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Out of sight, out of mind? The bipartisan Australian foreign
policy on irregular migration
Gabriele Abbondanza
a,b,c
a
School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Sydney (USYD), Sydney, Australia;
b
Faculty of
Political Sciences and Sociology, Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), Madrid, Spain;
c
Istituto Affari
Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy
ABSTRACT
Australian foreign policy traditionally claims middle power and good
international citizenship credentials, although it also resorts to
unilateral actions due to its deep-rooted condition of ‘frightened
country’. This article argues that the country’s irregular migration
governance embodies this tension, and thus seeks to shed light on
this increasingly-neglected aspect of Australian external
engagement. Following a theoretical understanding of Australian
foreign policy, it investigates the country’s irregular migration
policies between 2000 and 2024. The article finds that there is a
strong continuity in such policies irrespective of the type of
government in power, supported by foreign policy bipartisanship,
resulting in specific foreign policy tools to stem seaborne arrivals.
These include military missions; territorial excisions from the
migration zone; offshore processing and/or externalisation
agreements with Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, and Sri
Lanka; pushback manoeuvres, and at-sea processing of asylum
claims. Inevitably, such measures complicate Australia’s
international status as they emphasise the uneasy coexistence of
both the globalist middle power and the self-interested nation
images in its foreign policy, therefore warranting new research on
this under-examined condition.
KEYWORDS
Asylum seekers; Australia;
Australian foreign policy;
bipartisanship; frightened
country; good international
citizen; irregular migration;
middle power
Introduction
The twenty-first-century global order is in flux, due to several processes that are unfold-
ing at the same time, including the disorderly advent of multipolarity, China’s rise and
revisionism, growing divisions within ‘liberal order’countries, and both traditional
and non-traditional security challenges across the globe (Jervis et al.2023). The Indo-
Pacific region encapsulates this complexity, as it embodies both the opportunities and
the challenges of a rapidly-evolving international system (He and Li 2020; Medcalf
2022). Amidst these power shifts, Australia grapples with an enduring challenge since
Federation: navigating its uneasy position between its leading ally (today, the United
States) and the Indo-Pacific’s contrasting security landscape, which undermines its
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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or with their consent.
CONTACT Gabriele Abbondanza gabriele.abbondanza@sydney.edu.au
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
2024, VOL. 78, NO. 5, 702–721
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2398748
sense of security (Gyngell 2017). Far from being a new condition for Australian policy-
makers, the country’s‘liminality’(Higgott and Nossal 1997) can now be interpreted as an
awkward regional posture, torn between its strategic and military pillars, revolving
around the US security architecture, and its economic anchors, centred on east and
southeast Asia instead (Abbondanza 2022).
Australia’s international relations are further complicated by a second factor, an
apparent dichotomy that can be found in the country’s foreign policy attitudes. Scholars
have long detected a tension in this respect, highlighting Canberra’s multilateral and
inclusive middle power identity and ‘good international citizenship’on the one hand
(Abbondanza 2021; Teo 2018; Wilkins 2017, among the many), and instances in
which its foreign policy resulted from deep-rooted strategic fears on the other, as per
the ‘frightened country’thesis (Burke 2008; McMaster 2002; Renouf 1979; Wallis
2021). Such a ‘conflicted’nature has been associated with a variety of policies, and irre-
gular migration governance makes no exception. A transnational phenomenon of global
proportions, irregular migration is a multi-faceted and inherently dangerous process for
asylum seekers seeking dignified living conditions elsewhere (de Haas, Castles, and Miller
2020; International Organization for Migration 2022), as well as a challenging reality that
destination countries struggle to address (Ambrosini and Hajer 2023; Dastyari, Nethery,
and Hirsch 2023). Partially due to the aforementioned regional volatility, Southeast Asia
continues to be a region of both origin and transit for Australia, by virtue of the latter’s
favourable socio-economic conditions and the relative feasibility of the voyage towards
its coasts. Amidst this complex context, Australia’s governance of irregular migration
—based on externalised procedures and offshore centres—has drawn criticism for its
highly-restrictive approach, prompting calls to respect international refugee and
human rights law (among the many, see Crock 2019).
Consequently, Australia’s irregular migration policies have been the object of many
scholarly works, chiefly within the disciplines of migration studies (Stevens 2002), inter-
national law (Vogl 2015), human rights studies (Tazreiter 2017), policy studies (Matera,
Tubakovic, and Murray 2023), criminology (Pickering and Weber 2014), and political
science (Martinez i Coma and Smith 2018).
1
However, while these and other works
provide a remarkable contribution to the study of Australia’s controversial irregular
migration governance, little has been said from a specific international relations (IR) per-
spective, that is focusing on Australia as a state and therefore on its specific (migration-
related) foreign policy. To be sure, the extant literature offers some valuable insights,
including those by Nethery and Gordyn (2014), Carr (2016), Maley (2016), Larking
(2017), Mansouri (2023), and Abbondanza (2023), which are directly or indirectly
related to the international relations discipline. Nevertheless, the IR and foreign policy
components of Australia’s irregular migration governance remain markedly under-exam-
ined, particularly if compared with migration, legal, or human rights studies, which have
extensively explored this subject instead. This represents the first reason behind the neces-
sity of new research, focusing on Australia and its migration-related foreign policy.
A second reason is due to the low level of attention that is paid to this issue if com-
pared to the peak of irregular maritime arrivals from a decade ago, notwithstanding
the maintenance of Canberra’s restrictive policies.
2
To wit, despite a mere 463 asylum
seekers intercepted in the past five years (from 2019 to June 2024 inclusive, see Australian
Border Force 2024), Canberra persists with its severe irregular migration policy. The
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 703
latter entails a number of foreign policy tools often utilised by other comparable destina-
tion countries: navy vessels to intercept asylum seekers’boats, ‘boat turnback’
manoeuvres, at-sea asylum claims processing, territorial excision from the migration
zone, return agreements, externalisation agreements (currently with Sri Lanka and
Nauru, formerly with Papua New Guinea and Cambodia), military operations (such as
Operation Sovereign Borders), international engagement with relevant forums (the
Bali Process, for example), and an emphasis on sovereignty and security whenever Can-
berra’s policies are questioned nationally or internationally (Price 2021).
As a result, the scholarly study of the country’s irregular migration governance seems
to follow the old adage ‘out of sight out of mind’—since unauthorised migrants are rarely
at the centre of media reports, as per the seminal account by Bleiker et al.(2013), and,
with the few exceptions listed earlier, from the recent Australian IR literature as well—
hence the title of this article. The latter highlights that the same foreign policy architec-
ture remains in place in spite of the minuscule numbers of asylum seekers attempting to
reach Australia, thanks to a remarkable foreign policy bipartisanship and path depen-
dence (see Carr 2017). Both the under-examined foreign policy perspectives mentioned
earlier, and the decreasing scholarly attention due to very few irregular arrivals, warrant a
new investigation under these premises, and emphasise the contribution to the literature
that this article seeks to make. Complementary aspects such as the role of pressure groups
and the domestic policy formulation processes, however important, fall outside of the
scope of this IR-focused research and are therefore left for future endeavours.
Consequently, this study aims to fill this scholarly lacuna by analysing Australia’s irre-
gular migration governance from 2000 (just before the inception of the ‘Pacific Solution’)
to the present day (mid-2024), with an emphasis on its foreign policy (external measures)
components. Such a goal could be tackledin a variety of ways, although some of them,
however directly relevant, would require a much longer investigation to be dealt with
appropriately, and are therefore not pursued here. To wit, the article does not focus
on the country’s visa policy for people seeking asylum onshore, nor on specific time
frames or policies as case studies, as it seeks to provide a wide-scoped and up-to-date
survey of Australian foreign policy on irregular migration, which is currently missing
in the literature. Moreover, this article’s investigation is centred on Australia, thus it
does not aim to assess other countries’viewpoints on Canberra’s policies. This is due
to both reasons of space and the fact that the Australian case study in itself provides a
wealth of insights into irregular migration governance, thanks to its controversial pol-
icies. These are implemented in the broader region, involve several partner countries,
and entail a variety of foreign policy tools such as military deployments, politico-diplo-
matic agreements, and financial contributions, thus representing the international
elements scrutinised here. Consequently, the article’s argument—namely that Australia’s
international image is tarnished by its restrictive policies—can be pursued without a
survey of regional countries’views, as Canberra’s aforementioned credentials stem
from IR theory and can therefore be assessed with theoretical investigations (see Pert
2014 and Abbondanza 2021 for comparable efforts).
To achieve this, it examines the above elements theoretically and empirically in two
distinct sections, to present a nuanced view of Australia’s international relations in the
light of this specific aspect of its foreign policy. The article’s overall argument is that Can-
berra’sunwavering irregular migration governance is emblematic of the country’s
704 G. ABBONDANZA
ostensibly ‘conflicted’international status mentioned earlier. These two seemingly-
dichotomous facets have, nevertheless, uneasily coexisted for more than two decades,
thus representing two pillars of its foreign policy which are not mutually-exclusive.
Specifically, Australia is torn between its traditional middle power/good international
citizen identity, and its equally-established sense of insecurity and strategic fears, what
leading diplomats and scholars have defined ‘unreasoning fearfulness’(Renouf 1979),
‘what to do with powerlessness’(Wesley 2009, 327), and the ‘fear of abandonment’
(Gyngell 2017). Irregular migration policies evidently stem from this second, more secur-
ity-oriented facet, as McMaster (2002, 279) wrote about ‘asylum-seekers and the insecur-
ity of a nation’(Australia) and Burke (2008, 11) recounted ‘fears of invasion in relation to
asylum seekers’exploited for electoral reasons.
From a methodological perspective, this research makes use of foreign policy analysis
(FPA) as a long-established qualitative method to analyse case studies in international
relations. FPA relies on six broad approaches, namely multifactorial, multilevel, multidis-
ciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specific assessments of states’policies
(Hudson 2005). In other words, with a focus on states, it explores the nexus between
domestic elements, regional/international context, and resulting foreign policy (Carls-
naes 1992; Hudson and Day 2019). This is particularly relevant since, in the words of
Maley (2016, 670), ‘the politics of refugees has been toxically affected by domestic poli-
tics’. This methodological flexibility allows to capture the complexity of Australia’s irre-
gular migration foreign policy, which makes the adoption of FPA germane to this article’s
goals. From a definitional viewpoint, this article employs neutral descriptors such as
‘asylum seekers’,‘seaborne migrants’,‘irregular migrants’,‘irregular maritime arrivals’
(IMAs), and ‘undocumented migrants’interchangeably, which are conventionally uti-
lised by scholars and international organisations (see Castles et al.2012 and International
Organization for Migration 2024, by way of example). Expressions such as ‘illegal
migrants’and ‘clandestine migrants’are intentionally avoided since no human being is
inherently ‘illegal’thanks to international refugee and human rights law.
This article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the theoretical
debates pertaining to Australian foreign policy are presented, thus focusing on the
notions of middle power, good international citizen, and frightened country. Next,
the qualitative empirical analysis of Australia’s irregular migration governance from
2000 to June 2024 is undertaken, spanning across 23.5 years and 13 administrations.
The following section assesses the theoretical and empirical implications for Australia’s
international posture. Lastly, the conclusion summarises the article’s premises, aims,
and findings, while calling for the need to continuously study the country’s irregular
migration governance, irrespective of the number of asylum seekers Canberra inter-
cepts. This research finds that there is a strong continuity in Australia’s strict
foreign policy on irregular migration, supported by the country’s well-known
foreign policy bipartisanship, which results in the longstanding use of specific
foreign policy tools to stem seaborne arrivals. Consequently, despite the deep roots
of the middle power idea in its political debates, Australia’s middle power and good
international citizen credentials are tarnished, and the latter are found to uneasily
coexist with security-oriented policies stemming from the ‘frightened country’identity.
The article ends with a call for further research on whether this represents yet another
evolution of the middle power notion.
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 705
A theoretical understanding of Australian foreign policy
Australian foreign and security policy has traditionally attracted a solid amount of scho-
larly attention, chiefly due to the country’s peculiar socio-cultural, economic, and stra-
tegic characteristics, which often differ more or less explicitly from those of countries
in its broader region (formerly the Asia-Pacific, currently the Indo-Pacific, see
Patman, Köllner, and Kiglics 2021). Consequently, works on Australia’s external
relations abound (see Brooklyn, Jones, and Strating 2023; Gyngell and Wesley 2003;
Patience 2018, among the many) and recounting all of them is neither possible nor
necessary here. Instead, this article considers the three theoretical elements that are
more closely related to both Australian foreign policy and its irregular migration govern-
ance. These are the middle power concept, the ‘good international citizen’idea, and the
notion of Australia as a ‘frightened country’prioritising national interests due to strategic
anxieties. While such conceptual notions cannot shape a country’s international affairs
by themselves, they traditionally represent influential drivers in Australian foreign
policy and are thus outlined below.
Relatedly, the relationship between the country’s foreign policy and its irregular
migration governance requires a brief clarification. To quote the seminal book by Witt-
kopf, Jones, and Kegley (2008, 17), foreign policy involves ‘the goals that the nation’s
officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the
means or instruments used to pursue them’. According to this perspective, the initiatives
that a state pursues to implement its migration policy abroad—military operations, inter-
national political agreements, specific visa or asylum measures, by way of example—are
subsumed under the broader foreign policy category, a view that this article shares and
adopts. Moreover, the Australian case stands out as its foreign policy on irregular
migration does not stem from a single ministry, but rather from several ones—chiefly
the Department of Home Affairs—which complicates Canberra’s assessment of the inter-
national consequences of its policies (Maley 2016). As mentioned earlier, a survey of the
theoretical concepts often associated with Australian foreign policy helps to better inter-
pret these issues.
Starting with middle power theory, this established branch of IR theory has enjoyed a
‘theoretical renaissance’since the end of the Cold War, after which second-tier states that
were no longer pressured into bipolarity could expand the goals and means of their
foreign policy. The middle power notion is a vast and continuously-evolving subject,
one where—unsurprisingly, from an IR perspective—there is no universal consensus
on what middle powers actually are or on the usefulness of this idea (Robertson and
Carr 2023). This predicament is aptly shown by middle power scholars who stated that
‘confusion reigns supreme’(Robertson 2017), and argued that middle power definitions
need to be constantly updated in the light of an evolving global order (Abbondanza and
Wilkins 2021). Even so, a review of the theoretical literature at least allows us to identify
the three main definitional criteria that constitute the backbone of middle power theory,
which are respectively associated with the three paradigmatic theories of IR.
3
The ‘positional’criterion (drawing on realism) is centred on material capabilities such
as size of the economy, armed forces, and population (Ping 2005), and generally places
middle powers between the 10th–11th and the 30th position in the vertical hierarchy
resulting from those parameters. The ‘behavioural’and ‘normative’criteria (building
706 G. ABBONDANZA
on liberalism), on the other hand, emphasise the international law-abiding, cooperative,
and multilateral attitudes of these states, including participation in forums pertaining to
irregular migration governance such as the Bali Process. This often produces a list of
liberal democracies with ‘niche diplomacy’and a proclivity for international cooperation
(Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993), such as Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden. Next, the ‘identity’parameter (stemming from constructivism) highlights
those states that self-identify with this concept, and therefore adopt a corresponding
foreign policy (Teo 2022). Under this notion, middle powers include Canada, Australia,
South Korea, and South Africa, among others. Unsurprisingly, Australia appears in all
these different understandings of the middle power notion and is therefore defined as
a‘quintessential’,‘archetypal’, and/or ‘traditional’middle power (Wilkins 2014). Relat-
edly, all Australian prime ministers with the exception of John Howard (whose govern-
ment attempted to popularise the ‘pivotal power’label instead, see Evans 2019) have
engaged with the middle power idea regardless of their political affiliation.
4
The second theoretical facet that is often associated with Australian foreign policy is
the notion of ‘good international citizenship’(GIC). Revolving around the respect of
international law, multilateralism, humanitarianism and idealism, a proactive inter-
national posture, and a congruous national identity (Abbondanza 2021), it is arguably
intertwined with the behavioural/normative criteria of middle power theory, and it is
therefore understandable that the two are often discussed together (see Youde and
Slagter 2013). On the basis of possessing foreign policies that feature internationalist
and progressivist goals and means, GIC has been linked to a number of states and organ-
isations over time, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada, and,
predictably, Australia as well (Dunne 2008). While explicit mentions by Australian prime
ministers are rarer compared to those referring to the more popular middle power
notion, observers have frequently associated good international citizenship with a
number of aspects of Australian foreign policy, thus tracing linkages that date back
decades. More specifically, Australia is generally considered a GIC due to its role in
global diplomacy, international peacekeeping missions, regional leadership, foreign aid
programmes, non-restrictive asylum seekers’policies during select Labor governments,
and its domestic social characteristics supporting this international image (Pert 2014).
The two concepts that have just been discussed are long established in the study of
Australian foreign and security policy, and indeed refer to numerous instances in
which Canberra has contributed to regional and international efforts multilaterally,
cooperatively, and successfully. However, Australian foreign policy is complex and mul-
tifaceted, and displays several key characteristics that contrast with this image, which
consequently prevent an uncompromising acceptance of its ‘ideal’middle power and
good international citizen credentials. This refers to situations in which Canberra has
deviated from the principles of multilateralism, cooperation, and indisputable legality,
either in its own region to unilaterally promote the country’s national interests at the det-
riment of others, or elsewhere to support the United States—at times against UN rec-
ommendations or international law principles. Whether due to security fears centred
on Asia (Burke 2008; Renouf 1979), or due to strategic cost-benefit analyses that privi-
leged an unwavering support of the US ally (Gyngell 2017), the ‘frightened country’
foreign policy involved the exertion of power politics that openly contrasts with the
two aforementioned images. In this case, too examples abound, and observers often
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 707
mention Australia’s involvement in military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq defying
UN recommendations, Canberra’s problematic contribution to climate change mitiga-
tion, the somewhat domineering attitude towards South Pacific nations, and—returning
to the article’s focus—the country’s controversial irregular migration policies as examples
(Abbondanza 2021).
Consequently, there are many scholars who have critically reviewed these diverse
aspects of Australian foreign policy. To name just a few, Holland (2013, 63) argued
that Australia resorted to justifications ‘for moral intervention’to legitimise the ‘war
on terror’; and Gleeson (2016, 32) reviewed Australia’s non-compliance with UN pro-
visions concerning Iraq and Afghanistan and labelled it a ‘lost opportunity’; although
these examples of unwavering support to the United States may have favoured the
2016 ‘refugee deal’with Washington (Higgins 2022). With reference to foreign aid,
whose levels and geographical scope narrowed considerably under Coalition govern-
ments, Corbett (2017, 209) highlighted the risk that it might be ‘always be a hostage to
political fortunes’. In terms of climate change mitigation (or lack thereof), Tangney
(2019, 131) stressed that ‘fossil fuel-intensive industries and their conservative allies
have repeatedly blocked progress’. To reapproach this article’s subject—irregular
migration—criticisms abound. Sawer, Abjorensen, and Larkin (2009, 66) labelled Austra-
lian policies ‘the Western world’s worst practice’; de Leeuwl and van Wichelen (2019)
argued that they represent Canberra’s attempt to ‘un-sign Geneva’(the Refugee Conven-
tion); and Larking (2017, 86) wrote that they ‘undermine regional stability and the rule of
law’.Inevitably, such views have also addressed the two ‘positive’theoretical concepts
previously discussed. Among the many, Warren (2019) criticised Australia’s GIC creden-
tials by writing it is ‘a paradoxical player in which it adheres to its US alliance obligations
while clinging to the waning vestiges of its position as a good global citizen’; Patience
(2018) asked whether Australia is a middle power or rather an ‘awkward partner’; and
Wallis (2020) reviewed the risks of Australia’s alliance with the US and argued it
should start to prioritise a ‘free and open middle power foreign policy’instead.
Understandably, these two seemingly-contrasting images—the middle power/good
international citizen and the ‘frightened’and thus national interest-driven actor—seem
thoroughly incompatible. However, upon closer inspection of Australian foreign
policy history, it appears that these two facets are not irreconcilable. As mentioned
earlier, if Australian international relations stem from a deep-rooted sense of insecurity
and the attempt to address ‘powerlessness’(Wesley 2009), then it must follow that Can-
berra adopts a middle power and GIC foreign policy when it is in its interest to do so.
Conversely, it resorts to unilateral or US-led actions when it perceives this is the best
course of action to secure its interests. In other words, rather than being two
mutually-exclusive interpretations, they represent two sides of the same coin and illus-
trate the complexity of Australian foreign policy. After all, countries’foreign policies
and related national identities are never monolithic. By way of example, scholars such
as Taylor (2020, 95) have argued that the country’s approach to its broader region, the
Indo-Pacific, provides a ‘point of convergence’for two different Australian foreign
policy traditions (middle power and US-dependent ally), while Lee (2024)finds a com-
parable coexistence in Australia’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Starting from these theoretical premises, this article argues that irregular migration
exemplifies this apparent dichotomy within Australian foreign policy. Consequently, it
708 G. ABBONDANZA
seeks to shed light on its conceptual and practical complexities. This section has engaged
with relevant theoretical elements, whereas the following one explores its empirical
aspects. To qualitatively analyse Australian irregular migration governance from 2000
to June 2024, it briefly mentions the domestic (type of government)
5
and regional/inter-
national context (irregular arrivals) for each political administration, prior to highlight-
ing the resulting foreign policy as per the broad principles of foreign policy analysis.
Australian irregular migration governance 2000–2024
The largest national group of irregular migrants comprises people who mostly travelled
to Australia by plane with a valid visa and then overstayed their time there, often referred
to as ‘overstayers’(Crock 2019). This condition, coupled with the fact that Australia does
not experience unauthorised land crossing for obvious geographic reasons, explains this
article’s focus on irregular maritime arrivals. While mandatory detention for undocu-
mented asylum seekers was first introduced by Paul Keating’s Labor government in
1992 (Fleay and Briskman 2013), the scope of this policy was unprecedentedly expanded
by conservative politician John Howard nine years later, that is at the onset of the time
frame considered by this research.
Domestically, the new century began with a clear political continuity, as Howard had
continuously been Prime Minister since 1996. During the 2nd Howard ministry (1998–
2001), irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs) became an emerging international issue for
Canberra, also due to the increase in IMAs after 1998 (from 200 in 1998 to 2,929 in
2000, see the official data collated by Refugee Council of Australia 2024). August 2001
represented a watershed moment in Australia’s migration governance and foreign
policy, since Canberra refused permission to enter Australian waters for Tampa, a Nor-
wegian freighter that had rescued 433 asylum seekers who were about to sink in inter-
national waters, near Australia’s Christmas Island. Following Tampa’s attempt to enter
Australian waters, the Howard administration deployed the Special Air Service Regiment
(SASR) who boarded the ship, thus cementing the unfolding diplomatic crisis with
Norway, the latter stressing Australia’s international obligations (Mares 2002). Canberra
proceeded with additional foreign policy tools, in the form of a temporary agreement
with Nauru to host around two-thirds of those asylum seekers in exchange for funds,
which became the blueprint for the country’s future policies in this area.
The subsequent federal elections were impacted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US
soil, which steered political debates with national security concerns. Having won the elec-
tions (3rd Howard ministry, 2001–2004) with promises to prevent asylum seekers from
reaching Australia, Howard implemented the controversial ‘Pacific Solution’to address a
growing regional phenomenon (5,516 IMAs in 2001) (Crock, Saul, and Dastyari 2006). It
relied on three foreign policy pillars: (i) denying asylum seekers access to Australia with
navy vessels, also performing ‘pushback’operations in 2001–2003 under Operation
Relex; (ii) escorting migrants to Nauru and Manus Island (Papua New Guinea) thanks
to economic-logistical agreements with the two countries, in addition to Christmas
Island; and (iii) excising thousands of islands (including Christmas Island) from Austra-
lia’s migration zone to avoid obligations not to turn back asylum seekers (Vogl 2015).
Despite being effective in terms of IMAs (from 5,516 in 2001 to a yearly average of 64
between 2002–2008), and notwithstanding its rationale of ‘reducing deaths at sea’, the
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 709
new externalisation and offshore processing policy (supported by the establishment of
the Bali Process in 2002) attracted criticism nationally—though it enjoyed bipartisan pol-
itical support—and internationally throughout its seven years of implementation
(McAdam and Chong 2019). For the purposes of this work, it is interesting to note
that this policy was accompanied by the attempt to replace the ‘middle power’descriptor
with the ‘pivotal power’one during all four Howard ministries (1996–2007), with the goal
of reframing Australia as a country pursuing its national interest even at the expense of its
international obligations (Cotton, Ravenhill, and John 2011). Conceptually, those years
complicated Canberra’s image of a good international citizen (Maley 2016) and
middle power, since the latter’s‘normative-behavioural’credentials were clearly not
upheld by the Pacific Solution, and given that Canberra’s‘identity’as a middle power
was intentionally discarded.
Australia’s next government was the first Labor administration after almost 12 years of
Coalition leadership. Led by Kevin Rudd (1st Rudd Ministry, 2007–2010), the new govern-
ment sought to revert Australia’s regional and international standing to its previous inter-
national law-abiding credentials, as shown by the government’s‘new values’on irregular
migration’s detention (Australian Parliament 2008). With a regional context characterised
by very low levels of seaborne arrivals (161 in 2008), Rudd kept its electoral promise and
dismantled the Pacific Solution (Grewcock 2008). In foreign policy terms, apart from the
abandonment of previous provisions, the Rudd government replaced Operation Relex with
Operation Resolute, which continued to monitor the country’s northern exclusive econ-
omic zone. Unsurprisingly, this policy change produced opposite effects compared to
the Pacific Solution: on the one hand it was praised by numerous international bodies
such as the UNHCR (2008), on the other it was followed by a surge in IMAs (from 161
in 2008 to 6,555 in 2010; see Refugee Council of Australia 2024). Moreover, the Rudd
administration proved to be antithetical to Howard’s in conceptual and definitional
terms as well, since the ‘pivotal power’descriptor was swiftly abandoned not only for
the more traditional ‘middle power’label, but also for the related ‘good international
citizen’role Australia was to readopt (see Rudd 2018). Consequently, the country’s‘norma-
tive-behavioural’and middle power ‘identity’were reinstated. However, decreasing public
and internal (Labor) support led to a leadership spill that replaced Rudd with Julia Gillard
as the new Prime Minister (1st Gillard ministry, 2010), who did not alter the country’s
foreign policy on irregular migration in this short time frame (less than three months).
Gillard won the 2010 elections shortly afterwards, therefore starting the 2nd Gillard
ministry (2010–2013). From a regional perspective, flows of seaborne asylum seekers
remained relatively high (6,555 in 2010, 4,565 in 2011), as highlighted by the conservative
opposition at the time. Consequently, after a stillborn plan to resettle asylum seekers in
Timor-Leste, Canberra sought and reached a new deal with Malaysian authorities (the
‘Malaysian Solution’) stemming from the 4th Bali Process conference. It consisted of a
transfer of migrants between the two countries, whereby Australia would resettle 4,000
refugees from Malaysia, and the latter would host 800 asylum seekers from Australia.
However, despite human rights’insurance from Malaysian authorities, the proposed
policy raised numerous doubts and presented juridical ambiguities, and was thus ruled
invalid by Australia’s High Court (Pastore 2013). With IMAs continuing to rise (17,204
in 2012) and approval rates more increasingly favouring the Coalition, the government
appointed an expert panel which recommended the reopening of both the Nauru and
710 G. ABBONDANZA
the Manus Island centres (Australian Parliament 2012). Canberra swiftly reverted to its
Howard-era externalisation approach through offshore processing, by reinforcing the
whole-of-government foreign policy effort (including Operation Resolute) which
enjoyed bipartisan support. Somewhat counterintuitively, from a theoretical viewpoint,
this firm foreign policy change did not seek to challenge Australia’s middle power tra-
dition, as Gillard remained explicitly committed to an ‘activist middle power diplomacy’
(Cotton, Ravenhill, and John 2011). This paved the way for the peculiar condition that
distinguished Australia since then: the uneasy coexistence of middle power activism on
the one hand (thus satisfying middle power ‘identity’credentials), and externalised
offshore processing on the other (weakening ‘normative-behavioural’principles instead).
In June 2013 Rudd won a new Labor leadership spill, therefore starting the 2nd Rudd
ministry (2013). Despite its very short lifespan (less than three months), and against a
regional backdrop of growing migrants’flows (20,587 arrivals, the highest number
since 1976; see Refugee Council of Australia 2024), the new government pursued diame-
trically opposed foreign policy means to manage irregular migration if compared to the
1st Rudd ministry, which led to the establishment of the ‘PNG Solution’. The latter main-
tained the existing security architecture—externalised offshore processing through Oper-
ation Resolute with frigates, patrol vessels, and other assets from multiple agencies—and
expanded detention facilities on Manus Island and Nauru. It also provided that even
migrants who were deemed refugees could never be resettled in Australia (Salyer, Dals-
gaard, and West 2020). The new iteration of Australia’s foreign policy on irregular
migration was approved with bipartisan support, with protests by the Greens and
human rights advocates. As Teo (2018) notes, despite the initial divergence in terms of
irregular migration policies, there is a clear continuity in the way that Rudd’s and Gillard’s
second governments have explicitly engaged with the country’s middle power ‘identity’.
This involved the same justification for the country’s restrictive irregular migration gov-
ernance, which complicated Canberra’s‘normative-behavioural’credentials instead.
Conservative politician Tony Abbott (Abbott ministry, 2013–2015) won the sub-
sequent federal elections after a campaign revolving around, among other issues, national
and border security. With a regional context leading to a peak in IMAs (20,587 in 2013),
Abbott further strengthened Australia’s foreign policy tools concerning migration gov-
ernance, chiefly through three new provisions. First, it introduced Operation Sovereign
Borders (OSB), which reinforced the existing externalisation policy, adopted a ‘zero tol-
erance’approach, assessed asylum claims at sea, labelled IMAs as ‘illegal maritime arri-
vals’, and incorporated Operation Resolute. Second, it reinstated ‘turnback’procedures
pushing back migrants’boats to Indonesia, a country that had (has) not signed the
Refugee Convention (McDonald 2015). Third, it concluded a new offshore processing
agreement with Cambodia, which turned out to be a costly option (around 50 million
dollars) that was eventually chosen by a minuscule number of migrants (Wanna
2015). Even so, IMAs decreased to 217 in 2015. Despite the different political affiliation
compared to the two previous prime ministers, Abbott too implemented (and strength-
ened) restrictive irregular migration governance with bipartisan support—thus continu-
ing to tarnish the country’s adherence to ‘normative-behavioural’principles—while
explicitly labelling Australia as a middle power and reinforcing its ‘identity’as such (Aus-
tralian Government 2014), therefore protracting the uneasy coexistence of these two
elements within Australian foreign policy.
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 711
As a result of a leadership spill within the Coalition, Malcolm Turnbull became prime
minister (1st and 2nd Turnbull ministries, 2015–2018). Regionally, irregular flows con-
tinued to decrease to the point that intercepted IMAs reached 51 in 2016, 60 in 2017, and
24 in 2018, the lowest number in 13 years (Refugee Council of Australia 2024). Supported
by this favourable regional context, the Turnbull government’s main initiatives in terms
of irregular migration governance were twofold. On the one hand, at the Papua New
Guinean government’s request,
6
it progressively ceased activity at the Manus Island pro-
cessing centre. On the other, it concluded a difficult asylum seekers’resettlement and
exchange agreement with the United States, planned during the Obama presidency
and then implemented with several complications during the Trump presidency. The
remaining components of Australia’s foreign policy on irregular migration, including
the Nauru processing centre, the whole-of-government effort, and OSB, remained
active with bipartisan support (McDougall 2018). As with all prime ministers since
2012, regardless of their political affiliation, Turnbull too attempted to reconcile the
country’s stern irregular migration policy—sitting uneasily with once-traditional ‘nor-
mative’and ‘behavioural’credentials—with explicit mentions of Australia’s traditional
middle power ‘identity’and status (Australian Government 2017).
In the aftermath of a new leadership spill within the governing Coalition, Scott Morri-
son replaced Turnbull as prime minister (1st and 2nd Morrison ministries, 2018–2022).
The broader regional context—and the COVID-19 pandemic—continued to favour Aus-
tralia’s no-entry efforts, with IMAs progressively decreasing until they reached the sym-
bolic value of zero in 2021 (Refugee Council of Australia 2024). In February 2019, the
government’s defeat in the House of Representatives led to the temporary implementation
of the Home Affairs Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Measures) Act 2019, better
known as the ‘Medevac Bill’, which gave doctors a stronger role in the medical evaluation
of the many mentally and/or physically ill asylum seekers in both Manus Island and Nauru
(the Medevac Bill was repealed 10 months later). In terms of the government’s changes to
offshore processing, the Manus Island centre witnessed an uneven pathway to closure that
was eventually completed in October 2021, the Nauru centre was closed in 2019 (although
both centres continued to host migrants for several months) only to be reopened in Sep-
tember 2021, and the Christmas Island centre was reopened in February 2019 (Kelly
2021). Accordingly, OSB and the whole-of-government effort concerning irregular
migration governance remained in use with bipartisan political support. Notwithstanding
the continuation of Australia’s restrictive foreign policy on irregular migration, along with
the increasingly-problematic relation with weakened ‘normative-behavioural’credentials,
Morrison too partially fostered the country’s middle power ‘identity’by continuing to
engage with the notion of Australia being a middle power making positive contributions
to the international community (Australian Government 2019), therefore cementing an
increasingly-rooted political tradition among Australian prime ministers.
Anthony Albanese won the 2022 federal elections, thus becoming the first Labor prime
minister in nine years (Albanese ministry, 2022-ongoing). Australia’s regional landscape
remained advantageous to the country’s irregular migration governance, as shown in
Figure 1 (199 in 2022, 74 in 2023, 110 in the first six months of 2024; see Australian
Border Force 2024). The slight increase in IMAs is due to Sri Lanka’s economic and huma-
nitarian crisis, which is spurring hundreds of people to seek better conditions abroad,
including Australia. Canberra addressed this crisis in two ways: it upheld its strict no-
712 G. ABBONDANZA
entry policy with externalised offshore processing, and provided 50 million dollars in the
form of aid to both ameliorate the humanitarian crisis and stem outbound asylum
seekers’flows. This externalisation policy also entails the cooperation of the Sri Lankan
navy to this end, and the provision of 4,000 GPS trackers to local fishing boats, which
might transfer migrants in the future. Moreover, Australia’s‘Sri Lankan approach’—
which enjoys bipartisan support and is still ongoing at the time of writing—also comprises
the assessment of asylum seekers’claims at sea, for those who are intercepted inside Aus-
tralian waters (Senanayake, Geeth, and Doherty 2023). Lastly, Canberra will not be able to
detain migrants withouta time limit anymore, since migrants’indefinite detention has been
declared unlawful by the High Court (Human Rights Law Centre 2023). Against this
complex backdrop, Albanese has maintained the customary habit of all prime ministers
—since Gillard—who have defended Australia’s stern irregular migration’s foreign
policy while concurrently reinvigorating the country’s middle power roots in public
speeches (see Australian Government 2023). As before, this implies support of the country’s
middle power ‘identity’on the one hand, and disregard for deteriorated middle power ‘nor-
mative-behavioural’principles on the other.
Implications for Australia’s international posture
The discussions presented in the two previous sections allow for a number of consider-
ations pertaining to both the theoretical and the empirical elements of Australia’s inter-
national standing (see Table 1). Starting with the latter, this article highlights three main
practical implications. To begin with, a strong continuity in Australia’s strict foreign
Figure 1. Australia’s irregular maritime arrivals between January 2000 and June 2024 inclusive (official
data collated by the author).
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 713
policy on irregular migration stands out. Out of 13 administrations from 2000 to June
2024, 11 of them implemented restrictive foreign policy measures to prevent seaborne
asylum seekers from reaching the Australian territory, the only exceptions being the
1st Rudd ministry and, due to its very short lifespan, the 1st Gillard ministry. Further,
this foreign policy continuity has been enabled by a steady bipartisanship in Australia’s
political system. Apart from the two aforementioned exceptions, all governments (eight
led by the Coalition, three by the Labor party) maintained and at times strengthened
existing provisions concerning the offshore processing of asylum seekers and the coun-
try’s broader externalisation approach. To be sure, there have been differences in terms of
rhetoric and the adoption/abandonment of select policy components (temporary protec-
tion visas, for example), but these have not meaningfully altered the main foreign policy
framework which is the focus of this research.
Relatedly, this continuity has cemented the use of specific foreign policy measures
over the years. These are substantial and comprise: the broader whole-of-government
externalisation effort; territorial excisions from Australia’s migration zone; the provision
of humanitarian, development, and/or logistical funds to third countries; offshore pro-
cessing centres in Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, and Christmas Island (at
different points in time); return agreements; interception agreements with Sri Lanka;
military operations such as Operation Sovereign Borders, Relex, and Resolute; navy
deployments to intercept and repel migrants’boats (turnback manoeuvres); the ship-
board assessment of migrants’asylum claims in international waters; and the concurrent
engagement in relevant regional forums such as the Bali Process.
As per the other set of implications, while acknowledging that related conceptual
elements cannot shape a country’s foreign policy by themselves, the real-world develop-
ments and considerations outlined above nevertheless exert a significant influence over
the theories and notions that traditionally frame Australian foreign and security policy.
First, the middle power image (and its corollary good international citizenship notion)
are deeply rooted in Australian debates (see Ungerer 2007). After all, as shown in this
article, out of the seven prime ministers who have governed Australia from 2000 to the
present day, six of them have explicitly engaged with the idea of Australia as a middle
power throughout their tenure (the only exception was John Howard, who unsuccessfully
Table 1. Overview of Australia’s governments, their political affiliation, their approach to irregular
migration governance, and their (dis)engagement with the middle power notion.
Prime minister (ministry
no.) Time frame
Political
affiliation
Irregular migration
policy
Engagement with middle power
idea
Howard (2nd) 1998–2001 Coalition Restrictive No
Howard (3rd) 2001–2004 Coalition Restrictive No
Howard (4th) 2004–2007 Coalition Restrictive No
Rudd (1st) 2007–2010 Labor Non-restrictive Yes
Gillard (1st) 2010 Labor Non-restrictive Yes
Gillard (2nd) 2010–2013 Labor Restrictive Yes
Rudd (2nd) 2013 Labor Restrictive Yes
Abbott 2013–2015 Coalition Restrictive Yes
Turnbull (1st) 2015–2016 Coalition Restrictive Yes
Turnbull (2nd) 2016–2018 Coalition Restrictive Yes
Morrison (1st) 2018–2019 Coalition Restrictive Yes
Morrison (2nd) 2019–2022 Coalition Restrictive Yes
Albanese 2022–Labor Restrictive Yes
714 G. ABBONDANZA
attempted to replace it with the ‘pivotal power’label). More to the point, the direct engage-
ment with the middle power notion was not a prerogative of Labor politicians, since all
Coalition prime ministers with the exception of Howard embraced it as well.
Second, and despite the above, Australia’s credentials as a middle power and a good
international citizen are tarnished by its irregular migration-related foreign policy. Not-
withstanding the country’s positive engagement in other areas of international relations
(from the support to free trade to the defence of freedom of navigation, among the
many possible examples, see Brooklyn, Jones, and Strating 2023), Australia’s record in
terms of irregular migration governance is controversial and seems unlikely to change
in the near future. Moreover, the fact that both Nauru and Papua New Guinea are
countries formerly administered by Australia raises concerns of postcolonial nature
(see Salyer, Dalsgaard, and West 2020). Third, it may be the case that Australia’s
complex engagement with the middle power idea has shifted in the twenty-first century
as a result of a more challenging strategic landscape, including revisionism by rising
powers in the Indo-Pacific, the US’relative decline, terrorism, irregular migration, and
others. These have altered Australia’s security environment, or at the very least its percep-
tion thereof, potentially heightening deep-rooted fears of strategic insecurity (the ‘frigh-
tened country’condition) and hardening its foreign policy accordingly. While it is not
within the scope of this article to dissect the changing nature of the middle power idea,
the literature offers more than one insight into a potential conceptual shift of this adapt-
able term (see Abbondanza and Wilkins 2021; Efstathopoulos 2023; and Robertson and
Carr 2023), all of which warrants future research on the evolving meanings of this
notion for countries that actively adopt it.
In essence, the ostensibly-conflicted nature of Australian foreign policy, introduced at
the beginning of this article, seems to emerge from this research as well. Torn between its
middle power and good international citizenship credentials on the one hand, and its
‘frightened country’foreign policy posture (stemming from strategic insecurity) on the
other, Canberra operates under a definitional—and arguably identity—dichotomy that
has captured little scholarly attention so far with reference to irregular migration govern-
ance. Following the broad principles of foreign policy analysis (FPA), accounting for
select domestic and international factors influencing the country’s foreign policy, this
research has shown that Australia’s irregular migration governance is not only relevant
to this under-explored facet of Australian foreign policy but effectively embodies it. To
return to the article’s initial assumption, the country’s defence of its stern irregular
migration governance, and its concurrent promotion of its middle power status, are
not mutually-exclusive as they could appear under a cursory look. Rather, they represent
two sides of the same (Australian) coin for two substantial reasons: the large time frame
behind this condition (virtually a quarter of a century), and the strong political biparti-
sanship supporting it.
Conclusion
This article has pointed at the low levels of scholarly attention devoted to Australia’s
foreign policy on irregular migration—especially in the international relations discipline,
and particularly after the 2013 peak in arrivals—prior to attempting to address this gap in
the literature through a dedicated investigation of the country’s irregular migration
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 715
governance from 2000 to June 2024 inclusive. Supported by a theoretical overview of
three notions that are traditionally associated with Australian foreign policy, it has
probed into the irregular migration policies of 13 Australian governments following
the guidelines of foreign policy analysis. The article’sfindings—encapsulated by the six
considerations that have just been discussed—hold value for both theoretical and empiri-
cal understandings of Australian foreign policy. On the one hand, a strong continuity in
Australia’s strict foreign policy on irregular migration stands out, supported by the coun-
try’s well-known foreign policy bipartisanship, which results in the longstanding use of
specific foreign policy tools to stem seaborne arrivals. On the other, and notwithstanding
the prevalence of the middle power idea in the country’s political debates, Australia’s cre-
dentials as a middle power and a good international citizen are inevitably diminished.
Nonetheless, a careful assessment seems to at least partially reconcile the two appar-
ently-contrasting images—middle power and national interest-driven (‘frightened’)
nation—given the long time frame in which they have coexisted and the bipartisanship
behind them, thus adding to the few pieces of literature assessing the apparent dichoto-
mies within the country’s foreign policy (including Taylor 2020 and Lee 2024).
Whether this tension signals another evolution of the ever-changing middle power
notion remains open to debates, since the multifarious challenges of the twenty-first
century likely impact on Canberra’s interpretation of its middle power status. Even so,
the country’s under-examined governance of irregular migration appears to effectively
embody this uneasy condition, which warrants further research on a significant
element of Australian foreign policy that is, however, increasingly taken for granted,
and therefore shifting in the background of scholarly investigations. To that end, this
research aims to offer a novel contribution to the extant literature in terms of both theor-
etical and foreign policy insights.
Notes
1. Global research on this subject is, of course, too large to be recounted here. Similar consider-
ations apply to other parts of this article that mention large parts of disciplinary literatures,
which do not make any pretence to comprehensiveness due to space constraints.
2. For the purposes of this research, ‘restrictive’policies are understood as attempting to
prevent seaborne migrants from reaching the Australian territory, whereas ‘non-restrictive’
ones do not pursue this objective.
3. Apart from the positional, behavioural/normative, and identity criteria, the functional, sys-
temic impact, and the now-defunct geographic criteria ought to be mentioned. See Abbon-
danza and Wilkins (2021) for a review of middle powers’definitional parameters.
4. Examples are included in the empirical section of this article.
5. Contemporary Australian governments are either led by the Coalition (conservative) or the
Australian Labor Party (progressive).
6. In 2016, the PNG Supreme Court had declared that the processing centre was breaching the
country’s constitution.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank both the journal’s editors—Joanne Wallis and Tim Legrand—and
the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. An earlier version of this research was pre-
sented at the 2023 Australian Political Science Association (APSA) conference.
716 G. ABBONDANZA
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions: [Grant Number 847635].
Notes on contributor
Dr. Gabriele Abbondanza is Marie Curie Fellow (a position funded by the EU) at the Complutense
University of Madrid (Spain); Honorary Associate at the School of Social and Political Sciences of
the University of Sydney (Australia); and Associate Fellow at the Italian Institute of International
Affairs—IAI (Italy). He specialises in Australian and Italian foreign and security policy; irregular
migration; the Indo-Pacific; and middle power and great power theory. His research has been pub-
lished by leading journals including International Affairs,International Political Science Review, the
Australian Journal of International Affairs, and others. His latest monograph is ‘The Foreign Policy
of Irregular Migration Governance’, published by Routledge in 2024. He is co-editor of ‘Italy and
Australia’(Palgrave Macmillan, 2023) with Simone Battiston, and co-editor of ‘Awkward Powers’
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), with Thomas Wilkins. Dr. Abbondanza currently teaches a number of
courses related to international relations, security studies, and irregular migration governance, and
frequently contributes to media and institutional debates concerning his fields of expertise.
ORCID
Gabriele Abbondanza http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1036-2884
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