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THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POST-COLONIAL BORDER

August 2024

Authors:

Adekunle Ajasin University

The prerogative compartmentalization of African territories by the erstwhile colonial government that shaped post-colonial borderlines resurfaced strongly in the academic circle after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States of America, exposing the reality that African porous and ungoverned territories have served as a safe haven for unrestrained foreign fighters migrating from the horn of Africa and the Middle East. The Nigerian state has since 2009 been grappling with containing international terrorists that find sympathetic cohorts among border communities alienated from the national government in Northeastern Nigeria. Their support largely contributed to crippling the extant strategies adopted in fighting Boko Haram insurgents. The policymakers ignored or undermined the consequences of entrenched ancestral, ethnic and linguistic affinities spanning several centuries brought about by the colonial partition. The situation raises severe problems in identifying and classifying residents in these border communities based on nationalities, as Boko Haram terrorists drew members from neighbouring countries that display extremist postures. Specific questions emerge: What factors made the existence of sympathetic cohorts in northeastern border communities resilient? What are the extant counterterrorism strategies in northeast Nigeria, and why do they flop? Can securitization serve as an efficient counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria's northern border communities? What challenges are likely to affect the efficacy of the securitization strategy? The existential threats posed by the Boko Haram insurgency and the sustained feeling of alienation by the indigenes of the northeastern border communities deserve rigorous research to elicit a more nuanced strategy that can eliminate the existential threats posed by the insurgents. Snowballing research techniques were used to select indigenes of border communities in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in northeast Nigeria for the interview, and relevant articles on Boko Haram and international terrorism were content analysed. Primordial and state fragility theories provided a theoretical analysis of why attachments to kith and kins across international boundaries are often asserted, undermining the threats to the community and national security. A securitization strategy is recommended because of its functional design to infiltrate opaque and clandestine non-state actors, including eliminating existential threats. Keywords: Border security, migrants, insecurity, securitization, primordial attachment

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*Nnaoma Hyacinth IWU Ph.D is in the Department of Political Science, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State Nigeria,

Email: , Phone: +234-7061546003hymanfrantz@yahoo.com hyacinth.iwu@aaua.edu.ng,

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POST-COLONIAL BORDER

COMMUNITIES AND INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA'S WEST AFRICAN

SUB-REGION: The Need for Securitisation

Nnaoma Hyacinth IWU Ph.D*

Abstract

The prerogative compartmentalization of African territories by the erstwhile

colonial government that shaped post-colonial borderlines resurfaced strongly in

the academic circle after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United

States of America, exposing the reality that African porous and ungoverned

territories have served as a safe haven for unrestrained foreign fighters migrating

from the horn of Africa and the Middle East. The Nigerian state has since 2009

been grappling with containing international terrorists that find sympathetic

cohorts among border communities alienated from the national government in

Northeastern Nigeria. Their support largely contributed to crippling the extant

strategies adopted in fighting Boko Haram insurgents. The policymakers ignored

or undermined the consequences of entrenched ancestral, ethnic and linguistic

affinities spanning several centuries brought about by the colonial partition. The

situation raises severe problems in identifying and classifying residents in these

border communities based on nationalities, as Boko Haram terrorists drew

members from neighbouring countries that display extremist postures. Specific

questions emerge: What factors made the existence of sympathetic cohorts in

northeastern border communities resilient? What are the extant counterterrorism

strategies in northeast Nigeria, and why do they flop? Can securitization serve as

an efficient counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria's northern border communities?

What challenges are likely to affect the efficacy of the securitization strategy? The

existential threats posed by the Boko Haram insurgency and the sustained feeling

of alienation by the indigenes of the northeastern border communities deserve

rigorous research to elicit a more nuanced strategy that can eliminate the

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

existential threats posed by the insurgents. Snowballing research techniques were

used to select indigenes of border communities in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe

states in northeast Nigeria for the interview, and relevant articles on Boko Haram

and international terrorism were content analysed. Primordial and state fragility

theories provided a theoretical analysis of why attachments to kith and kins across

international boundaries are often asserted, undermining the threats to the

community and national security. A securitization strategy is recommended

because of its functional design to infiltrate opaque and clandestine non-state

actors, including eliminating existential threats.

Keywords: Border security, migrants, insecurity, securitization, primordial

attachment

Background

This paper examines border security measures adopted to contain the

migration of extremist groups and other armed groups into Northeastern border

communities in Nigeria. September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States

of America and the Arab Spring resulting in the killing of and migration by

militias who fought on the side of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi,

killed by armed militias in Libya in 2011 marked the geo-strategic interest of the

northeastern border communities. Studies have identified that Nigeria has more

than 10,000 unmanned routes with no physical boundaries, police, customs, and

immigration officers. Operating as maximal borderlands, migrants from

neighbouring countries that claim common ancestral, ethnic, and linguistic

affinities spanning several centuries combine with indigenes of the border

communities, thereby raising severe challenges in identifying and classifying the

residents based on nationality as Boko Haram recruit members migrants who

display extremist posture. There is a severe problem if Nigerian border

communities serve as a melting point for people of diverse nationalities that do

not display allegiance to the Nigerian state. One major problem is that scholarly

work on border issues in Nigeria has primarily focused on economic integration

and movement of goods across West African borders (Ashafa, Usman, Sama'ila

2018, Abdoul and Tremolieres 2017, Olukoshi 2013 ECOWAS Commission

2009, Meagher 2003). Operations of the multi-national Joint Task Force

(MNJTF) fighting insurgency in the northeast have equally dominated the

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

attention of scholars (Nwolise 2017, Albert 2017,

). How pre-colonial social formations embedded in religion and

cultural identities within border communities in northeastern Nigeria have

contributed to the recent upsurge of insecurity. How it has contributed to the

crippling of the counterinsurgency measures and nuanced strategy that eliminated

the existential threat that posed by Boko Haram attacks that have not been

adequately captured by scholars.

The statement made by Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai

Mohammed, published by Nigerian Tribune Friday, 8 February 2019, p 2,

reinforces the above position that Nigeria is seriously grappling with serious

security challenges that are linked to religion where adherents display much

similarity that makes it difficult to classify them on the bases of their nationality.

The paper states thus:

The link between the Boko Haram insurgents and the

Islamic State (ISIS) had made the group more potent than

in 2009. The Islamic State in West African Province

(ISWAP) that we contend with today is no longer a rag-tag

army. It is full of elements who have fought the various

wars in Syria, Libya, Iraq and other parts of the Middle

East.

Nigeria is situated in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea. It shares its border

with the Republic of Benin to the west, Cameroon to the east and southeast, Niger

Republic to the north and Chad to the northeast (Levinson, 1998). These countries

share borders with Libya, Sudan, Mali, and Algeria, which have profound cultural

and religious affiliations with Middle East countries that serve as a base for the

extremist groups that take advantage of the ungoverned space at Nigeria's borders

to launch their heinous attack inside Nigeria's territory.

The Boko Haram insurgents seeking to carve out a separate territory to

establish a caliphate state in the entire country is traced to Utz Muhammad Yusuf,

an Islamic preacher and a leader of a local group known as Jama'atu Ahlis Suna

Lidda'awti Wal-Jihad, interpreted as (People Committed to the Propagation of the

Prophet's Mohammad Teachings and Jihad) assert that Western education is evil

or unlawful. Primarily, their members are youths with no skills or refuse to engage

in meaningful jobs. Many of these youths are known as talakawa and almajirai

William, Jeanniane, and

Wnedyam, 2016

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

(youth that received Qur'anic educations during their early childhood in a school

called tsangaya under an Islamic teacher called Mallam), indoctrinated into the

wrong perception that engenders sentiment against other religions and ethnic

groups (Odumosi et al. 2013).

Methodological and Theoretical Discourse

Snowball research techniques were used to identify indigenes of the

northeast and some security officers who served in the area to elicit questions

dealing with 'what,' 'how,' 'why,' and 'when' that were not adequately captured in

literature for this research. Also, an explanatory research technique was used to

analyse relevant literature, magazines, newspapers, monographs, and essential

media reports on Boko Haram, terrorism and general conditions in northeast

Nigeria. Primordial and constructivists theories that emphasise autochthony and

deconstruction of people's claim to originality were used to resolve the claim of

the autochthony of tradition and the persuasion by the constructivist that

autochthony of tradition should be adjusted to accommodate contemporary

reality (Anderson, 1983; Ranger, 1983; Cohen, 1993; Appadurai, 1995; Lentz,

1998). The constructivists who argue that society, community, nation, ethnicity,

custom, and tradition emerged from human interactions and creations to meet

their emergencies have succeeded in raising questions on primordialism's claim to

autochthon of tradition and community. However, primordialism's idea has

surged in contemporary developing states because of the inability of states like the

Nigerian State to provide adequate economic and social security for their citizen

in this twenty-first century, thereby reinforcing relapse to hometown associations

as a coping strategy that often raises consciousness of where one is born or grew

up, which very often form the basis for rejecting or accepting policies that have to

do with their cosmologies.

We use the state fragility theory to contextualise how the Nigerian state

has responded to Boko Haram terrorism and other predisposing factors like

poverty, social unrest, identity crisis, legitimacy crises, and conflicts (Huntington,

1968; Holsti, 1996; Myrdal, 1988; Rice, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Rotberg, 2004;

Chomsky, 2006; Patrick, 2006; Newman, 2007; Kersmo 2021,). State fragility is

increasingly dominating political discourse in Africa and some states in the

middle east. A poverty-stricken environment like Nigeria's border communities in

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

the northeast is the same as the three poorest regions in Syria (Deir Ezzor,

Hassaka, and Raqqa) that served as the cradle of ISIS's recruitment and

consolidation (Wickham, 2013; Alexander, 2015). As

'state-within-state' (Saliba, 2017). The rest of the paper looks at the extant policies

for managing insecurity in Nigeria's international border communities and finally

builds an argument for the securitization of Nigeria's international border

communities.

Nigeria's Northeastern Border Communities in Context

Nigeria showcases a complex mix of people from diverse ethnolinguistic

groups. Majorly these groups live in northern Nigeria. Some of these linguistics

groups straddle Nigeria's international boundaries because they live in the border

communities in the northeast and northwest. There are twenty-five tribal and

language groups straddling the boundaries between Nigeria and her immediate

neighbours—the Republic of Benin, Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon.

Hausa, Adarawa, Tazarawa, Manga, Woba, and Kabembu tribal groups are found

along the Nigeria-Niger boundary, and some of the areas have low population

density while others have high density. The severe drought in the Sahel region,

which climaxed in 1973, saw people from Mali, the Republic of Niger, Burkina

Faso, Mauritania, Senegal, and Chad fluxed into Nigeria and finding sympathetic

cohorts built on religion and affinal relations failed to return (Mamman, 2011).

Previous scholars have not ignored a border as a security problem in the

northeast and northwest. Akindele and Akinterinwa (2011), and Ate and

Akinterinwa (2011), in their edited books, contain various contributions by

scholars on the cross-border security challenges in the northeast and northwest

Nigeria. More recent is an edited book by Ibrahim, Bagu, and Ya'u (2017) in

which the contributors focused their research on eliciting the community's

resilience in countering the Boko Haram insurgency. Specific questions emerge,

asking why Nigeria's borders have continued to pose serious security challenges.

Does Nigeria have a specific policy towards border communities in northeast

Nigeria? Does Nigeria presently have a viable bilateral framework for managing

the trans-border challenges? Can securitization serve as a more strategic policy to

'new wars' are concentrated

in places where states and state apparatus are extremely weak or collapsed, a

similar situation in Nigeria provides opportunities for Boko Haram to create

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

contain the insurgents' activities in Nigeria's northeastern border communities?

Studies on border communities in northeast and northwest Nigeria can be

categorized into nine significant areas. Those focusing on banditry; illegal trade

on arms; narcotics; other forms of transborder crimes; border markets;

transhuman pastoralism; terrorists crossing boundaries; joint commission

between Nigeria and its immediate neighbours; and security agencies operating in

the border communities. There is no watertight compartment in the studies as such

cases overlap in border communities operating on maximal borderlands with a

near absence of formal control (Tijani, 2011; Yaqub, 2011; Asiwaju 2011;

Ibrahim, 2011; Mamman, 2011; Adamawa State Boundary Affairs, 2011; Balami,

2011; Bobbo, 2011; Mohammed, 2011). The Berber tribes of the Tubo (Tuareg) in

Niger republic more vicious in the banditry is, accused of armed banditry in

Nigeria to gather resources that would enable the sustenance of their uprising

against their home government, believed to be trained rebel soldiers (Ibrahim,

2011, 2). Akinterinwa and Quaker-Dokubo (2011, 58) described the activities of

the Tuarge as a kind of festering sore within Nigerien body politics because of

identity operating in an ecological zone that further helped in their planning and

execution of war of conquest. They operate in a vast area between 1 500 000 and 2

000 000 square kilometres spreading across five countries- Niger, Chad, Mali,

Algeria, and Libya.

The problem extends to the Republic of Chad, which borders Nigeria. It

shares a border with Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, the Central African

Republic to the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the southwest, and the Republic

of Niger to the west. Chad is engrossed in a series of political crises that pose a

serious obstacle to achieving nationhood. Lacking no national barriers, Chad had

long served as a crossroads for tribes from east and north. The crisis in Libya and

Sudan had seen the number of immigrants to Chad increase, and the crisis there

had accelerated the movement of Chadians to Cameroon and Nigeria. Downey

(2006: 21) notes that Yemen's position at the bottom of the Arabian Peninsula

makes it closer to the Horn of Africa than most of the Middle East. This provides

opportunities for terrorists from Yemen to cross to Somalia and vice-versa, as seen

in the case when Somali citizens crossed the Gulf of Aden in an attempt to flee

fighting in Somalia. Somalia is home to many terrorist organisations and has

served as a supply channel for foreign fighters (Kabukuru, 2014) after Jordan, the

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

world's highest foreign fighter contributor per capita (Chin, Gharaibeh,

Woodham, and Deeb 2016, 116). This implies that Chad serves as a transit for the

foreign terrorist fighter who merely settle in areas where they find sympathetic

cohorts. Ate (2011, 85 & 91) argues that it is difficult to determine who is foreign

and who is indigene among the trans-border population in certain instances.

Specific individuals assume a dual identity as they move back and forth the porous

border to mix with their kith and kin. People in the trans-border regions generally

resist the idea of a border separating them from their kith and kin and their

farmlands, grazing and fishing grounds. There are cases where Nigerian villages

are located in territory claimed by Cameroon or Chad, and vice versa. Such cases

abound in Borno, Adamawa, and Taraba States in Nigeria.

According to Yaqub (2011, 29), the informal ties between people across

international borders are much stronger and more resilient than measures aimed at

checking criminality across Nigeria's international borders. Therefore, such

efforts hardly succeed, not necessarily because the borders are porous nor because

they may not be effectively or adequately policed. The proof that a feeling of

national consciousness or commitment to Nigeria state in the northeast is a mere

conjecture is explicitly captured by Muhammadu Barkindo Aliyu Mustapha, the

12 Lamido of Adamawa Emirate, who affirmed that:

My kingdom transcends three countries – Nigeria, Cameroon, and

the Niger Republic. Until today, the traditional rulers in those

countries have come to me. They write letters, and I reply to them.

Even recently, last December, I went to Cameroon. The whole of

Northern Cameroon is my kingdom. Africa was shared during the

Berlin Conference, in which the French and Germans took that part

of Africa, and the British took this part (Tell Magazine, 2014, 14-

16).

Governor Aminu Tambuwal of Sokoto of State in 2022 stated, “we have

communities that are not more than 10 kilometres from each other in Nigeria and

the Niger Republic. As I speak to you, some of those communities, once it is

evening, move into the Niger Republic where they can sleep with their two eyes

closed and, in the morning, they return to Nigeria” (The Nation 2022, 1&5). The

primary concern is that the people in these communities share common religious

symbols and ancestral links that pose a problem of separating them based on their

contemporary nationalities. Succinctly capturing the flexibility of the maximal

borderlands in Northern Nigeria, Afolayan (2000, 50-54) argues that maximal

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

borderland in the northeast, defined as porous, 'nation-peripheral' primarily

operating independently from the nation-state, provides opportunities for easy

penetration and a safe haven for these extremists' in Nigeria. In this case, the local

population unknowingly or intentionally creates entry points by trekking in and

out as gateway communities. In one case, a building has entrance and exit doors

open to the Niger Republic and Nigeria in Birin Kula in Bamle village (Ibrahim,

2011). For example, in a situation where Gaboru Ngala shares borders with the

Chad Republic. Damasak shares borders with the Niger Republic. Banki, Bama,

Kirawa, and Gwoza share borders with Cameroon, all in Borno state. Geidam,

Machina, and Yunusari share borders with the Niger Republic, all in Yobe state.

Maiha, Gurin-Fufore, Michika, Madagali, Mubi, and Toungo share borders with

Cameroon, all in Adamawa state, meaning that people from different countries

will be flooding into one state at the same time. This situation can only pose

difficulty for a country that operates maximal borderlands and lacks technological

surveillance capacity (Keister, 2014).

These border communities encapsulated under Ummah (the global

community of Muslims) (Osama, 2015, 37-47) have some members who cannot

identify the trickery radicalization carried out by the extremist groups or

intentionally yields to it. This is seen as the backdrop of the accessible “melting”

of Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) into these borders, originally

the domain of Boko Haram and ISIS cum Al-Qaeda. Now Boko Haram and

ISWAP are locked in a struggle for supremacy. It is important to argue that the

Ummah (the global community of Muslims) is often sociologically constructed.

The traditional African worshippers who initially inhabited the areas were

indoctrinated through socialization. So, where one is born may matter less than

where a person acquires a new identity or drops the old one (Isajiw 1999, 18).

Ethnic morphology of the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri show a straddle across

international boundaries in northeastern Nigeria, West Africa, and the Sahel

region of Africa. Kanuri people migrated into present-day Nigeria in the 15

century and absorbed indigenous Chadic-speaking peoples into their kingdom in

the large area of the central Sahara in the 16 century. This complex mix poses a

herculean task in identifying and isolating indigenous people because of centuries

of acculturation. Northern Cameroon has the Fulani (Fulbe or Peul) ethnic group

found in Nigeria, Chad, and the Niger Republic, which includes nomadic Arabs,

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

and the Tuareg found in Libya dating back to the 11 Century through commercial

activities (Davison, Buah, and Ajayi 1976; Levinson 1998, Lenshie, Ayokhai, and

Ayokhai 2013). A study by Tijani (2011, 128) in 1985 for the National Institute for

Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) identified that one of the District Heads then

in charge of border districts ceded a portion of Nigeria's territory to a chieftain of a

neighbouring district of Republic of Niger, as a gift to a good neighbour.

The extant policies for managing insecurity at Nigeria's international border

communities

The management of insecurity at Nigeria's international borders is

encapsulated in the official protocol in the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) established in Lagos in 1975. It aims to improve and create

harmonious relations and social, economic and cultural activities. Still, it was

revised in a 1993 Treaty, which states that the citizens of ECOWAS shall have the

right of entry, residence, and business establishment in any member state,

requiring only valid travel documents like an international health certificate, not a

visa. The right to live in the territory of a member state following the conditions

defined by the legislative and administrative laws of the Member States stands

out. Still, the problem is that border communities operate as states within states

because of feelings of alienation. In this case, there are no laws regulating

migrants from member states. Ibrahim (2011, 192) argues that the northeast zone

of modern Nigeria is particularly prone to security collapse because of the nature

of the amalgamation. He pointed out that during the first two decades of this

century, the colonial officials marked these areas as “thief-infested areas.”

Graduating from mere “thief-infested areas,” Nigeria's border

communities now serve as safe havens for the Boko Haram. The official

deliberative effort policy to address boundary-related problems was created in

1987 when National Boundary Commission (NBC) was established. Before this

period, Nigeria had entered into various transborder cooperation agreements with

her neighbours because of the menace posed by transborder crime. One such is

International Joint Patrol Accord (IJPTL) signed in Abuja in 1984 after a bloody

clash between Nigeria and Chadian soldiers after they later pursued rebels from

their country into Nigeria's territory aimed to forestall future occurrence.

Countries sharing borders at Lake Chad agreed to properly demarcate boundaries

which started in 1988 and was completed in 1992. The NBC has had a series of

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

transborder cooperation workshops, incorporating border community leaders to

sensitize them on their rights, obligations, and knowledge of the parallel border

administration to avoid interference in affairs in the neighbouring countries. The

National Committee on Development of Border Region, which emerged from the

conference in 1990, was to specifically provide a plan for the development of the

Nigerian border region resulting in the promotion of the Local Bilateral

Committee to encourage active cooperation between states and local authorities

across the boundaries. That these efforts could not contain security challenges can

be seen against the success of the Boko Haram insurgency in sustaining long-

drawn wars in these border communities.

The long-drawn wars are against the backdrop of the kinetic operational

strategy known as Operation Restore Order (ORO 1, 11, and 111) in Adamawa,

Borno, and Yobe states in sequential tactics. The State of Emergency was declared

in 2013 and 2014, code-named Operation Boyona, to flush out Boko Haram from

the urban cities. The pertinent question is if the rural communities can contain the

retreat of terrorists flushed out from the urban cities who now would act like

wounded lions or if they are merely retreating to a sympathetic cohort. The

introduction of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in late 2014 and early

2015 and local vigilantes and hunters known as the Civilian Joint Task Force

(CJTF) to protect rural areas, routes, and supply of intelligence to facilitate

information gathering about the Sambisa Forest that remains elusive to the

Nigerian military (Adegbamigbe, 2017; Nwolise 2017) is an indication of the

importance of the knowledge of these local terrains. However, the local train

remains elusive to the “visiting” military because of a balance of loyalty that

works to the insurgents' advantage.

Analysis of Nigeria's Northeastern Border Communities in Confrontation

against Boko Haram Attacks

Analysis of the confrontation against Boko Haram by Northeastern border

communities located in the three most affected states: Adamawa, Borno, and

Yobe, can be explained using two frames. The first is communities that exhibited

weak resistance and were quickly overrun by Boko Haram. The second was

communities that exhibited strong resistance and were able to repel and prevent

Boko Haram from occupying their communities. The latter did not only mobilise

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

to prevent penetration and the action of Boko Haram but were able to mobilize

after Boko Haram penetrated to prevent the recurrence of Boko Haram activities.

Adamawa State falls within the first category where communities had weak

resistance. It comprises twenty-one (21) local governments with about fifty-eight

(58) ethnic groups sharing international borders with the Republic of Cameroon

to the East. Mubi Local government in Adamawa is about two hours drive to

Cameroon, located in an area full of hills and mountains of strategic importance to

Boko Haram. It is known for its commercial trading activities with people from

Cameroon, Gabon, and Central Africa. Boko Haram attacked its Kabanga ward,

took over and renamed it Madinatul Islam in 2014, two years after which it

penetrated the town (Shalangwa, 2017, 110). The commercial activities provided

opportunities for recruiting youths and radicalizing them because religious

polarizations have adversely affected the areas. In the end, Mubi, Madagali,

Michika and Hong were captured, showing the absence of initiative by the local

government, traditional council, or community leaders to mobilize against the

Boko.

Boko Haram also took over Goniri by participating in the community

markets in Yobe State. In Talala, they entered the community through the

establishment of Islamiyya schools, and their targets for three years were youth

between the ages of 15 and 40 years. So, members of Boko Haram, known as the

'Yobe Taliban', took over Gujba and Gulani local governments and controlled the

entire areas without resistance between 2014 and 2015 (Raji, 2017, 339-350). The

same happened with Gwoza and Bama local governments in Borno State, where

community resilience to the Boko Haram attack was very low. Borno State has

nine (9) local governments that share international borders and was historically

under German control before being governed by the United Nations under

trusteeship. Still, Bama and Gwoza were brought under Nigeria in the 1961

plebiscite (Monguno, 2017, 203). Borno State occupies an area of 69 435 sq.

kilometres, sharing a 650km long border with Cameroon, Chad, and the Republic

of Niger. Bama community is only 15km away from the dreaded Sambisa Forest

that served as a home and hideout for Boko Haram and an illegal route where

smuggling has festered from Cameroon through logistics, and weapons were

brought into Nigeria by Boko Haram (Monguno, 2017, 215). Gwoza presents a

situation where Boko Haram attacked and tried to take over the town about nine

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

times before it finally succeeded in August 2014. That it has been a safe haven is

seen against the background that Muhammad Yusuf and the group known as Boko

Haram was sported in the mountainous terrain at Bayan Dutse in 2004, engaging

in a military type of training, indicating the incidence of sympathetic cohorts.

Thus, in the mid-2000s, when Muhammad Yusuf and his successor Abubakar

Shekau preached against widening inequality and injustice in the Nigerian society

in a famous Mosque in a custom area of the town, they were speaking the minds of

youths who jealously got radicalized. The initial strategy of Boko Haram in Bama

was to blend with the local Izala Muslim sect that has always had a confrontation

with Sufi Brotherhood (Tarika), even though its mission was, in hindsight,

radically different because Boko Haram belongs to the Sunni sects that have

always been in confrontation with other Islamic sects in Nigeria. However,

because the Izala Muslim sect also displayed violent acts contrary to the Sufi

movement, they could not form a common front to fight Boko Haram (Monguno

2017, 208-209).

On the other hand, communities antagonistic to Boko Haram exhibited

high resilience in fighting Boko Haram. These antagonistic cohorts do not mean

an absence of religious or ethnic diversity but a resolution that their communities

will not yield to the imposition by an external force. The communities did not only

mobilise against Boko Haram but developed robust social networks and systems

that support recovery after the adversities. For example, the Biu community

inhabited by Babur/Bura ethnic group strongly resisted and defeated Boko

Haram. The community's boldness to attack and repel Boko Haram in the first

instance is explained as a nurtured habit over time against foreign intruders and

impositions (Akubuiro, 2016, 6-7; Schneider, 2015). Some of the respondents

from Biu affirmed that the community has a high number of educated elites,

making it difficult for the people to embrace Boko Haram, “for we can easily draw

the line between right and wrong. Members of Boko Haram are often illiterates.

We cherish civilised values, and our people were not prepared to surrender these

values to what Boko Haram represents”.

It is striking to note that Biu was among the first set of 14 local

governments under a state of emergency declared by the federal government in

2013 for being insecure and volatile. This was because of a partly successful

attack on vulnerable parts like Buratai, Mirnga, and Gunda. However, most parts

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

of the local government remained safe, but the entire Biu is safe and remained

impermeable by Boko Haram. Though differences exist in dialects Bubur/Bura,

Biu has members cut-crossing the two African traditional religions. The Muslim

religious leaders openly condemned and preached against extremism in sermons

by the Imam of Dibal mosque despite being targeted for attack by Boko Haram.

The youths who were not debarred by religious differences formed a formidable

CJTF and refused to be controlled by a similar body from Maiduguri, adopting a

“bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency war” (Monguno, 2017, 223). One

crucial factor instrumental to the community resilience in Biu was the trust

between members of the community and the traditional institutions, making it

easy to mobilize against Boko Haram. Biu is geographically 760m above sea level

with only three roads from Maiduguri, Garkida, and Gombe, making it easy the

identification of Boko Haram, who usually move in convoys of motorcycles

(Monguno 2017, 224). Still, we argue that this is not enough if the community had

individuals or groups sympathetic to Boko Haram ideology.

Communities in Gombi local government Adamawa were also affirmed to

have resisted invading Boko Haram from Madagali, Michika, and Hong. Our

respondents said, 'our people took the war to their hideouts in the surrounding

villages where they built camps,' corroborating Shalangwa's (2017, 119) account

on the same Gombi local government that “the people were able to withstand the

insurgents successfully and took the fight to them in the surrounding villages

where they had built camps and were basking in the marginal successes that they

had in looting farm harvest and livestock.” This is the same as in Mandara

mountainous area between Nigeria and Cameroon with high resilience

(Schneider, 2015, 12), where Boko Haram had little or no impact. Despite the

attack by the insurgents, the effort of the local hunters and the military prevented

Gombi town from being captured. The resilience of Gombi is seen against the

backdrop that Boko Haram where heavily armed with assault rifles and rocket-

propelled grenades in convoys of Hilux trucks and motorbikes, yet the people

repelled them. Social capital was substantial, resulting in regular meetings

between the representatives of Christians to promote peaceful coexistence

between the two religious leaders.

Yobe State had more attacks on its educational institutions, mainly

primary and secondary schools. The first was on school buildings which

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

destroyed 1098 classrooms. The second attack, which started in 2013, targeted

killing of students, teachers, school administrators, and education officials, which

the governor of the State complained that Yobe State suffered the most school-

based causalities recording over one hundred and twenty (120) students killed by

the insurgents (Raji, 2017, 371). According to the president of the National Union

of Teachers (NUT), six hundred (600) teachers were killed, and nineteen thousand

(19,000) others were displaced (The Nation 2016), shrinking the space for girl-

child education (Osunyikanmi & Iwu, 2017).

Kidnapped schoolgirls and boys were later used as suicide bombers in

schools reinforcing Boko Haram's primary objective of erasing Western

education in the Northeast. Ninety per cent (90%) of the suicide bombing in Yobe

State were carried out by young girls and boys believed to be school pupils. There

was a teenage suicide bomber at Government Secondary School (GSS) Potiskum

who dressed in a school uniform with a school bag laden with Improvised

Explosive Device (IED), where 48 students were killed and 79 injured. The data

from the UN children agency shows that 44 children were used in suicide attacks

in Northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries in 2015 compared with four cases

the previous year (The Guardian, 2016).

Though the attacks resulted in reduced enrollment in schools, the

individuals and the State devised a strategy of relocating students to the capital

cities from the rural areas, often closing schools and reopening them after some

time. However, in all these, the parents of these children were not deterred from

sending their children to schools, albeit with a slight reduction in primary school

enrollment in 2014 from 785,111 to 693,413 (Raji 2017, 367). Though Boko

Haram insurgents overran the entire Gujba local government, locals appreciated

Federal Government Safe School Initiative (SSI) that saw many students

transferred to other schools away from the insurgents-infested environment (Raji

2017, 368). It is important to argue that the insurgents wanted total eradication of

the Western educational system in the northeast because even Yobe, which had

most of its educational institutions attacked, has faced many challenges in

building robust education for its teeming populations (Osunyikanmi & Iwu,

2017). Currently, the gap in students' enrollment and performance is not closing

between northern and southern Nigeria. The former governor of Borno state, Alli-

Modu Sheriff, defended his critiques on the increasing unemployment in his State

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

that resulted in the vulnerability of the youths to recruitment radicalization by

Boko Haram that “he has no blame because only less than five per cent of

indigenes of Borno state were literate (Oluokun, 2014, 22).

Poverty and illiteracy notwithstanding, the diverse nature of the

inhabitants of these border communities has profound security implications

because of multiple loyalties. Onwuejeogwu (1972), shows that Borno/Yobe

States have twenty-five (25) ethnic nationalities, and Adamawa/Taraba have

eighty-eight (88) that kit and kins crossing Nigeria's international and other States

in Northern Nigeria, totalling one hundred and thirteen (113) ethnic nationalities.

Except consciously mainstreamed into national security planning, this complex

mix in the face of weak security architecture will serve as a safe haven for Boko

Haram for recruiting members, conducting training and even hiding. Augustine

(2002, vii) raised this point, arguing, “how do we deter individuals hidden in

society and seeking martyrdom. The insurgents enter in and out of the society like

fish swims in the water”.

The subtle penetration to occupy and to kill increased during and after the

killing of Muammar Qadhafi, who ruled Libya for 40 years, known as the Libyan

debacle that resulted in eight (8) months of civil war (Duodu, 2011: 10-15)

climaxing the Arab Spring. In the first place, Qadhafi believed that the rebels

fighting him could not have muscled courage if they did not receive support from

the Western world and her allies. Therefore, his supporters were instructed to

retaliate against Western allies like Nigeria. Secondly, the interim government

that emerged after the civil war cannot control internal security; as a result, some

militias migrated to Nigeria's border communities, thereby joining and boosting

Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria. Some groups are already “melting” into

external identities, such as “Islamic States,” also known as Islamic State in Iraq

and Syria (ISIS) and other extremist groups like Al-Qaeda (Osman, 2015). El-

Katiri (2012), shows that the interim government that took over after the death of

Muammar Qadhafi had no monopoly on the legitimate use of weapons. The work

argues that the National Transitional Council (NTC) formed after the collapse of

the Muammar Gaddafi regime is not even able to exercise control over military

affairs within Tripoli, let alone across the country. Dozens of separate armed

groups took control of Tripoli's neighbourhoods and strategic infrastructure, such

as ports, airports, and border crossings across the country. Many distinct militias

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

arose because of tribal and regional divisions within the country and acted

independently.

President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria openly blamed the insecurity in

the north on militias who fought on the side of Muammar Gaddafi, killed eight

years ago (Ogundipe, 2018). The Country Reports on Terrorism (2020), shows

that desert areas, particularly in central and southern Libya, which remain safe

havens for al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State of Iraq and the

Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) under the control of the Libyan National Army (LNA)

are sparsely populated. The proliferation of arms (Marsh, 2017) sold on Libyan

streets ends up in the hands of terrorists who merely migrate through the Republic

of Niger bordering Nigeria and Libya. The United Nations agency reported a

similar issue that the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported

that a pickup truck in Maroua bid for Nigeria in 2013 with 5,400 AK-47 rifles was

seized, and a man attempting to transport 655 guns to Nigeria in 2014 arrested by

Cameroonian security forces (Saturday Tribune, 2014, 4).

The capacity to introduce compulsory security measures is highly limited

in States sharing borders with Nigeria. The problem is identified going by the

debate raised by Isaac Albert, (a Professor in African history) and countered by

Smart Adeyemi, senator representing Kogi-West, who argues that border walls

are critical to reducing insecurity in Nigeria (Ajaja, Aborishade and George,

2021:10). This debate is reminiscent of the Great Wall of China, constructed

around 200BC stretching over 5,500 miles with an average height of 25 feet and

an average width of 19 feet (Abolurin, 2011, 38-39) or the United States (US)

under Trump's attempt to construct a wall to the fence of Mexico. While it may be

difficult to talk about terrorist communities but evidence, as highlighted in this

paper, suggests that members of some communities have sympathy for the

extremists serving as enablers for Jihadist cells (Lupsha, 1985; Bale, 2012;

Asiwaju, 2011; Yaqub, 2011; Iwu et al., 2018). Duke and Gross (1993: 203-205)

note that US policy on border management is enhanced by introducing an

interdiction strategy. The terrorist attack in the United States of America (USA)

on September 11, 2001, provided a springboard for fundamental security

recontextualisation in the USA. Shapiro and Darken (2010, 298), show that the

Federal, State and Local levels were involved in border security management to

check terrorists moving into the USA. At the Federal level, the United States

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) participated in a border security exercise

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

focused on illegal migration and its attendant problem across borders. Restricting

border crossing, checking visas during a mass exodus from Mexico, and shutting

down a port of entry in response to a terrorist threat were carried out at the state

and local levels. It is important to note that this exercise was not extended to a

friendly state like Canada. TOPOFF-2 was constituted to deal with a border

security issue with Canada in the Pacific north-west and TOPOFF-4 with border

security issues at the territory of Guam.

However, the critical issue about the insurgency war in Nigeria is that the

insurgents are already inside, and the indigenes of the border communities do not

feel that there is any difference between them and new migrants as the

demarcation of the areas occupied is viewed as mere colonial creation. Creating

the absence of a battle line, and the people are constantly competing with the

authority of the State to win the support of the citizens, thereby making

insurgency war appears like people's wars, partisan wars, and wars of national

liberation, all of which capture the essential idea that the insurgents hope to

overcome its weakness against a conventional foe with stealth, mobility and

ruthlessness (Kalyvas, 2006; Boyle, 2008). As argued by Olukolade (2015, 275),

who was once Director of Defence Information Nigeria Army, “at the beginning,

the government was misled into thinking that the Boko Haram elements were our

brothers, and killing them meant killing our brothers. Some people even thought

that fighting them meant fighting the entire North”.

Weak institutions attributed to state fragility could have aided the success

recorded by the Boko Haram insurgents. Still, the propelling idea for terrorist

attack and expansion across international frontiers can be seen against what

Huntington (1996), labelled the “clash of civilizations”. Some religious

extremists are serious about orchestrating this war of supremacy by attacking the

West and their supporters across the world. Africa has always been targeted for

prong attacks, seriously championed by the late former Libyan leader, Muammar

Gaddafi (El-Katiri, 2012, 5). Osama Bin Laden's second in command, Ayman Al-

Zawahiri, expressed a high commitment to ensuring that the West and its allies are

brought under Islamic hegemony. Shapiro and Darken (2010, 90) argue that the

terrorist attacks are to compel Western powers to stop supporting apostate Arab

regimes. Secondly, to replace these regimes with an Islamic caliphate, something

only possible once they no longer have Western support. Thirdly, is to expand the

caliphate to spread Islamic rule to the world. The great worry is that the

ungoverned space around the Northeastern Nigerian border serves as the first

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

point of convergence, and more worrisome is that some individuals and groups in

these border communities profess Ummah. A military institution that should act

as a unifying force is not spared of religious and ethnic divisions (Iwu & Ajisafe,

2021). Adekanye (2008), raised the concern when he argues that leaders who

attempt to organise the military in multi-ethnically segmented societies face an

inevitable tension between societal decentralisation that seeks to reflect and

perpetuate dissimilarities of custom, language, and religion. Common to the

definition of ethnicity is a consciousness of “we feeling”, common ancestry,

religion, institutions, values, customs, and language as differentiated from others

that often have a very dysfunctional effect (Isajiw, 1999, Varshney, 2002, 2009).

To mobilise members against others, the extremists have often drawn upon this

constructed consciousness of “we feeling or we and them”.

The position of this paper is that given the existing maximal borderlands,

individuals or groups, including indigenes of the border communities, should pass

through strict scrutiny to identify those with an extremist disposition from

neighbouring countries and their collaborators in Nigeria. One critical point

opined by Stolberg (2012) is that different nations can craft their national security

strategies reflecting their national security concerns. The critical issue in

insurgency war is that the battle line is absent, and they are constantly competing

with the authority of the State to win the support of their citizens (Kalyvas, 2006).

Tijani (2011,122) argued that the current security defence and strategies,

especially on our border areas, are more on faith than science, faulty

conceptualisations, and based on generalisation than specific structures and

processes. The study conducted by Adamawa State Boundary Affairs (2011, 33)

reported that the three agents of security, namely, the police, customs, and

immigration, whose responsibility is to ensure border security, lack adequate

transportation facilities, essential gadgets, and other equipment to cover the large,

rugged terrain, thereby giving way to illegal activities that thrive in the region

with little impediment. The worst is that some of these men have to rent houses

belonging to smugglers at their various stations.

Securitisation as a Strategy and the Securitisation of Northeastern Border

Communities

Waever's (1995) work on securitisation and de-securitisation show the

increasing need to understand security beyond military threats. In this case,

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

religion, economy, cultural identity, environmental concerns and political rights

become relevant when it concerns human security. Securitisation as a security

strategy emerged in Eastern Europe during the cold war when any speech act

indicating support for liberal ideology was considered a security threat (Wæver,

1995, 58-62), but reemerged as a post-cold war construction through the works of

Copenhagen School in Denmark by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (McDonald,

2013, 71). The study of security understood as survival reinforced cultural,

religious, social, and political issues that can be identified through a “speech act”

(Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde 1988; Wæver 1995, 55; Williams 2003). Observing

communication expressed through speech acts in individuals and groups can

enable political leaders to frame security problems to appear more salient. The

importance of securitization is that it can be used to analyse issues beyond a

country's territory. This is seen against the backdrop of the ordering for the

elimination of Major General Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian top military

commander whom US security intelligence interpreted as constituting an

existential threat to the US citizens (Kjær, 2020). Securitization becomes

instructive if it is established that (1) there is a threat; (2) the threat is potentially

existential, and (3) the possibility and relative advantages of security handling

compared to non-securitized handling (Wæver, 2011, 473).

We argue that cultural and religious symbols common to border

communities in the northeast exploited by the jihadist migrants who “fuse” within

the sympathetic cohorts constitute an existential threat. For example, Boko

Haram entered first using religious preaching and the establishment of Islamiyya

schools to penetrate the minds of youths almost three years before they eventually

fought and drove people away from Goniri, Gujba, and Buni Gari communities

(Monguno, 2017; Mohammed, 2017; Diggi, 2018). Existential threats previously

have manifested in the Nigerian security circle but were ignored, such as Osama

bin Laden's warning of “establishing a new caliphate to rule over the world”

(Ericsson, 2006, 24); Muammar Gaddafi's statement that “Nigeria should be

divided into a Christian south and a Muslim north to save it from religious strife”

(Duodu, 2011, 15); a statement by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi champions that

“humanity should neatly be divided into two camps. First the camp of the

Muslims and the mujahidin (holy warriors) everywhere and the camp of the Jews,

the Crusaders, their allies” (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, 1), and the conspiracy by

Sudan and Libya to Islamize Nigeria code-named Afrikaya—a doctrine that all

African states must be governed by Muslims and that life should be made difficult

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

for any Christian leader of any African country” (Adogamhe, 2018, 177), could

have necessitated the restructuring of the national security architecture in Nigeria.

At least President Buhari's statement that blames Muammar Gaddafi for

Nigeria's insecurity (Premium times. January 9, 2019) confirms this existential

threat emanating from Libya. As more insurgents are killed, more are radicalized

by unsuspecting Islamic preachers acting as proxies for Boko Haram (Osama,

2015; Taºpinar, 2015; Emeozor, 2015: 15, Vanguard 2019: 25). The United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that about 8,000 children are recruited

in fighting the war against Nigeria in the North East” (Idowu, 2022, 8) whom they

can quickly indoctrinate, manipulate and cheaply manage financially” (Odeniyi

2022, 4). These thousands of brainwashed children serving as a replacement for

the crumbling ISIS caliphate could terrorize us for years (Feldman, 2017). It is

incontrovertible that these recruitments of young people by extremists are

primarily carried out in rural communities. The issues raised in this paper

certainly provide enough justification for the securitization of border

communities, including their local security agencies, religious institutions,

academic learning institutions, and civil societies, despite the argument by

President Buhari that insurgency in Nigeria is not religious (Odeniyi & Angbulu,

2022, 26).

The import of securitisation can be debated because political leaders can

misuse it or direct it to their political opponents. This is against the backdrop that

the efficacy of the securitisation strategy can violate some aspects of human rights

and raise legitimacy questions, social capital, and the right to define what

constitutes insecurity by the political elites. Still, these issues can be isolated and

contextualised under national interest if existential threats are pervasive. We

argue that if Nigeria had adopted securitisation, it would have exposed the

activities of too many people comparable to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who

attempted to blow off an American airline on 25 December, Christmas Day, 2009

whom his father claimed to have alerted relevant authorities in Nigeria (Soyinka

2010, 18-26). Several moles in the government and the military, including the

absence of social capital, would be contextualised under national security

interests. We argue that fear of infringing on human rights embedded in

legitimacy crises common in third-world countries (Balzacq, 2011, 35) failed to

acknowledge that absolute freedom is a mere philosophical principle that loses its

tenacity when such freedom causes harm to others. The sole end of which

humanity is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

of the action of any of their member is for self-protection or the prerogative of the

state to protect her citizens (Mill, 1991, 14). Seen against the backdrop, the

Canadian authority deployed securitisation of the Muslim civil societies

perceived by some as suspect communities (Ahmad, 2020).

The Canada case groups expressing sympathy for extremists' ideology are

securitized, but in Nigeria, it is merely identified and highlighted and not

securitized. For example, funding of Boko Haram from the United Arab Emirates

(UAE), as confirmed by the United States of America (USA), and Osinbajo, the

vice president of Nigeria, commented that wealthy Nigerians are joining

terrorism (Adetayo & Isenyo 2015, 7; The Nation, 2021, 5; Ojeme, 2022),

including the critics against the establishment of Islamic banking in Nigeria by

Lamido Sanusi, the then central bank governor (Onabanjo 2009, 28-31; Vanguard

2020, 18) that the bank was used for providing loans based on Sharia precepts

cannot beg the relevance of securitization in Nigeria.

Specifically Agbo (2013, 22), reported a case of an organisation called

Abd-el-Hassan Taher Fadlalla, belonging to Hezbollah Islamic jihad organisation

in Abuja, Nigeria, acting as a cooperative organisation but clandestinely funding

terrorism in Nigeria. Unfortunately, we argue that the signing into law of anti-

money laundering counter-terrorism bills in May 2022 (Angbulu, 2022, 30) is

belated, going by the number of years activities of Boko Haram indicated external

funding. These funding organisations broadly aim at the indoctrination of

students, as the Turkish envoy in Nigeria cautioned (Adepegba, 2018, 3). Again,

like the antigraft law in Nigeria, it raises questions about the success of the

profiling of non-governmental organisations and their finances in 2018

(Nnochiri, 2018, 9, Nzechi, 2018, 2, Njoku, 2022), which we argue is likely to be

mere window-dressing.

Conclusion

Boko Haram's war against the Nigerian state must be tackled seriously.

The strategies adopted presently cannot produce sufficient success. The attack has

remained lethal, requiring a more nuanced strategy to handle. Northeastern border

communities that experience a more lethal attack from Boko Haram also serve as

safe haven for Islamic extremists both within and outside Nigeria, reinforcing

state fragility theory as used in this paper. The existential threat it poses requires

securitization of the entire social space since the terrorists capitalize on common

Journal of Defence and Security Studies

religious and cultural symbols as a tool to recruit and radicalize new members.

While common ancestry would have served as an essential constituent of

ethnicity, religion overlooks and lays overarching loyalty across people of diverse

regions. Eroding primordial emphasis on the place of birth, cross-national

identities based on feeding, clothing, and information technology are tearing

national states and creating enemies, especially against those who share Western

values. We adopted the content analysis of concrete issues and speech acts that

emerged in a counterinsurgency war. Ultimately, we concluded that the entire

social space should be securitized as a nuanced strategy to eliminate or contain the

Boko haram insurgency in the northeast.

The Vulnerability of the Post-colonial Border Communities and Insurgency in Nigeria's West African Sub-region

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The Nexus Between ‘Failed States’ and International Terrorism

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Jul 2021

Tadesse Biru Kersmo

The nexus between “failed states” and “international terrorism” is not as simple and straight-forward, as it may look at the first glance. This essay presents arguments that establish strong links, and arguments that cast doubts on the existence of a strong link between the two. It then substantiates the author’s position that although state failure may create a conducive environment for the spread of international terrorism, we cannot establish a cause-and-effect relationship between failed states and international terrorism.

The State and the Securitization of Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2021

Emeka Thaddues Njoku

While debates on the effects of the post-9/11 counterterrorism measures (CTMs) on civil society organizations (CSOs) exist, there is a paucity of data on how CTMs are shaping the spaces and actors of CSOs in Nigeria. Using a mixed-methods design, this article analyzes CSOs’ perceptions on the effects of counterterrorism financing measures, the countermeasures that CSOs are taking, and the government’s views on the security threat posed by CSOs. The findings show that although counterterrorism financing were not as constraining, it appears to increase the administrative cost of CSOs and disadvantaged the less prominent CSOs forcing them to close down or merge with more prominent CSOs. Besides, the result shows the state’s increasing interest in the activities of CSOs on the grounds of national security imperatives. Thus, I argue CTMs are evolving, and thus CSOs will experience increased financial regulations. Also, CTMs expansion will threaten CSOs’ sustainability and polarize them. Keywords Boko Haram, Islamic State of West African Province, foreign aid, de-risking policy, anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing, closing of civic space

Rethinking the Functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2017

Isaac olawale Albert

The countries in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in April 2012 and upgraded it in 2015 for managing the ongoing Boko Haram crisis that started in Nigeria in 2002. The decision followed the realization that the problem is not necessarily Nigerian, as initially perceived, but a regional question. This security management formation is with a counter-terrorism mandate. This article takes a critical look at the challenges in the functioning of the security regimen. The most critical of the problems is that, though the countries need to work collaboratively at dealing with a common enemy, they are suspicious of each other over border issues. Nigeria is suspicious of Cameroon and Chad, which are in turn suspicious of Nigeria. This factor has reduced the effectiveness of this security community. The lesson here is that African states need to work on their relations timeously to enable them have smooth working relationship when they have to face a common enemy.

Rethinking Pre-Colonial State Formation and Ethno-Religious Identity Transformation in Hausaland under the Sokoto Caliphate.

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2013

State formation in Hausaland was on course in precolonial Nigeria in the context of geographical proximity, biosocial relations and cultural contiguities before the development was impeded by the Fulani overlords in the Usman Danfodio led jihad (1804-1817). During the jihad, the populations of the Hausa (Habe) states were spontaneously disaggregated and later, re-aggregated to establish a new state, the Sokoto Caliphate. This paper examines the nexus between pre-colonial state formation and social identity transformation along ethno-religious lines in Hausaland under the Sokoto Caliphate. It finds that a major outcome of precolonial state formation in Hausaland is the transformation of social identities along ethno-religious lines. The paper argues that the jihad was not only motivated by the need for religious purification but also as much by the quest for â€˜power to make binding decisions and authoritative allocation of values in the societyâ€™ and to also â€˜determine who gets what, when and howâ€™. This paper contends that the jihadistsâ€™ interception of the evolution of the Hausa States had two significant implications. Firstly, it ended the possibility of the transformation of the Hausa States under the Habe rulers into an empire and aborted the Habe dynasties while enthroning the rule of the Fulani over states in Hausaland. Secondly, the Hausa states founded on the cosmopolitanism ideology were transformed to adopt a new ethno-religious identity, the Hausa-Fulani. These implications were to significantly influence the trajectories of social identity formation in Hausaland under the Caliphate.

Ethnic Militias and Democratic Governance in Nigeria

Article

Jan 2021

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century

Book

Dec 2019

Francis Fukuyama

The production of locality: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge

Chapter

Dec 2003

Arjun Appadurai

Insurgency and the Shrinking Space for Young Girl Education in the North-East, Nigeria

Article

Nov 2017

Prior the incursion of Boko Haram insurgency into the social nerve of Nigeria, low level of literacy in the North-East geo-political zone of the country was pervasive and has always been a subject of concern to all stakeholders and the federal government. The Almajiris, a vernacular euphemism for child-beggars, were offered mobile schools. Besides, free and compulsory education were introduced to take school age children off the streets. Of major interest to activists and researcher is the issue of young girl education. The female children had been irresponsibly left behind when western education was introduced to the North. The young girl was neglected for religious, socio-economic and cultural reasons. Expectations of wholistic benefits, therefore, became high when girls finally have opportunity to access Western education. However, Boko Haram insurgency became a clog in the wheel of progress when they began to kidnap girls and women, destroy school properties, and engaged in suicide bombings. The Chibok girls that were kidnapped from a government secondary school in Borno State was a classic case. This paper examines the implications of Boko Haram’s operations and activities on education in the North-East especially on the fragile status of girl child education. Consideration was also given to the far-reaching effect of the insurgency on the economic lives of the affected children. It concludes with a call for government to embark on strategies that will end insurgency and give the young girl a new lease in life.

The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa

Chapter

Mar 2012

Terence Ranger

The 1870s, 1880s and 1890s were the time of a great flowering of European invented tradition – ecclesiastical, educational, military, republican, monarchical. They were also the time of the European rush into Africa. There were many and complex connections between the two processes. The concept of Empire was central to the process of inventing tradition within Europe itself, but the African empires came so late in the day that they demonstrate the effects rather than the causes of European invented tradition. Deployed in Africa, however, the new traditions took on a peculiar character, distinguishing them from both their European and Asian Imperial forms. By contrast to India many parts of Africa became colonies of white settlement. This meant that the settlers had to define themselves as natural and undisputed masters of vast numbers of Africans. They drew upon European invented traditions both to define and to justify their roles, and also to provide models of subservience into which it was sometimes possible to draw Africans. In Africa, therefore, the whole apparatus of invented school and professional and regimental traditions became much more starkly a matter of command and control than it was within Europe itself. Moreover, in Europe these invented traditions of the new ruling classes were to some extent balanced by the invented traditions of industrial workers or by the invented ‘folk’ cultures of peasants. In Africa, no white agriculturalist saw himself as a peasant. White workers in the mines of southern Africa certainly drew upon the invented rituals of European craft unionism but they did so partly because they were rituals of exclusiveness and could be used to prevent Africans being defined as workers. © E. J. Hobsbawm, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Prys Morgan, David Cannadine, Bernard S. Cohn, Terence Ranger. 1983.

State-building challenges in a post-revolution Libya

Article

Apr 2013

Mohammed El-Katiri

Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) inherited a difficult and volatile domestic situation following the overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi. The new leadership faces serious and simultaneous challenges in all areas of statehood. Libya's key geostrategic position, and role in hydrocarbon production and exportation, means that the course of internal developments there is crucial not only to the Libyan people, but also to neighboring countries both in North Africa and across the Mediterranean in southern Europe. The mitigation or prevention of conditions that could lead to Libya becoming a failing or failed state is of vital importance.In this chapter, United Kingdom-based academic Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri reviews the major challenges to the new Libyan regime, including the continuing role of tribalism and the difficulty posed by the NTC's lack of monopoly on ensuring security in Tripoli and beyond. Key issues of concern to foreign partners when engaging with the new Libyan leadership are highlighted, and a number of policy recommendations are made. Libya's immediate future is of critical importance, and will determine whether the country faces state consolidation or state failure.

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POST-COLONIAL BORDER

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