Dog tales: second-generation joke parties on the horizon

Abstract

Political humour, lampooning of political figures and political satire have been part of political life since ancient times. Political parties that used humour as a means to an end in the political process emerged in the second half of the twentieth century criticizing the political elite and the electorate. This comparative paper analyses the phenomenon of modern joke/satirical parties and their use of political humour, focusing on the second generation of centrist anti-establishment joke parties that emerged and boomed amidst the 2007–2008 financial and economic crisis. This group includes the German Die PARTEI, which sends representatives to the European Parliament, and the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP), which is present in local governments. Both of these successful joke parties are characterised by their mockery of the political elite and its messages, criticising the whole establishment, using the tools of satire, irony and humour. In the case of the second generation of joke parties, the joke is no longer just an end but also a means of drawing attention to corruption and political anomalies.

Full text

Viktor Glied* and Peter Szegedi
Dog tales: second-generation joke parties on
the horizon
https://doi.org/10.1515/humor-2024-0021
Received April 13, 2023; accepted June 23, 2024; published online September 12, 2024
Abstract: Political humour, lampooning of political figures and political satire have
been part of political life since ancient times. Political parties that used humour as a
means to an end in the political process emerged in the second half of the twentieth
century criticizing the political elite and the electorate. This comparative paper
analyses the phenomenon of modern joke/satirical parties and their use of political
humour, focusing on the second generation of centrist anti-establishment joke
parties that emerged and boomed amidst the 2007–2008 financial and economic
crisis. This group includes the German Die PARTEI, which sends representatives to
the European Parliament, and the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP), which is
present in local governments. Both of these successful joke parties are characterised
by their mockery of the political elite and its messages, criticising the whole
establishment, using the tools of satire, irony and humour. In the case of the second
generation of joke parties, the joke is no longer just an end but also a means of
drawing attention to corruption and political anomalies.
Keywords: joke party; political humour; anti-establishment; Die PARTEI; Hungarian
two-tailed dog party
1 Introduction and methodology
Satirical/joke parties offer an alternative political choice for disillusioned voters who
are dissatisfied with traditional political forces, particularly resonating with the
younger, more educated demographic that approaches politics with a critical
mindset. These unconventional parties employ humor to criticize established polit-
ical systems and the economic agents behind them. The use of irony, sarcasm, and
political satire is a strategic approach to highlight the deceptive aspects of political
conduct. Despite the fact that joke parties appeared in the political arena decades
ago, a comprehensive analysis of joke parties is hampered by the incomplete nature
*Corresponding author: Viktor Glied, University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary, E-mail: glied.viktor@pte.hu.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2467-5435
Peter Szegedi, University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary, E-mail: szegedi.peter@pte.hu
HUMOR 2024; 37(4): 489–512
Open Access. © 2024 the author(s), published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

of the literature and the difficulty of comparison, as these actors are organized in
different ways, in different historical contexts, in different political systems, and
usually use different means to achieve their goals (Almedia 2010; Barr 2009;
Baumgartner and Lockerbie 2018; Farkas 2018; Havlík and Voda 2018; Pop-Eleches
2010; Szegedi 2021a). Providing a complex definitionofjokepartiesisalso
problematic, as it is not possible to clearly define their ideological character either.
On the one hand, because they do not use the mainstream attributes of the tradi-
tional political division, on the other hand, they do not consider it important to be
classified as a left- or right-wing political entity. Instead of classic ideologies, they
can be characterized by thin ideologies and behavioral patterns furthermore thus
fall outside the framework of traditional party systems. Even the adjectives used
for similar parties, such as “anti-party,”“opposition of the opposition,”“moderate/
centrist anti-establishment power,”“movement party,”cannot fully cover the
characteristics of these parties (Engler 2020; Kitschelt 2006; Mudde 2004).
The emergence and functioning of joke parties is a unique response to the
disillusionment of traditional party voters. There are basically two characteristics
that define this particular political family. One is their protest nature as these parties
generally criticize the existing power system and parties by using the language of
humor and irony to highlight the cynical, unserious and dishonest nature of politics.
They articulate a profound critique of the elite, emphasising that political elites,
intertwined with their economic cronies, systematically engage in corruption and
make decisions based on political-economic interests. The other characteristic is the
constant use of humor. This feature is a more complex constellation, as there are
numerous layers through which humorous political messages can be decoded and
interpreted. These communicative and cognitive layers can alter the sender’s
intention, especially if the receiver lacks the necessary background knowledge and
decoding skills. Humor can soften political attacks and transform them into enter-
taining critical message structures in which humor appears in various forms (Ver-
hulsdonk et al. 2022). In this way, joke parties partly hold up a distorted mirror
(mocking glass) to the political elite, partly convey messages to their followers and
supporters, and draw attention to an apparent contradiction or anomaly in the
communication of mainstream political actors. Since these parties’main “ideology”
is humor, the traditional party system classification cannot be clearly interpreted in
their case.
The aim of this study is to provide an overview of the characteristics and
functioning of second generation centrist anti-establishment joke parties and their
use of political humor, focusing on the examples of the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog
Party (MKKP) and the German Die PARTEI (The Party). We have conducted
theoretical and empirical research on anti-establishment and joke parties, espe-
cially investigating the MKKP’s characters in detail. Due to the limited scope of the
490 Glied and Szegedi

study, in this paper the authors focus on the aforementioned joke parties through
various issues such as their posters and their campaigns during the migration crisis
in 2014–2015. This comparative analysis is primarily a descriptive presentation
using the new concept of centrist anti-establishment parties (CAPs) definition
developed by Sarah Engler (Engler 2020). In addition, this paper aims to identify
similarities in the communication of these parties, drawing on a literature review
of communication studies using content analysis and expert interviews (Magin
et al. 2017). Our paper presents analytical constructs used by studies to scrutinize
the content of political messages identifying styles and functions of political
communication in campaigns (Steppat and Castro 2023).
Describing joke parties’engagement involves a systematic approach to analyze
and present the various dimensions of their place on the political map. Overall, we
utilized a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection. Specif-
ically, we relied on primary sources, engaging in interviews with prominent leaders
from both MKKP and Die PARTEI, to gain insights into their internal dynamics and
political initiatives. Additionally, we conducted analyses of their programs,
manifestos and speeches. In the case of MKKP we also conducted a survey to collect
quantitative data on supporters and members of the Hungarian joke party, moreover
we employed fundamental systematic observation methods by attending party
events and meetings, providing opportunities to converse with activists.
Why are these two, seemingly insignificant political parties matter? The answer
lies in their provision of unique alternatives to the solutions offered by traditional
parties, primarily through community activism.
2 Evolution of joke parties
The evolution of joke parties can be fundamentally divided into two main periods.
There are significant differences between these two periods, both in terms of party
organisation and also in the form of the use of humor.
1. The period of classic joke parties as initiatives that emerged mainly from the
counterculture of the 1960s and from new left-wing movements, especially in
English-speaking countries (USA, UK, Australia, etc.), and later during the period
of political transition in Central Europe.
2. The period of modern, second-generation joke parties as political communities
that emerged or became more visible primarily in continental Europe as a
response to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008.
It should be noted that there is little or no continuity between these periods, as almost
all classic joke parties had ceased to exist by the 1990s, with the exception of the
Dog tales 491

British Official Monster Raving Loony Party (OMRLP) (founded in 1982), which still
retained classic joke party attributes.
The humor of classic joke parties is rooted, if not consciously, in the nonsensical
literary genre of Victorian England. Nineteenth-century English nonsense was a
form of rebellion against the boredom and predictability of the Victorian era, where
deliberate meaninglessness confronted reason and rationality. Originally nonsense
defines itself against realism, conventionality and pragmatism, which gives rise to
two interpretations: first, as a symbolic text that is not meaningless but has real
meaning in its own context, with some harmony behind the symbols; second,
nonsense can be interpreted as the absolute absurdity that mixes expressions,
words, and meanings without any sense (Kačāne 2014). Purposively utilized
“nonsense”in political communication refers to the communication panels that are
perceived as lacking clarity, coherence, meaningful content, but full of deliberate
misinformation and disinformation, empty and unfeasible phrases, extreme state-
ments, or fully sarcastic comments. In this regard sarcasm is recognized as the use of
irony to mock politicians and political slogans, in a word, it holds a mocking glass to
the political elite. Often sarcasm is used to convey the opposite what is true, or what
would be better to be true to make the subject of the sarcasm feel ridiculous or
untrustworthy (Camp 2011). Marvin Surkin (1969) identified nonsense in politics with
Henry Wallace’s populist politics, new left movements, and the extreme left and
right, whose anti-establishment stance may seem nonsensical from the perspective
of the majority narrative, but is entirely logical within their own context, as the
world itself is nonsense. However, the early prank parties were much less radical in
their communication. The first joke party to run for office in the state of Washington
in the United States was the OWL Party. We can also mention the Official Monster
Raving Loony Party as a first-wave joke party, whose slogan was “Vote For Insanity”,
1
or the Canadian Rhinoceros Party, which referred to its own ideology as “Marxist-
Lennonist,”alluding to Groucho Marx the humorist and John Lennon the musician
(Paár 2016).
As seen, the humor of classic satirical parties responds to real societal issues and
builds on realities. However, these critiques are approached from the perspective of
nonsense, giving rise to surreal political promises that rebel against the predict-
ability of political cycles, much like in Victorian-era poetry. In contrast, modern joke
parties use much more sharp, catchy, and provocative humor, with the main goal
being to provoke, intentionally offend, and create controversy. This humor aligns
better with the polarized party politics that emerged after 2008, where the pursuit of
consensus was replaced by seeking conflict and verbally attacking political
1https://www.loonyparty.com/history-4/loony-archive/1987-general-election-manifesto/ (retrieved:
2023. 08. 10).
492 Glied and Szegedi

opponents, discrediting them, and character assassination (Aiolfi2022; De Mesquita
and Smith 2011).
Parties of both generations were created with the aim of fun and entertainment
or satire, but they did it in the sphere of politics and parties and not in the world of
entertainment. And because all of them direct their jokes at the political elite and
institutions, not at minorities, refugees or other impoverished sections of society, we
consider them to be anti-political or anti-establishment organisations (Feusette
2003).
2.1 Modern joke parties’mocking glass
In order to understand the phenomenon of European joke parties in the changing
social and political environment we must examine the changing attitudes of voters,
and developments of party systems. Still, average thinking about party systems is
dominated by the traditional left–right dichotomy (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This
being said, in addition to traditional, historical cleavages, a number of new fault lines
have emerged in recent decades, creating new political-social debates and thus also
new parties (Ford and Jennings 2020). Due to the ongoing crises since the first decade
of 2000s –financial, economic, migration, COVID –have triggered radical changes in
the social and political sphere (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). Both average voters and
politicians, have begun to believe that traditional European parties are unable to
effectively respond to the challenges therefore solutions will be born outside of the
mainstream party system and the establishment. Some forces promised radical (and
extremely populist) responses, breaking the dominance of traditional parties and
challenging the elite that had dominated political discourse (Kitschelt 2007; Kriesi
and Pappas 2015). The multiplying crisis phenomena in the 2010s led to the rise to
power of parties in several European countries which, in various forms, questioned
the establishment and proposed radical responses as possible solutions (Engler et al.
2019).
In parallel with these processes, a transformation has taken place that has
created a new electoral attitude in post-modern consumer societies of the developed
countries. This approach has also sought unusual but non-extremist, non-violent
responses to existing problems. It argued that political parties had lost their tradi-
tional role, moreover that new grassroots civil society initiatives and movements
were needed to act as catalysts (Katz and Mair 2009).
In Central Europe –including Hungary –many voters believe they have no
opportunity to implement change, therefore they become apolitical, indifferent,
passive and “no longer interested”in politics (Krastev and Holmes 2019). There are
voters who are although disillusioned with the classical political parties, but still are
Dog tales 493

open to support or even join new, not extreme movements: new wave green parties
and the pirate parties –which were organized around specific topics such as envi-
ronmental protection and universal basic income or internet freedom –, but also
the joke parties. These parties’supporters believe that politics has “left them behind”
and is only concerned with social issues to maintain its own grip on power. There-
fore, they initiate “issues”themselves, mainly trying to change local conditions. The
fundamental difference is that while radical and extremist anti-establishment
parties mostly themselves generate the problems that they later “want to solve,”even
though increasing social tensions (Mudde 2007), CAPs –including satirical parties –
also use populist slogans, but they do not consciously aim to incite. While extremists
undermine and dismantle democratic frameworks, forcing voters into opposing
camps, CAP parties encourage their followers to engage in public life, although not
along the traditional, left–right-based political fault lines. CAPs also consider the
opposition a part of the establishment, so try to influence the functioning of politics
by taking an extra-political role. Like anti-establishment parties, joke parties also use
the tools of populism, but primarily in the context of using humor to draw attention
to the anomalies of the status quo or the importance of holding those in power to
account (Barr 2009). This can also be found in anti-elite populism, which, while in line
with the rhetoric of anti-establishment parties, is a way of highlighting the incom-
petence of decision-makers regardless of political affiliation (Jagers and Walgrave
2007). Anti-establishment parties are ideologically diverse, with no single worldview.
They frequently use so-called thin ideologies, which, while not forming a coherent
system of worldview, can convey attitudes and opinions, and therefore almost any
party can adopt such ‘sub-ideologies’(Mudde 2004; Taggart and Pirro 2021: 282).
What distinguishes joke parties from other anti-establishment political actors is
that in their case humor is not a spontaneous element, but rather a constant
communication tool and political goal. Humor removes the electorate from the realm
of serious but ultimately meaningless reality, while at the same time shaping reality
and providing a humorous context to serious issues, which helps to alleviate the
gravity of important issues. In addition, political humor can serve as a genuine
educational tool, as voters are more likely to absorb information due to its enter-
taining nature. With its unique logic, it can draw attention to political incoherence,
propaganda or lack of credibility in a more tangible way (Maslo 2016).
In order to understand the phenomenon of joke parties it is worth clarifying the
category itself. Joke parties condemn not only to the exclusivity of the Western liberal
path of development, globalisation, consumer society and capitalism, but also to
illiberal, hybrid, authoritarian regimes by criticising the whole mainstream political
system (Diamond 2002). They do this by using satire and humor, at the same time
showing irony to their followers (Paár 2016). The anti-establishment policies and
messages of a particular party can be attractive to protest voters as well, as taking a
494 Glied and Szegedi

stand against something can be a manifestation of negative attitudes (Engler 2020), or
such as expected utility when voters abandon their most-preferred candidate, or
they basically do not want to advocate the mainstream candidates expressing their
dissatisfaction (Kselman and Niou 2011). As Engler writes the centrist label distin-
guishes CAPs from radical anti-establishment parties, furthermore, Pop-Eleches
(2010) describes these parties as manifestation of protest voting. From the perspec-
tive of content and political narrative, joke parties can be seen as an elite-critical
political force (Oross et al. 2018), because they criticize the existing party systems and
their actors in their own particular ways. They show strong anti-establishment
characteristics (Schedler 1996), and this is also reflected in their rhetoric where they
interpret corruption as a collusion between leading political groups. Cas Mudde’s
research (1996) say joke parties are also so-called anti-parties. These parties repre-
sent essentially less-ideological “anti-political”attitudes, they do not seek to be
political in the “traditional sense”until they become part of institutionalized political
decision-making. Unlike other anti-establishment forces, extremism and radical
communication do not characterize the joke parties, or, if they do, it is clearly
intended to break through the walls of social indifference and passivity (Pop-Eleches
2010, 231). Therefore, they are almost always critical and confrontational towards
mainstream parties (Havlík and Voda 2018: 163). Although they do not claim to be and
do not define themselves in this way, the joke parties can be classified as being in the
centre within the traditional party system, a designation that refers to their ideo-
logical –often non-ideological –position and political engagement in the space
between the left and the right (Učen et al. 2005, 29).
Joke parties, based on the organisational typology, have both the characteristics
of parties and the separation of organisational units (activists, membership,
electorate, execution, etc.) that are present in a party organisation as described by
Katz and Mair (1993). However, these party characteristics are complemented by
attributes typical of social movements, such as collective action, bottom-up organi-
sation and participatory democratic functioning. On this basis, joke parties can best
be related to the concept of movement parties described by Kitschelt (2006). Move-
ment parties are political and social organisations that most closely resemble social
movements in their strategy and organisational structure, but the parties operate
according to the rules of politics, i.e. they compete in elections and try to win public
offices (Almedia 2010).
Joke in their name, the mockery of other political actors and of politics as a
phenomenon shape joke parties. In their case, humor and irony are formulated as a
much deeper, almost ideological phenomenon, as a specific expectation. If we try to
understand the communication of the joke parties through theories of humor, the
cognitive-perceptual approach to humor can be helpful. The joke is rooted in the
mismatch of ideas with distant meanings, the laughter or humorous medium is
Dog tales 495

triggered by the recognition or resolution of this mismatch (Attardo 1994, 48; Attardo
et al. 2002). However, in almost all cases there is a real critique, a coded message
veiled behind the humor, therefore mainly the highly educated voters are able to
decode it. We can find similarities in the formulation of humorous messages towards
the political elite, as well as common points in terms of organisational structure and
supporters, but each joke party has its own specificities.
2.2 Political humor
Political humor is as old as politics itself (Holm 2017). The second half of the twentieth
century also saw the emergence of so-called joke parties, which similarly poked fun
at political elites and political institutions (Oross et al. 2018). However, while
cartoonists and humorists were essentially outsiders to the world of politics and
engaged in humor without holding political office, joke parties penetrated the arena
of parties and politicians. However, as most of them did not become professional
politicians, political science considers them outsider parties (see Barr 2009;
McDonnel and Newell 2011). They never considered themselves traditional parties
and that their political strategy, activism and participation fall into the category of
non-conventional (see Pitti 2018; Somma 2018).
In addition, political humor has both legitimising and delegitimising powers
with respect to political institutions and participation (Innocenti and Miller 2016).
However, these powers can be used in different ways. According to Webb (1981) there
is radical political humor, which, firstly, mocks and degrades symbols and ideas that
are considered unquestionable by a particular community. Secondly, it helps to
understand and accept institutional or value changes, especially for those who do not
support the change, by showing the disadvantages of traditional value structures.
Thirdly, radical political humor emerges from social change, highlighting the
political implications of all institutions.
In their famous book The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge Berger and Luckmann (1966) portrayed the interaction
within social groups and individual persons create concepts of the actions of each
other. Beyond their general knowledge based on their primary socialization people
learn to differentiate reality by degrees of familiarity. These elements mean a specific
knowledge for them through subuniverses, special skills, the language and signs
what play a significant role in their social reality. The social world is a compre-
hensive and particular reality that confronts the individual in an analogous way to
the reality of the natural world. When individuals face reality, are able to understand
language and codes beyond simple communication, then they become able to decode
the more complicated –in our case –humorous, satirical, grotesque, ironic messages.
496 Glied and Szegedi

For the joke parties, the symbolic universes and narratives of the existing systems do
not legitimize their operation, but mean the massive opposite, questioning the
interpretation of ruling power, even if this explains traditions or values. This
symbolic universe appears in a different way in the case of joke parties and their
campaigns, for them it manifests itself in normality.
In the case of joke parties, content analysis is often a more complex process than
with other parties because their texts consist of humorous content in which the
actual messages are often latent and not explicitly expressed. Therefore, the texts
need to be deciphered in order to understand their implications. For this reason,
traditional theories of communication are not necessarily appropriate for analysis.
Wilson and Sperber's (2004 [1986]) theory of relevance is much more appropriate
than traditional decoding communication theories. However, according to their
theory, there are subtasks to be performed when interpreting content, which are as
follows:
a. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (explicatures) via decoding,
disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes.
b. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (implicated
premises).
c. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (implicated
conclusions). (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 615).
Most humorous or humorously intended political advertisements fall under the
incongruity (resolution) theory of humor, which is categorized within the cognitive-
perceptual approach (Sanz 2013, quoted by Larkin-Galiñanes 2017). Its essence lies in
the false pairing of unrelated, distant concepts in a logical relationship (Attardo 1994,
48). What makes a political advertisement humorous is precisely the fact that the
recipient recognizes this incompatibility and can resolve it internally. To do this, they
have to decode the message itself and also be aware of what it reflects. Thus, in the
case of most humorous political advertising, the recipient must be aware of the
format of a traditional political ad or message.
3 The short story of the MKKP and the Die PARTEI
3.1 MKKP
The story of the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party –founded in 2006 –is really special
because it is the only Central European joke party that, according to opinion polls,
Dog tales 497

will cross the 5 % parliamentary threshold and it was the most popular opposition
party among the under-40s in Hungary in 2023.
2
The party has representatives in
several municipalities, the MKKP has a deputy mayor in one Budapest district and
has a chance of sending MEPs to the European Parliament in June 2024. In the
national elections held in 2022 MKKP achieved 3.3 % and therefore did not get into
parliament. What is even more important than the party’s political potential, how-
ever, is its street and urban renewal activities, i.e. the unannounced, secret reno-
vation, cleaning and construction of urban monuments and infrastructure, filling
potholes, painting benches or building bus stops. These kinds of activities are called
urban guerrilla actions. Although these are small-scale community actions, they
make the daily lives of residents better and happier. In addition to political goals, the
joke party also provides a community experience that gives many people the
opportunity to take action and do useful work for the local community.
While the name of the Two-Tailed Dog Party refers to an inverted, satirical
reality, as there is no such thing as a two-tailed dog, the party’sfight against
corruption is very real. MKKP representatives constantly bring suspected cases of
corruption to the public’s attention, forcing the relevant political leaders and
authorities to act against the graft. Famous slogans like “eternal life”and “free beer”
appeared for the first time, but also wall stickers such as “an empty lot has been built
here for 18 years”(Bucs 2011, 16).
In terms of socio-economic criteria Hungarian joke party is popular in Budapest
and in large municipalities. It is no coincidence that the activists are basically urban
guerrillas carrying out urban reconstruction and renovation actions, which is the
most prominent street activity of MKKP to date. What is really special about this
party is that the MKKP activists (“passivists”) constantly organize urban renewal
actions: painting benches, constructing bus stops, renovating pavements or shopping
for elderly people during the epidemic. In order to reach out better results MKKP
started to operate as a party but meanwhile building on its local organizations,
exactly halfway between the movement and the party (Metz and Várnagy 2021). The
party leadership justifies this by saying that while the political work of the Hungarian
opposition usually consists of organising press conferences and issuing statements in
protest, meanwhile MKKP delivers sanitary products and equipment to hospitals. It
also fits in with this pattern that, according to their own claim, there is no other party
like MKKP. It is called a joke party, but only because its messages are usually sent in a
humorous, comic form. Otherwise, they carry out activities typical of NGOs when
they do community work.
2Medián: The most popular opposition party is the Two-Tailed Dog Party under-40s. Index. 14 02
2023. https://index.hu/belfold/2023/02/14/median-kozvelemeny-kutatas-ketfarku-kutya-part-ellenzek-
fidesz-dk/ (Retrieved 12 09 2023).
498 Glied and Szegedi

MKKP became well-known in 2015, when the Hungarian government carried out
an anti-immigration communication and campaign during the migration crisis.
MKKP seeks to overcome the deep ideological gap between the binary Hungarian
party system, when it points out the hypocritical, disingenuous behaviour of the
political sides. Since MKKP is not bound by rigid ideological determinisms, they can
easily rise above civilizational, cultural antagonisms. It is worth mentioning that
MKKP was the only Hungarian party that was able to run a counter-campaign against
the government’s anti-migration campaign. Hundreds of billboards were placed
across the country, responding to the government’s“fake facts”and controversial
narrative in a humorous and satirical way (Szegedi 2021a).
As a result of the counter-campaign MKKP became measurable for polling
companies. Later the party has focused on the development of their organisation, for
that they used community building tools and due to this progression party’s activity
rather started to concentrate on the practical community work like renovation of
public places and sidewalks. In the case of both MKKP and Die PARTEI, the organi-
sations are grassroots democratic at the local level and activists have a say in col-
lective decisions (Szegedi 2022).
In 2019 MKKP won three seats in local councils and the position of deputy mayor
in the IX district of Budapest (NVI 2019) and the MKKP candidates received over 10 %
in almost every district in Budapest. This brought about a general change of image,
with MKKP having to take a stand on serious issues. For this reason the leader of
MKKP Gergely Kovács said, the focus of the work of local councillors shifted to anti-
corruption and investigative work. “At the council meetings, which are endlessly
boring and nobody watches them, nobody cares, and I started to make jokes and say
funny things to the 20 people who were sitting there in a deadlock. That was really not
fine. Then I realised that it was much more fun to watch public procurement pro-
cedures or property sales, or even how the municipality was putting out tenders.”
3
In
some cases the joke party sounds the issue of corruption on national level, for
instance at the Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2022, when they made a new
transparency program for the public procurement procedure. They function by
using the traditional methods of politics in public offices, but for the public audience
they utilize jokes, mockeries and other rhetoric “weapons”of the joke parties.
Strongly anti-elite and anti-corruption slogans appeared in the rhetoric of
MKKP, both in the 2015 and subsequent poster campaigns, and also during the 2018
election campaign: “The water company could smuggle LSD into the drinking water at
any time,”and in the 2018 elections the campaign slogan “More of everything, less of
3Kerényi, György: As if I were an opposition politician –Kovács Gergely, the president of MKKP. 15
03 2022. Szabad Európa. https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/mintha-ellenzeki-politikus-lennek-kovacs-
gergely-a-kutya-part-elnoke/31146172.html (Retrieved 13 02 2022).
Dog tales 499

nothing”was used. Although MKKP mostly criticizes the ruling parties, he also keeps
distance from the opposition (Farkas 2018). As their decision-making mechanism
takes place at both national and local level considering a participatory democratic
basis, involving members and supporters, the party’s decisions can be considered
fully legitimate.
Hartleb (2015) describes anti-establishment parties as more hostile towards
their political opponents. Similar behaviour can be observed in the case of MKKP
towards other parties. MKKP has received several invitations from opposition
parties to join the coalition in 2022, but it has refused each time. In interviews, party
leaders have confirmed that they will not join the opposition coalition because of
ideological and pragmatic differences: “Based on their past […]based on their
representatives [we cannot cooperate with them], [our ideological problem] is that
it is difficult to cooperate with the Nazis (referring to the former far-right party
Jobbik).”
4
Given the fact that MKKP’s relations with mainstream parties are
conflictual rather than consensual, and that its primary goal is not to gain public
office and political posts through negotiations, but to gain as many votes as
possible, we can assume that the party’s potential for cooperation is very low.
3.2 Die PARTEI
The German political party “Die Partei für Arbeit, Rechtsstaat, Tierschutz, Elit-
enförderung und basisdemokratische Initiative”(The Party for Labor, Rule of Law,
Animal Welfare, Elite Promotion, and Grassroots Democratic Initiative [Die PARTEI]),
was founded in 2004 by the editorial team of the satirical magazine Titanic (Neu 2018).
However, they did not achieve significant success until the 2010s. In the 2005 elections,
they garnered 0.0 % of the vote with 6,923 votes (Statistisches Bundesamt 2005). Their
popularity gradually increased, and in 2014, they gained a European Parliament seat
with 0.63 % of the vote, thanks to Germany’s unique regulations that lack a parlia-
mentary threshold (Bundeswahlleiter 2014).
In the 2019 EP elections, they achieved 2.4 % of the vote that resulted two seats
(Bundeswahlleiter 2014). What is even more remarkable is that they reached 9 %
among first-time voters, surpassing the SPD and FDP (Brady 2019). However, Die
PARTEI’s success is primarily concentrated in less significant elections (or second-
order elections Reif and Schmitt 1980), as they consistently underperform in state or
national elections. As Thomas Poguntke explained “Die PARTEI could do well in some
local council elections, but I don’t see them suddenly being the big challenger in
4Pincehelyi Zita, interview, 15 05 2021.
500 Glied and Szegedi

Germany’s 2021 federal elections. […] For some voters, the EU elections aren’t‘prime
elections,’so it’s easier for them to vote less seriously”(quoted by Brady 2019).
Their election results suggest that they are particularly popular among the
young, the urban, and the highly educated voters (Szegedi 2021b). Their party or-
ganization has also continuously expanded, with 38,000 members in 2019, compared
to 14,158 in 2014 (Brady 2019). Additionally, they have a youth organization called
“hintnerjugend”referring to the youth movement of the Nazi Party in Germany
(Mashiach 2019).
Their relative popularity is primarily attributed to their extensive use of social
media (Olterman 2017) and attention-grabbing actions, such as when they released a
90-s blurred sex video as a political advertisement during the election campaign
(Reuters 2013). Another example is when they displayed the slogan “a Nazi could be
hanging here”on posters
5
(Knight 2017) (Table 1).
4 Comparative analysis
The empirical analysis compares the posters of the MKKPand the Die PARTEI, based on
two main aspects. On the one hand, based on their perceptions of other parties –which
we expect to confirm the anti-establishment attitude –and on the other hand, we want
Table :Characteristics of joke political parties in general and the Hungarian two-tailed dog party; +
means yes, −means no, +/−means both.
Joke political parties
in general
Hungarian two-tailed
dog party
Die PARTEI
Anti-elitism ++ +
Anti-corruption +/−++
Movement parties ++ +
Collective actions ++ +
Populism +/−++
New-leftism +/−++
Bottom-up organization ++ +
Urban development –+–
Performances +–+
Political stand ups +/−–+
Source: Authors.
5This was a response to an action by Die Rechte, who placed “We are not hanging just signs”posters
near refugee homes.
Dog tales 501

to show the emergence of a post-materialvalue shift through the issue of the migration
crisis. Since modern joke parlours do not primarily use the tools of “traditional
nonsense”but convey real messages through incongruity, our analysis aims to reveal
the actual content. To do so, we draw on the work of Sanz (2013), who analysed the
British Labour Party’s funny posters. Based on this, we distinguish between the
meaning of the image and the text (of course, for text-only posters, only the text), the
implied premises, and the implied conclusion (Figure 1).
4.1 Die PARTEI
Text analysis: The poster shows the names of relevant German parties, followed by
the denial of their most important self-definitions. The main incongruity over here is
the appearance of Die PARTEI, which claims that it is not funny. The crucial
difference is that while the other parties interpret the loss of identity negatively, the
Die PARTEI does not. Being unfunny in politics is a positive attribute and Die PARTEI
repositions itself by considering itself exclusively serious (Oltermann 2017).
Implicit premises: The implicit premise is that every German party has no
identity and is dishonest about itself, and only the Die PARTEI should be taken
seriously and its claims accepted.
Figure 1: Die PARTEI poster about other parties. “CDU: not Christians, SPD not social, Grüne: not
ecological, FDP: not liberal, AfD: not alternative, Die PARTEI: not funny”. Source: https://www.facebook.com/
MartinSonnebornEU/photos/a.182449111816888/3936550269740068/?type=3 (retrieved: 11 08 2023).
502 Glied and Szegedi

Implied conclusion: The entire political elite is dishonest and discredited, and
only the Die PARTEI is the true electoral alternative (Figure 2).
4.2 MKKP
Text analysis: The MKKP compares the four main Hungarian political blocs: Fidesz,
Opposition Cooperation, Our Homeland Movement and the MKKP itself on the basis of
which is conducting a “hate campaign”against various social groups. According to the
poster, Fidesz is not waging a hate campaign against Hungarians from beyond the
borders andRoma, but against all other groups. Our Homeland Movement only avoids
a hate campaign against Hungarians from beyond the borders, while the united
opposition conducts a hate campaign against them and certain groups of women. On
the other hand the MKKP is not a partner in hate campaigns against anyone.
Implied premises: With that, MKKP implies the similarity among the major
election blocs. The campaign poster suggests that there is no real difference between
the major parties; they only differ in terms of which social group they “hate.”
Implied conclusion: Consequently, the implied conclusion of the poster is that
MKKP is unique within the Hungarian party system because they do not seek
political advantage from hatred. In other words, while other parties attempt to gain
popularity through hate and fear (Figure 3).
Figure 2: MKKP poster about other parties. “Topics of hate campaigns by other parties: Muslims, foreign
Hungarians, LGBTQ+, Romas, women, Jews, homeless, poor people, Gyurcsány Ferenc, science, culture.”
Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/CZFiNNyMTtR/ (retrieved: 11 08 2023).
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4.3 Migration
4.3.1 Die PARTEI
Interpretation of text and image: The main contradiction on this poster lies between
the text and the image, where “For a beach where we would lie well and gladly”
contrasts with the image showing the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi, a Syrian refugee
child who drowned in the Aegean Sea while trying to cross. In the upper right corner
of the image, the logo of the CDU is visible, while the entire image is structured as if a
Die PARTEI poster were pasted over it.
Implied premise: Due to CDU’s anti-migration policies, Alan Kurdi (and many
other refugees) died, thus the German government is indirectly responsible for
people’s deaths. In addition, the CDU is attempting to minify the issue and disguise
the messages conveyed by Die PARTEI.
Implied conclusion: Germany needs to change its migration policy and provide
assistance to refugees, otherwise they risk human lives.
Figure 3: Die PARTEI poster about
migration. “For a beach where we would lie
well and gladly”–This poster looks like a CDU
poster being removed to reveal the Die PARTEI
poster as a replacement. Source: https://www.
dnn.de/lokales/dresden/wahlplakat-von-
die-partei-sorgt-fuer-aufregung-in-dresden-
FUSKZR6SDO7YUT4DZKGL5JA7T4.html
(retrieved: 11 08 2023).
504 Glied and Szegedi

4.4 MKKP
The migration crisis that spilled over to Hungary in 2015, the EU rule of law mech-
anism, the government-initiated campaigns (against migrants, George Soros,
“Brussels”) and the deep dive of opposition parties created a situation in which it was
difficult to distinguish the actual messages of the relevant parties from jokes. This is
what Gergely Kovács, the head of the MKKP, refers to when he says that even the big
parties make promises they cannot keep: “They talk about each other, they berate
each other, they serve the needs of those who want to hear why it is possible to hate
someone in the country.”
6
The incongruity theory came out strongly during the 2015
counter-billboard campaign, as MKKP billboard posters had the same imagery,
background, font and colours as the government’s anti-migrant posters, but with an
entirely different message (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Political posters from 2015 (Source: Authors). Government message in English: “If you come to
Hungary, you can not take the jobs of Hungarian people.”
6Kerényi György: As if I were an opposition politician –Kovács Gergely, the president of MKKP. 15 03
2022. Szabad Európa. https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/mintha-ellenzeki-politikus-lennek-kovacs-
gergely-a-kutya-part-elnoke/31146172.html (Retrieved 13 02 2022).
Dog tales 505

MKKP in they countercampaign used the following messages as respond: “Sorry
about our prime minister!”or “If you’re Hungary’s Prime Minister, you have to respect
our laws!”(Nagy 2019). MKKP also responded to the government’s anti-migration
campaign with posters featuring a quote from Hungary’sfirst king, St Stephen: “For a
country of one single language and one set of customs is weak and vulnerable.”This
presupposes a deeper, more complex understanding of reality on the part of the
electorate, as it makes a historical, political reference to criticize the government’s
refugee policy. This also requires those who understand the message to be more
highly educated and able to decode the implicit reference in the quote (Figure 5).
Text analysis: With this poster, the MKKP juxtaposes the government’s anti-
immigration rhetoric with a biblical quote: “For I was hungry, and you gave me food; I
was thirsty, and you gave me drink; I was a stranger, and you took me in”(Nagy 2019).
The quote is a passage from the Gospel of Matthew and is clearly directed towards
helping the less fortunate. The poster’s incongruity lies in the fact that it uses a
biblical message to argue for support for migrants and against the government’s
position. This creates an irreconcilability because the Hungarian government
identifies itself as Christian, theoretically making it incompatible to oppose its ide-
ology with a biblical quote. This duality is what adds to the humor of the poster. The
text Matthew 25:35 occupies a prominent place in the image, making it clear to all
observers that they have encountered a biblical quote.
Figure 5: MKKP billboard about the migration. “I was hungry and you gave me something to eat; I was
thirsty and you gave me something to drink; I was a stranger and you took me in”. Source: https://img0.hvg.
hu/image.aspx?id=31893a19-7cf5-47c3-b55f-80d694f9e008&view=7fcefbf8-ac48-4ee6-aef5-
32203afa118c (retrieved: 11 08 2023).
506 Glied and Szegedi

Implied premises: Perhaps more important is what the poster only suggests,
namely, the implied premises. Arguing against the government based on its own
ideological background suggests the duplicity of decision-makers. It implies that the
Christian character is merely superficial and is driven more by governance
techniques and the goal of maximizing votes than by genuine religious conviction.
Implied conclusion: With this poster, the MKKP provides a broader implied
conclusion, asserting that the government not only lies on the issue of migration but
also does not tell the truth on more extensive issues.
5 Conclusions
Second generation joke parties typically have anti-establishment, apolitical, protest
and anti-party characteristics. They display patterns of behaviour of civil society
organisations and movements, but function as parties with membership, party
structure and decision-making mechanisms. Their relationship with power is
contradictory. Since their aim is not necessarily to gain power, they rather “criticize
from the outside,”meanwhile, once in a position of power, they become part of the
political system and may lose their joke-party character as a result of expectations.
Their thin “ideology”is humor, through which they criticize the system and the
entire political elite in a tough but not extreme way.
Through the comparison of modern joke parties, we have analysed two unique
and successful political initiatives, the Hungarian MKKP and the German Die PARTEI.
Both MKKP and Die PARTEI use satire, irony and humor to draw attention to political
issues and engage in political activism through satire. They aim to criticize tradi-
tional politics and bring attention to social issues, political anomalies and corruption
cases. They also participated in elections including local and European Parlament
elections and have the chance to win seats in 2024 again. These parties can be
positioned somewhere between a civil society movement and an organized party in
terms of its aims and functions. In addition, MKKP also performs the work of local
governments confronting the corruption and waste of money found in traditional
tender application systems, criticizing the cynicism of political narratives and the
anomalies of the political system in general. In spite of the work in local political
communities the party is most comfortable with street action, using new techniques,
mainly street art and other forms of urban art.
In the case of the party system, they use the typical stereotypes about political
parties as “liars,”focusing on their own interests, elitists or corrupts, etc. Therefore,
in this sense, we can categorize the MKKP and Die PARTEI also as anti-establishment
parties, because their political enemies/rivals have not been created by clear political
ideologies or party strategies. Basically, they constructed the political conflict between
Dog tales 507

the political elite, the mainstream parties, and their point of views about politics and
society. So, in that case they are closer to the radical populits parties –however joke
parties, especially the MKKP and the Die PARTEI not extremist –thereby we consider
the aforementioned political entities as centrist anti-establishment parties (based on
Engler 2020). Moreover,both parties have post-material values, which means that they
are sensitive to social issues and this also fact strengthens their centrist, moderate
character.
An important question is what happens to joke parties when they get into a
responsible position and really have to start making politics and political decisions.
Since it was a rare moment in history when a joke party got into a policy-making
position –this mainly emerges regarding the European Parliament elections and
local government elections –there is no comprehensive analysis of this. MKKP’s
politicians in local government positions continued the city renovation and com-
munity development activity they had begun and began to carry out vigorous anti-
corruption and fact-finding work. A responsible position requires more answers
than “the more everything, less nothing”phrase, since public policy decisions have to
be made, serious subsidies, investments, and tender funds have to be decided upon.
Climate adaptation theme is also important to them because cities are the most
vulnerable places to negative impacts of climate change. The speeches of the rep-
resentatives of Die PARTEI in the European Parliament were similarly made around
the anti-corruption topic, the protection of the publicity and transparency, the
protection of individual freedoms, and the protection of the freedom of the press.
7
In a word, as responsible policymakers behind the joke, they have to take on the
representation of serious topics, joke parties manifest themselves in the appearance
of a kind of protest alternative, the proactive protector of rule of law and
transparency.
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Bionotes
Viktor Glied
University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary
glied.viktor@pte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2467-5435
Viktor Glied, PhD in political science, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and
International Studies, University of Pécs (Hungary). He is historian and political scientist. His research
interests cover sustainable development, migration, Hungarian and international history in the 20–21st
centuries and civil society. He is the author and editor of several academic books and studies, furthermore
member and contributor of research teams which examine different aspects of political science, migration
and sustainable development. He is an editor of Polarities Journal on Social Sciences and Journal of Civil
Review. He delivered scientific presentations and taught at universities of Austria, Italy, Poland, Czechia,
Serbia, North Macedonia, Israel and Thailand.
Peter Szegedi
University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary
szegedi.peter@pte.hu
Peter Szegedi received his MA degree at the University of Pécs (Hungary) in political science. He began his
doctoral studies at the University of Pécs, Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Political Science Doctoral
Programme in 2019. His research interest focuses on anti-establishment political forces, especially joke/
satirical parties. He is author of several academic papers.
512 Glied and Szegedi