Elections Administration and Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) Technology:

Abstract

To mitigate electoral challenges in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) deploys Smart Card Readers (SRC) to conduct the 2015, 2019 elections. However, the SCR had challenges, such as the inability to authenticate voter cards and verify biometric data. Hence, INEC introduced Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) in 2023. Relying on data generated using the macro qualitative and eclectic approach (Technological Acceptance Model and Innovation Diffusion Theory), the paper assesses the acceptance, challenges of BVAS and the relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trial-ability and the observability of BVAS during the 2023 presidential elections. The findings reveal that INEC's failure to upload the election results on the Result Viewing (IREV) portal in real-time was a significant setback, leading to doubt about the credibility of the elections. This failure was not only a breach of the 2022 Electoral Act but also of INEC's guidelines. Therefore, the paper recommends an effective way of administering elections in Nigeria using technology-based devices

Full text

International Journal of Public Administration in the Digital Age
Volume 11 • Issue 1 • January-December 2024
DOI: 10.4018/IJPADA.352042
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This article published as an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and production in any medium, provided the author of the
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Elections Administration and Bimodal Voter
Accreditation System (BVAS) Technology:
Interrogating the 2023 Nigerian Presidential Election
Augustine Ugar Akah
https:// orcid .org/ 0000 -0003 -3798 -486X
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Ojonimi Ferdinand Edino
Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria
Uno Ijim Agbor
https:// orcid .org/ 0000 -0002 -4660 -3080
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Chris Iwejuo Nwagboso
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Andrawus Musa
https:// orcid .org/ 0009 -0003 -1952 -1658
Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria
John Anyabe Adams
https:// orcid .org/ 0000 -0002 -1500 -7470
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Joseph Ebegbulem
https:// orcid .org/ 0000 -0002 -0250 -6107
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Terrence Richard Eja
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Ugo Samuel Bassey
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Joy Iyeumbe Ogar
https:// orcid .org/ 0009 -0006 -6520 -2553
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Salome Nnenna Nwagboso
University of Calabar, Nigeria
Stella Odey Ekpo
University of Calabar, Nigeria
ABSTRACT
To mitigate electoral challenges in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) deploys Smart Card Readers (SRC) to conduct the 2015, 2019 elections. However, the SCR
had challenges, such as the inability to authenticate voter cards and verify biometric data. Hence,
INEC introduced Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) in 2023. Relying on data generated
using the macro qualitative and eclectic approach (Technological Acceptance Model and Innovation
Diffusion Theory), the paper assesses the acceptance, challenges of BVAS and the relative advantage,
compatibility, complexity, trial-ability and the observability of BVAS during the 2023 presidential
elections. The findings reveal that INEC's failure to upload the election results on the Result Viewing
(IREV) portal in real-time was a significant setback, leading to doubt about the credibility of the
elections. This failure was not only a breach of the 2022 Electoral Act but also of INEC's guidelines.
Therefore, the paper recommends an effective way of administering elections in Nigeria using
technology-based devices
KEYWORDS
BVAS Technology, Election Administration, Electoral System, Presidential Election, Technology Acceptance,
Improvement, Relative Advantage, Compatibility, Complexity, Trial-Ability, and Observation

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INTRODUCTION
Globally, elections are the platforms for recruiting political officeholders in a democracy. An
election is thus the hallmark of democracy, and it is integral for a democratic society to remain stable
(Chukwuma, 2022; Ojo, 2007). Elections allow the electorates to choose who should govern them
peacefully (Shaapera & Yusufu, 2019; Yusufu, 2021). Elections also enable the people to indicate
their preference among the policies and programs advanced by rival leadership elements contesting for
political power (Ayeni-Aleke, 2008). Citing Harrop and Miller (1987), Kassem and Osasona (2020)
note that elections are a mechanism through which politicians can be called to account for their actions
and be forced to introduce policies that reflect public opinion. Casting votes during an election is a
powerful weapon to elect contestants judged to have good track records; it can also be used to vote out
those leaders who fail to fulfill their campaign promises (Onah, 2020). In this manner, ultimate ruling
power resides in the masses that elect and control their representatives through established modes
of accountability (Olisa et al., 1991). According to Obakhedo (2011), an election is an integral part
of a democratic process that enables the citizenry to determine who should lead them at every level
of government and make decisions that shape a socioeconomic and political destiny; if they falter,
citizens still possess the power to recall them or vote them out in the next election.
As important as elections are in a democracy, elections in Nigeria are often fraudulent and violent,
which are severe problems for an emerging democracy (Akpan, 2017; Awofeso & Odeyemi, 2016;
Etim et al., 2019; Nwagwu, 2016; Shaapera et al., 2014; Shaapera & Yusufu, 2021). Elections in
Nigeria have involved a combination of issues ranging from shootings during elections, a resurgence
of armed gangs, the carting away of ballot boxes, the buying of votes, an arms race in the electoral
process, gangsterism, thuggery, and hooliganism (Olurode, 2013). Elections in Nigeria are thus
habitually subverted by political parties and politicians through the illegal use of money, physical
force, and governmental patronage, deployed through the intermediary known as the “godfathers”
(Adeyemi, 2004). Because of the high premium placed on political power, electoral malpractices
have become a feature of Nigeria's electoral process; this has caused a loss of confidence in the
democratic process and the erosion of the credibility and integrity of the electoral process (Alvarez
et al., 2009; Audu & Akuva, 2020). Given that winning state power gives access to the acquisition of
wealth, the capture of this state power has inevitably become a matter of life and death (Ake, 1964,
2001; Obadahun & Nzeako, 2020; Shaapera & Yusufu, 2021). Electoral malpractice has more severe
political implications, allowing a party or candidate to take over public positions against the popular
will (López-Pintor, 2010). Consequently, in these cases, the democratic process is undermined, which
usually leads to electoral violence, insecurity, and political instability (Alebiosu, 2016). This thus
constitutes a significant threat to the survival of democracy (Adesote & Abimbola, 2014).
Nigeria returned to democratic governance on May 29, 1999, after over a decade of military rule.
Since the 1999 general election, which marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the country's
election management body (EMB), the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), has
conducted seven general elections—namely, the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019, and 2023
elections as well as several off-season elections undertaken in different parts of the country. Most of
the polls conducted in Nigeria since 1999 have been marred by fraud and violence and the destruction
of the lives and properties of citizens; this has attracted the attention of the local and international
community (Nnamani et al., 2019). Such irregularities affect the credibility of elections in Nigeria
and sometimes lead to the emergence of unpopular candidates as winners.
Several scholarly works have demystified elections, electoral systems, election administration, and
election irregularities in different contexts. For example, Kantack and Lassi (2021), Bali (2007), and
Berrebi and Klor (2006) examined the effects of mass shootings and terrorism on electoral behavior
and electoral outcomes. Etim et al. (2019) conceptualized the electoral system and court verdict.
Others like Benoit (2007), Blais et al. (2012), Cox (1997), Moser and Ethan (2012), and Patrick
(2021) have examined electoral systems, elections coordination, and the impact of electoral rules.

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Similarly, Kohnert (2023), Ahmad et al. (2022), and Gavin (2023) addressed the impact of the 2023
Nigerian election on democracy and the African sub-region. However, in the following section, we
review the previous works related to the present study's scope.
Conceptualizing Election in Nigeria’s Context
An election is a means of choosing representatives (Ball, 1990). This implies a process through
which eligible electorates cast their votes to choose from political contestants that vie for various
elective positions (Onah, 2020). Similarly, while citing Osumah and Aghemelo (2010), Olowojolu et
al. (2019) argued that an election is a process through which the people choose their leaders, indicate
their policy and program preference, and consequently invest in a government with authority to rule.
In other words, an election is a political phenomenon that signifies standardized procedures for a
country’s electorates choosing political officeholders (Kassem & Osasona, 2020; Paki & Inokoba,
2006).
Elections are fundamental in democratic processes as they signal the end and beginning of a
leadership cycle. They are the mechanisms through which individuals and groups of great political
desire can be put in public office to account for their actions and be made to introduce policies that
reflect the people's general will (Heywood, 2013). Heywood's (2013) conceptualization of elections
comes remarkably close to Agbaje and Adejumobi’s (2006), who asserted that elections express the
people's sovereign will, which helps confer legitimacy on political leadership. Elections express the
people's sovereign will and right to elect leaders, but Akindele (2011) also contends that elections
are not only what happens on election day (ED); they are also subsumed in the process encompassing
activities before, during, and after elections. This process includes the legal and constitutional
framework of elections; the registration of political parties; campaigns and manifesto debate; the
authenticity of voter registration and financing; the activities of security agents and governments
in power; electoral agencies; the liberalization of the political process in the country; and the
independence of adjudicating bodies on elections (Adesola & John, 2014)
The electoral process is expectedly preplanned, managed, and administered so that the people can
choose those who will occupy political offices through ballots without being coerced, manipulated,
or influenced by money, bribes, etc. This is supposedly the way of ushering in a new government or
changing those in government periodically and holding them accountable for their actions (Jonah,
2018; A. M. Okolie, 2015; Orungbami, 2021). In this sense, for the electoral system to be democratic,
it must provide equal ground for all electorates and the freedom of electorates to make real and
meaningful choices without coercion or intimidation (Eminue, 2005). Therefore, a credible election
allows a democratic government to be constituted by persons freely chosen and responsible to the
governed (Kassem & Osasona, 2020). This means factors like ethnicity, religion, and tribe should
have a minimal influence in any electoral system. Unfortunately, most elections in Africa are far away
from being credible; the regional affiliation of the candidates, and not their competence, is decisive
for victory. Therefore, the whole electoral process often triggers ethno-religious conflicts, further
consolidating the idea of a rotating presidency as a negotiated solution (Faluyi, 2022). Adejumohbi
(2004) notes that elections should rather be viewed from the standpoint of a social contract; election
symbolizes the expression of a social contract pact between the state and the people, defining the
basis of political authority, legitimacy, and citizen obligation. The process should be seen as a way
of measuring the political maturity, health, legitimacy, and stability of a democratic government
(Alapiki, 2004). Hence, the effective administration of an election will require that all of the activities
involved in the process of the elections—and the activities before, during, and after the elections—are
well-coordinated (Tobi & Oikhala, 2018), including the duties of the election bodies and the extant
rules and regulations that guide the electoral process (Ajayi, 2007).

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The 2023 Nigerian Presidential Elections in Context
Africa's largest democracy, Nigeria, reached another milestone by holding its seventh presidential
election on February 25, 2023 (Acheampong, 2023). The main activities leading to the elections
commenced on February 28, 2022 when the INEC published a notice of election. Following the
timetable, the primaries and all litigations to the immediate results were held between April 4 and
June 9, 2022. Issues of zoning, ethnicity, religion, and geopolitics dominated the debates by the
significant political parties. Despite the informal convention, the People's Democratic Party (PDP)
declined to formally zone its nomination before going against the convention to elect a northerner
Atiku Abubakar as the presidential flag-bearer, a repeat of what occurred in the 2019 elections. The
All Progressives Congress (APC) declined the call within the party hierarchy to issue a unanimous
ticket. Instead, it formally zoned its nomination to the south, which led to the emergence of Bola
Tinubu as its flag-bearer. However, the APC broke the other long-known convention by picking the
same religious ticket for both president and vice president. In another twist of events, one of the
major contenders who had much organic support, especially among young people, Peter Obi, was
handed the Labour Party (LP) ticket after resigning as a member of the PDP. At the same time, Rabiu
Kwankwaso represented the New Nigeria People's Party.
Moreover, 93.4 million voters registered for the 2023 elections, according to INEC reports, but
only a 27% turnout was recorded, representing an abysmal decline from the last three elections (54%
in 2011, 44% in 2015, and 35% in 2019). On March 1, 2023, the INEC announced the final results
after a chaotic count lasting almost four days. Tinubu's victory was irrefutable, with 8.79 million
votes, putting him well ahead of primary opposition challenger Atiku Abubakar, with 6.98 million,
and the newcomer Peter Obi, with 6.1 million votes (Kohnert, 2023). Although Bola Tinubu was
announced the winner of the elections by the INEC, the inauguration occurred on May 29. However,
the Nigerian electoral act allows individuals and parties to challenge the conduct of an election through
the election petition tribunal, and this petition must be filed within 21 days of the declaration of the
result of the election (Etim et al., 2019). Hence, the two main opposition parties (the PDP and LP)
approached the court to seek to nullify elections. The PDP and LP argue that the presidential elections
lack credibility, transparency, and fairness. The parties have questioned the outcome of the elections
and called on the INEC to uphold the electoral laws. For example, the LP claim that Bola Tinubu fails
to satisfy the requirement to be elected president. The claim is based on the constitution's provision
that a candidate must have received a plurality of votes cast in his/her favor and must receive votes
in at least two-thirds of the total number of states. This requires 25% of votes in 24 out of 36 states.
Additionally, the candidate must win 25% of the votes in the federal capital territory. Unfortunately,
Bola Tinubu lost in the federal capital territory, and his declaration by INEC has led to a serious
constitutional debate.
Beyond the constitutional crisis, Nigerians, election experts, democratic institutions, foreign/
local observers, the media, and some stakeholders have criticized the process and outcome of the
2023 presidential elections. A survey carried out by Afrobarometer (2022) suggests that about seven
out of 10 Nigerians do not believe that their views are reflected in elections. In contrast, 77% do not
believe that the latter provides an avenue for leaders to be removed from office (Afrobarometer, 2022).
These sentiments are not without basis, given the array of electoral malpractices (such as rigging,
vote-buying, violence, and ballot-box snatching) that have continually riddled and undermined the
legitimacy of the country's electoral process (Acheampong, 2023). The violence and insecurity in the
country may have also contributed to the gaps in the election outcome. For example, the INEC recorded
134 attacks on its offices or personnel (Gavin, 2023). In the 12 months preceding the election, over
200 violent events involving party members and supporters were recorded, resulting in nearly 100
reported fatalities (Serwat & Carboni, 2023). Violence has been the bane of Nigerian elections since
colonialism (Ugwuoke et al., 2020). According to lessons learned from previous presidential elections
in Nigeria, the pre-election period is the most violent time of election campaigns. Electoral terrorism
typically occurs before, during, and immediately after elections (Ewi, 2015). This corresponded largely

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with central ups to the previous two election years, with over 150 reported deaths between 2018 and
2019 and an estimated 115 events and over 90 deaths between 2014 and 2015 (Kohnert, 2023). The
Niger Delta and the South East accounted for the largest share of violence against the INEC offices
and staff in the run-up to the 2023 elections (Serwat & Carboni, 2023). On the day of the elections,
several violent attacks, including ballot box snatching, voter intimidation, thuggery, and vote buying,
were reported in several cities nationwide. These crises also affect voters' nationwide turnout on ED.
Voter apathy in Nigeria is not blamed only on insecurity and violence; there is also a widespread
distrust in the INEC, the police, and other agencies responsible for elections administration and
management. The media have been inundated with reports and evidence of INEC officials and
security agencies aiding vote buying and rascality on ED. From the primary to the main elections,
money plays an integral role in the process; elections see transactional “stomach” politics, where
the candidate with the most money gets the votes. This is further worsened by the increasing rate
of poverty and starvation in Nigeria. It becomes tempting for many citizens to sell their votes, even
for a mere 5kg bag of rice. We understand that administering an election in any democracy involves
money, especially for campaigns, election equipment, and logistics. Nevertheless, African countries
like Nigeria are a particular case because presidential candidates and state governors often consider
the investment in the electoral process only as start-up capital for scrupulous personal enrichment
by way of embezzlement of state funds and money laundering during their tenure (Kohnert, 2023).
This has contributed to over 45 years of underdevelopment since the independence of Nigeria
(Markovska & Adams, 2015; Sule & Tal, 2018). The 2023 presidential elections witnessed an open
display of “money politics,” as citizens were scouting for the new naira note following the central
bank policy of naira redesign and the eventual phasing out of the old naira notes. The politicians had
access to the new notes, which became their vote purchasing power during the elections; they offered
them an undue advantage to buy their way into office. In doing so, competing political elites, parties,
and “godfathers” desperately tried to secure victory for wealth accumulation and to win at all costs
(Sule et al., 2018; Sule & Tal, 2018).
Consequently, some scholars have argued that the challenges confronting election administration
in Nigeria, as evidenced in the 2023 presidential elections, could have an impact on Africa, including
the sub-Saharan countries like Benin, Chad, and Cameroon, which share a boundary with Nigeria
and where regular sham elections are not delivering the kind of leadership, accountability, and
service delivery that citizens would like to see (Gavin, 2023). Moreover, growing insecurity in times
of pre-election could increase voter fatigue and cynicism in other African countries also affected by
security challenges, like in the Congo, Malawi, Botswana, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Kenya (Jenkins,
2020). Credible elections would cement Nigeria's role as the “big brother” for other African states, a
legacy that would inspire other states in the region, but the 2023 presidential elections for many fail
to establish that legacy. However, one positive aspect is worth noting: the massive support by mainly
young people for the candidate of the LP, Peter Obi, shows that youth participation in politics and
election processes in Nigeria is significant and a plus for the sustainability of democracy in Nigeria
and beyond. Kohnert (2022) notes that the growth of social media and the appeal of politicians like
Peter Obi to the Nigerian youth and social movements of the youth, in general, could exert effects
beyond Nigeria and trigger new enthusiasm for political participation, drawing inspiration from
Zambia's youth-driven democratic transfer of power in 2021 (Gavin, 2023). The emergence of a
robust third party in Nigeria's 2023 election presents a unique example, focusing on personalities
rather than parties or regional and ethnic affiliation, for the growth of democracy all over Sub-Saharan
Africa (Hassan, 2023).
Comparative Analysis of the 2023 Presidential Elections
To compare the impact of technology on Nigeria's presidential elections with other presidential
elections held in 2023 in the West Africa sub-region, we draw from two indexes, the first being the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). This index

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assesses participation in electoral processes, including the use of technology and its potential impact
on electoral integrity. The second is the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity; this index evaluates the
integrity of electoral processes in countries worldwide, including the use of technology in voter
registration, ballot casting, and result tabulation. Reviewing these indexes and reports, we analyze
Nigeria's electoral performance and progress in leveraging technology for electoral purposes within
the West African landscape. In other words, we identify comparative strengths and weaknesses and
assess the impact of the presidential elections on participation, electoral integrity, and democratic
governance, which provides insight into the impact and limitations of technology in the 2023 elections.
The above indexes are among the most reliable resources for election statistics worldwide. The
databases allow us to search for data by country for a nuanced comparative analysis. For instance,
in reporting participation in the 2023 elections held in West African countries, the International
IDEA uses the voting age population and number of registered voters as indicators. In 2023, about
seven West African countries, including Nigeria, held their presidential elections. Maseko (2023)
states that these countries include Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Liberia, Madagascar,
and the Congo. The International IDEA (2023) provided the statistics for the above-stated countries'
presidential elections in West Africa in 2023. The data suggest that the deployment of technology
and the credibility of the process significantly impacted the voter turnout for the elections. The data
revealed that Nigeria recorded a 26.71% voter turnout, Sierra Leone 83.00%, Zimbabwe 68.86%,
Gabon 56.64%, Liberia 66.12%, and Madagascar 46.35%, while the Congo recorded a 41.05% turnout.
From these data, Nigeria had the lowest percentage of voter turnout in the presidential elections held
in 2023 in West Africa.
Scholars have attributed the low turnout in Nigeria's elections to several factors. For instance, A.
Okolie (2018) identified voter apathy or lack of interest in the political process as a significant factor
contributing to low voter turnout in Nigeria. Citizens may feel disillusioned with the political system
due to perceived corruption, inefficiency, or a lack of representation, leading them to abstain from
Figure 1. The 2023 Nigerian presidential elections results

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voting. Also, electoral violence and security concerns can deter voters from participating in elections
(Ojo, 2018). Violence, intimidation, or threats during election periods create an atmosphere of fear
and uncertainty, discouraging citizens from exercising their right to vote.
Similarly, widespread distrust in the integrity and fairness of the electoral process can lead to voter
disengagement (Adekanye, 2019). Past electoral fraud, irregularities, and contested election results
have eroded trust in Nigeria's electoral institution, the INEC, and deterred citizens from participating
in elections. The deployment of technology in administering elections in Nigeria could foster trust
and build citizens' confidence in the electoral process. Technology can improve the transparency
and accountability of the electoral process by providing mechanisms for real-time monitoring and
verification of election activities (Akinterinwa & Obadare, 2019). Electronic voting systems, biometric
voter registration, and result transmission platforms could minimize opportunities for electoral fraud
and manipulation, thereby increasing public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. Using
technology in elections can increase efficiency and accuracy in voter registration, ballot counting, and
result tabulation (Ujo, 2018). Automated processes reduce the likelihood of human error and ensure
the timely dissemination of election results, mitigating concerns about irregularities and discrepancies.
Deploying technology could make for robust encryption protocols, biometric authentication, and
secure data transmission channels to protect the confidentiality and integrity of voter information,
bolstering public trust in the electoral system's ability to safeguard privacy and ensure the fairness
of elections. By leveraging technology to enhance credibility in the electoral process, Nigeria can
foster greater trust and confidence among citizens in the integrity and legitimacy of its elections,
strengthening the foundation of democracy in the country.
Electronic Technology-Based Devices and Election Administration in Nigeria
Deploying electronic technology-based devices for election administration is not new to Nigerians.
Technological devices play a role in several elections in most African states. Acheampong (2023) notes
that the past decade has seen a considerable drive towards utilizing technological tools and solutions
to improve electoral processes and outcomes across sub-Saharan Africa. Today, almost all elections
in the region deploy one form of digital technology or another. According to Crawford (2022), this
ranges from established democracies like Ghana utilizing biometric technology for voter registration
and verification to consolidating ones like Kenya releasing raw polling-station results in real-time.
Research on democracy and elections in Africa has continued to treat the deployment of technological
devices in election administration as a measure to minimize the irregularities that often characterize
elections on the continent. Debrah et al. (2018) and Nwagwu (2016) examined using the Biometric
System Guarantee in Ghana's 2012 elections. Achieng and Ephias (2013) and Debrah et al. (2018)
analyzed the effects of technology on voter turnout and popular trust in democratic elections. Others
like Alebiosu (2016), T. P. Ayeni and Esan (2018), Audu and Akuva (2020), Kassem and Osasona
(2020), Dahiru et al. (2017), Assibong and Oshanisi (2018), and Ogbeide-Ihama (2022) focused on
the role of electronic technology-based devices, such as smart card reader (SCR) machines, among
others, in the administration of elections in Nigeria.
Alebiosu (2016) argued that the reasons the technology-based device, the SCR, was deployed
in the 2015 Nigerian general elections were to prevent electoral fraud, to allow the electorates' votes
to count, to reduce litigation arising from elections, to authenticate and verify voters, to protect the
integrity and credibility of elections, to audit results from polling units (PUs) across the federation,
and to ensure transparency and accountability. He further noted that due to a lack of trust in the
electoral process and the vested interests in the elections, the outcome created tensions within the
polity. However, Alebiosu (2016) concludes that using the SCR machines in the 2015 Nigerian
general elections signaled an improvement in the election administration. Therefore, he recommended
sustaining technology deployment in subsequent elections in Nigeria. Nigeria's 2015 and 2019
general elections increased the confidence of the electorates in the country's electoral process and
reduced the incidences of electoral malpractice, post-election violence, and post-election litigations;

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they also increased the country's democratic capacity and strengthened its democratic institutions
(Audu & Akuva, 2020). Audu & Akuva (2020) however, argue that the deployment of the SCR
devices led to other challenges, such as inadequate knowledge of operating the device, a lack of
proper sensitization by the INEC on the functions of the device, and an inability for the device in
some PUs to authenticate the permanent voters' card (PVC) and verify voters' biometric data. These
shortcomings notwithstanding, Audu and Akuva (2020) conclude that using digital technology in the
2015 and 2019 Nigeria general elections achieved transparency, fairness, freeness, and credibility in
the country's electoral process.
Kassem and Osasona (2020) accentuated the above premise. They observed that despite some
technical difficulties for the SCR machines, such as incomplete or non-verification of voters'
fingerprints and a slow accreditation procedure, the devices helped to reduce electoral malpractices.
Dahiru et al. (2017) believed that the deployment of technological-based devices, particularly the SCR
machines, during the 2015 Nigeria general election yielded a positive result in consolidating democracy
in Nigeria, especially the voter's accreditation process, authentication of the registered voters, and
control of election malpractices like the multiple voting system. In another study, T. P. Ayeni and Esan
(2018) examined the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on the conduct of
elections in Nigeria. Their findings reveal that introducing the electronic voter registration (EVR),
the automatic fingerprint identification system (AFIS), and SCR machines drastically reduced the
incidence of multiple registrations and multiple voting. Meanwhile, the development of e-collation
support platforms has reduced the incidence of poll result manipulation at collation centers. T. P. Ayeni
and Esan's (2018) findings corroborate with those of Assibong and Oshanisi (2018), who affirmed
that the INEC deployed SCR machines in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria to improve the
electoral process and deepen the democratic process. They argue that adequately utilized electronic
technology-based devices could eliminate electoral fraud, speed up the processing of poll results,
increase accessibility, and make voting more convenient for the electorate.
Ogbeide-Ihama (2022) also observes that ICT devices could minimize electoral fraud and
manipulation, which are common in Nigeria's elections. That is, the public perception of biometric
technology, the availability of proper infrastructure, and the distance between polling stations and
the dwellings of rural voters all affect their level of adoption of biometric technology (Iwuoha,
2018). These factors combine to produce specific modalities that shape voting behavior and general
political culture (Iwuoha, 2018). The point is that using integrated technologies in elections can
help achieve efficiency, reduce costs, and enhance the integrity of the electoral processes (Micheni
& Murumba, 2018). While these benefits are undeniable, Peters (2015) argues that the machines
are deliberately deployed to assist a particular party in winning the general elections, given the
character of Nigerian society. The machine might have been programmed to assist a pre-determined
election winner. According to Peters (2015), such irregularity could be possible by systematically
disenfranchising many eligible voters who are the prominent supporters of the opposition parties.
The significant factors that influenced the introduction of electronic voting in Nigeria are the desire
to regain the lost integrity of the INEC and to enhance the veracity of the election result and the quest
for exoneration from public accusations. The citizens were also urged to elect credible and committed
leaders for infrastructural development and to curtail post-election violence that has claimed many
innocent lives in past elections (Adebayo et al., 2013). That perhaps accounts for why the INEC,
since 2011 and for the last four presidential elections, has deployed one form of digital device or the
other in administering elections in Nigeria. While the EVR, AFIS, and SCR were used in the last
three elections, the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) technology was used for the 2023
elections. While many stakeholders have praised EVR, AFIS, SCR, and BVAS, others have blamed
the devices for Nigeria's lack of credible elections. However, this paper is more interested in BVAS
technology since it is the newest technological device used in conducting elections in Nigeria.
Beyond the works reviewed above, other scholars have focused mainly on factors that have
hampered the smooth deployment of electoral technology in Nigeria, such as weak internet and

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broadband connectivity (Fatai, 2023; Udegbunam, 2022; Yeboah, 2023), cost of electoral technology
(Ifeanyi-Ajuko & Hoffman, 2023; Odote & Kanyinga, 2021; Okwueze, 2022); logistic and preparedness
of the electoral bodies (Angalapu, 2023); weak cyber-security and susceptibility to hacking and trust
deficit in the electoral system (Abdurahman, 2023; Angalapu, 2023); the impact of digital technology
(Acheampong, 2023; T. Ayeni & Esan, 2018). While the previous works provide insight, specific
research attention is still needed to understand the newly introduced BVAS technology in the electoral
system in Nigeria. Against this backdrop, therefore, this paper aims to assess the acceptance rating,
challenges (need for improvement), and relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trial-ability,
and observability of the BVAS technology in the context of the 2023 Nigerian presidential elections.
In doing so, the paper focuses on the stakeholders' and users' experience deploying BVAS technology
in the 2023 Nigerian presidential elections.
BVAS and the 2023 Presidential Elections in Nigeria
Two technological devices conducted Nigeria's 2023 presidential elections: the BVAS and the
result viewing (IREV). The BVAS is an electronic device designed to read PVCs and authenticate
voters using their fingerprints to prove they are eligible to vote in a particular PU. It has a facial
recognition feature that can read and analyze the information of voters on the INEC's database to
identify a voter before the voter casts his/her vote. The process involves:
• scanning the barcode/Queen Response (QR) code on the PVC;
• entering the last six digits of the voter's identity number;
• typing in the voter's last name.
The INEC announced that the BVAS technology serves two purposes: the verification of the
genuineness of the PVCs and the fingerprint or facial authentication of voters during accreditation;
and the replacement of the Z-pad for uploading the PU results to the IREV in real-time on ED.
Following the electoral act that former president Muhammadu Buhari signed into law in 2022,
there was rising hope among citizens that the 2023 presidential elections would be credible. This
enthusiasm was even more evident among young people seeking to make a change. This sudden trust
in the ability of INEC was, among other things, inspired by the fact that technological innovations
will address the slew of malpractices that typify elections in Nigeria. The most prominent of these
innovations are the BVAS and the INEC’s IREV portal (Abdulrahman, 2023). However, while it is
true that technology may ensure greater efficiency in the administration of elections and enhance
overall popular trust in the electoral process, it still needs to be determined whether the outcome of the
2023 presidential elections is credible and transparent. Therefore, many stakeholders have questioned
whether these technologies are susceptible to newer forms of vulnerabilities and disruptive attacks
and whether there are technical hitches that may arise that could equally compromise the credibility
of the electoral process and undermine public confidence in democracy. That is what this paper will
examine.
Theory
We use the eclectic theoretical approach to explain the deployment of technology in the 2023
presidential election in Nigeria. The approach embodies the technological acceptance model (TAM)
and the innovation diffusion theory (IDT). TAM was developed in 1986 by Fred Davis. The model
explains the acceptance of new technology by individuals, groups, and society. The TAM explains the
perceived usefulness and ease of using new technology in an individual's attitude, which determines
their intention to use it (Maria & Emmanuel, 2020). Similarly, Maria and Emmanuel (2020) agree
that the TAM has two categories: individuals tend to accept a new technology if it is easy to use; and
when such a technology is beneficial to them, the technology could improve their performance. The

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relevance of this model lies in its ability to predict the acceptance of new technology and identify the
modifications that must be brought to it to make it accepted by all users (Maria & Emmanuel, 2020).
On the other hand, IDT was developed in 1962 by Everett Rogers. Citing Rogers (1962), Nnamani
et al. (2019) define innovation as an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new, while diffusion
is the process by which an innovation is communicated through specific channels over time among the
members of a social system. That is, the potential users of an innovation are free to decide whether
or not to accept it based on the belief that they are well-informed about such an innovation (Agarwal,
2000). Again, Nnamani et al. (2019) identify five characteristics of the theory that exemplify the crux
of this paper: relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation appears better than the idea it
replaced; compatibility is the degree to which innovation is consistent with the potential end-users’
existing values, prior experiences, and needs; complexity is the end-users’ perceived level of difficulty
in understanding innovations and their ease of use; trial-ability is the degree to which innovations
can be subjected to trial on a regular basis; and observability is the degree to which the results of
innovations can be visible by other people.
In the context of this paper, the theoretical arguments supporting the TAM and IDT justify why
the INEC introduced BVAS and IREV in the conduct of the 2023 presidential elections. Deploying
the technology is aimed at correcting the irregularities in previous elections. The TAM and IDT
emphasize the extent to which new technology is accepted and the improvement it brings. In the
following data analysis, we will show the acceptability rate of the BVAS, the success achieved with
the technology in the 2023 presidential election, and how to address the challenges confronting the
BVAS and election administration in Nigeria.
METHOD
The study adopts the macro-qualitative method of analysis. Macro-qualitative analysis involves
integrating theoretical perspectives or frameworks to interpret the findings concerning existing
knowledge and scholarship. We draw on the theoretical models of the TAM and IDT to analyze
the findings and provide theoretical insights into the 2023 Nigeria presidential elections and the
BVAS. Schneider (2019) refers to this method as one that describes and explains macro-level
phenomena, predominantly uses qualitative data, and makes claims about these phenomena in
terms of set relations. The method can be static or dynamic and is commonly used for single-case or
Figure 2. The BVAS

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small-to-medium-N-sized studies. The approach describes data analysis in a non-experimental way
by examining the specific cases at the “macro” level of political systems. It differs slightly from other
qualitative analysis methods, such as the participant observations in ethnology or the interpretative
(hermeneutics) approach.
In contrast to overall statistical methods, macro-qualitative analyses are more strongly
case-oriented; that is, each case that is taken into account has, in principle, the same value for the
analysis (Berg-Schlosser & Cronqvist, 2005). Therefore, we selected theory-guided cases, leaving a
minimum amount of homogeneity among the cases to be chosen to analyze them meaningfully. The
strategy of a case study is a suitable method for examining a phenomenon on a macro or meso level
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006). The case study will reveal context-dependent knowledge for understanding
the impact and challenges of BVAS in administering Nigeria's 2023 presidential elections. Even
though technological devices were deployed in the previous presidential elections in Nigeria, there is
still a need to examine the acceptance rate, limitations, relative advantage, compatibility, complexity,
trial-ability, and observability based on the user's experiences with the recently used technology,
BVAS, in Nigeria’s presidential elections. That being said, the data for this study were collected
through document reviews and interviews.
In obtaining data through document review, we focused on two variables drawing from the TAM;
that is, the study examine the acceptance ratings of BVAS and areas where the technology needs
improvement using Nigeria's 2023 presidential elections as a case study. The materials or documents
were drawn from Nigeria’s election databases containing journal articles, reports from the media,
civil society organizations and international observers who monitored and participated in the 2023
presidential elections. We created three nodes (n) for collecting the documents, which we represented
as follows: n1= 2023 presidential elections, n2= the performance (acceptance rating) of BVAS, and
n3= improvement of BVAS for future elections. In each case, we critically examined the documents
to see the context in which they are considered and established a link with the theoretical assumptions.
Against this backdrop, to investigate the acceptance rating and technology challenges in the 2023
presidential elections, we examined what meanings are conferred to the signifier BVAS technology
in Nigeria's elections databases. The present study initially searched the materials for the term
BVAS technology to know the context in which the term appeared. In doing so, we identified and
recognized words usually directly linked to the signifier BVAS technology, for example, “performance
of BVAS technology,” “challenges of BVAS technology,” “impact of BVAS technology,” “improving
BVAS technology,” etc. Hence, we selected two signifiers (performance and improvement of BVAS
technology) within the context of the TAM that dominate Nigeria's elections databases and are
frequently used in connection with the term “BVAS technology.” All these signifiers embody the
scope of the TAM. Therefore, we used these signifiers to illicit meanings from the materials and
explained the performance and challenges of BVAS technology in the 2023 presidential elections.
The initial materials consist of 30 documents from the above-mentioned sources. Only the
materials that focus on the BVAS technology in the administration of elections in Nigeria were
considered (that is, the 2023 presidential elections) instead of all other forms of elections (e.g.,
governorship elections, national/state assembly elections, primary elections, previous elections,
off-cycle elections in Nigeria and in other African states). Given the nature of the study, out of the
30 materials, the ones that have the same contents with already considered materials were discarded
during the analysis, that is, contents that are similar to already analyzed materials. In doing that,
we narrowed our focus to the materials that address the specific issues about BVAS technology that
provoked a substantial amount of post-elections discourse, engagements, and contestations before
and during the final days in office of the former President Buhari (that is, before the final verdict of
the supreme court on the election matters). These specific contents were given more attention in the
analysis. They include the submissions published in journals and popular blogs, particularly from
Ogieva and Ajisebiyawo (2023), Fatai (2023), Peter & Inokoba (2024), Oladeji (2023), and Abowei
(2023); the two leading Nigerian local newspapers; the most popular foreign news outfits in Nigeria;

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one Nigerian civil society organization whose mandate is to promote democracy through credible
and transparent elections, accredited by the INEC to monitor the 2023 presidential elections; and one
foreign election observation mission (the European Union election observation mission).
To minimize bias and achieve reliable findings, we conducted a systematic review and content
analysis of the materials. Grant & Booth (2009) provide the framework for such a systematic process.
For instance, Grant and Booth (2009) stated that the process involves systematically searching
databases, journals, archives, and other sources using predefined search terms and criteria (Grant &
Booth, 2009). On the other hand, content analysis involves coding, categorizing, and interpreting the
content of the documents to identify patterns, themes, and relationships (Krippendorff, 2018). By
following a systematic approach, we minimize bias and ensure that only relevant and content-specific
materials related to the prepositions of the TAM were included in the analysis. This approach enables
us to narrow our focus to the exact meaningful insights from 40 initial materials. We reviewed the
materials, summarized the main issues without subjectivity, and contributed to the depth and richness
of the macro-qualitative research in the social sciences.
For the interview, we considered the five relevant characteristics of the IDT, which determine
whether or not a new technological innovation (in this case, the BVAS) should be accepted or
discarded. The characteristics include relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trial-ability,
and observability. For that, we focused on four sources: the INEC, the political parties, the local
observers (stakeholders from democratic crusaders whom the INEC cleared to observe the elections),
the electorates and (specifically those who voted in the elections and who were eyewitnesses of
the performance of the BVAS technology during accreditation and actual voting). The interview
protocol rationalizes the variables of the 2023 presidential elections and the deployment of the BVAS
devices, making sure all relevant elements of the theoretical framework are covered. The respondents
were selected on a purposive basis to ensure the participation of those with adequate information
on the 2023 presidential elections and the impact of BVAS technology. As purposive sampling is a
non-random sampling technique, we deliberately selected specific individuals, groups, or cases with
certain characteristics of interest and relevant information concerning the research objectives. Unlike
random sampling methods that aim to provide representative samples of a population, purposive
sampling focuses on selecting participants who can provide specific insight to address the research
objectives. The interviews were conducted via phone for one week, and each case was initiated with
open questions. The respondents were assigned numbers with an “n” description but without names
to ensure anonymity. The calls were recorded, and the respondents consented to being recorded.
However, after preparing the interview transcripts, we did the data's within- and cross-case
analyses. We interviewed 20 respondents who were purposefully selected from the sources listed
above. The respondents were 18 and above years old and were all involved in the 2023 presidential
elections either as officials, voters, or observers. Since all of the respondents are part of the larger,
heterogeneous Nigerian population, the sample size needs to be purposefully selected. Going by
Ormrod's (2016) submission, when a population is 500 or below, 50% as a sample is sufficient, within
and around 1,500, using 20% as the sample is adequate; whereas where there are more than 5,000,
little effort and attention should be placed on the sample size. That is why we adopted purposive
sampling, so we could focus on the sample that matters. We used a software program called NVivo 12
to analyze the data, which allowed us to equally generate themes (nodes) and subthemes to represent
some of our variables of interest and match them up with the innovation diffusion model. We used
an inductive method during the coding process because dealing more with the themes generated
during the interviews than pre-defined nodes from the literature review was essential. That way, we
achieved validity and examined the user's experiences of the BVAS in the 2023 presidential elections.
Justifying the Method
The following points justify our method.

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The macro qualitative approach allows us to examine the user's experiences with the BVAS in
the 2023 presidential elections. Here, we engaged in data reduction techniques, which helped us
manage and organize the vast amount of qualitative information. We achieved that by summarizing
the observations, transcribing the interviews, and coding the textual data to identify critical themes
or categories.
The approach helps us to identify and analyze patterns, themes, or trends within the data to
ascertain recurring ideas, concepts, claims, or suggestions that emerge across different sources or
contexts.
We explored the similarities, differences, or variations across different sources. This comparative
approach helps to identify commonalities and distinctions and the performance and limitations of
BVAS.
It allows us to synthesize our findings from the macro-qualitative analytical perspective into a
coherent narrative or explanation of the impact of innovative technology on the 2023 presidential
elections. We interpreted the data in light of the study's objectives, theoretical groundings, and broader
implications for theory, practice, and policy.
Since studies of this nature deal with complex and multifaceted phenomena that cannot be
adequately understood through superficial cause-and-effect relationships, the macro-qualitative
analysis allowed us to explore the intricate interplay of various factors within the context of elections
administration and digital devices, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon
under study.
Ethical Consideration
The study carefully followed all ethical considerations, especially regarding respondents'
anonymity, confidentiality, and consent during the interview process. Respondents also knew what
the study was about and how the data generated would be used.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The findings are summarized in two sections: the findings from the reviewed publications and
documents concerning the acceptance rate and improvement of the BVAS technology, buttressing
the first theoretical model, the TAM; and the findings from stakeholder interviews conducted to
examine the use of BVAS technology during the 2023 Nigeria's presidential elections in line with
the five core features of the IDT model.
Acceptance Ratings, Criticisms, and Calls for Improving the BVAS Technology
On the first level, an analysis of the materials (that is, publications, press releases available to
mass media, and the reports from observers) reveals that the introduction of the BVAS technology
Figure 3. The sample of NVivo coding process

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significantly improved the administration of the presidential elections. Accordingly, the technology
enabled INEC officials to complete the process of accrediting voters on time compared to the
previous elections. Moreover, the technology made facial recognition and biometrics checks possible
and practical. Therefore, multiple voting, vote buying, the high jacking of ballot boxes, and other
irregularities were minimal. However, the result also revealed that in most cases, the BVAS technology
could not transmit the election results from the pooling units to the INEC’s IREV portal. Also, in
some pooling units, the officials needed help operating the technology, as some devices were not
fully charged to last for the entire ED. For instance, Ogieva and Ajisebiyawo (2023) agree that by
electronically authenticating voters' identities and matching them against the registered database,
the INEC effectively minimized the possibility of unauthorized voting and protected the integrity of
the electoral process. Therefore, the BVAS received a high acceptance rating on accreditation and
voter identification. However, despite the initial success of the technology to curb electoral fraud
and prevent rigging, the BVAS encountered significant challenges, leading to its failure during the
election (Fatai, 2023).
Such reported challenges corroborate the views of Peter & Inokoba (2024), who admitted that
implementing the BVAS during the elections fell short of expectations, leaving many Nigerians
disappointed and disillusioned. They expressed dissatisfaction, emphasizing that they had anticipated
more substantial outcomes than what was delivered (Oladeji, 2023). From their perspective, the
use of the new technology by the INEC could have been better. Notably, they had anticipated that
final results would be announced within 24 hours after voting, as previously explained by the INEC
(Oladeji, 2023). Similarly, Abowei (2023) accentuated the criticism against the BVAS on the result
transmission, arguing that the BVAS kits worked well when it came to accrediting voters—the real
problems began when it came to transmitting the results of the presidential elections to the IREV
portal in real-time; partly as a result of poor communication of likely timelines and partly due to
unexplained delays, results were slow to start coming in and never did for some areas, undermining
public confidence. If a technology is perceived as enhancing the integrity, transparency, and efficiency
of the electoral process, it will likely have a higher stakeholder acceptance rate. Conversely, if there
are concerns about the reliability or accessibility of technology, acceptance rates may be lower.
Therefore, building trust and confidence in technology among voters, political parties, and election
officials is essential for its adoption. Transparency in the procurement, testing, and deployment of
technology and robust mechanisms for accountability and oversight are necessary to address concerns
and mitigate skepticism.
A further review of the reports from mass media revealed that the findings concerning the
acceptance and criticism of the BVAS in the 2023 presidential elections corroborate what has been
published in existing literature. That is, while some stakeholders agree that the technology improved
the administration of the 2023 presidential elections, others claim that the technology failed to meet
expectations. For example, Iremeka's (2023) report published in the Guardian on April 8, 2023
stated that the BVAS, as stipulated in the Electoral Act 2022, is a technological system that allows
for the accreditation of voters through biometrics and the capturing and uploading of results. Many
have described it as an upgrade of the SCR used in the last elections, which achieved some results in
the country's electoral process. Iremka (2023) further stated that deploying technologies in the 2023
elections brought several improvements. However, some schools of thought felt that the technologies,
especially the BVAS, failed the country despite their achievements. However, the INEC has not
admitted it openly; there are strong indications that the BVAS and the IREV failed the required stress
tests. Hence, there is room for improvement. In essence, the inability to manage or implement the
data in motion may have accounted for the many queries on the technology.
Similarly, on March 6, 2023, Punch reported that the BVAS and IREV were meant to usher in a
new dawn on Nigeria's electoral process. However, from every indication, they might have maintained
the status quo (Jaiyeola, 2023). Accordingly, many other PUs across the country also recorded
a malfunctioning BVAS, causing a disenfranchisement of voters. The technology failed to curb

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over-voting, with many PUs recording over-voting, leading to the cancellation of results. Before this
election, the INEC’s chairman, Yakubu Mahmoud, stated that results would be uploaded on its portal
to allow individuals to monitor the elections in real-time (Jaiyeola, 2023). In addition, the findings
from foreign media were similar to the analysis of the local newspapers and other media reports. The
Cable News Network, for instance, reported on March 9, 2024, that the INEC's BVAS, an electronic
voting machine configured with fingerprints and facial recognition features, was at the center of the
controversy that blighted the February 25 polls (Nimi, 2023). According to the network, voters are
accredited with the BVAS device, which also transmits election results from polling stations to an
online server. However, results were not transmitted on time in the last election, sparking allegations
of vote rigging (Nimi, 2023). On the other hand, the British Broadcasting Company report on
February 26, 2023, also agrees that the BVAS is essentially a small rectangular box with a screen
that is more technologically advanced than the SCR used in the past (Macaulay, 2023). So, the BVAS
can authenticate voters on ED through their fingerprints and facial recognition. That means that with
the help of technology, people without valid PVCs and those ineligible cannot cast their votes. The
BVAS can upload vote results directly to the INEC results portal for all to see, which, in theory,
means results cannot be compromised. However, there have been concerns about the BVAS after it
experienced glitches in state-wide elections in 2021 and 2022, but the INEC insists these problems
have been resolved (Macaulay, 2023).
The qualitative analysis of the opinions and reports from civil society organizations, international
observers, and other significant stakeholders concerning the acceptance and challenges of the BVAS
technology in the 2023 presidential elections revealed a similar trend as highlighted above. The Yiaga
Africa (2023) report on the elections stated that based on reports from Watching The Vote (WTV) field
observers during the presidential election, the BVAS was used throughout the day for the accreditation
of voters in 99% of PUs, which ensured the number of voters did not exceed the accreditation figure
at their PUs, eliminating the possibility of multiple voting by only accepting one accreditation per
person per PVC. However, the organization also observed that the most significant technological
shortcoming was experienced during the presidential election. Significant delays in uploading results
for the presidential election on the IREV raised fundamental questions about the integrity of the results,
eroding public trust in the elections (Yiaga Africa, 2023). From that perspective, it becomes clear
that the competence and integrity of electoral technologies and all human agents must be guaranteed
in administering credible elections. It takes more than electoral technology to protect the integrity
of elections. Additional oversight from political parties, civil society groups, media, and citizens is
required in all aspects of the election value chain. A similar report from the European Union (2023)
revealed that the certainty and integrity of the INEC’s IREV portal, promoted as a real-time public
viewing platform for results transmitted directly from PUs, was significantly tarnished due to failures
of prompt transmission and publication of presidential results. In the run-up to the state elections,
information about the functionality and specifics of using the BVAS and transmitting the result forms
remained unclear and non-transparent. One of the stakeholders at the forefront of promoting credible
elections in Nigeria admitted that several innovations were introduced before the election to combat
electoral fraud and enhance the integrity of the process. Innovations such as using the BVAS for
voter accreditation improved the transparency of the accreditation process. While it is unclear if the
technical glitch that resulted in the delay in uploading presidential results was accidental or deliberate,
the IREV would have deepened the credibility of the election, assuming the results were uploaded
to the portal in real time as provided in the INEC's guidelines. The newly introduced timelines in the
2022 Electoral Act gave the INEC and political parties sufficient time to plan for the elections. Full
compliance with the guidelines on results management enshrined in the electoral law would have
inspired public confidence in the electoral outcome. Unfortunately, the guidelines were observed to
have been breached in several collation centers.
From the preceding summary of the findings concerning the acceptance and the call for
improvement of the BVAS machine using the 2023 Nigeria presidential elections as a case study, it

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is clear that integrating technology into elections in Nigeria and other African countries can offer
several benefits and disadvantages, reflecting both opportunities and challenges in modernizing
electoral processes. The experience of administering elections with the aid of technological devices
in Nigeria is akin to the experiences of other emerging and transient democracies in the African
continent. The experience is positive (acceptance based on the TAM model) and negative (areas of
improvement based on the TAM model). The positive factors that determine the level of acceptance
of a technological device include but are not limited to efficiency, transparency, inclusivity, and time
management. Technology can streamline various aspects of the electoral process, including voter
registration, ballot counting, and result tabulation, leading to faster and more accurate outcomes
(Kritz, 2017). Beyond efficiency, electronic voting systems and digital result transmission mechanisms
can enhance transparency by providing real-time access to electoral data and reducing opportunities
for manipulation or fraud (Cheeseman & Crook, 2016). There are strong indications that the BVAS
technology was designed to achieve that level of transparency and to save time and cost as stated in the
election manual. Birch and Abdul (2014) argued that while the initial investment in technology may
be significant, electronic voting systems and digital voter registration processes can lead to long-term
cost savings by reducing the need for printed materials, manual labor, and logistical expenses. The
findings indicate that before the 2023 presidential elections, the introduction of the BVAS raised public
optimism and expectations that the election would guarantee free, fair contest and credible outcomes.
The pre-election period saw a resurgence of interest in political activities, particularly among
young people, who constitute over 50% of the eligible voting population. The emergence of a “third
force” gave voters multiple voting options, making the elections competitive; citizens exhibited
unprecedented resilience to cast their votes and demand accountable political leadership. Despite
the optimism ahead of the 2023 elections in Nigeria, negative factors or criticism against the BVAS
technology abound, including technical concerns and political influence, among other things. The
INEC blames its inability to transmit presidential election results on technical challenges; implementing
and maintaining technology in electoral processes requires technical expertise and resources. Technical
failures, software glitches, and malfunctions can disrupt elections and erode public trust (Geleta, 2016).
That means electronic voting systems and digital result transmission mechanisms are vulnerable to
security breaches, including hacking, tampering, and manipulation, which can undermine the integrity
and credibility of elections (Magalhães & João, 2015).
Moreover, the lack of clearly defined legal frameworks governing the use of technology in
elections can lead to uncertainty, inconsistency, and disputes over issues such as data privacy,
cyber-security, and electronic voting procedures (Elklit & Reynolds, 2018). As a result, most Nigerians
believe the judicial decision regarding the election petitions in favor of the incumbent president
was biased and unclear. In that understanding, we argue that addressing these challenges requires
careful planning, investment in infrastructure, capacity-building, stakeholder engagement, and robust
regulatory frameworks to ensure that technology serves as a tool for strengthening democracy and
electoral integrity.
The Relative Advantage of the BVAS Technology
On the second level of results and analysis, the findings from the interview focused on the user's
experience with the BVAS technology in the 2023 presidential elections. The interview was designed
to address the five core characteristics of the IDT: the relative advantage, compatibility, complexity,
trial-ability, and observability of the technology. From the total of 20 respondents, we selected
four from each of the sources. We marched them with the core characteristics of the technology
proposed by the IDT: political parties = relative advantage, INEC = compatibility, local observers
= complexity, judiciary = trial-ability, and electorates = observability. However, we analyzed the
responses together, which were similar without any significant differences. The summary of the
findings and the discussion are presented below.

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On the relative advantage of the BVAS technology in the 2023 presidential elections, one of the
respondents, a stalwart of the ruling party, the APC, had this to say: “The BVAS technology reduced
the contentious menace of electoral fraud and other forms of manipulation that have characterized our
electoral system in times past. With BVAS, voters were accredited successfully in many PUs” (n1).
In contrast, three respondents from the main opposition parties (the PDP, the LP, and the New
Nigeria's People's Party) all had a similar response on the relative advantage of the BVAS technology:
The BVAS technology was introduced to improve our electoral system. However, the technology
failed to transmit the election results from the PUs in real-time to the IREV portal, which was
a critical part of preventing the manipulation of the results and credibility of the outcome. (n2,
n3, & n4)
From the findings summarized above, it is clear that the 2023 elections were the most
technologically aided in Nigeria's history, with the INEC introducing the BVAS for voters' accreditation
and IREV portal for real-time result viewing and collation intended to reduce the irregularities
associated with the previous elections. The introduction of the BVAS increases the public trust in the
electoral process, with millions of Nigerians registering to vote and an almost 50% increase in the
number of PUs across the country. However, while most respondents agree that the relative advantages
of the BVAS—ranging from accuracy, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility—are justifiable,
others are concerned about the challenges of the technology, particularly the technical capacity and,
more importantly, public trust. As most respondents observed, the INEC should be blamed for failing
to transmit the election results. Such failure already suggests that the INEC has lost public trust and
that accounts for the voter's apathy in the governorship elections that were held after the presidential
elections. Trust in the capacity of the election management body will reinforce trust in using election
technology. In Nigeria, as trust continues to dwindle from the experience of the previous process of
elections and the ability of the ruling political class to co-opt the election management bodies, it is
challenging for citizens to trust technology; hence, the crisis of trust hampers technology (Angalapu,
2023; Peter & Inokoba, 2024).
The Compatibility of the BVAS Technology
On the compatibility of the BVAS technology with the electoral system in Nigeria, an official
of the INEC averred that:
The use of technology in administering elections in Nigeria has come to stay. We cannot, under
any circumstances, go back to the use of BVAS for voter accreditation, and we cannot also go back
on the issue of transmitting PU-level results into our INEC’s IREV portal. The glitch experienced
in uploading the presidential results on February 25, 2023 was due to the inherent complexity
within the system, which was difficult to anticipate and mitigate. (n5)
Similarly, another official of the INEC stated that:
The BVAS is recognized within the confines of the Electoral Act of 2022; it is very much compatible
with our guideline, and INEC does not have any fear whatsoever concerning the validity,
credibility, and legality of the BVAS and other election technological devices in Nigeria. (n6)
Two staff of the ICT unit at the INEC gave a similar response, when asked about the compatibility
of the BVAS with Nigeria's elections:
For one, the BVAS proved efficient in preventing the recurrence of bloated voter figures based
on ineligible names, thus limiting opportunities for impersonation and vote-rigging in the 2023
presidential elections. With the BVAS, voter fraud and instances of people casting their ballot
multiple times were checked. To this extent, the technology has improved the INEC's efficiency
in administering the elections. (n7, n8)
Regarding the compatibility of the BVAS with the electoral system, the findings revealed that
the technology is consistent with democratic principles, transparency, fairness, and inclusivity. As the
BVAS is designed with suitable user interfaces, language options, and accessibility features, it fits with
existing infrastructural capabilities and resources available within the Nigerian electoral system. The

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INEC said the BVAS was deployed because of its ease of integration with existing electoral processes,
systems, and procedures in Nigeria. In other words, seamless integration minimizes disruptions,
facilitates transition, and enhances user acceptance. In essence, technology that complements or
enhances traditional methods rather than completely replaces them is more compatible and more
accessible. However, despite BVAS compatibility with the electoral system, our findings also revealed
that factors such as internet connectivity, electricity supply, technological expertise, and logistical
support affected the feasibility and effectiveness of the technology during the 2023 presidential
elections. That means technology that requires extensive infrastructure or technical expertise may face
challenges in compatibility if these resources are lacking or insufficient. Despite the INEC admitting
that the BVAS is compatible with the electoral system, the outcome of the polls has left scholars and
the public wondering and even more concerned about the credibility of future elections in the era of
technology in Nigeria (Egbejule, 2023; Peter & Inokoba, 2024; Rajvanshi, 2023).
The Complexity of the BVAS Technology
On the complexity of the BVAS technology in the 2023 Nigerian presidential elections, a local
observer from the center for social justice claimed that:
Voters' accreditation was simple and faster with the help of BVAS technology. As soon as a voter
presents his PVC and the BVAS device verifies it, it immediately detects the validity of the PVC.
The machines take pictures of the voters to verify the voter's information and face recognition.
However, INEC refuses to use BVAS to transmit the presidential election results, given that Nigeria
is, by many standards, a very tech-savvy country. The public's faith in the use of technology to
protect elections in the future would undoubtedly be impacted by INEC's inability to accomplish
something comparable for Nigeria's elections. (n9)
Another respondent who is with the citizens’ rights and leadership awareness initiative observed
that: “There was nothing complex about the BVAS technology. It was INEC that compromised the
credibility of the elections. Nigerians had expectations of a free and fair process, but INEC failed
the country” (n10).
In the same vein, two other local observers, when asked about the complexity of the BVAS
technology, stated that:
The technology is simple to operate and can work for about 24 hours if fully charged. The results
announced by INEC are different from collated results from the field based on my observation.
If other “smaller” African countries have had credible elections using biometric technology,
why can't Nigeria? INEC should be blamed for failing to transmit the results, even though many
funds were invested in acquiring the technology. (n11, n12)
Complexity plays a significant role in shaping the diffusion and acceptance of technology,
as stakeholders must navigate various technical, organizational, and socio-political challenges to
effectively integrate technology into electoral procedures (International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, 2020). From the preceding results, the respondents revealed that the BVAS technology was
simple. That is, election officials, poll workers, and other stakeholders had the skills, knowledge,
and competencies to use the technology effectively. Training programs and capacity-building
initiatives were organized to equip stakeholders with the technical expertise to navigate the BVAS.
The respondents believe that the INEC complicated the process as the commission failed to upload
the results and failed to communicate the reason for such failure to help build trust in the electoral
process and foster acceptance among voters, opposition parties, and other stakeholders. As Peter
and Inokoba (2024) argued, the fact that electoral technologies are often confounded with logistical,
human, and operational intervention opens them up to manipulation. However, drawing on best
practices and lessons learned from other countries can help improve future elections in Nigeria. In
doing that, the INEC must become genuinely impartial and engage with stakeholders to adopt and
implement technological innovations effectively.

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The Trial-Ability of the BVAS Technology
On the trial-ability of the BVAS technology in the 2023 Nigeria presidential elections, two
judiciary officers and legal practitioners stated that:
The BVAS trial and mock accreditation were carried out too close to the election date. For
instance, the mock accreditation was conducted only 20 days from the date of the presidential
elections. INEC had limited time to resolve issues and challenges identified during the trial. It
was reported that in one of the trials, the BVAS failed to accredit some voters who showed up at
the PUs with their INEC-issued PVCs. (n13, n14)
Also, two human rights activists and senior advocates in Nigeria observed that:
The challenges with the trial-ability of BVAS include failed activation and configuration
procedures due to hardware failures such as problematic cameras, screens, and power buttons.
In addition, the mock exercise revealed underlying challenges with migrating voters to the PU
and missing names on the voter register. Despite calls from stakeholders to INEC to share its
report from the exercises, specifically set-up and testing of the BVAS and steps taken to address
the challenges identified, the commission failed to issue an official report to the public. (n15, n16)
Findings show that the BVAS technology was tested and tried before the 2023 presidential
elections. The trial-ability enables the INEC to conduct mock accreditation to test the functionality
and usability of the BVAS in a controlled environment. The mock exercise allows INEC and other
stakeholders to observe how the electronic accreditation, the voting processes, and the results
transmission perform under actual voting conditions, identify potential challenges, and gather
participant feedback. However, respondents also observed that the trial-ability was conducted very
late, making it difficult for INEC to effectively and thoroughly assess the impact and feasibility
of the BVAS technology, address the technical or logistical issues, and build confidence among
stakeholders before the nationwide deployment. Moreover, the INEC did not have enough time to
review user feedback, including voters, ad hoc workers, and technical staff, about their experiences
with technology during the trials. Such feedback could have informed iterative improvements to
the design, functionality, and usability of the BVAS technology, ensuring that they met the needs
and preferences of end-users. However, in the INEC's defense, the commission claimed that before
deploying the BVAS in the presidential elections, it understudied how similar technologies in other
democratic elections in Africa were used and how the BVAS technology was successfully used to
administer other elections at state levels in Nigeria. Elections across Africa show that nearly half
of the “national elections” are using one form of electoral technology to improve their electoral
processes, such as the widespread use of “biometric system” in the registration of voters or their
identification during voting as well as the adoption of the electronic mode of results transmission,
which is considered more credible (Odote & Kanyinga, 2021). Despite the claim made by the INEC,
the respondents agreed that there was a need for the technology to have been tested on time before
the presidential elections. That would have helped the INEC identify potential risks and challenges
and how to mitigate them, thereby minimizing disruptions or failures during actual elections.
The Observability of the BVAS Technology
Finally, on the observability of the BVAS technology in the 2023 Nigeria presidential elections,
one of the voters asserts that:
At the PU, the BVAS devices function optimally. I was accredited without any hassle. BVAS was
not the problem; INEC was the problem. Some INEC staff allowed themselves to be induced by
corrupt politicians/parties, especially the ruling APC, to rig election results electronically in
their favor. That is not suitable for our democracy. (n17)
The second voter we interviewed observed that:
It is not that BVAS did not work on the ED; it worked perfectly. The issue was that INEC
deliberately refused to use the BVAS to upload presidential election results to the IREV portal.
Also, Party Agents (PAs) were not allowed to accompany election results to INEC offices. Instead,

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PAs only got copies of the results from the PUs. Results were manipulated at the INEC offices
where PAs were not present. (n18)
Similarly, the third respondent who also voted in the 2023 presidential elections observed that:
BVAS technology could not upload presidential election results on the INEC portal in real time
but was used to upload the national assembly election results in real-time, and both elections
were held on the same day. So, what went wrong? We were told there was a network failure, so
the results did not transmit from the PU to the IREV portal. I do not believe the network was
the problem; it was a deliberate attempt by INEC to ensure that a particular candidate or party
won the election. (n19)
Meanwhile, the other respondents believe that:
There is a need to improve the BVAS technology. That is because there were instances where
the machines could neither authenticate voters' fingerprints nor capture their faces. That also
contributed to the poor turnout during the governorship and state houses of assembly elections.
Moreover, most of the BVAS machines were configured only to store information of about 750
voters, which is relatively too low given Nigeria's increasing number of electorates. The BVAS
machines should be able to take at least 1500 voters. (n20)
In the findings highlighted above, the respondents credited the BVAS technology, especially its
ability to accredit/identify voters and do that with a limited time compared to the manual process. In
this sense, the criticisms were not about the BVAS but about the INEC compromising on collating and
announcing the election results. In other words, while some aspects of the electoral processes, such
as voter registration, accreditation, ballot casting, counting, and result tabulation, were practical in
most PUs, the aspect of not transmitting the results to the IREV portal remained contestable, leading
to the questions about the integrity of the presidential elections. Digital result transmission and
reporting systems facilitate quick dissemination of election-related information, allowing stakeholders
to observe voting trends, turnout rates, and preliminary results as they unfold during the electoral
process. As Okwueze (2022) would argue, in the management of electoral technology for the conduct
of an election, the role played by the election management bodies is the critical differentiating factor
in facilitating a smooth transition and resolving crises. The BVAS is backed up by law; the INEC is
therefore obliged by the same law to transmit the election results. The two leading opposition parties
challenged the outcome of the elections on that ground. Transmitting the election results improves the
credibility of the electoral process. It enables voters to access election results, engage in discussions,
and express their opinions, contributing to a more inclusive and participatory democracy.
Finally, the INEC's deployment of the BVAS technology has improved citizens' participation
in the electoral process. Automated voter registration, submission of a list of candidates, PAs,
election observers and accreditation portal are some innovations introduced by the INEC to scale its
operations and deepen public trust. However, the adoption of technology for the conduct of credible
elections in Nigeria and across Africa has been greeted with applause and skepticism (Ifeanyi-Ajufo
& Hoffman, 2023). While some scholars have argued that technology is critical in addressing the
lack of transparency and fairness in administering elections in the region, many others have argued
that technology itself is just another tool open to manipulation, control by the incumbency, and, given
the weakness of cyberspace on the continent, hacking (Aworinde, 2023; Odote & Kanyinga, 2021;
Ifeanyi-Ajufo & Hoffman, 2023). The present study makes two distinct non-reductionist contributions
to knowledge. First, it provides a nuanced analysis of the acceptance and criticism against a newly
introduced technological innovation, the BVAS, in the 2023 Nigeria presidential elections in the
context of the TAM. Second, it expatiates the five proposed features of the IDT: relative advantage,
compatibility, complexity, trial-ability, and observability, which align with the stakeholders'/users'
experience in the 2023 Nigerian presidential elections. As the research on the impact of technology
on election administration continues to evolve, more research is needed, offering opportunities to
deepen our understanding and address the remaining gaps in knowledge. For example, future research
could focus on longitudinal studies to track the long-term effects of technology adoption on electoral

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outcomes, voter behavior, and governance, especially in a nascent democracy. In doing that, researchers
can assess the sustainability and significance of technology-driven electoral reforms and identify
potential challenges or unintended consequences that may arise.
Policy Recommendations and Implications
Based on the findings summarized above, we make six policy recommendations to improve
elections administration in Nigeria with the aid of technological-based devices:
1. Compulsory training on the use of technological devices in elections: The INEC should enforce
training for all its staff on the use of technological tools introduced to improve efficiency and limit
human interference in election administration. Also, the commission should conduct extensive
public awareness campaigns and voter education programs to inform citizens about the benefits
and challenges of technology-based electoral systems. They should promote civic engagement
and participation in the electoral process by providing relevant information on how technology
will enhance elections' transparency, efficiency, and credibility.
2. Improving electoral infrastructure: The Nigerian government should prioritize investing in
sustainable electoral infrastructure to allow for the effective deployment of technology-based
devices, including voter registration systems, electronic voting machines, and results transmission
mechanisms. The government should provide adequate funding, technical support, and electoral
personnel. Technology-based devices should follow international standards of transparency,
accountability, and reliability. The INEC should implement safeguards such as voter-verified paper
trails, audit trails, and independent oversight mechanisms to verify the accuracy and integrity of
election results.
3. Legal framework: The national assembly should amend the 2022 Electoral Act to introduce
timelines for conducting mock elections to test the technological devices adequately. A
comprehensive legislation to regulate the use of technology in elections will help in addressing
issues such as data protection and cyber-security. The amended Electoral Act should provide
guidelines on the procuring, deploying, and utilizing technology-based devices to safeguard
the integrity and credibility of the electoral process. The act should further make the electronic
transmission of results compulsory, including the upload of PU-level results and results sheets
used at different levels of results collation.
4. Reduce the rigidity with voter identification: With the successful introduction of the BVAS
technology that stores biometric information of voters, the INEC should adopt other means for
identifying voters apart from PVC such as the national identity card, driver's license, international
passport, etc. Also, the reconfiguring of the technological devices should follow the timetable
and schedule of activities for elections. The reconfiguration process should be open to political
parties, media, and election observers.
5. Improve the election results management process: The Electoral Act should further be reviewed to
define the results collation and transmission process clearly and the role of the BVAS technology
in the process. Beyond that, there is a need to implement cyber-security measures to protect the
devices from hacking. For example, we are securing the encryption protocols, firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, and regular security auditing to check the activities of hackers.
6. Stakeholders engagement: To rebuild trust and confidence in the electoral process, the INEC
should improve its public engagement. Stakeholders, including party officials, civil society
organizations, security personnel, and technology experts, should be engaged to build consensus
on the use of technology in elections. Such stakeholder engagement should transcend the
preparatory stage of the electoral cycle.

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CONCLUSION
Technology plays a significant role in election administration in all democratic institutions.
In Nigeria's 2023 presidential elections, introducing the BVAS minimized multiple voting and
vote-rigging incidences. With the biometric system embedded in the BVAS, voter accreditation
concluded in good time. To this extent, the BVAS has improved election administration in Nigeria.
However, the election administration in Nigeria still needs to be more effective; the challenges of the
BVAS coupled with human interference (actions and inactions) during the election undermine the
credibility of the electoral process and its outcome. Apart from the failure of the INEC to transmit
the presidential election results in real-time into the IREV portal, the BVAS devices needed to be
more functional. There are concerns that many of these challenges were either deliberate sabotage
or well-planned in advance to allow for electoral fraud. To remedy these shortcomings, we strongly
recommend an improvement of the functions and capacity of the BVAS; we recommend introducing
an electronic voting and collation system independent of the INEC. We recommend adequate staff
training and for the election umpire to adhere to the electoral guidelines by transmitting the election
results in real time.
COMPETING INTERESTS STATEMENT
The authors of this publication declare there are no competing interests.
FUNDING STATEMENT
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors. Funding for this research was covered by the authors of the article.
PROCESS DATES
July 24, 2024
Received: February 11, 2024, Revision: July 19, 2024, Accepted: May 11, 2024
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR
Correspondence should be addressed to Augustine Akah (Nigeria, firs tclassakah augustine@
gmail .com)

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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Dear respondent,
We are researching the following topic: Elections Administration and BVAS: Interrogating the
2023 Nigerian Presidential Election.
To generate data to achieve the research objective, we are hoping you will participate by
responding to the questions we ask during this phone call.
Rest assured that the information you provide shall be used for academic purposes only.
Thank you.
SECTION A: ESSENTIAL INFORMATION
Do you consent to the call being recorded?
20 [Yes]
0 [No]
Are you 18 years of age or older?
20 [Yes]
0 [No]
What was your role in the 2023 Nigerian presidential elections?
INEC Official [ ]
PA [ ]
Observer [ ]
Voter [ ]
Stakeholder [ ]
Other (specify) [ ]
SECTION B: EXPERIENCE WITH BVAS
What can you say about the relative advantage of the BVAS in the 2023 Nigerian presidential
elections?
Was the BVAS technology compatible with Nigeria’s electoral system?
In your opinion, were there some issues with the BVAS technology in the 2023 Nigerian
presidential elections?
Was the BVAS technology tried and tested before the 2023 presidential elections, and how would
you rate the mock accreditation?
Could you share your observations regarding voters' accreditation, identification, and collation
and the transmission of results with the BVAS technology during the 2023 presidential elections?

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International Journal of Public Administration in the Digital Age
Volume 11 • Issue 1 • January-December 2024
Augustine Ugar Akah (PhD), is an expert in public policy, elections and governance, security study and political
discourse analysis. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Policy and Administrative Studies and distinctions in
Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Public Policy from the University of Calabar, Nigeria. He is currently a Lecturer
at the University of Calabar, Nigeria. He has over ten years of experience in research/academic writing. He has
collaborated with several authors to publish many papers in international journals with high-impact factors. He has
participated in more than twenty-ve academic conferences, including the Research in Social Science Conferences
held at Oxford University and Roehampton University in the United Kingdom and ICERMediation conference at
New York, United States. Akah is a DAAD, PTDF and ABO Scholar with over twenty-two awards and recognitions.
Ojonimi Ferdinand Edino (PhD) is a senior lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, University of Calabar,
Nigeria. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree, a Master’s Degree and a Doctoral Degree in Public Administration. His
research interest includes Human Resource Management and Public Policy. He has supervised and contributed
to the graduation of several Master’s and Bachelor’s degree students. He has published widely in local and
international journals.
Uno Ijim Agbor (PhD) is an associate professor of Political and Administrative Studies. He was a former Head of
the Department of Public Administration at the University of Calabar. He holds a PhD in Political Science (Public
Administration) from the University of Calabar after a preliminary degree programme in political and administrative
studies at the University of Port Harcourt. He specializes in Public Policy, Development Administration and
psychology. He is a scholar of the United States Institute on American Politics and Political Thought and holds a
certicate in this eld from the University of Massachusetts, USA. He has also published several publications in
both local and international Journals.
Chris Iwejuo Nwagboso (PhD) is a senior lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, University of Calabar,
Nigeria. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree, a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from the University of Calabar
and a Doctoral Degree in Public Administration from the University of Uyo, Nigeria. He formerly served as Transition
Committee Chairman for Isiala Ngwa and a Deputy Chief of Sta in Abia State, Nigeria. He has 22 publications in
national and international journals. His research interest includes Public Policy, Security Studies and Social Crisis.
Andrawus Musa holds a BSc (Hons) degree in Economics from the Federal University of Technology and a
Master's degree in Financial Economics from the University of Abuja. He is a member of the Nigerian Economic
Society (NES) and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN). Musa is currently a PhD student
at the Federal University Lokoja.
John Anyabe Adams (PhD) is an Associate Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the
Department of Political Science, University of Calabar, Nigeria. He obtained a Bachelor and Master Degrees from
the University of Ibadan and a PhD from the University of Calabar. He has published over 25 articles in local and
international journals and he has contributed to the graduation of many Master and Doctoral students.
Joseph Ebegbulem (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer and immediate past Head of Department of Political Science,
University of Calabar, Nigeria. He obtained a Bachelor Degree from Alabama State University and a Master
Degree from the City College of the City University of New York in the United States of America. He holds a
PhD in International Relations from Ebonyi State University, Nigeria. He has over 50 publications in local and
international journals to his credit. He is also the author of two well researched text books in Government and
International Relations.
Dr Eja Terrence Richard holds a BSc, MSc, and PhD in Public Administration, specializing in Human Resource
Management. He has been a lecturer at the Department of Public Administration, University of Calabar, since 2017.
Ugo Samuel Bassey (PhD), is a Lecturer at the Department of Public Administration, University of Calabar, Nigeria.
She holds a B.Sc., M.Sc., PhD in Public Administration and PGDE in Education. She specializes in Public Policy,
Development Administration, Gender and Security Studies. She has attended several conferences and published
over 15 articles in local and international journal.
Joy Iyeumbe Ogar is a lecturer at the Department of Public Administration, University of Calabar. She is a doctoral
student at Enugu State University, Nigeria.
Salome Nnenna Nwagboso (Mrs) is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Public Policy and Administration (IPPA),
University of Calabar, Nigeria. She holds a B.Sc., MPAS and M.Sc. in the eld of Sociology and Policy Studies.
She is currently a PhD Candidate in Criminology. She has over ve publications in local and international journals.
Stella Odey Ekpo (PhD) is a leader and a former commissioner at Cross River State, Nigeria. She holds a BSc,
MPA MSc and a PhD in Public Administration and International Relations.