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Discourse of self-legitimation
Self- and other-presentation in the European
Parliament’s so law on Brexit
Monika Brusenbauch Meislová
Masaryk University |Aston University
The article proposes an original conceptual framework that captures the
discursive logic of self-legitimation and applies it to the empirical case of
European Union so law and the process of Brexit. Adopting the general
orientation of Discourse Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis
and working with a dataset of all European Parliament (EP) resolutions on
Brexit in the – period, the article investigates how, and interprets
the particular ways in which, the EP legitimised itself as an actor vis-à-vis
Brexit, through dierent linguistic and discursive devices in its resolutions.
The analysis illustrates that the EP’s use of so law for self-legitimation
purposes is an intriguing case of how legal instruments can be leveraged in
multifaceted ways beyond their traditional function for broader
communicative and political purposes. As such, the article extends the
traditional understanding of the purposes of EP resolutions by explicitly
acknowledging them as powerful discursive resources for self-legitimation.
Keywords: Self-legitimation, discourse, European Parliament, so law,
Brexit
. Introduction
The contextual milieu for the European Parliament’s (EP) involvement in the
Brexit process was not always favourable. Following its unsuccessful eorts to
procure a seat at the negotiating table (Gostyńska-Jakubowska , ), its formal
role during the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) negotiations was limited to giving
an assent to an agreement that had already been negotiated at the consent stage
of the process. In the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) negotiations,
even though the legal setting for its engagement was more amenable, the EP was
sidelined even more (Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann ; von der Burchard
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.24010.bru |Published online: 13 September 2024
Journal of Language and Politics ISSN 1569-2159 |E‑ISSN 1569-9862
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). The organizational model adopted for the negotiations proved to be more
constraining and created “signicant obstacles for the EP to inuence the negoti-
ations” (Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann , ).
Notwithstanding the adverse conditions, the EP skilfully managed to raise its
prole during both phases of the Brexit negotiations. During the WA negotiations,
the EP evolved into a “quasi negotiator” (Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann ,
) and “an important interlocutor” that co-shaped the negotiations (Meissner
and Schoeller , ) and was active already in the negotiation phase of
the withdrawal process (Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann ; Brusenbauch
Meislová ). During the TCA negotiations, the EP “emerged as an even more
empowered institution” and “managed to enhance its own prole” (Larik ),
having obtained inter alia greater capacity to scrutinize the TCA (Brusenbauch
Meislová ).
A key argument foregrounded in this article is that the strategic use of self-
legitimation strategies in its resolutions helped the EP leverage its prole during
the Brexit process. The analysis presented below illustrates that the EP’s use of
so law for self-legitimation purposes presents an intriguing case of how legal
instruments can be leveraged for broader communicative and political purposes.
As such, the article extends the traditional understanding of the purposes of EP
resolutions (Archick ; Hart ) by explicitly acknowledging them as pow-
erful discursive resources for self-legitimation.
This linguistically informed inquiry aims to investigate how, and interprets
the particular ways in which, the EP self-legitimised itself as an actor vis-à-vis
Brexit, through dierent linguistic and discursive devices in its resolutions. To
this eect, an original conceptual framework that captures the discursive logic of
self-legitimation is proposed which is then applied to the empirical case of so
law and the process of Brexit. In order to do so, the article adopts the general
orientation of the Discourse Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis
(Fairclough and Wodak ; Reisigl and Wodak ; Wodak ) and works
with a dataset of all EP resolutions on Brexit in the – period, survey-
ing the discursive treatment of EP’s self-legitimation during: () the withdrawal
process (–), () the transition period (), and () the post-transition
period (since ), thereby covering all the transformative periods of the Brexit
process. As such, the study provides critical insights into how the EP has used so
law to make sense —and shape the reality —of Brexit, applied it to (re)produce
shared meaning(s), and legitimised, through language, not only itself but also its
perspectives on the United Kingdom (UK) as a (non)member state.
In so doing, the article brings together, and adds to, three strands of academic
literature. First, it makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on the legiti-
mation in discourse in a broader sense (Bäckstrand and Söderbaum ; Bennett
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, ; Gilley ; Elnakkouzi ; Halliday, Block-Lieb and Carruthers
; Reyes ; Suchman ; van Leeuwen ) by proposing a new heuris-
tic tool for understanding self-legitimation discursive practices.
Second, by focusing on EP resolutions and extending the traditional under-
standing of their purposes (Archick ; Hart ) by explicitly acknowledging
them as powerful discursive resources for self-legitimation, the article adds to the
literature on the discursive perspectives on law (Cheng and Machin ; Con-
dor ; Coulthard ; Gibbons ; Huisman ). As Cheng and Machin
(, ) argue, “Given Critical Discourse Studies’ (CDS) interest in the role of
language and communication in the functioning of society […] it is notable that
there has been much less attention to the analysis of the language of law”. There
are a couple reasons why law is deemed challenging matter for discourse analy-
sis, including the opaque language, its complex, self-sucient and self-referential
nature and o-putting stylistic features (especially in the sense of archaic words,
use of Latin and long, convoluted, repetitive sentences) (Condor ; Coulthard
; Cheng and Machin , , ; Huisman ). What is more, law is oen
associated with procedural rules and formal structures and might require special-
ized knowledge (Condor ). Yet, it is essential not be deterred. As such, this
article heeds the call of scholars, such as Cheng and Machin (), advocating
for more research on the language of law.
Third, the article makes an original contribution to the scholarly understand-
ing of the EP’s Brexit-related performance (Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann
, ; Brusenbauch Meislová , , ). With the exception of
Rautajoki and Fitzgerald (), who explore the ways in which solidarity was
invoked and signied through narrative and categorical devices during the EP
oor debate following the UK’s referendum, there remains a substantial gap in the
academic literature concerning the discursive aspects of such engagement. This
study seeks to ll this gap.
The inquiry proceeds as follows. It begins by attending to the theoretical and
methodological framework. Following that, the article presents the typology that
conceptualizes the discursive self-legitimation strategies. The next section is then
devoted to the application of the typology to the empirical case of the EP and
Brexit. Aer unpacking the data, the subsequent section presents the results of
the empirical analysis. The nal section summarises the key ndings, discusses
lessons for policymakers and suggests potential next research steps.
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. Theoretical framework
Following Hurrelmann, Gora, and Wagner (, ), the paper understands
political legitimation in a Weberian sense as a social activity that can be empir-
ically observed and tested. As to the conceptual distinction between discursive,
institutional and behavioural legitimation (Bäckstrand and Söderbaum, ), I
am concerned with the discursive dimension, which relies exclusively on lan-
guage. The article builds upon the poststructuralist approach by Diez (a,
b) who explicitly conceives of discourse as constitutive of reality as we know
it (cf. Carta and Morin , ). The governing assumption underpinning the
paper is a dialectical relationship between certain discursive situations on the one
hand and the institutions and social structures in which they are embedded on the
other (de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak , ). As Bennett (, ) argues, “In
many of the elds of action and genres in which political discourse is manifested,
the ultimate endgame is the persuasion of interlocutors to the relative merits of
the speaker’s argument (and the weaknesses of the opposition’s claims)”.
Based on Bennett (, –), the paper conceptualises legitimation as
a discursive process “through which actions and actors are bestowed with legit-
imacy or marked by their illegitimacy, which in turn are based on socially con-
structed and communicated values and norms”. Self-legitimation is then
understood as an actor’s own strategic attempts at establishing and maintaining
legitimation in the eyes of others (in the sense of practices employed by the actor
to positively inuence the legitimation process) (Hall, Lenz and Obydenkova
). The approach adopted in this analysis is actor-oriented and adheres to the
top-down perspective within the legitimation research.
. Methodological framework
In an attempt to detect and interpret the key self-legitimating discourse practices
of the EP in Brexit, the study adopts the general orientation of the discourse his-
torical approach (DHA) to critical discourse studies (Krzyżanowski and Wodak
; Reisigl and Wodak ; Wodak ), understanding discourse analysis
both as “a theory and a method” (Larsen , ). The article is concerned with
so law and from the perspective of critical discourse, the law, like any form of
language, “carries ideas and values (…) classies the world and represents iden-
tities and human agency (…) shapes, legitimizes and naturalizes social practices”
(Cheng and Machin , –; cf. Condor ; Coulthard ). As such,
the law is “infused by discourses that shape both what can be said about a par-
ticular thing and how it can be said” (Cheng and Machin , ). A discursive
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strategy is dened here as a “more or less accurate and more or less intentional
plan of practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or
linguistic aim” (Reisigl and Wodak , ). The article is interested both in the
contents of the discourse —agreeing with Fairclough and Fairclough (, ) that
“analysis of political discourse should centre upon analysis of practical argumen-
tation” —as well as in the structure of the discourse underlying the said contents
and related linguistic features (Krzyżanowski , –). Importantly, even sub-
tle discursive realisations are important, as “Cognitive images can be projected
and, in the process of repetition, legitimized through language use” (Szymańska
, ).
. Typology of discursive self-legitimation strategies
The paper develops an original conceptual framework that helps identify and
interpret discursive practices of self-legitimation. In the rst step, the article
brings together insights from four key scholars in the eld of legitimation in
discourse: Aristotle, van Leeuwen (), Reyes (), and Suchman ().
Drawing from classical philosophy, Aristotle’s tripartite rhetorical model high-
lights ethos (character, credibility), pathos (emotion), and logos (logical argu-
ment) and their importance in persuasive communication. Van Leeuwen’s ()
work emphasises the discursive methods used in legitimation practices, suggest-
ing authorisation (references to the authority of tradition, custom, law), moral
evaluation (references to value systems), rationalisation (references to the goals
and uses of institutionalised social action) and mythopoesis (legitimation con-
veyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish
non-legitimate actions) as key legitimation techniques. Reyes () provides an
understanding of how elements of authority, rationality, moral evaluation and
hypothetical futures and emotions can be deployed for legitimation purposes.
Finally, Suchman’s () work oers an organisational perspective, linking legit-
imation to organisational behaviour and social expectations, focusing on audi-
ence self-interest, comprehensibility, and normative approval. Finally, Suchman’s
() work oers an organisational perspective, linking legitimation to organisa-
tional behaviour and social expectations, focusing on audience self-interest, com-
prehensibility, and normative approval.
As depicted in Table , which integrates these insights, the proposed typology
classies four primary dimensions of legitimation: rationality-based, credibility-
based, morality-based and emotion-based. Rationality-based strategies engage
with the content of the argument itself, focusing on logic, evidence and intellectual
rigor, while credibility-based strategies emphasise the source of the argument, cen-
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tring on the trustworthiness, authority and reputation of the individual or entity
presenting the argument. In other words, rationality-based legitimation appeals
to the mind, whereas credibility-based legitimation appeals to trust and the sub-
jective assessment of reliability and competence. Morality-based strategies then
seek alignment with universal principles and appeal to a sense of right and wrong,
while emotion-based strategies focus on individual or collective emotional expe-
riences, seeking to inuence through feelings rather than principles. The ordering
below can be seen as a progression from strategies grounded in reason and evi-
dence (rationality) to those more dependent on the actor’s qualities (credibility),
then to those appealing to shared social values (morality), and nally to those that
leverage human feelings (emotion).
Table . Primary dimensions of legitimation
Primary
dimensions of
legitimation
Aristotle Van Leeuwen Reyes Suchman
Rationality-
based
legitimation
Logos
(logical
argument)
Rationalisation Legitimation by
rationality
Cognitive (based on
comprehensibility
and taken-for-
grantedness)
Credibility-
based
legitimation
Ethos
(character,
credibility)
Authorisation Legitimation by
authority
Pragmatic (based on
audience self-
interest)
Morality-based
legitimation
Moral
evaluation
Legitimation by
moral evaluation
Moral (based on
normative approval)
Emotion-Based
legitimation
Pathos
(emotion)
Legitimation by
hypothetical future
and emotions
In the second step, the primary dimensions of legitimation are combined with
van Dijk’s (, ) concept of the ideological square, which stems from his
work on the role of discourse in social cognition and power relations. According
to van Dijk, positive self-presentation refers to how actors assess themselves pos-
itively within a discourse with an aim to enhance their credibility, legitimacy or
likability in the eyes of their audience. By contrast, negative other-presentation
involves portraying others negatively in order to discredit or diminish them and
hence improve one’s own legitimacy (van Dijk , ).
Combining these two steps, the article presents a new integrative typology
of self-legitimation discursive strategies that encompasses both positive self-
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presentation and negative other-presentation across four primary dimensions, as
captured in Table . The resultant framework provides for eight distinct discursive
self-legitimation strategies. While the positive self-presentation category com-
bines rationality-based, credibility-based, morality-based, and emotion-based
strategies to illustrate how actors legitimise themselves by seeking to bolster their
own image or stance, the negative other-presentation category explores the corre-
sponding strategies employed to construct others in a negative light, illuminating
how rationality, credibility, morality, and emotion can be used to undermine or
critique others in order to reinforce one’s own legitimacy.
Table . Typology of self-legitimation discursive strategies
Categories
of
presentation
Rationality-based Credibility-based Morality-based Emotion-based
Positive self-
presentation
Employing logical
arguments,
evidence, and
well-structured
reasoning to
appeal to the
audience’s
intellectual
sensibilities
Utilising
authority,
character, or
credentials by
highlighting
qualications,
experience, or
associations with
reputable entities
to reinforce one’s
reliability
Emphasising
moral values,
ethical principles,
alignment with
societal values or
social
responsibility to
portray oneself as
in line with widely
accepted norms
Leveraging
emotions and
hopes to foster a
positive
emotional
connection with
the audience
Negative
other-
presentation
Using rational
arguments and
highlighting
logical
inconsistencies,
awed reasoning,
and lack of
evidence in others’
arguments to
undermine their
positions
Questioning or
undermining
others’ credibility
and casting doubt
on qualications,
motives, or
integrity to
diminish their
standing
Challenging the
moral standing,
values, or ethical
principles of
others, portraying
them as out of step
with accepted
social norms
Utilising
emotional
appeals, fear,
distrust, and
disdain through
emotional
discourse or
charged language
to cultivate
negative
perceptions of
others
Importantly, when used together, these two categories of positive self-
presentation and negative other-presentation can reinforce each other, leading to
a more powerful self-legitimation message. However, achieving this synergistic
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eect requires maintaining a careful balance. Negative other-presentation must be
proportional and aligned with the positive attributes being emphasised, as exces-
sive negativity could overshadow the positive message, leading to a perception of
aggressiveness or hostility. By integrating these eight strategies into one coherent
typology, the article oers a multi-layered perspective on self-legitimation in dis-
course that can be applied across various domains.
. Application of the typology: The case of the European Parliament and
Brexit
. European Parliament as an actor in the Brexit process
Expanding on the initial discussion in the Introduction, the EP’s engagement in
Brexit negotiations is a compelling case study that deserves particular attention,
for a number of reasons. With Brexit constituting a critical juncture in the process
of European integration, (Zappettini and Bennett ), the negotiations of Brexit
agreements were massively complex, sensitive and emotional, with unusually high
stakes (Martill and Steiger ). Crucially, the EP’s involvement with the process
highlights how, despite being sidelined in the negotiations and facing organisa-
tional challenges, the assembly sought to assume a role of a tactical actor and “a
maximiser of its own powers” (Closa Montero et al. , ). In line with the
assembly’s strife for post-Lisbon empowerment as a legislative actor (Meissner
and Schoeller ), the EP sought to become a de facto negotiator, claim its
voice in the negotiations beyond the simple power of consent and win governance
gains (Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann , ; Brusenbauch Meislová ,
).
As Brusenbauch Meislová () shows, the EP leveraged its inuence over
the negotiations of the WA and the TCA through ve bargaining self-
empowerment strategies of obstructing, moving rst, issue-linking, allying with
other actors, and mobilising public opinion. The strategy of obstructing proved
eective in both negotiations. During the WA negotiations, the EP was keen to
threaten to use its veto power to reinforce its bargaining position. However, in the
TCA negotiations, the EP applied this strategy more forcefully by delaying its rat-
ication of the agreement, thereby gaining more time to scrutinise the deal and
assert its concerns over the Northern Ireland Protocol (Brusenbauch Meislová
, ; Larik, ). In employing the rst-mover strategy, the EP sought to
act as an agenda-setter and input provider. During both sets of negotiations, it
actively proposed measures and exerted political pressure through its resolutions
(Brusenbauch Meislová , ). The issue-linking strategy was used dier-
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ently in the two sets of negotiations. During the WA negotiations, the EP made its
consent conditional on specic issues like citizens’ rights and the Northern Irish
border. In the TCA negotiations, the EP expanded this strategy to include broader
issues like the level-playing eld and linked its consent to the provisional applica-
tion of the TCA to demands for a constructive role in supervising its implementa-
tion (Brusenbauch Meislová , ; Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann ).
Alliance-building was another strategy the EP used eectively by forging alliances
with other EU institutions and member states. During the WA negotiations, the
EP maintained a close alliance with the European Commission and supported
Ireland’s interests, emphasizing the importance of the Good Friday Agreement.
This strategy continued during the TCA talks, with the EP’s strong stance on the
Northern Ireland Protocol and cooperation with Ireland being key factors in its
approach (Brusenbauch Meislová , ; Bressanelli, Chelotti and Lehmann
, ; Meissner and Schoeller ). Mobilising public opinion was consis-
tently used by the EP to publicise the negotiation process and increase its visi-
bility. During the WA negotiations, the EP engaged closely with the media and
held public debates and hearings to promote transparency and gather informa-
tion. Although the intensity of this engagement was somewhat reduced during the
TCA talks due to the COVID- pandemic, the EP continued to emphasize trans-
parency and public participation (Brusenbauch Meislová , ).
. Data
The data is analyzed using the DHA, which combines detailed textual analysis
with the context in which the texts are produced and received. The dataset com-
prises all EP resolutions related to Brexit and UK-EU relations adopted since .
EP resolutions typify the realm of so law. So law refers to rules and principles
that are not legally binding but still have signicant inuence on the behavior of
actors within international and domestic legal systems. These may include guide-
lines, codes of conduct, recommendations, and resolutions. While so law does
not have the formal status of hard law, it oen serves as a precursor to legally bind-
ing agreements or complements existing legal frameworks by providing detailed
guidance on their implementation (Crawford ).
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Table . European Parliament resolutions on Brexit
Withdrawal period
(..–..)
Resolution of
June
(European
Parliament )
– Acknowledgement of the referendum decision
– Swi and coherent implementation of the withdrawal procedure
– Urges the notication to take place as soon as possible
Resolution of
April
(European
Parliament
a)
– Principle of sequencing of negotiations
– Unacceptability of any trade-os between security and the future
EU-UK economic relationship
– Emphasis on three key issues:
– Citizens’ rights
– Northern Ireland peace process
– Indivisibility of the four freedoms
Resolution of
October
(European
Parliament
b)
– Acknowledgement of the insuciency of the British government’s
progress on Brexit
– Emphasis on key issues:
– Financial settlement
– Citizens’ rights
– Irish border
Resolution of
December
(European
Parliament
c)
– Acknowledgement of the “sucient progress” in withdrawal
negotiations
– Emphasis on four outstanding issues:
– Citizens’ rights
– Administrative procedures for citizens applying for “permanent
residence status”
– European Court of Justice decisions
– Irish border
Resolution of
March
(European
Parliament )
– Proposal for an UK-EU association agreement based on four
pillars:
– Trade and economic relations
– Foreign policy
– Internal security
– Thematic cooperation
Resolution of
September
(European
Parliament )
– Preference for an “orderly Brexit” resting on the already negotiated
WA
– Openness to “alternative solutions”
– Concerns about safeguarding the rights of EU citizens in the UK
and British citizens in the EU
Resolution of
January
(European
Parliament
a)
– Focus on implementing and monitoring provisions on citizens’
rights in the WA
– Special focus on the UK government’s EU Settlement Scheme
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Table . (continued)
Transition period
(..–..)
Resolution of
February
(European
Parliament
b)
– Initial input to the upcoming negotiations on a new post-Brexit
EU-UK partnership
– Preference for as-deep-as-possible association agreement with the
UK based on three pillars:
– Economic partnership
– Foreign aairs partnership
– Specic sectoral issues
Resolution of
June
(European
Parliament
c)
– Views on the negotiations, the WA and future relations
– Insistence on level playing eld guarantees
– Strict implementation of the NI Protocol as the precondition for
the successful conclusion of the future agreement
Post-transition period
(since ..)
Resolution of
April
(European
Parliament )
– Evaluation of and expectations from the TCA
– Preservation of peace on the island of Ireland as one of the EP’s
main goals in agreeing on the future relationship
– Insistence that the EP plays a full role in monitoring how TCA is
applied
Resolution of
April
(European
Parliament )
– Future of sheries in the Channel, North Sea, Irish Sea and
Atlantic Ocean in the light of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU
As delineated in Table , a total of twelve Brexit-related resolutions were
passed: ten non-legislative and two legislative ones. The focus on the resolutions
is underpinned by their role as “a salient tool that enabled the EP to oer political
guidance and substantive comments on the negotiations and contents of the deals
in a consistent manner” (Brusenbauch Meislová , ). Indeed, the EP devi-
ated from its standard practice of issuing resolutions at the conclusion of the
negotiation process (Hart, ) and instead adopted them while Brexit negoti-
ations were still underway, despite the inherent uidity and increased potential
for error. This proactive approach allowed the EP to both inform and constrain
other decision-makers early in the process, thereby establishing itself as a swi,
well-prepared, and knowledgeable actor (Brusenbauch Meislová , .). The
signicance of the resolutions was reinforced by the broad intergroup consensus
across the assembly, which further amplied their importance and bolstered the
credibility of the EP as a formidable negotiating entity. The assembly consistently
underscored to all negotiating parties and the public the critical nature of its reso-
lutions, routinely designating the priorities and demands articulated within them
as “red lines” (Brusenbauch Meislová , , , .).
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The scholarly literature has assessed the EP resolutions’ purposes, particularly
noting that although they are “largely symbolic” (Archick , ), they constitute
essential normative and political governance tools at the EP’s disposal (Hart )
whose value rests not only in their inuence on the other EU institutions, but also
in the political signals it transmits to policymakers and ocials within member
states, and other stakeholders such as businesses, civil society organizations, and
the general public (Hart , ). This article extends this understanding of the
purposes of EP resolutions by explicitly acknowledging them as powerful discur-
sive resources for legitimation, showing how they can eectively serve as a potent
tool for the EP’s self-legitimation.
While a thorough audience reception study would be necessary to fully
understand the resolution’s impact on the Brexit process, it is plausible to spec-
ulate that the EP’s strategic use of so law in its resolutions played a key role
in shaping the Brexit discourse. These texts likely contributed to the EP’s ability
to assert its inuence and legitimacy during a period of signicant political
upheaval. By framing its positions through carefully craed language, the EP
could have eectively communicated its stances to both internal and external
audiences, reinforcing its role as a key player in the Brexit process.
. Analysis and results
This chapter details how the EP strategically exploited so law to make sense —
and shape the reality —of Brexit, applied it to (re)produce shared meaning(s)
and legitimised, through language, both itself and its perspectives of the UK as a
(non)member state. The chapter analytically assesses and interprets some of the
ways in which the EP applied the above-outlined eight self-legitimation discur-
sive strategies throughout the Brexit process. It will also refer to concrete textual
examples derived from the resolutions to illustrate the argumentation.
.. Strategies of positive self-presentation
Rationality-based positive self-presentation
Rationality-based positive self-presentation emerged as a principal strategy of the
EP’s self-legitimation eorts, prominently evident throughout the entire Brexit
process and manifested in the assembly’s utilisation of logical, evidence-based
arguments and well-structured reasoning to appeal to its audience’s intellectual
sensibilities. All of the resolutions on Brexit framed the EP as a rational actor
grounded in established legal frameworks, a strategy that positioned it as a
guardian of order and stability. All of them meticulously delineated the obliga-
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tions for all parties involved and proactively outlined numerous concrete propos-
als for a future course.
Rooting the EP’s positions in a rational episteme, a recurrent theme was the
emphasis on legal certainty and portrayal of the EP as ensuring that all Brexit-
related decisions be tethered to strict rules (as in “[The EP] believes that transi-
tional arrangements ensuring legal certainty and continuity can only be agreed
[…] if they contain the right balance of rights and obligations for both parties”
[European Parliament a], which resonated with the ideals of international
negotiations rooted in stability and predictability (Firth ).
Moreover, the EP also rationalised its authority by spotlighting its own role in
the Brexit process and asserting its centrality in the decision-making process, in
what can be understood as explicit claim-to-power moves (as in “Insists that Par-
liament must play a full role in the monitoring and implementation of the Agree-
ment” [European Parliament a; Brusenbauch Meislová , ]). A related
strategy was the vehement emphasis on the EP’s retrospective consistent proactive
involvement in the Brexit process throughout the years (as in “acknowledges that
Parliament was able to express its opinion on a regular basis” [European Parlia-
ment ], with the resolutions showcasing a timeline of sustained involvement,
thus bolstering its claim to be an engaged decision-making body.
Credibility-based positive self-presentation
Central to the strategy of credibility-based positive self-presentation, present
throughout the whole Brexit process, were the EP’s eorts to construct itself as an
institution deeply rooted in procedural integrity. A key tool here was the inher-
ently self-referential nature of the resolutions, where “each part can reference, and
be legitimized by other parts” (Goodrich in Cheng and Machin , ),
suggesting a unied, credible whole. The EP’s discourse on Brexit was, indeed,
marked by a steadfast discursive practice of intertextuality, where the resolu-
tions can be eectively conceptualised as “intertextual chains” (Fairclough ,
). This manifested through the consistent referencing of cornerstone legal doc-
uments as well as the past resolutions. For instance, the resolution of April
on the future of sheries refers to as many as distinct documents, agree-
ments, regulations and prior resolutions (European Parliament ). Through
this diachronic referencing, the EP rmly situated itself within precedent and
underscored the historical and procedural consistency that underpinned its
stances. By donning the mantle of the “custodian of the treaties”, the EP discur-
sively enriched its claim to be viewed as a trustworthy institution dedicated to
upholding its end of commitments. Constant references to procedural rules, such
as “having regard to Rule () of its Rules of Procedure” (European Parliament
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), conjured up the imagery of commitment to thoroughness and procedural
depth, augmenting its perceived credibility.
What is more, the assembly’s credibility was discursively reinforced by high-
lighting a convergence between its own views on Brexit and those of the Council
and the European Commission (as in “Welcomes the fact that there is a high level
of convergence between the negotiating objectives expressed in Parliament’s res-
olution […] and in Council Decision […] emphasises that the Commission has
Parliament’s full support” [European Parliament c]).
Morality-based positive self-presentation
The EP also connected its positions on Brexit to broader moral principles to nar-
rate itself as in line with widely accepted societal norms and ethical values. As
the Brexit process unfolded, its employment of this strategy became progressively
more evident (especially in the transition and post-transition periods).
An illustrative element of this strategy was the EP’s o-reiterated appeals
to universal values such as justice, human rights and non-discrimination (as in
“[EP’s] continued adherence to democratic principles, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms” [European Parliament c], which positioned the assembly
not just as a political body but as a moral guardian —as a virtuous actor in a
complex political landscape, committed to ensuring that all actions adhere to a
morally sound framework. Conveying a profound sense of duty and responsibil-
ity, the EP constructed itself as ensuring that principles that are dear to the EU and
its citizens are not compromised, which in turn reinforced the image of the Brexit
negotiations as not just political but morally imperative. The following excerpt
illustrates this tendency well:
[…] throughout the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, Parliament has
sought to protect the rights of EU citizens, protect peace and prosperity on the
island of Ireland, protect shing communities, uphold the EU’s legal order, safe-
guard the autonomy of EU decision making, preserve the integrity of the customs
union and internal market.
(European Parliament ; see also European Parliament a, c, ,
b, c, )
Just as importantly, multiple times in the resolutions, the EP justied its Brexit
stances as driven by a quest for fairness, emphasizing its commitment to achieving
a fair and balanced relationship with the UK (as in “recalls that any nal agree-
ment must be based on a balance of rights and obligations” [European Parliament
c; similarly also European Parliament b]). Lastly, its recurrent claims
to transparency, openness and inclusivity also bolstered the EP’s moral image in
the negotiation process (as in “Calls on the Commission to continue conducting
negotiations transparently…” [European Parliament c]), showcasing the EP’s
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consideration of diverse stakeholder perspectives (Brusenbauch Meislová ;
cf. Rautajoki and Fitzgerald ).
Emotion-based positive self-presentation
Though more subtle than the previous three strategies, the EP’s resolutions show-
cased a conscious eort to self-legitimise the EP’s role and stances within the
Brexit process also through emotion-based positive self-presentation. The EP
focused on leveraging emotions to foster positive emotional connections, leaning
more heavily on this strategy as the Brexit process advanced.
In particular, the EP constantly evoked a deep sense of shared history and
cooperation with the UK, as in: “given the shared basis of common values held by
the EU and the UK, their close links and current regulatory alignment, the UK’s
-year membership of the EU […] the UK will continue to be an important part-
ner for the EU” (European Parliament b). By alluding to shared interests and
mutual interdependence, the resolutions were designed to cultivate sentiments of
unity and collaboration despite the Brexit ri. Routinely represented as ‘partner-
ship’, the traits attributed to the envisioned future EU-UK relationship included
qualities such as “strong, close and special”, “ambitious, close and lasting”, “deeply
integrated and coordinated” and “comprehensive” (European Parliament b),
conveying a sense of goodwill, shared aspiration and mutual condence. Relat-
edly, the EP mobilised the rhetoric of stability and security through repeated
assurances that, despite the changing dynamics, it was committed to upholding
the core principles that had governed its relationship with the UK (European Par-
liament c). This chimes well with the literature showing that the EP was the
most approachable of all EU institutions during Brexit (Brusenbauch Meislová
).
What is more, the EP’s discursive choices highlighted an increasing emphasis
on the role of trust in the Brexit process (“[the EP] considers that trust is an essen-
tial element of any negotiation…” [European Parliament b], aiming to res-
onate with the understanding of trust as a fundamental value in any partnership
(Firth ). Apart from that, the resolutions were also replete with assertions of
the EP’s protective stance towards EU citizens, which foregrounded it as a caring
and responsible entity (“European Parliament represents all citizens of the Euro-
pean Union and will act throughout the whole process leading to the withdrawal
of the United Kingdom to protect their interests” [European Parliament a]).
.. Strategies of negative other-presentation
Rationality-based negative other-presentation
The EP also strategically legitimised itself through the discourse of negative other-
presentation, with this set of strategies having become more pointed over time, as
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the Brexit process faced multiple challenges (Martill and Steiger ). For the EP,
the conceptualisation of the “other” was invariably epitomised by the UK.
Central to rationality-based negative other-presentation was the EP’s self-
representation as a beacon of rationality, methodical planning and consistent
approach, juxtaposing its stance against the UK’s portrayed irrational, haphazard
and inadequate positioning. This was evident in the way in which the resolutions
dissected, in a nuanced manner, the UK’s negotiation strategies, laying bare
apparent lapses in reasoning. The EP’s resolutions oen drew attention to per-
ceived inadequacies of the UK’s proposals, as in “[The EP] is of the opinion that
the United Kingdom’s proposals set out in its position paper of June fall
short in that respect” (European Parliament b). Such critiques extended to
pointing out apparent inconsistencies in the UK’s overall stance, suggesting a lack
of forethought and rational planning, as in “Whereas she [the UK Prime Minister]
has not yet set out a consistent view on future EU-UK relations” (European Par-
liament ), or “Whereas comments such as those made by David Davis, calling
the outcome of phase of the negotiations a mere ‘statement of intent’, risk under-
mining the good faith that has been built during the negotiations” (European Par-
liament c).
As the Brexit negotiations progressed, the EP’s discursive posture vis-à-vis
the UK got even more assertive, more vocally lamenting its endeavours for insti-
tutional selectivity (as in “cherry-picking’ approach is unacceptable for the EU”
[European Parliament c); “the EU will not accept the UK’s piecemeal
approach” [European Parliament c]; for more on this see Martill and Sus,
) and directly attributing the stumbling blocks in negotiations to the UK’s
missteps (“whereas the current time pressure in the negotiations is merely the
result of the UK’s choices” [European Parliament c]).
Credibility-based negative other-presentation
The EP also framed its resolutions in a way that articulated the UK as a less credi-
ble actor, juxtaposing it against its own projected image of reliability and integrity.
One salient feature of this strategy was the depiction of the UK as internally
divided, a tactic that cast doubt on its ability to present a unied front. A telling
instance is the following excerpt that questioned the UK government’s credibility
in fully representing the interests of its citizens:
many citizens of the United Kingdom have expressed strong opposition to losing
the rights they currently enjoy pursuant to Article of the Treaty on the Func-
(European Parliament a)tioning of the European Union.
Anchoring its legitimacy further in the notion of credibility, the resolutions rou-
tinely highlighted the UK’s deciencies in what the assembly saw as the UK’s fail-
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ure to meet its responsibilities. The EP’s criticism of the UK’s handling of the
Irish border dilemma was particularly pointed, casting the UK as inadequately
prepared and thereby eroding its credibility (as in “Strongly believes that it is the
responsibility of the UK Government to provide a unique, eective and work-
able solution that prevents a ‘hardening’ of the border […] regrets that the United
Kingdom’s proposals fall short in that regard” [European Parliament b]).
Apart from that, the EP’s assessment of the British approach depicted the UK as
breaching previous agreements (as in “condemns the UK’s more recent unilateral
actions, in breach of the Withdrawal Agreement” [European Parliament ]).
The strategy was reinforced also by the parliamentarian discourse around
the TCA which foregrounded the UK’s “lack of political will”, casting doubt on
its dedication to collaborative endeavours (“[EP] regrets nonetheless the limited
scope of this Agreement, due to the lack of political will on the part of the UK
to engage in important areas…” [European Parliament ]). In a similar vein,
references to the “extreme last-minute nature of the Agreements” and the UK’s
“refusal to extend”, even in the midst of a pandemic (European Parliament ),
further cemented the discursive representation of the UK as lacking in credibility.
Morality-based negative other-presentation
EP resolutions also bolstered the body’s legitimacy by casting the UK in a morally
questionable light. In many instances (especially during the transition and post-
transition periods), the EP’s challenging of the UK in this sense was very direct.
This was evident, for instance, in its accusations against the UK for discriminatory
practices, as in “Expresses concern about regrettable administrative practices
against EU citizens living in the United Kingdom” (European Parliament b).
Similarly, the EP was discursively creating a moral dichotomy by contrasting its
commitment to principles such as fairness, justice and community with perceived
failings on the UK’s part (as in “Reiterates its commitment to ensuring an equi-
table and fair solution for citizens, and regrets the United Kingdom’s lack of
progress in safeguarding the rights and dignities of the people involved” [Euro-
pean Parliament b]).
In other cases, the assembly positioned itself on higher moral ground in a
more subtle way through references to potential future scenarios. For instance, by
urging the UK to enact a new employment bill —(“Urges the UK Government to
enact a new employment bill before the end of the transition period” [European
Parliament b]) —the implication was that the UK may not have acted respon-
sibly or ethically towards its workers, connoting a potential moral misalignment
between the UK and the EU. The resolutions also conveyed an image of the UK
potentially acting out of step with accepted norms and ethics: “[EP] requires the
fair treatment of EU- citizens living or having lived in the United Kingdom […]
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stresses that any degradation of the rights […] would be contrary to Union law”
[European Parliament a]).
As Brexit progressed, the EP increasingly displayed a higher degree of linguis-
tic assertiveness vis-à-vis the UK, which was mirrored, for instance, in its explicit
appeals to action directed towards the UK, “calling on” the UK or declaring that
the EP “expected” the UK to act in a certain manner. Sometimes, the parliamen-
tarian discourse conveyed the image of the image of the EP having authority to
impose an obligation on the UK, via the use of the modal verbs “should” and
“must”, thereby making the UK an explicit object of the obligation (for instance,
European Parliament c, a).
Emotion-based negative other-presentation
The EP resolutions also rooted the assembly’s legitimacy in an evocative,
emotion-driven representation of the other. As the Brexit negotiations unfolded,
the emotional intensity with which the EP approached the UK grew stronger.
Most oen, the resolutions were marked by a pronounced discourse of regret
and disappointment over the UK’s withdrawal (“whereas this will be an unprece-
dented and regrettable event as a Member State has never withdrawn from the
European Union before” [European Parliament a]) as well as over its propos-
als —(“Regrets that the United Kingdom’s proposals in relation to Ireland and
Northern Ireland are not comprehensive and fall short in that regard” [European
Parliament b]). To illustrate more specically, the resolutions, for instance,
regretted the UK’s stance towards the free movement principle (“Regrets, in this
context, that the UK has announced that the principle of the free movement of
persons between the EU and the UK will no longer apply” [European Parliament
b]) as well as the UK’s decision not to participate in Erasmus+, an emotion-
based appeal highlighting a missed opportunity for young people (“Regrets also
the UK’s decision not to participate in Erasmus+, depriving young people of
such a unique opportunity” [European Parliament ]). Such expressions func-
tioned not merely to convey an institutional stance but to resonate with and
elicit comparable emotions in the audience. The frequent use of the emotionally-
charged term “regret” instilled a poignant sense of loss, suggesting that the UK’s
actions were profoundly sorrowful for both EU and UK citizens, and underscored
the missed opportunities that the EP (and the EU as such) continuously champi-
oned but the UK chose to forgo.
Emblematic of this strategy were also expressions of anxiety and apprehen-
sion, especially when highlighting the UK’s perceived shortcomings (as in “Notes
with concern that negotiations […] have not yet progressed to the next stage and
that many issues, in particular citizens’ rights, remain to be resolved” [European
Parliament b]. A key element was also the invocation of feelings of eroding
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trust, painting certain UK actions as potential threats to the hard-won mutual
faith between the two entities, as illustrated by the EP’s above-mentioned reaction
to David Davis’ comments (European Parliament c).
. Concluding remarks
The analysis has demonstrated that the proposed typology conveniently guides
the thinking on varying types of self-legitimation discursive strategies and pro-
vides useful theoretical yardsticks to anchor a discussion thereupon. Even though
the typically technical, complex, and “dry” nature of the legal language (Cheng
and Machin ; Condor ) might make resolutions an unconventional tool
for self-legitimation purposes, their use by the EP illustrates how a legal tool can
be leveraged in multifaceted ways beyond its traditional function. The resolutions
serve not just as legal instruments but also as strategic communications, reinforc-
ing the legitimacy of the institution while shaping perceptions of a highly complex
and politically charged issue.
The analysis shows that the EP resolutions proved to be rich texts that com-
bine all eight strategies of self-legitimation. Through careful wording and struc-
turing, the EP legitimised itself as a rational, credible, ethical, and emotionally
resonant entity, using discourse in its resolutions to develop and rearm a cohe-
sive institutional identity centring on a set of particular traits and shared nor-
mative values. By employing these strategies, the resolutions craed a narrative
where the UK’s perceived shortcomings validated and necessitated the EP’s posi-
tions.
Crucially, the analysis oers several valuable policy lessons when it comes
to navigating the land of discursive self-legitimation. First, policymakers should
recognise the potential of legal instruments not just for their direct legal impact
but also as tools for strategic communication and self-legitimation. Second, it
important to bear in mind that overstepping the bounds of the delicate balance
between positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation can turn the
potentially synergistic relationship into a counterproductive one (cf. Liebrecht,
Hustinx and van Mulken ). The EP’s resolutions during the Brexit process
serve as a testament to the assembly’s adept navigation of this delicate balance.
Even though the EP employed both types of strategies, its primary focus was on
presenting itself positively, whilst its use of negative other-presentation served to
underscore its own contrasting positive attributes and legitimise its stances. Third,
the analysis underscores the necessity of maintaining a balance between emo-
tional and non-emotional elements in discourse, particularly when engaging in
negative other-representation. The analysis demonstrated that the EP grounded
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the negative portrayal of the Other primarily on factual foundations, as unsub-
stantiated or overly emotional communication might reect poorly on the percep-
tion of its rationality (Kirman, Livet and Teschl ).
Funding
Writing of this article was supported by the Czech Science Agency [project GA-S].
Open Access publication of this article was funded through a Transformative Agreement with
Aston University.
Acknowledgements section
I would like to thank the editors of the Journal of Language & Politics and the anonymous
reviewers for their insightful feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript.
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Address for correspondence
Monika Brusenbauch Meislová
Department of International Relations and European Studies
Faculty of Social Studies
Masaryk University
Joštova
Brno,
Czech Republic
brusenbauch.meislova@email.cz
brusenbauch.meislova@muni.cz
Biographical notes
Monika Brusenbauch Meislová is an associate professor at the Department of International
Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic and a visiting
professor at Aston University in Birmingham, United Kingdom. In , she has been awarded
the Jean Monnet Chair by the European Commission in EU digital diplomacy. In –,
she was one of the coordinators of the UACES research network ‘The Limits of EUrope’. Her
[] Monika Brusenbauch Meislová
Guest (guest) IP: 86.104.77.197 On: Sat, 14 Sept 2024 06:58:40
research work covers issues of political discourse, legitimacy and UK-EU relations. Her most
recent research has been published in various journals, including Journal of Common Market
Studies, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Journal of Contemporary Euro-
pean Studies, European Security or Europe-Asia Studies.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8581-4000
Publication history
Date received: December
Date accepted: July
Published online: September
Discourse of self-legitimation []
