What is narrativity?

Abstract

In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self‐conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships among these events—a story of how events lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of narrative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly story‐like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narrative explanation and propose a teleological account, according to which narratives consist of goal‐directed explanations of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the concept of “narrative” in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections.

Full text

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Ratio. 2024;37:204–214.
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rati
Received: 20 October 2023
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Revised: 7 Feb ruar y 2024
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Accepted: 10 June 2024
DOI : 10.1111/ra ti.12418
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
What is narrativity?
Nazim Keven
This is an op en access arti cle under the ter ms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License , which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided th e origin al work is p roperly cited and is not used for commercial
purposes.
© 2024 The Aut hor(s). Ratio published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Depar tment of Philosophy, Bilkent
University, Ankara, Turkey
Correspondence
Nazim Keven , Depar tment of Philosophy,
H249, Bilkent Univer sity, Bilke nt, Ankara
0680 0, Turkey.
Email: nazimkeven@bilkent.edu.tr
Abstract
In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained in-
creasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are sto-
rytelling creatures, that stories shape our self- conception,
and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework.
While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative,
it is generally understood to be more than a chronological
listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory
relationships among these events—a story of how events
lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this
explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have
pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions
of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of nar-
rative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is
both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from
being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to
accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly
story- like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narra-
tive explanation and propose a teleological account, accord-
ing to which narratives consist of goal- directed explanations
of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account
of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the
concept of “narrative” in the context of the narrative self by
addressing the most common objections.
KEY WORDS
goal, narrative, narrative explanation, narrative self, plot,
purpose, story, teleological explanation, teleology

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1 | INTRODUCTION
There has been increased interest in narrative accounts of the self in recent years1. Although narrativist views
differ in many ways, there is widespread agreement that human beings typically see, live, or experience their lives
i n vi ew of a la rg e r li fe na rr at iv e o r s t or y. On e of th e ea rl y pr op on en t s of t h e na rr at i ve vi ew , Al as da ir Ma cI nt yr e (1981),
quotes Barbara Hardy with approval: “We dream in narrative, day- dream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope,
despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative” (p. 211). MacIntyre argues
that “man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story- telling animal” (p. 216).
Dennett (1992 a) put s it this way:
We are all virtuoso novelists, who find ourselves engaged in all sor ts of behavior, and we always
try to put the best ‘faces’ on it we can. We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good
story. And that story is our autobiography. The chief fictional character at the center of that auto-
biography is one's self. (p. 114)
Marya Schechtman (1996) argues that constituting an identit y requires conceiving one's life as a story with the form
and logic of a conventional, linear narrative. She maintains that we constitute ourselves as persons by forming a nar-
rative self- conception that guides our experience and organisation of life. Charles Taylor (1992) goes further, arguing
that to determine the direction of our lives, we must inescapabl y unde rstand them in narrative form, as a “quest,” and
see them as a stor y (p. 52). This is an “inescapable structural requirement of human agency” (p. 52).
David Velleman (2005) articulates the relationship bet ween lived and narrated life explicitly, arguing that “an
autobiography and the behaviour that it narrates are mutually determining” (p. 9). He maintains that our ability to
narrate the past is closely tied to our ability to narrate the future and that these prospective narratives influence
subsequent behaviour. We not only narrate our behaviour but also act out of our narratives.
I am a product of my past in many profoundly important respects. No one would deny that. However, the
narrativists make the more interesting claim that one's narrative interpretation of the past is pivotal for self-
understanding and self- control. Thus, what is distinctive about the narrativists' claim is the essential role that nar-
ratives play in constructing a self- conception. According to narrativists, human beings typically unify and organise
their experiences by situating their actions, motivations, desires, goals, values, character traits, and so on in a life
narrative that traces their origins and plots their development. In order to construct a self- conception, one needs
to have an understanding of how the events in one's life hang together in a narrative.
There is much less agreement on what constitutes a narrative. It is generally considered more than just a
chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships a mon g the m— a story of how
the events in one's life lead to other events. However, specifying what that explanatory relationship amounts to
has proven difficult. Note, for instance, that representation in a narrative need not be a conscious representation.
Narrativists would denounce this requirement as too stringent. It is not even clear whether narrative representa-
tion is necessarily linguistic.
One problem with this ambiguit y is that narrativists often resort to a thin notion of narrative when faced with
criticism, as critics have stressed (Christman, 2004; Lamarque, 2004; Strawson, 2004; Zahavi, 2007). For example,
Strawson argues that if someone says that making coffee is a narrative because it involves planning, sequencing,
and so forth and that everyday life is full of such narratives, then the claim is trivial. One can fall prey to the gener-
ality constraint when addressing the triviality constraint. If narratives are defined restrictively based on the con-
ventions of works of literature, many ordinary lives may not qualify as narratives. The concept of narrative must
be defined in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives
and inclusive enough to encompass the ordinary experiences of everyday life.
1See, for e xample MacInt yre (1981), Denn ett (1992), Taylor (199 2), Sc hechtm an (1996), Velleman ( 2005), Hard castle (2008), G oldie (2012)
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In this paper, I ask whether the models of explanation available in the philosophy of science can account for the
explanator y force of narrative. Explanation occupies a prominent place in the philosophy of science, and I cannot
do it justice here (see Woodward & Ross, 2021 for a review). Instead, I focus on a specific t ype of explanation,
namely teleological explanation, and argue that narratives render events intelligible based on goals and purposes,
much like teleological explanations.
It is important to note one caveat. Narratives come in all shapes and forms, from myths, fairy tales, and
fables to avant- garde literary pieces such as Camus's intentionally absurd novel The Stranger or nonlinearly
plotted movies such as Memento and Pulp Fiction. Although a general theory of narrative explanation is
desirable, it may not be possible given its wide variety. In this paper, I will focus on a core form of narratives,
which are usually found in myths, fairy tales, fables, life narratives, and historical narratives. I will not be
concerned with avant- garde novels and movies, as these genres generally react to and modify in one way or
another the core forms of storytelling and are hence difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate within any
general account.
This paper is organised as follows. In the first section, I provide an overview of two accounts of narrative
explanation: causal and emotional theories. In the second section, I argue that narratives offer goal- directed ex-
planations, similar to teleological explanations. In the third and final section, I consider common objections to the
teleological view and show that it can address them all.
2 | NARRATIVE EXPLANATION
Musicians work with notes, painters work with colours, and story tellers work with events. In the contex t of nar-
ratives, an event is a change (McKee, 1997). For example, if you wake up and see that the streets outside your
window are wet, even though they were dry before you went to sleep, you assume that an event has occurred,
such as rain. Events in a narrative are related to each other in a pattern or sequence called a plot. Consider E.M.
Forster's (1956) famous example: “The king died and then the queen died” is a temporal sequence of two events.
“The king died and then the queen died of grief” is a plot. In a temporal sequence of events, we ask, “and then?”
whereas in a plot , we ask, “Why?”. An answer to the question “Why?” is, of course, an explanation. Hence, Forster
conceives the plot as a form of explanation, but what kind of explanation is it?
For Forster and many others, the answer is a causal explanation. The causal view of the plot can be traced back
at least to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, a sequence of event s hangs together in a plot because later events
are necessary or probable consequences of the earlier events. Noel Carroll (2001) provides a modern rendering
of the causal view. Carroll argues that narratives are temporally ordered and pertain to a single subject, but the
narrative connection among events is tighter than mere temporal succession and subject matter. What makes
the connection tight is that earlier events in a narrative are causally necessar y conditions for the occurrence of
later events. Earlier events may not be sufficient to bring about later events because there may be other causes.
However, Carroll maintains, that later events could not have happened without the earlier events. This causal
necessit y provides a tight connection between the narrated events. Carroll suggests that the causal content of
a narrative also underlies it s explanator y potential. Narratives are used to explain how things happened because
they track causal networks.
Emotional accounts of narratives offer an alternative to causal accounts. Velleman (2003) argues that a se-
quence of events qualifies as a story because it has the power to initiate and resolve an emotional cadence in the
audience. In this view, stories are designed to elicit particular emotional responses from the reader. The story
begins with the circumstances that initiate some emotions or sequence of emotions, and it ends when that emo-
tional sequence is brought to a close. For example, a story might begin with a puzzling situation that arouses the
reader's curiosity. The story then develops, resolving the puzzle and satisfying the reader's curiosity. For example,
consider the puzzlement:
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Puzzlement is typically aroused out of the blue—indeed, as a response to out- of- the- blueness—and
it tends to motivate behavior designed to resolve it into the emotions associated with discover y.
The lat ter include horror, which is a temporarily paralyzing emotion that is therefore static and
self- sustaining at first; yet horror eventually gives way to fear, which motivates behavior designed
to resolve it into relief. Thus, horror is by its nature an emotional complication, temporarily delay-
ing a sequence initiated by puzzlement and concluding in the relief of fear. Horror is an emotional
middle, to which puzzlement stands as the beginning and relief as the end. In carrying the audience
through this emotional cadence, a tale displays the structure of what is known as a horror story.
(Velleman, 2003, p. 16)
According to Velleman, stories generally lead their audiences through familiar sequences of emotions, such as the se-
que nce from puzzle ment to cu riosity to forebo ding to dismay to grief. In this way, stories en able th eir audien ces to as-
similate events not to familiar patterns of how things happen, but rather to familiar patterns of how things feel. Story
audiences understand narrated event s because they know how going through such an emotional sequence feels.
Although the idea that story events are bounded by an emotional sequence or cadence is appealing, I am
unsure how far it can go. One immediate concern is that not every emotional sequence is a story. For example,
musical pieces such as symphonies or piano sonatas also have an emotional sequence, even a more distinctive one.
Still, they are not narratives in any ordinar y sense of the term. Of course, this is not an insurmountable problem
for the emotion theorist, who can specify other conditions to obtain, such as the existence of characters, events,
time, and setting, in order to count something as a story besides the emotional sequence.
A more serious concern with emotional account s is their applicabilit y in narrative self- views, as it is unclear
whether they satisfy the generality constraint. Many ever yday stories do not have a tangible emotional sequence.
For example, gossiping about a boss, recounting a day's events to friends, or sharing a past stor y at a family dinner
may not have a clear emotional arc. Moreover, even the life stories of many people would be pretty dull to listen
to and fail to resolve an emotional cadence in any audience, unless the individual had an exceptionally triumphant,
mysterious, or suspenseful life.
To clarify, I do not intend to suggest that these ordinary stories would not elicit any emotional response from
the audience. In other words, I am not claiming that ordinary stories are emotionally neutral. Instead, my claim is
that the events in these stories are not typically sequenced emotionally. Identifying emotional sequences such as
puzzlement, curiosity, foreboding, dismay, and grief in everyday stories about the misdemeanours of a boss, an
ordinar y day at work, or one's time on a college rowing team is challenging. Yet, these ordinary narratives are still
perfectly good candidates for stories.
Emotion theorists might deny that these ordinar y narratives are proper stories, but this would exclude several
stories from consideration. A more plausible response would be to grant that these ordinary narratives are narra-
tives but to deny that they are goo d. According to Brewer and Lichtenstein (1982), a critical aspect of what makes
a stor y good is it s ability to arouse particular emotional responses in the audience. Therefore, emotion theorists
might be correct in claiming these stories are not good. However, even if they are not masterpieces of literature,
these ordinary narratives are still stories. If these ordinary narratives constitute stories even though they lack an
emotional sequence, perhaps emotional sequence is not what binds events together. The emotional theory might
be a bet ter theory about what makes a sequence of events good, pleasurable, or interesting, but not about what
makes a sequence of events a story, i.e., what makes them hang together.
It is helpful to distinguish between the aesthetic and epistemic dimensions of narratives. The aesthetic dimen-
sion concerns the stor y characteristics that make a narrative a good example of its class, i.e., the things that make
a story enjoyable or interesting. Emotional theory is a plausible candidate for explaining the aesthetic dimension
of narratives, as people may find particular stories good, enjoyable, or interesting because of the emotions that
these stories arouse. On the other hand, the epistemic dimension concerns how narrative renders events intelli-
gible. It is related to how narrative segmenting, ordering, and interpreting event s make sense of a chronology that
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is otherwise difficult to make sense of. Emotional understanding can contribute to the epistemic dimension but
cannot fully explain it.
In terms of revealing the epistemic dimension of stories, the motivation behind the causal theory is a step in
the right direction. Narratives connect earlier events to later events in a particular way, rendering them intelligible
as a whole. However, I think the causal theory gets this relationship backwards. According to causal theory, earlier
events are causally necessar y for later event s in a story. I believe that the opposite is true: later events are neces-
sary for the occurrence of earlier events because the relationship between earlier and later events is not causal.
Consider Carroll's example: “Aristarchus hypothesised the heliocentric theory, thereby anticipating Copernicus'
discovery by many centuries.” According to the causal theory of narrative, Aristarchus' anticipation of the he-
liocentric theor y cannot be a story because the earlier event is not causally related to the later event. Carroll,
therefore, bites the bullet and argues that this is not a narrative unless there is a causal line of influence between
Aristarchus' discovery and Copernicus'.
Velleman (2003) is not convinced that there is no story to be told about Aristarchus and Copernicus because of
their mutual isolation in the causality web. He contends that any sequence of events, no matter how improbable,
can provide material for storytelling if it completes an emotional cadence. I share Velleman's suspicion but for dif-
ferent reasons. The story's plot can be made more evident by enforcing the classic third- person omniscient view.
Aristarchus hypothesised the heliocentric theor y, but his views were rejected in favour of the geo-
centric theories of Aristotle and Ptolemy, and he died in despair. Little did he know that he had
anticipated one of the most significant scientific discoveries of many centuries.
Even the sceptic would be hard- pressed to deny that the story of Aristarchus and Copernicus is a story. Similar
stories are often told about misunderstood scientists and artists who were not appreciated in their time. Although
Aristarchus's hypothesis was not accepted in his own time, his efforts were not in vain, as he anticipated an impor tant
discovery. However, the events depicted in the stor y are not causally related.
The causal theory of narrative cannot explain why Aristarchus' anticipation of the heliocentric theory is a
story because Aristarchus could not have causally influenced Copernicus' discovery. However, after Copernicus'
discovery, Aristarchus' hypothesis can be reinterpreted as an anticipation of it. A fic tional connection can then be
ascribed between Copernicus' later discovery and Aristarchus' earlier hypothesis, as if Aristarchus unknowingly
foresaw Copernicus' discovery and there was an intentional link between the two. Intention attribution is a defin-
ing characteristic of narratives, which I will explore in more detail later in this paper.
By their very nature, narratives create a sense of intention by constructing fictional connections between
events that lack an actual causal link in the real world. These fictional connections cannot be causal, because
ordinar y causes cannot function backwards. However, they can be teleological. Teleology is the idea that some
things can be explained by appealing to their purpose or goal. Telos, meaning endpoint, purpose, or goal, was
used by Aristotle to refer to a process that has a very definite goal, a final cause, so to speak. Telos has also been
used to refe r to the termination of an en d- directed proce ss. As May r (1992 ) notes, several philosophers have des-
ignated as teleological any processes that “persist toward an endpoint under var ying conditions.” I use the term
“teleological” in this latter sense. Generally, the terms “purpose” and “goal” are used in functional and behavioural
explanations, respec tively. However, for simplicit y, I will use them interchangeably depending on the context, as
the distinction is not important in the case of narratives.
In teleological explanations, the explanans is always a goal or purpose; the explanandum is the event in ques-
tion. More importantly, the explanandum depends on the explanans such that the former occurs for the latter's
sake. A later event can give meaning to a former event, such as Aristarchus' effor ts becoming meaning ful, con-
sidering Copernicus' discovery. Hence, in teleological explanations, a chronologically later event, i.e., the end
result, is considered an explanation of a chronologically earlier event. Teleological explanations of why an event
occurred asser t that it happened for a second event to occur or produce a particular result. For example, the
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man ran to catch the train. In this case, catching the train is the goal of running. Teleology seeks to answer a
why- did- this- happen question by answering a prior what- is- its- purpose or what- is- its- goal question. To explain
something teleologically is to cite the purpose or goal toward which it naturally tends. Teleological explanations
have a forward- looking character in this sense and tend to reverse the chronological order of events by their logic.
The claim that a sequence of events is teleologically directed toward an end at which point it stops is a sub-
stantive claim that goes beyond the claim that the sequence merely ended at that point. Woodfield (1976 ) argues
that the claim is not only that the earlier events led to the end, but also that there was a force pushing the events
in that direction, such that later events provide an understanding of why the earlier events occurred. In other
words, the later event reveals the purpose of the earlier events and makes them intelligible. Earlier events occur
to achieve a goal, which is revealed by later event s. According to Woodfield, this is the crucial characteristic of
teleological explanations.
A teleological sequence of events differs from a coincidental sequence of events in that the former can be
understood in terms of its purpose or goal, whereas the latter cannot. It also differs from an ordinary causal se-
quence of events, such as a hurricane causing a tree to fall down. In an ordinar y causal sequence, events occur in
accordance with strict causal laws; therefore, if we knew the laws and the initial conditions, we would be able to
predict the outcome. However, this is not enough to make the sequence teleological. In a teleological sequence,
the later events provide an understanding of why the earlier events occurred. In other words, the later event re-
veals the purpose of the earlier events and makes them intelligible.
For example, the hurricane may have caused the tree to fall down, but the hurricane did not blow in order for
the tree to fall down. If the tree had been in a different spot , the hurricane would not have chased it down. This
added goal- directedness marks the difference between teleological sequences and ordinary causal sequences. A
system is considered goal- direc ted if it persists toward an end state under varying conditions. This is known as
equifinality. A goal- directed system shows plasticity in its behaviour in the sense that it makes a series of attempt s
until the goal is achieved. Whereas humans are paradigmatically goal- directed, hurricanes are not.
I propose that narratives provide goal- directed explanations similar to teleological explanations. In narratives,
hurricanes chase down the protagonists, if not trees, and this goal- directedness distinguishes narrative explana-
tions from causal explanations. Narratives organise events into an intelligible whole by interpreting and connect-
ing a series of attempts to achieve a goal. The protagonist's pursuit of a goal under varying conditions exemplifies
equifinality in stories. Narratives begin with events or states that create a goal or introduce a problem for the at-
tainment of an existing goal, and through a sequence of episodes, the protagonist tries to find a way to achieve the
goal. Narratives usually come to an end when the goal is achieved or the protagonist refrains from the goal through
some transformation. Thus, the events in a narrative can be seen as a teleological or goal- directed sequence. In
this sequence, earlier events occur for the sake of some goal and are usually the type of events that bring about
this goal. In the teleological view, a plot consists of a sequence of events connected by goals.
3 | TELEOLOGY: GOALS, PLANS, AND OBSTACLES
According to Labov (2010), when a narrator decides to tell a story, they must solve a fundamental problem: where
to begin. The most remarkable event, say e0, is the most salient, but the narrator cannot start with it. This would
give away the most interesting part of the story from the star t. Instead, to tell a stor y about this salient event, the
narrator must answer the question, “How did this (remarkable) event come about?” The answer requires a shift in
focus back wards in time to a precursor event e1, which is linked to e0. The process will continue recursively e2, e3,
and so on until an ordinary, mundane event en is reached, for which th e question “Why did you do that? ” is absurd
because en is exactly what we would expect the person to do in the situation described. The event en is called the
orientation. Orientation is used to introduce the context, time, and persons involved in the story to come. Labov
gives an example of a narrator telling of a time he was on shore leave in Buenos Aires:
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a. Oh, I was settin’ at a table drinkin’.
The mundane and non- reportable character of the orientation requires a triggering event to set the narrati ve in
motion toward the most remarkable event. Thus, (a) is followed by:
b. an’ this Norwegian sailor come over
c. an’ kep’ givin’ me a bunch o’ junk about how I was sittin’ with his woman
The triggering event initiates a goal for the prot agonist, referred to as the superordinate goal. In L abov's ex-
ample, the superordinate goal is to safeguard the narrator's safety against the sailor's threats. The narrative pro-
gresses toward fulfilling this superordinate goal after being set in motion by the triggering event. While in many
stories, the superordinate goal aligns with the protagonist's objectives, there may be instances where it deviates.
While protagonists often drive the narrative with their own aims, superordinate goals can encompass broader
themes, messages, or arcs that transcend individual characters. For instance, in “The Hunger Games,” Katniss
Everdeen initially aims to save her sister, but the rebellion against the Capitol becomes the overall superordinate
goal. The decision of whether or not to align the superordinate goal with the protagonist's depends on the desired
effect and the type of stor y being told. Both alignment and divergence can produce engaging narratives with
distinc t strengths and complexities.
A narrative moves forward by telling one event af ter another and by approaching or at least seeming to ap-
proach a conclusion to those events, a finish, closure, or telos. In the example above, one of the narrator's friends
saves him just in time before he is at tacked, thereby satisfying the superordinate goal of preser ving his safety.
Events are depic ted insofar as they contribute to satisf ying the superordinate goal. Thus, the superordinate goal
has a pervasive influence on the depiction of story event s.
Many famous stories have superordinate goals. For example, in Macbeth, the Scottish lord commits murder
in order to become king. He continues to commit murders to preserve his kingdom, but his political ambition
ultimately leads to misery and death. Similarly, in Pride and Prejudice, the superordinate goal is to obtain good
marriages for the protagonist and many other characters. Even more recent works of fiction use this core form of
narrative. For example, in The Lord of the Rings, the superordinate goal is to prevent anyone from putting the One
Ring on their finger. In the T V show Breaking Bad, a chemistry teacher who learns he has cancer starts cooking
crystal meth in order to secure his family's future after his death. When the superordinate goal is aligned with
the protagonist's goals, it provides a clear and compelling motivation for the protagonist 's actions and decisions
throughout the narrative. The protagonist's pursuit of the superordinate goal drives the plot forward and shapes
the overall trajec tory of the stor y.
Achieving the superordinate goal of a story typically requires a plan involving subordinate goals. In simple sto-
ries, such as the Norwegian sailor story, the superordinate goal can be achieved through a single attempt, such as a
friend arriving just in time to help. However, more complex stories require the protagonist to devise a plan in order
to achieve their superordinate goal. In Breaking Bad, for example, Walter White teams up with a former student,
Jesse Pinkman, and devises a scheme to become partners in an attempt to combine their skills to manufacture and
distribute the purest crystal meth on the streets. Walter would cook the product, and Jesse would use his street
connections to distribute it.
In a story episode, the protagonist at tempts to achieve his or her current subgoal. If the outcome is unsuccess-
ful, the episode may end, but the protagonist of ten tries again. In other words, goal paths are recursive, meaning
that any number of attempts to achieve the same goal may occur. For instance, during Walter and Jesse's early days
of selling Albuquerque's finest meth, they encountered a series of problems with local drug dealers. Jesse knows
th at Kr a z y- 8 is a drug deal e r in Al buq u erq ue, so they appr oac h him in the ho pes of mak ing a deal . How eve r, Kraz y- 8
attempts to rip them off instead. After their failed business deal with Krazy- 8, Jesse reaches out to another local
crime boss, Tuco Salamanca, to see if he is interested in buying larger quantities of the pair's high- quality meth.
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In this respect, narratives exhibit equifinality. The protagonist's actions are typically equifinal, meaning that the
protagonist can circumvent obstacles. When one route toward a goal is blocked, the protagonist can pursue other
routes to achieve their goals. In fact, many stories develop on the basis of the interplay between the prot agonist's
go als and th e obs tac les th ey fa ce. Th is co nf lic t bet ween go als an d ob s t acl e s dri ves th e sto r y for war d. Th e se ob s t acl e s
can be internal or external. Internal conflict is a struggle within the character, such as a moral dilemma, psychological
conflict, or physical conflict. For example, in The Catcher in the Rye, Holden Caulfield struggles with his identity as a
teenager; in Les Misérables, Jean Valjean struggles with his values; and Macbeth struggles with his desires.
External conflict is a struggle bet ween the protagonist and an out side force, such as another character, a
group of people, nature, or society itself. For example, in Breaking Bad, Walter White struggles against the villain
Gustavo Fring. In The Odyssey, Odysseus struggles against the forces of nature. In To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus
Finch struggles against the racist society of the American South. The stor y progresses as the protagonist struggles
to overcome these obstacles and achieve their superordinate goal.
The teleological view holds that narratives involve protagonists performing actions to overcome obstacles in
pursuit of goals. Many actions, states, and event s described in narratives are related to goals: they are either part
of a goal plan struct ure or form an obstacle to achi eving a goa l. Thu s, a goal plan hi er ar chy is a fundam en ta l or ga n-
isational mechanism for structuring narrated events. Because of their centrality, readers or listeners of a narrative
should be able to infer the connections between goals and other stor y elements to understand it.
The central claim of the teleological view, that story goals provide an organising principle for narratives, is well
supported by empirical evidence. Extensive research in psychology suggests that stor y goals do indeed provide
an organising principle for narratives (Graesser et al., 1994; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Narrative comprehension
is fundamentally rooted in understanding the goals, attempts, and outcomes that drive the narrative forward.
These goal- based structures provide the framework for individuals to interpret and remember the events de-
picted in stories. People make online and offline goal inferences to follow, understand, and remember stories (Suh
& Trabasso 1993). Moreover, developmental studies suggest that understanding goals, attempts, goal failures,
goal reinstatements, and ultimate success leads to children's ability to narrate coherent stories (Berman, 1988;
Stein, 1988; Trabasso & Nickels, 1992).
The teleological and causal views of narrative differ in their understanding of the relationship bet ween events
in a story. The causal view holds that earlier events in a narrative are causally necessary for the occurre nce of later
events. This means the later event s could not have happened without the earlier events, even if there were other
possible causes. The teleological view, on the other hand, denies the claim of counterfactual causal necessity. In
other words, the earlier events in a narrative are typically not causally necessary for the later event s unless there
is only one way to achieve a goal. Therefore, earlier events are contingent on the superordinate goal in the tele-
ological view. This means that the earlier events were not bound to occur, but were instead possible, and there
were other possibilities.
Beatt y (2017) suggests that narratives can be considered branching trees of possibilities. The occurrence
of an event in a narrative opens up the possibility of several different outcomes but also forecloses the possi-
bility of others. These possibilities exist because goals can be achieved via different paths due to equifinality.
Equifinality is the principle that the same outcome can be achieved through different means. In narratives,
the protagonist can achieve a goal in various ways. For example, a protagonist might achieve his or her goal of
becoming a successful entrepreneur by starting their own business or by working for a large corporation and
eventually rising through th e ra nk s. The spe cific pat h that the protagonist takes is less imp or tant than th e fa ct
that they achieve their goal.
The structure of a narrative is not a simple, linear progression of event s, as the causal view would have
us believe. Instead, it is a more complex probabilistic system that includes sequences of event s that can be
divided into different sequences or paths. These sequences represent the different choices the characters in
the narrative could make and the different ways the story could unfold. This complexity is what makes narra-
tives lifelike.
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Narratives explain events by incorporating the human element. They consider the motivations, beliefs, and
values of the people involved and how these factors influence their actions when faced with external conflicts.
Narratives not only explain what the actors did but also foreshadow what they could have done instead. By ex-
plaining a series of events based on the actor's intentions, narratives provide an understanding of why people do
what they do. As Bruner (1986) puts it, narrative “deals with the vicissitudes of human intention” (p. 13).
4 | TRIVIALITY AND GENERALITY CONSTRAINTS RECONSIDERED
According to the teleological view, narrativity is a psychological capacity for explaining event sequences through
interpretation and connection within a goal- plan hierarchy. Thus, narrative explanations involve both action plans
and goals. In this view, a narrative self is defined by the ability to explain one's life through achieved or failed
goals and plans, and by ac tively setting future goals and planning their achievement. While a complete defence is
beyond this paper's scope, I propose that cashing out “narrative” in the narrative self as a teleological explanation
holds promise. This aligns with prominent accounts of agency (e.g., Bratman, 2000) and offers a potential frame-
work for understanding narrativist claims like the common asser tion that future event s determine the meaning of
past events in narratives (Altshuler, 2021). However, further exploration is needed to address potential objec tions
regarding triviality and generality.
One objection to the teleological view is that it trivialises the notion of a narrative if ordinary actions, such as
making coffee, count as narratives. Making coffee is goal- directed action; therefore, at first glance, it may seem
to meet the definition of a narrative according to the teleological view. However, it is essential to distinguish be-
tween goal- directed behaviours, such as making coffee, and goal- directed explanations. Goal- directed behaviours
are actions that are performed to achieve a specific goal. Goal- directed explanations, on the other hand, provide
a deeper understanding of why an action was performed by revealing the actor's mental state and the intentions
behind their actions. According to the teleological view, narratives are goal- directed explanations and, not simply
goal- directed behaviours. This implies that narratives extend beyond mere sequences of actions and incorporate
explanations that delve into the underlying goals and intentions driving those actions. In other words, narratives
are not merely a chronological arrangement of events but a dynamic interplay between events and the motiva-
tions that drive them.
Another sense of triviality is the ease with which humans can construct stories about any ordinary event. Even
though making coffee is a goal- directed behaviour, one can turn it into a story if one wants to. However, the ease
of narrative construction should not be mistaken for evidence of the simplicity of the underlying psychological
process. Narrative construction has a long and protracted developmental trajectory. For example, Trabasso and
Nickels (199 2) showed striking developmental differences in the narrations of younger and older children and
adults. As children develop, they increasingly use hierarchically organised plans in their narrations. Their research
suggests that children's narrations change from predominantly describing states and identifying objects to nar-
rating isolated actions between the ages of 3 and 5 years. They describe actions related to the superordinate
goal, including the subgoals of these attempts. By the age of 9, children and adults narrate according to a goal
plan hierarchy by making connections between subgoals and superordinate goals. This suggests that narrative
construction is a complex psychological capacity that is dif ficult to master.
Does the teleological view of narrative extend to the ordinary experiences of ever yday life? The common
practice of explaining behaviour through goals and intentions suggests that it does. When individuals seek to
comprehend the reasons behind a person's actions, they frequently invoke mental states, encompassing both per-
sonal motivations (e.g., underlying goals or intentions) and contextual factors (e.g., desired outcomes or external
influences). Numerous researchers have proposed that a person's mental states, including beliefs, goals, and in-
tentions, serve as a fundamental framework for understanding and explaining behaviour (Malle & Holbrook, 2012;
Moskowitz & Olcaysoy Okten, 2016; Reeder, 2009). This mentalising framework is not limited to explaining others'
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behaviour; it can also be applied to understand our own actions. For instance, we might explain our decision to
pursue higher education by stating our desire for a quality education and a fulfilling career. We could justif y our
decision to star t a business by expressing our aspiration to be our own boss and make a positive impact on the
world. Our decision to have children might be attributed to our yearning to form a family and nurture future gen-
erations. These explanations fall within the realm of teleological reasoning.
An objector might concede that people reflect on their lives in terms of goals but still contend that many lives
lack the grand, overarching goals often seen in fictional works. This objection overlooks the fact that the purpose
of ordinary life does not require extraordinary achievements. This is where literature and ordinary lives diverge.
Unlike fictional characters, whose lives of ten revolve around grand, overarching goals, the purpose of ordinary
life can be far more modest and attainable, centred on nurturing relationships, contributing to the community,
or pursuing personal passions. Numerous individuals find something that imbues their lives with meaning and
significance, and the paths to achieving this purpose are as diverse as the human experience itself. For instance,
a parent may find fulfilment in nurturing their children, a doctor alleviating suffering, a scientist expanding our
understanding of the universe, and a religious individual ser ving their faith.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, I argued that narratives provide goal- directed explanations similar to teleological explanations. Like
teleological explanations, narratives organise events into an intelligible whole by interpreting and connecting a se-
ries of attempts to achieve a goal. In stories, the protagonist persists toward a goal despite varying conditions and
obstacles. I further suggested that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify
the concept of “narrative” in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections. However,
ultimately, it is up to narrativists to decide whether the teleological view can do the job they want the notion of
“narrative” to do.
ORCID
Nazim Keven https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5368-8265
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How to cite this article: Keven, N. (2024). What is narrativity? Ratio, 37, 204–214. https://doi.o rg /10.1111/
rati .12418
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