A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in violent intergroup conflict settings: Differentiating actor, target, and type of action

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A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in
violent intergroup conflict settings: Differentiating
actor, target, and type of action
Özden Melis Uluğ, Maria Chayinska, Julia A. Schreiber & Laura K. Taylor
To cite this article: Özden Melis Uluğ, Maria Chayinska, Julia A. Schreiber & Laura K. Taylor
(11 Sep 2024): A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in violent intergroup conflict
settings: Differentiating actor, target, and type of action, European Review of Social Psychology,
DOI: 10.1080/10463283.2024.2396733
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2024.2396733
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 11 Sep 2024.
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A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in
violent intergroup conict settings: Dierentiating
actor, target, and type of action
Özden Melis Uluğ
a
, Maria Chayinska
b
, Julia A. Schreiber
a
and Laura K. Taylor
c
a
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK;
b
Department of Cognitive,
Psychological and Pedagogical Sciences, and Cultural Studies, University of Messina, Messina,
Italy;
c
School of Psychology, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
ABSTRACT
Despite an increase in social psychological research on allyship, less attention
has been paid to allyship action in violent intergroup conict settings. In this
contribution, rst, we introduce a multi-dimensional typology of allyship action
in such settings by dierentiating allyship based on the a) actors (i.e. individuals,
collectives, and societies), b) targets (i.e. victim- vs perpetrator-focused), and c)
types of those actions (i.e. low- vs high-cost action). Second, we mostly draw on
examples from our own research programmes and where relevant from global
conicts and previous studies on allyship to show the applicability of the
proposed typology. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical implications,
reect on the limitations of past studies and suggest directions to address
research gaps. Our typology contributes to the collective action and intergroup
conict literatures by showing how allyship action has been studied in conict
settings andthe similarities and dierences between conict and non-conict
settings.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 25 September 2022; Accepted 19 August 2024
KEYWORDS Allyship; intergroup conflict; solidarity; collective action; victim
In a globally interconnected yet hierarchically organised world, where some
groups have more advantages than others, understanding the role of allyship
is crucial. There have been recent attempts to conceptualise allyship such as
“advocacy for others motivated by the values and norms of the ingroup for its
own ends” (Louis et al., 2019, p. 1). Building on and extending this definition,
we conceptualise allyship actions as low- or high-cost acts taken by indivi-
duals, collectives, or societies to change the status quo among groups in
CONTACT Özden Melis Uluğ omu20@sussex.ac.uk School of Psychology, University of Sussex,
Pevensey Building, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2024.2396733
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the
Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

conflict, either by targeting victims or perpetrators of direct and structural
violence.
Social psychologists historically have focused on collective action among
disadvantaged groups, only shifting to study allyship in the last decade (e.g.,
van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). For instance, allyship action by advantaged
group members has been studied in relation to equal rights for racial
minority groups (e.g., Brown & Ostrove, 2013; I. R. Johnson & Pietri,
2022), ethnic justice (Uluğ & Uysal, 2023), gender justice (e.g., Subasic
et al., 2018), and LGBTQ+ rights (e.g., Russell, 2011). Allyship action has
also been linked to psychological group memberships (Craig et al., 2020; Van
Zomeren et al., 2008), emotions (Chong & Mohr, 2020; Roden & Saleem,
2022), beliefs and attitudes (Adra et al., 2020; Chan & Lam, 2023; Stefaniak
et al., 2020; Uysal et al., 2022) as well as morality (Kende et al., 2017; van
Zomeren et al., 2018). Complementing the empirical study of allyship, there
is a relatively recent focus on theorising about the social psychological
motivations that may produce and maintain allyship. More specifically,
four motivations have been identified: (a) morality, (b) personal, (c)
ingroup-focused, and (d) outgroup-focused (Radke et al., 2020; see also
Woo et al., 2024). Additional theorising, however, around the different
dimensions of allyship is needed because allyship is a complex and multi-
faceted concept that varies significantly across different contexts, commu-
nities, and social issues, as well as might have different motivations and
barriers depending on the type of action, and theorising this concept will
help researchers study allyship and its nuances more effectively.
Social psychological literature suggests that being an ally implies
a commitment to address and disrupt the hegemonic status quo and oppres-
sive realities through specific demands and social justice-oriented actions
(Selvanathan et al., 2020, 2023). Therefore, allies, including third-parties, are
seen as important agents of social change (e.g., Kutlaca et al., 2022; Saab et al.,
2015; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a). The mere fact of holding privileged identities
allows them to challenge systemic institutional barriers, speak out for, as well
as provide a platform and protection for victim groups whose voices have
been silenced or ignored. For example, in violent conflict contexts, allies can
be crucial in protecting victim groups in order for them to maintain their
resistance efforts against perpetrator groups and remain present in the land
(see, e.g., Fleischmann, 2021). Allies’ actions are believed to be particularly
impactful for social change to the extent that their identities are seen as
privileged among the dominant population, which confers entitlements and
resources unavailable to victim groups.
Previous conceptualisations of allyship distinguish between individual vs
collective levels (Thomas & McGarty, 2018) or costly vs non-costly group
behaviour (Becker et al., 2022; Odağ et al., 2023), mostly directed at helping
the victimised or disadvantaged social groups. Acknowledging the
2Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

importance of these ideas, in the current paper, we seek to bring more
attention to the context in which allyship action occurs (see also De Souza
& Schmader, 2024). Specifically, our focus is on settings characterised by
intergroup conflict, in which there is often direct and asymmetric violence
(Galtung, 1969) and a less powerful group seeks influential allies from the
broader political public to increase their own capacity for organised political
resistance (see also Hasan‐Aslih et al., 2020, Simon & Klandermans, 2001;
Subašić et al., 2008). We argue that the proposed typology is timely as it
underscores the role of a political context in shaping allies’ willingness to
intervene in conflict situations as well as their capacities to prevent escalation
of human-caused humanitarian crises. Indeed, allyship has become
a recurring theme in present-day intra-state (e.g., Turkish-Kurdish conflict)
and inter-state struggles (e.g., Russia-Ukraine war).
Notably, there is little psychological research about allyship in intergroup
conflict settings where there is direct intergroup violence (Galtung, 1969).
One possible reason behind the lack of a clear and consistent scholarly
understanding of allies’ actions may be caused by unique characteristics of
such contexts (e.g., structural barriers to intervention, limited possibilities to
collect data in hostile environments) as well as the psychological phenomena
associated with motivations that prompt the outsiders to join an ongoing
intergroup conflict. Yet, in such settings, the motivations of, barriers to, and
impact of allyship might differ due to the contextual characteristics (e.g., the
risk associated with showing allyship; lower/no influence of allies on other
ingroup members; Hasan-Aslih et al., 2023). Extending existing knowledge
might help to answer fundamental questions regarding psychological obsta-
cles to lasting peace. For example, the effectiveness of non-violent resistance
to peace processes has been discussed by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011),
who argued that merely 5% of a countries’ population could enact construc-
tive, social-political change. In such contexts, allyship action might be an
effective way to mobilise the general public, including advantaged group
members, to enact structural change. Moreover, allies are not only members
of advantaged groups, but also may include third-party actors (i.e., people
who are not a party to the conflict). Allies, including third parties, in conflict
settings are crucial as their actions may affect the course and outcome of
intergroup conflicts (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017; Harth & Shnabel, 2015; Iyer
et al., 2007; Levine et al., 2011; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a).
Despite the conceptual overlap in the collective action and intergroup
conflict literature, to date, there has been no typology of allies’ actions in
violent intergroup conflict settings. However, a typology like this is
needed because it would enhance scholars’ ability to systematically exam-
ine how allies’ actions are impacted by various factors as well as how
those actions impact social change. Therefore, we introduce a new multi-
dimensional typology of allyship action in violent intergroup conflict
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3

settings by differentiating allyship based on the a) actors of those actions
(i.e., individuals, collectives, or societies), b) targets of those actions (i.e.,
victim- vs perpetrator-focused) as allies’ actions typically operate within
a victim-perpetrator paradigm (e.g., Jankowitz, 2018), and c) types of
those actions (i.e., low- vs high-cost action). The proposed typology
thus offers a holistic and reproducible conceptual framework for achiev-
ing an integrated, multilevel understanding of allyship action in violent
intergroup conflict settings. As such, this typology underscores the impor-
tance of incorporating a broader social context and structure in which
allyship occurs into analysis.
Our aims: why do we need an allyship typology and how does it
generalise?
We have three aims in the current contribution. First, we aim to introduce
a multi-dimensional typology to help researchers conceptualise allyship
actions in violent intergroup conflict settings and to illustrate different
dimensions of this typology in existing empirical research. As mentioned,
we define allyship actions as actions taken by individuals, collectives, or
societies to change the status quo among groups in conflict, either by
targeting victims or perpetrators of direct and structural violence. We define
such settings as violent social contexts that are characterised by disagreement,
divisions, or confrontation between two or more groups and their members
(see also Tropp, 2012). By building on and extending this definition, we
argue that such settings can be generally characterised by 1) disparities in
group status, 2) pervasive direct violence and its many pernicious forms
(including coercion and arbitrary deprivation of liberty; see also Christie,
2006; Galtung, 1969), 3) asymmetrical power relations, and 4) involvement
of non-state groups. However, our typology has some constraints on gen-
eralisability (Simons et al., 2017): it is applicable to contexts where 1) inter-
group relations continue to be marred by differences in group status, 2)
violence is direct and pervasive, 3) asymmetrical power relations are rein-
forced, and 4) non-state groups may also become a party to the conflict.
Second, we aim to show what types of actions have been studied in violent
intergroup conflict settings especially from a social-psychological perspec-
tive. While illustrating the allyship typology, we draw on examples mainly
from our own programmes of research. However, when we do not have
examples from our own research, we incorporate previous research focused
on solidarity-based action without necessarily conceptualising it as allyship.
This approach allows us to highlight the gaps in the literature by showing
which actions have been studied more frequently and for which actions more
(interdisciplinary) work is needed to understand the motivators, dynamics,
and processes.
4Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

Third, with an eye towards generalisation, we aim to identify both simila-
rities and differences (if any) across conflict and non-conflict settings in
terms of studying allyship actions. This approach will highlight the overlaps
and distinctions among dimensions of allyship actions between the two
contexts.
Positionality statements: why have we chosen to write on allyship in
violent intergroup conict settings?
The first author, Uluğ, has been conducting research in conflict settings over
the last ten years, with a focus especially on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict
among others (e.g., Northern Irish, Mapuche). As an ethnically Turkish
researcher from Turkey, she tried to understand how being a member of
a perpetrator group in a conflict setting may motivate perpetrator group
members to take action on behalf of victim group members. This is what
motivated her to conceptualise allyship in conflict settings. The second
author, Chayinska, has been conducting context-centred, history-informed
empirical research to advance the social psychology of collective action since
2014. As an ethnically Ukrainian researcher from Ukraine who spent four
years living in Latin America (Argentina and Chile), she used both qualita-
tive and quantitative methods to conduct research in the contexts of the
Russia-Ukraine military conflict and the Mapuche conflict in Araucania
(South of Chile). In particular, she investigated what prompted advantaged
group members in Ukraine to engage in political solidarity with Crimean
Tatars who faced the forced annexation of their homeland (i.e., Crimean
Peninsula) by Russia in 2014. She also examined the factors predicting
outgroup trust, forgiveness, and intentions to reconcile among victim
group members in the contexts of Chile’s Mapuche conflict and the military
conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The third author, Schreiber, has an
academic background in psychology and has been trained as a conflict and
peace practitioner. She is currently conducting PhD research on allyship in/
towards conflict settings, specifically looking into the motivators and barriers
of third parties to support victim groups in Israel/Palestine and Turkey. She
previously monitored different intra-state conflicts in India for annual con-
flict reports and worked in monitoring and evaluation for a peacebuilding
NGO in Israel/Palestine. The fourth author, Taylor, is trained in psychology
and peace studies; she has worked as a practitioner in intergroup conflict
settings, such as Guatemala and Nepal, and as an academic in settings such as
the Balkans, Colombia, Israel, and Northern Ireland, among others. Her
theoretical contributions have included teasing apart the target and type of
prosocial action among youth in conflict settings in the Developmental
Peacebuilding Model (DPM; see Taylor, 2020). Relevant to the focus on
allyship, her research has focused on constructive responses to adversity
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 5

and violence by majority and minority group members. Overall, our team’s
positionality guided us in how we conceptualised, understood, and
researched allyship (e.g., how our own privileged positions helped us focus
on the positive role of allies in conflicts and how we support non-violent
allyship actions over violent ones). We invite the reader to keep it in mind
while reading about our own research programme on allyship, which is
presented in the following sections.
How should allyship be studied? Developing a multi-dimensional
typology for allyship actions in violent intergroup conict settings
Recent debates in the literature acknowledge the importance of the context in
which allyship action takes place, suggesting investigating the peculiarity of
the phenomenon outside peaceful and democratic settings (e.g., WEIRD
contexts; Henrich et al., 2010), paying attention to both pitfalls and impact
of allyship in non-democratic, authoritarian and conflict settings (Hasan-
Aslih et al., 2023; Odağ et al., 2023; Uluğ & Uysal, 2023). To show that
allyship action is not limited to non-conflict settings, we provide examples
from our own research programmes, bringing together literature from ally-
ship in collective action and conflict studies. When we do not have examples
from our own research, we benefit from previous research as well as our own
observations from global conflicts. That is the reason why some parts of the
typology will be shorter (i.e., examples from previous research/global con-
flicts) than others (i.e., examples from our own research). This approach
helps us highlight how allyship has been studied in violent conflict settings,
where there are research gaps and how we can address those gaps in future
research.
We propose a multi-dimensional typology for allyship actions in inter-
group conflict settings by asking three important questions: (1) who are the
actors that show allyship action?; (2) who are the targets that allyship action is
aimed at?; and (3) what are the types of allyship action? Based on these
questions, the typology distinguishes the (a) actors (i.e., individuals, collec-
tives, and societies), b) targets (i.e., victim- vs perpetrator-focused), and
c) types of action (i.e., low- vs high-cost; see Table 1). We also offer two
examples of relevant allyship action for each cell in Table 1. We explain each
question below and discuss our typology in detail.
Individuals, collectives or societies: who are the actors?
We expand the consideration of allyship actors in two ways: considering
three levels of actors as well as the actors’ identities. First, the social psychol-
ogy literature tends to focus on the individual- or collective-level analysis for
social change (Acar & Uluğ, 2022; Uluğ & Acar, 2018). Some previous work
demonstrated that there is a clear distinction between actions on the
6Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

Table 1. A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in conflict settings.
Low-cost High-cost
Target
Actor
Victim
(support)
Perpetrator
(undermine)
Victim
(support)
Perpetrator
(undermine)
Individual
ally
1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.2.1. 1.2.2.
●Posting pro-victim content on
social media
●Wearing clothing with pro-
victim messages
●Rejecting negligible, easy-to-replace
services of perpetrator groups
●Signing petitions to punish
perpetrators
●Offering victim groups a place
to stay
●Engaging in on-site work to
support victim groups (e.g.,
education, building
infrastructure)
●Rejecting essential ser-
vices of perpetrator
groups
●Disrupting events that
symbolise ties with per-
petrator groups
Collective
ally
2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.2.1. 2.2.2.
●Running online campaigns to
raise awareness of victim
groups in conflicts
●Placing flags of victim groups
in open spaces or websites
●Collecting signatures for petitions
such as human rights violations of
perpetrator groups
●Boycotting institutions of perpetra-
tor groups in international events
●Protesting to support victim
groups
●Sit-ins at train stations to sup-
port victim groups
●Blocking trucks with
arms supplies for perpe-
trator groups
●Hacking technology sys-
tems of perpetrator
groups
Societal
ally
3.1.1. 3.1.2. 3.2.1. 3.2.2.
●Online official announce-
ments to show support for
victim groups
●Placing flags of victim groups
in front of government
buildings
●Freezing the fortune of politicians
from perpetrator groups that are
located abroad
●Raising awareness of propaganda of
perpetrator groups in open spaces
(e.g., railways)
●Sending large financial sup-
port to victim groups
●Rescuing victim groups via
bus/train/plane
●Imposing sanctions for
perpetrator groups
●Sending diplomats of
perpetrator groups
away
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 7

individual (actions taken by one person based on their personal decisions
such as signing a petition) and collective (actions taken by a collection or
group of people based on a shared decision such as demonstrating) level
(Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Thomas & McGarty, 2018; see also Acar & Uluğ,
2022) although the same actions can be shown both by individuals and
collectives (e.g., displaying a flag to signal allyship). Moreover, the construc-
tive role of individuals (e.g., Volcic & Erjavec, 2015) and collectives, such as
civil society movements (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021; Davies & Kaufman,
2003), in conflict settings has been widely documented (Chayinska &
McGarty, 2021). The conflict literature, however, also focuses on high-level
actors such as states (e.g., Norway; Waage, 2005; see also Krieger, 2016),
international associations (e.g., UN; Howard, 2007), or international orga-
nisations (e.g., ICRC; Forsythe, 1976). Therefore, we argue that allyship
action in conflict settings must also include societal-level actors. Societal
actions can be defined as those taken on a larger scale of social aggregation,
such as actions taken by international organisations (e.g., EU, UN) or
governments or political parties (see Böhm et al., 2019). Their role can
range from (in)formal and legal, as in the case of arbitration (e.g.,
Bercovitch, 1985), to broader forms of soft power (e.g., Spector & Zartman,
2003). Taking these actors into account is crucial to understanding conflict
and peace processes since they have significant power and influence due to
their visibility, status, and policy-making capacities (Lederach, 1997). Thus,
while not often labelled as “allies” in the conflict literature, these actors –
across individual, collective and societal levels – have relatively privileged
positions and actively work to advance the equitable well-being and struc-
tural inclusion of victimised groups (Taylor & Christie, 2015).
Second, intergroup conflict settings highlight the multiplicity of actors,
and issues of identity are highly salient. Expanding the focus from advan-
taged groups locked in the antagonistic dispute, third parties (i.e., actors
not directly involved in the dispute) are often involved in conflict settings.
Allies may share overlapping identities with the victims, such as the
diaspora (e.g., Irish-American support for the Northern Ireland peace
process; Cochrane, 2007) and co-ethnics (e.g., Albanians in the US and
UK on behalf of Kosovo; Koinova, 2013), or even collective victim
identities (e.g., South Africans in support of Palestinians; Momberg,
2017; see also Vollhardt, 2020). Perpetrators can also engage in allyship,
such as the US solidarity movement with Central America in the 1980s
(Power & Charlip, 2009; Stuelke, 2014). Finally, the identities of third-
party allies may range from overlapping identities with the conflicting
parties to relatively distinct and orthogonal ethnically, politically, and
geographically (e.g., Norway as a mediator for the Oslo Accord; Waage,
2005). Central across all of these examples, allies are constructively work-
ing for victimised groups in conflict settings.
8Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

Directed toward the victim vs perpetrator: who are the targets?
In asymmetric intergroup conflicts, victim groups typically have lower
power, with limited legal status (e.g., being not internationally recognised
as a state) and fewer resources (e.g., armaments, technological, economic,
demographic, and other structural resources; Berglund & Souleimanov,
2020). At the same time, perpetrator groups tend to have more power, are
often recognised by other countries and have access to far more resources.
Allies can direct their allyship actions towards both groups in different
ways. First, they can support the victims. For example, allies can empower
victims by giving them a platform to amplify their voices or helping them to
dismantle inequalities caused by structural violence or discrimination (e.g.,
economic or educational disadvantages). For example, on a collective level,
allies can engage in social media campaigning (e.g., Palestine Solidarity
Movement in Ireland and the UK; Abu-Ayyash, 2015). Second, allies can
undermine the perpetrators. For example, allies can block resources that
perpetrators use for oppression (e.g., barricade the roads of arms factories)
or damage their international cooperation ability (e.g., impair moral image,
boycott companies that support perpetrator groups; e.g., boycott of South
Africa or Israel; DiStefano & Henaway, 2014). Both types of actions can be
performed to diminish power inequalities between groups and catalyse social
change in conflict settings.
Low-cost vs high-cost: what are the types of allyship action?
Underpinning different types of allyship, the majority of the studies noted so
far include low-cost action at the interpersonal level (e.g., self-reported
prosociality, Taylor et al., 2014, or resource allocation, but not at “own
expense,” for an exception, see Corbett et al., 2023). However, these types
of behaviour have been linked to broader forms of collective (i.e., mesosys-
tem) and societal (i.e., macrosystem) action (e.g., Taylor & Hanna, 2018). In
other words, understanding some of the factors that produce or sustain
allyship at the interpersonal level may also be effective at mobilising collec-
tive or even societal actors to support victimised groups or punish perpe-
trators. Focusing on these factors when addressing social injustice may be
particularly important in conflict settings (Carlo et al., 2022), where deep
history and entrenched norms that span generations (Taylor, Dautel, et al.,
2020) can influence how identity-related processes influence allyship actions
(see also Baysu & Uluğ, 2024).
Building on the collective action literature, we distinguish between differ-
ent costs of allyship action (Schumann & Klein, 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Costs
“refer to the material and social resources to overcome mounting injustice
(e.g., energy, time, and financial loss)” (Odağ et al., 2023, p. 236). We note
that costs, whether low or high, might affect whether people will take action
or not. Low-cost actions, on the one hand, usually take no to little effort,
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 9

require far less time, risk, or resources, and do not have serious consequences
for the actor (Corcoran et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015; see also Kutlaca & Radke,
2023, for performative allyship). High-cost actions, on the other hand,
usually involve social, economic, and time-related costs and may have
serious consequences, such as injury, imprisonment, and threat to life, for
the actor (Corcoran et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Examples from previous
work for low-cost collective actions include signing a petition or boycotting
products, while high-cost collective actions include joining unofficial strikes
or occupying buildings (Corcoran et al., 2015).
Allyship in intergroup conflict settings accentuates this cost-benefit ana-
lysis (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). For example, high-cost allyship in such
settings may even be fatal. However, we should also note that these actions
can be context-dependent (Odağ et al., 2023; Uluğ et al., 2022); explicit
criticism for the perpetrator group may require little material resources in
one setting (e.g., in a relatively more democratic context), but risk imprison-
ment and threat to life in another (e.g., in a relatively less democratic
context). Despite the contextual variations, the importance of teasing apart
low- and high-cost allyship actions is particularly crucial due to higher costs
in conflict settings.
Actors, targets, and actions: a multi-dimensional typology of allyship
action in conflict settings
In this section, we introduce the allyship typology by drawing on examples
from our complementary research programmes on allyship. In other words,
the work we reviewed below mostly comes from our own research. However,
when we do not have specific examples for some cells of the proposed
typology, we use our own observations from global conflicts as well as benefit
from previous studies to show the applicability of the proposed typology.
However, these parts of the typology will be relatively shorter than the parts
where we reviewed our own work. Thus, we illustrate how the dimensions of
the typology of allyship action in violent conflict settings have been studied
in the social-psychology literature and highlight the research gaps (see
Table 2 for how the dimensions of the typology of allyship action in violent
conflict settings have been studied in the social-psychology literature).
Individual-level allyship
Individual, low-cost, victim-directed allyship
In this type of allyship, individual allies act alone to show their
support for the victim group. Their actions usually require either no
or relatively few resources (e.g., money and time), have low personal
costs that impact core needs like freedom or social belonging (e.g.,
10 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

prison, exclusion from someone’s social circle), and are often of
a symbolic nature. For example, an individual ally may hang the
victim’s flag as a sign of support on their door, change their social
media banner to the victim’s flag or post pro-victim messages on social
media.
Most of our knowledge about individual (and collective; see below), low-
cost, victim-directed allyship has come from studies on allyship in non-
conflict societies (e.g., the US, Australia, Germany). These studies have
shown the role of individual experiences (e.g., closeness to people targeted
by prejudice; Tropp & Uluğ, 2019), various emotions (e.g., anger, empathy;
Chong & Mohr, 2020; Roden & Saleem, 2022; Selvanathan et al., 2018),
moralities (e.g., moral outrage and convictions; Green et al., 2023; Kende
et al., 2017; van Zomeren et al., 2011), (dis-)identification processes (e.g.,
Craig et al., 2020; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), and beliefs and attitudes (e.g., zero-sum
beliefs; Adra et al., 2020; Chan & Lam, 2023; Stefaniak et al., 2020; Uysal
et al., 2022) in allyship actions.
Table 2. An illustration of how the dimensions of the typology of allyship action in
conflict settings have been studied in the social-psychology literature.
Low-cost High-cost
Target
Actor
Victim
(support)
Perpetrator
(undermine)
Victim
(support)
Perpetrator
(undermine)
Individual
ally
1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.2.1. 1.2.2.
●Ethnic
awareness
●Empathy
●Efficacy
beliefs
●Religiosity
●Consumer
beliefs
●Identity content
●Social norms
●Type
of costs
Collective
ally
2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.2.1. 2.2.2.
●Conflict
narratives
●Intergroup con-
tact and com-
munication
topics-
Disidentification
and perceived
loyalty of victim
groups
●Injustice
appraisals
●Anger
●Hope
●Moral
conviction
●Ally
identification
●Non-violent
communication
intervention
●Conflict
narratives
●Competitive
victimhood
●Ideology/
moral
conviction
●Thrill-
seeking
●Increasing
self-esteem
Societal
ally
3.1.1. 3.1.2. 3.2.1. 3.2.2.
●Raising
awareness
●Uniting around
new political
platforms
●Literature
gap
●Literature gap ●Category
inclusion
●Category
norms
●Category
interest
Topics in italics represent our own work whereas non-italic topics represent other studies.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 11

Our research, on the other hand, so far has mostly focused on individual-
level, low-cost, victim-directed allyship action in intergroup conflict settings.
In the next paragraphs, we outline two factors for this type of allyship action
that we have found in our work: ethnic awareness and empathy.
Ethnic awareness
The Helping Kids! Lab, for example, has focused on individual actions
towards conflict-rival targets (i.e., dual victim/perpetrator identities depend-
ing on the perspective and context), framed by the DPM (Taylor, 2020),
which outlines how different types of outgroup prosocial behaviour among
children and young people can contribute to consolidating peace in settings
of intergroup conflict. Integrating developmental psychological and peace-
building paradigms, the DPM emphasises the constructive ways that indivi-
duals, particularly children and young people, can respond to adversity. The
DPM argues that prosocial behaviour towards a conflict-rival can promote
social cohesion.
First, the Helping Kids! lab aimed to understand at what age children were
aware of socially relevant groups, that is, the targets of allyship. We reasoned
that only if children are aware of these groups, and the relative disadvantage,
could they begin to act in agentic and prosocial ways to help or include such
groups. To test this idea, we developed a child-friendly task that has been
adopted and applied in at least six countries (Croatia; Israel; Kosovo;
Northern Ireland; Republic of Ireland; Republic of North Macedonia). In
one version of the task, children simply sorted pairs of images that adults
categorise as being associated with one conflict-rival group over another
(e.g., the Irish flag, and not the British flag, is categorised as Catholic, in the
case of Northern Ireland). The greater number of images or symbols that
children sorted in the hypothesised direction, above chance, was an indica-
tion of awareness of that social category. This sorting task taps into the first
stage of social identity development theory (Nesdale, 2004), ethnic
awareness.
In Northern Ireland, for example, we found that among children, evenly
split by gender and Catholic/Protestant background, children sorted symbols
above chance with both the hypothesised national (i.e., British/Irish) and
ethnopolitical (i.e., Protestant/Catholic) labels (Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020).
National category awareness emerged earlier than religious-ethnic category.
In addition, ethnic awareness was largely stronger for ingroup symbols,
compared to outgroup symbols, and increased with age (Figure 1). In other
words, children showed greater ethnic awareness of ingroup symbols, in
general, perhaps reflecting the relatively divided nature of social life and
with increased exposure as they aged. A similar pattern was found when we
adapted this task to the Republic of North Macedonia, where tense
12 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

interethnic relations remain and can be seen in the largely separate living
patterns, particularly in schools (Tomovska Misoska et al., 2020). That is 194
primary school children also sorted both ingroup and outgroup symbols with
the hypothesised ethnic group, and ethnic awareness was present among the
earliest school grades and increased with age. These findings suggest that
socialising contexts, such as schools, may have an accumulative effect on
ethnic awareness. Similar patterns of findings emerged in other conflict-
affected societies (e.g., Dautel et al., 2020) and towards marginalised ethnic
groups (i.e., Irish Travellers; Counihan et al., 2022).
These child-friendly quantitative tasks have been supported by comple-
mentary qualitative work. For example, we conducted a thematic analysis to
understand how Jews and Arab-Muslims in middle childhood perceive the
difference between these two ethno-religious groups in Israel (Shamoa-Nir
et al., 2022). We found two themes: differences (a) in everyday ethnic and
cultural properties and (b) related to religion. Providing validity to the
sorting task, children spontaneously brought up differences in religious
customs, traditions, clothing and symbols, which reflect their ethnic aware-
ness. Towards understanding allyship, this set of studies suggests that aware-
ness of group identities emerges and grows across primary school years.
These findings raise the question: If children are aware of such groups, will
they act in ways consistent with allyship?
Second, using a variation of the quantitative task, we examined if ingroup
preferences shaped children’s prosocial behaviours (e.g., sharing) towards
conflict rivals as one aspect of allyship in this age group (Bähr et al., 2021).
Figure 1. For each age group in the sample, the lines represent the number of images -
out of 38 - that children sorted above chance (p < .05) in the hypothesised direction for
national (black) and ethno-political (grey) labels.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 13

This series of studies tease apart similarities and differences related to
contexts, such as the recency and intensity of violence and majority/minority
group status. For example, 1,236 children participated in the series of inter-
active games. Settings of more recent and intense conflict (i.e., Israel and
Kosovo) showed greater differences in prosocial resource distribution tasks
across ingroup and outgroup members compared to settings where
a generation past the formal cessation of conflict (i.e., Croatia, Northern
Ireland, Republic of North Macedonia; Bähr et al., 2021). In other words, we
found differential prosocial giving, exacerbating inequality to working
against allyship goals. This, furthermore, indicates that there might be
a higher barrier to becoming an ally in intergroup conflict settings.
Despite mean-level differences in prosocial giving towards conflict rivals,
our research has found similarities across contexts in the underlying
mechanisms (Taylor et al., 2021). More specifically, supporting social iden-
tity development theory, a multiple-group mediation across children in three
post-accord settings (Northern Ireland; Kosovo; Republic of North
Macedonia) found that preferences for ingroup symbols mediated the link
from child age to outgroup prosociality. In other words, while there were
differences in the total number of stickers given to an outgroup child,
stronger ingroup preferences were linked with less prosociality towards the
conflict-rival. A similar finding was replicated among 387 children in Israel
(Shamoa-Nir et al., 2021). In this analysis, child age was related to greater
ingroup symbol preference, which in turn linked to negative outgroup
attitudes and then lower prosocial giving. In this analysis, the findings held
across both majority (Jewish) and minority (Arab-Muslim) children. Taken
together, both across contexts and across groups within a context, we find
support for age-related ingroup preferences for understanding prosocial
giving across group lines.
Empathy
The Helping Kids! Lab conducted a series of studies extending Batson’s
seminal work on the empathy-attitudes-action model (Batson et al., 1997).
The model outlines how empathy for an outgroup member, specifically
a stigmatised group (e.g., drug addict), may generalise to more positive
attitudes towards the group as a whole. Moreover, those positive attitudes
would mediate a link to prosocial action on behalf of the outgroup. The
Helping Kids! Lab adapted this model for children, and more specifically, the
focus was on individual actors directing different types of action towards
victimised groups (e.g., both refugees and conflict rivals). Across these
studies, we varied both the operationalisation of empathy (e.g., trait vs
state; general vs outgroup-specific; see O’Driscoll et al., 2021; Taylor et al.,
2022) as well as the methodological approach (e.g., experimental, cross-
14 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

sectional, longitudinal). For example, we developed a storybook intervention
which aimed to enhance host-society children’s attitudes and prosociality
towards recently arrived refugee children (Glen et al., 2020). In Taylor and
Glen (2020), we tested how the use of this storybook, as compared to an
information-only control group, would affect empathy, outgroup attitudes,
and three types of prosociality among 94 children in Northern Ireland,
a setting of protracted conflict. Compared to those in the information-only
condition, children in the storybook condition reported higher empathy
towards refugees as well as helping intentions towards a (fictional) refugee
that was told they would be moving to their school. In addition, children who
had higher outgroup attitudes, on average, also reported greater helping
intentions towards the (fictional) refugee who was the protagonist in the
storybook; however, they did not donate more to refugees in general when
given the opportunity. In addition, in this study, the overall empathy-
attitudes-action model was non-significant. These findings suggest that it
may be possible to enhance individual allyship towards an individual victim,
in this case, a refugee child, but the short intervention was not effective at
motivating broader forms of helping across a wider target group in middle
childhood.
Extending this line of research, we found support for the empathy-
attitudes-action model among adolescents in a two-wave study with
a focus on refugees (Taylor & McKeown, 2021). More specifically, we
included a trait measure of general empathy at Time 1 for 383 adoles-
cents. Informed by the DPM (Taylor, 2020), we tested if earlier empathy
related to three forms of prosociality, roughly mapping onto interperso-
nal, structural and cultural forms of constructive social change. In this
model, we found that outgroup attitudes did mediate the link from
empathy to outgroup helping (as well as collective action and political
activism; see collective-level allyship below) among youth in Northern
Ireland (Figure 2). More specifically, youth not only signed a United
Nation’s petition to stand #WithRefugees but also reported greater like-
lihood of taking part in a protest to support refugees in Belfast. The
former behavioural measure further suggests a link between motivational
factors for allyship at the individual level with those acts that can poten-
tially pressure third-party actors to engage in broader forms of collective
and societal allyship.
We also have found support for the empathy-attitudes-action model
motivating individual allyship action among children, adolescents and
young adults towards former conflict rivals. For example, across two studies
(Study 1, correlational: N = 132; Study 2, longitudinal design: N = 466), we
found that more positive attitudes towards the conflict-rival mediated the
impact of trait empathy on both actual sharing and self-reported helping,
comforting, and sharing towards the same outgroup in Northern Ireland
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15

(Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020). Relatedly, we found that, among young adults,
the role of empathy in predicting prosociality was even stronger when the
target in need was a conflict rival compared to an ingroup member (Taylor &
Hanna, 2018). Using an experimental approach with 186 young adults in
Northern Ireland, this research highlights the particular importance of
empathy as a motivational factor when the outgroup is a conflict rival.
This finding was extended in two studies using a dictator-style paradigm
(Urbanska et al., 2019). First, amongst adolescents in Northern Ireland, those
who reported higher empathy, on average, also perceived greater injustice in
a scenario of inequality (Study 1: N = 466). We followed up with a registered
report (Study 2: N = 406) and found that in the context of inequality,
empathy shaped perceptions of fairness through facilitating the experience
of anger on behalf of the victim. With implications for allyship, this finding
suggests that empathy may not only have a direct effect, but also may enable
perceiving a range of other emotions that further motivate allyship action on
behalf of victims in the face of injustice or inequality.
Individual, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship
Individuals act alone to undermine the perpetrator without expecting costs
for their actions. This type of allyship focuses on the perpetrator with an aim
to damage it in various ways such as boycotting/blacklisting the perpetrator’s
Figure 2. Structural equation bootstrapped mediation of the indirect effect of trait
empathy at time 1 on three types of outgroup prosocial behavior aiming to benefits
different levels of the social ecology (N = 383). Control variables of adolescent gender,
community background, and general prosocial behavior at time 1 are omitted for
readability. Indirect effects are depicted with dashed lines and non-significant paths
are depicted with dotted lines. Standardized coefficients reported. *p < .05; ***p < .001.
16 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

services/products that are not needed for daily life or are easily replaced by
alternatives. For example, individuals in third-party countries have stopped
buying products imported from Russia and replaced these products with
alternatives from other countries (e.g., Polish vodka). A previous study
focused on the case of individual allies in Indonesia boycotting Israeli
products (Awaludin et al., 2023). They found that allies were particularly
motivated by perceived efficacy, rather than religiosity or consumer animos-
ity (i.e., negative views of Israel), for these low-cost, perpetrator-directed
allyship actions.
Individuals might also sign petitions to request one’s government to
impose economic sanctions on the perpetrator group. Complementing
online support for the victims, this type of allyship also includes signing
petitions to punish the perpetrator for human rights violations via online
platforms that give the option to sign anonymously.
Individual, high-cost, victim-directed allyship
Individuals act alone to support the victim group, but invest a significant amount
of resources, such as money or time, or risk negative personal consequences,
such as loss of well-being, freedom or sometimes even their lives (see, e.g.,
Fleischmann, 2021). Allies can donate money or products (e.g., medicine,
clothes, food), volunteer to assist the victims (e.g., sort donated products, provide
accommodation), or even join the army of the victim group. Since the cost to
show allyship may be higher for individuals within the perpetrator country, this
might also include actions that seem low-cost at first sight. For example, signing
an online petition publicly to support the victims may lead to social exclusion
from ingroup members, financial (e.g., fines) or physical (e.g., force by police)
punishment, or even imprisonment or execution in the perpetrator country.
In one study, Uluğ and colleagues (2023) focused on the individual allyship
actions of the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel; People’s Protection Units)
supporters on social media (N of tweets = 550). Representing a variety of victim
groups, the YPG played a significant role in fighting against the Islamic State as
the perpetrator group in the context of the Syrian conflict. In this study, we
focused on how identity content and social norms may be related to the YPG
supporters’ allyship actions on social media. We call these allyship actions
high-cost because openly supporting the YPG, even on social media platforms,
one might be charged with supporting terrorism in Turkey. The findings
showed that the YPG identity is frequently associated with being a fighter,
a hero and a martyr. Positive or even noble acts such as initiating a revolution,
liberating oppressed groups, and resisting jihadism were also considered the
norms of the YPG identity. These social norms brought both ingroup members
and allies who identify themselves with the YPG on online platforms to
become allies with people in Northern Syria as well as to advocate mobilisation
for freedom and resistance for them.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 17

Individual, high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship
Individuals act alone to undermine the perpetrator group, but their actions
have high costs (e.g., being called “self-hating Jew” when criticising the Israeli
government; Finlay, 2005). Moreover, in some intergroup conflict settings
such as Turkey, individuals who protest against perpetrators’ wrongdoings
and misinformation risk punishments such as fines or imprisonment. In one
study, we asked our participants whether there were individual costs of
becoming active as a part of a movement or a protest to challenge the status
quo in their own setting (Odağ et al., 2023). We compared two different
settings: (1) Germany as a non-conflict setting and (2) Turkey as a conflict
setting. Although there were some overlaps between the costs involved in
activism in both settings, in the conflict setting (i.e., Turkey), the costs were
much differentiated (see Figures 3a and 3b). For example, in the non-conflict
setting (i.e., Germany), the most strongly endorsed costs were time concerns
(e.g., expenditure of effort, exhaustion, having no break), police interventions
(e.g., fears of torture, prison, water cannons, and tear gas) and negative
judgements from others (e.g., distrust, protection of privacy, social media
bullying, knowing things about people, and isolation). In the conflict setting
(i.e., Turkey), on the other hand, the most strongly endorsed costs were
Figure 3a. Perceived costs of activism in the sample from Germany. Shape sizes
represent the number of times each perceived cost was mentioned by interviewees.
The larger the shapes, the more often has the perceived cost been mentioned.
18 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

negative judgements from others and police interventions. Negative judge-
ments included social media bullying, sanctions as a consequence of posting
critical comments on social media, reactions from close others as well as
stigma and social exclusion. The police intervention included death, facing
teargas, plastic ammunition, water cannons, police sticks, weapons, gas bombs,
tanks, torture, interrogation, police calls, and having to embark on a police car.
Other risks, such as existential risks in Turkey, also included loss of employ-
ment, having to seek exile abroad, inability to find a state-owned job, salary
reduction, workplace bullying, being kept away from school, and the impair-
ment of regular life. In summary, although there were risks in both settings,
risks were much differentiated and taking action to challenge the perpetrator
group(s)’ positions was more costly in a conflict setting like Turkey.
Collective-level allyship
Collective, low-cost, victim-directed allyship
Groups and collectives – individuals working together to reach a common
goal – and organisations – such as NGOs and companies – often show their
support for victims using relatively few resources and such actions are often
symbolic. For example, organisations or companies might put the victim flag
Figure 3b. Perceived costs of activism in the sample from Turkey. Shape sizes represent
the number of times each perceived cost was mentioned by interviewees. The larger the
shapes, the more often has the perceived cost been mentioned.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 19

on their website or in their building or display it at events like a soccer cup
(e.g., pro-Ukraine messages on display in-stadium activities to promote
peace; SkySports, 2022) or collect donations from clients or members to
support the victim group. A good real-life example of this type of action was
that at the Oscars, there was a moment of silence for Ukraine in combination
with the appeal to support Ukraine as much as possible with donations for
food, medical care, water, and emergency services (T. Johnson, 2022). In the
next sections, we outline five important factors for this type of allyship action
that we have found in our research: conflict narratives, intergroup contact,
communication topics during contact, disidentification and perceived loy-
alty of the outgroup.
Conict narratives
One of the most critical factors that may affect allyship, especially in conflict
settings, is the narratives people endorse regarding the conflict. In our
previous work, we first identified five conflict narratives in the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict setting (Uluğ, 2016, 2023a; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016, 2019): (1)
a terrorism narrative that describes the problem as stemming mainly from
the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan; the armed wing of the Kurdish move-
ment); (2) an economic narrative that describes the problem as stemming
from economic backwardness and class-related differences in the Kurdish
region; (3) a democracy and Islam narrative that describes the problem as
stemming from Turkey’s nation-state ideology which was based on
Turkishness and excluded Kurds, and suggests an Islamic fellowship that
brings Turks and Kurds together under a Muslim identity; (4) a democracy
and rights narrative according to which the problem stems from a lack of
implementation of democracy and denial of rights to the Kurds; and (5) an
independence narrative that describes the problem as one based in need for
independence for Kurds. After identifying those narratives, we categorised
them as pro-Turkish vs pro-Kurdish narratives (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a): the
terrorism and the economic narratives can be considered pro-Turkish nar-
ratives whereas the independence and, to a certain extent, the democracy and
rights narratives can be considered pro-Kurdish narratives. The democracy
and Islam narrative, finally, does not reflect a pro-Turkish or pro-Kurdish
orientation and may be endorsed both by conservative religious Turks or
Kurds.
In one correlational study, we collected data from Turkish participants as
perpetrator group members (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a). We examined how
Turks see the Turkish-Kurdish conflict would be related to their attitudes
towards reconciliation and peace. Again, we categorised Turkish participants
as potential allies (i.e., çapulcu-Turks) and non-allies to Kurds (i.e., non-
çapulcu-Turks) based on whether they saw themselves as çapulcu in the Gezi
20 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

Park protests (N = 385). We presented the participants with these five con-
flict narratives and asked to what extent they endorsed each conflict narra-
tive. The findings showed that endorsement of the pro-Turkish terrorism
narrative was related to more negative attitudes towards both reconciliation
and the peace process, and the pro-Turkish economic narrative was related
to more negative attitudes towards the peace process (but not towards
reconciliation).
Conversely, endorsement of the democracy and rights narrative predicted
more positive attitudes towards reconciliation in the two Turkish groups and
more positive attitudes towards the peace process in all three groups. The
endorsement of the independence narrative consistently predicted more
negative attitudes towards reconciliation and more positive attitudes towards
the peace process. One possible reason behind the differential relationships
between endorsement of the pro-Turkish conflict narratives and negative
attitudes towards reconciliation and the peace process is that the peace
process addresses the problems related to the victim group (i.e., Kurds),
their leader as well as their identity. This might be seen as a unilateral “giving
in” and a more “confrontational” approach from the perpetrator’s perspec-
tive, whereas reconciliation explicitly requires constructing peace together in
a bilateral manner (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a).
Another correlational study focused only on çapulcu-Turks and tested
the role of terrorism and independence narratives in this potential ally
group’s political solidarity with Kurds (i.e., ethnic victim group) and
Alevis (i.e., religious victim group; Uluğ, 2023b; N = 295). The same
conflict narratives were presented to the participants, and later, political
solidarity with two victim groups (i.e., Kurds and Alevis) was presented
separately. More endorsement of the terrorism narrative (i.e., pro-Turkish
conflict narrative) predicted less political solidarity with Kurds whereas
more endorsement of the independence narrative (i.e., pro-Kurdish con-
flict narrative) predicted more political solidarity with Kurds. The results
even showed that there is a positive relationship between standing in
solidarity with one victim group (Kurds) and another victim group
(Alevis).
After these studies, we also examined the moderating role of ally identity
among perpetrator group members again in a conflict setting (i.e., Turkey;
Uluğ & Uysal, 2023). We collected data from 271 self-identified Turkish
participants and tested whether the paths between (a) ethnic identification
and endorsement of the victim’s conflict narrative (i.e., independence narra-
tive) and (b) endorsement of the victim group’s conflict narrative and
support for minority rights would be moderated by ally identification (i.e.,
Turkish ally identification; Figure 4). We conceptualised a Turkish ally as
someone who feels strong ties with Kurds, feels close to Kurds, and advocates
for Kurdish rights. The results showed that the strength of the relationship
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 21

between (a) ethnic identification and endorsement of the victim group’s
conflict narrative is particularly strong among strong allies, whereas the
strength of the relationship between (b) endorsement of the victim group’s
conflict narrative and support for minority rights is particularly strong
among weak allies. Complementing the previous findings on conflict narra-
tives, we also found that the more groups endorsed the victim group’s
conflict narrative, the more they supported pro-victim policies. These results
suggest that allyship needs to be taken into account in conflict settings as it
might affect people’s support for the victim groups (e.g., pro-victim policies,
behaviours, etc.) as well as their opposition to the perpetrator group’s actions
(e.g., criticising aggressive policies of the perpetrator group).
Intergroup contact and communication topics
Intergroup contact may motivate perpetrator group members to see the
conflict from the perspective of the victim and support peace-related out-
comes that benefit the victim group in conflict settings (Uluğ & Cohrs,
2017a). We collected data from 385 Turkish participants in Turkey and, as
mentioned earlier, asked a question to categorise them as potential allies (i.e.,
çapulcu-Turks)
1
and non-allies to Kurds (i.e., non-çapulcu-Turks) based on
whether they saw themselves as a çapulcu in the recent Gezi Park protests
(Uluğ & Acar, 2019). We later measured their contact quality with Kurds,
endorsement of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict narratives, as well as their
attitudes towards reconciliation and peace. We found that among non-
çapulcu-Turks (i.e., non-allies), higher-quality contact with Kurds was asso-
ciated with greater support for reconciliation and the peace process, but
unrelated to any conflict narratives. At the same time, for çapulcu-Turks (i.e.,
potential allies), contact with Kurds was associated with lower endorsement
of pro-Turkish narratives (the terrorism and economic narratives), and
higher endorsement of the pro-Kurdish independence narrative as well as
more positive attitudes towards reconciliation and the peace process through
its association with these narratives. On the one hand, we argue that contact
may have little impact on perpetrator group members’ broader understand-
ing of the conflict and may not lead them to endorse victim-supporting
conflict narratives. On the other hand, contact may have this effect on
a subset of the perpetrator group that feels excluded in society (i.e., [poten-
tial] allies to the victim group).
We also provided empirical tests of the role of intergroup contact in
allyship by focusing on low-cost actions towards victimised groups (e.g.,
1
During the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 in Turkey, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referred to
the protesters as “a few çapulcu.” It means looters in Turkish. However, the protestors took the term
and redefined it positively as someone who fights for their democratic rights (Uluğ & Acar, 2019).
22 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

racial and ethnic minorities) such as willingness to engage in collective
action for racial or ethnic justice. We examined what occurs during the
contact that may encourage members of perpetrator groups to become
willing to engage in collective action in solidarity with members of victim
groups (Tropp et al., 2021). In two correlational studies, we collected data
from perpetrator groups in non-conflict (White Americans in the US;
Study 1) and conflict settings (Turks in Turkey; Study 2) by asking
questions assessing their contact with victim groups (Black people and
Kurdish people, respectively). Participants were later asked how fre-
quently they talk about group differences in power (e.g., racial/ethnic
injustices in society, personal experiences with racial/ethnic discrimina-
tion, and the existence of racial/ethnic privilege) when they come into
contact with Black/Kurdish people. In Study 2, we also asked participants
how frequently they talk about group differences in culture (e.g., lifestyles,
customs or cultural traditions) when they come into contact with Kurdish
people. Our findings showed that greater contact with members of victim
groups corresponds with perpetrators’ greater willingness to engage in
collective action in solidarity with the victim through the pathway of
communication about group differences in power, but not through com-
munication about group differences in culture (see Figure 5). These
findings highlight the importance of not only having more general, every-
day intergroup contact experiences, but also other meaningful experiences
that might produce allyship among the perpetrator group (see also
Hässler et al., 2021). We should also note that these two studies are
particularly important because the second study in Turkey provides
Figure 4. Path diagram of the theoretical Model among perpetrator group members.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 23

evidence for allyship from a conflict setting, and we argue that some of
the mechanisms that we observe in non-violent conflict settings (e.g., the
US) may be generalisable to conflict settings.
Disidentication and perceived loyalty of the outgroup
We proposed that political solidarity is a form of collective action in
which allies can align their aspirational identities to the oppressed
group’s political loyalties through a process of disidentification from
powerful outgroups (Chayinska et al., 2017). Adapting and extending
the social identity model of helping and solidarity (Subašić et al., 2008),
our research sought to examine the mechanisms behind rival Ukrainian
solidarity campaigns advocating the protection of the minority Crimean
Tatars in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of the
Crimean peninsula. More specifically, the focus was on the intentions to
engage in collective action supporting the political and civil rights of
Crimean Tatars on the self-definition in the face of the annexation
among (both pro-EU and pro-Russia) Ukrainians, that is, citizens with
the opposed political aspirations. In this research, disidentification was
conceptualised as a politicised sense of standing against certain cate-
gories (i.e., “who we are not and what we stand against”; see also
Chayinska & McGarty, 2021). In specific, we argued that contending
parties within Ukraine (pro-European- and pro-Russia-minded indivi-
duals) used context-specific political claims (e.g., polarised views within
Ukrainian society regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea) to encapsu-
late the commonalities between themselves and an oppressed minority
and then assert political demands on behalf of that group in order to
mobilise solidarity-based collective action. We found supportive evi-
dence among Ukrainian citizens for the notion that both action (facil-
itation pathway) and inaction (inhibitory pathway) to support the
Crimean Tatars were derived from disidentification from the European
Union or the Russian-Federation-dominated Customs Union (CU) and
were mediated by perception of the Crimean Tatars’ loyalties towards
Russia and Ukraine (Chayinska et al., 2017). In particular, it has been
revealed that the more Ukrainians strongly opposed Russian Federation
policies (by disidentifying from the CU), the more likely they perceived
Crimean Tatars as loyal to Ukraine and, therefore, supported collective
action to rescue Crimean Tatars from the annexation. Similarly, the
more Ukrainians opposed connections to Western Europe (by disidenti-
fying from the EU), the more they perceived Crimean Tatars as loyal to
Russia and, as such, refraining from acting because they might not see
the necessity to rescue this victim group within Ukraine. These results
lend support to the core argument behind this research that political
24 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

mobilisation of third parties in support of victims (i.e., an indigenous
group with a history of oppression) often occurs when contending
parties use political claims to encapsulate and symbolise the commonal-
ities between themselves and a group presumed to be oppressed, articu-
late and assert political demands on behalf of that group, and mobilise
a larger society for third-party allyship.
Collective, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship
This type of allyship is shown by groups, collectives and organisations to
undermine the perpetrator group, facing minimal costs (e.g., if a company or
organisation signs a petition to punish the perpetrator group). This type of
allyship also includes excluding teams of the group from (international)
events or firing individuals of the perpetrator group (diaspora) with close
ties to the perpetrator group’s government. In one recent study, we focused
exactly on this topic (Landmann et al., 2024): what predicts Germans’
collective action intentions (and goals) to punish those responsible for the
violent conflict (i.e., punishment goal) in the Ukraine-Russia conflict con-
text? We collected data from German participants (N = 339) and found that
anger mediated the association between injustice appraisals (a belief that the
situation is unjust) and collective action against Russia.
Similarly, in 2022, the annual Eurovision Song Contest excluded Russia
from the competition (Watts, 2022), while the Munich Philharmonic fired its
conductor due to his ties to the government and his refusal to speak against
the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Connolly, 2022).
2
Another good example of
Figure 5. Path diagram of the theoretical Model in study 2.
2
We would like to clarify that we do not consider allyship actions in which individuals from the
perpetrator group who do not support the perpetrators’ agenda get discriminated against in any form.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 25

low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship is the University College London
Union’s support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) move-
ment (BDS, 2016).
Collective, high-cost, victim-directed allyship
Collective allyship to support the victim group can also be of a high cost.
These actions could be greater in scale (e.g., larger donations), but also could
include coordinated efforts to support large numbers of victims. For exam-
ple, funding and coordinating temporary civilian shelters inside Ukraine,
such as Human Appeals’s collaboration with the Ukrainian Muslim
Women’s League (Human Appeal, 2022). The costs of allyship may be higher
if the collective is directly engaging with victims, such as refugee camps at the
Ukraine-Poland border, because of the emotional toll and physical separa-
tion the collective’s members must sustain. Depending on the context, these
actions can be costly because allies can be physically injured, fined, or
imprisoned.
Previous research in Israel/Palestine highlights the role of non-violent
communication interventions (i.e., interventions that focus on increasing
mutual understanding by talking about the situation without judgement,
stating feelings and needs, and making clear and non-judgemental requests;
Rosenberg, 2012) for allyship actions of the perpetrator group (Avichail et al.,
2021). These interventions can impact Jewish Israelis’ willingness to partici-
pate in allyship actions towards Palestinians (e.g., engagement in protests
that improve Palestinians’ living conditions or raising awareness about the
living conditions of Palestinians among close relationships) by increasing
their hope towards Palestinians.
Collective, high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship
This type of collective allyship to undermine or punish the perpetrator
involves significant costs. For example, Coca-Cola and McDonald’s sus-
pended business in Russia, forgoing income from that market. The IT
Army for Ukraine – hackers around the world who disrupt Russian govern-
ment web services or power supplies – collectively invest a significant
amount of time and risk revenge from the perpetrator government (Shore,
2022). This type of allyship action – hacktivism – is usually associated with
socio-political motivations although thrill-seeking and increasing self-esteem
may also play an important role (Romagna & Van den Hout, 2017). This type
of allyship may specifically interfere with the perpetrator’s war actions; for
example, anti-war activists blocked the Polish-Belarus border to delay the
transport of goods to Belarus and Russia (Sukhov, 2022). As a consequence,
allies can face some costly consequences, including legal prosecution.
We conducted a study with perpetrator group members in Turkey to
investigate how conflict narratives are related to actions that aim to challenge
26 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

the perpetrator group’s policies and behaviours (Uluğ et al., 2021). First,
a total of 110 self-identified Turkish participants completed the survey online
(Uluğ et al., 2021). Participants were presented with the terrorism and
independence conflict narratives (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a), competitive victim-
hood (Noor et al., 2008), support for non-violent conflict resolution (Uluğ &
Cohrs, 2017a), forgiveness (Noor et al., 2008), support for stopping violence
and support for aggressive policies. We found that stronger endorsement of
the terrorism narrative predicted more competitive victimhood, more sup-
port for aggressive policies and less support for stopping violence, whereas
stronger endorsement of the independence narrative was unrelated to com-
petitive victimhood and most of the outcome variables (with the exception of
support for non-violent conflict resolution; Figure 6). Among the perpetra-
tor group members, the pro-Turkish conflict narrative seems to be a barrier
to conflict resolution and peace-building efforts, but the pro-Kurdish conflict
narrative may help them support non-violent conflict resolution. The results
show that conflict narratives may play a crucial role not only in victim-
directed allyship but also in perpetrator-directed allyship.
We argue that even demanding non-violent conflict resolution and challen-
ging the perpetrator group might be classified as high-cost in some conflict
settings. In Turkey, for example, Academics for Peace started a signature cam-
paign to stop the Turkish government’s crimes against Kurdish citizens in the
context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Acar, 2018). As a result of this
allyship, some Academics for Peace in Turkey found themselves incarcerated on
charges of purportedly aiding terrorism within a milieu of conflict, wherein vocal
opposition to the perpetrator group incurred severe repercussions for those allies
(e.g., some academics got fired from their jobs).
Societal-level allyship
Unlike political science and international relations literature (Eznack, 2011),
social-psychological literature on allyship has tended to ignore societal-level
allyship as a unit of analysis. As presented above, most of our work also focused
on individual- and collective-level allyship. In the following sections, we present
a few studies on and other examples of societal-level allyship in conflict settings.
Societal, low-cost, victim-directed allyship
Societal allyship includes actions by societal-level actors such as local and
national authorities (e.g., political parties, governments) and supranational
authorities (e.g., European Union), which usually take minimal effort to
support the victim group. In our own research, although indirectly, we
examined how societal-level allyship may bring about social change in
a conflict setting. In Turkey (Acar & Uluğ, 2016), we interviewed 34 activists
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 27

who participated in the Gezi Park protests to understand their evaluation of
activism, allyship and social change outcomes. The results showed that one
of the many outcomes of the Gezi Park protests was the building of coalitions
of leftist groups and a political party, which challenged the legitimacy of the
AKP government to disrupt the status quo and gave hope to the opposition
(see also Uluğ & Acar, 2018). However, the government responded with
a backlash and implemented different restrictive measures, such as arresting
any protesters or taking them into custody or even criminalising the newly
founded political party. One may argue that the reason behind these restric-
tive measures was that the government felt threatened as the allyship was
taken to the societal level and did not stay at the collective level.
Three years later, we interviewed 17 expert activists to understand the
impact of societal-level allyship actions in the context of the Gezi Park
protests (Uluğ & Acar, 2018). The findings highlighted that allyship actions
included raising social awareness for certain groups (e.g., LGBTIs, Alevis)
and uniting around new political platforms (e.g., a new political party; then
Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP, which is an alliance of pro-Kurdish and
left-wing political forces). These forces were also participants of Gezi and
surpassed the 10% threshold necessary in general elections in 2015 to win
seats in the new Parliament. The experts in our study indicated that both
allyship and solidarity had a vast impact on HDP’s surpassing the election
threshold because people who demand peace and fundamental freedoms,
without being interested in the Kurdish movement in particular, voted for
HDP and challenged the system through societal-level allyship.
Although not being studied in social psychology, at the societal level,
there are numerous real-life examples of low-cost victim-directed allyship
in different conflict settings (e.g., more at the state level). For example,
Australian and New Zealand governments condemn human rights abuses
against ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang through
Figure 6. Path model for study 1; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths; ***p <
.001, **p < .01.
28 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

official statements, and this exemplifies a low-cost victim-directed ally-
ship. Similarly, local governments in Berlin, London, and Liverpool lit up
public buildings in the yellow and blue of the Ukrainian flag, while both
national governments and the European Union openly supported Ukraine
through public statements on their websites. Furthermore, the European
Council invited the Ukrainian president to discuss supportive actions at
its political summit. Recently, Ireland, Norway, and Spain announced
their decision to officially recognise a Palestinian state to show allyship
(Time, 2024).
Societal, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship
This type of societal allyship takes minimal effort to hinder perpetrators.
Some diplomatic actions by different countries may fall under this type of
allyship action. For example, various countries in the EU (e.g., Greece,
Latvia, Czechia) have imposed a visa ban for Russian citizens in response
to the conflict in Ukraine. Similarly, Israeli citizens being prohibited from
entering some countries such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen is an example of low-
cost, perpetrator-directed allyship.
Societal, high-cost, victim-directed allyship
Societies may be uniquely positioned to offer high-cost allyship to victims.
For example, while some countries have provided costly financial and
humanitarian aid to Ukraine (e.g., foodstuffs, medicine, and clothing),
others have provided military aid (e.g., tank deliveries), and the EU even
considered granting Ukraine EU membership to make support easier.
Another example of high-cost, victim-directed allyship is the
U.S. government’s aiding the YPG via air support during the ISIS siege
of Kobani. Not only are these actions financially and time costly, but
military support also may risk third parties becoming involved in the
conflict. Research highlights the potential impact of this type of allyship
action on other levels. For example, research in the US shows that when
governments have alliances (i.e., societal allies) with victim groups (e.g.,
groups that get invaded by another country for territorial gains), this
significantly can impact the public support (i.e., individual & collective
allies) for military intervention in favour of the victim, regardless of
whether this action is perceived as costly or not (Tomz & Weeks, 2021).
Societal, high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship
Societal allyship to hinder perpetrators may also bear high costs, such as
imposing sanctions or expelling diplomats. One past example of this type of
allyship is how Italy refused to accede to German demands for the deporta-
tion of Jews (Haaretz, 2019). Similar to Italy, Bulgaria was another country
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 29

that resisted the orders of Nazi Germany (Reicher et al., 2006). The success
behind the Bulgarian case was a) category inclusion, in which Jews were
treated as part of a common ingroup rather than a separate group, b)
category norms which highlighted the core aspect of Bulgarian identity and
c) category interest which emphasised that ingroup will be harmed if Jews are
harmed (Reicher et al., 2006).
There are also some contemporary examples of this type of allyship. For
example, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US, UK, Canada, and the
European Union announced new sanctions against Russia, excluded some
Russian banks from the Swift financial network, and prevented Russia’s
central bank from deploying $600 billion in reserves to help its economy.
EU allies also expelled 200 Russian diplomats two days after the Bucha
killings (The Guardian, 2022). Another example of a high-cost, perpetrator-
directed allyship at the societal level is the US government’s sanctions on
China over human rights abuses of Uighurs (Madhani, 2021). These types of
allyship actions may be particularly costly for those allies (e.g., a full boycott
of Russian gas could devastate the European economy), as seen in the rising
gas and oil prices globally in particular and in import prices in general (Guo
et al., 2023).
Discussion
Theoretical implications
In the current contribution, we had three aims. First, we aimed to develop
a multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in conflict settings by inte-
grating collective action and conflict research (e.g., Moran & Taylor, 2021;
Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a; Uluğ & Uysal, 2023). In the typology, we distinguished
the a) actors, b) targets, and c) types of allyship actions. Theoretically, the
proposed typology can be generally utilised as a comprehensive framework
to (1) clarify and refine the concept of allyship action, (2) map out the
underlying dimensions, (3) enhance the accuracy of explanatory models by
grounding the phenomenon in the intergroup realities characterised by
a violent conflict, and (4) emphasise that allyship action should consider
contextual constraints.
Second, we aimed to highlight what types of actions have been studied in
violent conflict settings, especially from a social-psychological perspective.
Illustrating the typology with examples mostly from our own research
programmes as well as previous work and recent real-world examples helped
us identify the gaps in the literature. For example, low-cost victim-directed
allyship has been frequently studied both at the individual and collective
levels in violent conflict settings. Individual, high-cost, both victim- and
perpetrator-directed allyship has also been studied, but not as frequently as
30 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

low-cost victim-directed allyship (Odağ et al., 2023). However, high-cost
victim- and perpetrator-directed allyship at the collective level has rarely
been studied in conflict settings (Avichail et al., 2021; Hasan-Aslih et al.,
2023). Our own review of this literature highlighted that there are especially
gaps in research for a) low-cost perpetrator-directed allyship and b) high-
cost victim-directed allyship at the societal level, as seen in Table 2.
Therefore, more work is needed to understand the motivators, dynamics
and processes of these types of allyship action in general (e.g., De Souza &
Schmader, 2024) and in violent conflict settings at the societal level in
particular.
Third, we aimed to show how allyship has been studied in conflict vs. non-
conflict settings. In other words, our aim was to pinpoint both commonal-
ities and differences between these two contexts. We argued that our typol-
ogy generalises to contexts where 1) intergroup relations continue to be
marred by differences in group status, 2) violence is pervasive, 3) asymme-
trical power relations are maintained, and 4) non-state groups may also
become a party to the conflict. Previous studies from non-conflict settings
have shown how individual experiences (e.g., closeness to people targeted by
prejudice and witnessing discrimination; Tropp & Uluğ, 2019; Uluğ &
Tropp, 2021), emotions (e.g., anger, empathy; Chong & Mohr, 2020;
Roden & Saleem, 2022; Selvanathan et al., 2018), morality (e.g., moral out-
rage and convictions; Green et al., 2023; Kende et al., 2017; van Zomeren
et al., 2011), (dis-)identification processes (e.g., Craig et al., 2020; Iyer &
Ryan, 2009), and beliefs and attitudes (e.g., zero-sum beliefs; Adra et al.,
2020; Chan & Lam, 2023; Stefaniak et al., 2020; Uysal et al., 2022) may play
a crucial role in allyship actions. Our own research showed some similarities
between conflict and non-conflict settings in terms of predicting various
forms of allyship actions. These were ethnic/national awareness (Bähr et al.,
2021; Shamoa-Nir et al., 2022; Taylor et al., 2021; Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020;
Tomovska Misoska et al., 2020), empathy (Glen et al., 2020; Taylor & Glen,
2020; Taylor & Hanna, 2018; Taylor & McKeown, 2021; Urbanska et al.,
2019), and intergroup contact with victim groups (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a) as
well as communication topics during intergroup contact situations (e.g.,
communication about group differences in power; Tropp et al., 2021). In
addition to these similarities, we also indicated the similarities of costs of
allyship actions across both conflict and non-conflict settings (Odağ et al.,
2023). More specifically, these costs were police interventions (e.g., fears of
torture, prison, water cannons, and tear gas) and negative judgements from
others (e.g., distrust, protection of privacy, social media bullying, knowing
things about people, and isolation).
Despite these similarities, other factors, variables and processes may be
unique to or more prominent in violent intergroup conflict settings such as
conflict narratives (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a; Uluğ et al., 2021), competitive
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 31

victimhood (Uluğ et al., 2021), victim group’s political loyalties (Chayinska
et al., 2017), preferences for ingroup symbols (Taylor et al., 2021), recency or
intensity of violence (Bähr et al., 2021), and disidentification from powerful
outgroups (Chayinska et al., 2017). We believe these conflict settings may
bring victim vs perpetrator dynamics to the fore for allyship actions, and
therefore, it is essential to unpack the target of such actions. Moreover,
conflict settings can change and raise the costs of allyship action. For
example, in Turkey, existential risks such as loss of employment, having to
seek exile abroad, inability to find a state-owned job, salary reduction, work-
place bullying, being kept away from school, and the impairment of regular
life were more frequently reported (Odağ et al., 2023; see also Landmann et
al., 2024). Costs may also be calculated differently compared to norms of
fairness about the status quo in conflict settings (Corbett et al., 2023). Yet,
time concerns, such as expenditure of effort and exhaustion, are also promi-
nent in non-conflict settings (e.g., Germany). Even though we showed
similar costs associated with activism and allyship action in both settings,
taking action to challenge the perpetrator was more costly in conflict settings.
Practical implications
Our typology also has practical implications. First, it proposes to distinguish
actors at three different levels: a) individual, b) collective, and c) societal. It
thus problematises the issue of allies’ status and political power along with
their potential resources and how those might influence the probability of
achieving allies’ goals. For example, the efficacy beliefs of individuals, com-
pared to collectives and societies, may be quite different and shape which
actions are considered effective (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Similarly, our
suggestion to distinguish the actors by the levels of representation may also
yield further practical discussion about plausible causal inferences among
social movements. For example, the bottom-up approach that starts from the
individual allyship may grow into a collective allyship and then, conse-
quently, societal phenomenon, reflected in state-level policies or political
actions or vice versa (Burrows et al., 2023; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017b, 2017c). Our
typology thus highlights the notion of the plurality of peace (e.g., Grabe, 2012;
Palmiano Federer et al., 2019), suggesting that within conflict-affected com-
munities, allies, at all levels, can direct their efforts at achieving different,
often compatible goals, such as rescuing the victim group or hampering the
perpetrator’s aggression. Social movements that focus on improving the
conditions of victim groups should pay particular attention to the type of
allyship action.
Second, our typology underscores the importance of considering the
target of allyship action (see Uluğ et al., 2024, for a discussion on the target
of collective action; Taylor, 2020, for the target of peacebuilding). In
32 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

mainstream collective action research, the notion of the targeted action
(i.e., either rescuing the disadvantaged or diminishing the offender), the
idea of multi-target action and their operationalisation lacks conceptual
clarity (for an exception, see De Souza & Schmader, 2024), which may
affect social movements’ target capacities. Our typology thus addresses this
issue by bringing the target of allyship action to the forefront of analysis.
We invite further discussions about how allyship action can be viewed as
a multi-target phenomenon that requires a simultaneous alleviation of the
multiplicity of causes, especially in violent conflict settings that are char-
acterised by a complex, dynamic relationship between two or more rival
groups.
Third, we differentiated between low- vs. high-cost allyship actions in
conflict settings. Overall, low-cost actions usually take minimal effort,
require less time, risk, or resources, and do not have serious conse-
quences for the actor, whereas high-cost actions require higher motiva-
tion to confront the social, economic, and time-related costs or potential
severe consequences such as injury, imprisonment, or even fatality
(Carlo et al., 2022; Corcoran et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Although
the typology distinguishes between different types of action, the cells and
the examples we provided in those cells are not static or mutually
exclusive. An action can be low-cost in one conflict setting and high-
cost in another conflict setting. Given the fluidity and ever-changing
nature of conflict settings, the cost of allyship actions can vary by
context, actor, and timeframe with a given conflict (e.g., an action
changing from low-cost to high-cost in the same conflict context).
Moreover, depending on the actions that researchers or programme
evaluators plan to analyse or compare (e.g., several high-cost allyship
actions), it might be beneficial not to disaggregate costs into only two
categories, but rather to conceptualise actions on a cost continuum. We
also note that more costly actions are not necessarily more effective. For
example, in the context of climate action (societal conflict), Fridays for
Future has been far less costly (cost of time) than the actions of more
radical groups (cost of time, physical injury, and fines; e.g., Aufstand der
letzten Generation
3
is tying themselves on highways), yet seem more
effective in generating public awareness, and pushing governments inter-
nationally to focus on environment-protecting policies (Fabel et al.,
2022) compared to more radical movements that might decrease the
support of the wider population for the issue (i.e., activist dilemma;
Feinberg et al., 2020). Thus, our typology highlights how and why ally-
ship action costs should be taken into account, especially by activists,
allies and social movement organisers.
3
Rebellion of the last generation in German.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 33

Limitations and future directions
Despite an increase over the past decade (e.g., Kutlaca et al., 2020), research
on the social psychology of allyship is still very much in its infancy. The
research we present in this article, therefore, suffers from some important
limitations that need to be addressed in future research. First, our research
mostly relied on correlational research although there were a few exceptional
experimental and longitudinal studies. However, we know little about how
allyship is qualitatively understood by allies themselves and victim groups
(for exceptions, see Momberg, 2017; Selvanathan et al., 2023), especially in
violent conflict settings. More qualitative research is needed on allyship to
unpack the motivations for and barriers to allyship in such settings.
Second, one might argue that some actions, such as waving a flag, may
not be classified as allyship, but rather as solidarity, because it neither
helps the victim group to gain a better position nor contributes to
changing power inequalities between the victim and perpetrator (see
Louis et al., 2019). However, these actions may raise awareness, which
in turn might motivate allyship actions that challenge the status quo. We
believe this is where the type of action comes into play and shows the
importance of the intention for the action of the ally. Future studies may
also add another dimension, such as the impact of actions on dismantling
power differences, to better understand allyship dynamics in conflict
settings (see Selvanathan et al., 2020 for a discussion). For example, do
the actions intend to yield relational, cultural or societal change (Taylor,
2020)?
Third, our typology did not offer specific hypotheses for which motiva-
tions can correspond to which allyship actions and what kind of social
change impacts these actions may have. For example, contextual factors
might influence which forms of allyship are adopted in a particular con-
flict, and each type of allyship might have different impacts in terms of
facilitating or achieving peace. Even though our research programmes
have provided some insights into the allyship action that takes place at
the individual or collective level (less so at the societal level) or that targets
victim or perpetrator groups, we cannot speak to the motivators or
impacts of each action we provided in the typology. Therefore, future
research should provide empirical support for the motivators and out-
comes of, for example, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship (3.1.2.) or
high-cost, victim-directed allyship (3.2.1.) at the societal level in conflict
settings.
Last, conflicts are often complex and multifaceted (Byrne & Senehi, 2009),
as such, categories such as victim and perpetrator may be blurred.
Distinguishing the target in symmetrical conflicts, where both parties have
relatively equal degrees of power (Noor et al., 2017), is still important, but
34 Ö. M. ULUĞ ET AL.

might not fit neatly into victim- or perpetrator-directed actions. In addition,
people may have motivations both to support victim groups but also to
reduce perpetrator groups’ power. Thus, future studies may also take the
relative power of each group into account to study allyship in conflict
settings.
Conclusion
In summary, research has established that allyship takes place not only in
democratic contexts, but also in non-democratic, authoritarian and violent
conflict contexts. The findings we have reviewed in this article, mostly from
our own research programmes, indicate that social psychology plays a vital
role in understanding allyship actions both in non-conflict and conflict
settings. To understand those actions, we provide a multi-dimensional
typology of allyship action in violent conflict settings. This typology extends
previous work by focusing on actors across three levels, the target of actions
and the associated cost of allyship actions. We offer this typology to open
new avenues for understanding allyship, solidarity-based collective action,
and prosocial behaviour in settings of violent intergroup conflict.
Acknowledgments
We thank Martijn van Zomeren and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback
as well as our colleagues who made it possible to conduct studies in this line of
research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Özden Melis Uluğ http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7364-362X
Maria Chayinska http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2373-5141
Julia A. Schreiber http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7711-7838
Laura K. Taylor http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2353-2398
Data availability statement
No new data were collected or analysed for this article. Therefore, links to the
majority of the data discussed in depth can be found in the respective articles
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 35

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