—but not political interest—is also associated with more news in people’s Facebook feeds. Compared with the NFM dimensions, political knowledge and interest are stronger predictors of online news exposure in our study. Taken together, the novel combination of Facebook and web tracking data provides evidence that online news exposure is shaped by a confluence of traditional factors and more diffuse interpersonal processes.
Why would people share news they think might not be accurate? We identify a factor that, alongside accuracy, drives the sharing of true and fake news: the ‘interestingness-if-true’ of a piece of news. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 904), participants were presented with a series of true and fake news, and asked to rate the accuracy of the news, how interesting the news would be if it were true, and how likely they would be to share it. Participants were more willing to share news they found more interesting-if-true, as well as news they deemed more accurate. They deemed fake news less accurate but more interesting-if-true than true news, and were more likely to share true news than fake news. As expected, interestingness-if-true differed from interestingness and accuracy, and had good face validity. Higher trust in mass media was associated with a greater ability to discern true from fake news, and participants rated as more accurate news that they had already been exposed to (especially for true news). We argue that people may not share news of questionable accuracy by mistake, but instead because the news has qualities that compensate for its potential inaccuracy, such as being interesting-if-true.
What are the psychological consequences of the increasingly politicized nature of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States relative to similar Western countries? In a two-wave study completed early (March) and later (December) in the pandemic, we found that polarization was greater in the United States ( N = 1,339) than in Canada ( N = 644) and the United Kingdom. ( N = 1,283). Political conservatism in the United States was strongly associated with engaging in weaker mitigation behaviors, lower COVID-19 risk perceptions, greater misperceptions, and stronger vaccination hesitancy. Although there was some evidence that cognitive sophistication was associated with increased polarization in the United States in December (but not March), cognitive sophistication was nonetheless consistently negatively correlated with misperceptions and vaccination hesitancy across time, countries, and party lines. Furthermore, COVID-19 skepticism in the United States was strongly correlated with distrust in liberal-leaning mainstream news outlets and trust in conservative-leaning news outlets, suggesting that polarization may be driven by differences in information environments.
Research revolving social media and democracy has exploded. For almost two decades, scholarship has offered new theories, revisited some old ones, and provided empirical evidence that helped cast a strong light on social media effects over people’s social life, and democracy at large. Thanks to social media, citizens consume news, express their political views, discuss political matters, and participate in political activities. However, social media also cultivates the dissemination of fake news and misinformation, exposure to hate speech, media fragmentation, and political polarization. In short, social media seems to simultaneously be a springboard for encouraging and undesirable outcomes that foster and challenge democracies alike. One of these phenomena that stems from social media news use is the News Finds Me perception (NFM), which takes place when individuals feel they do not have to actively seeks news any more to be well-informed about public affairs, as they expect to receive relevant news and information by relying on their peers in social media. This article traces back the origin of the theory, its evolution, and the set of effects found in the literature. It also presents guidelines for future research and potential challenges as the scholarship centering on NFM continues to grow.
Using data from a two-wave panel survey among 18 countries worldwide, this study investigates the individual- and country-level antecedents of the “News Finds Me” perception (NFM). Results show that older, more educated, and individuals belonging to the ethnic majority are less prone to develop the NFM. However, social media (news) use, incidental news exposure, discussion frequency, and group affiliations lead to a higher NFM. In contrast, information elaboration as well as news use online were found to weaken the NFM. Testing various country-level factors, only gross domestic product was found to be negatively related to the NFM. The findings form a theoretical and empirical basis for future studies that aim at investigating news use in today’s high-choice media environment.
Significance
Almost four billion people around the world now use social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and social media is one of the primary ways people access news or receive communications from politicians. However, social media may be creating perverse incentives for divisive content because this content is particularly likely to go “viral.” We report evidence that posts about political opponents are substantially more likely to be shared on social media and that this out-group effect is much stronger than other established predictors of social media sharing, such as emotional language. These findings contribute to scholarly debates about the role of social media in political polarization and can inform solutions for creating healthier social media environments.
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation has been circulating on social media and multiple conspiracy theories have since become quite popular. We conducted a U.S. national survey for three main purposes. First, we aim to examine the association between social media news consumption and conspiracy beliefs specific to COVID-19 and general conspiracy beliefs. Second, we investigate the influence of an important moderator, social media news trust, that has been overlooked in prior studies. Third, we further propose a moderated moderation model by including misinformation identification. Our findings show that social media news use was associated with higher conspiracy beliefs, and trust in social media news was found to be a significant moderator of the relationship between social media news use and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, our findings show that misinformation identification moderated the relationship between social media news use and trust. Implications are discussed.
The spread of misinformation, including “fake news,” propaganda, and conspiracy theories, represents a serious threat to society, as it has the potential to alter beliefs, behavior, and policy. Research is beginning to disentangle how and why misinformation is spread and identify processes that contribute to this social problem. We propose an integrative model to understand the social, political, and cognitive psychology risk factors that underlie the spread of misinformation and highlight strategies that might be effective in mitigating this problem. However, the spread of misinformation is a rapidly growing and evolving problem; thus scholars need to identify and test novel solutions, and work with policy makers to evaluate and deploy these solutions. Hence, we provide a roadmap for future research to identify where scholars should invest their energy in order to have the greatest overall impact. © 2021 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
This study examines the causal effects of social media use on political knowledge as well as the underlying mechanisms through which such an effect occurs. The findings suggest that social media use hinders rather than enhances an individual’s learning about politics, because social media use fosters the perception that one no longer needs to actively seek news in order to stay informed (i.e., news-finds-me perception), and this in turn may have an adverse effect on an individual’s learning about politics. However, those who use traditional forms of media to a substantial degree to complement their news consumption via social media are less negatively affected than those who do not.
Research across many disciplines seeks to understand how misinformation spreads with a view towards limiting its impact. One important question in this research is how people determine whether a given piece of news is real or fake. The current article discusses the value of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) in disentangling two distinct aspects in the identification of fake news: (1) ability to accurately distinguish between real news and fake news and (2) response biases to judge news as real versus fake regardless of news veracity. The value of SDT for understanding the determinants of fake news beliefs is illustrated with reanalyses of existing data sets, providing more nuanced insights into how partisan bias, cognitive reflection, and prior exposure influence the identification of fake news. Implications of SDT for the use of source-related information in the identification of fake news, interventions to improve people's skills in detecting fake news, and the debunking of misinformation are discussed.
Misinformation about COVID-19 is a major threat to public health. Using five national samples from the UK (n= 1050 and n= 1150), Ireland (n = 700), the USA (n = 700), Spain (n= 700) and Mexico (n= 700), we examine predictors of belief in the most common statements about the virus that contain misinformation. We also investigate the prevalence of belief in COVID-19 misinformation across different countries and the role of belief in such misinformation in predicting relevant health behaviours. We find that while public belief in misinformation about COVID-19 is not particularly common, a substantial proportion views this type of misinformation as highly reliable in each country surveyed. In addition, a small group of participants find common factual information about the virus highly unreliable. We also find that increased susceptibility to misinformation negatively affects people's self-reported compliance with public health guidance about COVID-19, as well as people's willingness to get vaccinated against the virus and to recommend the vaccine to vulnerable friends and family. Across all countries surveyed, we find that higher trust in scientists and having higher numeracy skills were associated with lower susceptibility to coronavirus-related misinformation. Taken together, these results demonstrate a clear link between susceptibility to misinformation and both vaccine hesitancy and a reduced likelihood to comply with health guidance measures, and suggest that interventions which aim to improve critical thinking and trust in science may be a promising avenue for future research.
Scholarly work has placed political discussion at the center of a healthier democracy. However, this might not always be the case considering the vast amount of different discussion attributes and their effects. This study extends existing research on the influence of different discussion attributes (cognitive elaboration, network size, exposure to disagreement, and online/offline discussion) on political attitude change. To do so, we introduce the concept of obstinate partisanship and explore different discussion attributes as its antecedents. Obstinate partisans remain loyal to their political party irrespective of its performance, just as staunch sports fans do with their team. Results from a survey conducted in three democracies show that discussion network size, discussion disagreement, and offline discussion are all negative predictors of obstinate partisanship. Conversely, online discussion fosters this negative orientation. We finally examine the moderating role of discussion disagreement and network size on some of these relationships. The idea that political discussion can help transcend ideological, religious, or cultural cleavages by shaping attitudes has been the scope of great academic debate. Thus, the past decades have seen a plethora of studies exploring the effects of political talk on a wide range of prodemocratic dispositions. These have proven to be largely positive. For example, political talk has been found to increase discussants' sense of Alberto Ardèvol-Abreu: aardevol@ull.es Homero
This study investigates antecedents and consequences of incidental and intentional exposure behavior to political information on social media. Based on the Social Media Political Participation Model (SMPPM), we investigated how political and non-political motivations predict intentional and incidental exposure modes while accounting for moderators (i.e., personal curation skills and the frequency of social media political exposure). We also examined how intentional and incidental exposure modes affect low-and high-effort political participation. We rely on data from a two-wave panel survey based on representative quotas for the Austrian population (N = 559) to run autoregressive models. Political information motivation predicted the intentional mode, and this relationship was stronger with rising levels of curation skills. By contrast, entertainment and social interaction motivations increased indi-viduals' incidental exposure mode. The intentional mode led to low-effort political participation but not to high-effort participation. However, the incidental mode was unrelated to both low-and high-effort participation.
This study proposes a three-way interaction model that examines how (1) partisan selective exposure to political information on social media, (2) information processing, and (3) ideology influenced support for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump for president. Findings indicate that processing election information systematically affected support for Clinton among those who were exposed to diverse information; otherwise, heuristics were the main cue to process political information. Conservatives supporting Trump relied on heuristic processing and avoided information that challenged their beliefs. Liberals, in contrast, were more likely to systematically process election information, but the effect was significant only for those who exposed themselves to diverse information. As such, systematic processing might not make a difference in highly polarized environments, where strong partisans are unlikely to engage with different viewpoints and expose themselves to diverse information.
Across two studies with more than 1,700 U.S. adults recruited online, we present evidence that people share false claims about COVID-19 partly because they simply fail to think sufficiently about whether or not the content is accurate when deciding what to share. In Study 1, participants were far worse at discerning between true and false content when deciding what they would share on social media relative to when they were asked directly about accuracy. Furthermore, greater cognitive reflection and science knowledge were associated with stronger discernment. In Study 2, we found that a simple accuracy reminder at the beginning of the study (i.e., judging the accuracy of a non-COVID-19-related headline) nearly tripled the level of truth discernment in participants’ subsequent sharing intentions. Our results, which mirror those found previously for political fake news, suggest that nudging people to think about accuracy is a simple way to improve choices about what to share on social media.
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behaviour with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.
The mechanisms by which users of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter spread misinformation are not well understood. In this study, we argue that the effects of informational uses of social media on political participation are inextricable from its effects on misinformation sharing. That is, political engagement is both a major consequence of using social media for news as well as a key antecedent of sharing misinformation. We test our expectations via a two-wave panel survey of online media users in Chile, a country experiencing information disorders comparable to those of the global North. Analyses of the proposed and alternative causal models with two types of structural equation specifications (fixed effects and autoregressive) support our theoretical model. We close with a discussion on how changes in the way people engage with news and politics – brought about by social media – have produced a new dilemma: how to sustain a citizenry that is enthusiastically politically active, yet not spreading misinformation?
This study, derived from campaign communication mediation models, examines how incidental news exposure on social media affects political participation. Analysis of two-wave panel data collected before the 2016 US presidential election shows that incidental news exposure on social media is associated with increases in offline and online political participation (1) through online political information seeking and (2) through online political information seeking and online political expression in serial. Interestingly, results show that incidental news exposure on social media also has a direct negative relationship with offline and online political participation. Implications for the political utility of social media are discussed.
This study explores the role of the news-finds-me (NFM) perception-the belief that people can be well-informed without actively seeking news due to their social networks-in fostering social media users' inaccurate beliefs about COVID-19. Findings from a US national survey (N = 1003) suggest that NFM perception is positively associated with belief in COVID-19 misinformation and mediates the positive relationship between social media use and false beliefs when NFM is measured as a single-dimensional construct. However, the sub-dimensions of NFM have distinct implications: The reliance on peers and not seeking but feeling informed dimensions work in the same manner as when NFM is treated as a single-dimensional construct, whereas reliance on algorithmic news negatively predicts belief in misinformation and negatively mediates the aforementioned relationship. We also found the mediating role of exposure to misinformation in the relationship between social media use and false beliefs. Implications from these findings are discussed.
During the Information Search and Retrieval (ISR) process, user-system interactions such as submitting queries, examining results, and engaging with information, impose some degree of demand on the user’s resources. Within ISR, these demands are well recognised, and numerous studies have demonstrated that the Cost, Effort, and Load (CEL) experienced during the search process are affected by a variety of factors. Despite this recognition, there is no universally accepted definition of the constructs of CEL within the field of ISR. Ultimately this has led to problems with how these constructs have been interpreted and subsequently measured. This systematic review contributes a synthesis of literature, summarising key findings relating to how researchers have been defining and measuring CEL within ISR over the past 50 years. After manually screening 1,109 articles, we detail and analyse 91 articles which examine CEL within ISR. The discussion focuses on comparing the similarities and differences between CEL definitions and measures before identifying the limitations of the current state of the nomenclature. Opportunities for future research are also identified. Going forward, we propose a CEL taxonomy that integrates the relationships between CEL and their related constructs, which will help focus and disambiguate future research in this important area.
This study modelled the rational factors that predict fake news sharing behaviour. It also tested the moderating role of social media literacy skills. The focus was on social media users in Nigeria. An online survey was conducted to gather the responses from participants across Nigerian geopolitical zones. Structural equation modelling (SEM) Smart PLS 3.6 was used to analyse the data. We found that information sharing, the news finds me perception, trust in social media and status-seeking lead to fake news sharing among social media users in Nigeria. Specifically, trust in social media and status-seeking had a greater effect on fake news sharing behaviour. We also found that social media literacy skills significantly moderate the relationship between information sharing, status-seeking, the news finds me perception, trust in social media and fake news sharing in such a way that the effects/relationships are stronger among those with low social media literacy skills. This outcome contributes to theory and practice which was highlighted in the concluding aspect of this study.
COVID‐19 is very different from the cases typically studied by constructionist analysts of social problems: it emerged quickly, spread widely, and affected many aspects of social life. As such, it offers important opportunities to reconsider the constructionist model. We focus on three issues—metrics, masks, and vaccines—where COVID‐19 disputes about authority led to different alliances among several categories of claimsmakers. Our point is that COVID‐19 discourse seems far messier than most of the narratives presented by constructionist analysts, and we identify several lessons from this unusual contemporary case that might help us strengthen existing social problems theory.
Sharing of misinformation on social media platforms is a global concern, with research offering little insight into the motives behind such sharing. Drawing from the cognitive load theory and literature on cognitive ability, we developed and tested a research model hypothesising why people share misinformation. We also tested the moderating role of cognitive ability. We obtained data from 385 social media users in Nigeria using a chain referral technique with an online questionnaire as the instrument for data collection. Our findings suggest that information overload and social media fatigue are strong predictors of misinformation sharing. Information stress also contributed to misinformation sharing behaviour. Furthermore, cognitive ability moderated and weakened the effect information strain and information overload have on misinformation sharing in such a way that this effect is more pronounced among those with low cognitive ability. This indicates that those with low cognitive ability have a higher tendency to share misinformation. However, cognitive ability had no effect on the effect social media fatigue has on misinformation sharing behaviour. The study concluded with some theoretical and practical implications.
Despite widespread concerns that misinformation is rampant on social media, little systematic and empirical research has been conducted on whether and how news consumption via social media affects people's accurate knowledge about COVID-19. Against this background, this study examines the causal effects of social media use on COVID-19 knowledge (i.e., both in the form of factual knowledge and misinformation detection) as well as the underlying mechanisms through which such effects occur. Based on original panel survey data across six weeks (W1 N = 1,363, W2 N = 752) in the U.S., we found that consuming news from social media fostered the perception that one need not actively seek news anymore because it would reach them anyway through their social connections (i.e., “news-finds-me” perception). This, in turn, can make one both uninformed and misinformed about COVID-19 issues. Furthermore, this mediated relationship is stronger among those who experience higher levels of information overload while on social media.
This study examines whether reading a news snippet on a news aggregator leads to reading the original story linked to the news producer. A panel survey of 1,628 adults of South Korea in 2018 and 2019 shows that over time scanning a news snippet on an aggregator has a positive, although marginal, association with click-through of the full story on the news site. Further, perceived news importance and news efficacy positively moderate the association, by increasing the probability of click-through. To the contrary, the news-finds-me perception negatively moderates the association, by decreasing the probability of click-through of the linked full story. Over time, snippet scanning is not significantly related to an increase of consumption of news from news organizations, while click-through has a positive link to an increase.
Misinformation has been identified as a major contributor to various contentious contemporary events ranging from elections and referenda to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only can belief in misinformation lead to poor judgements and decision-making, it also exerts a lingering influence on people’s reasoning after it has been corrected — an effect known as the continued influence effect. In this Review, we describe the cognitive, social and affective factors that lead people to form or endorse misinformed views, and the psychological barriers to knowledge revision after misinformation has been corrected, including theories of continued influence. We discuss the effectiveness of both pre-emptive (‘prebunking’) and reactive (‘debunking’) interventions to reduce the effects of misinformation, as well as implications for information consumers and practitioners in various areas including journalism, public health, policymaking and education.
Social media has been implicated in the proliferation of fabricated news narratives posing as professional journalism. In response, scholars have prioritized the study of the antecedents and outcomes of citizen's ability to detect so-called ‘fake news’. Growing evidence supports the cognitive involvement hypothesis, which states that deeper reflection and elaboration on news content increases one's tendency to correctly identify fake news. This study adds to this literature by exploring connections between reliance on social media for news and emergent scholarship on the News Finds Me Perception (NFMP). We argue that the NFMP represents a low-effort cognitive style of attention to news and therefore, high NFMP respondents are more likely to evaluate fake news as credible. Furthermore, we examine whether this association holds despite partisan affiliation. Panel survey data from the United States provide robust evidence that the NFMP is associated with inaccurate assessments of both apolitical and pro-conservative fake news stories. Moderation analyses show that NFMP is a boundary condition for media effects; reliance on social media for news only leads to fake news acceptance when people hold the NFMP, and this effect exacerbates partisan motivated reasoning. Implications for theory building are discussed.
The rise of “fake news” is a major concern in contemporary Western democracies. Yet, research on the psychological motivations behind the spread of political fake news on social media is surprisingly limited. Are citizens who share fake news ignorant and lazy? Are they fueled by sinister motives, seeking to disrupt the social status quo? Or do they seek to attack partisan opponents in an increasingly polarized political environment? This article is the first to test these competing hypotheses based on a careful mapping of psychological profiles of over 2,300 American Twitter users linked to behavioral sharing data and sentiment analyses of more than 500,000 news story headlines. The findings contradict the ignorance perspective but provide some support for the disruption perspective and strong support for the partisan polarization perspective. Thus, individuals who report hating their political opponents are the most likely to share political fake news and selectively share content that is useful for derogating these opponents. Overall, our findings show that fake news sharing is fueled by the same psychological motivations that drive other forms of partisan behavior, including sharing partisan news from traditional and credible news sources.
With the circulation of misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization has raised concerns about an “infodemic,” which exacerbates people’s misperceptions and deters preventive measures. Against this backdrop, this study examined the conditional indirect effect of social media use and discussion heterogeneity preference on COVID-19-related misinformation beliefs in the United States, using a national survey. Findings suggested that social media use was positively associated with misinformation beliefs, while discussion heterogeneity preference was negatively associated with misinformation beliefs. Furthermore, worry of COVID-19 was found to be a significant mediator as both associations became more significant when mediated through worry. In addition, faith in scientists served as a moderator that mitigated the indirect effect of discussion heterogeneity preference on misinformation beliefs. That is, among those who had stronger faiths in scientists, the indirect effect of discussion heterogeneity preference on misinformation belief became more negative. The findings revealed communication and psychological factors associated with COVID-19-related misinformation beliefs and provided insights into coping strategies during the pandemic.
Fake news dissemination on COVID-19 has increased in recent months, and the factors that lead to the sharing of this misinformation is less well studied. Therefore, this paper describes the result of a Nigerian sample (n=385) regarding the proliferation of fake news on COVID-19. The fake news phenomenon was studied using the Uses and Gratification framework, which was extended by an “altruism” motivation. The data were analysed with Partial Least Squares (PLS) to determine the effects of six variables on the outcome of fake news sharing. Our results showed that altruism was the most significant factor that predicted fake news sharing of COVID-19. We also found that social media users’ motivations for information sharing, socialisation, information seeking and pass time predicted the sharing of false information about COVID-19. In contrast, no significant association was found for entertainment motivation. We concluded with some theoretical and practical implications.
In this study, we investigate dysfunctional information sharing on WhatsApp and Facebook, focusing on two explanatory variables—frequency of political talk and cross-cutting exposure—and potential remedies, such as witnessing, experiencing, and performing social corrections. Results suggest that dysfunctional sharing is pervasive, with nearly a quarter reporting sharing misinformation on Facebook and WhatsApp, but social corrections also occur relatively frequently. Platform matters, with corrections being more likely to be experienced or expressed on WhatsApp than Facebook. Taken together, our results suggest that the intimate nature of WhatsApp communication has important consequences for the dynamics of misinformation sharing, particularly with regard to facilitating social corrections.
The news media industry has changed as the internet and social media have matured and become integral to modern life. I describe these changes through a theoretical analysis of the economic structure of the industry and explore the implications for scholars of online media and politics. The crux of my argument is that social media simultaneously serves as a distribution platform and reputation builder, as social recommendations take the place of expensive investments in high-quality journalism. This development rendered crucial portions of previous models of the market for news inaccurate due to the declining importance of firm reputation. This mechanism interacts with the massive heterogeneity in digital literacy and growing animosity toward the news media among conservatives to create “credibility cascades,” which I argue are a necessary condition for Fake News to flourish.
As online news today is an important source of political information and available in vast quantities, understanding its use and its impact on citizens' political knowledge is vital. The aim of the present study is to identify different usage patterns of online news and their relation to individually perceived (i.e., subjective) and actually measurable (i.e., objective) political knowledge. To do so, we conducted an online survey of German online news users (n = 396), investigating characteristics of their online news usage as well as their subjective and objective political knowledge. Latent class analysis revealed six distinct usage patterns, of which a usage pattern drawing heavily on social media and push accesses as a source of news (e.g., Facebook newsfeed, email newsletter) and being rather highly driven by entertainment needs has been found to be associated with an overestimation of one's own political knowledge (illusion of knowing). The potential negative implications of such an illusion of knowing are discussed against the backdrop of the democratic ideal of informed citizens.
As citizens inadvertently “encounter” news and political information through digital media and social networking sites, they might perceive themselves to be well informed about politics without actively seeking political information, which has been labeled as the “News Finds Me” (NFM) perception. We attempt to explicate and further advance the conceptualization and corresponding measurement of “News Finds Me” perception. Using a nationally representative survey conducted in Austria, our analysis shows that social media news use may contribute to cynicism towards politics, and that such a relationship is critically mediated through NFM perceptions, but to a differential degree depending on specific sub-dimensions of NFM perceptions.
The spread of online disinformation is one of the 10 global risks of the future according to the World Economic Forum, and 51% of experts believe that this situation will not improve in the coming years. By 2022, half of the news will be fake news. In terms of users, young people and adults have problems understanding where the information they find online comes from and what sources to trust or not. In order to ascertain the degree of credibility that young users in Andalucía give to information, this study presents the results of the evaluation of online news by university students pursuing degrees in communication and education (N = 188), using the CRAAP test. The data reveal differences in gender and degree programme in the credibility assigned to the news. The conclusion is that university students have difficulty differentiating the veracity of the sources, in line with previous studies, with fake news earning higher ratings than real news.