Overview of Energy Policy in Iran: The Proper Path to Clean Energy

Abstract

This article evaluates the existing energy policy in Iran, focusing on the nation’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels and the implications of such dependency. With one of the world’s highest energy intensities, Iran’s energy consumption significantly overshadows its economic output, largely due to subsidized energy prices that discourage efficient use. This study highlights the economic, environmental, and societal challenges stemming from this unsustainable energy consumption, including excessive natural resource depletion, environmental degradation, and economic inefficiencies. It proposes a strategic shift toward renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind carriers, outlining necessary domestic and foreign policy changes to facilitate this transition. The study’s findings indicate that certain modifications to Iran’s domestic and foreign policy are required. These include reorganizing energy pricing and regulations, increasing public awareness, enhancing energy efficiency, and promoting international collaborations to facilitate the advancement of cleaner energy technologies.

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Brief Research Report
Published: 2024-08-26
https://doi.org/10.20935/AcadEnergy7316
1ECO College of Insurance, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran 1436863113, Iran.
2Energy Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran 14565114, Iran.
*email: maleki@sharif.edu
ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 1 of 10
Overview of energy policy in Iran: the proper path to
clean energy
Maryam Hasheminejad1, Hasan Raei2, Abbas Maleki2,*
Academic Editor(s): Antonio Sanchez-Bayon and Amjad Anvari-Moghaddam
Abstract
This article evaluates the existing energy policy in Iran, focusing on the nation’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels and the implications of
such dependency. With one of the world’s highest energy intensities, Iran’s energy consumption significantly overshadows its economic
output, largely due to subsidized energy prices that discourage efficient use. This study highlights the economic, environmental, and
societal challenges stemming from this unsustainable energy consumption, including excessive natural resource depletion,
environmental degradation, and economic inefficiencies. It proposes a strategic shift toward renewable energy sources, especially solar
and wind carriers, outlining necessary domestic and foreign policy changes to facilitate this transition. The study’s findings indicate
that certain modifications to Iran’s domestic and foreign policy are required. These include reorganizing energy pricing and regulations,
increasing public awareness, enhancing energy efficiency, and promoting international collaborations to facilitate the advancement of
cleaner energy technologies.
Keywords: Iran’s energy policy, clean energy, energy security, Iran’s foreign policy
Citation: Hasheminejad M, Raei H, Maleki A. Overview of energy policy in Iran: the proper path to clean energy. Academia Green
Energy 2024;1. https://doi.org/10.20935/AcadEnergy7316
1. Iran and energy policy
Iran, as the world's leading holder of accumulated crude oil and
natural gas, is heavily dependent on oil and gas products . The
country possesses 9.11% of the world's proven natural gas
reserves and 17.07% of its crude oil reserves, despite comprising
just 1.08% of the global population [1]. The information pre-
sented in Chart 1 indicates that Iran’s primary energy consump-
tion increased between 2012 and 2022, reaching a total of 12.16
exajoules in 2022. However, with reference to Chart 2, natural
gas is Iran’s main source of energy consumption.
In Charts 3 and 4, we discuss the trends in energy intensity and
per capita energy consumption in Iran.
Chart 1 • Iran’s primary energy consumption from 2012 to 2022 in exajoule [1].

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 2 of 10
Chart 2 • Iran’s primary energy consumption portfolio in 2022 [1].
Chart 3 • Total energy supply per unit of GDP in Iran (MJ/thousand 2015 USD) [2].
Chart 4 • Primary energy consumption per capita in Iran (gigajoule per capita) [1].
Iran owns significant recoverable reserves of crude oil and
natural gas, amounting to 157.8 billion barrels and 32.1 trillion
cubic meters, respectively (Tables 1 and 2). This positions Iran
as the fourth largest global holder of crude oil and the second
largest holder of natural gas [3].
Table 1 • Iran’s crude oil reserves from 2012 to 2020 (billion barrels) [3]
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Proven reserves
157
157
157.8
157.8
158.4
157.2
155.6
155.6
157.8

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 3 of 10
Table 2 • Iran’s natural gas reserves from 2012 to 2020 (trillion cubic meters) [3]
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Proven reserves
33.6
33.8
34
34
33.5
33.2
31.9
32
32.1
As of the conclusion of 2022, Iran’s crude oil and natural gas
production amounted to 3.822 million barrels per day and 259.4
billion cubic meters (bcm), representing 4.1% and 6.4% of the
global crude oil and natural gas production, respectively [1]. Iran
has had a notable rise in the consumption of crude oil and natural
gas, with figures increasing from 1.745 million barrels per day and
173.4 bcm in 2014 to 1.912 million barrels per day and 228.9 bcm
in 2022 (Charts 5 and 6). From the data presented in Chart 4, it
can be observed that Iran has consistently maintained a positive
balance between natural gas production and consumption over the
preceding years. Notably, in 2022, Iran’s natural gas consump-
tion reached a substantial magnitude, surpassing the natural gas
consumption of the African continent (162.5 bcm) and Central
and South America (161.7 bcm) [1].
Iran’s heavy consumption of natural gas has hindered its ability
to establish a significant position in the global natural gas
market. In certain years, Iran has had to rely on gas imports from
neighboring nations to meet its natural gas demands.
Chart 5 • Iran’s crude oil production and consumption from 2014 to 2022 (thousand barrels per day) [1].
Chart 6 • Iran’s natural gas production and consumption from 2014 to 2022 (billion cubic meters per year) [1].
Iran’s substantial reliance on fossil fuels has resulted in a notable
increase in carbon dioxide emissions attributed to energy con-
sumption. Based on the findings of the British Petroleum, Iran
ranked as the seventh highest global emitter of carbon dioxide,
with an emission of 667.4 million tons attributed to energy
consumption in 2022 (Chart 7).
In 2021, Iran produced 256.7 bcm of natural gas, of which 241.2
(~94%) was used for domestic needs (Table 3). Despite the rich
resources of natural gas, only 17.3 bcm of Iran’s natural gas was
exported through pipelines to Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Iraq in 2021. In 2019, the residential and commercial sectors
consumed 35% of natural gas, industrial sectors (including petro-
chemicals) consumed 27%, and electricity generation consumed
26%. Natural gas consumption has increased significantly in
recent years due to the substitution of liquid fuels with natural
gas, more installation of domestic gas pipelines, and the develop-
ment of the energy-intensive industrial sector [4]. Among all
sectors, the residential sector is the largest consumer of energy.
To increase natural gas exports, Iran will need to design policies
that enhance efficiency, reform domestic consumption patterns,
and attract investment.

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 4 of 10
Chart 7 • The amount of carbon dioxide emissions due to Iran’s energy consumption, 2012–2022 (million tons) [1].
Table 3 • Iran’s natural gas statistics in 2021 (billion cubic
meters per year) [3]
Production
Consumption
Import
Export
256.7
241.1
1.7
17.3
The US sanctions have had a significant impact on Iran’s
economy, particularly on its oil exports. These sanctions have
restricted Iran’s ability to export oil to many countries, leading to
a decrease in revenue and economic challenges for the country.
This is a complex geopolitical issue with various implications for
both Iran and the global economy.
The outlook for Iran’s oil exports is influenced by factors such as
geopolitical dynamics, international agreements, and global
energy demand. Currently, Iran faces significant challenges due
to the US sanctions that limit its ability to export oil to many
countries. These sanctions have resulted in a decrease in Iran’s
oil exports and have negatively impacted its economy. However,
the situation is subject to change. There have been discussions
and negotiations between Iran and other countries to potentially
ease or lift the sanctions. If such negotiations are successful, it
could lead to an increase in Iran’s oil exports. Moreover, global
energy demand plays a crucial role in determining the outlook for
Iran’s oil exports. As the world transitions toward cleaner and
renewable energy sources, the demand for oil may decrease over
time. This shift in energy preferences could impact Iran’s oil
exports in the long term. It is important to note that predicting
the future of Iran’s oil exports is challenging, as it depends on
various geopolitical and economic factors. The outcome will be
influenced by ongoing negotiations, changes in global energy
demand, and the evolving dynamics of international relations.
Iran has historically been an important oil supplier to China.
Despite the US sanctions, China has continued to import oil from
Iran, albeit at reduced levels compared to before the sanctions
were imposed. China has been one of the few countries willing to
defy the US sanctions and maintain trade relations with Iran,
including oil imports. China’s reliance on Iranian oil is driven by
its growing energy needs and the favorable terms it can negotiate
due to the limited number of buyers for Iranian oil. However,
China has also faced some challenges in its oil trade with Iran,
including difficulties in payment transactions and insurance
coverage due to the sanctions. It is important to note that the
situation regarding Iran’s oil exports to China can change due to
evolving geopolitical dynamics, international agreements, or
changes in US policies. Chart 8 illustrates Iran’s crude oil
exports.
Chart 8 • Iran’s crude oil export from 2014 to 2023 (thousand barrels per day) [5].

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 5 of 10
2. Renewables in Iran
The utilization of fossil energy provides significant benefits in
terms of the reliability and resilience of the power grid, as well as
its extensive application in the field of transportation. Renewable
energies are considered by some experts to be more reliable and
safer than fossil energy due to their local reception. While fossil
fuels have caused significant concerns in regions, such as Europe
and East Asia, it appears that these energy sources can provide
the energy security of hydrocarbon carriers. However, the
urgency of climate change and global warming has compelled
Iranian decision-makers to prioritize the adoption of renewable
energy sources without delay.
Iran’s strategic geographical location and its position on the solar
belt have endowed it with a substantial capacity for harnessing
solar energy. Moreover, Iran possesses diverse wind patterns that
can be used to provide environmentally friendly power. The
country is evaluating the potential of utilizing renewable ener-
gies. Supporting such energy carriers can enhance the diversi-
fication of Iran's energy portfolio, thereby bolstering the security
of energy supply and meeting the demands of consumer sectors.
Additionally, it can contribute to the reduction of environmental
pollutants. Figure 1 shows the annual average solar radiation
and wind speed maps of Iran.
Table 4 provides a concise overview of the advantages and
obstacles associated with the implementation of renewable
energy in Iran’s energy industry.
Figure 1 • Annual average solar radiation and wind speed maps of Iran [6].
Table 4 • Opportunities and challenges of renewable electricity in Iran
Opportunities
Challenges
Strategic
• Improving energy security by diversifying
the energy portfolio
• Movement in the path of energy transition
• Increasing the export of fossil fuels,
especially natural gas
• Earning foreign exchange earnings
• The possibility of selling excess electricity
• Reduce water consumption
• Increase network reliability
• Providing the necessary equipment
Economic–
Financial
• Reducing the cost of electricity bills in the
household sector
• Reducing the cost of setting up solar panels
and wind turbines
• The possibility of financing small-scale
power plants with the method of providing
factoring
• Employment
• Lack of investment
• Not giving financial incentives
• Expensive battery
Technical
• Using the capacity of the wind and sun as
permanent energy sources
• Iran’s capacity in terms of wind speed and
solar radiation
• Short setup time
• Short useful life of solar panels and wind turbines
• Limitation in the field of spatial and temporal positions
• The need to use a battery for storage
• Difficulty in transporting the equipment

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 6 of 10
• The possibility of creating decentralized
power generation centers
• Inability to provide basic load
Social
• The presence of a positive view in the elite
spectrum of society
• Lack of proper information among the general public
Political
• Putting the development of renewable
power plants on the agenda of governments
• Lack of practical framework
• Complex bureaucracy
• Lack of support for private investment
• Unequal competitive conditions between renewable and fossil power plants
• Lack of support from the Ministry of Power
Environmental
• Reducing the consumption of fossil fuels
• Reducing carbon dioxide emissions
• Threatening the life of animals and plants by occupying significant space and
creating environmental pollution after the renewable power plant facilities are
worn out due to the toxic substances they contain
The primary impediment to progress in the development of
renewable energy sources is the government’s provision of
natural gas to thermal power plants at a significantly reduced
cost, around one thousandth of its true market value. Under these
circumstances, it is evident that renewable energy sources will
not be able to establish a significant presence, and the country
will persist in relying on fossil fuels. To address this issue, it is
recommended that the government and relevant government
entities provide fuel to power plants at a market price without any
subsidies. In return, the government should compensate the final
supplier company for the difference between the regulated price
and the actual cost, as stipulated by the applicable laws.
3. Limitations of Iran’s energy policy
and its repercussions
Iran’s high energy consumption is caused by the way energy is
priced and distributed. Keeping energy carrier rates flat for four
years, five years, and ten years would be disastrous in a country
with an inflation of 20–50% [7]. Currently, Iran annually
consumes 650 million barrels of oil products valued at $58
billion, about 300 billion cubic meters of gas worth $96 billion,
and 330 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity costing at least $33
billion [1]. If we subtract the value of gas consumed by power
plants from the value of electricity produced, the total value of
consumed energy will be about $171 billion per year, which is a
terribly large number. Iran’s aggregate energy consumption,
encompassing crude oil, natural gas, and electricity, equates to
around 7 million barrels of oil daily. With a GDP estimated at
$400 billion [8], Iran’s economic ranking fluctuates between
20th and 25th globally, depending on currency parity calcula-
tions. Consequently, Iran exhibits one of the highest energy
intensities (the ratio of energy consumption to GDP), reflecting a
disproportionate energy consumption relative to its GDP [9].
Iran’s electricity consumption, ranging from 320 to 330 billion
kilowatt-hours [10], places it among the top 12 nations. This
consumption exceeds that of populous countries like Mexico,
Indonesia, Italy, the UK, and Turkey. Iran uses twice the
electricity of Egypt, which has a population of 100 million, and
two and a half times that of Pakistan, with 240 million people.
The primary issue with Iran’s energy consumption and manage-
ment is the absence of regular, annual adjustments to energy
prices in line with inflation. As energy becomes increasingly
cheaper yet more valuable, Iran sees an annual 6% rise in energy
consumption [11]. Without significant costs, there is little incen-
tive to optimize energy use. The consequences of excessive energy
consumption are manifold:
a. A significant portion of finite national resources is being
depleted.
b. Economic growth and development are hindered by a
shortfall in exports.
c. There is a need to invest in 4,000–5,000 megawatts of
power plant capacity annually.
d. The environment suffers due to the affordability and
abundance of energy.
e. Air, water, and soil pollution, along with overextraction of
groundwater, are exacerbated by low-cost energy.
f. Iranian households adopt unsustainable lifestyles, char-
acterized by high energy use for heating, cooling, and
transport.
g. High domestic energy consumption impairs industrial and
production sectors due to energy shortages.
In developed countries, energy costs account for about 10–15% of
household expenses [12]. In contrast, Iranian households, bene-
fiting from substantial energy subsidies, may spend less than 4%
on average. The government is reluctant to adjust energy prices,
but as energy is a critical economic resource, consumption
cannot be effectively controlled or optimized without realistic
pricing. There are domestic policy requirements and foreign
policy approaches that Iran should follow for reaching the goal of
utilizing cleaner energies [13].
4. Energy policy requirements in Iran to
enhance the approach
Based on the data from the International Energy Agency, global
oil production reached an average of 101.8 million barrels per day
in 2023. Additionally, statistics from the Global Carbon Project
indicate that oil production in the same year will result in the
emission of 12.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide
accounts for 33% of the overall pollution. In order to adhere to
the Paris Agreement of 2015, which aims to restrict the global
average temperature increase to 1.5°C, it is imperative to swiftly
and significantly reduce the production of harmful gases.

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 7 of 10
The conclusion of COP28 represents a significant milestone in
global climate diplomacy. From the heart of the world’s oil-rich
regions, a call was made for the reduction of demand for the
primary energy source of the 20th century. Secretary-General
Simon Stiell of the UNFCCC declared that we were unsuccessful
in concluding the oil screen during the Dubai meeting, but we did
manage to signify the commencement of the “end of oil”. Given
that Iran and other oil-rich nations in the Persian Gulf possess
substantial reserves and benefit from cheap production costs,
they are capable of enduring until the depletion of oil resources,
sometimes referred to as the “end of oil”. In a typical scenario,
when global oil demand decreases, countries with high produc-
tion costs will be forced out of the market. Regardless, the energy
transition will necessitate significant alterations to the opera-
tional framework of the oil industry, a framework that has
profoundly influenced its interaction with the global economy
over the past five decades. In October 1973, members of the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
ceased oil exports to the United States and other European
nations that were backing Israel, as a direct retaliation for
America’s support of Israel during the conflict with the Arab
nations. Prior to this embargo, the cost of each unit of oil was
approximately three dollars per barrel. After a few months, the
price surged to $13. The oil shock of 1973 and the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 are widely regarded by Western commen-
tators as the primary catalysts for the evolution of Western
energy policy over the past 50 years.
Now, half a century later, it is imperative for the global commu-
nity to conduct a thorough examination of the oil crisis that
occurred in 1973. The dynamics of the global oil market since
1973 have always depended on the quantity and method of supply
and demand growth. However, given the current emphasis on
climate limits, it is imperative to halt this trend. While some
argue for a consistent demand, others advocate for a significant
and rapid reduction in world oil demand. The primary concern in
this scenario will be the displacement of oil-exporting nations
from the market and the resulting consequences.
The transition of Iran from a reliance on oil and gas resources to
a more diverse energy portfolio necessitates the establishment of
a favorable environment for the investment and development of
renewable energy infrastructure. It needs planning to transition
from fossil oil to renewables. It would be better for Iran to shift
its usage from crude oil and its products to natural gas. After
implementing such plan, transitioning from gas to renewables
would be easier. To successfully transition in Iran, it is crucial to
raise awareness about the importance of energy among Iranian
households through various media channels, such as radio, press,
and social networks. Additionally, aligning energy prices with
official inflation rates on an annual basis, improving insulation,
utilizing suitable building materials, and adopting architectural
designs that are suitable for tropical climates without excessive
use of iron and glass in building facades are essential steps.
Furthermore, it is imperative to discover an innovative design for
chillers and solar coolers specifically tailored for tropical regions.
This can be achieved by promoting the installation of solar panels
on building roofs and facades, potentially through the provision
of subsidies or by sourcing cost-effective panels from China.
Additionally, the adoption of solar thermal collectors for solar
chillers and heating should be encouraged. Moreover, the
utilization of water coolers in central areas of the Iranian plateau
and the expansion of rail transportation as an alternative to road
travel are essential measures to be taken [14].
5. Energy policy and foreign policy
Now, we examine Iran’s adherence to foreign and energy policies
in relation to two specific countries as examples. We have
selected China as the primary purchaser of Iran’s crude oil and
Iraq, as Iran’s nearest neighbor following the downfall of Saddam
Hussein’s regime.
1. In 2014, President Xi Jinping explained the specific
requirements of the energy revolution at the sixth meeting of
the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic
Affairs, emphasizing that there is a need for the country to
change its energy production and consumption policies to
ensure energy benefits and security. In this regard, in
December 2016, the Chinese government published a long-
term strategic plan (2016–2030) called the Energy
Production and Consumption Revolution Strategy, which
outlined the practical steps needed to promote and achieve the
energy revolution. The report of the 19th National Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 emphasizes the shift
from rapid growth to long-term economic and social
development (high-quality development) [15]. According to
the China National Petroleum Corporation, it is predicted that
the share of coal in the energy mix of the country will fall
sharply to 44% by 2030 and 8% by 2060 [16]. In this regard,
China’s power mix is projected to transition from 30%
renewable energy in 2022 to 88% by 2050. Oil consumption
is expected to decrease by half from its peak in 2027 by 2050,
while natural gas consumption will peak in the 2030s and
then return to current levels by the middle of the century.
Additionally, China will solidify its position as the global
leader in green energy by significantly expanding its
renewable technology infrastructure and exporting it
worldwide [17].
The energy transformation in China can present both advanta-
geous prospects and potential risks for Iran. Traditionally, the
Iranian energy industry has played a crucial role in Iran’s
economic collaboration with China. China’s status as a promi-
nent energy importer gives its relationship with Iran, a country
that exports energy, considerable importance. China’s oil imports
are projected to rise by 2 million barrels per day, reaching a total
of 10 million barrels per day by 2030 [18]. Nevertheless, the
anticipated decline in China’s oil consumption and imports poses
a significant threat to Iran, as it diminishes the country’s future
prospects for energy exports. However, there are also numerous
prospects. Considering China’s energy security plan, which aims
to achieve diversification in both energy sources and
transmission channels, as well as taking into account China’s
estimated energy requirements by 2050 [19], Iran can capitalize
on this opportunity by exporting its oil to China in exchange for
acquiring advanced technology and expertise in the renewable
energy sector. Furthermore, given the projected increase in
China’s gas demand until the 2030s and its significant role in
China’s energy consumption, Iran has the opportunity to com-
mence gas exports to China, particularly as Iran’s renewable
energy consumption portfolio expands. Thus, there is even more
potential for collaboration in creating alternate transportation
pathways that reduce the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz
and the limitations of the Strait of Malacca. China is expected to

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 8 of 10
increase its annual gas imports by 70 billion cubic meters by
2030 [20]. This growth would be facilitated by the Iran–
Pakistan–China and Iran–Central Asia–China corridors, pre-
senting opportunities for collaboration. Iran has the potential to
provide China with technology transfers for coal-fired power
facilities and explore opportunities for long-term collaboration in
energy networks.
2. Currently, Iran has the position of being the principal
energy exporter to Iraq since Iraq depends on Iran to fulfill
20% of its energy requirements [21]. This makes Iran the
leading energy provider for Iraq. In the next ten years, Iraq
will need a total of 50 gigawatts of energy [22]. If Iran’s
exports remain unchanged, Iraq’s domestic energy produc-
tion is forecasted to reach 36 gigawatts, resulting in a
decrease in Iran’s share of Iraq’s energy supply from 20%
to 14%. Furthermore, it is probable that Iran’s competitors
in the region will strive to obtain a greater portion of the
Iraqi energy market, making it necessary for Iran to adopt
a strategic strategy.
6. Conclusions
The paper concludes that Iran’s current energy policy is unsus-
tainable and necessitates comprehensive reform to align with
global trends toward sustainability and economic viability. It
advocates for a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy
sources as a crucial strategy for economic stability, environmen-
tal sustainability, and energy security. To achieve this, Iran must
implement realistic energy pricing, invest in renewable energy
infrastructure, and promote energy conservation practices
among its populace. Additionally, leveraging international part-
nerships, particularly with major energy consumers like China,
could provide the technological and financial support needed for
this energy transition. Ultimately, adopting these recommenda-
tions would not only address the immediate challenges of high
energy consumption and environmental impact but also position
Iran as a leader in sustainable energy in the region.
In contrast to other commodities, empirical evidence and ad-
vancements in scientific knowledge have demonstrated that
market regulations and protocols are incapable of achieving
equilibrium in the realm of energy generation and consumption.
The historical record of human endeavors to utilize energy
carriers in a sustainable manner clearly demonstrates that the
absence of a central energy strategy makes it unfeasible to initiate
and mitigate the persistence of sporadic crises in this domain.
Hence, it is advisable for the energy sector of the country to
establish a supranational institution in order to effectively
coordinate and align the vision, mission, goals, policies, and
strategies of various energy sectors. The integration of policies in
energy matters is crucial. The division of energy affairs in Iran
into three distinct categories and the allocation of responsibility
for their progress to the Ministry of Petroleum and Power, as well
as the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, has resulted
in the inefficient utilization of resources, duplication of efforts,
and occasional unnecessary rivalry.
The government should minimize its involvement in entrepre-
neurship related to the production, transmission, and distribution
of energy carriers. If this issue is acknowledged, the government
would prioritize deliberating on the macro-policies of the energy
sector. Therefore, it is recommended:
• While Principle 44 of the Iranian Constitution permits
the private sector to engage in several areas of produc-
tion, including infrastructure, it imposes significant
limitations on activities in the upstream sector of the
oil and gas industry. Under such circumstances, the
government has the option to grant permission to all
private enterprises to engage in the production,
export, or importation of various energy sources, such
as crude oil, petroleum products, different forms of
natural gas, electricity, and coal. However, energy
carriers should be made available to consumers in the
open market without being restricted by compulsory
energy rates and at a mutually agreed-upon price.
• Big industries can take direct action to supply their
energy needs. This means that if they can produce elec-
tricity at a lower cost than the cost of buying electricity
from the government, these industries will put the
construction of small-scale power plants on the agenda.
One crucial aspect of advancing renewable electricity is to
authorize the construction of renewable power plants for the
nation’s key sectors by satisfying the following three prerequisites:
• It is advisable for enterprises that consume large amo-
unts of energy to construct wind- and solar-generating
facilities in order to meet their electricity require-
ments. If these power plants generate an excess of
electricity beyond the industry’s requirements, it will
be supplied to the power grid. The power grid will then
be obligated to provide the same amount of electricity
to the industry during other hours as needed.
• Highly energy-intensive industries should build wind
and solar power plants to supply their electricity
needs. If these power plants produce electricity over
the industry’s needs, they will deliver it to the grid, and
the power grid will be obliged to deliver the same
amount of electricity to the same industry in other
hours required by the industry.
• The Ministry of Energy should transmit the electricity
produced by self-supplying renewable power plants at
zero tariffs through the national grid.
• In case of electricity deficit in other sectors, the
Ministry of Energy should not allocate the electricity
produced by the self-supplying power plants for pur-
poses other than the intended use of the power plant.
Funding
The authors declare no financial support for the research,
authorship, or publication of this article.
Author contributions
Conceptualization, A.M.; methodology, M.H.; software, H.R.;
validation, A.M., M.H. and H.R.; formal analysis, H.R.; investi-
gation, M.H.; resources, A.M.; data curation, H.R.; writing—
original draft preparation, M.H.; writing—review and editing,
M.H.; visualization, H.R.; supervision, A.M. All authors have read
and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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ACADEMIA GREEN ENERGY 2024, 1 9 of 10
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Data availability statement
Data supporting these findings are available within the article, at
https://doi.org/10.20935/AcadEnergy7316, or upon request.
Institutional review board statement
Not applicable.
Informed consent statement
Not applicable.
Sample availability
The authors declare no physical samples were used in the study.
Additional information
Received: 2024-05-17
Accepted: 2024-08-06
Published: 2024-08-26
Academia Green Energy papers should be cited as Academia
Green Energy 2024, ISSN 2998-3665, https://doi.org/10.20935/
AcadEnergy7316. The journal’s official abbreviation is Acad.
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