Drug market risk environment and navigational strategies of street-level dealers in Nigeria

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Drug market risk environment and navigational strategies of street-level dealers in Nigeria
Ediomo-Ubong Nelson1,2, Macpherson Uchenna Nnam3, Olayinka Onayemi4
1Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University, United Kingdom
2Centre for Research and Information on Substance Abuse, Nigeria
3Directorate of Research Development and Innovation, Walter Sisulu University, Private
Bag X1, Mthatha 5117, South Africa
4Sociology Programme, Bowen University, Iwo, Nigeria
degreatnelson@yahoo.com
Abstract
Background: Researchers have investigated drug market risks and navigational strategies of
drug dealers in western societies. Less is known about this phenomenon in Africa. This study
explores drug market risk environment and navigational strategies of street drug dealers in
Nigeria. Methods: The study uses qualitative data from in-depth interviews with street-level
dealers (n=31) recruited through snowball sampling in Uyo, Nigeria. Thematic analysis of
transcripts generated three major themes (‘policing’, ‘rivalry’ and ‘indiscretion’) as risk
factors for police harassment, arrest and violence. Results: Accounts identified policing,
rivalry between drug dealers and indiscretion (e.g., exchanging drugs for potentially stolen
items) as risk factors for police harassments, arrest and violence. Drug dealers navigate risks
in different ways, including through bribing police officers, using police proxies in partisan
negotiation of drug market conflicts, and non-exchange of drugs for potentially stolen items.
Conclusion: The findings underscore an ecological view of drug market risks where factors
operating at different levels interact to shape risks, with policing featuring as an overarching
macro-level risk factor. The failure of law enforcement to absolutely deter drug selling due
to dealer’s navigational strategies such as informal privatization of police, indicates a need
for alternative approaches to controlling street-level drug markets.
Key words: deterrence, drug markets, policing, risk environment, violence
Introduction
Drug markets are systems of regular exchange of drugs for money between sellers and
buyers. They are ‘illegal’ because the drugs and their exchange are prohibited by the law.
This illegality, and its characteristic features such as lack of protection of property rights,
non-definition and enforcement of standards of product quality and prosecution of market

actors by the state (Beckert & Wehinger, 2012), introduces risk into the market. In its most
generic form, risk is ‘a measure of exposure to danger, of the likelihood and extent of loss’
(Garland, 2003, p. 2). Risk exists in situations of uncertainty where outcomes are not pre-
determined. Studies have outlined the different risks associated with selling illegal drugs
(Reuter & Kleinman, 1986; MacCoun & Reuter, 1992; May & Hough, 2004; Werb et al.,
2008), and a range of strategies used by drug sellers to minimize these risks (Caulkins et al.,
1999; Cross, 2000; May & Hough, 2004; Bouchard, 2007; Moloney et al., 2015). Research
has also shown that local drug markets consist of the physical and social contexts where
drug market activities takes place, and are shaped by different factors including the drugs
sold, the social organization of market activities, norms regulating interactions between
sellers and buyers, as well as specific law enforcement responses (Small et al., 2013). These
factors influence the potential for different drug market-related risks, including the risk of
arrest and violence (Coomber & Maher, 2006; Curtis & Wendel, 2007).
The existing literature on drug selling risks is replete with research from western societies.
Drug markets-related risks remain under-researched in Africa, even though the continent is
a large consumer market for drugs such as opioids and cannabis (United Nations Office for
Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2022). Given the diversity and contextual complexity of drug
markets across geographical locations, local research is needed to understand drug market-
related risks and dealers’ navigational strategies. Such research has potential to facilitate a
better understanding of drug markets on the continent as well as inform appropriate policy
responses. This study aims to contribute to the literature by exploring the sources of risks
and navigational strategies of street-level drug dealers in Nigeria, focusing on contextual
dynamics such as police extortion and bribery, exchange of drugs for potentially stolen
items and use of police proxy in response to drug robbery. A further contribution of the
study is that it adopts an ecological understanding of drug market risks, wherein risk factors
are seen as inter-dependent and overlapping. From this perspective, illegal drug markets are
conceptualized as ‘risk environments’, where physical, social, economic, and policy-related
factors operate at different levels to influence risks (Rhodes, 2002). The rest of the paper is
structured as follows: (1) review of relevant literature, (2) description of drug markets and
policy in Nigeria, (3) methods and data, (4) results and discussion, as well as (4) conclusion.
Risks in retail drug markets – literature review
Risks associated with selling illegal drugs in traditional offline markets is a subject of interest
to many drug market researchers. Some have examined risk perceptions (Webb et al., 2008;
Small et al., 2013; Moyle, 2019; Payne & Langfeld, 2021), and how these are shaped by
social contexts and life-course events (Fader, 2016). Others focus on how risks influence
prices in illicit drug markets, where drug prices are seen as a ‘function of state induced risk
towards market actors’ (Munksgaard & Tzanetakis, 2021, p. 2). Market actors are thought to
be compensated for the relative risk arising from legal classifications and enforcement of
laws on drugs through increase in the market prices of drugs (Reuter & Caulkins, 2004).
Here, the focus is not on the risks faced by drug dealers per say, but the role they play in
shaping drug prices. Still others focus on the specific risks associated with drug selling, most
notably the ‘risk of arrest’ (Reuter & Haaga, 1989; Reuter & Kleinman, 1986; MacCoun &
Reuter, 1992; May & Hough, 2004), which has been shown to depend on the level of law
enforcement (Reuter & Kleinman, 1986). The risk of arrest also varies with drug dealer’s
roles and positions (Reuter & Haaga, 1989).

Studies have shown that law enforcement often targets the ‘low hanging fruits’ (low-level
dealers) (Coomber et al., 2017; Kleinman & Smith, 1990; Maher & Dixon, 1999). Also, retail-
level drug markets, especially street markets, are key sites of law enforcement activities
such as crackdown, a disruptive, intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing that aims to
reduce drug-related crime or the visibility of drug sales in a particular location (Scott, 2003).
However, law enforcement often has only ‘restrictive deterrence effect’ on drug selling
(Jacobs, 1996). This means that instead of terminating drug selling, dealers adapt to law
enforcement in ways that allow them to continue selling with reduced risk of apprehension
(Jacobs, 1996; Jacobs & Miller, 1998; Jacques & Allen, 2014; Jacques & Reynold, 2012).
Further, law enforcement may have the ‘perverse effect’ of stimulating drug markets and
law enforcement corruption (Best et al., 2001), including through police complicity in illegal
drugs trade, as has been reported in Nigeria (Nelson, 2023; Nnam et al., 2020).
Law enforcement is related to the ‘risk of violence’. Drug dealers, particularly low-level
dealers, face a risk of violence during interactions with law enforcement agents (Werb et al.,
2008). They also face risk of violence from competitors (Reuter & Kleinman, 1986; Reuter &
Haaga, 1989; Skolinick et al., 1990) and customers (May & Hough, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2009),
who may employ violence or threats to rob dealers of money or drugs. Dealers also face a
‘risk to profits’, due to loss of money or drugs following arrest (Caulkins et al., 1999; Fairlie,
2014) or theft by competitors (Reuter & Kleinman, 1986; Reuter & Haaga, 1989; Skolinick et
al., 1990; Caulkins et al., 1999), customers (Caulkins et al., 1999; Fairlie, 2014) and
employees (Caulkins et al., 1999). Risk to profits could also arise from default on payments
by customers (Reuter & Haage, 1989). Researchers have also identified a ‘risk to reputation’,
due to selling poor quality of drugs or being a victim of violence and robbery (Anderson,
2000; Decary Hetu et al., 2016; Jacobs et al., 2000). Reputation is an essential capital for
drug dealers. A reputation for violence helps to deter victimization (Bourgois, 1995; Topalli
et al., 2002; Jacques & Wright, 2008), while a reputation for selling good quality drugs
increases patronage and helps to build long-term relationship with partners (Jacobs et al.,
2000; Anderson, 2000; Denton & O’Malley, 1999).
For drug dealers, ‘the risks associated with drug sales are not simply passively accepted, but
are actively navigated’ (Moloney et al., 2015, p. 4). Drug dealers navigate risks by adapting
to drug market changes. This involves sourcing drugs locally rather than via importation, and
adopting new technologies (e.g., cell phones) (Adler 1993; Reuter & Kleiman, 1986; Caulkins
et al., 1999; May & Hough, 2004; Bouchard, 2007). It also involves selling only to trusted
customers and conducting sales in safer locations (Johnson & Natarajan, 1995; Cross, 2000;
Moloney et al., 2015; Nelson & Tasha, 2022). Drug dealers are ‘active agents’ (Johnson &
Natarajan, 1995), who decide ‘what to sell, where to sell and whom to sell to’ (Moloney et
al., 2015, p. 4). The present study contributes to this literature by exploring risks and how
they are navigated by street-level drug dealers in Nigeria, including contextual risk factors
which are shaped by local economic conditions and law enforcement practices.
Drug markets and policy in Nigeria
Nigeria plays a prominent role in global drug production and trafficking, and constitutes a
large market of consumers with an estimated 14.3 million past year users according to the
most recent national survey of drug use (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018).
Cannabis is the most commonly used illegal drug in Nigeria, followed by opioids (including
heroin) (UNODC, 2018). Indian Hemp (as it is known in Nigeria) was introduced into West

Africa by Sierra Leonian drug traffickers and popularized by servicemen returning from India
after the Second World War in the 1940s (Akyeampong, 2005; Borrofica, 1966). The crop
thrived in the tropical climate in Nigeria, and by the 1960s it was being exported to western
markets by Nigerians as local production increased (Obot, 2004). The decline in the world
market price of cocoa from 1958 encouraged local cocoa farmers to diversify into cannabis
cultivation, in the context of increased demand and lucrativeness (Klantschnig, 2014).
The intensification of security at European and North American airports encouraged heroin
and cocaine traffickers from Asia and Latin America respectively to resort to West African
countries as entry-points beginning from the 1980s, where they recruited nationals who
served as couriers transporting the drugs into western markets (Akyeampong, 2005). Nigeria
became a hub for drug trafficking through the West African sub-region in the 1980s, and has
gained notoriety internationally for drug trafficking. Nigerian criminal groups have played
important roles in international drug trafficking since the 1970s. They have served as major
suppliers of couriers (or mules) for drug trafficking from South Asia to North America (Ellis,
2009). Nigerian couriers have been credited with inventing the ‘swallow’ method of drug
smuggling, which involves swallowing drugs packed either in condoms or polythene nylon
and transporting them across borders in their bodies (Ellis, 2009).
International drug trafficking through the West African sub-region has had spill-over effects,
contributing to the emergence of domestic consumer markets for drugs such as heroin and
amphetamine-type stimulants. Dealers who retail small quantities of drugs to consumers
bear a disproportionate burden of law enforcement (Nelson, 2018), while traffickers, who
make huge profit from the drug trade, rely on their political and economic capital to secure
protection from law enforcement (Williams, 2014). Retail-level dealers experience police
brutality, often used extra-legally as a strategy of extortion (Nelson, 2023a). In Nigeria, as
elsewhere on the continent (for the South African case see Khan, Savahl, & Isaacs, 2016),
illegal drug dealing is embedded within gang culture. In cities such as Lagos, retail drug trade
is monopolized by youths who organize themselves in gangs that control neighbourhoods
and often create a hostile environment for residents (Adisa et al., 2022).
The Nigerian state has relied on criminal sanctions to curb drug supply and consumption for
much of its history. The highpoint of drug criminalization was the enactment of the death
penalty for cultivation and trafficking of illegal drugs from 1966 to 1975 (Obot, 2004). The
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act of 1989 (which became an Act of the
Federal Government of Nigeria in 2004) stipulates 10 years sentence for simple possession
of drugs, and life imprisonment for cultivation and trafficking. Although these stipulations
are rarely enforced in practice (and offenders usually receive bail), they are often used
extra-legally by police officers to threaten and extort drug dealers and users (Nelson, 2018).
Law enforcement involves crackdowns on street-level markets by law enforcement officials
as well as arrest of dealers and users (Nelson, 2018; Nelson & Tasha, 2022). Most arrests are
on charges of cannabis retail and consumption, leading to many ‘casualties, including
hundreds of people convicted on several years’ sentences for smoking cannabis inside a
joint’ (Klein, 1999, p. 68). Criminal penalties have not reduced the trade and use of illegal
drugs; instead they have exacerbated the social marginalization of people who sell or use
drugs (Nelson, 2018).

Methods and data
The present study is based on original research conducted to understand street-level drug
trade in Nigeria, including market entry and exit, law enforcement, and violence. It adopted
an exploratory design with qualitative methods of data gathering and analysis. Violence and
market entry/exit have been reported elsewhere (Nelson, 2023b; 2003c). Here, we examine
these factors (violence, law enforcement) as sources of risks in drug selling. The study was
approved by the research ethics committee, Ministry of Health, Akwa Ibom state, Nigeria.
Study setting
Fieldwork took place in Uyo, the largest city in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria, with an estimated
population of 1,294,276 people (World Bank, 2020). A large proportion of the population
(51%) lives in absolute poverty, defined as living on less than one US dollar per day (National
Bureau of Statistics, 2010). This translates into significant social and material deprivation,
including inability to meet basic subsistence needs (e.g., food, shelter, healthcare) for a vast
majority of people. Urban expansion has stimulated massive in-migration, resulting in a
rapidly growing ethnically-diverse population with attendant social problems. Population
increase has surpassed the development of infrastructures and provision of social amenities
such as healthcare services, housing, electricity and safe water supply. The local economy is
dominated by commerce, services and a variety of low-level office, administrative and
salaried positions mostly in the civil service. Poverty and unemployment have pushed many
residents into the informal economy, where state regulation is conspicuous by its absence
and the boundary between what is legal and illegal is blurred. In this context, a growing
number of young people have turned to illegal activities such as selling drugs to earn income
to meet subsistence needs (Nelson, 2023b).
Sampling and participants
Study participants were male commercially-oriented retail drug dealers (i.e., currently
retailing illegal drugs for commercial profit) (Dickinson, 2017). Female dealers could not be
recruited due to the stigma surrounding women’s involvement with illegal drugs (Nelson,
2021). The participants (n=31) ranged in age from 26 to 45 years, with a mean age of 35
years. They sold different types of illegal drugs, including crack cocaine (26), heroin (29),
Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) (17), cannabis (31) and diverted prescription drugs (27).
On average, the participants had been selling illegal drugs for 16.5 years (range = 3 to 27).
They were recruited through snowball sampling (Noy, 2008). Contacts developed during
previous researches facilitated recruitment of the first 6 participants from diverse networks
and neighbourhoods to make the sample diverse. This helped to improve external validity in
a sample where representativeness is difficult to determine since the parameters of the
population are unknown (Wright and Decker, 1994). The first author is well-known to drug
users and dealers in the city due to his involvement in service provision for this population.
The participants knew they could speak with him freely, and this made them comfortable.

Interviews
Interviews, which lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, were semi-structured and conducted
in a conversational manner that allowed the participants to respond freely and openly as
well as introduce new themes and concepts. This paper reports on accounts of risks involved
in selling drugs. Measures were taken to improve internal validity, including not asking for
names and assuring participants of anonymity and confidentiality. Further, inconsistent
responses were probed, and participants were asked to clarify ambiguous statements. In-
depth interviews are known to be an excellent method for generating offender self-reports
that have a good level of validity and reliability (Elliot and Ageton, 1980). This does not
mean that deception is completely absent, but that it is far less rampant than is often
assumed (Fleisher, 1995). Interviews took place at locations chosen by the participants (e.g.,
eateries, drop-in centres). This was done to make them feel comfortable and safe during
interviews. Responses were digitally recorded with the consent of each participant.
Data analysis
Audio files of interviews were transcribed verbatim and all identifying information were
removed. Transcripts were cross-checked with the recorded versions to ensure accuracy.
The framework approach was used to code and analyse the data because it is better suited
for capturing different aspects of a phenomenon (in this case, risks associated with selling
illegal drugs) (Ritchie, Spencer, & O’Connor, 2010). After familiarizing ourselves with the
data and gaining a broad overview of the participants’ responses, we developed a ‘coding
index’ from initial themes and sub-themes identified in the data. This was applied to code
the data through line by line reading of each transcript. Next, we created thematic charts to
capture interpretations of the themes and sub-themes, which we further developed by
working backwards and forwards across each transcript to make sense of the data, clarify
information and select relevant quotes. Quotes are identified by pseudonym, age and the
types of drugs sold by participants.
Results
The participants identified intersecting risk factors in the local street drug market (policing,
rivalry, and indiscretion). They also described how they navigate these risks. In what follows,
we present accounts of risks and the dealers’ navigational strategies.
Policing and the risk of harassment and arrest
Policing is a major risk factor in street drug markets. It is aimed at disrupting drug market
activities through apprehension and arrest of drug sellers and buyers. Policing was identified
as a major risk factor across interviews, with accounts emphasizing the risk of harassments
and arrest. Ikpa (36, cannabis, heroin, cocaine) stated:
The major problem is the police. That is what most people who sell drugs are worried about. If
the police arrest you, it is a lot of trouble because of how the police behave. They always like to
treat people roughly. Like harassing you, and stuff like that. The police are always a problem.
The risk of harassment and arrest only restrictively deterred the participants from selling
drugs because dealers are able to navigate these risks. Dealers navigated law enforcement

by temporarily desisting from selling drugs during periods of intensified law enforcement
activities, consistent with existing findings on the limited or restrictive deterrence effect of
arrest risk (e.g., Jacobs, 1996). Edwin (34, heroin, pharmaceutical opioids) stated:
There are times like when police are raiding every joint and arresting people. That is not a good
time to go out to sell stuff. You have to go under-ground (which means hide) and allow that
time to pass. You will not allow people to buy for the whole of that period untill it is over.
Apart from temporary desistance and hiding, drug dealers also navigated the risk of arrest
using financial resources. This involved paying the necessary fee to bail oneself from police
custody or, when apprehended, offering bribe to police officers in exchange for non-arrest.
Extortion and collection of bribes are common features of policing in Nigeria (indeed many
African countries), and rank-and-file officers often seek to increase their meagre earnings
through extortion of offenders who comply to evade arrest or court favour with the police
(Agbiboa, 2015; Onyango, 2022). Iko (36, cannabis, heroin) stated:
If the Nigerian police force arrests you, you will be bailed. You will negotiate. As you sell, you
have to keep some money so that when it is time to negotiate, you will pay. Then they will tell
you how to do it. If you do it gently (i.e., carefully), you will not have any problem. It is always
about negotiation, and how you do things with police.
As shown earlier, Nigeria’s drug laws have been repressive for most of its history. Corrupt
policing, including collecting bribes and enabling drug dealing through informal protection
of drug dealers, renders criminal justice processes in relation to drugs lenient in practice
(Nelson, 2023a).
Navigating law enforcement in street markets is a tough call since policing in Nigeria ‘has
degenerated into lawless predatory policing where policing activities are primarily devoted
to personal enrichment and self-preservation of the officers themselves rather than the
protection of the public’ (Hope, 2016, p. 4). Police routinely extorted the dealers with who
they are confederate, a dynamic that made it difficult to get informal police protection on a
sustained basis (‘Police do not have friends… They can turn you in at any time’, Henry, 31;
cannabis). Drug dealers also navigated the risk of arrest by screening potential buyers to
avoid selling drugs to undercover police officers. Okon (31, heroin, cocaine) noted:
There are times you find out that this person has not been taking drugs. You look at him
psychologically, he doesn’t look like a user. You won’t sell to that person so that you might not
fall your hand in selling to a security operative that should be against you. So, you watch your
back… before you sell out.
Overall, the data presented in this section show how policing and corrupt practices create a
macro-structural context shaping the experience and navigation of risk at the micro level in
street drug markets. This supports the view of street drug markets as risk environments.
Rivalry and the risk of violence and arrest
A meso-level risk factor in the local street drug market is rivalry between dealers. Study
participants described how drug dealers competing for control over neighbourhoods use
violence as a strategy to sabotage other dealers. This includes orchestrating the assault and
robbery of ‘runners’ (users who facilitate sales and run other errands for a dealer in return
for cash or drugs) who work for a rival dealer. They do so to provoke the later to retaliate
and risk getting arrested. Joe (29, cannabis) stated:

It is our guys that cause the problem. They will go and stab a young man you gave something to
sell. When that happens and you are losing a lot of money, how will you let that go? You will
have the mind to prove. You won’t like your money to go like that because the game (retail
drug trade) is not something you go and collect goods like that. You are given them on trust
(i.e., to sell and remit money), and you cannot behave anyhow otherwise you will be shot dead.
Here, retaliatory violence, which is usually emotionally-driven, unplanned and haphazardly
executed, creates a meso risk context for arrest of the retaliating dealer. This amounts to a
‘set up’, a phrase used frequently by participants to describe the strategic manipulation of
situations and events to create conditions for a rival to become complicit in her or his own
undoing. Set ups were said to be motivated by envy, a socially dynamic emotion that has
been shown to link micro-level social action to meso and macro-level economic conditions
(Nelson, 2023c). Mali told us:
The only problem is that there are enemies in the business. When you sell it and have money
more than your fellow dealer or even the buyer who is sent by your fellow dealer who has bad
beef with you (i.e., envies you), because you sell to different kinds of people. You don’t know
who is who. When you sell so much, people will hate you.
Here, Mali puts rivalry between dealers down to envy of others’ success (‘When you sell it
and have money more than your fellow dealers…’), which shows how structural inequality
shape inter-personal relations and creates a context of risk for violence and arrest. One of
the ways drug dealers navigated the risk of violent attack from envious rivals was through
vigilance and preparedness to escape. Danny (36, cannabis, cocaine, heroin) noted:
That is why dealers like us suffer a lot. We don’t sleep in one place. I can wear what I am
wearing now, but I am very important. I don’t want too much dressing so that wherever it (i.e.,
attacks orchestrated by rival dealers) happens I can remove my slippers and run because they
are people who are looking for you to kill you.
In regards to robbery instigated by rival dealers, the use of police proxy was described as a
strategy for recovering losses while at the same time mitigating the risk of apprehension
and arrest. In Nigeria, it is not uncommon for citizens to strategically enlist police help (often
informally) in the partisan negotiation of disputes (Cooper-Knock & Owen, 2015). However,
such enlistments usually happen in cases of breaches of trust occurring in the context of
legitimate interactions (for example, the police could be brought in where an artisan fails to
deliver a product for which payment has been made). Our participants’ accounts suggest
that enlisting police help in this way, a feature of the ‘informal privatization of the police’
(Homberger, 2004), is not restricted to legitimate everyday interactions, but also apply to
illegal activities. For example, Joe (26, cannabis) described how he recovered drugs stolen
from one of his runners with the help of a police officer with who he was confederate:
Like two weeks ago, my boy (runner) was robbed of goods worth two hundred and fifty
thousand naira (US$322.35). I asked him and he mentioned the name of the person. I won’t go
because if I do, I am not just going to collect the goods or the money back. I am going to
retaliate. So, I called a police man that I know. He went and arrested the guy and got some of
the drugs he stole back.
This quote shows that Joe understands the ‘rules-of-the-game’ in the street market risk
environment, and is able to navigate the meso and macro contexts of rivalry and policing to
mitigate risk and protect his interests.
Accounts indicated that informal relationships between police officers and drug dealers
developed from the offer of bribe to police officers in return for non-arrest. Misconducts

such as collection of bribe and extortion of offenders are common features of everyday
interactions between the police and citizens in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Indeed,
everyday policing practices in Nigeria is known to be influenced by greed and opportunism
(Agbiboa, 2015). In the context of street drug market policing, bribery may pave the way for
a mutually beneficial relationship (supposedly) when the parties exchange phone numbers,
a common practice for fostering informal relationships with the police in Nigeria (for cases
from South Africa see, Homberger, 2004). This allows the dealer to call on the police officer
to help prevent raids, recover losses or perform other services for a fee. Pat (33, cannabis,
heroin) told us:
They (police officers) will take you and drive around and bring you back and release you. They
will ask you if there is something at home. You will bring them home and find like N10,000
(US$23.93) for them and they will give you their number. I have up to five police officers’
number.
Here, the apprehended dealer is driven around by the police officers rather than being
taken straight to the police station. It is during this time that the police officers and the
dealer negotiate the amount to be paid for non-arrest. The exchange of phone numbers
enables the continuation of this exchange relationship. The relationship is ‘supposedly’
mutually beneficial because, as shown elsewhere (Nelson, 2023a), it often evolves into an
extractive and exploitative relationship due to dealers’ dependence on the police officers for
protection. Establishing relationships with multiple police officers allow dealers to negotiate
the risk of exploitation by switching between different officers when seeking informal police
help (hence Pat had five police officers’ numbers). This finding adds further insight to the
informal privatisation of police in Africa.
Indiscretion and the risk of arrest
Accounts revealed that dealers may also put themselves and their ‘business’ at risk through
indiscretion, suggesting a micro-level risk factor. This is, however, linked to the macro-level
since individual indiscretion creates risk through intersection with law enforcement. Across
interviews, participants identified collecting (stolen) items in exchange for drugs as a kind of
indiscretion that could put a drug dealer at risk of being arrested as a criminal accomplice.
Mike (27, heroin, pharmaceutical opioids) told us:
There is someone who is selling and someone bring a laptop that does not has his name on it.
You know this laptop is worth up to N100, 000 (US$72.97 as of the time of writing), but he will
bring it and smoke for N10,000 and you collect. When the problem of that laptop comes, it will
affect many people. Those who did not expect to go to prison will go.
Mike meant that criminal investigation in relation to stolen items could result in the arrest
of other people. This is possible because of a potential raid on the hotspot by police officers
and arrest of buyers who were not involved or even privy to the transaction in question. The
use of valuable items as a method of payment is quite common even in legitimate trade. But
it is more pronounced in illegal drug trade, where stolen items are sold off cheaply and the
money used to purchase drugs or such items are exchanged for drugs (Nelson, 2023c). Such
economic practices thrive within conditions of poverty and material deprivation in Nigeria,
and are explainable in terms of the incentives and opportunities that such exchanges offer
to poor young people earning a precarious living from illegal activities.

In police practice, a person who purchases a stolen item may be arrested as an ‘assessory
after the fact’, an application of Section 10 of Nigeria’s Criminal Code Act (2004) to aiding of
property crime. Where this involves raid on a drug hotspot, the risk to the drug dealer is
exacerbated since innocent buyers could also be arrested and the hotspot shutdown. Police
officers usually warn their confederate dealers against transactions involving potentially
stolen items. Henry stated:
They (police officers) will only tell you to be careful with the people you sell to. They will tell
you that when they arrest someone and he says you bought stolen goods from him, you are
involved in the crime.
Accounts emphasized that dealers are most likely to go to jail for collecting stolen items
than for selling drugs because whereas the later involves only the police officer(s) and the
dealer and could therefore be kept off the records, the former involves other parties,
notably the owner of the stolen item (which makes it difficult to keep it off the records) (for
a discussion of policing ‘off the books’ in Nigeria see, Cooper-Knock & Owen, 2015). In this
context, exchanging drugs for money was seen as the surest way to avoid being arrested as
a criminal accomplice. Iko explained:
Me I don’t collect anything other than money. Wherever you go to get the money bring it, I will
collect and sell to you. It won’t be that your father’s laptop is what I am collecting to sell drugs
for you. When your father looks for it, I will be in trouble.
As other participants pointed out, exchanging drugs for potentially stolen items can be
tempting since the dealer could realize several times the amount of the drugs after selling
the item. Such opportunities are particularly enticing for young men propelled into retail
trade in illegal drugs by conditions of poverty and privation. As shown elsewhere (Nelson,
2023b), such opportunities enable them to augment their income to meet myriads of needs,
including those of dependents. Nevertheless, the cumulative cost of arrest as an accomplice
in a crime outweighs these gains. Reflecting on this fact helped the participants to exercise
self-restraint in these situations (‘You have to remember that you could get into trouble for
collecting something that is stolen’, Iko).
Discussion
This qualitative study explored risks in street-level drug markets and navigational strategies
based on the accounts of retail dealers in a Nigerian city. The findings contribute to existing
literature on drug market-related risks and risk perceptions, offering a perspective from
Africa on a topic that is currently dominated by research from western societies. The study
adopts an ecological perspective, understanding drug market-related risks as arising from
intersecting factors operating at different levels. Corroborating previous researches (Reuter
& Haaga, 1989; Reuter & Kleinman, 1986; MacCoun & Reuter, 1992; May & Hough, 2004;
Webb et al., 2008), study findings identify policing as a significant source of risks in the local
street market, particularly the risk of arrest and harassments by law enforcement officers.
Nevertheless, these risks only restrictively deterred dealers by making them to desist from
selling drugs during periods of intensified policing activities. The findings thus corroborate
previous studies which show the restrictive deterrence effect of law enforcement on drug
market resulting from dealers’ modification their behaviours to avoid apprehension and
arrest (Jacobs, 1996; Jacobs, 1996; Jacobs & Miller, 1998; Jacques & Allen, 2014; Jacques &
Reynold, 2012).

Our study adds to the existing literature on restrictive deterrence in drug market policing by
highlighting complex negotiations of policing through bribery and informal privatization of
the police, where confederate police officers are used as proxies in partisan negotiations of
drug market conflicts. Police complicity and co-optation into retail drug markets serves to
render a repressive drug law quite lenient in practice. The use of police proxies in street
drug market disputes is a form of ‘micro governance’ (Homberger, 2004, p. 219), within a
context of poverty, struggle over scarce resources, and the absence of formal regulatory
mechanisms. The police become involved in the conflict through informal relationships
based on pecuniary interests and the aim is so that the confederate drug dealer could gain
an advantage. This is an informal use of formal regulatory mechanism, the appropriation of
state power to regulate an illegal market in pursuit of private interest. Such practices are
common place in everyday policing in Nigeria and other African countries (Cooper-Knock &
Owen, 2015).
The findings show that the relationship that facilitate informal privatisation of police in
street markets develop through corrupt policing practices involving extortion and collection
of bribes. This stands in contrast to the situation in South Africa, where friction and division
among police officers allow individuals in conflict to develop alliances with different police
officers, often through ‘default and coincidental concurrence rather than overlap of interest’
(Homberger 2004, p. 224). Our findings show that in the context of Nigerian street markets
such alliances develop on the basis of a confluence of interests where entire police teams
unite around the extraction of funds through informal protection of drug dealers (for the
involvement of police departments in drug-related corrupt practices see Nelson, 2023a).
Our research, therefore, helps to centre economic interests as the key social factor driving
the informal privatisation of police in the context of street drug markets, while situating this
process the context of poor wages and lack of incentives that render rank-and-file officers
highly vulnerable to bribery and other forms of corrupt practices.
Rivalry between drug dealers, motivated by envy and competition for control over drug
markets (e.g., neighbourhoods), was also identified as a source of risks in the street-level
drug market. Expressed through orchestrated drug robberies and snitching on other drug
dealers, rivalry created a risk of violence and arrest. Previous studies have reported on inter-
personal violence and robbery of drug dealers (Skolinick et al., 1990; Caulkins et al., 1999;
Topalli et al., 2002; Jacques & Wright, 2008; 2011), but none has linked these phenomena to
rivalry and competition among drug dealers (with the exception of Nelson, 2023c). Studies
have also described how the potential costs of retaliation (e.g., police arrest) deters drug
dealers from using violence in response to robbery and other forms of victimization (Topalli
et al., 2002; Jacques & Wright, 2011). Our study adds to the existing literature by situating
drug robbery and inter-personal violence within social relations of envy among street-level
dealers, demonstrating the role of meso-level factors in the social production of risks in drug
markets. As a meso-level factor, inter-personal relations among drug dealers exist in relation
to a macro-structural background characterized by market competition. Here, factors at the
meso and macro levels overlap to create risk environments in drug market. Recognizing how
factors at different levels intersect to shape risks in local drug markets has important policy
implications, including in determining how and at what level to intervene to reduce risks.
Another source of risk identified in the accounts was acts of indiscretion on the part of drug
dealers, especially exchanging drugs for potentially stolen items with drug buyers. This was
described as an individual-level risk for arrest as a criminal accomplice, illustrating that drug

dealers’ behaviours do not only minimize risks but could also contribute to producing them.
This finding offers insight into how drug selling, as a criminalized activity, is entangled with
other types of crime (in this case, property crime). It also adds a further layer of complexity
to the drug market risk environment, showing how policing mediates and influences other
risk factors. For example, indiscretion as an individual-behavioural factor contributes to risk
through its contextualization within a wider risk environment of policing. Like other factors
(such as rivalry among drug dealers), indiscretion operates as part of a constellation of
factors within the drug market risk environment. Thus, while refusing to exchange drugs for
potentially stolen items may mitigate the risk of arrest as an accomplice in crime, it does not
cancel-out the risk of arrest altogether since this is rooted not in individual behaviour, but
within the macro-context of law enforcement. Put differently, risk minimization strategies
may reduce risks for individual drug dealers, but they may not reduce risks within the wider
drug market. Reducing risks at the level of the drug market requires interventions beyond
the individual level. It calls for structural-level interventions such as reforming policy and
legal frameworks for the control of drug distribution and consumption.
Figure 1: The risk environment of the local street-level drug market
Taken together, the findings show how factors operating at the micro, meso and macro
levels interact to shape risks in the street market. At the micro-level, dealer’s indiscretion,
particularly exchanging drugs for stolen items, emerged as a key micro-level risk factor for
police arrest. On the other hand, rivalry between drug dealers competing for control over
market segments, often expressed through orchestration of robberies of rival drug dealers,
operated as a meso-level risk factor for violence and police arrest. At the macro-structural
level of the street drug market, law enforcement created a risk for arrest and harassment of
drug dealers. This suggests an ecological view of the drug market, where drug distribution
activities occurring within physical and social contexts are influenced by intersecting social-

structural factors operating at the micro, meso and macro levels (Rhodes, 2002). The study
develops this understanding of drug market risks by highlighting the salience of policing in
the drug market risk environment. As shown in the data presented, policing featured as an
overarching macro-structural factor influencing risk of arrest, harassment and violence for
drug dealers not only through the effects of policing, but also through how it interacts with
other factors at different levels (e.g. indiscretion, drug-related violence) to shape risks (see
Figure 1).
Drug law enforcement activities have a number of key objectives, including to disrupt drug
market activities through the enforcement of criminal sanctions. At the retail market-level,
sanctions (e.g., arrest, prosecution) are intended to deter drug dealers from selling drugs to
would be users. The accounts presented in this study shows that the risk of arrest is mostly
ineffective in absolutely deterring dealers from selling drugs. Instead, the deterrence effect
is restrictive because the dealers modify their behaviours to avoid apprehension and arrest
(Jacobs, 1996; Jacobs & Miller, 1998; Jacques & Allen, 2014; Jacques & Reynold, 2012). The
failure of arrest risk to absolutely deter dealers, along with other problems related to law
enforcement such as corruption and complicity of officers in drug selling, highlights a need
to consider alternative approaches to controlling retail drug markets, including those that
address the underlying macro-structural drivers of illegal drug trade among young people in
Nigeria (Nelson, 2023b). On the other hand, greater success has been documented for law
enforcement strategies that attempt to deter drug market transactions by affecting and
sustaining an increase in the level of risk (e.g., Braga & Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al., 2018).
In this light, the role of law enforcement in increasing the level of perceived risk in street-
level drug markets through its overlap with other risk factors, which the risk environment
approach helps to highlight, points to the potential of law enforcement to help curb drug
selling. Nevertheless, the involvement of law enforcement officers in drug selling through
bribery and informal protection of dealers could undermine this potential.
Conclusion
This qualitative study explored different risks and navigational strategies of dealers in a
street-level market in Nigeria. The findings underscore an ecological view of drug market
risks wherein factors operating at the micro, meso and macro levels interacted to shape
risks. Importantly, they highlight the prominence of policing in the street-level market risk
environment. Policing operated as an all-embracing, macro-level factor influencing risk by
itself, but also through its interaction with other risk factors in the street market ecology.
The findings further show that drug dealers are able to navigate the factors that shape risk
in the drug market, including the overarching risk factor that is policing. A key implication of
the findings is that policies aiming to curb retail drug distribution through intensification of
law enforcement, which is the case currently in Nigeria, will only be modestly effective, its
capacity to affect an increase in levels of risk notwithstanding. This is so because, as shown
in this study, policing does not only fail to curb retail drug distribution; it becomes part of
the problem through informal privatisation of police whereby police officers are co-opted
into the drug trade. A more promising approach would be to address the socio-economic
factors that incentivize participation. An approach that is based on social policy (including
providing alternative means of income for young people engaged in drug selling) may be
more effective than the current emphasis on law enforcement.

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